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Wednesday, May 18, 2016

when the appellant is in possession - granting of interim stay before judging whether the allotment is valid or not - Status Quo is sufficient as prima faice case and balance of inconvenience is infavour of appellant = The dispute between the appellant and respondent No. 2 relates to allotment of retail dealership of the Petrol Pump of the Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (respondent No. 1) located between Km stone 94-97 as S.H. 11 as Sonepat as mentioned in Advertisement (Ann. P1) at item No. 115. Respondent No. 2 questioned the allotment made to the appellant in aforementioned writ petition successfully before the single Judge giving rise to filing of two appeals before the Division Bench. One is filed by the appellant and other by the Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. These appeals were admitted for final hearing, wherein aforementioned interim stay was granted.= the High Court should not have passed the interim order of the nature which is impugned herein. Instead, in our view, having regard to the factual scenario, it could at best direct the parties to maintain status quo as existed on the date of impugned order, i.e., 25.04.2016 in relation to petrol pump. On perusal of documents filed herein, we find that the appellant (a widow) has been running the petrol pump in question for more than a year. In this view of the matter, the prime facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss was more in appellant’s favour rather than in favour of respondent No. 2. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the stay granted by the Division Bench and instead direct the parties to maintain status quo as existed on the date of the order, i.e., 25.04.2016 in relation to the subject matter of the appeal, i.e., Petrol Pump located between Km stone 94- 9 on S H 11 (at S.N. 115) at Sonepat as specified in Ann. P-1 advertisement notice.



                                                              Non-Reportable
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5174 OF 2016
                    (ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO.13981/2016)


      Krishna Devi                                       Appellant(s)


                             VERSUS


      Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. & Anr.           Respondent(s)


                       J U D G M E N T



Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
Leave granted.
2.    Having regard to the nature of  short  controversy  involved  in  this
appeal, notice to Respondent No. 1 is not considered necessary. It  is  more
so when the contesting respondent No. 2 is present on caveat.
3.    The High court while admitting the appeal of Respondent No. 1  against
the final order dated 28.01.2016 passed by the  Single  Judge  in  W.P.  No.
19906/2013 filed by Respondent  No.  2  against  the  appellant  herein  and
Respondent No. 1 passed the following interim order:-

“The controversy in these Letter Patent Appeals pertains to  appointment  of
Retail Outlet Dealership. The selection committee  placed first  respondent-
writ petitioner at No. 1 and the appellant in  the  accompanying  appeal  at
No. 2 without even inspecting the land offered by  them.   After  the  merit
list was circulated on 06.03.2013, the land offered by respondent No. 1  was
inspected  on  07.05.2013  and  found   ‘suitable’   on   08.05.2013.   Soon
thereafter,  on  27.05.2013,  the  inspection  committee   asked   for   the
‘demarcation of the land’ in  question.  The  record  further  reveals  that
first respondent claims to have taken on lease the land measuring 2  Kanals,
9 Marlas out of total land measuring 22 Kanals 13 Marlas. The land is  owned
by several co-sharers and one of them has  in  fact,  filed  even  partition
proceedings. The said co-sharer had raised  objection  against  installation
of retail outlet on the piece  of  land  offered  by  respondent  No.  1  as
without partition, she cannot claim that the  prime  front  portion  of  the
land abutting the main highway, has fallen to the share of her lessors.

      The appellant is unable to explain as to how could it  make  selection
or declare the land ‘suitable’ without verifying the record as it was  still
a joint holding and the affidavits relied upon by respondent No. 1  are  not
by all the co-sharers.

      Similarly, the appointment of appellant in the accompanying appeal  as
the Retail Outlet Dealer on the basis of her placement at  No.  2  in  merit
list is equally strange. The site  where  she  has  statedly  installed  the
outlet is 40 kilometers away  from  the  area,  which  was   advertised  for
appointment of dealership.

      Prime-facie, the merit list appears to  have  been  prepared  for  the
reasons other than the merit.

      Admit.

      Operation of the order passed by learned  Single  Judge  shall  remain
stayed. Resultantly, neither respondent No.  1  nor  the  appellant  in  the
accompanying appeal shall be allowed to operate  the  retail  outlet.  Fresh
advertisement, if any,  by  the  Corporation,  shall  be  subject  to  final
outcome of these appeals.

4.    Feeling aggrieved by the interim order passed by the  Division  Bench,
the appellant has filed this appeal.
    Brief facts:
The dispute between the appellant and respondent No. 2 relates to  allotment
of retail dealership of the Petrol Pump of the Indian Oil  Corporation  Ltd.
(respondent No. 1) located between Km stone 94-97 as S.H. 11 as  Sonepat  as
mentioned in Advertisement (Ann. P1) at item  No.  115.   Respondent  No.  2
questioned the allotment  made  to  the  appellant  in  aforementioned  writ
petition successfully before the single Judge giving rise to filing  of  two
appeals before the Division Bench. One is filed by the appellant  and  other
by the Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.  These appeals were  admitted  for  final
hearing, wherein aforementioned interim stay was granted.
Without going into more details of the issue which is  presently  seized  of
in appeal before the Division Bench in  the  two  pending  appeals  for  its
decision on merits, we are of the view that the High Court should  not  have
passed the interim order of the nature which is  impugned  herein.  Instead,
in our view, having regard to  the  factual  scenario,   it  could  at  best
direct the parties to  maintain  status  quo  as  existed  on  the  date  of
impugned order, i.e., 25.04.2016 in relation to petrol pump. On  perusal  of
documents filed herein, we find  that  the  appellant  (a  widow)  has  been
running the petrol pump in question for more than a year. In  this  view  of
the matter, the prime facie case, balance of  convenience   and  irreparable
loss was more in appellant’s favour rather than   in  favour  of  respondent
No. 2.
7.    We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the  stay  granted  by  the
Division Bench and instead direct the parties  to  maintain  status  quo  as
existed on the date of the  order,  i.e.,  25.04.2016  in  relation  to  the
subject matter of the appeal, i.e., Petrol Pump located between Km stone 94-
9 on S H 11 (at S.N. 115) at Sonepat as specified in Ann. P-1  advertisement
 notice.
8.    We request the High court to hear both the appeals, i.e., LPA No.  649
of 2016 (O&M) and LPA No. 650 of 2016 (O&M)  expeditiously  uninfluenced  by
our observations as these observations are made  only  for  the  purpose  of
deciding stay but not the merits of the controversy, which is presently  sub
judice in two appeals before the High Court.




.……...................................J.
                                     [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]


                     ………..................................J.
                                      [ASHOK BHUSHAN]
      New Delhi,
      May 16, 2016.
-----------------------
6


Section 378(3) of the Code = whether requisite leave should or should not be granted, the High Court must apply its mind, consider whether a prima facie case has been made out or arguable points have been raised and not whether the order of acquittal would or would not be set aside.= “Heard. No case for grant of leave is made out. Accordingly, the leave to appeal stands dismissed.” = cryptic order = it was a clear case of total non application of mind to the case by the learned Judges because the order impugned neither sets out the facts nor the submissions of the parties nor the findings and nor the reasons as to why the leave to file appeal is declined to the appellant. We, therefore, disapprove the casual approach of the High Court in deciding the application



                                                                  Reportable
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 750 OF 2006



      State of Rajasthan                                 Appellant(s)


                             VERSUS


      Firoz Khan @ Arif Khan                 Respondent(s)





                               J U D G M E N T

     Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
      1)    This appeal is filed by the State of Rajasthan against the final
      judgment and order dated  28.10.2005  passed  by  the  High  Court  of
      Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur in D.B. Criminal Leave  to  Appeal
      No. 227 of 2005 whereby the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed
      the application filed by the appellant herein seeking  leave  to  file
      appeal under Section 378(3)  of  the  Criminal  Procedure  Code,  1973
      (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”)  against  the  judgment  dated
      13.08.2004 passed by the Sessions Judge, Jaisalmer in  Sessions  Trial
      Case No. 48 of 2002.

