It becomes clear from the above that insofar as dispute pertaining to 94 Bigha 15 Biswa is concerned, it was totally a different subject matter not covered by the proceedings in the first round. We would like to reproduce the following observations of the learned single Judge in his judgment dated December 01, 2010 which clinches the issue and we entirely agree with the said reasons. “20. The petitioners have not pleaded that the said 94 bighas 15 biswas of land or any part thereof was part of the holding in Khewat Nos. 73 and 85 of which the petitioners and the respondents were Bhumidars and in possession. Thus it cannot be said that the partition/distribution of land of which the petitioners and the respondents were Bhumidars and in possession of is bad for the reason of non inclusion of 94 bighas 15 biswas of land of which the petitioners are not shown to be Bhumidars and in possession. The petitioners in fact by way of these proceedings are found to be seeking to reopen the matters which stand concluded in the earlier round of litigation till the Supreme Court.” - It is for this reason that this Court gave liberty to the appellants to initiate appropriate proceedings in this behalf including filing of suit if that was remedy available in law. The appellants, in fact, filed the suit for this purpose. However, for reasons best known to them, they choose to withdraw the suit. After the withdrawal of the suit, they again approach the Commissioner and filed revision petition arising out of earlier proceedings which was rightly dismissed by the Commissioner holding that such proceedings were not maintainable. It is this view which is upheld by the single Judge as well as Division Bench of the High Court. We may point out that the learned single Judge of the High Court has even recorded in his judgment that respondents have no objection to the appellants instituting proceedings, if entitled in law, for claiming share in the said 94 Bigha 15 Biswa of land.

                                                              NON-REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  2522 OF 2016
              (ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (CIVIL) NO. 15358 OF 2011)


|RAM DUTT (D) THROUGH LRS. & ORS.           |.....APPELLANT(S)            |
|                                           |                             |
|VERSUS                                     |                             |
|DEV DUTT (D) THROUGH LRS. & ORS.           |.....RESPONDENT(S)           |


                               J U D G M E N T


A.K. SIKRI, J.

                 Leave granted.

We heard learned counsel for the  parties  at  length.   For  deciding  this
appeal, those  facts  which  are  essential  to  understand  the  nature  of
controversy are captured hereinafter.
            The appellants, who  are  three  in  numbers,  and  the  private
respondents, who are 27 in numbers (hereinafter referred to as the  “private
respondents”), are members of one family.  Their predecessors owned land  in
the Revenue Estate of Burari, Delhi since 1948, i.e., much before the  Delhi
Land Reforms Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”)  was  enacted.
The appellants,  therefore,  claimed  that  they  are  co-sharers  with  the
private respondents in the said land which is described as  Khewat  Nos.  73
and 85 in Revenue Estate, Burari, Delhi.  According to them, total  area  of
the land comprised by the aforesaid  two  Khewat  numbers  is  253.31  Bigha
which is now owned by the said family members.  After coming into  force  of
the said Act, a part of said land was  recorded  in  the  Bhumidari  of  the
appellants   only.    This   gave   cause   of   action   to   the   private
respondents/their predecessors to file proceedings under Section 11  of  the
Act for declaration that they were also Bhoomidars of the  said  land  which
could not be exclusively  entered  in  the  name  of  the  appellants.   The
appellants, on the other hand, claimed that the land  in  respect  of  which
they were declared Bhoomidars vested in them  exclusively  as  a  result  of
oral partition and re-partition during consolidation  proceedings  conducted
in the year 1975-76.  The Court of Revenue Assistant decided  the  issue  in
favour of the appellants and dismissed  the  proceedings  initiated  by  the
private respondents.  First appeal  of  the  private  respondents  preferred
against the aforesaid order  was  also  dismissed.   However,  their  second
appeal  to  the  Financial  Commissioner  was  accepted  vide  orders  dated
February  08,  1979  and  these  private  respondents   were   declared   as
Bhoomidars, in accordance with their shares, along with  the  appellants  in
respect of those lands contained in Khewat Nos. 73 and  85  in  the  Revenue
Estate of Burari.

The Consolidation Officer implemented the aforesaid orders vide  his  orders
dated December 31, 1982 thereby modifying the allotment pursuant to the  re-
partition.  The appellants, on the other hand, did  not  accept  this  order
and preferred a revision petition  to  the  Financial  Commissioner  against
orders dated December 31, 1982.  Main plea of the appellants  was  that  the
Consolidation Officer could not have ordered modification in the  allotment,
having  become  functus  officio.   The  Financial  Commissioner,   however,
rejected the revision petition of the appellants vide his orders dated  June
14, 1983.  He held that since at the time when the order dated  February  8,
1979 (supra) was passed holding the private  respondents/their  predecessors
as Bhumidars together with the appellants, consolidation proceedings in  the
village were in progress, the private  respondents/their  predecessors  were
entitled to approach the Consolidation Officer  for  allotment  of  land  to
them in lieu of their share in the Bhumidari rights out of  Khewat  Nos.  73
and 85.  The contentions of the appellants that  the  Consolidation  Officer
had become functus officio and could not effect partition was negatived  and
the Consolidation Officer was held to be  entitled  to  allot  land  to  the
private respondents/their predecessors as per their joint Khewats  with  the
appellants.

The appellants preferred CWP No. 2462/1984 in the  High  Court  against  the
aforesaid order dated June 14, 1983  of  the  Financial  Commissioner.   The
said Writ Petition was dismissed vide order dated February 11, 1985.

The appellants then preferred SLP No. 9594/1985  which  was  also  dismissed
vide order dated January 27, 1986.  It is, thus, clear  that  order  of  the
Financial Commissioner attained  finality.  However,  while  dismissing  the
special leave petition, this Court also made  certain  observations.  Since,
these observations are relevant for our purposes,  we  are  reproducing  the
order dated January 27, 1986 in its entirety:
“There is no ground to interfere with the order dated 8.2.1979  which  shall
be binding on the parties.  If the petitioners have not been allotted  1/5th
of the total holding as determined in the order dated 8.2.1979  it  will  be
opened to the petitioners to resort to any other  remedy  available  in  law
including a suit if it is permissible.  Status quo will  continue  for  four
weeks.  The Special Leave Petition is disposed off with the observations.”



Armed with this order, showing a window to agitate  their  rights  qua  non-
allotment of a particular land, the appellants filed a suit in the court  of
Revenue Assistant for allocation of their 1/5th share in the  Bhoomidari  in
Khewat Nos. 73 and 85.  However, after some time   the  appellants  withdrew
the said suit.

It so happened that respondent no. 26 also  felt  aggrieved  by  the  orders
dated December 13, 1982 of the Consolidation Officer  as  according  to  him
the Consolidation Officer had not correctly  implemented  the  orders  dated
February 08, 1979 passed by the  Financial  Commissioner.   He,  thus,  also
preferred a revision  petition  before  the  Financial  Commissioner.   This
revision petition was opposed by Respondent Nos. 1  to  25.   The  Financial
Commissioner, after hearing parties, passed  orders  dated  April  13,  1987
thereby remanding the matter back to the Consolidation Officer  for  correct
implementation of his order dated February  08,  1978.   The  writ  petition
filed by the Respondent  Nos.  1  to  25  against  the  said  order  of  the
Financial Commissioner was dismissed by the High Court.

When the matter was, thus, remanded back to  the  Consolidation  Officer  at
the instance of Respondent No. 26, the aforesaid success of  Respondent  No.
26 in the revision petition filed by him emboldened the appellants  as  well
to file another revision petition before the Financial  Commissioner.   They
contended that their grievances were the same as that of Respondent No.  26.
 They also referred to orders dated January 27, 1986 passed  by  this  Court
in Special Leave Petition No. 1994/1985 and on  that  basis  submitted  that
the Supreme Court had permitted them to claim their rightful share.

The Financial  Commissioner  vide  order  dated  November  11,  1987  though
dismissed   the   Revision   Petition    but    held    that    since    the
Tehsildar/Consolidation Officer  pursuant  to  the  order  in  the  Revision
Petition of the respondent no. 26 was verifying the  shares  of  the  family
members in Kehwat Nos. 73 and 85, if the appellants had any grievance,  they
could also approach  the  Teshildar/Consolidation  Officer  who  vide  order
dated 12th July, 1988 divided the land in Khewat Nos. 73 &  85  between  the
appellants  and  the  private  respondents.  The  said  order  contains  the
particulars of the land allotted to each of the groups.  However,  after  so
dividing/apportioning the land, the Tehsildar/Consolidation Officer  at  the
foot of the order mentioned “the details of Khasra Nos. of two Khewats  i.e.
73 and 85 which have been left out for distribution amongst the  co-sharers”
and thereafter gave the Khasra Nos. of 94 bighas 15 biswas of land  so  left
out.  The said order of the  Tehsildar/Consolidation  Officer  records  that
the same was agreed to by all the parties.

The appellants  contending  that  the  Tehsildar/Consolidation  Officer  had
failed to divide/apportion the aforesaid 94 bighas 15 biswas of  land  again
preferred a Revision Petition to the Financial Commissioner.

