Once the order is passed it can be challenged in appeal or revision but not by recall petition - dismissal of recall petition is just and proper. = By order dated 15.09.1997, the executing Court bi- party determined the amount payable to the respondents by the State towards compensation and issued warrants against the judgment-debtor (State) for recovery of the interest amount of Rs.50,000/- and odd as it was found still payable by the State to the respondents due to delay on their part in paying the decreetal sum. It is pertinent to mention that this order was not challenged by the State in higher Courts and hence it attained finality. What was challenged by the State was an order dated 22.10.1997 by which the application made by the State to recall the order dated 15.09.1997 was dismissed by the executing Court. The executing Court was, therefore, justified in rejecting this application by holding that since the order dated 15.09.1997 was not an ex-parte order, it was binding on the State and the same not having been challenged by them had to be given effect to for realization of decreetal amount from the State. The High Court was equally justified in upholding this order of the executing Court by impugned order. What was involved was only the calculation of payment of interest on the decreetal sum for a particular period. In this Court also, learned counsel was unable to show any kind of illegality or perversity in the said calculation made by the executing Court while working out the liability of the State in paying Rs.50,000/- towards interest. Therefore, it was, in our view, a sheer abuse of process on the part of the State to pursue a matter in filing a misconceived appeal against an interim order, which we do not approve. It is unfortunate that a genuine claim of the respondents was not satisfied by the State for such a long time. Be that as it may, we find no merit in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed with cost of Rs. 10,000/- payable to the respondents

                                                              Non-Reportable
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5647 OF 2006



      The Land Acquisition Officer, A.P.                 Appellant(s)


                             VERSUS


      Ravi Santosh Reddy(D) by L.Rs.         Respondent(s)


                       J U D G M E N T



Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

1)    This appeal is filed against the final order dated 13.04.2001  of  the
High Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in C.R.P. No.  928  of
1998 wherein the High Court dismissed the revision filed  by  the  appellant
herein against the order dated 22.10.1997 passed by  the  Subordinate  Judge
at Bhongir, Nalgonda Dist. In E.A. No. 41 of 1997 in E.P. No. 34 of 1993  in
O.P. No.7 of 1987.
2)    Few facts need mention for the disposal of the appeal, which  involves
short point.
3)    The  appellant-State  acquired  53  acres  of  land  pursuant  to  the
notification issued under Section 4(1) of the  Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894
(hereinafter referred to as “the  Act”)  on  11.05.1978.  This  notification
included the land  belonging  to  the  respondents’  predecessors  measuring
around 13 acres 18 guntas situated in Nagireddy village  Palli  in  District
Nalgonda in AP.  It was acquired for the purpose of laying  down  New  Broad
Gauge line.
4)    On 20.03.1980,  the Land Acquisition Officer (LAO)  by his  Award  No.
12  of  1980  divided  the  land  into  three  categories  and  awarded  the
compensation to all the landowners whose lands had been  acquired  including
the respondents’  predecessor  at  the  rate  of  Rs.1100/-,  Rs.1200/-  and
Rs.1700/- per acre respectively.
5)    The respondents’ predecessor  then  filed  reference  in  Civil  Court
(subordinate Judge, Bhongir) under Section 18 of the Act being O.P. No.7  of
1987 for re-determination of the compensation. This reference  was  referred
to Lok Adalat for mutual settlement.
6)    On 07.12.1988, in pursuance of the order passed by   the  Lok  Adalat,
the  subordinate  Judge  at  Bhongir  passed  an  award  and  enhanced   the
compensation payable  to  the  respondents.  In  terms  of  the  award,  the
respondents were entitled to claim a  sum  of  Rs.  6,42,681/-   by  way  of
compensation for his land from the State.
7)    The respondents’ predecessor  then filed the execution petition  being
E.P. No. 34 of 1993 for realization of the entire decreetal amount in  terms
of the said award. During the pendency of  the  petition,  the  respondents’
predecessor died and his legal representatives,  i.e.,  present  respondents
were brought on record.  By order dated 15.09.1997, the executing Court  bi-
party determined the amount payable to the respondents by the State  towards
compensation  and issued warrants against the  judgment-debtor  (State)  for
recovery of  the interest amount of Rs.50,000/- and  odd  as  it  was  found
still payable by the State to the respondents due to delay on their part  in
paying the decreetal sum.  It is pertinent to mention that  this  order  was
not challenged  by  the  State  in  higher  Courts  and  hence  it  attained
finality.
8)    However, the State made an application being E.A. No. 41  of  1997  in
E.P. No. 34 of 1993 seeking to recall the order dated 15.09.1997.  By  order
dated 22.10.1997, the executing court dismissed the said   application  made
by the State.
9)     Felt aggrieved by this  order,  the  State  filed  revision  petition
before the High Court. By impugned  order,  the  High  Court  dismissed  the
revision petition. Against the said order, the State has filed  this  appeal
by way of special leave before this Court.
10)   Heard Ms. Bina Madhavan, learned counsel appearing for the  appellant.
 Despite notice none appeared for the respondents.
11)   Having heard the  learned  counsel  for  the  appellant-State  and  on
perusal of the record of the case, we  find  absolutely  no  merit  in  this
appeal. The impugned order reads as under:
“The only question that arises for  consideration  in  this  CRP  is  as  to
whether the  order  dated  15.09.1997,  passed  in  E.P.  No.  34  of  1993,
directing attachment of the moveables of the  petitioner  should  have  been
recalled.  The order dated 15.09.1997 was passed  after  giving  opportunity
of hearing  to both the parties.  The  application  seeking  recall  of  the
said order was filed on the ground that the decree-holder did not  file  any
calculation memo.
      In the opinion of this Court, as rightly observed by  this  Court,  as
rightly observed by the learned trial Judge, if there is any  error  in  the
order dated 15.09.1997, the same can be rectified by the higher Courts.   As
the learned trial Judge has not exercised his discretion,  this  Court  does
not see any reason to interfere therewith.
      For the reasons aforementioned, the CRP is dismissed.  No costs.”

12)   Mere perusal  of  the  impugned  order  would  go  to  show  that  the
reasoning given by the High Court is just and proper.  As  rightly  held  by
the High Court, the proper remedy available to the State in  this  case  was
to challenge the main order dated  15.09.1997. This order  (15.09.1997)  was
not challenged by the State. It, therefore,  attained finality.
13)   What was challenged by the State was  an  order  dated  22.10.1997  by
which  the  application  made  by  the  State  to  recall  the  order  dated
15.09.1997 was dismissed by the executing Court. The  executing  Court  was,
therefore, justified in rejecting this application  by  holding  that  since
the order dated 15.09.1997 was  not an ex-parte order,  it  was  binding  on
the State and the same not having been challenged by them had  to  be  given
effect to for realization of decreetal  amount  from  the  State.  The  High
Court was equally justified in upholding this order of the  executing  Court
by impugned order.
14)   Though order  dated  15.09.1997  was  never  under  challenge  in  any
proceedings at the instance of the State, yet  we  perused  the  said  order
with a view to find out its  sustainability.  We  find  that  the  executing
Court found that the State was liable to pay a sum  of  Rs.50,000/-  towards
interest due to delayed payment of decreetal sum for  the  period  mentioned
therein. It is for realization of this amount (Rs.50,000/-), the warrant  of
attachment had been issued at the instance of the  respondents  against  the
State properties.
15)   In our considered opinion, the State unnecessarily pursued  this  pity
matter to this Court in this appeal, which does  not  involve  any  arguable
point either on facts or  in  law  nor  it  involves  any  point  of  public
importance and nor  it  involves  any  substantial  money  claim.  What  was
involved was only the calculation of payment of interest  on  the  decreetal
sum for a particular period.   In  this  Court  also,  learned  counsel  was
unable to show any kind of illegality or perversity in the said  calculation
made by the executing Court while working out the liability of the State  in
paying Rs.50,000/-  towards interest. Therefore, it was,   in  our  view,  a
sheer abuse of process on the part of  the  State  to  pursue  a  matter  in
filing a misconceived appeal against an  interim  order,  which  we  do  not
approve. It is unfortunate that a genuine claim of the respondents  was  not
satisfied by the State for such a long time.
16)   Be that as it may, we find no merit in this appeal. It is  accordingly
dismissed with cost of Rs. 10,000/-  payable to the respondents.
17)   The State is directed  to  pay  the  unpaid  decreetal  sum,  if  any,
including the amount,  which  is  the  subject  matter  of  this  litigation
together with the cost amount after proper verification within three  months
from the date of this order.



