The efficiency of a public servant demands that he should be free to perform his official duties fearlessly and without any favour. The dire necessity is to fill in the existing gap by protecting the honest officers while making the corrupt officers realize that they are not above law. The protection to an honest public servant is required not only in his interest but in the larger interest of society. This Court time and again extended assurance to the honest and sincere officers to perform their duty in a free and fair manner towards achieving a better society. It appears that after his discharge from the Court proceedings, the petitioner had written a letter to the Chief Minister on 12th May, 2011 seeking an amount of Rs.4½ crores towards compensation and damages. Normally, this Court is reluctant in determining or granting any compensation while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution, but advises the parties to approach the competent Courts for adjudicating those issues. However, keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case and taking into consideration the age and trauma suffered by the petitioner who spent about 11 days in jail and fought the legal battle for about a period of 10 years before various forums and more particularly in the absence of any proved charges of corruption against the petitioner, we deem it fit that a lump sum amount of Rs.10 lakhs be awarded as compensation to the petitioner on all forms. 15. Accordingly, we direct the State of Uttar Pradesh to pay a lump sum of Rs.10 lakhs to the petitioner within a period of three months towards compensation.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                         CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

                    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No.933 OF 2014

Dr. RAM LAKHAN SINGH                      …. PETITIONER

VERSUS

STATE GOVERNMENT OF UTTAR PRADESH
THROUGH CHIEF SECRETARY                    ….  RESPONDENT

                               J U D G M E N T

N.V. RAMANA, J.

      This petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India  is  filed
by one Dr. Ram Lakhan Singh, an incumbent of  Indian  Forest  Service  (1969
Batch, U.P. Cadre)  who  rendered  services  to  the  respondent  State  and
Government of India in  various  positions  for  about  35  years  till  his
retirement.  The main contention of the petitioner is that he was  illegally
detained by the  respondent  authorities  after  implicating  him  in  false
vigilance cases and dishonouring the High Court’s  directions.   Because  of
the malicious, willful and contemptuous acts of the State  and  clear  abuse
of legal process, he and his family members had to suffer a great ordeal  of
mental agony and heavy financial loss besides being defamed in the  society.
 Hence, he prayed this Court to express displeasure over  the  violation  of
his family members’ fundamental rights and to direct the respondent  to  pay
compensation for the loss of his professional  career,  reputation  and  for
causing mental agony.
2.    The relevant facts as submitted by  the  petitioner,  who  argued  his
case before us in person, are that he has rendered about  35  years  service
to the State of U.P. and  the  Government  of  India,  with  an  unblemished
record.  He became a Member of the National Board for Wild Life  (for  short
“NBWL”)  on  22nd    September,  2003.   The  then  Chief  Minister  of  the
respondent State wanted the petitioner to take necessary steps so as to  get
the Benti Bird Sanctuary located at Kunda of Pratapgarh District  denotified
by the NBWL in its meeting held on 15th October, 2003.   As  the  petitioner
did not comply with  the  directions,  the  then  Chief  Minister  of  Uttar
Pradesh, in the guise of a complaint by the MLA of  his  own  party  against
the  petitioner,  issued  directions  to  the  Director  General,  Vigilance
Establishment of the State to initiate a vigilance enquiry against him.   As
per the procedure envisaged for the purpose by  D.O.  Letter  No.2020/39(2)-
12(5)-74, dated
12-09-1997 (Annexure P-11), before  a  case  is  sent  for  State  Vigilance
Establishment,  the   approval  of  the  State  Vigilance  Committee  is   a
condition  precedent,  but  the  respondent  State  without  following   the
prescribed procedure, conducted vigilance enquiry and removed him  from  his
post.  The petitioner moved the High Court by Writ Petition No.126  of  2004
to declare that  the  vigilance  enquiry  against  him  was  done  in  clear
violation of the prescribed procedure.  The High Court by orders dated  30th
January,  2004  and  14th  September,  2007  directed  the  State  Vigilance
Committee to carry out the enquiry proceedings, but the respondent  did  not
comply with the directions of the High Court.
3.    While that being so, Writ Petition No.2985 of 2004  was  filed  before
the High Court by an advocate arraying the  petitioner  as  respondent  No.4
therein.  According to the petitioner,  the  writ  petition  (PIL)  was  got
purportedly filed by the advocate who was working in the office of the  then
Advocate  General,  making  false  averments  stating  that  the   vigilance
committee had already completed the enquiry in various issues  against  him.
As a matter of fact, on the date of institution of the said  writ  petition,
the enquiry against the petitioner  was  not  even  referred  to  the  State
Vigilance Committee.  In the said petition, the High Court,  on  25th  June,
2004, passed an order which, inter alia, reads thus:
     “List this case on 12.02.2004, Vigilance Committee shall carry on with
      the proceeding, but no final order shall be passed.


      It has been further averred that the vigilance committee had  already
      completed the enquiry in various issues against the  respondent  No.4,
      namely Dr. Ram Lakhan Singh and the matter is serious in nature in mis-
      utilization of Government funds in its own way.  Nowhere the  Division
      Bench vide its order dated 30.01.04 had stopped  the  State  to  lodge
      FIR, if prima facie, the Vigilance Committee comes to  the  conclusion
      that some cognizable offence is committed by respondent No.4.  It  was
      always open for the State to lodge FIR, if prima facie, the  Vigilance
      Committee had come to a conclusion that some  cognizable  offence  has
      been committed by respondent No.4, it is always open for the State  to
      lodge an FIR, if  some  cognizable  offence  is  found  to  have  been
      committed by the Respondent No.4, and if it comes out from the  report
      of the Vigilance Committee, not only the State but also any person can
      lodge an FIR under Section 154 Cr.P.C. with respect  to  a  cognizable
      offence said to have been  committed  by  a  particular  person.   The
      Division Bench has never stopped the State to lodge an FIR  since  the
      Departmental proceeding can very well continue simultaneously.


      With the aforesaid observation, this petition stands finally disposed
      of.”

