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Wednesday, August 5, 2015

. 1. The appellant is engaged in the manufacture of pig iron. The appellant imported Low Ash Metallurgical (LAM) Coke under seven Bills of Entry, against four advance licenses without payment of basic customs duty (BCD) levied under Section 12 of the Customs Act, 1962, special customs duty (SCD) levied under Section 68 of the Finance Act, 1996, special additional duty (SAD) levied under Section 3A of Customs Tariff Act, 1975 and Anti-dumping duty (ADD) levied under Section 9A of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 during the period June 1998 to August 1998, which were exempt from duty vide (i) Notifications No. 30/97 Cus dated 1.4.1997, (ii) Sr. No.4 of Notification No.12/97 Cus dated 1.3.97, (iii) Sr. No.3 of the Notification No.34/98-Cus dated 13.6.1998, and (iv) Notification No.41/97-Cus dated 30.4.97 respectively.We may add, that after 2002, Sections 3(2) and 3A(2) have been amended with effect from 1.3.2002 so as to expressly not include Anti- dumping duty.= 1. Doubts have been expressed about the method of computing the additional duty of customs (CVD) under section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. The doubt raised is on the point that whether anti-dumping duty, safeguard duty and other duties etc. should be taken into account while computing the CVD. In this regard, it is clarified that for computing the CVD,only the value of the imported article as determined under section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962, including the landing charges, if any and the basic customs duty chargeable at the rates specified in the First Schedule to the said Customs Tariff Act (read with any notification for the time being in force in respect of the basic customs duty) needs to be taken into account. Other duties such as anti-dumping duty, safeguard duty, etc. should not be taken into account.” “In the explanatory notes for the last year’s budget it was clarified that for computing the CVD, only the value of imported article as determined under section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962, including the landing charges, if any and the basic customs duty chargeable at the rates specified in the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act (read with any notification for the time being in force in respect of the basic customs duty) needs to be taken into account. Other duties such as anti-dumping duty, safeguard duty, etc. should not be taken into account. A view has been expressed that section 3A of the Customs Tariff Act does not permit such interpretation. To place the matter beyond doubt, it is proposed to amend section 3 and section 3A of the Customs Tariff Act so as to make it very clear that for computation of additional duty of customs, only the c.i.f. price, landing charges and basic customs duty will be included. Similarly for determining special additional duty of customs (SAD), only the c.i.f. price, landing charges, basic customs duty and the additional duty of customs will be included. Other duties such as anti- dumping duty safeguard duty, etc. shall not be taken into account. This amendment will have effect from 1.3.2002.” As far as penalty is concerned, we feel that the appellant before us has not diverted goods meant for export to the domestic tariff area. We are satisfied that market considerations made it difficult, if not impossible, for the appellant to fulfill its export obligations and are, therefore, of the view that the penalty imposed in the present case ought to be set aside. 38. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed in the aforesaid terms and the judgment of CESTAT is set aside.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.7189 OF 2005




      M/S. JASWAL NECO LTD.                   … APPELLANT




                                   VERSUS
      COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS,
      VISAKHAPATNAM                                ...RESPONDENT




                              J U D G M E N T

      R.F. Nariman, J.




      1.    The appellant is engaged in the manufacture of  pig  iron.   The
      appellant imported Low Ash Metallurgical (LAM) Coke under seven  Bills
      of Entry, against four  advance  licenses  without  payment  of  basic
      customs duty (BCD) levied under Section 12 of the Customs  Act,  1962,
      special customs duty (SCD) levied under Section 68 of the Finance Act,
      1996, special additional duty (SAD) levied under Section 3A of Customs
      Tariff Act, 1975 and Anti-dumping duty (ADD) levied under  Section  9A
      of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 during the period June 1998 to  August
      1998, which were exempt from duty vide (i) Notifications No. 30/97 Cus
      dated 1.4.1997, (ii) Sr.  No.4  of  Notification  No.12/97  Cus  dated
      1.3.97,  (iii)  Sr.  No.3  of  the  Notification  No.34/98-Cus   dated
      13.6.1998,  and   (iv)   Notification   No.41/97-Cus   dated   30.4.97
      respectively.

      2.    At the time of import, the appellant furnished a bond containing
      an  undertaking  to  pay  duty  on  imported   goods   cleared   under
      Notification No.30/97 and 41/97 in the event of failure to fulfill its
      export obligation.

      3.    It is an admitted position that the appellant failed to  fulfill
      its export obligation in the terms of the exemption notifications. The
      entire LAM so imported has instead been used by the appellant  in  its
      factory for the manufacture of pig iron.

      4.    Demand of duty of Rs.7.21 crores was sought to be  raised.   The
      break up of demand of Rs.7.21 crores is as under:

           1.    Basic Customs Duty                Rs.1.01 crores

           2.    Antidumping Duty            Rs.5.00 crores

           3.    Special Customs Duty              Rs.0.50 crore

           4.    Special Additional Duty                Rs.0.66 crore

           5.    Cess                              Rs.0.02 crore

                 Total                             Rs.7.21 crores.




      5.    Pending final adjudication of  the  show  cause  notice  by  the
      Commissioner, the appellant duly paid the entire duty payable  towards
      BCD, SAD and SCD after considering partial exports already made.   The
      appellant did not make any payment towards ADD.

      6.    The Commissioner of Customs vide Order dated 4.11.2004 confirmed
      the duty demand of Rs.3.37 crores and  imposed  a  penalty  of  Rupees
      Twenty  lakhs.  According  to  the  learned  Commissioner,  since  the
      appellant after issuance  of  the  show  cause  notice  paid  duty  of
      Rs.1,66,18,563/-,  the  differential  duty  to  be  paid  amounted  to
      Rs.1,70,98,510/-.  Further, interest on the said  amount  at  24%  was
      also held to be payable.

      7.    The appellant appealed to CESTAT.  Vide  the  impugned  judgment
      dated 18.8.2005, CESTAT partly allowed the  appeal  by  remanding  the
      matter to the original authority  to  calculate  duty,  interest,  and
      penalty in accordance with the findings  contained  in  its  judgment.
      The basic difference  between   CESTAT’s  judgment  and  that  of  the
      Commissioner is that interest was reduced from 24%  to  15%,  but  the
      Anti-dumping duty was increased by applying the higher rates specified
      by the final Notification No.69 of 2000.

      8.    Shri Lakshmikumaran, learned advocate for the appellant did  not
      dispute before us that the appellant failed in its export  obligations
      and was, therefore, not liable to be exempted so far as  customs  duty
      is concerned.  He, therefore, conceded that basic customs duty and the
      special customs duty as well as special additional duty was payable by
      the appellant.   However,  he  disputed  that  Anti-dumping  duty  was
      payable  at  all  stating  that  the  appellant   was   exempt   under
      Notification No.69 of 2000.  He further argued  that  no  interest  is
      chargeable on any of the four duties inasmuch as  the  bond  that  was
      furnished under Notification No.30 of 1997 did not stipulate  that  in
      the  event  of  default,  interest  would  become  payable.   Further,
      according to him, it is clear that the assessment in the present  case
      is only provisional and that being the case, even if the provisions of
      the Customs Act are made applicable insofar as  Anti-dumping  duty  is
      concerned, under the Customs Act itself there  was  no  provision  for
      collection of interest for the period in dispute  as  Section  18  was
      amended to include such a provision  only  prospectively  with  effect
      from 2006.  He further argued, that  in  any  case  Anti-dumping  duty
      could not be added for purposes of  computing  customs  duty,  special
      customs  duty  and  special  additional  duty.   Also  no  penalty  is
      imposable inasmuch as nothing contumacious was done by  the  appellant
      and the export obligation could  not  be  fulfilled  only  because  of
      bonafide commercial impossibility.  It is contended that  nothing  has
      been diverted to the domestic tariff area and sold in that  area,  and
      the entire imports made have been used by the appellant  captively  in
      its factory for the manufacture of pig iron.  He further  argued  that
      he could not be worse off in an appeal filed  only  by  the  appellant
      herein to CESTAT and that on the assumption  that  the  appellant  was
      liable to pay Anti-dumping duty, they should only pay the said duty at
      the lower rate prescribed by  the  Commissioner  as  Revenue  had  not
      appealed to the Tribunal against the Commissioner’s order.

      9.    Shri Radhakrishnan, learned senior counsel appearing  on  behalf
      of the revenue countered the aforesaid submissions and submitted  that
      the exemption contained in the Anti-dumping duty  Notification  69  of
      2000 was only prospective and, hence Anti-dumping duty had to be  paid
      for the relevant period. He further submitted  that  interest  in  any
      case was payable as Notification No.30 of 1997 independently levied  a
      charge of interest.  Further, he  also  supported  the  Commissioner’s
      order and the Tribunal so far as the various  other  aspects  of  this
      appeal are concerned.