       2)   Keeping in view the short point involved in the  appeal,  it  is
      not necessary to state the facts in detail except  few  to  appreciate
      the grievance of the appellant.
      3)    The respondent (accused) was prosecuted and tried for commission
      of an offence of murder of one Liley Khan aged around 11  years  under
      Section 302 of  the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter  referred  to
      as “IPC”)  pursuant to lodging of FIR No  44/2002  in  Police  Station
      Ramgarh, District Jaisalmer in Sessions Trial Case No. 48 of  2002  in
      the Court of District and Sessions Judge, Jaisalmer.  The  prosecution
      adduced evidence in support of their case.
      4)    By judgment dated 13.8.2004, the Session Judge  on  appreciating
      the evidence adduced by the prosecution acquitted  the  respondent  of
      the charge of murder by giving him benefit of doubt.
      5)     The  State  of  Rajasthan,  felt  aggrieved   of   respondent's
      acquittal, filed application for leave to appeal before the High Court
      under Section 378 (3) of the Code.
      6)    By impugned order, the High Court declined to  grant  leave  and
      accordingly rejected the application made by the State. It is  against
      this order, the State has filed this appeal by way  of  special  leave
      petition.
      7)    Notice of lodgment of petition  of  appeal  was  served  on  the
      respondent but despite service  of  notice,  the  respondent  has  not
      appeared.
      8)    Heard learned counsel for the State of Rajasthan.
      9)    Learned counsel for  the  appellant-State  has  made  only   one
      submission.  According to him, the High  Court  while  dismissing  the
      application for leave to appeal did not assign any  reason  and  hence
      the impugned order is rendered bad in law. It was his submission  that
      there were several discrepancies and errors in  the  judgment  of  the
      Sessions Judge against which the  leave  to  appeal  was  sought  and,
      therefore, this was a fit  case  where  the  High  Court  should  have
      granted leave to appeal for further  probing  into  the  case  by  the
      appellate court. In support of his submission, he placed  reliance  on
      the decision of this Court in State of Maharashtra vs.  Sujay  Mangesh
      Poyarekar, (2008) 9 SCC 475.
      10)   We are inclined to agree in part with the  submission  urged  by
      the learned counsel for the appellant.
      11)   The question as to how the application for  grant  of  leave  to
      appeal made under Section 378 (3) of the Code should be decided by the
      High Court and what are the parameters which  the  High  Court  should
      keep in mind remains no more res Integra. This issue was  examined  by
      this Court  in  State  of  Maharashtra  vs.  Sujay  Mangesh  Poyarekar
      (supra). Justice C.K. Thakker speaking for the Bench held in paras 19,
      20, 21 and 24 as under:

           “19. Now, Section 378 of the Code provides for filing of  appeal
           by the State in case of acquittal. Sub-section (3) declares that
           no appeal “shall be entertained except with  the  leave  of  the
           High Court”. It is, therefore, necessary for the State where  it
           is aggrieved by an order of acquittal recorded  by  a  Court  of
           Session to file an application for leave to appeal  as  required
           by sub-section (3) of Section 378 of the Code. It is  also  true
           that an appeal can be registered and heard on merits by the High
           Court only after the High Court grants  leave  by  allowing  the
           application filed under sub-section (3) of Section  378  of  the
           Code.
           20. In our opinion, however, in deciding  the  question  whether
           requisite leave should or should not be granted, the High  Court
           must apply its mind, consider whether a  prima  facie  case  has
           been made out or  arguable  points  have  been  raised  and  not
           whether the order of acquittal would or would not be set aside.
           21. It cannot be laid down as an abstract proposition of law  of
           universal application that each and every petition seeking leave
           to prefer an appeal against an order of acquittal recorded by  a
           trial court must be allowed by the  appellate  court  and  every
           appeal must be admitted and  decided  on  merits.  But  it  also
           cannot be overlooked that at that stage,  the  court  would  not
           enter into minute details of the prosecution evidence and refuse
           leave observing that the judgment of acquittal recorded  by  the
           trial court could not be said to be “perverse”  and,  hence,  no
           leave should be granted.
           24. We may hasten to clarify that we may not  be  understood  to
           have laid down an  inviolable  rule  that  no  leave  should  be
           refused by the appellate court against  an  order  of  acquittal
           recorded by the trial court. We only state that in  such  cases,
           the appellate court must consider the relevant  material,  sworn
           testimonies of prosecution  witnesses  and  record  reasons  why
           leave sought by the State should not be granted and the order of
           acquittal recorded by the trial court should not  be  disturbed.
           Where there is application of mind by the  appellate  court  and
           reasons (may be in brief) in support of such view are  recorded,
           the order of the  court  may  not  be  said  to  be  illegal  or
           objectionable. At the same time,  however,  if  arguable  points
           have been raised, if the material  on  record  discloses  deeper
           scrutiny  and  reappreciation,  review  or  reconsideration   of
           evidence, the appellate court must grant  leave  as  sought  and
           decide the appeal on merits. In  the  case  on  hand,  the  High
           Court, with respect, did neither. In the  opinion  of  the  High
           Court, the case did not require grant  of  leave.  But  it  also
           failed to record reasons for refusal of such leave.”


      12)   Coming now to  the  facts  of  this  case,  it  is  apposite  to
      reproduce the impugned order in verbatim infra.
                 “Heard.
                 No case for grant of leave is made out.  Accordingly, the
           leave to appeal stands dismissed.”


      13)   We are constrained to observe that the High Court grossly  erred
      in passing the impugned order without assigning any  reason.   In  our
      considered opinion, it was a clear case of total  non  application  of
      mind to the case by the learned  Judges  because  the  order  impugned
      neither sets out the facts nor the submissions of the parties nor  the
      findings and nor the reasons as to why the leave  to  file  appeal  is
      declined to  the  appellant.  We,  therefore,  disapprove  the  casual
      approach of the High Court in deciding the application, which  in  our
      view is against the law laid down by this Court in the case  of  State
      of Maharashtra vs. Sujay Mangesh Poyarekar (supra).
      14)   In  the  light  of  foregoing  discussion,  the  impugned  order
      deserves to be set aside. The appeal thus succeeds and is  accordingly
      allowed and the  impugned  order  is  set  aside.        The  case  is
      remanded to the High Court for deciding the application  made  by  the
      appellant for grant of leave to appeal afresh on merits in  accordance
      with law keeping in view the law laid down by this Court in  State  of
      Maharashtra vs. Sujay Mangesh Poyarekar (supra).
      15)   It is made clear that we have not applied our mind to the merits
      of the case and remanded the  case  having  noticed  that  it  was  an
      unreasoned  order.   The  High  Court  will  accordingly  decide   the
      application on merits uninfluenced by any of our observations made  in
      this order.
      16)   Since the case is old, we request the High Court to  decide  the
      matter within three months from the date of  receipt  of  this  order.
      Since no one appeared in this Court for the respondent despite  notice
      to him, the High Court will issue a fresh notice  of  the  application
      for grant of leave to the respondent and then decide  the  application
      as directed.