4.    Taking advantage of the order dated 25th  June,  2004  passed  by  the
High Court, FIR was registered against the  petitioner  and  his  house  was
raided.  The petitioner claims that in the case of house raid and arrest  of
a Member of the All India Services like that of the  petitioner,  the  State
Vigilance Establishment is required to take prior  permission  and  approval
of the Chief Secretary of the State, whereas in the case of  the  petitioner
no such approval had been obtained.   Afterwards,  the  respondent  obtained
approval by a
pre-dated letter on 5th July, 2004,  concealing  the  fact  of  raiding  the
petitioner’s house on 25-06-2004 and the petitioner  was  finally  arrested.
Subsequently, two more FIRs were registered against the  petitioner  on  the
same day and the petitioner was suspended from his official duties.
5.    Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner approached  this  Court  by  way  of
filing Writ Petition No.236 of 2004 and this Court permitted the  petitioner
to approach the  High  Court  afresh.   Accordingly,  the  proceedings  were
recommenced before the High Court  in  Writ  Petition  No.126  of  2004  and
finally on 30th August, 2011, the High Court disposed of the  matter,  inter
alia, observing thus:
      “Heard Sri Prashant Chandra, learned Senior Advocate in  the  presence
       of the  petitioner  Dr.  Ram  Lakhan  Singh  and  Sri  J.N.  Mathur,
       Additional Advocate General for the State.


        The prayer of the counsel for the petitioner is that all actions and
       orders passed, if any, in violation of the Court’s order dated 30-01-
       2004 be declared to be null and void and be  quashed  and  that,  in
       fact, the matter was  never  referred  to  Vigilance  Committee  and
       consequently, no vigilance enquiry was ever  initiated  against  the
       petitioner and, therefore, all actions  taken/complaints lodged with
       the assumption that vigilance enquiry has been initiated against the
       petitioner, shall stand void and non est.


        Sri J.N. Mathur does not dispute the aforesaid position and  has  no
       objection if such a direction is issued.


        We have gone through the documents on record and we find that it  is
       a case where the petitioner has undergone severe  agony  because  of
       the  incorrect  statement  about  the  Vigilance   Committee   being
       constituted and vigilance enquiry being initiated against him.”

6.    The petitioner finally submitted that  he  was  prosecuted  without  a
plausible  cause  and  only  by  malicious  and  willful  intention  of  the
respondent, he had to suffer unlawful suspension from the post of  Principal
Chief Conservator of Forest, loss of full  salary  and  retirement  benefits
which were withheld for a period of more than ten years.   For  causing  him
the loss of professional career  including  that  of  the  Member  of  NBWL,
reputation, great mental agony and heavy  financial  loss  besides  defaming
his character, the petitioner prayed for compensation.
7.    The State has filed a counter affidavit denying the  allegations  made
against the State and the learned senior counsel  appearing  for  the  State
submitted that the arrest and suspension of  the  petitioner  were  done  in
accordance  with  proper  procedure.   The  prior  approval  of  the   State
Vigilance Committee applies only in those  cases  where  the  Administrative
Department recommends the cases for investigation and  such  prior  approval
of State Vigilance Committee is  not  required  in  cases  as  that  of  the
petitioner where the Chief Minister directly orders for  vigilance  enquiry.
In the enquiry, it was  found  that  the  petitioner  was  allegedly  owning
disproportionate assets beyond his income, as being a public  servant,  such
offence attracts  punishment  under  Sections  13(1)(e)  and  13(2)  of  the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.  Even the search operation by  the  team
consisting  of  officers  from  the  Vigilance  Department  including   lady
officers  was  conducted  in  consonance  with  the  rules  and  regulations
honoring the human rights.  Thus,  the  respondent  had  not  committed  any
illegality and there was no flouting of  any  orders  of  the  Hon’ble  High
Court or blatant violation of fundamental right to life  guaranteed  to  the
petitioner.
8.    Learned senior counsel finally submitted that even all the  retirement
dues of the petitioner amounting to  Rs.14.57  lakhs  and  Rs.3,00,886/-  as
interest on gratuity for delay has been paid.   In addition, the  petitioner
who retired on 31-12-2004 was being paid provisional pension  w.e.f.  01-01-
2005 till his final pension was sanctioned on 28-08-2015.   However,  earned
leave encashment of Rs.4,03,106/- was sanctioned on 21-02-2014, but for  the
payment of interest on  late  payment  of  leave  encashment,  there  is  no
provision in the rules and hence the interest could not be paid.
9.    Having heard the parties on either side, we find  that  the  narration
of the facts  indicates  a  clear  procedural  lapse  on  the  part  of  the
respondent which  caused  mental  agony  and  financial  loss  to  the  writ
petitioner.    Though  there  is  no  material  before  us  indicating   the
involvement of the Chief Minister in initiating the proceedings against  the
petitioner for not fulfilling his request, as  alleged  by  the  petitioner,
however, the initiation of vigilance proceedings and statements made  before
the High Court by officers of the respondent State led to the arrest of  the
petitioner causing great loss to him.  At the end of the  day,  as  per  the
statement made by the respondent before the High Court and by the  order  of
the Special Judge, Anti Corruption Act, Lucknow (Annexure  P-31)  on  15-02-
2012, all the actions against the applicant have been declared as  null  and
void.  But in the entire process, the petitioner had to suffer mental  agony
and loss of reputation in the society besides  huge  financial  loss.   Even
the retrial benefits have been paid to the  petitioner  belatedly  which  is
attributable to the negligence and irresponsible act of the State.
10.   A public servant in a democracy should be a guardian  of  morals.   He
is entrusted with higher  responsibilities  of  a  public  office  and  they
contribute their best for the just and humane society.   We  feel  that  for
effective functioning  of  a  democracy,  the  role  of  Executive  is  very
important.  Civil servants and public officials  are  expected  to  maintain
and strengthen the public’s trust and confidence by demonstrating  the  high
standards  of  professional  competence,  efficiency  and  effectiveness  by
upholding the Constitution and rule of law, keeping in mind the  advancement
of public good at all times.  Public employment being a  public  trust,  the
improper use of the public position for personal advantage is considered  as
a serious breach of trust.  With the changing times, the role  of  Executive
and expectation of the citizens  in  governance  also  underwent  tremendous
change.
11.   Dishonesty and corruption are biggest challenges  for  any  developing
country.  If the public servant indulges in  corruption,  the  citizens  who
are vigilant in all aspects take note of this seriously and develop a  sense
of distress towards the Government and its mechanism, on a whole it sends  a
very alarming message to the society at large  and  to  the  common  man  in
particular.  In any civilized society, the paramount  consideration  is  the
welfare of the society and corruption  is  the  biggest  hindrance  in  that
process.  If the corrupt public servant is not punished, then it  will  have
a negative impact on the honest public servants who will be discouraged  and
demoralized.  Some upright officers resist corruption but they cannot  alone
change  the  system  which  victimizes  them   through   frequent   punitive
transfers, threat to their families and fabricating, foisting false cases.
12.   In such a scenario, until  and  unless  we  maintain  a  fine  balance
between prosecuting a guilty officer  and  protecting  an  innocent  officer
from vexatious, frivolous and  mala  fide  prosecution,  it  would  be  very
difficult for the public servant to discharge his duties in  free  and  fair
manner.  The efficiency of a public servant demands that he should  be  free
to perform his official duties fearlessly and without any favour.  The  dire
necessity is to fill in the existing gap by protecting the  honest  officers
while making the corrupt officers realize that they are not above law.   The
protection to an honest public servant is required not only in his  interest
but in the larger interest of society. This Court time  and  again  extended
assurance to the honest and sincere officers to  perform  their  duty  in  a
free and fair manner towards achieving a better society.
13.   In the case on hand, the counter affidavit  filed  on  behalf  of  the
State at the time of hearing specifically indicates that  the  FIRs  against
the petitioner were lodged for  the  crimes  relating  to  the  petitioner’s
owning  disproportionate  assets  beyond  his  income,  illegal  mining  and
auction of Tendu patta leaves causing loss  of  revenue  to  Government  and
undue gain to the purchasers.  However, except  making  such  averments,  no
material in support of allegations leveled against the petitioner  has  been
made available to this Court.  On the other hand,  the  order  of  the  High
Court passed on 30th August, 2011 in Writ Petition No.126 of 2004  (Annexure
P-30), clearly indicates that the Additional Advocate General for the  State
did not dispute the averments made by  the  petitioner  that  his  case  was
never referred to Vigilance Committee and consequently no vigilance  enquiry
was ever initiated against him.   The High Court order further reveals  that
the Additional Advocate General also expressed no objection to declare  that
all actions taken and complaints lodged against the petitioner  shall  stand
void and non est in the eye of law.  Thus, in the light  of  the  foregoing,
it is clear that the defence taken by the State in the counter affidavit  is
only  to  justify  its  illegal  action  against  the  petitioner,   without
producing any material supporting the stand taken by them.
14.   It appears that after his discharge from the  Court  proceedings,  the
petitioner had written a letter to the Chief  Minister  on  12th  May,  2011
seeking  an  amount  of  Rs.4½  crores  towards  compensation  and  damages.
Normally,  this  Court  is  reluctant  in  determining   or   granting   any
compensation while exercising its  jurisdiction  under  Article  32  of  the
Constitution, but advises the parties to approach the competent  Courts  for
adjudicating those issues.  However, keeping in view the peculiar facts  and
circumstances of this case and taking into consideration the age and  trauma
suffered by the petitioner who spent about 11 days in jail  and  fought  the
legal battle for about a period of 10 years before various forums  and  more
particularly in the absence of any proved charges of corruption against  the
petitioner, we deem it fit that a lump sum amount of Rs.10 lakhs be  awarded
as compensation to the petitioner on all forms.
15.   Accordingly, we direct the State of Uttar Pradesh to pay  a  lump  sum
of Rs.10 lakhs to the petitioner within a period  of  three  months  towards
compensation.
16.   The writ petition stands disposed of accordingly.