The Financial Commissioner vide order dated August 09,  1988  dismissed  the
said Revision Petition as  not  maintainable.   It  was  held  that  if  the
appellants were claiming Bhumidari rights in the said 94  bighas  15  biswas
of land, their remedy was by way of an application under Section 11  of  the
Act for declaration of this Bhumidari rights and  that  the  appellants  had
already been given their share in accordance with order  dated  February  8,
1979.

It is this order of the Financial Commissioner which  was  impugned  by  the
appellants by filing writ petition in the High Court.  Learned Single  Judge
was not convinced by the plea raised by the  appellants  in  the  said  writ
petition and dismissed the  same  vide  judgment  dated  December  01,  2010
holding that there was no error  in  the  orders  passed  by  the  Financial
Commissioner. We may note that primary contention raised by  the  appellants
was that 94 bighas 15 biswas of land was left out  and  not  distributed  by
the Consolidation Officer.   The  appellants,  therefore,  pleaded  that  it
should also be distributed and they should not be relegated to having  their
rights as Bhumidars with  respect  to  the  said  land  by  instituting  the
separate proceedings under Section 11 of the Act.  This  contention  of  the
appellants was rejected by the learned  Single  Judge  of  the  High  Court,
inter alia, on the ground that the  land  which  the  Consolidation  Officer
distributed/apportioned between the appellants and the  private  respondents
vide his orders dated July 12, 1988 was a land of which the  appellants  and
the respondents were Bhumidars and of which they were in possession  and  it
was only that land which was the subject matter  of  orders  dated  February
08, 1979.  According to the learned Single Judge of  the  High  Court,  left
out land admeasuring 94 bighas 15 biswas in which the  appellants  were  now
claiming their share was the land in respect whereof there was a dispute  of
ownership and it was not for the High Court to  inquire  into  this  factual
aspect in writ jurisdiction.

The appellants filed Letters Patent Appeal  No.  128  of  2011  against  the
aforesaid  order  of  the  learned  Single  Judge.   This  appeal  has  been
dismissed by the Division Bench vide  its  orders  February  1,  2011.   The
Division Bench has taken note of order dated  January  27,  1986  passed  by
this Court in  SLP  (C)  No.  9594/1985  and  filing  of  the  suit  by  the
appellants thereof which was withdrawn.  On that basis, it is  held  that  a
second writ petition could not have been filed when on earlier occasion  the
lis  in-question  was  adjudicated.   It  has,  thus,  brushed   aside   the
submissions of the appellants that when a revision  petition  was  filed  by
one of the respondents, the appellants felt that  they  could  also  file  a
revision petition.

It is this order which is in appeal before us.

After going through the orders and hearing the counsel for the  parties,  we
are of the opinion that the impugned order of the High Court does  not  call
for any interference.  The narration of facts disclosed above  unambiguously
reveals that in the first round they had claimed  that  they  were  the  co-
sharers with private respondents in the land described  as  Khewat  Nos.  73
and 85 in Revenue Estate of Burari, Delhi which was measuring 253.31  Bhiga.
 The issue was whether the respondents  were  also  Bhumidars  of  the  said
land.  The appellants  had  contended  that  they  were  declared  Bhumidars
exclusively to the exclusion of private respondents  as  a  result  of  oral
partition and re-partition during  consolidation  proceedings  conducted  in
the  year  1975-1976.   Their  respective  shares  were  apportioned.   Such
proceedings were  ultimately  decided  in  favour  of  the  respondents  and
achieved finality as the SLP No.  9594/1985  of  the  appellants  were  also
dismissed.  However, before this Court, the appellants  took  another  plea,
namely, they were not allotted 1/5th of the total holding as  determined  in
the order dated 08.02.1979.  Taking  note  of  this  contention,  the  Court
observed that it would be open to the appellants  to  resort  to  any  other
remedy available in law  including  a  suit  if  it  is  permissible.   This
clearly  implied  that  for  non-allotment  of  entire  1/5th  holding,  the
appellants were free to avail  'any  other  remedy'  as  per  law.   Precise
contention of the appellants was that 94 Bigha 15 Biswa  of  land  was  left
out and not distributed and, therefore, the same  be  also  distributed  and
the appellants should get their rights as Bhumidars  in  the  said  land  as
well.  This land of 94 Bigha 15 Biswa was not  the  subject  matter  of  the
earlier proceedings.  Position in respect of this  land  is  stated  by  the
learned single Judge of the High Court in judgment dated December  01,  2010
in the following manner:

“...It thus appears that 94 bighas 15 biswas of the left out  land  referred
to in the  order  dated  12th  July,  1988  of  the  Tehsildar/Consolidation
Officer is the balance land as per the Jamabandi  of  the  year  1948.   The
land which the Consolidation  Officer  vide  order  dated  12th  July,  1988
distributed/ apportioned between the petitioners  and  the  respondents  was
the land of which the petitioners and the respondents were Bhumidars and  of
which they were in possession of and which land was the  subject  matter  of
the order dated 8th February, 1979 (supra).  It  thus  transpires  that  the
entire land of which the petitioners and the respondents were the  Bhumidars
and in possession of and in which the rights of  the  respondents  1  to  27
were upheld by the  order  dated  8th  February,  1979  which  has  attained
finality has already been distributed.  The left  out  land  admeasuring  94
bighas 15 biswas in which the petitioners are  now  claiming  share  is  the
land which, according to the petitioners, had in the  settlement  fallen  to
the share of the respondents and in which the  respondents  had  lost  their
rights by not taking back the mortgage upon coming into  force  of  the  DLR
Act.”

It becomes clear from the above that insofar as  dispute  pertaining  to  94
Bigha 15 Biswa is concerned, it was totally a different subject  matter  not
covered by the proceedings in the first round. We would  like  to  reproduce
the following observations of the  learned  single  Judge  in  his  judgment
dated December 01, 2010 which clinches the issue and we entirely agree  with
the said reasons.

“20.  The petitioners have not pleaded that the said 94 bighas 15 biswas  of
land or any part thereof was part of the holding in Khewat Nos.  73  and  85
of  which  the  petitioners  and  the  respondents  were  Bhumidars  and  in
possession.  Thus it cannot be said that the partition/distribution of  land
of  which  the  petitioners  and  the  respondents  were  Bhumidars  and  in
possession of is bad for the reason of non inclusion of 94 bighas 15  biswas
of land of which the petitioners are  not  shown  to  be  Bhumidars  and  in
possession.  The petitioners in fact by way of these proceedings  are  found
to be seeking to reopen the matters which stand  concluded  in  the  earlier
round of litigation till the Supreme Court.”

It is for this reason that this Court gave  liberty  to  the  appellants  to
initiate appropriate proceedings in this behalf including filing of suit  if
that was remedy available in law.  The appellants, in fact, filed  the  suit
for this purpose.  However, for reasons best known to them, they  choose  to
withdraw the suit.  After the withdrawal of the suit,  they  again  approach
the  Commissioner  and  filed  revision  petition  arising  out  of  earlier
proceedings which was rightly dismissed by  the  Commissioner  holding  that
such proceedings were not maintainable.  It is this view which is upheld  by
the single Judge as well as Division Bench of the High Court.  We may  point
out that the learned single Judge of the High Court  has  even  recorded  in
his  judgment  that  respondents  have  no  objection  to   the   appellants
instituting proceedings, if entitled in law, for claiming share in the  said
94 Bigha 15 Biswa of land.



We, thus, find no merit in  this  appeal  which  is  accordingly  dismissed.
However, there shall be no order as to cost.



                                ….......................................CJI.
                                                                (T.S.THAKUR)



                             .............................................J.
                                                                (A.K. SIKRI)



                             .............................................J.
                                                              (R. BANUMATHI)


NEW DELHI;
MARCH 04, 2016.

when the period of limitation prescribed in the Act for passing the assessment order expires, thereafter, the Commissioner is debarred from exercising his powers under sub-section (10) of Section 11 of the Act and cannot extend the period of limitation for the purposes of assessment.=The Assessing Officer, however, sent notices to the respondent- assessee in Form ST-XIV for the aforesaid Assessment Years, i.e., after the expiry of three years. The assessee took an objection that these notices were sent beyond the period of assessment and, therefore, it was not permissible for the Assessing Officer to issue notice after the expiry of three years and carry on with the assessment proceedings.=Therefore, there would be no question of extending the time for assessment when the assessment has already become time barred. A valuable right has also accrued in favour of the assessee when the period of limitation expires. If the Commissioner is permitted to grant the extension even after the expiry of original period of limitation prescribed under the Act, it will give him right to exercise such a power at any time even much after the last date of assessment That provision is made for the benefit of the assessee which empowers the Assessing Officer to grant an extension of time for filing of the return of income and, therefore, obviously will have no bearing on the issue at hand. Moreover, this Court in Ajantha Electricals's case (supra), which is relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, held that the time can be extended even after the time allowed originally has expired on the interpretation of the words “it has not been possible” occurring in Section 133(2) of the Act. The Court, thus, opined that the aforesaid expression would mean that the time can be extended even after original time prescribed in the said provision has expired. Same is our answer to the argument of Mr. Ganguli predicated on Section 28 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 as that provision was in altogether different context.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                  CIVIL APPEAL NOS.      2506-2511 OF 2016
              (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NOS. 21712-21717 OF 2009)



|STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS.                            |…..APPELLANT(S)         |
|   VERSUS                                         |                        |
|M/S. SHREYANS INDUS LTD. ETC.                     |.....RESPONDENT(S)      |