     .……...................................J.
                                     [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]





                 ………..................................J.
                                      [ASHOK BHUSHAN]
      New Delhi,
      May 17, 2016.

Tuesday, May 17, 2016

the expression “possession” used in clause (a) of sub-Section (2) of Section (3) of the Repeal Act meant actual physical possession and that there was nothing on record to indicate that actual physical possession was taken by the Competent Authority by High court is a wrong one = The Writ Petition preferred in the year 2005, therefore, had no stateable claim and the High Court was completely in error in accepting the submissions advanced on behalf of respondent Nos.1 and 2.=The record indicates that notification u/s 10(3) of the Act was published in the official gazette on 29.04.1986 and an appropriate notice u/s 10(5) of the Act was issued by the Competent Authority on 31.03.1993. These aspects of the matter are not disputed by respondent Nos.1 and 2 but in their submission, despite such notice u/s 10(5) of the Act, the possession was never taken over. The factum about taking over the possession finds clear mention in the possession certificate dated 20.08.1994. Further, the objections preferred by respondent Nos.1 and 2 were dismissed vide order dated 30.06.1995 which order also records the fact that possession of the land already stood taken over.While dismissing the objections, it was observed that the possession of the surplus land in question was already taken by the Tehsildar, Meerut on 20.08.1994. - after the vesting of the surplus land with the State Government u/s 10(5) of the Act, if any transfer of the property in question is effected, such transfer would be void ab initio and the transferee would not be entitled to challenge the alleged inaction on part of the State Government or the Competent Authority in not taking possession in compliance with the provisions u/s 10(5) of the Act.=In the aforesaid circumstances, the view taken by the High Court in the instant case is completely unsustainable.


                                                              Non-Reportable

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.5102  of 2016
                (Arising from the SLP(Civil) No.7161 of 2011)


State of U.P.     and Ors.                                   ….Appellants


                                   Versus


Surendra Pratap and Ors.                             …. Respondents



                               J U D G M E N T


Uday U. Lalit, J.


Delay condoned.  Leave granted.



This appeal by special leave is directed  against  the  judgment  and  order
dated 12.11.2009 passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Judicature  at  Allahabad
allowing Writ Petition No.46843 of 2005 preferred by respondent Nos.1 and  2
herein.


After the enactment of the Urban Land (Ceiling  and  Regulation)  Act,  1976
(hereinafter referred to as the Act) imposing  ceiling  on  vacant  land  in
urban agglomerations, one Khairati who was Bhumidhar  of  Plot  Nos.222  and
144 measuring area 25232.13 Sq. Meters at  Village  Rali  Chauhan,  Pargana,
Tehsil & District Meerut, submitted a statement u/s 6 of the  Act.   On  the
basis of said statement, the Competent Authority after conducting  necessary
enquiry prepared a draft statement u/s 8(3) of the Act  which  was  sent  to
the land holder inviting objections, if any.  In due course,  the  Competent
Authority proceeded to pass an order u/s  8(4)  of  the  Act  on  23.05.1983
confirming the draft statement declaring 25232.13 sq.mtrs. of land  of  said
Khairati at Village – Rali Chauhan, Meerut as surplus land.  No  appeal  was
preferred against the order confirming the draft statement.


Thereafter, Notice u/s 9 of the Act along with final  statement  was  issued
by the Competent Authority which was received by the  legal  heirs  of  said
Khairati.  Later, notification u/s 10(1) of the Act  was  published  in  the
Gazette on 14.12.1985.  This was followed by notification u/s 10(3)  of  the
Act which was  published  in  the  Official  Gazette  on  29.04.1986,   upon
publication of which, the surplus vacant land stood vested  with  the  State
Government free from all encumbrances.


The Competent Authority vide notice dated 31.03.1993 u/s 10(5)  of  the  Act
directed the land holders to hand over possession of the  land  in  question
to the Collector within 30 days of the receipt of the notice.  Further,  the
Tehsildar, Meerut was also directed to take  possession  of  the  land.   It
appears that respondent No.1 who claimed to have  purchased  the  land  from
the heirs of said Khairati on  03.10.1986  i.e.  after  the  publication  of
notification  u/s  10(3)  of  the  Act,  preferred  objections  before   the
competent Authority on 07.05.1994 against the issuance of notice  u/s  10(5)
of the Act.


On 20.08.1994, possession of the surplus  vacant  land  was  taken  by  Land
Records Inspector, Meerut on behalf of the Tehsildar  from  respondent  No.2
herein through its  proprietor  namely  respondent  No.1.   Thereafter,  the
Competent  Authority  vide  its  order  dated   30.06.1995   dismissed   the
objections preferred by respondent No.1 against the issuance of  notice  u/s
10(5) of the Act.  While dismissing the objections,  it  was  observed  that
the possession of the surplus land in question  was  already  taken  by  the
Tehsildar, Meerut on 20.08.1994.


After enactment of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act,  1999
(hereinafter referred to as the Repeal Act),  the  respondent  Nos.1  and  2
preferred Writ Petition No.46843 of 2005 in the High Court contending inter-
alia that they were  still  in  possession  of  the  land  in  question  and
entitled to the benefit under the Repeal Act.  The High Court  accepted  the
contention and allowed their Writ Petition by its  order  dated  18.05.2010.
The High Court was of the view that  the  expression  “possession”  used  in
clause (a) of sub-Section (2) of Section (3) of the Repeal Act meant  actual
physical possession and that there was nothing on record  to  indicate  that
actual physical possession was taken by the Competent Authority.


We have heard Mr. Irshad Ahmad, learned Additional Advocate General for  the
State in support of the appeal and Mr. Aarohi Bhalla, learned  Advocate  for
respondent Nos.1 and 2.  The record indicates that  notification  u/s  10(3)
of the Act was published in  the  official  gazette  on  29.04.1986  and  an
appropriate notice u/s  10(5)  of  the  Act  was  issued  by  the  Competent
Authority on 31.03.1993.  These aspects of the matter are  not  disputed  by
respondent Nos.1 and 2 but in their  submission,  despite  such  notice  u/s
10(5) of the Act, the possession was never  taken  over.  The  factum  about
taking  over  the  possession  finds  clear  mention   in   the   possession
certificate  dated  20.08.1994.   Further,  the  objections   preferred   by
respondent Nos.1 and 2 were dismissed  vide  order  dated  30.06.1995  which
order also records the fact that possession of the land already stood  taken
over.  In the premises, all requisite actions  contemplated  under  the  Act
were taken in accordance with law well before the enactment  of  the  Repeal
Act and the surplus vacant land stood vested with the  State  Government  of
which the possession was also taken over.  The Writ  Petition  preferred  in
the year 2005, therefore, had no stateable claim  and  the  High  Court  was
completely in error in accepting  the  submissions  advanced  on  behalf  of
respondent Nos.1 and 2.