                                                       …………………………………………………J.
                            (RANJAN GOGOI)




                                                        .……………………………………………J.
                            (N.V. RAMANA)
NEW DELHI,
NOVEMBER 17, 2015.

Service matter= In somewhat similar facts, a Bench of three Judges of this Court in Shyam Babu Verma's case (supra) had issued a direction against the Government not to make recovery of any excess payment in relation to the money which was already paid to the employees concerned because it was noticed that the excess payments were not made to the employees concerned on account of any fault on their part. This is what was held in para 11 in Shyam Babu’s case, “11. Although we have held that the petitioners were entitled only to the pay scale of Rs 330-480 in terms of the recommendations of the Third Pay Commission w.e.f. January 1, 1973 and only after the period of 10 years, they became entitled to the pay scale of Rs 330-560 but as they have received the scale of Rs 330-560 since 1973 due to no fault of theirs and that scale is being reduced in the year 1984 with effect from January 1, 1973, it shall only be just and proper not to recover any excess amount which has already been paid to them. Accordingly, we direct that no steps should be taken to recover or to adjust any excess amount paid to the petitioners due to the fault of the respondents, the petitioners being in no way responsible for the same.” 17. Applying the same principle to the facts of the case in hand, we notice that firstly, the respondents issued an order sanctioning stepping up of the pay scale of the appellants on the strength of the order of High Court. Secondly, while claiming this relief, the appellants neither committed any fault nor made any incorrect/false statement to secure the benefits because it was being claimed only on the basis of parity and lastly, the appellants rendered their services for the period in question. 18. In the light of these reasons and further keeping in view the short controversy involved in the case which is somewhat akin to the case of Shaym Babu (supra), we are of the view that similar directions, which were given in the case of Shaym Babu, can also be given in these appeals against the respondents. In other words, it shall only be just and proper not to recover any excess amount from the appellants, which has been paid to them on the basis of stepping up of their pay scale. It is much more so when as mentioned above, the appellants have given up their challenge to the respondent's main action taken against the appellants objecting for the grant of benefit of stepping up of their pay and confined their attack to the issue of recovery of excess amount from them. 19. In view of foregoing discussion, the appeals succeed and are hereby allowed in part. The impugned order is modified only to the extent of directing the respondents not to make recovery of any excess amount from the appellants in relation to the payment made to them towards stepping up of their pay scale.