                                    WITH
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2512 OF 2016
                 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 31488 OF 2009)

                  CIVIL APPEAL NOS.      2513-2514 OF 2016
              (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NOS. 35619-35620 OF 2009)

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2515 OF 2016
                  (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 1672 OF 2010)

                     CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 2516-2517 OF 2016
              (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NOS. 13237-13238 OF 2010)

                  CIVIL APPEAL NOS.      2518-2519 OF 2016
               (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NOS. 5076-5077 OF 2011)

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2520 OF 2016
                 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 33095 OF 2011)

                                     AND

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2521 OF 2016
                 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 12305 OF 2015)


                               J U D G M E N T

A.K. SIKRI, J.
                 Leave granted.
In these appeals, the judgment which is  impugned  is  passed  by  the  High
Court of  Punjab  &  Haryana.   The  issue  involved  in  these  appeals  is
identical which pertains to the interpretation that is  to  be  accorded  to
sub-section (10) of Section  11  of  Punjab  General  Sales  Tax  Act,  1948
(hereinafter referred to as the “Act”).  It is  for  this  reason  that  all
these appeals were heard together and can conveniently  be  disposed  of  by
one common judgment.  Since SLP (C) Nos. 21712-21717 of 2009  was  taken  as
the lead case, for understanding the nature of lis  that  is  involved,  the
factual narration can be addressed from the said appeal.
In these appeals, we are concerned with Assessment Years  2000-01,  2001-02,
2002-03 and  2003-04.  Obviously, assessment in respect of these  Assessment
Years was to be made under the said Act.  The assessee had  filed  quarterly
returns in respect of the aforesaid Assessment Years.  In terms  of  Section
11(3) of the Act, time-limit for completing the assessment provided  therein
is three years from the end of the year.  Accordingly, assessments  were  to
be made by 30th April, 2004 for the Assessment  Year  2000-01,  30th  April,
2005 for the Assessment Year 2001-02, 30th April, 2006  for  the  Assessment
Year 2002-03 and 30th April, 2007 for the Assessment Year  2003-04.   It  is
an admitted case that no assessment was made in  respect  of  any  of  these
Assessment Years by the aforesaid stipulated dates.
The Assessing Officer, however, sent notices to the respondent- assessee  in
Form ST-XIV for the aforesaid Assessment Years, i.e., after  the  expiry  of
three years.  The assessee took an objection that these  notices  were  sent
beyond the period of assessment and, therefore, it was not  permissible  for
the Assessing Officer to issue notice after the expiry of  three  years  and
carry on with the assessment proceedings.
We may point out that under Section 11(10) of the Act, the  Commissioner  is
empowered to extend the period of three  years  for  passing  the  order  of
assessment for such further period as he may deem fit,  after  recording  in
writing the reasons for extending  such  period.   When  the  objection  was
taken by the assessee that the notices were  time  barred,  the  Excise  and
Taxation Commissioner, Patiala passed orders dated August 17, 2007  granting
extension of time.  Reason given for extension of time was that the case  of
the assessee for the year 1999-2000 was  pending  with  the  Tribunal.  This
order of extension was challenged by the respondent along with the order  of
assessment  passed  by  the  Assessing  Officer.   The  Tribunal,   however,
dismissed the appeal of the assessee vide  its  orders  September  13,  2007
holding that since there  was  a  power  of  extension  conferred  upon  the
Commissioner under Section 11(10) of the Act, the  Commissioner  was  within
his powers to extend the period.  The contention of the  assessee  was  that
though there was a power of extension, such a power could be exercised  only
within the limitation prescribed.  In other words,  it  was  contended  that
when the normal period of limitation for passing  assessment  order  by  the
Assessing Officer was three years, as per Section  11(3)  of  the  Act,  the
power to extend the period could be exercised  within  the  said  period  of
three years and not after the expiry of limitation  period.   This  plea  of
the assessee was rejected by the Tribunal.
The assessee took up the matter further by filing appeals  before  the  High
Court.  Here, the assessee has succeeded  in  its  submission  as  the  High
Court of Punjab and Haryana vide impugned judgment dated September 26,  2008
has held that once the period  of  limitation  expires,  the  immunity  from
subjecting  itself  to  the  assessment  sets  in  and  the  right  to  make
assessment gets extinguished.  Therefore,  when  the  period  of  limitation
prescribed in the Act for passing the assessment order expires,  thereafter,
the Commissioner is debarred from exercising his  powers  under  sub-section
(10) of Section 11 of the Act and cannot extend  the  period  of  limitation
for the purposes of assessment. This order is assailed  by  the  Revenue  in
the instant appeals before us.
It would also be pertinent to note, at this stage, that  while  arriving  at
the aforesaid conclusion, the Punjab  and  Haryana  High  Court  has  placed
heavy reliance upon the view taken by a Division  Bench  of  Karnataka  High
Court  in  Bharat  Heavy  Electricals  Ltd.  v.  Assistant  Commissioner  of
Commercial  Taxes  (INT-I),  South  Zone,  Bangalore  and  others[1]   which
judgment of Karnataka High Court, in turn, refers to similar view  taken  by
Gujarat High Court in Javer Jivan Mehta v. Assistant Commissioner  of  Sales
Tax (Appeal)[2].   Thus,  three  High  Courts  have  taken  identical  view,
namely,  though power to extend time of three years for a further period  of
passing the assessment is there with the Commissioner, the same  has  to  be
exercised before the  expiry  of  normal  period  of  three  years  and  not
subsequent there to.
As the submissions of the parties on either side would be better  understood
once the relevant statutory provision is noted,  it  would  be  apposite  to
reproduce the provisions of Section 11 of the Act, which are as follows:
“11. Assessment of tax. -  (1)  If  the  Assessing  Authority  is  satisfied
without requiring the presence of dealer or the production  by  him  of  any
evidence that the returns furnished in respect of  any  period  are  correct
and complete, he shall pass an order of assessment  on  the  basis  of  such
returns within a period of three years from the  last  date  prescribed  for
furnished the last return in respect of such period.

(2) If the Assessing  Authority  is  not  satisfied  without  requiring  the
presence of dealer who furnished  the  returns  or  production  of  evidence
that the returns  furnished  in  respect  of  any  period  are  correct  and
complete, he shall serve on such dealer a notice in  the  prescribed  manner
requiring him, on a date and at place specified therein,  either  to  attend
in person or to produce or to cause to be produced  any  evidence  on  which
such dealer may rely in support of such returns.

(3)   On the day specified in the notice or as soon afterwards  as  may  be,
the Assessing Authority shall, after hearing such  evidence  as  the  dealer
may produce, and such other evidence as the Assessing Authority may  require
on specified points, [pass an order of assessment within a period  of  three
years from the last date  prescribed  for  furnishing  the  last  return  in
respect of nay period.]

(4)   If a dealer having furnished returns in respect of a period, fails  to
comply with the terms of notice issued under sub-section (2), the  Assessing
Authority shall,  [within  a  period  of  three  years  from  the  1st  date
prescribed for furnishing the last return in  respect of such  period,  pass
an order of assessment to the best of his judgment.]

(5)   If a dealer does not furnish returns in respect of any period  by  the
last date prescribed the assessing authority shall within a period  of  five
years from the last date prescribed for furnishing the return in respect  of
such period and after giving the dealer a reasonable  opportunity  of  being
heard, pass an order of assessment to the best of his judgment.

(6)   IF upon information which has come into his possession, the  Assessing
Authority is satisfied that any dealer has been  liable  to  pay  tax  under
this Act in respect of any period but has failed to apply for  registration,
the Assessing Authority shall, within five years after the  expiry  of  such
period, after giving the dealer a reasonable  opportunity  of  being  heard,
proceed to access, to the best of his judgment the amount of  tax,  if  any,
due from the dealer in respect of such period  and  all  subsequent  periods
and  in  case  where  such  dealer  has  willfully  failed  to   apply   for
registration, the Assessing Authority may direct that the dealer  shall  pay
by way of penalty, in addition to the amount so  assessed,  in  addition  to
the amount so assessed, a sum not  exceeding  one  and  a  half  times  that
amount.

(7)   The amount of any tax, penalty or interest  payavble  under  this  Act
shall be paid by the dealer in the manner prescribed, by such  date  as  may
be specified in the  notice  issued  by  the  Assessing  Authority  for  the
purpose and the date so specified shall not be less than  fifteen  days  and
not more than thirty days from the date of service of such notice:

Provided that the Assessing Authority may, with the prior  approval  of  the
Assistant Excise and Taxation Commissioner, Incharge of the District  extend
the date of  such  payment  or  allow  payment  by  instalments  against  an
adequate security or bank guarantee.