      10.   We have heard learned counsel  for  the  parties.  In  order  to
      appreciate the first submission of Shri Lakshmikumaran,  namely,  that
      Anti-dumping duty in the present case ought to be nil, we set out  the
      relevant Notifications –

                 “Notification: 22/98-Cus. Dated 06-May-1998

           Metallurgical coke originating in or exported from China PR –
           Anti-dumping duty

            In exercise of  the  powers  conferred  by  sub-section  (2)  of
           section 9A of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 (51  of  1975),  read
           with rule 13 of the Customs Tariff  (Identification,  Assessment
           and Collection of Anti-dumping Duty on Dumped Articles  and  for
           Determination of Injury) Rules, 1995, the Central Government  on
           the  basis  of  the  preliminary  findings  of  the   designated
           authority, published in the  Gazette  of  India,  Extraordinary,
           Part I, Section 1, dated the 20th  March,  1998  that  there  is
           dumping in respect  of  the  Metallurgical  coke  falling  under
           Heading No. 27.04 of the First Schedule to  the  said  Act,  and
           originating in or exported from China PR, hereby imposes on  the
           said Metallurgical coke originating in or  exported  from  China
           PR, and imported into India, an anti-dumping duty at the rate of
           one thousand eight hundred rupees per metric tonne.

            This notification shall have effect upto and  inclusive  of  the
           5th day of November, 1998.”

                 “Notification: 82/98/Cus. Dated 27-Oct-1998

           Metallurgical coke originating in, or exported from, China PR –
           Anti-dumping duty – Notification No. 22/98-Cus. Rescinded

            In exercise of  the  powers  conferred  by  sub-section  (2)  of
           section 9A of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 (51  of  1975),  read
           with rule 13 of the Customs Tariff  (Identification,  Assessment
           and Collection of Anti-dumping Duty on Dumped Articles  and  for
           Determination of Injury) Rules,  1995,  the  Central  Government
           hereby rescinds the notification of the Government of  India  in
           the Ministry of Finance  (Department  of  Revenue),  No.  22/98-
           Customs, dated the 6th May, 1998, published in  the  Gazette  of
           India, Extraordinary, Part II, Section 3, Sub-section  (i)  vide
           G.S.R. 243 (E), dated the 6th May, 1998.”

            Notification: 81/98-Cus. Dated 27-Oct-1998

            Metallurgical coke (Metcoke) originating in, or  exported  from,
           China PR – Anti-dumping duty

           “Now, therefore, in exercise of the  powers  conferred  by  sub-
           section (1) of section 9A of the said Customs Tariff  Act,  read
           with rules 18 and 20  of  the  Customs  Tariff  (Identification,
           Assessment  and  Collection  of  Anti-dumping  Duty  on   Dumped
           Articles and for  Determination  of  Injury)  Rules,  1995,  the
           Central Government, after considering the aforesaid findings  of
           the Designated Authority,  hereby  imposes  on  Metcoke  falling
           under heading No. 27.04  of  the  First  Schedule  to  the  said
           Customs Tariff Act, originating in or exported from China PR and
           imported into India, an anti-dumping duty calculated at  a  rate
           as equivalent to the difference between Rs. 4673 and the  landed
           value of Metcoke, per metric tonne;

           2.    The anti-dumping  duty  imposed  under  this  notification
           shall be levied with effect  from  the  date  of  imposition  of
           provisional duty i.e. 6th of May, 1998.”




      11.   The final Notification dated 27.10.1998 was  challenged  by  the
      Pig Iron Manufacturers Association.  By its judgment reported  in  Pig
      Iron Manufacturers Association v. Designated  Authority,  Ministry  of
      Commerce, 2000 (116)  ELT  67  (Tribunal),  the  Tribunal  passed  the
      following order:-

           “12.  In the light of the above discussions and  findings  based
           on the data available on record, we pass the following orders:-

              1. All imports of metcoke exported from or originating in the
           People’s Republic of China to India be subjected to anti-dumping
           duties  at  the  following  rates  as  indicated  against   each
           exporter:-

            1. China  National Coal Industry       : 18.35US$  Import/Export
               (Group) Corporation.




            2.     China    National     Mineral     Import     and        :
               24.51US$
                    Export Corporation.


            3.  Shanxi Coal Import Export Group    :           19.22US$

                   Corporation. (Minmetal Group).




            4. Ningxia Xiacheng Import & Export    :     24.95 US$

                  Corporation.

            5. China North Industries Corporation. :     22.69 US$




            6. Shanghai Pacific Chemicals (Group)  :     19.22 US$
                   Corporation Ltd.


            7. All other  exporters.            :                      24.95
               US$



           2.    Subject to these modifications, the final  findings  dated
           27th August, 1998 of the D.A. are  confirmed.   The  Corrigendum
           dated 2nd September, 1998 is set aside.”




      12.   Pursuant to the  Tribunal’s  judgment,  the  Central  Government
      issued a Notification dated 26.5.2000 as follows:-

           “Now, therefore, in exercise of the  powers  conferred  by  sub-
           section (1) of Section 9A read with sub-section  (6) of  Section
           3 of the said Customs Tariff Act and sub-section (1) of  Section
           25 of the Customs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962), and in supersession of
           the notification of the Government of India in the  Ministry  of
           Finance (Department of Revenue) No. 81/98-  Customs,  dated  the
           27th October, 1998 [ G.S.R. 644 (E),  dated  the  27th  October,
           1998], except as respects things done  or  omitted  to  be  done
           before such supersession, the Central Government hereby  imposes
           on Metcoke falling under heading No. 27.04 of the First Schedule
           to the said Customs Tariff  Act,  originating  in,  or  exported
           from, China  PR  and  imported  into  India,  by  the  exporters
           mentioned in column (2) of the Table hereto  annexed,  an  anti-
           dumping duty of an amount equivalent to the  rate  indicated  in
           column (3) of the said Table,  converted  into  Indian  currency
           with reference to the rate of exchange as in force on  the  date
           on which a bill of entry is presented under section  46  of  the
           said Customs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962).”




           |S. No.      Name of the Exporter        Rate  per |
|metric tone                                       |
|                    (2)                           |
|(3)                                               |
|1.         China  National Coal Industry          |
|US$ 18.35                                         |
|Import/Export (Group) Corporation                 |
|2.         China National Mineral Import and   US$|
|24.51                                             |
|Export Corporation.                               |
|                                                  |
|3.         Shanxi Coal Import Export Group     US$|
|19.22                                             |
|Corporation. (Minmetal Group)                     |
|4.         Ningxia Xiacheng Import & Export   US$ |
|24.95                                             |
|Corporation                                       |
|5.         China North Industries Corporation     |
|US$ 22.69                                         |
|                                                  |
|6.         Shanghai Pacific Chemicals (Group) US$ |
|19.22                                             |
|Corporation Ltd.                                  |
|                                                  |
|7.         All other exporters.                   |
|US$ 24.95                                         |


           Nothing contained in this notification shall apply to imports of
           Metcoke by a manufacturer of pig iron or  steel  using  a  blast
           furnace if he follows the  procedure  set  out  in  the  Customs
           (Import of Goods at Concessional Rate of Duty for Manufacture of
           Excisable Goods) Rules, 1996.”

      13.   The bone of  contention  in  the  present  appeal  is  the  last
      paragraph of this Notification.

      14.   It is clear that under  Rule  20(2)(a)  of  the  Customs  Tariff
      (Identification, Assessment And  Collection  of  Antidumping  Duty  on
      Dumped Articles and For Determination of Injury) Rules, 1995, where  a
      provisional duty has been levied and where  the  designated  authority
      has recorded a final finding of injury or threat  of  injury  and  the
      further  finding  that  the  effect  of  imports  in  the  absence  of
      provisional duty would have led to injury, the Anti-dumping  duty  may
      be levied from the date of imposition of  provisional  duty.   In  the
      present  case,  therefore,  it  will  be  noticed   that   the   final
      Notification dated 27.10.1998 is said to come into force from the date
      of the first Notification dated 6.5.1998 imposing provisional duty  in
      the present case.  It is clear that as the  final  Notification  dated
      27.10.1998 has been superseded by the  Notification  dated  19.5.2000,
      the appellant would have had to pay Anti-dumping duty at the  rate  of
      US$ 24.95 per metric tonne as indisputably it falls within  Item  No.7
      of the said Notification.

      15.   It will  be  noticed  that  the  exception  carved  out  in  the
      Notification dated 19.5.2000 was pursuant  to  a  minutes  of  meeting
      dated 25.11.1999 by the Secretary (Steel) and representatives of  Mini
      Blast Furnace producers  of  Metallurgical  Coke.   These  minutes  of
      meeting state as follows:-

           “The  Representatives  of  IMCOM  (Indian   Metallurgical   Coke
           Manufacturers Association) said that IMCOM represents  both  the
           petitioners i.e. M/s. BLA Industries and Industries and Commerce
           Association in the anti dumping duty petition against import  of
           metcoke of Chinese  origin.   They  explained  that  while  anti
           dumping duty was essential for the survival of the domestic coke
           producers, the blast furnaces have never  been  their  principal
           customers and it was not  their  intention  to  harm  the  blast
           furnaces industry.

           5.    After detailed deliberations it was agreed between  Indian
           Metallurgical  Coke  Manufacturers   Association   (IMCOM)   and
           Association of Indian Mini Blast Furnaces (AIM) that  the  blast
           furnace units were not the principal market  that  the  domestic
           coke producers cater to.  The market to which the domestic  coke
           producers cater to companies ferrous and non-ferrous  foundries,
           ferro alloys producers, soda ash producers, zinc usmelting units
           some other chemical units and various SSI units.