.……...................................J.
                                     [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]


                     ………..................................J.
                                      [ASHOK BHUSHAN]
      New Delhi,
      May 18, 2016.
-----------------------
9

“(a) Issue a Writ, order or direction in the nature of Mandamus commanding and directing the respondents to accept application for registration and issue Registration Certificate as PTO under Category II for conducting Haj Tour, 2016; Issue a Writ, order or direction in the nature of Mandamus commanding and directing the respondents to consider the right of first registration to the Petitioner for conducting Haj Tour, 2016-2017;

                                                                  Reportable
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                         CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

                        WRIT PETITION NO. 239 OF 2016



      Subhan Tours & Travel Services               Petitioner (s)


                             VERSUS


      Union of India                               Respondent(s)

                             WITH

   WRIT PETITION Nos. 844 & 845 OF 2015, 70, 71 & 72 of 2016, 831 of 2015,
  166, 211, 246, 263, 279, 280,318, 319, 320, 325, 344, 286, 317, 64, 362,
               363, 364,310, 360, 328, 369, 368 & 262 of 2016



                       J U D G M E N T



Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1)    This decision shall dispose of  all  the  writ  petitions  because  as
stated by the learned counsel appearing for  the  parties,  all  these  writ
petitions essentially involve common issues.
2)    These writ  petitions are filed by the writ petitioners under  Article
32 of the Constitution of India for claiming following reliefs.
“(a) Issue a Writ, order or direction in the nature of  Mandamus  commanding
and directing the respondents to accept  application  for  registration  and
issue Registration Certificate as PTO under Category II for  conducting  Haj
Tour, 2016;

Issue a Writ, order or direction in the nature of  Mandamus  commanding  and
directing the respondents to consider the right  of  first  registration  to
the Petitioner for conducting Haj Tour, 2016-2017;

Pass such other and further orders as this Hon’ble Court may  think  fit  in
the interest of justice and equity.”

3)    The writ petitioners  are  private  tour  operators  (PTOs)   who  are
sending pilgrims for Hajj.  According to them, they are duly registered  and
qualified tour operators who have so far undertaken several tours  for  Hajj
successfully in the past and there is nothing against  any  of  them,  which
may debar them from undertaking the similar tour this  year  also  which  is
essentially a tour for the benefit of pilgrims going for Hajj.
4)    It appears from the reading of the  writ  petitions  that  these  writ
petitioners have a grievance based on some kind of apprehension  that  their
applications, if made or those which are pending with  the  authorities  for
grant of permission to undertake Hajj Yatra for the current year  2016,  are
likely  to  be  rejected  or  would  be  rejected   thereby   making   their
apprehension a reality and grievance infructuous.  It  is  essentially  with
this kind of  apprehension  asserted  in  the  writ  petitions,  these  writ
petitions are filed for grant of aforementioned reliefs.
5)      Shri  Neeraj  Kishan  Kaul,  learned  Additional  Solicitor  General
appearing for the respondent-Union of India at the very outset  fairly  made
a statement  that  so  far  no  decision  has  been  taken  on  any  of  the
applications made by these  PTOs  (writ  petitioners)  by  the  authorities.
Learned counsel also stated that let  each  writ  petitioner  make  a  fresh
application for grant of permission with necessary details and documents  as
prescribed latest by 27.05.2016 to the concerned authorities and  each  such
application  once  made  would  be  examined,  considered  and  decided   in
accordance with law on its individual merits by  the  authorities  concerned
and reasoned order would be  passed  on  each  such  application  latest  by
29.06.2016 under intimation to each applicant.
6)     Though  learned  counsel  for  the  writ  petitioners   and   learned
Additional Solicitor General argued the matter with  reference  to  previous
orders passed by this Court on the issues sought to be raised,  we  are  not
inclined to go into any of these questions because as  mentioned  above,  it
is not necessary to go into it at all in the light of the statement made  by
the learned Additional Solicitor General. We, therefore, express no  opinion
on any of the issues.
7)     Learned  counsel  appearing  in  three  writ  petitions  namely  Writ
Petition Nos. 262, 263 and 364 of 2016, however,  made attempt to urge  that
the cases of these three writ petitions involve  some  different  point.  We
have heard the learned counsel and  find  that  at  this  stage  it  is  not
necessary to go into the merits of writ petitions.
8)    In  the  light  of  aforesaid  discussion  and  keeping  in  view  the
statement made  by  the  Additional  Solicitor  General  on  behalf  of  the
respondent-Union of India, we dispose of these  writ  petitions  finally  by
granting liberty to each writ petitioner to make a  fresh  application  with
all the necessary details with the documents  as  prescribed  for  grant  of
permission to take the pilgrims for Hajj for the  year  2016  on  or  before
27.05.2016 to the prescribed authority.
9)    On such application(s)  being  made,  the  concerned  authority  would
examine, consider and decide each such application on its merit strictly  in
accordance with law and keeping in view the law laid down in  the  decisions
of this Court in  Union of India & Ors. vs. Rafique Shaikh  Bhikan  &  Ors.,
2013 (4) SCC 699,   Order dated 07.08.2014 passed in Special Leave  Petition
(c) No. 20743/2014 entitled Union of India & Ors. vs. All  India  Haj  Umrah
Tour Organizers Association & Ors., Order dated 07.08.2014  passed  in  Writ
Petition (civil) No. 480/2014 etc.etc. entitled   Jeddah  Travels  &  Jeddah
Hajj Group vs. Union of India, Order dated 12.05.2015 passed in I.A. No.  33
 of 2015 in Special Leave Petition (c)  No.  28609/2011  entitled  Union  of
India vs. Rafique Sheikh Bhikan and others and  Order  dated  23.07.2015  in
W.P.(civil) No. 344/2015 entitled Alban Hajj  Umrah  Service  vs.  Union  of
India.
10)   Let the applications be decided by the concerned authority by  passing
a reasoned order on each application on or before 29.06.2016 and  the  order
so passed be communicated to each  applicant(writ  petitioner)  immediately.

11)   The writ petitions are disposed of.



.……...................................J.
                                     [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]


                     ………..................................J.
                                      [ASHOK BHUSHAN]
      New Delhi,
      May 18, 2016.