(8)   If the tax assessed under this Act or any instalment  thereof  is  not
paid b y any dealer within the time  specified  thereof  in  the  notice  of
assessment  or  in  the  order  permitting  payment  in  installments,   the
Commissioner or any other person appointed to assist him  under  s9b-section
(1) of Section 3 may, after giving  such  dealer  an  opportunity  of  being
heard, impose on him a penalty not exceeding in  amount  the  sum  due  from
him.

(9)   Any assessment made under this section shall be without  prejudice  to
any penalty imposed under this Act.

(10)  The Commissioner, may for reasons to be recorded in  writing,  extends
the period of three years, for passing the  order  of  assessment  for  such
further period as he may deem fit.

(11)  Where the proceedings of assessment are stayed  by  an  order  of  any
court, the period for which such stay remains  in  force,  shall  not  count
towards computing the period of three years  specified  under  this  section
for passing the order of assessment.

(12)  The assessing authority may on his own motion, review  any  assessment
order passed by him and such review shall be completed within  a  period  of
one year from the date of order under review.”
                                                         (emphasis supplied)


A mere reading of  the  aforesaid  provision  would  reflect  that  wherever
return is filed by the assessee, assessment is to be made  within  a  period
of three years from the last date prescribed for furnishing  the  return  in
respect of such period. On the other hand, in those cases  where  return  is
not filed or any dealer, who is liable to pay the tax under  the  Act,  does
not get himself registered therein, the period of assessment  prescribed  is
five years.  We are not concerned with the alternate  situation  as  in  the
instant appeals not only the assessees  are  registered  dealers,  they  had
also filed  their  returns  regularly  within  the  prescribed  period  and,
therefore, assessments were to be completed within a period of  three  years
from the last date prescribed for  furnishing  the  returns,  which  is  the
normal period prescribed.  At the same time, sub-section (10) of Section  11
gives power  to  the  Commissioner  to  extend  a  period  of  three  years.
Interestingly, there is no upper limit prescribed for which the  period  can
be extended, meaning thereby such an extension can be given,  theoretically,
for any  length  of  time.   This  discretion  is,  however,  controlled  by
obligating the Commissioner to give his  reasons  for  extension,  and  such
reasons are to be recorded in writing.  Obviously,  the  purpose  of  giving
reasons in writing is to ensure that the  power  to  extend  the  period  of
limitation is exercised for valid reasons based on  material  considerations
and that power is not abused by exercising it  without  any  application  of
mind, or mala  fide  or  on  irrelevant  considerations  or  for  extraneous
purposes. Such an  order  of  extension  of  time,  naturally,  is  open  to
judicial review, albeit within the confines of law on  the  basis  of  which
such judicial review is permissible.
Be that as it may, the question before us is as  to  whether  the  power  to
extend time is to be necessarily exercised before the normal expiry  of  the
said period of three years run out.
Mr. Ganguli, submitted that there is no such embargo or impediment  provided
in sub-section (10) of Section 11 mandating  the  Commissioner  to  pass  an
order of extension necessarily within the normal period of three  years.  He
submitted that the word used in the aforesaid provision 'extension' of  time
is in contradistinction  to  the  word  'deferment'  which  appears  in  the
Karnataka Legislation. On that basis, he argued that  it  was  inappropriate
on the part of the High Court to refer to and  rely  upon  the  judgment  of
Karnataka  High  Court  inasmuch  as  provision  of  law  contained  in  the
Karnataka Sales Tax Act is entirely different.  He  further  submitted  that
since in Punjab Legislation, the expression used  is  'extension  of  time',
the Court was required to construe the provision keeping in  mind  the  said
language.  Mr. Ganguli argued  that  a  reading  of  meaning  of  expression
'deferment' and 'extension' of time as contained in Black's  Law  Dictionary
will clearly bring out the difference.
“defer, vb. 1. To postpone; to delay <to defer taxes to another year>”
“deferment, n.  1.  The  act  of  delaying;  postponement  <deferment  of  a
judicial decision>”

                  It  was  submitted  that  the  expressions   'defer'   and
'deferment' as can be seen from the above definitions,  clearly  contemplate
postponement, which presupposes that the time  period  originally  fixed  is
not extinguished.  In other words, an action, which is  deferred,  (i.e.  an
action which is required to be completed within a specified time frame)  can
only be deferred of which the time so fixed has not expired.
                 It was submitted that, in contrast, Black's Law  Dictionary
defines the expression 'extension' as follows:
      “Extension, n. 3. Tax. A period of additional time to file an  income-
tax return beyond its due date.  4. A period of additional time to  take  an
action, make a decision, accept an offer, or complete a task”

                  It  was  argued  that  the  word  'extension  has'  varied
meanings, dependent on the context in which  it  is  used.   The  expression
'extension' in the context of surveillance orders, has been  interpreted  in
the following manner:
“Where surveillance pursuant to order issued  under  Title  III  of  Omnibus
Crime  Control  and  Safe  Streets  Act  is  of  same   premises,   involves
substantially same persons, and is part of same investigation, second  Title
III  surveillance  order  issued  after  expiration  of   first   order   is
'extension' of first  order  for  purposes  of  requirement  of  sealing  of
recordings, even if there is gap of time  in  between  expiration  of  first
order             and             entry             of              second.”
(Emphasis supplied)



Mr. Ganguli also referred to the concept of  extension  as  incorporated  in
Section 148 of the Code of  Civil  Procedure,  1908.   He  relied  upon  the
judgment of this Court in D.V. Paul v. Manisha  Lalwani[3].  This  Court  in
paragraph 26 of the said judgment held as under:
“26. Insofar as the first aspect  is  concerned  Section  148  CPC,  in  our
opinion, clearly reserves in favour of the court the power  to  enlarge  the
time required for doing an act prescribed or allowed by the  Code  of  Civil
Procedure.  Section 148 of the Code may at this stage be extracted.

“148.  Enlargement of time.— Where any period is fixed  or  granted  by  the
court for the doing of any act prescribed  or  allowed  by  this  Code,  the
court may, it its discretion, from time to time,  enlarge  such  period  not
exceeding thirty days in total, even though the period originally  fixed  or
granted may have expired.”

A plain reading of the above would show that when  any  period  or  time  is
granted by the court for doing any act, the court has  the  discretion  from
time to time to enlarge such period even if the  time  originally  fixed  or
granted by the court has expired.  It is evident from the language  employed
in the provision that the power given to  the  court  is  discretionary  and
intended to be exercised only to meet the ends of justice.”

Mr. Ganguli further submitted that even in the context of  taxation  law,  a
similar reasoning has been adopted by the Court in  Commissioner  of  Income
Tax, Jullundur v. Ajanta Electricals[4]. While interpreting  Section  139(2)
of the Income Tax Act, which empowered the Assessing  Officer  to  grant  an
extension of time for filing of the return of income,  upholding  the  power
of the Income Tax Officer to extend the time for filing of  the  Income  Tax
return by the  assessee  even  after  the  expiry  of  the  time  originally
granted, this Court held as follows:“
“9. In this context, the question whether a  belated  application  could  be
regarded as valid or not has to be considered. As  rightly  pointed  out  by
the Punjab and Haryana High Court while deciding these cases  under  Section
256(2) and by the Calcutta High Court in Sunderdas  Thackersay  &  Bros.(137
ITR 646), there are no words of limitation in Section 139(2) to  the  effect
that no application could be filed after the period allowed had expired.  As
we have stated earlier, it was a procedural provision. The limit  of  thirty
days was not intended to be final as discretion was  given  to  the  ITO  to
extend that date. The ITO could have  been  called  upon  to  exercise  that
discretion for proper reasons. No fetters were placed  upon  the  discretion
of the ITO as regards the number of times he could extend the  date  or  the
period  for  which  he  could  extend  it.  It  is  conceded  that  repeated
applications could be made within the time allowed, in  view  of  the  clear
indication to that effect in Form No. 6, by the use of  words  “it  has  not
been possible”. If it was intended that the  application  for  extension  of
time under Section 139(2) was to be made within the time allowed  originally
or within the extended time then the words “it has not been  possible”  were
not at all necessary and the words “it is  not  possible”  would  have  been
sufficient. Though the rule cannot affect,  control  or  derogate  from  the
section of the Act, so long as it does not have that effect, it  has  to  be
regarded as having the same force as the section  of  the  Act.  If  Section
139(2) is read along with Rule 13 and Form No. 6 it becomes  clear  that  an
application for extension could  be  made  even  after  the  period  allowed
originally or as a result of extension granted had expired. Keeping in  mind
the object of giving discretion to the ITO and the  consequences  that  were
to follow from not filing the return within time, we  see  no  justification
for  reading  into  the  section  any  limitation  to  the  effect  that  no
application could be made after the time allowed  had  expired.  We  see  no
good reason to construe the section so narrowly.”
                                                         (emphasis supplied)