           6.    Since the imposition of the anti dumping  duty  the  blast
           furnace units had to resort to  import  from  expensive  sources
           like Russia, Japan etc.  In view of this it was suggested by the
           AIM that the blast furnace units could be exempted  from  paying
           ADD on import of metallurgical coke of Chinese origin,  provided
           this import is for actual use by the blast furnace  units.   The
           list of blast furnace  units  which  will  be  covered  by  this
           exemption is also enclosed.

           7.    Considering the financial difficulty  of  the  members  of
           AIM, IMCOM agreed that they have no objection if the  government
           exempts the blast furnace industry from the purview of the anti-
           dumping duty.  Metcoke will be imported under  OGL  with  Actual
           user Conditions for blast furnace industry without  ADD.   IMCOM
           reiterated that while the continuation of the ADD on metcoke  of
           Chinese origin is vital for the survival of the indigenous  coke
           manufacturers they also agreed that the exemption of  the  blast
           furnace units from ADD was vital for their survival.”




      16.   On reading these minutes  it  becomes  clear  that  Anti-dumping
      duties that had been imposed upon the Blast Furnace  Industry  had  an
      adverse impact upon the industry and that the intention of levying  an
      Anti-dumping duty was not to harm their interests.  Paragraphs 6 and 7
      of the said minutes in particular seem to suggest that  the  exemption
      that was contemplated by the minutes of such Blast Furnace  units  was
      something that could take place only in the future.

      17.   Quite apart from this, it is clear that no exception was  carved
      out before 19.5.2000 in favour of Blast Furnace  Manufacturers  either
      when the provisional Anti-dumping duty was first imposed or  when  the
      final Notification dated 27.10.1998 was issued.  It is clear that  the
      last part of the Notification dated 19.5.2000 creating an exception in
      favour of persons like the appellant has no reference to  the  earlier
      proceedings in the case  and  is  obviously  intended  to  apply  only
      prospectively.  This is also clear from the language used in the  said
      clause – ‘nothing  contained  in  the  Notification  “shall  apply  to
      imports” …. Using a Blast Furnace “if he follows”  the  procedure  set
      out in the Customs “import of goods at concessional rate of  duty  for
      manufacture of excisable goods” Rules, 1996’.   The  language  of  the
      aforesaid clause applies only in futuro and we are  afraid  that  Shri
      Lakshmikumaran’s first argument must, therefore, fail.

      18.   However,  Shri  Lakshmikumaran  is  on  firmer  ground  when  he
      submitted before us that the Commissioner has held that the  appellant
      is liable to pay Anti-dumping duty only under the  Notification  dated
      27.10.1998. The rate prescribed in the  said  Notification  is  lesser
      than the rate that would apply under the Notification dated 19.5.2000.
       As there was no appeal by the revenue against  this  finding  of  the
      Commissioner, the Tribunal could not have enhanced the rate  at  which
      the appellant would have to pay Anti-dumping duty in  the  appellant’s
      own appeal.  The appellant cannot be worse off by reason of filing  an
      appeal. To  this  limited  extent,  the  appellant  succeeds  and  the
      Tribunal’s order is set aside.  The appellant will have to  pay  Anti-
      dumping duty calculated at the rates specified  only  in  Notification
      No. 81/98 dated 27.10.1998.

      19.   It was argued by Shri Lakshmikumaran that the appellant was  not
      liable to pay interest on any of the customs duties for which  it  was
      held  liable  by  the  Commissioner’s  order.   He  referred   us   to
      Notification No.30 of 1997,  the  relevant  part  of  which  reads  as
      follows:

           “In exercise of the  powers  conferred  by  sub-section  (1)  of
           section 25 of the Customs Act, 1962 (52  of  1962)  the  Central
           Government, being satisfied that it is necessary in  the  public
           interest so to do, hereby exempts materials imported into India,
           against an Advance Licence with Actual User Condition  in  terms
           of para 7.4 of the Export & Import Policy 1997-2002 notified  by
           the Government  of  India  in  the  Ministry  of  Commerce  vide
           Notification  No.1/1997-2002  dated   the   31st   March,   1997
           (hereinafter referred to as the said licence), from the whole of
           the duty of customs leviable thereon which is specified  in  the
           First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 (51 of 1975)  and
           from the whole of the additional  duty  leviable  thereon  under
           Section 3 of  the  said  Customs  Tariff  Act,  subject  to  the
           following conditions namely:-

              i) xxx xxx

             ii) That the importer at the time of clearance of the  imported
                 materials executes a bond with such surety or security  and
                 in such form and for such sum as may be  specified  by  the
                 Assistant Commissioner of Customs binding himself to pay on
                 demand an amount equal to the duty leviable,  but  for  the
                 exemption, on the imported materials in  respect  of  which
                 the conditions specified in this notification have not been
                 complied with, together with interest at the rate of twenty-
                 four percent per annum from the date of  clearance  of  the
                 said materials.”



      20.   A reading of this Notification makes it clear that  interest  at
      the rate of 24% per annum is only liable to be paid if at the time  of
      clearance of the imported materials the importer executes  a  bond  in
      which such interest is stated to be payable.  We have been  shown  the
      bond executed in the present case.  It says nothing about any interest
      that is payable in case the conditions of the  Notification  No.30  of
      1997 are not met.  On this short ground alone, it  is  clear  that  no
      interest is payable on any of the customs duties that are due from the
      appellant.

      21.   It was also argued by Shri Lakshmikumaran that  Section  101  of
      the Finance Act, 2009 has been given a retrospective application  with
      effect from 1.1.1995.  Section 9A sub-section (8) as substituted  with
      effect from 1.1.1995 reads as follows:-

           “(8)  The provisions of the Customs Act, 1962 (52 of  1962)  and
           the rules  and  regulations  made  thereunder,  including  those
           relating to date of determination of rate of  duty,  assessment,
           non-levy, short levy, refunds, interest, appeals,  offences  and
           penalties shall, as far as maybe, apply to the  duty  chargeable
           under this section as they apply in relation to duties  leviable
           under that Act.”




      22.   Even though the Customs Act would necessarily  become  attracted
      to Section 9A of the Customs Tariff Act insofar as  Anti-dumping  duty
      is concerned, learned counsel further submitted that the  Customs  Act
      itself contained no provision for levy of  interest  until  13.7.2006.
      Section 18(3) was added only with effect from 13.7.2006 and  reads  as
      follows:-

           “(3)  The importer or exporter shall be liable to pay  interest,
           on any amount payable to the Central Government,  consequent  to
           the final assessment order under sub-section (2),  at  the  rate
           fixed by the Central Government  under  Section  28AB  from  the
           first day of the  month  in  which  the  duty  is  provisionally
           assessed till the date of payment thereof.”

      23.   It  is  clear  that  on  the  facts  of  the  present  case  the
      provisional assessment had been made in 1998 and the final  assessment
      only on 4.11.2004 by the Commissioner.  Both these dates  being  prior
      to  13.7.2006,  Shri  Lakshmikumaran  is  right  and  no  interest  is
      chargeable under Section 18 of the Customs  Act,  for  the  period  in
      question.

      24.   In Commissioner of Customs (Preventive) v. Goyal Traders, (2014)
      302 ELT 529, the Gujarat High Court has held as under:-

           “17. In the present case, we find that prior to introduction  of
           sub-section (3) of Section 18 of the Act in  the  present  form,
           there was no liability to pay  interest  on  difference  between
           finally assessed  duty  and  provisionally  assessed  duty  upon
           payment of which the assessee may have cleared  the  goods.   It
           was only with effect from 13.7.2006 that such charging provision
           was introduced in the statute.  Upon introduction therefor  such
           provision created interest liability for the first  time  w.e.f.
           13.7.2006.  In absence of any indication in the  statute  itself
           either  specifically  or   by   necessary   implication   giving
           retrospective effect to such a statutory provision,  we  are  of
           the opinion  that  the  same  cannot  be  applied  to  cases  of
           provisional assessment which took place prior to the said  date.
           Any such application would in our view amount  to  retrospective
           operation of the law.”




           We respectfully agree with the aforesaid view.  In addition,  it
      is clear that this Court has held that the  levying  of  interest  can
      only be by a substantive  provision  (See:  J.K.  Synthetics  Ltd.  v.
      Commercial Taxes Officer, (1994) 4 SCC 276 at paragraph  16),  thereby
      making it clear that such levy can only be prospective.