Moreover, in Civil Appeal Nos. 369-370 of 2016 (State of U.P.  and  Ors.  v.
Adarsh Seva Sahakari Ltd.) decided on 19.01.2016, this  Court  has  observed
that after the vesting of the surplus land with  the  State  Government  u/s
10(5) of the Act, if any transfer of the property in question  is  effected,
such transfer would be void ab  initio  and  the  transferee  would  not  be
entitled to challenge the alleged inaction on part of the  State  Government
or the Competent Authority in not taking possession in compliance  with  the
provisions u/s 10(5) of the Act.


In the aforesaid circumstances, the view taken by  the  High  Court  in  the
instant case  is  completely  unsustainable.   This  appeal  is,  therefore,
allowed and the Writ Petition  preferred  by  the  respondent  Nos.1  and  2
herein stands dismissed with costs.







…………………..CJI.
 (T. S. Thakur)



………………..……J.
(Uday Umesh Lalit)

New Delhi,
May 13, 2016


absence of any special or general permission as contemplated under Section 8(1) of FERA. No such permission is produced or relied upon. In fact, that is not even the case that Jatin Jhaveri had applied for and got such permission. For the purpose of Section 8(1) of FERA, “acquisition” of foreign exchange must be with general or special permission of the Reserve Bank of India. Even if the matter of ‘bringing into India’ of the currency in question - is not free from doubt, the question regarding ‘acquisition’ of currency must be independently established in the light of requirements under said Section 8(1). The assessment in that behalf by the Appellate Authority under FERA and the High Court is completely incorrect.= Notification No.FERA-81/89-RB dated 09.08.1989 as amended upto 09.03.1999, to submit that by said Notification the Reserve Bank of India was pleased to permit any person to bring into India from any place outside India foreign exchange without any limit, provided a declaration in such form as may be specified by the Reserve Bank of India is made on arrival in India to the Customs Authorities. First, said notification is in relation to Section 13 of FERA and not in relation to Section 8(1) thereof. Secondly, this notification was not adverted or referred to at any stage and in any case does not deal with acquisition as contemplated under Section 8(1) of FERA-We, therefore, set aside the orders passed by the Appellate Tribunal, FERA and by the High Court while accepting the view taken by the Special Director. Consequently, Civil Appeal Nos.11128-11131/2011 preferred by Union of India are allowed and the order dated 04.10.1999 passed by Special Director of Enforcement, Mumbai, stands restored. As we have upheld the order of confiscation, the challenge preferred by Jatin Jhaveri in the form of his writ petition and consequential Civil Appeal No.11127/2011 must fail and said appeal is dismissed.Since the amount of Rs.1,83,09,525/- was refunded and credited to the account of Jatin Jhaveri during the pendency of the proceedings subject to his undertaking to return the same with interest, he is directed to refund the amount with interest @ 10% per annum within six weeks from the date of this judgment.

                                                              Non-Reportable

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.11127 OF 2011

Jatin C. Jhaveri                                       ….Appellant


                                   Versus


Union of India                                  …. Respondent

                                    WITH

                      CIVIL APPEAL NOS.11128-31 OF 2011

Union of India                                         ….Appellant


                                   Versus


Jatin  C. Jhaveri, etc.                             …. Respondents



                               J U D G M E N T


Uday U. Lalit, J.


These appeals arise out  of  common  judgment  and  order  dated  19.10.2010
passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in  FERA  Appeal  Nos.64-66
of 2006 & in Writ Petition No.2976 of 2004.  The challenge in  Civil  Appeal
Nos.11128-11131 of 2011 at  the  instance  of  Union  of  India  is  to  the
decision of the High Court dismissing FERA Appeal Nos.64-66  of  2006  while
Civil Appeal No.11127 of 2011 filed by  one  Jatin  Jhaveri  challenges  the
dismissal of his Writ Petition No.2976 of 2004.

The facts leading to these appeals are as under:-


 On the  night  intervening  27th  and  28th  July,  1993,  one  Ajit  Dodia
intending to board a flight to Hongkong from Mumbai, had checked in  a  grey
suitcase and a black briefcase. On suspicion, the Custom  Officers  searched
the baggage and found the suitcase to be containing US $ 289,250  while  the
brief case contained US $ 114,300.  The currency was seized and  Ajit  Dodia
was questioned. He disclosed that he  was  to  accompany  Jatin  Jhaveri,  a
diamond trader, that his brother  Jitendra  Dodia  was  working  with  Jatin
Jhaveri  as a sorter, that his trip was  finalized  and  arranged  by  Jatin
Jhaveri who had driven him to the Airport.  In his statement Jitendra  Dodia
confirmed that he was working with Jatin  Jhaveri  and  that  he  and  Jatin
Jhaveri had packed US dollars in  bundles  in  the  evening.  However  Jatin
Jhaveri was not available for next two months i.e. till 27.09.1993.

In his statement dated 12.10.1993, Jatin Jhaveri confirmed that  he  was  to
accompany Ajit  Dodia to Hongkong on the  relevant  date  and  that  he  had
handed over his suitcase to Ajit  Dodia who in turn was to hand it  over  to
the brother of Jatin Jhaveri at Hongkong. He  however  denied  ownership  of
the currency in question and also stated that he had nothing to do with  the
briefcase. He repeated in writing to stress the point saying  “It  does  not
belong to me”. This incident led to initiation of proceedings under  Clauses
(d), (e) and (i) of Section 113 of the Customs Act, 1962  proposing  penalty
as well as confiscation of the currency.

In defence, Jatin Jhaveri now contended that he had  been  to  USA  in  June
1993 and had entered into contract for supply of polished diamonds and  that
in pursuance of the contract he had received  US  $  289,250.  According  to
him, his baggage that arrived along with him on 25.06.1993 had contained  US
$ 254,000 while other bag which  arrived  three  days  later  on  28.06.1993
contained remainder namely US $ 35,250.  In support of his  claim,  reliance
was placed on  Currency  Declaration  Form  No.100250  dated  25.06.1993  in
respect of US $ 254,000  and  Currency  Declaration   Form  No.10763   dated
28.06.1993  in  respect  of  US  $ 35,250. According  to  him  the  currency
was obtained and imported by  him  as  advance  payment  towards  supply  of
diamonds, that he could not deposit the currency in the  bank  as  the  bank
had refused to accept the same and therefore he was  proposing  to  take  it
along with him to Hongkong on 27.07.1993.  It  was  his  further  case  that
while he was going towards the Airport he had received a  message  that  his
mother was ill and  that  Ajit  Dodia  was  intercepted  with  currency  and
therefore he did not go to the Airport.