                 In that judgment,  applying  the  principles  contained  in
Section 148, CPC, it was remarked as under:
“10. We cannot accept the contention raised on behalf of  the  Revenue  that
the word ‘extend’ in the proviso to Section 139(2) implies that at the  time
of making the application the time allowed should not have  expired.  Though
the Civil Procedure Code by itself does not apply to the  proceedings  under
the Income Tax Act, we see no reason why a principle  of  procedure  evolved
for doing justice to a party to the proceeding cannot be called  in  aid  to
while interpreting a procedural provision contained in the Act. Section  148
of the Code provides that where any period is fixed or granted by the  court
for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by the Code, the  court  may,
in its discretion, from time to time, enlarge such period, even  though  the
period originally fixed or granted may have expired. Various situations  can
be envisaged where a party to the proceeding is prevented  by  circumstances
beyond his control from doing the required act within the fixed period.  The
assessee may be able to point out that because of  a  sudden  death  in  the
family or because of his sudden illness of a serious nature  or  because  he
had to leave for an outside place all of a sudden or because  he  could  not
return from outside in  spite  of  his  best  efforts,  or  for  other  good
reasons, as the case may be, he was not  able  to  file  the  return  within
time............”
                                   [Emphasis supplied]


Mr. Ganguli also drew sustenance from the Arbitration Act, 1940  which  gave
power to the Court to extend time.  It was submitted  that  this  Court  has
held  in  the  matter  of  Hindustan  Steelworks  Construction  Ltd.  v.  C.
Rajasekhar Rao[5] that the Court has got  the  power  to  extend  time  even
after the award has been given or after the expiry of the period  prescribed
from the award.
Mr. Ganguli re-emphasised that reliance upon the decision  of  Gujarat  High
Court in the impugned judgment was untenable as the provisions of  Karnataka
Sales Tax Act are  totally  different  inasmuch  as  Section  12(6)  of  the
Karnataka Act  provided  only  'deferment'.   He  submitted  that  even  the
judgment  of  Gujarat  High  Court  in   Javer   Jivan   Mehta2   case   was
distinguishable since that was also a case of exclusion of a period and  the
issue therein was the computation of period of limitation.
The aforesaid contentions were refuted by the learned counsel  who  appeared
for assessees in these appeals.  It was submitted that sub-section  (10)  of
Section 11 states, in no uncertain term, that the assessment order is to  be
passed 'within a period of three years......'. It was  emphasised  that  the
word 'within' was of significance.  It was pointed out that before the  year
1998, no period of limitation was prescribed and such a  provision  came  to
be inserted by way of amendment vide Act No. 12  of  1998  dated  April  20,
1998 .  It was further argued that sub-section (10) of Section 11  obligates
the Commissioner to record reasons in writing while  extending  the  period.
It was submitted that this requirement of recording of reasons came  up  for
consideration before Punjab  &  Haryana  High  Court  and  in  a  series  of
judgments, it is held that such an order of extension of time can be  passed
only after giving an opportunity of hearing to the  assessee.   The  learned
counsel referred to the following judgments of the High Court:
(i)   State of Punjab, Through Assistant Excise and  Taxation  Commissioner,
Bathinda v. M/s. Olam Agro India Ltd. (formerly  Olam  Export  India  Ltd.);
decided by the Punjab & Haryana High Court on August 20, 2013.

      (ii)  State of Punjab v. M/s.  Olam  Agro  India  Ltd.;  Daily  Order;
Dismissed by the Supreme Court vide Oder dated May 08, 2015.

      (iii) A.B. Sugars Limited v. The State of Punjab and  others;  Decided
by the Punjab & Haryana High Court on September 01, 2009.

It was also  argued  that  conceptually  there  was  no  difference  between
'deferment' and 'extension' insofar as it  related  to  the  issue  at  hand
which is concerned with the point  of  time  at  which  Commissioner  is  to
exercise his powers.  For that, the reasons given by  Karnataka  High  Court
as well as Gujarat High Court holding that such a  power  gets  extinguished
with the expiry of normal period of limitation  prescribed  and,  therefore,
cannot be exercised after the limitation period were  germane  and  relevant
while construing the provisions of sub-section (10) of  Section  11  of  the
Act as well and, therefore, those cases were  rightly  relied  upon  by  the
High Court in the impugned judgment.
In rejoinder, Mr. Ganguli refuted the aforesaid submissions of  the  learned
counsel for the assessees.  The arguments  advanced  by  him  was  that  the
submission  of  the  assessees  that  the  Commissioner  has  to  afford  an
opportunity of  hearing  to  the  dealer  before  extending  the  period  of
limitation does not arise in the present case as  this  was  not  the  issue
raised in the Courts below.  He argued that the question to  be  decided  in
these appeals was as to whether the power under sub-section (10) of  Section
11 of the Act could be exercised on the expiry of the period of three  years
and this question is not answered  in  the  judgments  referred  to  by  the
opposite party.  He further submitted that it is a question of  fact  to  be
decided in each case as to whether assessee was entitled to such a right  of
hearing and, therefore, this issue could not be taken up for the first  time
in these appeals.
We have bestowed our serious considerations to the submissions made  by  the
counsel who argued the matter.
We may say at the outset that  though  provisions  of  the  Punjab  Act  are
couched in different  language  from  Karnataka  Act  or  Gujarat  Act,  the
essence of these provisions is same.  As noticed above,  insofar  as  scheme
of Punjab Act is concerned, the assessment order is to  be  normally  passed
within a period of three years.  At the same time, power  is  given  to  the
Commissioner under Section 11(10) of the Act to extend the  said  period  of
three years.  Once such an extension is given,  the  order  is  passed  even
beyond the period of three years.  Significantly, no upper  limit  is  fixed
while giving such extension which means that the power can be exercised  for
extending the period  for  any  length  of  time,  subject  however  to  the
condition that the Commissioner is bound to record  the  reasons  justifying
such an extension.  Obviously, when the Commissioner passes  such  an  order
and give reasons, not only he would have to justify his action of  extending
time but also the period by which the time is extended.   In  the  Karnataka
Legislation, the power is of 'deferment'.  In that Legislation as well,  the
Assessment Order is to be passed within three years as  sub-section  (5)  of
Section 12 of Karnataka Sales Tax Act stipulates that  no  assessment  shall
be made after a period of three years from the  date  on  which  the  return
under sub-section (1) of that order is submitted by a dealer subject to  two
provisos mentioned therein.  Sub-section (6) of Section 12  mentions  as  to
how the period of limitation is to be computed and reads as under:
“(6)  In computing the  period  of  limitation  for  assessment  under  this
Section,-

(a)  the time during which the proceedings for assessment in  question  have
been deferred on account of any stay order  granted  by  any  Court  or  any
other authority shall be excluded;

(b)  the time during which the assessment has been deferred in any  case  or
class of cases by the Joint Commissioner  for  reasons  to  be  recorded  in
writing shall be excluded.”


Clause  (b)  of  sub-section  (6)  indicates  that  Joint  Commissioner,  in
appropriate cases, may pass an order for deferment of  Assessment  Order  to
be passed by the Assessing Authority and once such an order is passed,  that
period has not to be counted  while  computing  the  period  of  limitation.
Significantly, this  provision  also  mandates  the  Joint  Commissioner  to
record  reasons  for  deferring  the  orders  of  assessment.   In  essence,
therefore, the purport and objective behind the provisions in Punjab Act  as
well as in  Karnataka  Act  remains  the  same.   By  making  any  order  of
deferment under sub-section (6) of Section 12 of Karnataka  Sales  Tax  Act,
the Joint Commissioner is, in fact, achieving the same purpose  of  granting
more time to the Assessing Officer to pass the Assessment  Order.   Same  is
the purpose behind sub-section (11) of Section 10  of  the  Punjab  Act.  In
view thereof, it may not be appropriate to go into the  nuanced  distinction
between  “deferment”  and  “extension”  as  per  the  definitions  contained
Black's Law Dictionary in the given situation, which is dealt  with  in  the
instant appeals.

Even otherwise, it is important to understand the ratio  laid  down  in  the
judgment of Karnataka High Court in Bharat Heavy Electricals  Ltd.  (supra).
The issue in the said case  before  the  Karnataka  High  Court  was  as  to
whether the power to pass a deferment order is to be  exercised  even  after
the expiry of the period of limitation which was answered in  the  negative.
The reasons given in support of this conclusion are as follows:
“...Deferment of assessment has  the  effect  of  enlarging  the  period  of
limitation which  did  not  expire  by  the  time  the  deferment  order  is
contemplated to be passed.  When once the period of limitation expires,  the
immunity against being subject to assessment sets in and the right  to  make
assessment gets extinguished.   Resort  to  deferment  provisions  does  not
retrieve the situation.  There is no question of deferring assessment  which
has already become time-barred.  The provision  for  exclusion  of  time  in
computing the period of limitation of deferment of assessment  is  meant  to
prevent further running of time against the Revenue if  the  limitation  had
not expired.”
                                                         (emphasis supplied)