                                                               REPORTABLE  [
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                        CIVIL APPEAL No.  13407  OF 2015
                   (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) No. 29959/2013)

B. Radhakrishnan                  …..….Appellant(s)

                             VERSUS

The State of Tamil Nadu
& Ors.                                  ……Respondent(s)

                                    WITH

                       CIVIL APPEAL No. 13409  OF 2015
                   (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) No.30038/2013)

K. Padmaraj                       …..….Appellant(s)

                             VERSUS

The State of Tamil Nadu
& Ors.                                  ……Respondent(s)

                               J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1.    Leave granted.
2.    These appeals are filed against the common final  judgment  and  order
dated 02.07.2013 of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in  W.A.  Nos.398
and 399 of 2013 whereby the High Court allowed  the  appeals  filed  by  the
respondents herein and set aside the common order dated  13.09.2010  of  the
learned Single Judge in W.P. Nos. 9527  and  9528  of  2006   by  which  the
appellants’ writ petitions were allowed.
3.    In order to appreciate the issue involved in these appeals, which  lie
in a narrow compass, few relevant facts need mention infra.
4.    Mr. B. Radhakrishnan and Mr. K. Padmaraj,  -  appellants  herein  were
enlisted in the Police Department of the Coimbatore City Police Unit in  the
year 1976  and   1977  respectively  as  Grade-II  Police  Constables.   One
Eswaran and others were recruited between 1979 and 1982 in  the  Tamil  Nadu
Special Police  Battalion  as  Grade-II  Police  Constables,  Category  III.
These persons were promoted to the  post  of  Naik  in  the  year  1985  and
subsequently in the year 1987 to the post of Havaldar.  At that  time  these
persons were drawing higher pay than the appellants.
5.    In the year  1993,  Eswaran  and  others  exercised  their  option  as
provided in the Tamil Nadu Special Police  Subordinate  Service  Rules  1978
and sought their transfer to the Armed Reserve,  Coimbatore  City  Division.
It was allowed.
6.    After their transfer, it was found that in the transferred post,  they
have to receive lower pay and accordingly instructions were  issued  by  the
office of the Director General vide memo dated 27.07.1982 for protection  of
their pay and hence their pay was regularized in the scale of pay of Rs.825-
15-900-20-1200 on the basis of the pay last drawn by them in the time  scale
of pay of Rs.1200-30-1560-40-2040.   Subsequently,  they  got  promotion  as
Grade I  Police  Constable  and  Head  Constable  in  the  Taluk  Police  at
Coimbatore and consequently their pay was fixed under Fundamental Rule  22B.

7.    With regard to their pay protection, the Accountant General  of  Tamil
Nadu raised objection, therefore, the Government ordered recovery of  excess
pay and allowances from them.
8.    Aggrieved  by  the  orders  of  recovery,  Eswaran  and  others  filed
applications being O.A. No. 10317 of 1997 etc. etc. before  the  Tamil  Nadu
Administrative Tribunal, Chennai.  By order dated 06.04.2004,  the  Tribunal
allowed the applications and set aside the orders of recovery.
9.    The  appellants  herein,  therefore,  gave  a  representation  to  the
Commissioner of Police, Coimbatore to  fix  their  pay  at  par  with  their
juniors, namely, Eswaran and  others.   By  order  dated  17.09.2005,  their
representation  was  rejected  on  the  ground  that   the   conditions   in
Fundamental Rule 22B Ruling (2) are not fulfilled.
10.   Aggrieved by the refusal to step  up  their  basic  pay  at  par  with
Eswaran and others, the  appellants herein  preferred writ  petitions  being
W.P. Nos. 9527 & 9528 of  2006  before  the  High  Court.   By  order  dated
13.09.2010, the learned Single Judge of the  High  Court  allowed  the  writ
petitions and directed stepping up of basic pay of the appellants herein  at
par with Eswaran and others.  This order was implemented by the  respondents
by issuing the order dated 08.10.2011 and accordingly the basic pay  of  the
appellants was stepped up.
11.   Aggrieved by the order of the learned Single  Judge,  the  respondents
(State) filed appeals being Writ Appeal Nos. 398 and 399 of 2013 before  the
Division Bench  of  the  High  Court.   By  common  impugned  judgment,  the
Division Bench allowed the appeals, set  aside  the  order  of  the  learned
Single Judge and dismissed the appellants’  writ  petitions.   It  was  held
that the case of the appellants could not  be  compared  with  that  of  the
other set of employees – namely Eswaran and others to claim  parity  in  pay
in terms of Ruling 2 of Fundamental Rule 22B and  Ruling  2  of  Fundamental
Rule 27 for the reason that in order to claim parity in pay,  firstly,  both
junior and senior officers should belong to the  same  Cadre/Post  in  which
they have been promoted/appointed.  Secondly, there should be parity in  pay
in lower and higher pay.  Thirdly, Eswaran and others became  Armed  Reserve
Grade-II Police Constables on their own reasons and  apart  from  that  they
were promoted as ‘Naik’ and ‘Havaldar’ and were, therefore,  in  receipt  of
higher emoluments after transfer.  Fourthly,  their  emoluments  were  lower
than the amount received by them as members of  Tamil  Nadu  Special  Police
Battalion.  This view was taken by the Division Bench  by  placing  reliance
on the decision of this Court in Union of  India  &  Ors.  vs.  O.P.  Saxena
[1997 (6) SCC 360], wherein it was held  inter alia  that  when  the  feeder
post of employee concerned is different, the principle of  stepping  up   of
pay would not apply.
12.   Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment,  the  appellants  have  preferred
these appeals by way of special leave petitions before this Court.
13.   Mr. R. Basant, learned senior counsel appearing  for  the  appellants,
argued only one point.  It was his submission that the appellants  had  been
getting the benefit of the order dated  13.09.2010  passed  by  the  learned
Single Judge during the pendency of the petitions  because  the  respondents
had implemented the said order by stepping up their pay. It was pointed  out
that consequent upon the passing of the impugned order,  which  resulted  in
setting aside of the order of the learned Single Judge  and  in  consequence
resulted in dismissal of appellants’ writ petition, the respondents are  now
contemplating an action to recover the excess amount paid to the  appellants
during the interregnum  period  on  the  strength  of  the  impugned  order.
Learned counsel, by placing reliance on the principles laid  down   by  this
Court in Shyam Babu Verma & Ors. vs. Union of India &  Ors.,  (1994)  2  SCC
521, urged that the respondents can be restrained from  making  recovery  of
excess  amount  from  the  appellants   because   the   appellants   neither
misrepresented any fact nor committed any fault  and  nor  indulged  in  any
kind of illegality in securing the benefit.  Learned Counsel,  however,  did
not challenge the action of the respondents on merits.
14.   In contra, Mr. S. Prasad, learned senior counsel for  the  respondents
supported the impugned order.
15.   Having heard the learned counsel for the parties  and  on  perusal  of
the record of the case, we find force  in  the  submission  of  the  learned
counsel for the appellants.
16.    In somewhat similar facts, a Bench of three Judges of this  Court  in
Shyam  Babu  Verma's  case  (supra)  had  issued  a  direction  against  the
Government not to make recovery of any excess payment  in  relation  to  the
money which was already paid to  the  employees  concerned  because  it  was
noticed that the excess payments were not made to  the  employees  concerned
on account of any fault on their part. This is what was held in para  11  in
Shyam Babu’s case,
“11. Although we have held that the petitioners were entitled  only  to  the
pay scale of Rs 330-480 in terms of the recommendations  of  the  Third  Pay
Commission w.e.f. January 1, 1973 and only after the  period  of  10  years,
they became entitled to the pay  scale  of  Rs  330-560  but  as  they  have
received the scale of Rs 330-560 since 1973 due to no fault  of  theirs  and
that scale is being reduced in the year 1984 with  effect  from  January  1,
1973, it shall only be just and proper not  to  recover  any  excess  amount
which has already been paid to them. Accordingly, we direct  that  no  steps
should be taken to recover or to  adjust  any  excess  amount  paid  to  the
petitioners due to the fault of the respondents, the  petitioners  being  in
no way responsible for the same.”