      25.   Further, in India Carbon Ltd. v. State of Assam,  (1997)  6  SCC
      479, this Court held:-

           “11. Section 9(2-A) makes  applicable  to  the  assessment,  re-
           assessment, collection and enforcement of Central sales tax  the
           provisions relating to offences and penalties contained  in  the
           State Acts as if the Central sales tax was a  State  sales  tax.
           But Section 9(2-A) makes no reference to interest.
           12.    There  is  no  substantive  provision  in   the   Central
           Act requiring the payment of  interest  on  Central  sales  tax.
           There is, therefore, no substantive provision in the Central Act
             which obliges the assessee to pay interest on delayed payments
           of Central sales tax.
           13.   Now, the  words  "charging  or  payment  of  interest"  in
           Section 9(2) occur  in  what  may  be  called  the  latter  part
           thereof. Section 9(2) authorises the sales tax authorities of  a
           State to assess, reassess, collect and enforce  payment  of  the
           Central sales tax payable by a dealer as if it was payable under
           the State Act; this is the first part of Section  9(2).  By  the
           second part thereof, these authorities are empowered to exercise
           the powers they have under the State Act and the  provisions  of
           the State Act, including provisions  relating  to  charging  and
           payment of interest, apply accordingly. Having  regard  to  what
           has been said in the case of Khemka & Co., it must be held  that
           the substantive law that the States' sales tax authorities  must
           apply is the Central Act. In such  application,  for  procedural
           purposes alone, the provisions of the State  Act are  available.
           The provision relating to interest in the latter part of Section
           9(2) can be employed by the States' sales tax  authorities  only
           if the Central Act makes a substantive provision  for  the  levy
           and charge of interest on Central sales tax  and  only  to  that
           extent. There being no  substantive  provision  in  the  Central
           Act requiring the payment of interest on Central sales  tax  the
           States'  sales  tax  authorities  cannot,  for  the  purpose  of
           collecting and enforcing payment of Central  sales  tax,  charge
           interest thereon.
           14.    The  requirement  of  the  1st  respondent's  sales   tax
           authorities that the appellants should pay interest at the  rate
           of 24% p.a. on delayed payment of Central sales  tax  under  the
           provisions of Section 35(A) of the State Act must, therefore, be
           held to be bad in law.”



      26.   Given the aforesaid, it is clear that no interest is  chargeable
      on any of the customs duties that are payable  on  the  facts  of  the
      present case.

      27.   It now remains to consider  whether  Anti-dumping  duty  can  be
      included in calculating special customs duty  and  special  additional
      duty.

      28.   Special customs duty is levied under Section 68 of  the  Finance
      Act No.2 of 1996, which reads as follows:-

           “68. Special duties of customs. – (1)   In  the  case  of  goods
           mentioned in the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, or in
           that Schedule, as amended from  time to  time,  there  shall  be
           levied and collected as a special duty  of  customs,  an  amount
           equal to two per cent of the value of the goods as determined in
           accordance with the provisions of section 14 of the Customs Act.

           (2)   Sub-section (1) shall cease to have effect after the  31st
           day of March, 1999, and upon  such  cesser,  section  6  of  the
           General Clauses Act, 1897) shall  apply  as  if  the  said  sub-
           section had been repealed by the Central Act.

           (3)   The special duties of customs referred to  in  sub-section
           (12) shall be in addition to any duties of customs chargeable on
           such goods under the Customs Act or any other law for  the  time
           being in force.

           (4)   The provisions of  the  Customs  Act  and  the  rules  and
           regulations made thereunder, including those relating to refunds
           and exemptions from duties shall, as far as  may  be,  apply  in
           relation to the levy and collection of  the  special  duties  of
           customs leviable under this section in respect of  any  gods  as
           they apply in relation to the levy and collection of the  duties
           of customs on such goods under  that  Act  or  those  rules  and
           regulations, as the case may be.”




      29.   Similarly, special additional duty is levied under Section 3A of
      the Customs Tariff Act inserted by the Finance Act of  1998.   Section
      3A reads as under:-

           “Special additional duty.- (1)    Any article which is  imported
           into India shall in addition be liable to  a  duty  (hereinafter
           referred to in this section as  the  special  additional  duty),
           which shall be levied at a rate to be specified by  the  Central
           Government, by notification  in  the  Official  Gazette,  having
           regard to the maximum sales tax, local tax or any other  charges
           for the time being leviable on a like article  on  its  sale  or
           purchase in India:

                 Provided that until such rate is specified by the  Central
           Government, the special additional  duty  shall  be  levied  and
           collected at the rate of eight per cent  of  the  value  of  the
           article imported into India.

                  Explanation.-     In  this  sub-section,  the  expression
           “maximum sales tax, local tax or any other charges for the  time
           being leviable on a like article on  its  sale  or  purchase  in
           India” means the maximum sales-tax, local tax, other charges for
           the time being in force, which  shall  be  leviable  on  a  like
           article, if sold or purchased in India, or if a like article  is
           not so sold or purchased which shall be leviable on the class or
           description of articles to which the imported article belongs.

           (2)   For the purpose of  calculating  under  this  section  the
           special additional duty on any imported article,  the  value  of
           the imported article shall, notwithstanding  anything  contained
           in section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962 or section 3 of this Act,
           be the aggregate of –

           (i)   the value of the imported article  determined  under  sub-
           section (1) of section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962 (52 of  1962)
           or the tariff value of such article fixed under sub-section  (2)
           of that section, as the case may be;

           (ii)  any duty of  customs  chargeable  on  that  article  under
           section 12 of the Customs Act, 1962), and any sum chargeable  on
           that article under any law for the time being  in  force  as  an
           addition to, and in the same manner as, a duty of  customs,  but
           not including the special additional duty referred  to  in  sub-
           section (1); and

           (iii) the additional duty of customs chargeable on that  article
           under section 3 of this Act.

           (3)   The  duty  chargeable  under  this  section  shall  be  in
           addition to any other duty imposed under this Act or  under  any
           other law for the time being in force.

           (4) The provisions of the Customs Act, 1962 (52  of  1962),  and
           the rules  and  regulations  made  thereunder,  including  those
           relating to refunds and exemptions from duties shall, so far  as
           may be, apply to the duty chargeable under this section as  they
           apply in relation to the duties leviable under that Act.

           (5)   Nothing contained in  this  section  shall  apply  to  any
           article, which is chargeable to additional duties  levied  under
           sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Additional Duties of  Excise
           (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957 (58 of 1957).”




      30.   Section 3(2) of the Customs  Tariff  Act  as  it  stood  at  the
      relevant time reads as under:

           “(2)  For the purpose of calculating  under  this  section,  the
           additional duty on any imported  article,  where  such  duty  is
           leviable at any percentage  of  its  value,  the  value  of  the
           imported article shall, notwithstanding  anything  contained  in
           Section 14 of the  Customs  Act,  1962  (52  of  1962),  be  the
           aggregate of-

              i) The value of the imported  article  determined  under  sub-
                 section (1) of the said Section 14 or the tariff  value  of
                 such article fixed under sub-section (2) of  that  section,
                 as the case may be; and



             ii) Any duty  of  customs  chargeable  on  that  article  under
                 Section 12 of the Customs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962),  and  any
                 sum chargeable on that article under any law for  the  time
                 being in force as an addition to, and in  the  same  manner
                 as, a duty of customs”




      31.   Similarly, Section 3A(2) dealing with special additional duty as
      it stood at the relevant time reads as under:-

           “(2)  For the purpose of  calculating  under  this  section  the
           special additional duty on any imported article,  the  value  of
           the imported article shall, notwithstanding  anything  contained
           in section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962 or section 3 of this Act,
           be the aggregate of –

              i) The value of the imported  article  determined  under  sub-
                 section (1) of section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962  (52  of
                 1962) or the tariff value of such article fixed under  sub-
                 section (2) of that section, as the case may be;



             ii) Any duty  of  customs  chargeable  on  that  article  under
                 section 12 of the Customs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962),  and  any
                 sum chargeable on that article under any law for  the  time
                 being in force as an addition to, and in  the  same  manner
                 as, a duty of customs; and



            iii) The additional duty of customs chargeable on that article
                 under section 3 of this Act.”




      32.   It will be noticed that additional duty and  special  additional
      duty would include “any sum chargeable on that article under  any  law
      for the time being in force as an addition to, and in the same  manner
      as, a duty of customs”.  What has been contended  before  us  is  that
      these words would refer only to a surcharge provision  and  not  to  a
      provision which levies an independent duty, as the relevant words  are
      “an addition” and not “in addition”.  This argument  has  considerable
      force.  For example, the  Finance  Act  of  1963  made  a  distinction
      between a surcharge on duties of customs  and  a  regulatory  duty  of
      customs.  Sections 23 and 24 of the said Act are set out hereinbelow:-

           “23. Surcharge on duties of customs.

           1) In the case of goods chargeable with a duty of customs  which
              is specified in the First  Schedule  to  the  Tariff  Act  as
              amended by this Act or any subsequent Act of  Parliament,  or
              in that Schedule read with any notification  of  the  Central
              Government for the time being in force, there shall be levied
              and collected as an addition to, and in the same  manner  as,
              the total amount so chargeable, a sum equal to 10 per cent of
              such amount:

                 Provided that in computing the total amount so  chargeable,
                 any duty chargeable under Section 2A of the Tariff  Act  or
                 Section 24 of this Act shall not be included.

           2)  Sub-section(1) shall cease to have effect after the 31st day
              of March, 1964 except as respects things done or  omitted  to
              be done before such cesser; and  Section  6  of  the  General
              Clauses Act, 1897 shall apply upon such cesser as if the said
              sub-section had then been repealed by a Central Act.

           24. Regulatory duty of customs.

           (1) There shall be levied and collected, with effect  from  such
           date  as  may  be  specified  in  this  behalf  by  the  Central
           Government by notification in the Official Gazette, on all goods
           mentioned in the First Schedule to the Tariff Act as amended  by
           this Act or any subsequent Act of Parliament, a regulatory  duty
           of customs which shall be –

           (a) twenty-five per cent of the rate, if any, specified  in  the
           said First Schedule read  with  any  notification  issued  under
           Section 3A or sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Tariff Act; or



           (b) ten per cent of the value of  the  goods  as  determined  in
           accordance with the provisions of Section 14 of the Customs Act,
           1962 whichever   is higher:

           Provided that different dates may be specified  by  the  Central
           Government for different kinds of goods.