-----------------------
7

This appeal has been filed against the order dated 01.12.2010 of the Division Bench of the High Court of Uttrakhand by which judgment, the writ petition filed by the respondent – Raghunath Singh Rana has been disposed of after quashing the dismissal order dated 01.02.2002. Aggrieved by the judgment, the Chamoli District Co-operative Ltd., is in appeal before this Court.-Appeal is dismissed= From the above decisions, the following principles would emerge: i) The enquiries must be conducted bona fide and care must be taken to see that the enquiries do not become empty formalities. ii) If an officer is a witness to any of the incidents which is the subject matter of the enquiry or if the enquiry was initiated on a report of an officer, then in all fairness he should not be the Enquiry Officer. If the said position becomes known after the appointment of the Enquiry Officer, during the enquiry, steps should be taken to see that the task of holding an enquiry is assigned to some other officer. (iii) In an enquiry, the employer/department should take steps first to lead evidence against the workman/delinquent charged and give an opportunity to him to cross-examine the witnesses of the employer. Only thereafter, the workman/delinquent be asked whether he wants to lead any evidence and asked to give any explanation about the evidence led against him. (iv) On receipt of the enquiry report, before proceeding further, it is incumbent on the part of the disciplinary/punishing authority to supply a copy of the enquiry report and all connected materials relied on by the enquiry officer to enable him to offer his views, if any.”= From the proposition of law, as enunciated by Apex Court as noted above, and the facts of the present case, we arrive at the following conclusions:- (a) After service of charge sheet dated 16.01.1993 although the petitioners submitted his reply on 04.02.1993 but neither Inquiry Officer fixed any date of oral inquiry nor any inquiry was held by the Inquiry Officer. (b) Mandatory requirement of a disciplinary inquiry i.e. is holding of an inquiry when the charges are refuted and serving the inquiry report to the delinquent has been breached in the present case. (c) The employee/respondent No.1 having not been given opportunity to produce his witnesses in his defence and having not been given an opportunity of being heard in person, the statutory provisions as enshrined in Regulation 85 (i)(b), have been violated. (d) The Disciplinary Authority issued show case notice dated 04.05.1993 to the employee/respondent No.1 without holding of an inquiry and subsequent resolution by Disciplinary Authority taken in the year 2000 without their being any further steps is clearly unsustainable. The High Court has rightly quashed the dismissal order by giving liberty to the bank to hold de-novo inquiry within a period of six months, if it so desires. (e) The bank shall be at liberty to proceed with the Disciplinary Inquiry as per directions of the High Court in paragraph (1) of the judgment. The High Court has already held that petitioner shall be deemed to be under suspension and shall be paid suspension allowance in accordance with rules.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                        CIVIL APPEAL  NO.2265 OF 2011


CHAMOLI DISTRICT CO-OPERATIVE BANK LTD.
THROUGH ITS SECRETARY/MAHAPRANDHAK & ANR.            APPELLANT(S)

                                VERSUS

       RAGHUNATH SINGH RANA & ORS.                         RESPONDENT(S)



                               J U D G M E N T

ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.


1.    This appeal has been filed against the order dated 01.12.2010  of  the
Division Bench of the High Court of Uttrakhand by which judgment,  the  writ
petition filed by the respondent – Raghunath Singh Rana  has  been  disposed
of after quashing the dismissal order dated 01.02.2002.   Aggrieved  by  the
judgment, the Chamoli District Co-operative Ltd., is in appeal  before  this
Court.
      The short facts necessary for deciding this appeal are:   the  Chamoli
District  Co-operative  Bank  Ltd.  (hereinafter   referred   to   as   ‘the
appellant/Bank’) is a District Co-operative Bank  registered under the  U.P.
Co-operative Societies Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred  to  as  ‘the  Act’).
The Raghunath Singh Rana, respondent No.1 (hereinafter referred to  as  ‘the
employee/Respondent No.1’) at the relevant time, was  working  as  a  Branch
Manager at Ghat Branch  of  the  Chamoli  District.  A  charge  sheet  dated
03.07.1992 was issued to the employee leveling 19 charges against  him.  The
employee/respondent No.1 was asked to reply upto  3rd  August,  1992.  There
was allegation against the employee/respondent No.1 that  he  made  payments
to the bearers of cheques without its prior collection and made  payment  to
the bearer of the  cheque,  causing  loss  to  the  appellant/Bank.  Further
charges were that he had not taken any action against the persons  concerned
and had thus committed serious irregularities. Another set of  charges  were
imputation  that  the  respondent–employee   has   issued   overdrafts/loans
against the provision of the Act.

2.          The employee/respondent No.1 submitted  a  reply  on  31.07.1992
denying the allegations. On 05.8.1992, an Inquiry Officer was  appointed  to
conduct the  inquiry.  The  Inquiry  Officer  also  submitted  a  report  on
21.09.1992. The employee/respondent No.1  was  placed  under  suspension  by
order dated 21.10.1992. No further steps were taken on  the  inquiry  report
dated 21.09.1992. However, a  fresh  charge  sheet  containing  the  charges
which were levelled in the charge sheet dated  03.07.1992  as  well  as  six
additional charges was issued on 16.01.1993.  The  employee/respondent  No.1
submitted  a  reply  dated  04.02.1993  to  the  charge  sheet  denying  the
allegations. After submission of the reply by the employee/respondent  No.1,
a show-cause notice was  issued  to  the  petitioner  by  the  District  Co-
operative Bank Ltd. dated 04.05.1993 asking the employee/respondent No.1  to
submit a reply, failing which action under Regulation 84  of  the  U.P.  Co-
operative Societies Employees  Service  Regulations  Act,  1975  was  to  be
taken. The Disciplinary Authority passed a Resolution dated 11.07.2000  that
charges against the employee/respondent No.1 have been  proved  and  further
action  to  be  taken.  The  Disciplinary  Authority  passed  an  order   on
01.02.2002, dismissing the employee/respondent No.1 with  immediate  effect.
Aggrieved by dismissal order, writ  petition  was  filed  by  the  employee-
respondent No.1  praying  for  quashing  the  order  dated  01.02.2002  with
further prayer that employee/respondent No.1 be reinstated in  service  with
full back wages and salary.

3.          The employee/respondent No.1's case in  the  writ  petition  was
that  after  receipt  of  the  charge  sheet  dated  18.01.1993,  reply  was
submitted by the employee but without holding an inquiry,  the  Disciplinary
Authority took a decision to dismiss the petition.   No  Inquiry  have  been
held as provided by statutory regulations,  hence,  the  entire  proceedings
are liable to be set aside.

4.          The  appellant-Bank  filed  a  counter  affidavit  in  the  writ
petition. In the counter affidavit no inquiry report  subsequent  to  charge
sheet dated 18.01.1993 was referred to.

5.          The Division Bench of the High Court heard the matter  and  vide
judgment dated 01.12.2010 quashed the dismissal order.  The  Division  Bench
took the view that dismissal orders have  been  passed  without  holding  an
inquiry which deserves to be set aside.

6.           Learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for   the   appellant-Bank
contends that Inquiry Officer had issued a letter dated  11.09.1992  to  the
employee/respondent No.1 asking the employee/respondent No.1  to  appear  on
18.09.1992 at 10.00 AM, but employee/respondent No.1  failed  to  appear  in
the inquiry, hence, the view of the High court that no inquiry was  held  is
not correct. He further submits that inquiry  report  dated  21.09.1992  was
submitted by the Inquiry  Officer  which  has  been  brought  on  record  as
Annexure P3.  Learned counsel for the appellant-Bank  further  submits  that
there were serious allegations against the employee/respondent No.1  on  the
basis of which the employee/respondent No.1 was dismissed from service.

7.          It is further contended  that  First  Information  Reports  have
been lodged against the employee/respondent  No.1  and  criminal  cases  are
pending.

8.          We have considered the submissions and perused the record.

9.          The statutory  regulations  have  been  framed  under  the  Act,
namely, U.P. Co-operative Societies  Employees  Service  Regulations,  1975,
which regulations are applicable with regard to the conduct of  Disciplinary
enquiry against the employee/respondent No.1 and where governing  the  field
at the relevant time. Regulation 84, Chapter-VII  of  the  Regulation  deals
with Penalties, Regulation  85  deals  with  Disciplinary  proceedings,  and
Regulation  86  deals  with  Appeal.  Regulation  85    which   deals   with
Disciplinary proceedings, is as follows:-
“85.  Disciplinary Proceedings.-

(i)   The disciplinary proceedings against an employee  shall  be  conducted
by the Inquiring Officer  (referred  to  in  clause  (iv)  below)  with  due
observance of the principles of  natural  justice  for  which  it  shall  be
necessary -

(a)   The employee shall be served with a charge-sheet  containing  specific
charges and mention of evidence in support of each charge and  he  shall  be
required to submit explanation in respect of the charges  within  reasonable
time which shall not be less than fifteen days;

(b)   Such an employee shall also be given an opportunity to produce at  his
own cost or to cross-examine witnesses in his  defence  and  shall  also  be
given an opportunity of being heard in-person, if he so desires;

(c)   If no explanation in respect  of  charge  sheet  is  received  or  the
explanation submitted is unsatisfactory, the competent authority  may  award
him appropriate punishment considered necessary.