Commissioner of Customs by his order dated  30.08.1995  concluded  that  the
currency was being taken by Ajit  Dodia  illegally.   He  found  that  Jatin
Jhaveri had played a major role and made available the currency in  question
and had also packed and concealed the same in the  baggage  of  Ajit  Dodia.
As regards Currency Declaration Forms,  it was observed:

“Shri Jatin C. Jhaveri has  come  forward  with  two  Currency,  Declaration
Forms dated 25.6.93  and  28.6.93  to   substantiate  his  claim  that  this
currency was legally imported into India,  when he  had  come  from  USA  on
25.6.93 with US $ 2,59,250/- and made this declaration  before  the  Customs
on his arrival.  Had these currency declaration forms been with  Shri  Jatin
Jhaveri then in the normal course, they should have been  found  along  with
the foreign currency only and these  receipts  should  have  been  recovered
during the search of the office/residential premises of Shri Jatin  Jhaveri.
 He ought to have come forward before the Customs Officers on the  night  of
27th/28th July, 1993    after it was seized at the  time  of  its  smuggling
out.  He did not  do  so.   He  was  also  specifically  questioned  in  the
statement on 12.10.93 and he had made a statement claiming that  the  seized
foreign currency, did  not  belong  to  him.   Thus,  he  had  disowned  the
currency seized from the baggage of Shri Ajit Dodia.  Further  no  plausible
explanation or reason has been offered by him as to what prevented him  from
going abroad on 27th /28th July  1993.   Had  these  currency  been  legally
brought into India, Shri Jatin Jhaveri would have  perhaps  himself  checked
the baggage through Customs, but the fact that he left  to  be  checked  and
cleared through Customs by Shri Ajit Dodia itself indicate that he  did  not
have any honest design of flying abroad on that night and that  he  did  not
have any legal documents for possession of these currency”.


In the premises, he  ordered  confiscation  of  foreign  currency  of  US  $
403,550 (US $ 289,250 recovered from the suitcase and US $ 143,300 from  the
Brief case).  He also imposed penalty of Rs.10 Lacs on Jatin Jhaveri and  of
Rs.3 lacs on Ajit Dodia and of Rs.2 lacs on Jitendra Dodia.

A Show Cause Notice dated 21.11.1997 was thereafter  issued  by  Directorate
of Enforcement, Mumbai for contravention of provisions of Section 8(1)  read
with 64(2) of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (herein  after  referred
to as FERA).

On  27.11.1998  Appeal  Nos.C/537/95-Bom,  C/576/95-Bom   and   C/577/95-Bom
preferred by Jatin Jhaveri, Ajit Dodia and Jitendra Dodia against the  order
of the Commissioner of Customs were disposed by the Customs Excise and  Gold
Control Appellate Tribunal (CEGAT, for short), West Regional Bench,  Mumbai.
 It held that  though  Jatin  Jhaveri  had  disowned  the  currency  in  his
statement dated 12.10.1993, it did  not  mean  that  he  had  forfeited  the
ownership and could not make a claim in respect thereof at  a  later  stage.
The concerned Currency Declaration Forms  according  to  CEGAT  sufficiently
proved that the currency was brought in by said Jatin  Jhaveri.  It  however
held that  the  currency  amounting  to  US  $  289,250  was  sought  to  be
unauthorisedly exported, and was liable to confiscation but imposed fine  of
Rs. 9 lacs in lieu of confiscation of US $  289,250.  The  personal  penalty
imposed on Jatin Jhaveri was also reduced from Rs.10 lacs to 7 lacs.  In  so
far as currency amounting to US $ 143,300 was concerned, since no  one  made
any claim in  respect  thereof,  the  confiscation  was  confirmed  but  the
personal penalty imposed on Ajit Dodia was reduced to Rs.1 lac.  As  regards
Jitendra Dodia, it was observed that he  had  dissociated  himself  and  the
role attributed to him was also limited to packing the  bag.  This  decision
rendered by CEGAT was not challenged and attained  finality  in  respect  of
proceedings under the Customs Act.

Thereafter an addendum dated 06.08.1999 was issued  by  the  Directorate  of
Enforcement, Mumbai to the earlier Show Cause Notice dated 21.11.1997 as  to
why the currency in question be not  confiscated  under  the  provisions  of
FERA.

The proceedings so  initiated  under  FERA  culminated  in  an  order  dated
04.10.1999 passed  by  the  Special  Director  of  Enforcement,  Mumbai.  He
observed  that  in  his  statement  dated  12.10.1993  Jatin   Jhaveri   had
emphatically denied having any  connection  with  the  seized  currency  and
there was no whisper in the statement that any part  of  that  currency  was
brought by him from USA which represented advance payment towards export  or
that he was in possession of relevant Currency Declaration Form  in  support
of his claim. He found that the Immigration/Embarkation Card of  Ajit  Dodia
was admittedly filled in by  Jatin  Jhaveri  which  indicated  that  he  was
physically present  at  the  Airport  along  with  Ajit  Dodia.  As  regards
genuineness  of  the  Currency  Declaration  Forms,  he  relied   upon   the
observations made by Commissioner of Customs, Mumbai in  adjudication  order
dated 30.08.1995 as quoted above. The Special Director concluded as under:-
“From  the  evidence   discussed   above,   only   irresistible   conclusion
forthcoming is that the entire foreign exchange of  US  $  403,  550  seized
from Shri Ajit Dodia by the  Air  Customs,  Mumbai  was  in  fact  illegally
acquired by the said Shri Jatin Jhaveri, as indicated in  the  impugned  SCN
and then transferred to Shri Ajit K. Dodia for its onward  transfer  to  his
(Shri Jatin’s) brother in Hongkong. Similarly, the notice, Shri  Ajit  Dodia
has in fact otherwise acquired the said foreign exchange  of  US  $  403,550
from Shri Jatin Jhaveri,  a  person  other  than  an  Authorised  Dealer  in
Foreign exchange in India, which was later on  seized  by  the  Air  Customs
Officers from Shri Ajit Dodia on 28.07.1993  under  the  panchanama.  It  is
equally abundantly crystal clear that Shri Jitendra Dodia has in fact  aided
and abetted said Shri Jatin Jhaveri  in transferring and  his  brother  Shri
Ajit K. Dodia in acquiring the aforesaid foreign exchange of  US  $  403,550
from said Shri  Jatin  Jhaveri.  All  the  three  notices  viz.  Shri  Jatin
Jhaveri, Ajit Dodia and  Jitendra  K.  Dodia  have  failed  to  produce  any
permission of the RBI as required under Sec.  8(1)  of  the  FERA  1973  for
acquiring/transferring     foreign     exchange     as     indicated      in
acquiring/transferring foreign exchange as indicated in  the  impugned  Show
Cause Notice. Thus the charges of contravention of Sec.  8(1)  of  the  FERA
1973 against Shri Jatin Jhaveri and Shri Ajit  Dodia and of  Sec.  8(1)  r/w
Sec. 64(2) of the FERA 1973  against  Shri  Jitendra  K.  Dodia  are  proved
beyond any doubt. Accordingly,  I  hold  them  guilty  of  these  respective
contraventions against them.

      Concluding thus, the Special Director imposed penalty  of  Rs.30  lacs
each on Jatin Jhaveri and Ajit  Dodia and of Rs.7.5 lacs on Jitendra  Dodia.
It was held that the currency in question was liable to  confiscation  under
Section 63 of FERA and it was so ordered.