           1)  Sub-section (1) shall cease to have effect  after  the  31st
              day of March, 1964 except as respects things done or  omitted
              to be done before such cesser; and Section 6 of  the  General
              Clauses Act, 1897 shall apply upon such cesser as if the said
              sub-section had then been repealed by a Central Act.

              (3) The duty  of  customs  leviable  under  this  section  in
              respect of any goods referred to in sub-section (1) shall  be
              in addition to any other duty of customs chargeable  on  such
              goods under the Customs Act, 1962.

              (4) The provisions of the Customs Act, 1962 and the rules and
              regulations made  thereunder,  including  those  relating  to
              refunds and exemptions from duties, shall, as far as may  be,
              apply  in  relation  to  the  levy  and  collection  of   the
              regulatory duty of customs leviable  under  this  section  in
              respect of any goods as they apply in relation  to  the  levy
              and collection of the duties of customs on such  goods  under
              that Act or those rules and regulations.

              (5) Every notification issued under sub-section (1) shall, as
              soon as may be after it is  issued,  be  placed  before  each
              House of Parliament.”




       33.  It will be noticed that the very words “as an addition  to,  and
      in the same manner as” used in Section 3(2) and 3A(2) of  the  Customs
      Tariff Act have been used in Section 23 of the  Finance  Act  of  1963
      when what was sought to be levied was only a  surcharge.   By  way  of
      contrast, Section 24(3) when it levies a different duty – a regulatory
      duty of customs – uses the  expression “in  addition”.  It  is  clear,
      therefore, that what is referred to in Section 3(2) and 3A(2) is  only
      a surcharge or an additional duty of customs.  The words “in the  same
      manner” also point to the same conclusion.  It is clear on  a  reading
      of the Customs Tariff (Identification, Assessment  And  Collection  of
      Antidumping Duty on Dumped Articles and For Determination  of  Injury)
      Rules, 1995, that Anti-dumping duty apart from being a  separate  levy
      from a levy of customs duty is also levied in a  completely  different
      manner from that of customs duty.

      34.   We may add, that after 2002, Sections 3(2) and 3A(2)  have  been
      amended with effect from 1.3.2002 so as to expressly not include Anti-
      dumping duty.  The amended Section 3(2) reads as follows:-

           “(2)  For the purpose of calculating  under  this  section,  the
           additional duty on any imported  article,  where  such  duty  is
           leviable at any percentage  of  its  value,  the  value  of  the
           imported article shall, notwithstanding  anything  contained  in
           Section 14 of  the  Customs  Act  1962  (52  of  1962),  be  the
           aggregate of –

        i) The value of the imported article determined  under  sub-section
           (1) of the said Section 14 or the tariff value of  such  article
           fixed under sub-section (2) of that section, as the case may be;
           and



       ii) any duty of customs chargeable on that article under Section  12
           of the Customs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962), and any sum chargeable on
           that article under any law for the time being  in  force  as  an
           addition to, and in the same manner as, a duty of  customs,  but
           does not include –

              a) the special additional duty referred to in section 3A;

              b) the safeguard duty referred to in sections 8B and 8C;

              c) the countervailing duty referred to in section 9;

              d) the anti-dumping duty referred to in section 9A; and

              e) the duty referred to in sub-section (1)”

      The amended Section 3A(2) reads as follows:-

           “(2)  For the purpose of  calculating  under  this  section  the
                 special additional duty on any imported article, the  value
                 of the imported  article  shall,  notwithstanding  anything
                 contained in section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962 or section
                 3 of this Act, be the aggregate of –

              i) The value of the imported  article  determined  under  sub-
                 section (1) of section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962  (52  of
                 1962) or the tariff value of such article fixed under  sub-
                 section (2) of that section, as the case may be;

             ii) Any duty  of  customs  chargeable  on  that  article  under
                 section 12 of the Customs Act, 1962 (52 of 1962),  and  any
                 sum chargeable on that article under any law for  the  time
                 being in force as an addition to, and in  the  same  manner
                 as, a duty of customs, but does not include-

              a) the safeguard duty referred to in sections 8B and 8C;

              b) the countervailing duty referred to in section 9;

              c) the anti-dumping duty referred to in section 9A;

              d) the special additional duty referred to in sub-section (1);
                 and

            iii) the additional duty of customs chargeable on that article
                 under section 3 of this Act.”




      35.   The relevant budget circulars of the Finance Bill 2002 and  2003
      respectively read as follows:-

           “Miscellaneous

              1. Doubts have been expressed about the  method  of  computing
                 the additional duty of customs (CVD) under section 3 of the
                 Customs Tariff Act, 1975. The doubt raised is on the  point
                 that whether anti-dumping duty, safeguard  duty  and  other
                 duties etc. should be taken into  account  while  computing
                 the CVD.

                 In this regard, it is clarified that for computing the CVD,
                 only the value of the imported article as determined  under
                 section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962, including the  landing
                 charges, if any and the basic customs  duty  chargeable  at
                 the rates specified in  the  First  Schedule  to  the  said
                 Customs Tariff Act (read with any notification for the time
                 being in force in respect of the basic customs duty)  needs
                 to be taken into account. Other duties such as anti-dumping
                 duty,  safeguard  duty,  etc.  should  not  be  taken  into
                 account.”

                 “In the explanatory notes for the last year’s budget it was
                 clarified that for computing the CVD,  only  the  value  of
                 imported article as determined  under  section  14  of  the
                 Customs Act, 1962, including the landing  charges,  if  any
                 and  the  basic  customs  duty  chargeable  at  the   rates
                 specified in the First Schedule to the Customs  Tariff  Act
                 (read with any notification for the time being in force  in
                 respect of the basic customs duty) needs to be  taken  into
                 account. Other duties such as anti-dumping duty,  safeguard
                 duty, etc. should not be taken into  account.  A  view  has
                 been expressed that section 3A of the  Customs  Tariff  Act
                 does not permit such interpretation. To  place  the  matter
                 beyond doubt, it is proposed to amend section 3 and section
                 3A of the Customs Tariff Act so as to make  it  very  clear
                 that for computation of additional duty  of  customs,  only
                 the c.i.f. price, landing charges and  basic  customs  duty
                 will  be  included.  Similarly  for   determining   special
                 additional duty of customs (SAD), only  the  c.i.f.  price,
                 landing charges, basic customs duty and the additional duty
                 of customs will be included. Other  duties  such  as  anti-
                 dumping duty safeguard duty, etc. shall not be  taken  into
                 account.  This amendment will have effect from 1.3.2002.”




      36.   Though it is stated that the  object  of  the  amendment  is  to
      clarify and set at rest doubts, it is not necessary to decide  whether
      this amendment is clarificatory and, therefore, retrospective in  view
      of what has already been held by us above.

      37.   As far as penalty is  concerned,  we  feel  that  the  appellant
      before us has not diverted goods meant  for  export  to  the  domestic
      tariff area.  We are satisfied  that  market  considerations  made  it
      difficult, if not impossible, for the appellant to fulfill its  export
      obligations and are, therefore, of the view that the  penalty  imposed
      in the present case ought to be set aside.

      38.   The appeal is, accordingly, allowed in the aforesaid  terms  and
      the judgment of CESTAT is set aside.



                                        ……………………J.

                                        (A.K. Sikri)







                                        ……………………J.

                                        (R.F. Nariman)

New Delhi;

August 4, 2015.

whether the existing canteen at Moradabad Division of the Northern Railway i.e., the subject Canteen, is located in a ‘Factory’ within the meaning of Section 46 of the Factories Act, 1948; and consequently, whether the services of the staff employed in the subject Canteen ought to be regularized. - Therefore, in the light of the settled principle enunciated hereinabove, we hold that the subject Canteen is a ‘Statutory Canteen’ under the Factories Act, 1948 and that the learned Single Judge had arrived at the correct conclusion. In our opinion, the Division Bench of the High Court was not correct in taking a contrary view. We, therefore, allow these Appeals. We set aside the impugned Judgment passed by the High Court, and direct the Respondents to treat the subject Canteen at Moradabad as a Statutory Canteen either under Section 46 of the Act or the relevant clauses of the Indian Railway Establishment Management. However, so far as the Appellants are concerned, we find it difficult to condone or ignore the fact that they were not appointed as per the regular recruitment procedure. To pass an order regularizing the services of all workers employed therein would necessarily imply ratification of appointments given outside the Constitutional scheme. We, therefore, direct the Respondents to consider regularizing the services of the Appellants presently serving as canteen workers in consonance with the principles laid down in Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi AIR 2006 SC 1806 and take requisite action within six months of the receipt of this Judgment. Further, as and when the subject posts fall vacant the Respondents shall be bound to fill the posts by a regular process of selection. The Appellants in the present case shall be allowed to compete in the regular recruitment and the Respondents shall grant to them appropriate age relaxation as well as grant proper weightage for their having worked in the subject Canteen. 19 There cannot be any cavil that the necessity for canteen amenities to be available where more than 250 workmen are engaged, is an essential facet of human or labour rights. Managements and employers are duty bound to provide these basic facilities. 20 Stay granted by this Court on 28.03.2014 stands vacated. There shall be no order as to costs.