(ii)(a) Where an employee is  dismissed  or  removed  from  service  on  the
ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or

(b)   Where the employee has absconded and his whereabouts are not known  to
the society for more than three months; or

(c)   Where the employee  refuses  or  fails  without  sufficient  cause  to
appear before  the  Inquiring  Officer  when  specifically  called  upon  in
writing to appear; or

(d)   Where it is otherwise (for reasons to be  recorded)  not  possible  to
communicate  with  him,  the  competent  authority  may  award   appropriate
punishment without taking or continuing disciplinary proceedings.

(iii) Disciplinary proceedings shall be taken by  the  society  against  the
employee on a report made to this effect by the inspecting authority  or  an
officer of the society under whose control the employee is working.

(iv)  The inquiring officer shall be appointed by the  appointing  authority
or by  an  officer  of  the  society  authorised  for  the  purpose  by  the
appointing authority:

            Provided that the officer at whose instance disciplinary  action
was started shall not be appointed as an inquiring  officer  nor  shall  the
inquiring officer be the appellate authority.

            ….......”

10.   From the facts, as noted above, it is clear that  charge  sheet  dated
03.07.1992 was issued to the employee/respondent No.1 to which he  submitted
a reply on 31.07.1992.  Inquiry  report  dated  21.09.1992  was  issued  and
submitted. However, without proceeding any  further  on  the  basis  of  the
inquiry report dated 21.09.1992, a fresh charge sheet dated  18.01.1993  was
issued  to  the  employee/respondent  No.1  containing   24   charges.   The
employee/respondent No.1 was asked to submit a reply within 15  days.  Reply
to the subsequent charge sheet was again filed  by  the  employee/respondent
No.1  on  04.02.1993.  The  second  charge  sheet  having  been  issued   on
18.01.1993 which included all  the  charges  which  were  contained  in  the
earlier charge sheet, the earlier proceedings  consequent  to  charge  sheet
dated 03.07.1992 stood abandoned.  The  appellant-Bank  decided  to  proceed
with  the  Disciplinary  Inquiry  on  the  basis  of  charge   sheet   dated
18.01.1993. After  18.01.1993  charge  sheet  reply  was  submitted  by  the
employee/respondent No.1 on 04.02.1993 but  there  is  no  material  on  the
record  brought  by  the  appellant-Bank   indicating   that   any   inquiry
proceedings were conducted.

11.   It is relevant to  note  that  in  the  writ  petition  filed  by  the
employee/respondent No.1, specific averments  were  made  that  disciplinary
proceedings against  him  were  conducted  in  violation  of  principles  of
natural justice and against  the  procedure  prescribed  in  Regulation  85,
which averments were made in  paragraphs 19 and 25 of the writ petition,  to
the following effect:-
“19.  That since the whole of the procedure adopted  in  conducting  of  the
disciplinary proceeding is against the  principle  of  natural  justice  and
procedure mention in regulation 85, In fact, no inquiry worth  to  name  has
been conducted by the respondents. The so called inquiry  was  a  mere  eye-
wash. It is a farce  and  fraud  played  on  the  statutory  rights  of  the
petitioner.”


25.   That the disciplinary proceeding held against the petitioner  was  not
conducted  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  natural  justice   and
procedure prescribed under the Regulations of 1975. Serious objections  were
raised by the petitioner through his replies  dated  31.07.1993,  04.02.1993
and 21.03.1993 but no heed  was  given  to  the  objections  raised  by  the
petitioner. Once the charge sheet has been issued to the petitioner,  second
charge sheet cannot be sent by the Inquiry Officer in the same  disciplinary
proceeding. But this objections was  also  not  considered  by  the  Inquiry
Officer or disciplinary authority. After the reply dated 04.02.1993  to  the
charge-sheet dated 18.01.1993, no inquiry was held by the  Inquiry  Officer.
Instead of holding the  inquiry  in  accordance  with  the  provisions,  the
disciplinary authority sent the letter  dated  04.05.1993  saying  that  the
charges  were  proved  against  the  petitioner.   Between   18.01.1993   to
04.05.1993 no inquiry was held and the petitioner was never called  upon  to
cross examine the witnesses. No records or documents  which  the  petitioner
has requested to inspect were summon or made available  to  the  petitioner.
Even these documents were  not  available  to  the  petitioner.  Even  those
documents were not inspected or considered  by  the  disciplinary  authority
and inquiry officer. The way the Disciplinary Proceeding were  conducted  it
cost serious doubt and aspersion against the respondents.  It  appears  that
before the conduct of the inquiry the respondents made up their mind to  get
rid of the petitioner and for that reason they have  conducted  the  inquiry
in  such  a  perfunctory  manner,   which   is   not   known   to   services
jurisprudence.”


12.   In the counter affidavit, the averments made in paragraph  19  and  25
were replied by the appellant-Bank in paragraph 18 and 24, which are to  the
following effect:-
“18.  That in reply to the  contents  of  para  nos.18  &  19  of  the  writ
petition it is submitted that the grounds on which the charges  issued  were
found proved was supplied to the petitioner vide letter  no.251-52  annexure
no.7 to the writ petition, instead of a copy  of  the  enquiry  report.  The
letter of charges serves the purpose  of  an  enquiry  report.  That  it  is
incorrect to say that no reasonable opportunity was given to the  petitioner
by the Inquiry Officer a letter dated  6-1-93  Annexure  No.5  to  the  writ
petition was sent to the petitioner to know whether he wanted to  be  cross-
examined by his  witnesses,  but  the  petitioner  did  not  want  any  such
opportunity. Further, the petitioner  was  directed  to  appear  before  the
committee of management in person, but he did not  appear  at  all.  Another
opportunity was given as per resolution no.14  dated  25.11.1993  which  was
also not available by him. Petitioner was  again  given  an  opportunity  to
appear before the committee on 3-8-2000 Annexure No.10 to the writ  petition
to explain his case personally, but he did  not  appear.  It  is  therefore,
totally false to say that no opportunity of being heard  was  given  to  the
petitioner. Copy  of  the  resolution  no.14  dated  25.11.1993  is  annexed
herewith and is marked as Annexure No. CA.5 to this counter affidavit.”


24.   That the contents of para nos.25, 26, 27 & 28  of  the  writ  petition
are denied. It is incorrect to say that the second charge sheet dated  18-1-
93 was sent in the same disciplinary proceedings as a matter  of  fact  this
was the first and the  only  chargesheet  issued.  Disciplinary  proceedings
were initiated on 21.10.92 and, therefore, charge sheet was  issued  to  the
petitioner on 18.1.93 to which reply was  submitted  by  the  petitioner  on
4.2.93. It is wrong to allege that records were not made  available  to  the
petitioner as the petitioner did not want to refer to any record and he  did
not make any request even during the course of the cross examination of  the
witness. It is further  incorrect to state that opportunity  was  not  given
to the petitioner. That the answering respondent is justified  a  dismissing
the  services  of  the  petitioner   as   heavy   loss   of   Rs.35,00,000/-
approximately  was  caused  to  the  bank,  exceeding  all  his  powers  and
overlooking all the  norms  laid  down  by  the  bank  in  making  unsecured
advances  to  various  customers/parties.  Therefore,  the  order   of   the
respondents dismissing the services of the petitioner is lawful and  in  the
interest of justice and the writ petition of the petitioner is liable to  be
dismissed on this ground alone.”

13.   As noted above, learned counsel for the  appellant/Bank  has  referred
to the letter issued by the Inquiry Officer dated  11.09.1992,  calling  the
employee/respondent  No.1  to  appear  before   the   Inquiry   Officer   on
18.09.1992.  The  inquiry  report  dated  21.09.1992  mentioned   that   the
employee/respondent No.1 did  not  appear,  hence  the  inquiry  report  was
submitted.  The  letter  dated  11.09.1992  and  the  inquiry  report  dated
21.09.1992 looses all its importance when the bank decided to issue a  fresh
charge  sheet  on  18.11.1993  which  includes  all  earlier  charges.   The
petitioner submitted  a  reply  on  04.02.1993  but  thereafter  no  inquiry
proceeding seems to have taken place. The employee/respondent  No.1  made  a
specific complaint that inquiry proceeding has not been held  and  there  is
violation of Regulation 85.  No  specific  reply  have  been  made,  by  the
appellant/bank referring  to  any  inquiry  proceeding  before  the  Inquiry
Officer or the date of any inquiry.