This order of the Special Director was challenged  in  Appeal  Nos.454,  462
and  463  of  1999  by  Jatin  Jhaveri,  Jitendra  Dodia  and  Ajit    Dodia
respectively before the  Appellate  Tribunal  for  Foreign  Exchange,  which
disposed of those appeals by its order dated 10.03.2004.   It  accepted  the
appeal preferred by Jitendra Dodia and  held  that  he  could  not  be  held
guilty of the charge of abetment in acquiring and  transferring  of  Foreign
Exchange unlawfully. In appeal preferred by Ajit Dodia, the confiscation  of
currency amounting to US $ 114,300 was affirmed but the penalty was  reduced
to   Rs.1 lac. As regards, appeal preferred by Jatin Jhaveri,  the  Currency
Declaration Forms furnished by  him  were  taken  to  be  strong  pieces  of
evidence. It was observed as under:-
“Simply because of the fact that the custom  authorities  are  not  able  to
trace out office copies of these forms, it will not render  these  forms  as
not being authentic and therefore inadmissible. It is for the respondent  to
prove that these  forms  were  not  genuine.  As  regards  the  confirmatory
evidence of overseas buyers, the respondents  could  have  called  them  for
cross examination,  if  they  have  any  doubt  the  authenticity  of  their
version.”

Allowing the appeal preferred by Jatin Jhaveri, the  order  of  confiscation
in respect of US $ 289,250 was quashed on the ground  that  the  acquisition
was duly explained.

  The aforesaid order of the Appellate Tribunal was challenged by  Union  of
India represented by Director of Enforcement in the High  Court  of  Bombay.
Writ Petition No.2976 of 2004 was also preferred by  Jatin  Jhaveri  in  the
High Court contending that he was entitled to the release of  US  $  289,250
along with interest @ 18%. The High Court affirmed the  view  taken  by  the
Appellate Tribunal and  dismissed  FERA  Appeal  No.64-66  of  2006  by  its
judgment and order dated 19.10.2010.  It was  observed  that  the  order  of
CEGAT having attained finality, that  order  had  definite  bearing  on  the
controversy in question and though the  findings  recorded  in  the  Customs
proceedings may not be binding on FERA proceedings,   it  was  not  possible
for the High Court to take a different view  in  the  matter.  By  the  same
judgment the High Court allowed Writ Petition No.2976 of 2004  holding  that
Jatin Jhaveri was entitled to the currency amounting to  US  $  289,250  but
would not be entitled to any interest thereon.

3.    Jatin Jhaveri, being aggrieved in so far as rejection  of  prayer  for
grant of interest was concerned, preferred SLP (C) No.5788 of 2011.  On  the
other hand, Union  of  India  preferred  SLP  (C)  Nos.26671-26674  of  2011
challenging the dismissal of FERA Appeal Nos.64-66 of  2006.  Special  Leave
to Appeal in all the matters was granted by  this  Court  vide  order  dated
09.12.2011. During the pendency of these appeals, by order dated  14.02.2014
passed in Notice of Motion No.225 of 2012 in Writ Petition No. 2976 of  2004
preferred by Jatin Jhaveri, the Customs  Department  was  permitted  by  the
High Court  to  refund  the  amount  of  US  $  289,250  in  Indian  Rupees.
Accordingly amount of  Rs.1,83,09,525  was  refunded  and  credited  to  the
account of Jatin Jhaveri  subject to the undertaking to return the said  sum
with interest in case this Court were to accept  the  appeals  preferred  by
Union of India.

     Mr.  R.P. Bhatt,  learned  Senior  Advocate,  who  appeared  for  Jatin
Jhaveri submitted  that the currency declaration  forms  were  accepted  and
relied upon in  Customs proceedings and thus the aspect  of  “bringing  into
India” of the currency in question, was rightly held  in  his  favour.   The
ownership of the currency having been established, in his submission,  Jatin
Jhaveri was entitled  to  the  same.  On  the  other  hand,  Mr.   K.  Radha
Krishnan,  learned Senior Advocate,  appearing for Union of India  submitted
 that the  initial  statement  of  Jatin  Jhaveri  recorded  on  12.10.1993,
which itself was  more than two months  after  the  seizure,  did  not  even
whisper  about currency declaration forms and  no ownership  in  respect  of
currency was claimed. In his submission,  Currency  Declaration  Forms  were
rightly observed to be  suspicious  and  not  relied  upon  by  the  Special
Director.  It was further submitted that  the  scope  of  proceedings  under
FERA was distinct and  different  and  exoneration  in  Customs  proceedings
would not enure to the advantage of  the  person  concerned  in  proceedings
under FERA and in any case the crucial question which the High Court  failed
to appreciate was the absence of requisite permission  of  Reserve  Bank  of
India.

Before we deal with rival submissions, it would  be  necessary  to  set  out
relevant provisions. The violation alleged in Customs proceedings  pertained
to Clauses (d) (e) & (i) of Section 113  of  the  Customs  Act,  1962.   The
relevant provisions of Section 113  with relevant clauses is as under:

“Section 113: Confiscation of goods attempted  to  be  improperly  exported,
etc:-
The following export goods shall be liable to confiscation
…………………….…..
………………………….
(d)  any goods attempted to be exported or brought within the limits of  any
customs area for the purpose of being exported, contrary to any  prohibition
imposed by or under this Act or any other law for the time being in force;
(e)  any goods found concealed in a package  which  is  brought  within  the
limits of a customs area for the purpose of exportation;
……
(i)    any goods entered for exportation which do not correspond in  respect
of value or in any material particular with the entry made  under  this  Act
or in the case of baggage with the declaration made under Section 77;”

      Section 8(1) of FERA is as under:

“8. (1) Except with the  previous  general  or  special  permission  of  the
Reserve Bank, no person other than an authorised dealer shall in India,  and
no person resident in India other than an authorised  dealer  shall  outside
India, purchase or otherwise acquire or borrow from, or sell,  or  otherwise
transfer or lend to or exchange with, any person  not  being  an  authorised
dealer, any foreign exchange: Provided  that  nothing  in  this  sub-section
shall apply to any purchase or sale of foreign currency  effected  in  India
between any person and a money-changer.




The emphasis in the relevant clauses of Section 113 of the  Customs  Act  is
on an attempt to export goods contrary to  any  prohibition  imposed  by  or
under said Act or any other law in for the time  being  in  force.   On  the
other hand, what constitutes a violation under Section 8(1) of FERA is  when
a person, except with the previous special  or  general  permission  of  the
Reserve Bank, purchases or otherwise “acquires” any foreign  exchange.   The
emphasis in proceedings under FERA is, therefore,  on  such  acquisition  of
foreign exchange without the previous general or special permission  of  the
Reserve Bank. Any failure in that behalf would lead to  incidents  including
confiscation under Section 63 of the FERA.

 We have gone though the currency declaration  forms  in  question.   It  is
relevant that in his first statement dated  12.10.1993,  Jatin  Jhaveri  had
clearly dissociated himself and disowned the  currency  in  question.   This
statement  itself  was  more  than  two  months  after  the  seizure.    The
subsequent reliance on currency declaration forms  was,  therefore,  rightly
found suspicious by Special Director in his order  dated  04.10.1999.    Mr.
Bhatt, learned Senior Advocate placed before  us  letters  dated  14.06.1993
and 23.06.1993 in support of the  contention  that  contracts  were  entered
into pursuant to which currency amounting to US $ 289,250  was  received  by
Jatin Jhaveri while he was in USA.  These letters are bereft of any  details
and in our view are quite self-serving.  At the same time, as found  by  the
Special Director, the original passport of Jatin Jhaveri was never  produced
from which it could be established that he was in USA on the dates  alleged.