                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                    CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 5874-5875  OF 2015
              (ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) NOS. 1624-25 OF 2014)




MOHAN SINGH & ORS.                                … APPELLANTS

                                   VERSUS

THE CHAIRMAN RAILWAY BOARD & ORS.       … RESPONDENTS



                               J U D G M E N T





VIKRAMAJIT SEN,J.



1     Leave granted.

2     The legal nodus that arise  in  the  present  Appeals  before  us  are
whether the existing canteen at Moradabad Division of the  Northern  Railway
i.e., the subject Canteen, is located in a ‘Factory’ within the  meaning  of
Section 46 of  the  Factories  Act,  1948;  and  consequently,  whether  the
services  of  the  staff  employed  in  the  subject  Canteen  ought  to  be
regularized.  These Appeals have been preferred against the Judgment  passed
by the Division Bench of the High Court of New Delhi in LPA No. 19 of  2012,
whereby the Orders passed in Writ Petition  No.  6582  of  2003  and  Review
Petition No. 670 of 2011 have been set aside and it has been held  that  the
subject Canteen is a ‘Non Recognized and Non Statutory’ canteen.

3     We shall briefly narrate the facts leading up to the present lis.  The
Appellants are employed in the  subject  Canteen,  which  has  been  running
within  the  precincts  of  the  Divisional  Railway  Manager   (hereinafter
referred to as “the DRM”), Moradabad since 1940 and  has  been  catering  to
more than 100 employees, (in fact, well over 500) since  its  establishment.
In 1963, the Respondent No. 1, namely the Chairman, Railway Board, issued  a
Circular No. E(W) 63/GN 1-2 dated 09.07.1963 for setting up of  canteens  as
a welfare measure, whenever and wherever the  staff  strength  exceeds  100.
The existing Staff Canteen, i.e. the subject Canteen  continued  to  operate
smoothly, even thereafter. It is the uncontroverted case of  the  Appellants
that when the subject Canteen underwent severe financial losses in 1971,  it
was the Respondent No. 3, i.e.  the  DRM  of  Northern  Railways,  Moradabad
Division, who decided to constitute a  committee  of  three  senior  Railway
Divisional Officers to examine whether the affairs of  the  subject  Canteen
could be taken over by the Railways. It was decided by  the  said  committee
that the affairs of the subject Canteen be revived; and an ad hoc  committee
comprising five Railway Officers, which was to be replaced  later  on  by  a
regular management committee, be appointed to  manage  the  affairs  of  the
said Canteen. It was in these circumstances that  the  subject  Canteen  was
formally taken over by the Respondent Railways with effect from  18.01.1972.
 Subsequently, Respondent No.1 issued Circular No.  E  (W)  83  CN1-8  dated
13.04.1987 laying down that prior approval of the  Railway  Board  would  be
mandatory for setting up of a new canteen as  well  as  for  increasing  the
staff strength of existing canteens. The Appellants assert that the  mandate
laid down in the Circular of 1987 was not applicable to the subject  Canteen
as it was validly operational since 1940, and was also  in  consonance  with
the Circular of 1963.  Ergo, no prior approval  was  required  to  be  taken
from the Railway Board since the subject Canteen was not a new canteen.   It
appears that  thereafter  on  19.09.1996,  Respondent  No.  2,  the  General
Manager of Northern Railways wrote a letter to the Railway Board  requesting
it to accord recognition to the subject  Canteen  in  the  interest  of  the
welfare  of  the  employees.   However,  vide  Order  dated  9.09.2002,  the
Ministry  of  Railways  rejected  this  request  on  the  premise  that   if
recognition were to be granted to the subject Canteen,  the  existing  staff
would nevertheless not be absorbed automatically, and  they  would  have  to
compete with other eligible candidates.  The Ministry  then  ordered  status
quo to be maintained in respect of the subject Canteen.  The  said  proposal
was thereafter  discussed  in  the  Permanent  Negotiating  Machinery  (PNM)
meeting held on 22.12.2003, wherein it was decided that  since  the  Railway
Board had already rejected the proposal for recognition due to  the  changed
priorities of Railways and cutting  down  of  non-planned  expenditure,  the
proposal for  recognition  of  any  canteen  under  the  provisions  of  the
Factories Act, 1948, or the Railway Manual could not be considered.

4     Aggrieved thereby, the Appellants filed a  writ  petition  before  the
Delhi High Court, seeking  directions  to  the  Railways  to  recognize  the
subject Canteen and regularize the services of the PS,  who  were  the  then
Canteen staff,  as  employees  of  Railways.    The  learned  Single  Judge,
relying heavily upon the view of this Court  in  M.M.R.  Khan  v.  Union  of
India (1990) Supp SCC 191, allowed the Writ Petition on 13.01.2011 and  held
that since the subject Canteen at Moradabad has been  operational  for  over
seventy years, by then catering to more  than  900  employees,  and  in  the
absence of any other canteen in the Moradabad Division, the  Railways  could
not be permitted to take advantage of  their  failure  to  comply  with  the
requirements of Section 46 of the Factories Act and treat  this  Canteen  at
Moradabad as a ‘Non-Statutory Canteen’.  Against the Order  of  the  learned
Single Judge, a Review Petition was preferred by the Respondents  which  was
dismissed on 2.12.2011.  The Respondents then filed  an  appeal  contending,
inter  alia,  that  the  subject  Canteen  was  a  ‘Non-Statutory  and  Non-
Recognized’ Canteen and that  it  could  not  be  treated  as  a  ‘Statutory
Canteen’ under the Factories Act,  1948  as  no  manufacturing  process  was
being carried on in the  DRM  Office  at  Moradabad.   In  the  appeal,  the
Division Bench, vide the impugned Judgment dated  16.03.2012,  reversed  the
decision of the learned Single  Judge.   It  held  that  the  provisions  of
Section 46 of the Act would not get  attracted  in  the  instant  case  only
because the number of the persons employed in  the  DRM  Office,  Moradabad,
exceeds two-hundred fifty, unless the concerned establishment squarely  fell
within the definition of ‘Factory’ as defined under Section  2  (m)  of  the
Act. The Division Bench acknowledged that  the  dictum  laid  down  by  this
Court  in  M.M.R.  Khan  has  become  locus  classicus  on  the  subject  of
regularisation of employees of several canteens being run in  the  different
Railway establishments.  All the same, it added that in order to  avail  the
benefit emanating from M.M.R. Khan the Appellants would have  to  prove  the
sine qua non of a ‘Statutory Canteen’, i.e.  that  the  subject  Canteen  is
being run in a premises which is  a  factory  within  the  four  corners  of
Section 46 of the Act.  The Division Bench then took note of Section  46  of
the Act, which enjoins that ‘manufacturing process’  must,  inter  alia,  be
carried on in the premises of a ‘factory’.

5     We shall, first, consider the concomitants  of  a  ‘Non-Statutory  and
Non-Recognised Canteen’, which aspect has been duly cogitated upon  by  this
Court  in  M.M.R.  Khan  where  this  Court   has   adumbrated   the   basic
characteristics of a ‘Non-Recognized and Non-Statutory Canteen’ thus –

 “38. (iii) Non-statutory Non-recognised Canteens:  The  difference  between
the non-statutory recognised and  non-statutory  non-recognised  canteen  is
that these canteens are not started with the approval of the  Railway  Board
as required under  paragraph  2831  of  the  Railway  Establishment  Manual.
Though, they are started in the premises belonging to the railways they  are
so started with the permission of the local officers. They are not  required
to be managed either as per the  provisions  of  the  Railway  Establishment
Manual or the Administrative Instructions (supra). There  is  no  obligation
on the railway administration to provide them with any facilities  including
the furniture, utensils, electricity and water. These canteens  are  further
not entitled to nor are they given any subsidies or loans. They are  run  by
private contractors and there is no continuity either of the contractors  or
the workers engaged by them. More often than not the  workers  go  out  with
the contractors. There is further no  obligation  cast  even  on  the  local
offices to supervise the working of these canteens. No rules whatsoever  are
applicable to the recruitment of the workers and their  service  conditions.
The  canteens  are  run  more  or  less  on  ad-hoc   basis,   the   railway
administration having no control on their working neither is there a  record
of these canteens nor of the contractors who run them who keep on  changing,
much less of the workers engaged in these canteens. In the circumstances  we
are of the view that the workers engaged in these canteens are not  entitled
to claim the status of the railway servants”.

6     It cannot be controverted that the subject Canteen  has  been  running
since 1940 within the precincts of the office of the DRM, Moradabad and  has
been under the direct control and supervision of the  DRM.   The  Management
Committee appointed for administration  of  the  subject  Canteen  comprises
office bearers of the Canteen Management Committee, duly  elected  in  union
elections held from time to time.  Further, no  private  contractor  or  co-
operative society has  ever  been  engaged  for  running  or  operating  the
subject Canteen.  The Appellants contend that the joining  and  leaving  the
canteen staff has always been sanctioned and regulated  by  the  Controller,
i.e. the Assistant Personnel Officer of the Northern Railways.   The  prices
of the food items supplied in the subject Canteen as well  as  the  salaries
of the staff are also fixed  by  the  said  Assistant  Controller  Personnel
Officer.   Even the renovation of the Canteen, in 2005, was carried  out  at
the directions of  the  Northern  Railways,  which  bore  all  the  expenses
incurred in this exercise.  It further  appears  that  the  Appellants  have
been  provided  with  uniforms,  medical  aid,   free   travelling   passes,
residential accommodations, privileged ticket orders etc. by  the  Railways.
Thus, it seems amply clear from this factual  matrix  that  the  Respondents
have remained in control of the management  and  operation  of  the  subject
Canteen.