17.   Applying the same principle to the facts  of  the  case  in  hand,  we
notice that firstly, the respondents issued an  order  sanctioning  stepping
up of the pay scale of the appellants on the strength of the order  of  High
Court.  Secondly,  while  claiming  this  relief,  the  appellants   neither
committed any fault nor made any incorrect/false  statement  to  secure  the
benefits because it was being claimed  only  on  the  basis  of  parity  and
lastly, the appellants rendered their services for the period in question.
18.   In the light of these reasons and further keeping in  view  the  short
controversy involved in the case which is  somewhat  akin  to  the  case  of
Shaym Babu (supra), we are of the view that similar directions,  which  were
given in the case of Shaym Babu, can also be given in these appeals  against
the respondents. In other words, it shall only be just  and  proper  not  to
recover any excess amount from the appellants, which has been paid  to  them
on the basis of stepping up of their pay scale. It is much more so  when  as
mentioned above, the  appellants  have  given  up  their  challenge  to  the
respondent's main action taken against  the  appellants  objecting  for  the
grant of benefit of stepping up of their pay and confined  their  attack  to
the issue of recovery of excess amount from them.
19.   In view of foregoing discussion, the appeals succeed  and  are  hereby
allowed in part. The impugned order  is  modified  only  to  the  extent  of
directing the respondents not to make recovery of  any  excess  amount  from
the appellants in relation to the payment made to them towards  stepping  up
of their pay scale.



……...................................J.
                                  [J. CHELAMESWAR]


                       ..……..................................J.
                                  [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]  New Delhi;
      November 17, 2015.


-----------------------
12

if a party is allowed to seek amendment in the grounds of appeal or writ petition after its disposal, it can lead to abuse of process of law, and the parties would not let the proceedings come to an end. As such, we are not inclined to allow the appellants to add grounds in writ petition by way of amendment, after its disposal. However, considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the view that to do complete justice between the parties, the matter needs to be remitted to the appellate court, as the reasons given by said court reversing the findings of the trial court, are not sufficient, and do not answer properly the issues raised in the appeals.

                 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                  CIVIL APPEAL NOS.       9190-9191 OF 2015
              (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 21952-53 of 2014)

Vishwanath Dadu Gurav
Since deceased through LRs & others          … Appellants

                                   Versus

Dattatray Ganapati Gurav                           …Respondent





                               J U D G M E N T


Prafulla C. Pant, J.


      These appeals are directed against order dated 14.3.2012  whereby  the
High Court of Judicature at Bombay has dismissed the Writ Petition No.  2576
of  2003,  affirming  the  order  dated  17.10.1997,  passed  by  the  Third
Additional District Judge, Kolhapur, in Regular  Civil  Appeal  No.  124  of
1991.  Appellants have further challenged order  dated  7.1.2014  passed  by
the High Court whereby Review Petition Stamp No.  33147  of  2012  (in  Writ
Petition No. 2576 of 2003) is dismissed.

We have heard learned counsel for the parties  and  perused  the  papers  on
record.

Briefly stated, one Chandrabai, issueless widow, resident of Khochi,  Taluka
Hatkanangale, District  Kolhapur,  died  on  2.12.1984.  She  was  owner  of
certain properties in the Village. An application was  moved  under  Section
276 of Indian Succession Act, 1925  before  Civil  Judge,  Senior  Division,
Kolhapur, by appellant Vishwanath Dadu Gurav  who  sought  probate  of  Will
dated 11.9.1984,  said  to  have  been  executed  by  Chandrabai.   In  said
application, which was registered as Civil Application No. 20 of  1989,  the
appellant pleaded that Chandrabai, widow of Annappa  Gurav  was  his  cousin
aunt, and she used to live with him.   Chandrabai  and  her  husband,  being
issueless, were maintained by the appellant till their death.   It  is  also
pleaded that a Will dated 11.9.1984 was executed in  a  sound  condition  of
mind by Chandrabai in  the  appellant’s  favour  in  respect  of  properties
mentioned in the application in presence of Dr.  B.A.  Herwade  (PW-2),  and
two witnesses, namely, Mahadev Ramngiri Gosavi (PW-4)  and  Dinkar  Shripati
Patil.  The deed was written  by  one  Sayed.   Out  of  the  two  attesting
witnesses Dinkar Shripati Patil died on 24.5.1985.  On the  basis  of  Will,
the appellant got his name entered in  the  revenue  record  in  respect  of
property in question, vide mutation entry No. 1637 dated 25.1.1985,  but  on
the objection  of  respondent  the  entry  was  cancelled.   Therefore,  the
petition for probate was filed by the appellant.

Respondent Dattatray Ganapati Gurav opposed  the  probate  application,  and
claimed that it was he who was looking after the deceased  till  her  death.
He denied that the deceased executed any Will in  favour  of  the  appellant
Vishwanath Dadu Gurav.   The  respondent  further  pleaded  that  he  is  in
possession of the property of the deceased.