14.   As noted above, Regulation 85 is a statutory Regulation  according  to
which an opportunity to the employee to produce at his own cost or to cross-
examine witnesses in his defence and shall also be given an  opportunity  of
being  heard  in  person,  if  he  so  desires.  Regulation  85  (i)(b)   is
specifically mandates the said requirements.

15.   From the pleadings and the materials on record, it is  clear  that  no
inquiry was conducted by the appellant/Bank in  conformity  with  Regulation
85 (i)(b) after issuance of charge sheet dated 16.01.1993.  The  High  Court
has set aside the dismissal  order  after  coming  to  the  conclusion  that
without holding an inquiry the employee/respondent No.1 has been  dismissed.
No materials have been brought in the appeal to indicate  that  any  inquiry
was conducted or inquiry report  was  submitted  subsequent  to  the  charge
sheet dated 16.01.1993.

16.   Learned counsel for the  appellant/Bank  has  submitted  that  in  the
Resolution passed by the Disciplinary  Authority  that  inquiry  report  has
been mentioned.

17.   Imposing of any penalty on an employee of  the  bank  that  too  major
penalty of dismissal from service can  only  be  done  after  following  the
statutory provisions governing the disciplinary proceedings.

18.   It is also relevant to note  that  after  submission  of  reply  dated
04.02.1993, Disciplinary Authority issued a show-cause notice on  04.05.1993
asking the employee/respondent No.1 to submit his reply.  When  the  Inquiry
Officer was appointed, conducting of the inquiry was mandatory  and  without
conducting of an inquiry and without any inquiry report having  been  served
on the employee/respondent  No.1,  Disciplinary  Authority  could  not  have
proceeded to   impose  any  punishment.  The  compliance  of  principles  of
natural justice by the appellant-Bank is not a mere formality, more so  when
the   statutory   provisions   specifically   provides   that   disciplinary
proceedings shall be conducted with due observations of  the  principles  of
natural justice.

19.   The compliance of natural justice in domestic/disciplinary inquiry  is
necessary has long been established. This Court has  held  that  even  there
are no specific statutory rule requiring observance of natural justice,  the
compliance of natural justice is necessary. Certain  ingredients  have  been
held to be constituting integral part of holding of  an  inquiry.  The  Apex
Court in Sur Enamel and Stamping Works Pvt. Ltd. v. Their  Workmen  reported
in (1964) 3 SCR 616 has laid down following:-
“... An enquiry cannot be said to have been properly held  unless,  (i)  the
employee  proceeded  against  has  been  informed  clearly  of  the  charges
levelled against him, (ii) the witnesses are examined –  ordinarily  in  the
presence of the employee – in respect of the charges, (iii) the employee  is
given a fair opportunity to cross-examine witnesses,  (iv)  he  is  given  a
fair opportunity to examine witnesses including himself in  his  defence  if
he so wishes on any relevant matter, and (v)  the  inquiry  officer  records
his findings with reasons for the same in his report.”


20.   The Apex Court again in State Bank of India Vs. R.K.  Jain  and  Ors.,
reported in (1972) 4 SCC  304  held  that  if  an  inquiry  is  vitiated  by
violation of principles of natural justice or if no  reasonable  opportunity
was  provided  to  the  delinquent  to  place  his  defence,  it  cannot  be
characterized as a proper domestic  inquiry  held  in  accordance  with  the
rules of natural justice. In paragraph 23, the following was laid down:-
“......As emphasised by this Court in Ananda Bazar Patrika (P) Ltd.  v.  Its
Workmen, (1964) 3 SCR 601, the termination of an employee's service must  be
preceded by a proper domestic inquiry held in accordance with the  rules  of
natural justice. Therefore, it is evident that if the  inquiry  is  vitiated
by violation of the principles  of  natural  justice  or  if  no  reasonable
opportunity was provided to a delinquent to place his defence, it cannot  be
characterized as a proper domestic  inquiry  held  in  accordance  with  the
rules of natural justice......”

21.   The Apex Court  in  State  of  Uttranchal  &  Ors.  Vs.  Kharak  Singh
reported in (2008) 8 SCC 236 had occasion to  examine  various  contours  of
natural justice which need to be specified in a  departmental  inquiry.  The
Apex Court noticed earlier judgments where principles were laid down  as  to
how inquiry is to be conducted. It is useful to refer paragraphs 9, 10,  11,
12, 13 and 15, which are to the following effect:-
“…..9. Before analyzing the correctness of  the  above  submissions,  it  is
useful to refer various principles  laid  down  by  this  Court  as  to  how
enquiry is to be conducted and which procedures are to be followed.

10. The following observations and principles laid down  by  this  Court  in
Associated Cement Co. Ltd. vs. The Workmen and Anr. [1964]  3  SCR  652  are
relevant:
"... ... In the present case, the first serious  infirmity  from  which  the
enquiry suffers proceeds from the  fact  that  the  three  enquiry  officers
claimed that they themselves had witnessed the alleged misconduct  of  Malak
Ram. Mr. Kolah contends that if the  Manager  and  the  other  officers  saw
Malak  Ram  committing  the  act  of  misconduct,  that  itself  would   not
disqualify them from holding the domestic enquiry. We are  not  prepared  to
accept this argument. If  an  officer  himself  sees  the  misconduct  of  a
workman, it is desirable that the enquiry should be left to be held by  some
other person who does not claim to  be  an  eye-  witness  of  the  impugned
incident. As we have  repeatedly  emphasised,  domestic  enquiries  must  be
conducted honestly and bona fide  with  a  view  to  determine  whether  the
charge framed against a particular employee is proved or not, and  so,  care
must be taken to see that these enquiries do not become  empty  formalities.
If an officer claims  that  he  had  himself  seen  the  misconduct  alleged
against an employee, in fairness steps should be taken to see that the  task
of holding an enquiry is assigned to some other officer. How  the  knowledge
claimed by the enquiry officer can vitiate the  entire  proceedings  of  the
enquiry is illustrated by the present enquiry itself. ... .....

            ..... It is necessary to emphasise that in  domestic  enquiries,
the employer should take steps first to lead evidence  against  the  workman
charged, give an opportunity  to  the  workman  to  cross-examine  the  said
evidence and then should the workman be asked whether he wants to  give  any
explanation about the evidence led against him. It seems to us  that  it  is
not fair in domestic enquiries against  industrial  employees  that  at  the
very commencement of the enquiry, the  employee  should  be  closely  cross-
examined even before any other evidence is led against him. In dealing  with
domestic enquiries held in such industrial matters, we cannot  overlook  the
fact that in  a  large  majority  of  cases,  employees  are  likely  to  be
ignorant, and so, it is necessary not to expose them to the risk  of  cross-
examination in the  manner  adopted  in  the  present  enquiry  proceedings.
Therefore, we are satisfied that Mr. Sule is right in  contending  that  the
course adopted in the present enquiry proceedings by  which  Malak  Ram  was
elaborately cross-examined at the outset constitutes  another  infirmity  in
this enquiry."

11) In ECIL v. B. Karunakar (1993) 4 SCC 727, it was held:

 "(1) Where the enquiry officer is other than  the  disciplinary  authority,
the disciplinary proceedings break into two stages.  The  first  stage  ends
when the disciplinary authority arrives at its conclusions on the  basis  of
the evidence, enquiry officer's report and the delinquent  employee's  reply
to it. The second stage begins when the disciplinary  authority  decides  to
impose penalty  on  the  basis  of  its  conclusions.  If  the  disciplinary
authority decides to drop the disciplinary proceedings, the second stage  is
not even reached.