However, what is of greater significance and import is the  absence  of  any
special or general permission as contemplated under Section  8(1)  of  FERA.
No such permission is produced or relied upon.  In fact, that  is  not  even
the case that Jatin Jhaveri had applied for and got such  permission.    For
the purpose of Section 8(1) of FERA, “acquisition” of foreign exchange  must
be with general or special permission of the Reserve Bank  of  India.   Even
if the matter of ‘bringing into India’  of  the  currency  in  question,  as
submitted by Mr. R.P. Bhatt, learned Senior Advocate, is taken to have  been
established, though that part of the matter itself is not free  from  doubt,
the question regarding  ‘acquisition’  of  currency  must  be  independently
established in the light of  requirements  under  said  Section  8(1).   The
assessment in that behalf by the Appellate  Authority  under  FERA  and  the
High Court is completely incorrect.

Mr. Bhatt,  learned  Senior  Advocate  attempted  to  rely  on  Notification
No.FERA-81/89-RB dated 09.08.1989 as  amended  upto  09.03.1999,  to  submit
that by said Notification the Reserve Bank of India was  pleased  to  permit
any person to  bring  into  India  from  any  place  outside  India  foreign
exchange without any limit, provided a declaration in such form  as  may  be
specified by the Reserve Bank of India is made on arrival in  India  to  the
Customs Authorities.  First, said notification is in relation to Section  13
of FERA and not  in  relation  to  Section  8(1)  thereof.   Secondly,  this
notification was not adverted or referred to at any stage and  in  any  case
does not deal with acquisition as contemplated under Section 8(1) of FERA.

We, therefore, set aside  the  orders  passed  by  the  Appellate  Tribunal,
FERA and by the High Court while accepting the view  taken  by  the  Special
Director.   Consequently, Civil  Appeal  Nos.11128-11131/2011  preferred  by
Union of India are allowed and the order dated 04.10.1999 passed by  Special
Director of Enforcement, Mumbai, stands restored.  As  we  have  upheld  the
order of confiscation, the challenge preferred by Jatin Jhaveri in the  form
of his writ petition and consequential Civil Appeal No.11127/2011 must  fail
and said appeal is dismissed.

Since the amount of Rs.1,83,09,525/-  was  refunded  and   credited  to  the
account of Jatin  Jhaveri during the pendency of the proceedings subject  to
his undertaking to return  the  same  with  interest,   he  is  directed  to
refund the amount with interest @ 10% per annum within six  weeks  from  the
date of this judgment.

The appeals are disposed of in the aforesaid terms.  No order as to costs.

                                                             …………………………….CJI
                                                         (T.S.Thakur)

……………………………….J                (Uday Umesh Lalit)
New Delhi
May 13, 2016

whether requirement to furnish Annual Turnover and Net Worth for last three years was a mandatory condition for infraction of which the bid made by the appellant had to be rejected. In Poddar Steel Corporation v. Ganesh Engineering Works and Others[1], this Court considered conditions which are essential conditions of eligibility and those which are ancillary or subsidiary with the main object to be achieved. It was observed in para 6 of the decision as under:- “…….As a matter of general proposition it cannot be held that an authority inviting tenders is bound to give effect to every term mentioned in the notice in meticulous detail, and is not entitled to waive even a technical irregularity of little or no significance. The requirements in a tender notice can be classified into two categories-those which lay down the essential conditions of eligibility and the others which are merely ancillary or subsidiary with the main object to be achieved by the condition. In the first case the authority issuing the tender may be required to enforce them rigidly. In the other cases it must be open to the authority to deviate from and not to insist upon the strict literal compliance of the condition in a appropriate cases.= the site in question was to be sold on outright sale basis. The advertisement or the stipulations therein did not contemplate creation and or continuation of any relationship between the parties calling for continued existence of any particular level of financial parameters on part of the bidder, except the ability to pay the price as per his bid. The condition was not an essential condition at all but was merely ancillary to achieve the main object that was to ensure that the bid amount was paid promptly. The advertisement contemplated payment of bid amount whereafter the Sale Deed would be executed and not a relationship which would have continued for considerable period warranting an assurance of continued ability on part of the bidder to fulfill his obligations under the arrangement. Nor was this condition aimed at ensuring a particular level of financial ability on part of the bidder, for example in cases where the benefit is designed to be given to a person coming from a particular financial segment, in which case the condition could well be termed essential. The idea was pure and clear sale simplicitor. As a matter of fact, the appellant did pay the entire bid amount within the prescribed period and the Sale Deed was also executed in his favor. In the circumstances the relevant condition in the advertisement would not fall in the first category of cases as dealt with by this Court in Poddar Steel Corporation (supra). The authorities could therefore validly deviate from and not insist upon strict literal compliance. The discretion so exercised by the authorities could not have therefore been faulted. Thus, the assessment made by the High Court that the condition in question was an essential condition for non-compliance of which, the bid furnished by the appellant was required to be rejected, in our view was not correct. We, therefore, allow this Appeal and set aside the decisions rendered by the Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court in the present matter. The Letter of Intent dated 02.03.2010 and consequent Sale Deed dated 31.03.2010 in favor of the appellant are held valid and correct.

                                                              Non-Reportable

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5101 OF 2016
                (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO. 19310 OF 2013


Om Prakash Sharma                               ….Appellant


                                   Versus


Ramesh Chand Prashar & Ors.                           …. Respondents



                               J U D G M E N T

Uday U. Lalit, J.


Leave granted.



This appeal by special leave challenges  correctness  of  the  judgment  and
order dated 20.05.2013 passed by the  High  Court  of  Himachal  Pradesh  at
Shimla in L.P.A. No.441 of 2012 affirming the decision dated  14.08.2012  of
the Single Judge of the High Court in CWP No.1557 of 2010.


On 03.11.2008, an advertisement was  issued  by  Himachal  Tourism  inviting
bids from interested parties for  outright  purchase  of  sites  located  at
three places in Himachal Pradesh including Café Aabshar  in  District  Solan
situated  at  3  kilometers  from  town  named  Kandaghat.    The   relevant
conditions mentioned in the advertisement were as under:-

“A Bidder is free to bid for one  or  more  than  one  cafes.   However  all
bidders need to provide  the  following  information  for  consideration  of
their EOI.

Area of  business  interests  (please  enclose  firm  profile  or  corporate
brochure)

Annual turnover & Net worth in last three (3) years (please  submit  audited
financial statements and income Tax Return of  last  three  financial  years
supporting this information).

Interest in particular café(s) and proposed usage.
Offer to “Outright purchase of the café” (a separate  rate  will  be  quoted
for each café).”


In so  far  as  Café  Aabshar  was  concerned,  the  appellant  as  well  as
respondent No.1 participated in the bid process.  The bid submitted  by  the
appellant for Rs.27,15,000/- was the highest.  Respondent No.1 had  given  a
bid of Rs.  17,00,000/-  which  was  the   4th  highest.   The  bid  of  the
appellant having been found to be the highest, it was  accepted  and  Letter
of Intent was issued on 02.03.2010.  Thereafter Sale Deed in respect of  the
Café was executed in favour of the appellant on 31.03.2010.