It was also observed that  upon  the  lapse  of  the  period  of  limitation
prescribed,  the  right  of  the  Department  to  assess  an  assessee  gets
extinguished and this  extension  confers  a  very  valuable  right  on  the
assessee.
If one is to go by the aforesaid dicta, with which we  entirely  agree,  the
same shall apply in the instant cases  as  well.   In  the  context  of  the
Punjab Act, it can be said that extension of time  for  assessment  has  the
effect of enlarging the  period  of  limitation  and,  therefore,  once  the
period  of  limitation  expires,  the  immunity  against  being  subject  to
assessment sets in and the  right  to  make  assessment  gets  extinguished.
Therefore, there would be no question of extending the time  for  assessment
when the assessment has already become time barred.  A  valuable  right  has
also accrued in favour  of  the  assessee  when  the  period  of  limitation
expires.  If the Commissioner is  permitted  to  grant  the  extension  even
after the expiry of original period of limitation prescribed under the  Act,
it will give him right to exercise such a power at any time even much  after
the last date of assessment.  In the instant appeals itself, when  the  last
dates of assessment were 30th April, 2004, 30th  April,  2005,  30th  April,
2006 and 30th April, 2007, order extending the time under Section 11(10)  of
the Act were passed on August 17, 2007, August 17,  2007,  August  17,  2007
and May 25, 2007 respectively.  Thus, for  the  Assessment  Year  2000-2001,
order of extension is passed more than three years after the last  date  and
for the Assessment Year 2001-2002, it is more than two years after the  last
date.  Such a situation cannot be countenanced as rightly held by  the  High
Court.  When the last date of assessment  in  respect  of  these  Assessment
Years expired, it vested a valuable right in the assessee  which  cannot  be
lightly taken away.  As a consequence, sub-section (11) of  Section  10  has
to be interpreted in the manner which is  equitable  to  both  the  parties.
Therefore, the only way to interpret the same is that by holding that  power
to extend  the  time  is  to  be  exercised  before  the  normal  period  of
assessment expires. On the aforesaid interpretation, other arguments of  Mr.
Ganguli lose all significance.  Argument of learned senior counsel  for  the
appellants based on Section 148 of the  CPC  would  be  of  no  consequence.
This Section categorically states that power to enlarge the  period  can  be
exercised  even  when  period  originally  fixed  has  expired.    Likewise,
reliance upon Section 139(2) of the Income Tax Act  is  misconceived.   That
provision is made for  the  benefit  of  the  assessee  which  empowers  the
Assessing Officer to grant an extension of time for filing of the return  of
income and, therefore, obviously will have no bearing on the issue at  hand.
 Moreover, this Court  in  Ajantha  Electricals's  case  (supra),  which  is
relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant,  held  that  the  time
can be extended even after the time allowed originally has  expired  on  the
interpretation of the words “it has not been possible” occurring in  Section
133(2) of the Act.  The Court, thus, opined that  the  aforesaid  expression
would  mean  that  the  time  can  be  extended  even  after  original  time
prescribed in the said provision has expired.  Same is  our  answer  to  the
argument of Mr. Ganguli predicated on Section 28  of  the  Arbitration  Act,
1940 as that provision was in altogether different context.
We, thus, do not find any error in the  impugned  judgments  of  Punjab  and
Haryana High  Court  and  as  a  consequence,  dismiss  all  these  appeals.
Parties are, however, left to bear their own cost.

                           .............................................CJI.
                                                               (T.S. THAKUR)



                          ................................................J.
                                                                (A.K. SIKRI)



                          ................................................J.
                                                              (R. BANUMATHI)


NEW DELHI;
MARCH 04, 2016.
-----------------------
[1]   (2006) 143 STC 10
[2]   (1998) 111 STC 199
[3]   (2010) 8 SCC 546
[4]   (!994) 5 SCC 182
[5]   (1987) 4 SCC 93

whether the State Police Chief/Director General of Police is empowered to appoint a superior police officer to investigate a crime case registered outside the territorial jurisdiction of such officer. - YES - Section 36 of the Cr.P.C. and Section 18(1) of the Police Act are in the following terms : “36. Powers of superior officers of police :- Police officers superior in rank to an officer in charge of a police station may exercise the same powers, throughout the local area to which they are appointed, as may be exercised by such officer within the limits of his station.” “18. State Police Chief :- The administration, supervision, direction and control of the Police throughout the State shall, subject to the control of the Government, be vested in an officer designated as the State Police Chief.”=In the instant case the High Court, in our considered view, was not right in reading the constraints imposed by Section 36 of the Cr.P.C. on the powers of the State Police Chief to appoint a suitable and competent officer to investigate a case irrespective of the limits of local jurisdiction of such officer, if such a course of action is required. This is not to say that the power of the State Police Chief would not be amenable to the judicial process; it can always be subjected to challenge on grounds of malafide or as being without justification and reasonable cause. This, however, is not the ground(s) on which the impugned actions were challenged before the High Court. Furthermore, a perusal of the representation on the basis of which the appointment of the special officer was made by the State Police Chief goes to show that what was sought for was the appointment of a neutral and impartial police officer to conduct further investigation in a fair and unbiased manner without specifically naming of any particular officer in the said application.

                                                              NON-REPORTABLE

                         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 192 OF 2016
                (Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.) No.9088 of 2012)

State of Kerala                                       ..  Appellant (s)

                                   Versus
P.B. Sourabhan & Ors.                               ...Respondent (s)


                                    WITH
                       Criminal Appeal No. 193 of 2016
               (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.9388 of 2012)

                               J U D G M E N T

RANJAN GOGOI, J.

Leave granted.

The short question that arises  for  decision  in  the  present  appeals  is
whether the State Police Chief/Director General of Police  is  empowered  to
appoint a superior police officer to investigate  a  crime  case  registered
outside the territorial jurisdiction of such officer.
The High Court answered the aforesaid question in the  negative giving  rise
to the present appeals by the State as well as by the complainant in one  of
the cases (who is also the accused in the other case) at whose instance  the
appointment was made and authorisation issued by the State Police Chief.

Over certain matrimonial disputes between  the  parties,  two  police  cases
i.e. Crime No. 621 of 2011 and Crime No. 637 of 2011 were registered in  the
Pettah Police Station. The complainant in Crime No. 637 of 2011, who is  the
accused in Crime No. 621 of 2011, had  filed  a  representation  before  the
State Police  Chief  for  further  investigation  by  a  competent/  neutral
officer. On the said representation, the State  Police  Chief  by  an  order
dated 24.01.2012 directed the District Police  Chief  of  Thiruvananthapuram
City   that   the   Assistant   Commissioner   of    Police,     Cantonment,
Thiruvananthapuram City may  be  entrusted  with  further  investigation  of
Crime Nos.621 of 2011 and 637 of 2011 of Pettah Police Station. Pursuant  to
the above direction of the State Police Chief,  one  M.G.Haridas,  Assistant
Commissioner of Police, Cantonment, Thiruvananthapuram City  was  authorised
to conduct further investigation of the two cases and send  weekly  reports.
This was by order dated 12.03.2012 of the Deputy Commissioner of  Police  (L
& O) Thiruvananthapuram City.  Thereafter  it  appears  that  the  specially
authorised and entrusted officer filed an  application  before  the  learned
trial court for further investigation of the two cases which was allowed  by
the said court on 20.03.2012. The aforesaid order appointing  M.G.  Haridas,
Assistant  Commissioner   of   Police,   Cantonment   to   conduct   further
investigation of the two cases and the order  of  the  learned  trial  court
dated.  20.03.2012  granting  permission  for  further  investigation  under
Section 173(8) Cr.P.C were assailed before the  High  Court.  The  challenge
before the High Court was primarily on the ground that the said  orders  are
in excess of the powers vested by Section  36  of  the  Cr.  P.C.  and  that
Section 18  of  the  Kerala  Police  Act  which  vests  the  administration,
supervision, direction and control of the police  throughout  the  State  in
the State Police Chief cannot override the  provisions  of  Section  36  Cr.
P.C.
We have heard the  learned  counsel  for  the  parties  and  considered  the
matter.
Section 36 of the Cr.P.C. and Section 18(1) of the Police  Act  are  in  the
following terms :
“36. Powers of superior officers of police :-
 Police officers superior in rank to  an  officer  in  charge  of  a  police
station may exercise the same powers, throughout the  local  area  to  which
they are appointed, as may be exercised by such officer  within  the  limits
of his station.”

“18. State Police Chief :-
 The administration,  supervision,  direction  and  control  of  the  Police
throughout the State shall, subject to the control  of  the  Government,  be
vested in an officer designated as the State Police Chief.”



Section 36 empowers police officers  superior  in  rank  to  an  officer  in
charge of a Police Station to  exercise  the  same  powers  as  that  of  an
officer in charge of a police station insofar as the territorial/local  area
within the jurisdiction of  such  superior  police  officers  is  concerned.
Section 18(1) of the  State  Police  Act,  on  the  other  hand,  vests  the
administration, supervision, direction and control of the police  throughout
the State in the State Police Chief. The power under Section 36, on a  plain
reading thereof, is to be exercised by the District  Police  Chief  who,  by
virtue of the said section, is empowered to appoint  an  officer  above  the
rank of an officer in charge of  a  police  station  to  exercise  the  same
powers as may be exercised by an officer in charge of  the  police  station.
This is, however, subject to the condition that such superior officer  would
be competent to exercise powers within the territorial/local limits  of  his
jurisdiction. We do not see how Section 36 Cr.P.C, in  any  way,  can  debar
the exercise of powers by the State Police Chief  to  appoint  any  superior
officer who, in his opinion, would be competent and  fit  to  investigate  a
particular case keeping  in  view  the  circumstances  thereof.  Section  36
Cr.P.C does not fetter the jurisdiction of the State Police  Chief  to  pass
such an order based on his satisfaction.  It  is  the  satisfaction  of  the
State Police Chief, in the light of the facts of a given  case,  that  would
be determinative of the appointment  to  be  made  in  which  situation  the
limits of jurisdiction will not  act  as  fetter  or  come  in  the  way  of
exercise of such jurisdiction by the superior officer  so  appointed.   Such
an appointment would not be hedged by the limitations imposed by Section  36
Cr.P.C.  Section 18 of the State Police Act, on the  other  hand,  does  not
confer any such power and merely recognises the State Police  Chief  as  the
head of the police force in the State.