While the right to represent against the findings in the report is  part  of
the reasonable opportunity available during the first stage of  the  inquiry
viz.,  before  the  disciplinary  authority  takes  into  consideration  the
findings in the  report,  the  right  to  show  cause  against  the  penalty
proposed belongs to the second stage when  the  disciplinary  authority  has
considered the findings in the report and has come to  the  conclusion  with
regard to the guilt of the employee and proposes to  award  penalty  on  the
basis of its conclusions. The first right is the right to  prove  innocence.
The second right is to plead for either  no  penalty  or  a  lesser  penalty
although the conclusion regarding the guilt is accepted. It  is  the  second
right exercisable at the second stage which was taken  away  by  the  Forty-
second Amendment. The second stage consists of the issuance  of  the  notice
to show cause against the proposed penalty and of considering the  reply  to
the notice and deciding upon the penalty. What  is  dispensed  with  is  the
opportunity of making representation on the  penalty  proposed  and  not  of
opportunity of making representation on the report of the  enquiry  officer.
The latter right was always there. But before the Forty-second Amendment  of
the Constitution, the point of time at which it  was  to  be  exercised  had
stood deferred till the second stage viz.,  the  stage  of  considering  the
penalty. Till that time, the conclusions  that  the  disciplinary  authority
might have arrived at both with regard to the guilt of the employee and  the
penalty to be imposed were only tentative. All that has happened  after  the
Forty-second Amendment of the Constitution is to advance the point  of  time
at which the representation of the employee against  the  enquiry  officer's
report would be considered. Now, the disciplinary authority has to  consider
the representation of the employee against the report before it  arrives  at
its conclusion with regard to his guilt  or  innocence  in  respect  of  the
charges.

                                    * * *

Article  311(2)  says  that  the  employee  shall  be  given  a  "reasonable
opportunity of being heard in respect  of  the  charges  against  him".  The
findings on the charges given by a third person like  the  enquiry  officer,
particularly when they are not borne out by the evidence or are  arrived  at
by  overlooking  the  evidence  or  misconstruing   it,   could   themselves
constitute new unwarranted imputations. The proviso  to  Article  311(2)  in
effect accepts two successive stages of differing scope. Since  the  penalty
is to be proposed after the inquiry,  which  inquiry  in  effect  is  to  be
carried out by the disciplinary authority (the enquiry  officer  being  only
his delegate  appointed  to  hold  the  inquiry  and  to  assist  him),  the
employee's reply to the enquiry officer's report and consideration  of  such
reply by the disciplinary authority also  constitute  an  integral  part  of
such inquiry.

             Hence,  when  the  enquiry  officer  is  not  the  disciplinary
authority, the delinquent employee has a right to  receive  a  copy  of  the
enquiry officer's report before the disciplinary authority  arrives  at  its
conclusions with regard to the guilt  or  innocence  of  the  employee  with
regard to the charges levelled against him. That right  is  a  part  of  the
employee's right to defend himself  against  the  charges  levelled  against
him. A denial of  the  enquiry  officer's  report  before  the  disciplinary
authority takes its decision on the  charges,  is  a  denial  of  reasonable
opportunity to the employee to prove his innocence and is a  breach  of  the
principles of natural justice.”

12) In Radhey Shyam Gupta vs. U.P. State 1Agro Industries  Corporation  Ltd.
and Another, (1999) 2 SCC 2, it was held:

"34. But in cases where the  termination  is  preceded  by  an  enquiry  and
evidence is received and findings as to misconduct of  a  definitive  nature
are arrived at behind the back of the officer and  where  on  the  basis  of
such a report, the termination order  is  issued,  such  an  order  will  be
violative of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as  the  purpose  of
the enquiry is to find out the truth of  the  allegations  with  a  view  to
punish  him  and  not  merely  to  gather  evidence  for  a  future  regular
departmental enquiry. In such cases, the termination is  to  be  treated  as
based or founded upon misconduct and will be punitive. These  are  obviously
not cases where the employer feels that there is a mere  cloud  against  the
employee's conduct but are cases where the employer has  virtually  accepted
the definitive and clear findings of the  enquiry  officer,  which  are  all
arrived at behind the back of the employee -- even  though  such  acceptance
of findings is not recorded in the order of termination.  That  is  why  the
misconduct is the foundation and not merely the motive in such cases."

13) In Syndicate Bank and Others vs. Venkatesh Gururao Kurati, (2006) 3  SCC
150, the following conclusion is relevant:



"18. In our view, non-supply of documents on which the enquiry officer  does
not rely during the course of enquiry does not create any prejudice  to  the
delinquent. It is only  those  documents,  which  are  relied  upon  by  the
enquiry officer to arrive at his conclusion, the non-supply of  which  would
cause prejudice, being violative of  principles  of  natural  justice.  Even
then,  the  non-supply  of  those  documents  prejudice  the  case  of   the
delinquent officer must be established by  the  delinquent  officer.  It  is
well-settled law that the doctrine of principles of natural justice are  not
embodied rules. It cannot be put in a straitjacket formula. It depends  upon
the facts and circumstances of each  case.  To  sustain  the  allegation  of
violation  of  principles  of  natural  justice,  one  must  establish  that
prejudice has been  caused  to  him  for  non-observance  of  principles  of
natural justice."

15.   From the above decisions, the following principles would emerge:

i) The enquiries must be conducted bona fide and care must be taken  to  see
that the enquiries do not become empty formalities.

ii) If an officer is a witness to any of the incidents which is the  subject
matter of the enquiry or if the enquiry was initiated  on  a  report  of  an
officer, then in all fairness he should not be the Enquiry Officer.  If  the
said position becomes known after the appointment of  the  Enquiry  Officer,
during the enquiry, steps should be taken to see that the  task  of  holding
an enquiry is assigned to some other officer.

(iii) In an enquiry, the employer/department  should  take  steps  first  to
lead  evidence  against  the  workman/delinquent   charged   and   give   an
opportunity to him to cross-examine the  witnesses  of  the  employer.  Only
thereafter, the workman/delinquent be asked whether he  wants  to  lead  any
evidence and asked to give any explanation about the  evidence  led  against
him.

(iv)    On receipt of the enquiry report, before proceeding  further,     it
    is    incumbent     on    the  part    of    the  disciplinary/punishing
authority to  supply  a  copy  of  the  enquiry  report  and  all  connected
materials relied on by the enquiry  officer  to  enable  him  to  offer  his
views, if any.”



22.   From the proposition of law, as enunciated  by  Apex  Court  as  noted
above, and the facts of  the  present  case,  we  arrive  at  the  following
conclusions:-

(a)    After  service  of  charge  sheet  dated  16.01.1993   although   the
petitioners submitted his reply on 04.02.1993 but  neither  Inquiry  Officer
fixed any date of oral inquiry nor any  inquiry  was  held  by  the  Inquiry
Officer.

(b)   Mandatory requirement of a disciplinary inquiry i.e. is holding of  an
inquiry when the charges are refuted and serving the inquiry report  to  the
delinquent has been breached in the present case.

(c)   The employee/respondent No.1 having  not  been  given  opportunity  to
produce  his  witnesses  in  his  defence  and  having  not  been  given  an
opportunity of being heard in person, the statutory provisions as  enshrined
in Regulation 85 (i)(b), have been violated.

(d)   The Disciplinary Authority issued show case  notice  dated  04.05.1993
to  the  employee/respondent  No.1  without  holding  of  an   inquiry   and
subsequent resolution by Disciplinary  Authority  taken  in  the  year  2000
without their being any further steps is clearly  unsustainable.   The  High
Court has rightly quashed the dismissal order by giving liberty to the  bank
to hold de-novo inquiry within a period of six months, if it so desires.

(e)   The bank shall be at liberty to proceed with the Disciplinary  Inquiry
as per directions of the High Court in paragraph (1) of  the  judgment.  The
High Court has already held that petitioner shall  be  deemed  to  be  under
suspension and shall be paid suspension allowance in accordance with rules.