The trial court, on the basis  of  the  pleadings  of  the  parties,  framed
following issues: -
Whether the deceased testator Chandrabai Annappa  Gurav  was  owner  of  the
property in question?

Whether the Will is valid and duly executed by testator in his favour?

Whether  the applicant entitled to the probate or letter  of  administration
as prayed?

To what order, if any, the applicant is entitled?


The parties filed their documentary evidence in support of their cases,  and
also led oral  evidence.   The  trial  court,  after  hearing  the  parties,
decided all the issues in favour of the applicant and directed  issuance  of
probate in the name of Vishwanath  Dadu  Gurav  in  respect  of  Will  dated
11.9.1984, executed by Chandrabai Annappa Gurav.

Aggrieved  by  said  judgment  and  order   dated   15.3.1991,   passed   on
Miscellaneous Civil Application No. 20 of 1989, original opponent  Dattatray
Ganapati Gurav filed Regular  Civil  Appeal  No.  124  of  1991  before  the
District Judge, Kolhapur, which was allowed  on  17.10.1997,  after  hearing
the parties, and  the  probate  granted  was  set  aside.   Thereafter  writ
petition No. 2576 of 2003 appears to  have  been  filed  on  behalf  of  the
original applicant on the  ground  that  the  appeal  was  not  maintainable
before the District Judge/Additional District Judge  (Kolhapur).   The  High
Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground that in  view  of  law  laid
down  in  Manohar  Bapurao  Sapre  v.  Bhaurao   Tukaramji   Shirbhate   and
Another[1], as the valuation of the property was only  Rs.25,000/-  as  such
the district court had appellate jurisdiction.  Hence  this  appeal  through
special leave.

However, the original applicant Vishwanath Dadu Gurav and original  opponent
Dattatray Ganapati Gurav have  died  and  their  legal  representatives  are
prosecuting the matter.

Learned counsel for the appellants argued that the High  Court  should  have
decided the writ petition on merits, and it erred  in  dismissing  the  writ
petition only on the ground  that  the  District  Judge/Additional  District
Judge had the jurisdiction to decide the appeal.

On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents contended that  since
the order passed by the appellate court was challenged only  on  the  ground
of maintainability of appeal, as such, the High Court was  not  required  to
look into the merits of the case.

Undisputedly, the Will (Ex.-38) in question was unregistered,  but  evidence
was led to prove it on record by the  attesting  witness.  It  is  also  not
disputed that the respondents were not related to Chandrabai (deceased).  As
against said fact there is specific  plea  that  Chandrabai  (deceased)  was
cousin aunt of the original applicant Vishwanath Dadu Gurav,  and  she  used
to live with him.  PW 2 Dr. Herwade, who used to  visit  the  deceased  when
she was ill before her  death,  was  got  examined  on  behalf  of  original
applicant to  corroborate  the  fact  that  Chandrabai  used  to  live  with
Vishwanath Dadu Gurav.  Though trial court recorded  finding  in  favour  of
the applicant, but the appellate court reversed the same.

The writ petition filed on behalf of the original  applicant  was  dismissed
by the High Court holding that there was no infirmity  in  the  jurisdiction
of the appellate court.  Consequently, a Review Petition No. 33147  of  2012
appears to have been moved before the  High  Court  seeking  review  of  the
impugned order dated 14.3.2012 passed in Writ Petition  No.  2576  of  2003.
In the review petition it was pointed out by the  writ  petitioner  (present
appellant) that initially civil revision application No. 1187  of  1997  was
moved challenging the merits of the order passed  by  the  appellate  court,
but the same was dismissed, vide order dated 2.12.2002, by  the  High  Court
as not maintainable in the light of the amended provisions of Code of  Civil
Procedure.  As such, the writ petition was filed  by  the  appellant  before
the High Court challenging the maintainability  of  the  appeal  before  the
District Judge, and  inadvertently  the  grounds  on  merits  could  not  be
mentioned.   Raising  the  grounds  on  merits  against  the  order  of  the
appellate court, the order passed in the writ  petition  was  sought  to  be
reviewed.

No doubt, when there existed no ground of challenge on merits  in  the  writ
petition, High Court could not have adverted to it. We  are  also  conscious
of the fact that if a party is allowed to seek amendment in the  grounds  of
appeal or writ petition after its disposal, it can lead to abuse of  process
of law, and the parties would not let the proceedings come to  an  end.   As
such, we are not inclined to allow the appellants to  add  grounds  in  writ
petition by way of amendment, after its disposal.  However, considering  the
peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, we  are  of  the  view
that to do complete justice between the parties,  the  matter  needs  to  be
remitted to the  appellate  court,  as  the  reasons  given  by  said  court
reversing the findings of the trial court, are not sufficient,  and  do  not
answer properly the issues raised in the appeals.

Therefore, without expressing any opinion as to final merits  of  the  case,
we direct the appellate  court  (Additional  District  Judge,  Kolhapur)  to
decide the appeals afresh after re-appreciating the evidence on record.




Accordingly, the present appeals stand disposed of.




                                                          ………………….....…………J.
                                                  [Dipak Misra]




                                                            .………………….……………J.
                                                          [Prafulla C. Pant]
New Delhi;
November 16, 2015.