In the instant case the High Court, in our considered view,  was  not  right
in reading the constraints imposed by Section  36  of  the  Cr.P.C.  on  the
powers of the State  Police  Chief  to  appoint  a  suitable  and  competent
officer  to  investigate  a  case  irrespective  of  the  limits  of   local
jurisdiction of such officer,  if such a course of action is required.  This
is not to say that the  power  of  the  State  Police  Chief  would  not  be
amenable to the judicial process; it can always be  subjected  to  challenge
on grounds of malafide or as  being  without  justification  and  reasonable
cause. This, however, is not the ground(s) on  which  the  impugned  actions
were challenged before  the  High  Court.  Furthermore,  a  perusal  of  the
representation on the basis of which the appointment of the special  officer
was made by the State Police Chief goes to show that  what  was  sought  for
was the appointment of a neutral and impartial  police  officer  to  conduct
further investigation in a fair and  unbiased  manner  without  specifically
naming of any particular officer in the said application.

For the aforesaid reasons, we cannot agree with the view taken by  the  High
Court and the conclusions reached. Consequently, the order dated  01.08.2012
passed by the High Court is set aside and both appeals are allowed.


                                                          …….…………………………...J.
                                                [RANJAN GOGOI]



                                                            …………………………….……J.
                                            [PRAFULLA C. PANT]

NEW DELHI;
MARCH 04, 2016.

When the appeal was pending before this Court, by way of an application filed in July, 2015, Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 offered an amount of Rs.80 Lakhs, whereas the intervenor had offered an amount of Rs.1.68 crores. Having regard to the background of the litigation, having regard to the dire necessity for the Deity to dispose of the property, having regard to the fact that Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have been in occupation of the property since 1956 and that they have constructed their houses in the property, we are of the view that it is in the interest of all concerned to put a quietus to the litigations between the State and Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 of the sale of the property under Section 19 of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowment Act.After considering the suggestions made from all quarters and having regard to the offers made before this Court, having regard to the circle rate and market rate and having regard to more than five decades of the admitted occupancy by Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, we fix the rate at Rs. 2.75 crores for the entire property now occupied by Respondent Nos. 1 and 2.This amount shall be deposited by Respondent Nos.1 and 2 within a period of three months from today. On such deposit, whatever rights available to Respondent Nos.1 and 2 in respect of property under Section 19 of the Act shall be transferred to them.

                                                              NON-REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6122 OF 2008


      STATE OF ORISSA & ANR.                      Appellant(s)

                                VERSUS

      ABANI BALLAV DEY & ORS.                     Respondent(s)


                               J U D G M E N T

KURIAN, J.
1.    The application for intervention is dismissed.

2.    Appellant No. 1 - State of Orissa is aggrieved by the  impugned  order
dated 14.05.2008 passed by the High Court of Orissa in RSA No.  10  of  2002
and Misc. Case No. 65 of 2008.

3.    For the purpose of disposal of  this  appeal,  we  shall  extract  the
short impugned order as under :-

"The  appellants and respondent no. 2 have filed a petition under  Order  23
Rule 3 of the CPC for compromise stating therein that to cut short the  long
term litigation and for the benefit and improvement of the respondent no.  2
Religious Trust they want to compound the matter.   Previously  the  parties
had filed Misc. Case No.  189  of  2006  for  recording  compromise  in  the
appeal.  But the Tahasildar, Cuttack raised objection on the plea  that  the
property under litigation has high market value and the amount  contemplated
in compromise is very low.  Objection was also raised  by  the  Commissioner
of Endowments that in absence of the permission of the Commissioner  u/s  19
of the OHRE Act, the compromise cannot be effected as  the  compromise  will
create stitiban tenancy  in  favour  of  the  appellants.   The  prayer  for
compromise was  accordingly,  disallowed  for  want  of  permission  of  the
Commissioner of endowments u/s 19 of the OHRE Act.  The parties,  therefore,
filed the  present  petition  for  compromise  indicating  inter  alia  that
permission of the Commissioner of  endowments  has  been  obtained  for  the
compromise and the amount to be paid by the appellants has  been  raised  to
Rupees thirty lakhs.  Counter affidavit has been filed by  the  Commissioner
of Endowments wherein it is stated that Deputy  Commissioner  of  endowments
by successive letters dated 5.2.2008 and 31.3.2008 intimated the  respondent
No.2 that no permission can  be  accorded  for  compromise  in  the  greater
interest of the institution.  It is also indicated in the counter  affidavit
that present petition for compromise is not maintainable after the order  of
rejection in Misc. Case No. 189 of 2006.  Reply to  this  affidavit  of  the
Commissioner of Endowments has been filed by the respondent  no.  2  to  the
effect that the letters of  the  Deputy  Commissioner  of  Endowments  under
Annexures A & B are to be ignored as the Commissioner of Endowments in  Memo
No. 10864 dated 5.9.2007 granted permission to respondent no.  2  to  effect
compromise in the second appeal.

            In this regard, the appellants and respondent no. 2 rely on  the
order dated 28.4.1989 of the Commissioner of Endowments,  Orissa  passed  in
OA No. 171 of 1988-II under Section  19  of  the  Act,  Order  No.  7  dated
11.12.2006 of the Commissioner of Endowments in misc. Case No.  17  of  2005
and Memo No. 10864 dated 5.9.2007 of  the  office  of  the  Commissioner  of
Endowments,  Orissa.   On  the  other  hand,   learned   counsel   for   the
Commissioner of Endowments rely on Memo No. 1589  dated  5.2.2008  and  4369
dated  31.3.2008  issued  by  the  Deputy  Commissioner  of  Endowments   to
respondent no. 2.  In the order in A. No. 171of 1988 on the  prayer  of  the
respondent no. 2, the Commissioner of  Endowments  accorded  permission  for
sale of the lands of the religious institution fixing minimum  rate  at  Rs.
20,000/- per gunth for lands adjoining road and at the rate of Rs.  15,000/-
per gunth for other lands.  In order dated 11.12.2006 of Misc. Case  No.  17
of 2005 it is reflected that permission was sought for the  compromise,  but
because it was submitted that the matter does not come  within  the  purview
of section 19 of the OHRE Act, the misc. case was  dropped  and  the  matter
was left to be dealt with in management side.  In memo No. 10864  respondent
no.2 was permitted to enter into compromise in the second appeal, if  he  so
wants.  But thereafter, in Memo nos. 1589  dated  5.2.2008  and  4369  dated
13.3.2008 respondent no. 2 was  intimated  by  the  Deputy  Commissioner  of
Endowments that he cannot be permitted to enter into  a  compromise  in  the
greater  interest  of  the  institution.   All  these  documents  show  that
initially the Commissioner of Endowments  had  permitted  for  sale  of  the
lands  of  the  institution  for  rupees  seven  lakhs  approximately,   but
litigation crept in and no such sale could be  effected.   Now,  by  way  of
compromise respondent no. 2 is willing to create stitiban tenancy in  favour
of the appellants in respect of the same lands of religious  institution  in
exchange for a sum of Rs. 30,00,000/- to be paid by the  appellants  to  the
religious institution.  The  Commissioner  of  Endowments  has  also  passed
order and intimated the order to respondent no.2 that he can  enter  into  a
compromise.  The previous orders passed under section 19 of the Act and  the
present order permitting respondent no.2 to enter into compromise passed  by
the Commissioner of Endowments in substance amounts to accord of  permission
under section 19 of the OHRE Act.  Dr. Rath, learned counsel  appearing  for
Commissioner of Endowments, however, states that because the  money  aid  by
the appellants will  go  for  the  benefit  of  religious  institution,  the
parties may do well to raise the amount considering the fact that  the  suit
lands are now urban valuable lands.  After  this  submission  of  Dr.  Rath,
there was a discussion in open court and learned counsel for the  appellants
on  instruction  submitted  that  instead  of  rupees  thirty   lakhs,   the
appellants would pay rupees forty five lakhs and that  may  be  incorporated
in the terms of compromise.  A memo was also filed in this regard.