23.   In view of the foregoing  discussion  and  our  conclusion,  as  noted
above, we do not find any merit in this appeal. In the  result,  the  appeal
is dismissed.


                                           ....................J.
                                             (ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE)


NEW DELHI                             ....................J.
MAY 17, 2016                          (ASHOK BHUSHAN)

Territorial - Jurisdiction - Claim Petition filed where the Insurance Company doing business =Section 21 CPC, objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction could not be entertained in absence of any prejudice. = “With reference to objections relating to territorial jurisdiction, Section 21 of the Civil Procedure Code enacts that no objection to the place of suing should be allowed by an appellate or revisional court, unless there was a consequent failure of justice. It is the same principle that has been adopted in Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act with reference to pecuniary jurisdiction. The policy underlying Sections 21 and 99 CPC and Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is the same, namely, that when a case had been tried by a court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in failure of justice, and the policy of the legislature has been to treat objections to jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as technical and not open to consideration by an appellate court, unless there has been a prejudice on the merits. The contention of the appellants, therefore, that the decree and judgment of the District Court, Monghyr, should be treated as a nullity cannot be sustained under Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act.’

Territorial - Jurisdiction - Claim Petition filed where the Insurance Company doing business = “With reference to objections relating to territorial jurisdiction, Section 21 of the Civil Procedure Code enacts that no objection to the place of suing should be allowed by an appellate or revisional court, unless there was a consequent failure of justice. It is the same principle that has been adopted in Section 11  of the Suits Valuation Act with reference to pecuniary jurisdiction. The policy underlying Sections 21 and 99 CPC and Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is the same, namely, that when a case had been tried by a court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in failure of justice, and the policy of the legislature has been to treat objections to jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as technical and not open to consideration by an appellate court, unless there has been a prejudice on the merits. The contention of the appellants, therefore, that the decree and judgment of the District Court, Monghyr, should be treated as a nullity cannot be sustained under Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act.’

Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10 OF 2016 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.27243 OF 2015) MALATI SARDAR …PETITIONER VERSUS NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED & ORS. ...RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J. 1. Leave granted. The question raised in this appeal is whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the award of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kolkata only on the ground that the Tribunal did not have the territorial jurisdiction. 2. On 7th May, 2008, the deceased Diganta Sardar, aged 26 years, a school teacher, unmarried son of the appellant was hit by Bus No.WB/15-A-4959 insured with the respondent company at Hoogly, in the State of West Bengal and died. He was travelling on motor cycle of his colleague, Uttam Samui as a pillion rider. The appellant filed an application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, Page 2 SLP (C) No.27243 of 2015 1988 (“the Act”) for compensation before the Tribunal at Kolkata. 3. Rash and negligent driving by the driver of the bus having been established, the Tribunal, applying the multiplier of 13 on account of age of the appellant being 47 years, and taking into account the income of the deceased and other relevant factors, fixed compensation of Rs.16,12,200/- with interest at the rate of 6% p.a. from the date of filing of claim petition vide its Award dated 7th February, 2012. 4. The respondent company preferred an appeal before the High Court on the only ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The objection of the respondent was that the accident took place at Hoogly and the claimant resided at Hoogly. Office of the respondent being at Kolkata did not attract jurisdiction of the Kolkata Tribunal. Reliance was placed on the decisions of this Court in Union of India vs. G.S. Grewal1 and Jagmittar Sain Bhagat vs. Director, Health Services, Haryana2 apart from the High Court judgments. The appellant supported the award by placing reliance on judgment of this Court in Mantoo 1 (2014) 7 SCC 303 2 (2013) 10 SCC 136 Page 2 of 9 Page 3 SLP (C) No.27243 of 2015 Sarkar vs. Oriental Insurance Company Limited3 apart from other judgments. 5. The High Court upheld the objection of the respondent and allowed the appeal of the respondent company and directed refund of the amount deposited/paid, if any, to the respondent company. It was observed : “In the instant case admittedly the accident took place in Hooghly. The claimant, as evident from the cause title, resides at Hoogly. The owner, the respondent, too resides at Hooghly. Hooghly, no doubt, is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Tribunal at Kolkata. The argument of the respondent-claimant that the Kolkata Tribunal exercises jurisdiction since the regional office of the insurance company is situated within its territorial limits cannot be accepted as the last option under section 166(2) cannot be construed to mean the residential address of the company as a company can have a business or an office address and not a residential address. Therefore, the Tribunal at Kolkata had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim petition. In this regard we follow the principles of law laid down in New India Assurance Company Limited vs. Kustiswar Pramanik (supra) [2010(1) T.A.C. 405 (Cal), in Nirmala Devi Agarwal (supra) [2013 (3) CLJ (Cal)] and in the unreported judgment delivered on 18th July, 2012 in FMA 724 of 2008 with C.O.T. 22 of 2008 (The New Indian Assurance Col. Ltd. vs. Silpi Dutta & Ors.) and we respectfully disagree with the judgment in FMA 1454 of 2013 (National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Alpana Jana & Ors.)”. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the High Court was in grave error in holding that the Kolkata 3 (2009) 2 SCC 244 Page 3 of 9 Page 4 SLP (C) No.27243 of 2015 Tribunal could not exercise jurisdiction on the ground that registered office of the insurance company was within its territorial limits. Jurisdiction was available under Section 166(2) if the defendant/respondent in a claim petition was residing within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The residence in the case of juristic person included its Principal office. In any case, the view taken by the High Court is directly in conflict with the law laid down by this Court in Mantoo Sarkar (supra) under which the High Court could interfere in such cases only if there was failure of justice. The decisions of this Court in G.S. Grewal and Jagmittar Sain Bhagat have no application to the fact situation at hand. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent company on the other hand, supported the view taken by the High Court and submitted that the place of residence within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Section 166(2) of the Act could not mean the place of business. He sought to distinguish the view taken by this Court in Mantoo Sarkar (supra). 9. The question for consideration thus is whether the Tribunal at Kolkata had the jurisdiction to decide the claim application under Section 166 of the Act when the accident took place outside Kolkata jurisdiction and the claimant also Page 4 of 9 Page 5 SLP (C) No.27243 of 2015 resided outside Kolkata jurisdiction, but the respondent being a juristic person carried on business at Kolkata. Further question is whether in absence of failure of justice, the High Court could set aside the award of the Tribunal on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. 10. In our view, the matter is fully covered by decisions of this Court in Mantoo Sarkar (supra). It will be worthwhile to quote the statutory provision of Section 166(2) of the Act : “166. Application for compensation.— * * * (2) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be made, at the option of the claimant, either to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred, or to the Claims Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the claimant resides or carries on business or within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant resides, and shall be in such form and contain such particulars as may be prescribed: Provided that where no claim for compensation under Section 140 is made in such application, the application shall contain a separate statement to that effect immediately before the signature of the applicant.” 11. In Mantoo Sarkar (supra), the insurance company had a branch at Nainital. Accident took place outside the jurisdiction of Nainital Tribunal. The claimant remained in the hospital at Bareilly and thereafter shifted to Pilibhit Page 5 of 9 Page 6 SLP (C) No.27243 of 2015 where he was living for a long time. However, at the time of filing of the claim petition he was working as a labourer in Nainital District. The High Court took the view that Nainital Tribunal had no jurisdiction and reversed the view taken by the Tribunal to the effect that since the office of the insurance company was at Nainital, the Tribunal had the jurisdiction. This Court reversed the view of the High Court. It was held that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal was wider than the civil court. The Tribunal could follow the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). Having regard to Section 21 CPC, objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction could not be entertained in absence of any prejudice. Distinction was required to be drawn between a jurisdiction with regard to subject matter on the one hand and that of territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction on the other. A judgment may be nullity in the former category, but not in the later. Reference was also made to earlier decision of this Court in Kiran Singh vs. Chaman Paswan4 to the following effect : “With reference to objections relating to territorial jurisdiction, Section 21 of the Civil Procedure Code enacts that no objection to the place of suing should be allowed by an appellate or revisional court, unless there was a consequent failure of justice. It is the same principle that has been adopted in Section 11 4 AIR 1954 SC 340 Page 6 of 9 Page 7 SLP (C) No.27243 of 2015 of the Suits Valuation Act with reference to pecuniary jurisdiction. The policy underlying Sections 21 and 99 CPC and Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is the same, namely, that when a case had been tried by a court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in failure of justice, and the policy of the legislature has been to treat objections to jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as technical and not open to consideration by an appellate court, unless there has been a prejudice on the merits. The contention of the appellants, therefore, that the decree and judgment of the District Court, Monghyr, should be treated as a nullity cannot be sustained under Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act.’ ” 12. We are thus of the view that in the face of judgment of this Court in Mantoo Sarkar (supra), the High Court was not justified in setting aside the award of the Tribunal in absence of any failure of justice even if there was merit in the plea of lack of territorial jurisdiction. Moreover, the fact remained that the insurance company which was the main contesting respondent had its business at Kolkata. 13. Reliance placed on decisions of this Court in G.S. Grewal and Jagmittar Sain Bhagat is misplaced. In G.S. Grewal, the subject matter of dispute was not covered by the definition of “service matters” under Section 3(o) of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 and on that ground, it was held that the Armed Forces Tribunal had no jurisdiction in the matter. Thus, it was a case of inherent lack of Page 7 of 9 Page 8 SLP (C) No.27243 of 2015 jurisdiction over the subject matter. Similarly in Jagmittar Sain Bhagat, the claimant before the Consumer Protection Forum was found not be a “consumer” under Section 2(1) (d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and on that ground the order of the consumer forum was held to be without jurisdiction. The said cases did not deal with the issue of territorial jurisdiction. 14. The provision in question, in the present case, is a benevolent provision for the victims of accidents of negligent driving. The provision for territorial jurisdiction has to be interpreted consistent with the object of facilitating remedies for the victims of accidents. Hyper technical approach in such matters can hardly be appreciated. There is no bar to a claim petition being filed at a place where the insurance company, which is the main contesting parties in such cases, has its business. In such cases, there is no prejudice to any party. There is no failure of justice. Moreover, in view of categorical decision of this Court in Mantoo Sarkar (supra), contrary view taken by the High Court cannot be sustained. The High Court failed to notice the provision of Section 21 CPC. Page 8 of 9 Page 9 SLP (C) No.27243 of 2015 15. Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restore the award of the Tribunal. …………..……..…………………………….J. [ ANIL R. DAVE ] …………..….………………………………..J. [ ADARSH KUMAR GOEL ] NEW DELHI JANUARY 5, 2016 Page 9 of 9