-----------------------
[1]    1995 (2) Mh.L.J. 336

permission to conduct college level counseling to fill up the left over vacant seats. The grievance of the appellants/petitioner is that because of the alleged arbitrary decision of Higher Education Department seats in these institutions have been left vacant.= It has further been contended by the appellants that despite almost more than 50% seats are lying vacant in their institutions, the respondent authorities have till date restricted the admissions to only those students who have appeared in the entrance examination conducted by Vyapam and not opened for all students possessing the minimum eligibility marks from the qualifying examination and have also proposed no program for college level counseling. Although respondent authorities have conducted almost three round of counseling, the seats are lying vacant in their institutions. Our attention was drawn to the decision dated 26.9.2014 of this Court passed in Civil Appeal No.5914 of 2011 and connected writ petitions and pleaded that this Court had directed the State Government of Uttar Pradesh to conduct the Counseling and allot students to the vacant seats. The entrance examination for such examination is conducted by the Professional Examination Board. For the academic session 2015-16, 63406 students participated in the examination conducted by Vyapam. It has been further submitted that under the Guidelines for admission framed by the State, an online registration is compulsory for all students who desired to participate in the counseling which was to be conducted after the entrance test. The Registration for first round counseling was held from 18.5.2015 to 28.5.2015 and three rounds of counseling were completed between 9.6.2015 to 29.6.2015. Thereafter, additional round of counseling was also conducted in July, 2015, for which all students were allowed/permitted to get the online registration subject to the only condition that they have participated in the entrance examination. According to the respondents, against total seats of 53,865 in the State of Madhya Pradesh for B.Ed. course, 63,406 students were allowed online registration. Despite four rounds of counseling, seats in the appellant colleges are remaining vacant, which means that the students are not interested in getting admission in these colleges. It has been further submitted that the entire pool of students who had participated in the Vyapam examination has been exhausted, and as such, no further counseling can be permitted now. In the background of all these facts, we do not find any reason to grant any interim relief to the appellants/petitioner to conduct a college level counseling and admit the students who have not even appeared in the entrance test. These applications are, therefore, dismissed.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                  CIVIL APPEAL NO.   13353          OF 2015
                  (arising out of SLP(C)No. 26311 of 2015)

VNS College of Physical Education and
Management Studies and others                Appellant(s)
                                   versus
State of Madhya Pradesh and others           Respondent(s)

                                    WITH

                      WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 674 OF 2015

Devi Ahilya Asaskiya Siksha
Mahavidyalayin Sanchalak Sangh               Petitioner(s)
                                   versus
State of Madhya Pradesh and others           Respondent(s)

                    CIVIL APPEAL Nos.13355-13357 OF 2015
              (arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 28803-28805 of 2015)

Preston College and others etc.                    Appellant(s)
                                   Versus

State of Madhya Pradesh and others           Respondent(s)


                               J U D G M E N T

|                                                         |
|M.Y. Eqbal, J.:                                          |


      Leave granted.
2.    Heard Mr. Vikas  Singh,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the
appellants/writ petitioner and Mr. Arjun  Garg,  learned  counsel  appearing
for the respondents.

3.     In  all  these  applications   the   appellants/petitioner,   private
recognized institutions are aggrieved by the impugned orders passed  by  the
High Court of Madhya Pradesh refusing to pass  an  interim  order  directing
these institutions for conducting counseling and admission to  the  students
possessing   minimum   eligible    marks.     In    other    words,    these
appellants/petitioner seek permission to conduct  college  level  counseling
to  fill  up  the  left  over  vacant   seats.    The   grievance   of   the
appellants/petitioner is that because of the alleged arbitrary  decision  of
Higher Education Department seats  in  these  institutions  have  been  left
vacant.

4.    It appears that by the impugned decision taken by  the  Department  of
Higher Education, admission to students have been restricted to  only  those
students who have appeared in the entrance examination conducted  by  Vyapam
and is not open for all students possessing the  minimum  eligibility  marks
from the qualifying examination and also opposed  the  request  for  college
level counseling.

5.      The contention of the appellants/petitioner are that the  counseling
by the respondent Department is being conducted in  complete  derogation  of
various mandatory provisions of Admission Rules 2008  framed  by  the  State
Government itself under the provisions  of  Madhya  Pradesh  Niji  Vyavsayik
Shikshan Santhan Adhiniyam 2007 where under it is  provided  that  if  after
two rounds of counseling, the seats are left vacant in the  private  unaided
colleges then the admission process would  be  open  for  all  the  students
having  minimum  eligibility  criteria  and  having  minimum  marks  in  the
qualifying examination.   It  is  pleaded  that  it  further  provides  that
“College level counseling” shall also be permitted to be carried out by  the
concerned college itself for filling its vacant seats.

6.    It has further been contended by the appellants  that  despite  almost
more than 50% seats are lying vacant in their institutions,  the  respondent
authorities have till date restricted the admissions to only those  students
who have appeared in the entrance examination conducted by  Vyapam  and  not
opened for all students possessing the minimum eligibility  marks  from  the
qualifying examination and have also proposed no program for  college  level
counseling.  Although respondent authorities  have  conducted  almost  three
round of counseling, the seats are lying vacant in their institutions.   Our
attention was drawn to the decision dated 26.9.2014 of this Court passed  in
Civil Appeal No.5914 of 2011 and connected writ petitions and  pleaded  that
this Court had directed the State Government of  Uttar  Pradesh  to  conduct
the Counseling and allot students to the vacant seats.

7.    The contention of the respondent-State of Madhya Pradesh is  that  the
State Government has issued circular for counseling for admission in  B.Ed.,
M.Ed. etc. courses in private institutions.  The  entrance  examination  for
such examination is conducted by the Professional  Examination  Board.   For
the  academic  session  2015-16,  63406   students   participated   in   the
examination conducted by Vyapam.  It has been further submitted  that  under
the Guidelines for admission framed by the State, an online registration  is
compulsory for all students who desired to  participate  in  the  counseling
which was to be conducted after the  entrance  test.  The  Registration  for
first round counseling was  held  from  18.5.2015  to  28.5.2015  and  three
rounds  of  counseling  were  completed  between  9.6.2015   to   29.6.2015.
Thereafter, additional round of  counseling  was  also  conducted  in  July,
2015, for which all  students  were  allowed/permitted  to  get  the  online
registration subject to the only condition that they  have  participated  in
the entrance examination.   According  to  the  respondents,  against  total
seats of 53,865 in the State of Madhya  Pradesh  for  B.Ed.  course,  63,406
students  were  allowed  online  registration.   Despite  four   rounds   of
counseling, seats in the appellant  colleges  are  remaining  vacant,  which
means that the students are not interested in  getting  admission  in  these
colleges.   It has been further submitted that the entire pool  of  students
who had participated in the Vyapam examination has been  exhausted,  and  as
such, no further counseling can be permitted now.

8.    In the background of all these facts, we do not  find  any  reason  to
grant any interim relief to the appellants/petitioner to conduct  a  college
level counseling and admit the students who have not even  appeared  in  the
entrance test.  These applications are, therefore, dismissed.

                                                              …………………………….J.
                                                                (M.Y. Eqbal)



                                                              …………………………….J.
                                                               (C. Nagappan)
New Delhi
November 06, 2015

THE REPEALING AND AMENDING ACT, 2015 NO. 17 OF 2015 [13th May, 2015.]