7     For a canteen to qualify as a ‘Recognized Canteen’  it  is  imperative
to obtain the approval  of  the  Railway  Board.   Since  the  proposal  for
approval, admittedly, had been rejected by  the  Railway  Board  vide  Order
dated 9.9.2002, it follows that the subject Canteen does not  qualify  as  a
‘Recognized Canteen’.  It thus, becomes crucial for us  to  examine  whether
the subject Canteen is a ‘Statutory Canteen’ as postulated in the  Factories
Act, 1948.

8     Section 46 of the Factories Act, 1948 which provides  for  setting  up
of a ‘Statutory Canteen’ reads as follows:
46. Canteens.—
(1) The State Government may make rules  requiring  that  in  any  specified
factory wherein more than two  hundred  and  fifty  workers  are  ordinarily
employed, a canteen or canteens shall be  provided  and  maintained  by  the
occupier for the use of the workers.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power,  such  rules
may provide for—
(a) the date by which such canteen shall be provided;
(b) the standards in respect of construction, accommodation,  furniture  and
other equipment of the canteen;
(c) the foodstuffs to be served therein and the charges which  may  be  made
thereof;
(d) the  constitution  of  a  managing  committee  for   the   canteen   and
representation of the workers in the management of the canteen;
(dd) the items of expenditure in the running of the canteen  which  are  not
to be taken into account in fixing the cost of foodstuffs  and  which  shall
be borne by the employer;
(e) the delegation to the Chief Inspector, subject  to  such  conditions  as
may be prescribed, of the power to make rules under clause (c)

 9    The statute  does  not  exempt  factories  belonging  to  the  Central
Government from its reach; Parliament obviously expected them to conform  to
what it perceived as essential to welfare of the workforce.   It is  evident
from a perusal of the definition of canteens and factories  that  Government
factories have not been conceived of as beyond the concept of  a  ‘factory’,
nor do we find any justification for it to be otherwise. Thus, what  emerges
from the above provision is  that  when  an  establishment  is  a  ‘factory’
within the meaning of Section 2(m) of the Act, and there are more than  two-
hundred fifty workers employed therein, the Occupier is obliged to set up  a
canteen and conform to the statutory rules made  in  that  behalf.   Section
2(n) of the Factories Act, 1948  defines  ‘Occupier’  of  a  factory  ‘as  a
person who has ultimate control over the  affairs  of  the  factory’.    Sub
Section (iii) of Section 2(n) states that ‘in the case of  a  factory  owned
or controlled by the Central Government or  any  State  Government,  or  any
local authority, the person or persons appointed to manage  the  affairs  of
the factory by the Central Government, the State  Government  or  the  local
authority, as the case may be, shall be deemed  to  be  the  occupier’.   It
cannot be  controverted  that  each  of  the  five  units  of  the  Northern
Railways, including the Moradabad  Division,  is  managed  by  a  respective
Divisional Railway Manager. Thus, for the purposes of Section  2(n)  of  the
Act, it can be fairly inferred that the DRM, by virtue of being  in  control
of the affairs of Moradabad Division, should be deemed to be the  ‘Occupier’
of that unit of the Northern Railways.

10.   Learned Counsel for the Respondents has duly admitted  that  Moradabad
Division is a part of the Northern Railways, but contends that the whole  of
Northern Railways cannot  be  declared  as  ‘Factory’.    We  are  presently
concerned only with the Moradabad DRM, which may well be dissimilar  to  the
other Divisional Offices  of  the  Northern  Railways,  where  manufacturing
activity is absent.  Therefore, we do not find merit in the  said  argument.
Section 4 of the Factories Act, 1948 gives power  to  the  State  Government
to, either suo motu or upon receiving an application in this  behalf  by  an
occupier,  declare  different  departments  to  be   treated   as   separate
factories. However, no such application can be said to  have  been  made  by
the Respondents or by the Northern Railways. In the  absence  of  any  clear
declaration in this respect, we cannot but assume  that  Moradabad  Division
is a unit of Northern Railway and DRM is its occupier  within  Section  2(n)
of the Factories Act, 1948.

11    Further, it also appears that providing for a staff canteen  was  felt
necessary by the Respondents themselves  and  several  representations  were
made to the Railway Board from time to time for recognition of  the  subject
Canteen.  Such conduct  or  approach  is  to  be  expected  of  every  model
employer, as the Government must be.  It is for this very  reason  that  the
Divisional Personnel Officer  made  the  first  request  to  the  Divisional
Superintendent  for  recognition  of  the  subject  Canteen  on  12.06.1972.
Thereafter, the Respondent No. 2 addressed another letter to the  Respondent
No. 1 on 19.09.1996, whereby it again stressed that running of a  recognized
canteen in Moradabad is an imperative and important staff  amenity.   It  is
evident that the Respondents were aware of  the  need  for  setting  up  and
continuing a recognised canteen.

12    The Factories Act, 1948  is  a  social  legislation  enacted  for  the
welfare of the workers. It deals with matters  connected  with  the  health,
safety, welfare, working hours of the workers, employment of  young  persons
and leave to be granted to workers.  The  idea  behind  providing  Statutory
Canteen in a Factory is to create efficient, healthy,  loyal  and  satisfied
labor force for the organization.  We  are  of  the  view  that  if  such  a
responsibility has been cast on an occupier of a Factory under the  law,  it
remains obligatory upon DRM, Moradabad to maintain a  statutory  canteen  so
long as the staff strength exceeds two-hundred and fifty.

13    Having discussed and noted the above  statutory  provisions,  we  also
find it necessary to examine the question whether the Moradabad Division  of
the Northern Railways can be considered a factory in  itself  under  Section
2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948.  To  answer  the  said  question,  we  must
examine the definition of ‘factory’ under the Factories Act, 1948.
Section  2(m)  -  “factory”  means  any  premises  including  the  precincts
thereof—
(i) whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any  day  of
the preceding twelve months, and  in  any  part  of  which  a  manufacturing
process is being carried on with the aid  of  power,  or  is  ordinarily  so
carried on, or
(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any  day
of the preceding twelve months, and in any part  of  which  a  manufacturing
process is being carried on without the aid of power, or  is  ordinarily  so
carried on,-
but does not include a mine subject to the  operation  of   the  Mines  Act,
1952 (35 of 1952), or  a mobile unit belonging to the armed  forces  of  the
Union, railway running shed or a hotel, restaurant or eating place.

14      It can be inferred from above that  the  following  ingredients  are
mandatory to constitute a premises including its precincts as "factory" -
Work i.e. manufacturing process should be carried on within the premises;
If the manufacturing process is being carried on with or without the aid  of
power, the number of  workers required to constitute a  factory  differs  as
follows:
 With the aid of power- 10 or more workers
Without the aid of power- 20 or more workers;
So far as the second requirement is concerned, it cannot  be  disputed  that
the subject Canteen is situated within the precincts of the  office  of  the
DRM, Moradabad and more than 1000 workers are working  in  those  precincts.
The crucial question that arises in the present case  then  is  whether  any
“manufacturing process” is being carried on within the premises of  the  DRM
Office, Moradabad.
Manufacturing process has been defined under Section 2(k)  of  the  Act  as:
Any process for—
(i) making, altering, repairing, ornamenting,  finishing,  packing,  oiling,
washing, cleaning,  breaking  up,  demolishing,  or  otherwise  treating  or
adapting any article or substance with a view to its use,  sale,  transport,
delivery or disposal;
(ii) pumping oil, water, sewage or any other substance; or
(iii) generating, transforming or transmitting power; or
(iv) composing types for printing, printing by  letter  press,  lithography,
photogravure or other similar process or book binding; or
(v) constructing,  reconstructing,  repairing,   refitting,   finishing   or
breaking up ships or vessels; or
(vi) preserving or storing any article in cold storage.