since the acquired lands are already within developed municipal limits- a cut of one-third the value granted instead of 66% of Market Value= High Court was justified in taking into consideration the size of the plots, which were exhibited for the purposes of comparison with the size of the plots acquired, but we are unable to uphold the cut of 60%,which has been imposed by the High Court, since the acquired lands are already within developed municipal limits. In these cases also, a cut of one-third the value would be appropriate as in the other cases. Accordingly, we modify the valuation arrived at by the High Court upon imposing a cut of 60% and direct that the amount of compensation be reassessed upon imposing a cut of 331/3 per cent while re-assessing the value of the land.”

                                                              NON-REPORTABLE


          IN THE  SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
          CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION


         CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5168  OF 2016
        (Arising out of SLP(C) NO. 12067/2016)




|ZILE SINGH                                     |.. APPELLANT(S)             |


                                VERSUS

|STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS.                      |.. RESPONDENT(S)            |



                     J U D G M E N T

        ANIL R. DAVE,J.
1.      Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner.
2.      We do not think it necessary to issue notice to the respondents   in
view of the fact that the matter is covered by the decision  of  this  Court
in Civil Appeal Nos. 6343-6356 of 2014, titled Shanti & Ors. Etc. vs.  State
of Haryana & Ors. decided on 02.07.2014.  If the respondents  are  aggrieved
by this order, it would be open to them to approach this Court by filing  an
application so that the case can be reconsidered by  hearing  the  concerned
parties.

3.      Leave granted.

4.      This  appeal  has  been  preferred  by  the  appellant  against  the
judgment dated 03.12.2015 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana  at
Chandigarh.

5.      In the Case of Ashrafi and Others Vs. State  of  Haryana  &  Others,
(2013) 5 S.C.C. 527, this Court held as under :

“
        .......

45. There is yet another set of lands forming  the  subject  matter  of  the
appeals  arising  out  of  Special  Leave  Petition  ©  Nos.33637-33638   of
2011,filed by Manohar  Singh  and  others,  which  are  situated  in  Hansi,
District Hisar. The said lands also  form  the  subject  matter  of  several
other Special Leave Petitions, which will be covered by the decision in  the
above-mentioned Special Leave Petitions (now appeals). In  the  said  cases,
the High Court had assessed the compensation payable for the acquired  lands
at the rate  of  Rs.805/-  per  sq.  yard  along  with  the  statutory  sums
available under Section 23(1A) of the Land Acquisition Act and  solatium  on
the market value under Section 23(2) thereof. It  was  also  indicated  that
the land owners would also be entitled to interest
as provided under Section 28 of the Act.


46. While deciding the valuation of the lands, the High Court applied a  cut
of 60% and also took into consideration that  the  lands  in  question  were
small plots, the value whereof was definitely higher than  the  lands  which
had been acquired which were much larger in area.


47. In our view, the High Court was justified in taking  into  consideration
the size of the plots, which were exhibited for the purposes  of  comparison
with the size of the plots acquired, but we are unable to uphold the cut  of
60%,which has been imposed by the High Court, since the acquired  lands  are
already within developed municipal limits. In these cases  also,  a  cut  of
one-third  the  value  would  be  appropriate  as  in   the   other   cases.
Accordingly, we modify the valuation arrived  at  by  the  High  Court  upon
imposing a cut of 60%  and  direct  that  the  amount  of   compensation  be
reassessed upon imposing a cut of 331/3  per  cent  while  re-assessing  the
value of the land.”



6.       Ashrafi's  case  was  finally  disposed  of  with   the   following
observation:

“57. The decision rendered in the
appeals arising out of SLP(C)Nos.33637-33638  of  2011  (Manohar  Singh  vs.
State of Haryana & Anr.) will govern Civil  Appeal  Nos.3388-3389  of  2011,
C.A.No.5206 of 2011, C.A. No.5208 of 2011, C.A.
No.5209 of 2011, C.A. No. 5210 of
2011, C.A. No.5211 of 2011, C.A.No.5212 of 2011, C.A. No.5213 of 2011,  C.A.
No.5214 of 2011, C.A. No.5207 of 2011, C.A. No.5215 of 2011, C.A.  No.  5216
of 2011, C.A.Nos.7179-7182 of 2011, SLP(C)Nos.  ......  (CC  14220-14221  of
2011), SLP(C)No. ..... (CC 14164 of 2011),  SLP(C)Nos.21344-21351  of  2011,
SLP(C)Nos.32764-32765    of    2011,    SLP(C)Nos.32766-32767    of    2011,
SLP(C)Nos.32770-32771   of   2011,   SLP(C)Nos.   32772-32773    of    2011,
SLP(C)Nos.32790-32791    of    2011,    SLP(C)Nos.32792-32793    of    2011,
SLP(C)Nos.32796-32797    of    2011,    SLP(C)Nos.32798-32799    of    2011,
SLP(C)Nos.32801-32802 of 2011 and SLP(C)Nos.32806- 32807 of 2011.”



7.      The case of the appellant being similar, we  also  dispose  of  this
appeal by allowing the same in terms of the judgment  delivered in the  case
of Ashrafi and Others Vs. State of          Haryana & Others.


                                                     .....................J.
                  [ ANIL R. DAVE ]

                         .....................J.
                           [ ADARSH KUMAR GOEL ]



                                                     .....................J.
          [ D.Y. CHANDRACHUD ]

NEW DELHI,
MAY 13, 2016.