MINISTRY OF LAW AND JUSTICE
 (Legislative Department) New Delhi,
the 13th May, 2015/Vaisakha 23, 1937 (Saka)
The following Act of Parliament received the assent of the President on the 13th May, 2015, and is hereby published for general information:—


THE REPEALING AND AMENDING ACT, 2015 NO. 17 OF 2015 [13th May, 2015.]

 An Act to repeal certain enactments and to amend certain other enactments.

BE it enacted by Parliament in the Sixty-sixth Year of the Republic of India as follows:—

1.   This Act may be called the Repealing and Amending Act, 2015. 
2.  The enactments specified in the First Schedule are hereby repealed to the extent mentioned in the fourth column thereof.
3.  The enactments specified in the Second Schedule are hereby amended to the extent and the manner mentioned in the fourth column thereof. 
4.  The repeal by this Act of any enactment shall not affect any Act in which such enactment has been applied, incorporated or referred to; 

Short title. Repeal of certain enactments. Amendment of certain enactments. Savings.

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 NEW DELHI, WEDNESDAY, MAY 13, 2015/VAISAKHA 23, 1937 (SAKA) bl Hkkx esa fHkUu i`"B la[;k nh tkrh gS ftlls fd ;g vyx ladyu ds :i esa j[kk tk ldsA Separate paging is given to this Part in order that it may be filed as a separate compilation.
REGISTERED NO. DL—(N)04/0007/2003—15 MINISTRY OF LAW AND JUSTICE (Legislative Department) New Delhi, the 13th May, 2015/Vaisakha 23, 1937 (Saka)
The following Act of Parliament received the assent of the President on the 13th May, 2015, and is hereby published for general information:—
2 THE GAZETTE OF INDIA EXTRAORDINARY [PART II— and this Act shall not affect the validity, invalidity, effect or consequences of anything already done or suffered, or any right, title, obligation or liability already acquired, accrued or incurred, or any remedy or proceeding in respect thereof, or any release or discharge of or from any debt, penalty, obligation, liability, claim or demand, or any indemnity already granted, or the proof of any past act or thing; nor shall this Act affect any principle or rule of law, or established jurisdiction, form or course of pleading, practice or procedure, or existing usage, custom, privilege, restriction, exemption, office or appointment, notwithstanding that the same respectively may have been in any manner affirmed, recognised or derived by, in or from any enactment hereby repealed; nor shall the repeal by this Act of any enactment provide or restore any jurisdiction, office, custom, liability, right, title, privilege, restriction, exemption, usage, practice, procedure or other matter or thing not now existing or in force.
THE FIRST SCHEDULE
(See Section 2)
 REPEALS
Year No. Short title Extent of repeal 1897
 4 The Indian Fisheries Act, 1897 The whole.
1947 47 The Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1947 The whole.
1978 49 The Sugar Undertakings (Taking Over of Management) The whole.
 Act, 1978 1999 30 The Representation of the People (Amendment) Act, 1999 The whole.
1999 33 The Indian Majority (Amendment) Act, 1999 The whole.
1999 34 The Administrators-General (Amendment) Act, 1999 The whole.
1999 36 The Notaries (Amendment) Act, 1999 The whole .
1999 39 The Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1999 The whole.
 2001 30 The Repealing and Amending Act, 2001 The whole.
2001 49 The Mariage Laws (Amendment) Act, 2001 The whole.
2001 51 The Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001 The whole.
2002 26 The Indian Succession (Amendment) Act, 2002 The whole.
2002 37 The Legal Services Authorities (Amendment ) Act, 2002 The whole.
2002 72 The Representation of the People (Third Amendment) Act, 2002 The whole.
2003 3 The Transfer of Property (Amendment) Act, 2002 The whole.
2003 4 The Indian Evidence (Amendment) Act, 2002 The whole.
2003 6 The Representation of the People (Second Amendment) The whole. Act,
2002 2003 9 The Representation of the People (Amendment) Act, 2002 The whole.
2003 24 The Election Laws (Amendment) Act, 2003 The whole.
2003 40 The Representation of the People (Amendment) The whole. Act,
2003 2003 46 The Election and Other Related Laws (Amendment) The whole.
Act, 2003 SEC. 1] THE GAZETTE OF INDIA EXTRAORDINARY 3 2003 50 The Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 2003 The whole.
2004 2 The Representation of the People (Second Amendment) The whole. Act, 2003 2004 3 The Delimitation (Amendment) Act, 2003 The whole.
2005 4 The Delegated Legislation Provisions (Amendment) The whole.
Act, 2004 2005 39 The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 The whole.
2006 31 The Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) The whole.
Amendment Act, 2006 2008 9 The Delimitation (Amendment) Act, 2008 The whole. 2008 10 The Representation of the People (Amendment) Act, 2008 The whole. 2009 41 The Representation of the People (Amendment) Act, 2009 The whole. 2010 30 The Personal Laws (Amendment) Act, 2010 The whole. 2010 36 The Representation of the People (Amendment) Act, 2010 The whole. 2012 29 The Anand Marriage (Amendment) Act, 2012 The whole. 2012 33 The Administrators-General (Amendment) Act, 2012 The whole. 2013 28 The Parliament (Prevention of Disqualification) The whole.
Amendment Act, 2013
THE SECOND SCHEDULE
 (See section 3)
AMENDMENTS
Year No.Short title Amendments
 2013 25 The Prohibition of Employment as Manual In the proviso to sub-section (3) of Scavengers and their Rehabilitation Act, section 1, for the words "the 2013 notification", the words "the said notification" shall be substituted.
2014 17 The Whistle Blowers Protection Act, 2011 (a) In the Enacting Formula, for the words "Sixty-second Year", the words "Sixty-fifth Year" shall be substituted; and (b) in sub-section (1) of section 1, for the figures "2011", the figures "2014" shall be substituted.
Year No. Short title Extent of repeal

DR. SANJAY SINGH,
Secretary to the Govt. of India.
 GMGIPMRND—1113GI(S3)—13-05-2015.
PRINTED BY THE GENERAL MANAGER,
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA PRESS, MINTO ROAD,
 NEW DELHI AND PUBLISHED BY THE CONTROLLER OF PUBLICATIONS, DELHI—2015.