      Since the parties are willing to enter into  compromise  and  end  the
litigation and the Commissioner of Endowments has permitted  the  respondent
no. 1 to enter into such compromise and since  the  amount  offered  by  the
appellants is more than six and half times of the amount  initially  set  by
the Commissioner of Endowments, the prayer for  compromise  is  allowed  and
the appeal is disposed of on  compromise  according  to  the  terms  of  the
compromise.   The  compromise  petition  along  with  memo   enhancing   the
compromise amount from rupees thirty lakhs to rupees forty five  lakhs  will
form part of the decree.
      The appeal and misc. case are thus disposed of."

4.    It is the main contention of the State that the property of the  Deity
could not have been disposed of by way of a compromise  as  referred  to  in
the impugned order.  After having heard Mr. P. S. Patwalia,  learned  senior
counsel appearing for the  State  and  also  the  learned  counsel  for  the
respondents, on 14.01.2016, this Court passed the following order :-
"Having heard the learned Senior Counsel appearing for  the  appellants  and
also learned Senior Counsel for the respondents, we are of the view that  it
would be in the interest of all the parties, that the matter  is  considered
afresh by the Commissioner of Endowments in exercise of power under  Section
19 of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1951.
      We Permit the Respondent No.3  herein  to  make  a  fresh  application
before the Commissioner within two weeks from today  and  the  Commissioner,
after hearing the appellant Nos. 1 and 2 as well  as  respondents,  consider
the application on merits and pass appropriate order within a period of  one
month thereafter.
      We make it clear that the orders already passed  by  the  Commissioner
of Endowments in the matter, shall not stand in the way of the  Commissioner
considering the matter afresh and passing appropriate orders.
      However, we make it clear that this order is passed without  prejudice
to the contentions raised by parties before this Court.
      Post after six weeks."

5.    The learned counsel appearing for the State today has  made  available
the order of the  Commissioner  of  Endowments,  Orissa,  Bhubaneswar  dated
24.02.2016.  According to the Endowment Commissioner also,  Respondent  Nos.
1 and 2 have long been in possession of the property.   The  Deity  and  the
Math are in a neglected position and for  want  of  funds,  no  improvements
could be made.  The Deity is badly in need of money  and  having  regard  to
the background of litigation,  the  property  needs  to  be,  in  any  case,
disposed of.  We shall extract the relevant consideration of  the  Endowment
Commissioner :-
"7..........The case land is located in urban area in one patch.   The  case
land is situated by the side of main road  which  runs  from  Biju  Pattnaik
Chhak to Deula Sahi of Cuttack Town.  Plot No.  321  has  been  recorded  as
Jalasaya kisam, but major part of that plot is filled with sand  and  earth.
Permission for sale of the case land was accorded in O.A.No.  171/1988  vide
order  dated  28.02.1989,  but  the  same  could  not  be  sold  within  the
stipulated period  of  one  year  due  to  several  litigations.   The  case
deity/institution is not getting any  income  from  the  case  land  due  to
number of litigations.  In case of sale of the case  land,  the  deity  will
get a considerable amount by way of interest from long  term  fixed  deposit
of the sale proceeds.  The report of the concerned Inspector  of  Endowments
as well as the Bench mark valuation of  the  case  land  obtained  from  the
District Sub-Registrar, Cuttack indicate that the cost of plot  no.  317  of
kisam Gharabari is Rs. 4  crores  forty  lakhs  (Rupees  four  crores  forty
lakhs) per acre.  The cost of plot No. 318 of kisam Bagayat is Rs. 2  crores
75 lakhs (Rupees two crores seventy five lakhs) per acre.  The cost of  plot
No. 320 of kisam Gharabari is Rs. 2  crores  75  lakhs  (Rupees  two  crores
seventy five lakhs) per acre.  The cost of plot No. 321  of  kisam  Jalasaya
is Rs. 2 crores 75 lakhs (Rupees two crores seventy five lakhs) per acre.

8.    Thus, I found that  the  case  land  belongs  to  the  deity  Sri  Sri
Raghunath Jew, bije Matha Sahi, Tulasipur of Cuttack Town under Bidanasi  P.
S. marfat Mahant Bijoy Narayan Ramanuja Das which has been reflected in  the
R.O.R.  vide  Ext.  1  produced  by  the   petitioners.    Admittedly,   the
deity/institution is public in nature.   So,  necessary  permission/sanction
order U/S. 19 of the O.H.R.E. Act, 1951 is required to sell  the  case  land
of the  deity  for  any  legal  necessity.   The  report  of  the  concerned
Inspector of Endowments and the R.O.R. of the case land and  the  management
file available in the Endowment Office indicate that  Mahant  Bijoy  Narayan
Ramanuja Das is the Hereditary Trustee of the deity/institution and as  such
he has filed the case U/s 19 of the O.H.R.E. Act, 1951 before the  Court  of
the Commissioner of Endowments, Odisha, Bhubaneswar in  order  to  sell  the
landed properties of the deity/institution for  legal  necessity,  which  is
beneficial for the deity/institution.

9.    As regards the legal necessity, I found that the  petitioner  Math  is
an old institution.  During my tour I have  seen  the  deity/institution  as
well as the case land located at Tulasipur of Cuttack Town.  The Temple  and
the surrounding  pucca  houses  of  the  institution  are  now  standing  in
dilapidated condition which require major  repair/renovation  and  for  that
purpose huge amount of money is  required.   The  deity/institution  has  no
funds  to  meet  the  above  expenses.   The  only  way  is  open   to   the
deity/institution to sell some  landed  properties.   The  deity/institution
has some cultivable lands which are now under  the  possession  of  the  the
institution.  But the case land is now under  the  possession  of  the  O.Ps
since long and the institution is not getting anything from the  case  land.
It will be very expensive on the part of the institution to evict  the  O.Ps
from the case land through litigations. Therefore, in my opinion it will  be
beneficial for the deity/institution to sell the case land in order to  meet
the above legal necessity of the deity/institution.  The O.Ps No.  1  and  2
are now staying over in the  case  land  with  their  family  members  after
constructing their house over it. The O.Ps are  now  ready  and  willing  to
purchase the case land at the reasonable rate fixed by this Court.   If  the
case  lands  are  sold  away  and  the  sale  proceeds  deposited   in   any
Nationalised   Bank   under   Long   Term   Fixed   deposit   scheme,    the
deity/institution will definitely get substantial income  annually  in  safe
of interest.  Hence, I feel that it is necessary to sell away the case  land
for   the   above   legal   necessity   which   is   beneficial   for    the
deity/institution.

6.    It  is  seen  from  the  order  at  Paragraph  5  that  prior  to  the
consideration of the matter, the Endowment Commissioner had given  a  public
notice and that, "In spite of publication of notice, no objection  has  been
received from any corner."

7.    The Endowment Commissioner having taken note  of  the  fact  that  the
circle rate available could be less than the  actual  market  price,  passed
the order for auctioning the property with upset price at Rs. 5  crores  per
acre for the first item, Rs. 4 crores per acre for the second item  and  Rs.
3 crores per acre for the third item.

8.    It is seen from the order passed by the  Endowment  Commissioner  that
even if the property is put to auction, it is likely to ensue a  long  drawn
litigation in the matter of eviction of the present occupants.

9.    Mr. Guru Krishna Kumar, learned senior  counsel,  on  instruction  and
after referring to the records, submits that Respondent Nos. 1  and  2  have
been in occupation of the property since 1956.

10.   The offer originally made by Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 before  the  High
Court was for Rs. 30 Lakhs, which was enhanced to Rs. 45 Lakhs  and  it  was
on Rs.45 Lakhs, the compromise was entered into and the appeal was  disposed
of by the High Court by the impugned Judgment in 2008.

11.   When  the  appeal  was  pending  before  this  Court,  by  way  of  an
application filed in July, 2015, Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 offered  an  amount
of Rs.80 Lakhs, whereas the intervenor had  offered  an  amount  of  Rs.1.68
crores.


12.   Having regard to the background of the litigation,  having  regard  to
the dire necessity for the Deity to dispose of the property,  having  regard
to the fact that Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have  been  in  occupation  of  the
property since 1956 and that they  have  constructed  their  houses  in  the
property, we are of the view that it is in the interest of all concerned  to
put a quietus to the litigations between the State  and  Respondent  Nos.  1
and 2 of the sale of the property under  Section  19  of  the  Orissa  Hindu
Religious Endowment Act.

13.   After considering the suggestions made from all  quarters  and  having
regard to the offers made before this Court, having  regard  to  the  circle
rate and market rate and having regard to more  than  five  decades  of  the
admitted occupancy by Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, we fix the rate at  Rs.  2.75
crores for the entire property now occupied by Respondent Nos. 1 and 2.

14.   This amount shall be deposited by Respondent  Nos.1  and  2  within  a
period of three  months  from  today.   On  such  deposit,  whatever  rights
available to Respondent Nos.1 and 2 in respect of property under Section  19
of the Act shall be transferred to them.

15.   In view of the above observations and directions,  this  civil  appeal
is disposed of with no order as to costs.

16.   We make it  clear  that  this  Judgment  is  passed  in  the  peculiar
background of the case we have extracted above and the  same  shall  not  be
treated as a precedent.

                                                   .......................J.
                                                           [ KURIAN JOSEPH ]


                                                   .......................J.
                                                   [ ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN ]

      New Delhi;
      March 02, 2016.