After the execution of the Sale Deed, respondent No.1 who has  been  running
a Dhaba next to the site, filed CWP No.1557 of 2010 in  the  High  Court  of
Himachal Pradesh submitting that the appellant had not submitted his  annual
turnover  and  net  worth  for  last  three  years  as  stipulated  in   the
advertisement.   No  allegation  was  made  of  any   arbitrariness,   bias,
favoritism or malice in the auction process.  The appellant filed his  reply
in  opposition.   An  affidavit  in  reply  was  also  filed  by  the  State
Government  opposing  the  Writ  Petition  stating  that  the  highest   bid
submitted by the appellant was rightly accepted after due  consideration  by
the Committee comprising of  high  ranked  officials  and  that  the  entire
process was completely fair and transparent.


The aforesaid Writ Petition was allowed by Single Judge of  the  High  Court
by his judgment and order  dated  14.08.2012.   It  was  observed  that  the
condition regarding submission of  the  net  worth  was  mandatory  and  the
Committee could  not  have  over-looked  such  condition.   It  was  further
observed that the Expert Committee had fixed the reserve  price  in  respect
of the Café at Rs.30,78,000/- while the bid submitted by  the  appellant  at
Rs.27,15,000/- was accepted.  Interestingly,  respondent  No.1  himself  had
given a bid  for  Rs.17,00,000/-,  far  below  the  alleged  reserve  price.
However, the Single Judge while accepting the submissions made on behalf  of
the respondent No.1 allowed the Writ Petition  and  quashed  the  Letter  of
Intent dated 02.03.2010 and Sale Deed  dated  31.03.2010  and  directed  the
authorities to re-do the entire process of selling said Café  in  accordance
with law.


This decision of the Single Judge was challenged by the appellant by  filing
LPA No.441 of 2012.  The Division Bench upheld the view taken by the  Single
Judge on both counts namely that  offer  of  the  appellant  was  below  the
reserve  price  and  that  the  condition  regarding  submission  of  annual
turnover and net worth for last three years was not  complied  with  by  the
appellant. The Division Bench thus dismissed  LPA  No.441  of  2012  by  its
order dated 20.05.2013.


This appeal challenges the correctness of the decisions so rendered  by  the
High Court.  While issuing notice, this Court by order dated 04.07.2013  had
directed that Status quo be maintained by the parties.  By subsequent  order
dated 08.10.2014 the respondent No.1 was directed to deposit in  this  Court
a sum  of  Rs.30,00,000/-,  which  the  respondent  had  offered  after  the
finalization  of  the  bid.   The  amount  having  been  deposited  by   the
respondent No.1,  it  now  stands  invested  in  an  interest  bearing  term
deposit.


We have heard Mr. Tushar Bakshi, learned Advocate for the appellant and  Mr.
Mahavir  Singh,  learned  Senior  Advocate  for  respondent  No.1  and   Mr.
Suryanarayan Singh, Senior Additional Advocate General for the State.


Mr. Bakshi, learned Advocate is right in  his  submission  that  no  reserve
price was fixed while inviting bids from  interested  parties.   The  Expert
Committee may have  indicated  a  figure  as  reserve  price,  however,  the
advertisement did not indicate any.  Precisely for  this  reason,  even  the
bid given by respondent No.1 was far below  the  figure  of  Rs.30,78,000/-.
The High Court was clearly in error in accepting  this  plea  on  behalf  of
respondent No.1


Now, the question that remains to be considered is  whether  requirement  to
furnish Annual Turnover and Net Worth for last three years was  a  mandatory
condition for infraction of which the bid made by the appellant  had  to  be
rejected.  In Poddar Steel  Corporation  v.  Ganesh  Engineering  Works  and
Others[1], this Court considered conditions which are  essential  conditions
of eligibility and those which are ancillary or  subsidiary  with  the  main
object to be achieved. It was observed in para 6 of the decision as under:-


“…….As a matter of general proposition it cannot be held that  an  authority
inviting tenders is bound to give effect to  every  term  mentioned  in  the
notice in meticulous detail, and is not entitled to waive even  a  technical
irregularity of little or no significance.  The  requirements  in  a  tender
notice can be classified  into  two  categories-those  which  lay  down  the
essential  conditions  of  eligibility  and  the  others  which  are  merely
ancillary or  subsidiary  with  the  main  object  to  be  achieved  by  the
condition.  In the first case  the  authority  issuing  the  tender  may  be
required to enforce them rigidly.  In the other cases it  must  be  open  to
the authority to deviate from and not to  insist  upon  the  strict  literal
compliance of the condition in a appropriate cases.


In the present case, the site in question was to be sold  on  outright  sale
basis.  The advertisement or the stipulations therein  did  not  contemplate
creation and  or  continuation  of  any  relationship  between  the  parties
calling for  continued  existence  of  any  particular  level  of  financial
parameters on part of the bidder, except the ability to  pay  the  price  as
per his bid.  The condition was not an essential condition at  all  but  was
merely ancillary to achieve the main object that was to ensure that the  bid
amount was paid promptly.  The advertisement  contemplated  payment  of  bid
amount whereafter the Sale Deed would be executed  and  not  a  relationship
which would have continued for considerable period warranting  an  assurance
of continued ability on part of the bidder to fulfill his obligations  under
the arrangement.  Nor was this condition  aimed  at  ensuring  a  particular
level of financial ability on part of  the  bidder,  for  example  in  cases
where the benefit is designed  to  be  given  to  a  person  coming  from  a
particular financial segment, in which case  the  condition  could  well  be
termed essential.  The idea was pure  and  clear  sale  simplicitor.   As  a
matter of fact, the appellant did pay  the  entire  bid  amount  within  the
prescribed period and the Sale Deed was also executed in his favor.  In  the
circumstances the relevant condition in the advertisement would not fall  in
the first category of cases as dealt with by  this  Court  in  Poddar  Steel
Corporation (supra).  The authorities could therefore validly  deviate  from
and not insist upon strict literal compliance.  The discretion so  exercised
by the authorities  could  not  have  therefore  been  faulted.   Thus,  the
assessment made by the High Court that the  condition  in  question  was  an
essential condition for non-compliance of which, the bid  furnished  by  the
appellant was required to be rejected, in our view was not correct.



We, therefore, allow this Appeal and set aside  the  decisions  rendered  by
the Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High  Court  in  the  present
matter.  The Letter of Intent dated  02.03.2010  and  consequent  Sale  Deed
dated 31.03.2010 in favor of the appellant are held valid and correct.   The
Writ Petition namely CWP  No.1557  of  2010  preferred  by  respondent  No.1
stands dismissed.  The amount deposited by the  respondent  No.  1  in  this
Court pursuant to order dated 08.10.2014 shall  be  returned  to  respondent
No.1 along with interest accrued therein.


The appeal is disposed of accordingly without any order as to costs.



      ………………………..CJI.
      (T. S. Thakur)


                                           ……………………..……...J.
                              (Uday Umesh Lalit)
New Delhi,
May 13, 2016
-----------------------
[1]    (1991) 3 SSC 273