15    The learned Counsel for the Respondent contends that no  manufacturing
activity is carried out within  the  DRM  Office  of  Moradabad,  where  the
subject Canteen is located.    We, however, do not accept  this  contention.
It cannot be disputed that railway wagons are  repaired  and  maintained  at
the Moradabad  Division.   It  is  also  not  disputed  that  the  Moradabad
Division carries on other activities such as repairing  of  faulty  signals,
sanitation  systems,  loading  and  unloading  of  goods,  supply  of  power
continuously  for  railway  tracks,  railway  station  etc.   Thus,  it  has
perforce to be inferred that manufacturing process is being carried  out  at
the Moradabad Division.
16     The  more  important  question  that  arises  is  whether  the   said
manufacturing activities are carried on within the premises of  DRM  Office,
Moradabad.   Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Edition defines ‘Premises’, so  far
as estates and property are concerned, as lands and tenements.  With  regard
to the Worker’s Compensation Act, ‘premises of employer’ is  not  restricted
to permanent site of the  employer’s  business  nor  to  property  owned  or
leased by him but contemplates any place under the exclusive control of  the
statutory employer where his normal business is conducted or  carried  out.”
 In Kamla Devi V. LaxmiDevi (2000) 5 SCC 646, in the context  of  the  Delhi
Rent Control Act, this Court has held that even an  open  plot  of  land  so
long as it has some structures on  it,  will  fall  within  the  meaning  of
‘premises’.  Extrapolating from these decisions, we  are  in  no  manner  of
doubt that  the  DRM  Office  of  Moradabad  Division  along  with  all  the
appurtenant lands, yards, etc. are ‘premises’ within  the  contemplation  of
the Factories Act.   In Ardeshir H. Bhiwandiwala  v.  State  of  Bombay  AIR
1962 SC 29,  the  Constitution  Bench  explained  that  "premises  including
precincts" does not necessarily mean that  the  premises  must  always  have
precincts. Even buildings need not have any precincts. The word  "including"
is not a term restricting the meaning of the word "premises" but is  a  term
which enlarges the scope of the word "premises". A comprehensive reading  of
the Factories Act, 1948 clearly shows that the word “premises” can refer  to
an entire area, which may have several separate  buildings,  within  it,  or
which may correspond to an open  yard.    Further,  an  important  point  to
consider is that the definition of "manufacturing process" does not  mandate
that the manufacturing activities should  be  carried  on  in  one  building
alone. What this definition really deals with is  the  nature  of  the  work
done and not with where that work is to be  done.  It  must,  therefore,  be
held that all the requirements  of  the  term  “factory”  as  defined  under
Section 2(m) of the Act are satisfied on the  facts  of  the  present  case.
Thus, the premises of DRM, Moradabad must  be  also  treated  as  a  factory
under the Factories Act, 1948 in which case  Moradabad  Canteen  shall  ipso
facto corresponded to a ‘Statutory Canteen’ within the  meaning  of  Section
46 of the Act.

17    Once that conclusion is reached, the result with respect to status  of
workers employed therein becomes obvious. In M.M.R.  Khan,  this  Court  has
held - “Since in terms of the Rules made  by  the  State  Governments  under
Section 46 of the Act, it is obligatory on  the  Railway  Administration  to
provide a canteen, and  the  canteens  in  question  have  been  established
pursuant to the said provision there is no difficulty in  holding  that  the
canteens are incidental to or connected with the  manufacturing  process  or
the subject of the manufacturing process. The provision of  the  canteen  is
deemed by the statute  as  a  necessary  concomitant  of  the  manufacturing
activity. Paragraph 2829 of the Railway Establishment Manual recognises  the
obligation on the Railway Administration created by the Act and  as  pointed
out earlier paragraph 2834 makes provision  for  meeting  the  cost  of  the
canteens.  Paragraph   2832   acknowledges   that   although   the   Railway
Administration may employ  anyone  such  as  a  Staff  Committee  or  a  Co-
operative  Society  for  the  management  of   the   canteens,   the   legal
responsibility for the proper management rests  not  with  such  agency  but
solely with the Railway Administration…..We  are,  therefore,  of  the  view
that the employees in the statutory canteens of the Railways  will  have  to
be treated as Railway  servants.  Thus  the  relationship  of  employer  and
employee stands created between the Railway Administration and  the  canteen
employees from the very inception.”

18     Therefore,  in  the  light  of  the  settled   principle   enunciated
hereinabove, we hold that the  subject  Canteen  is  a  ‘Statutory  Canteen’
under the Factories Act, 1948 and that the learned Single Judge had  arrived
at the correct conclusion.  In our opinion, the Division Bench of  the  High
Court was not correct in taking a contrary view. We, therefore, allow  these
Appeals.  We set aside the impugned Judgment passed by the High  Court,  and
direct the Respondents to treat  the  subject  Canteen  at  Moradabad  as  a
Statutory Canteen either under  Section  46  of  the  Act  or  the  relevant
clauses of the Indian Railway Establishment Management.    However,  so  far
as the Appellants are concerned, we find it difficult to condone  or  ignore
the fact that they  were  not  appointed  as  per  the  regular  recruitment
procedure. To pass  an  order  regularizing  the  services  of  all  workers
employed therein would necessarily imply ratification of appointments  given
outside the Constitutional scheme.  We, therefore,  direct  the  Respondents
to consider regularizing the services of the  Appellants  presently  serving
as  canteen  workers  in  consonance  with  the  principles  laid  down   in
Secretary, State of Karnataka  v.  Uma  Devi  AIR  2006  SC  1806  and  take
requisite action  within  six  months  of  the  receipt  of  this  Judgment.
Further, as and when the subject posts fall vacant the Respondents shall  be
bound to fill the posts by a regular process of selection.   The  Appellants
in the present case shall be allowed to compete in the  regular  recruitment
and the Respondents shall grant to them appropriate age relaxation  as  well
as grant proper weightage for their having worked in the subject Canteen.

19    There cannot be any cavil that the necessity  for   canteen  amenities
to be available where more than 250 workmen are  engaged,  is  an  essential
facet of human or labour rights.  Managements and employers are  duty  bound
to provide these basic facilities.

20     Stay granted by this  Court  on  28.03.2014  stands  vacated.   There
shall be no order as to costs.

…..…………………………………J.
(VIKRAMAJIT SEN)



………………………………….…..J.
(PRAFULLA C. PANT)

New Delhi,
August 3, 2015.


Saturday, August 1, 2015

even in the absence of statutory provision, normal rule is “no work no pay”. In appropriate cases, a court of law may take into account all the facts in their entirety and pass an appropriate order in consonance with law. The principle of “no work no pay” would not be attracted where the respondents were in fault in not considering the case of the appellant for promotion and not allowing the appellant to work on a post of Naib Subedar carrying higher pay scale. In the facts of the present case when the appellant was granted promotion w.e.f. 01.01.2000 with the ante-dated seniority from 01.08.1997 and maintaining his seniority alongwith his batchmates, it would be unjust to deny him higher pay and allowances in the promotional position of Naib Subedar. 14. The impugned orders passed by the High Court are set aside and this appeal is allowed. The respondents shall release the arrears of pay and allowances to the appellant for the period from 01.08.1997 till the date of his actual promotion that is 13.11.2000 in the promotional post of Naib Subedar within eight weeks from today. No order as to costs.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 811  OF 2007

RAMESH KUMAR                                          ...Appellant

                                   Versus

UNION OF INDIA & ORS.                               ...Respondents

                               J U D G M E N T


R. BANUMATHI, J.


Challenge in this appeal is the order of the High Court  of  Delhi  in  W.P.
(C) No.6466 of 2002 dated 02.12.2004, whereby the High Court  dismissed  the
writ petition filed against the order of denial of  pay  and  allowances  to
the appellant for the period from 01.08.1997 till the  date  of  his  actual
promotion i.e. 13.11.2000 and also the  order  dated  18.03.2005  dismissing
the Review Application No.55 of 2005.
2.          Background facts which led to the filing of this appeal  are  as
under:- The appellant got enrolled in the Indian Army on the post  of  Store
Keeper Technical/Sepoy on 19.03.1983 and was subsequently  promoted  to  the
rank of Havildar on 01.08.1989.  While  the  appellant  was  so  working,  a
Summary Court Martial (SCM) for the offences under Sections  41(i),  39  (a)
and 63 of the Army Act was initiated against him.  After completion  of  the
inquiry and on proved charges by an order dated  03.06.1992,  the  appellant
was sentenced to:- (i) reduction in rank; (ii) dismissal  from  service  and
(iii) rigorous imprisonment for one year in civil prison. Aggrieved  by  the
Order passed in Summary Court Martial, the appellant preferred  a  statutory
complaint under Section 164 of the Army Act.  The  Central  Government  vide
Order dated 17.08.1994 commuted  the  punishment  modifying  it  to  one  of
severe reprimand  and  further  remitted  the  sentence  of  dismissal  from
service directing reinstatement in service.  However, it was held  that  the
appellant was not entitled to any pay and allowances for the period  between
the date  of  dismissal  and  the  date  of  reinstatement  in  service.  In
compliance with the Order passed by the Central  Government,  the  appellant
was reinstated in service w.e.f. 29.10.1994.  The appellant  was  again  put
to Summary Court Martial for committing offence under Section 54(b)  of  the
Army Act and by an Order dated 18.02.1995; the appellant was awarded  severe
reprimand/red ink entry for the offence of loosing identity card.
3.          Case of the appellant for promotion to the rank of Naib  Subedar
came up for consideration before Departmental Promotion Committee  (DPC)  on
01.08.1997;  but  the  appellant  was  not  considered  for  promotion   and
according to the respondents, the appellant  did  not  meet  the  discipline
criteria for promotion as the appellant  was  having  two  red  ink  entries
during preceding five years. On  appellant’s  repeated  representations  for
his promotion as per his seniority, finally his claim was considered by  the
DPC held on 15.03.2000 and he was granted promotion w.e.f.  01.01.2000  with
ante-dated seniority w.e.f. 01.08.1997 alongwith his  batchmates.   However,
no direction was issued regarding any pay and allowances  to  the  appellant
in the higher rank of Naib Subedar from the back  date;  but  his  seniority
was maintained from 01.08.1997 when his batchmates have been promoted.
4.          Aggrieved by the order of the DPC, denying  pay  and  allowances
in the promotional post for the period  between  01.08.1997  to  13.11.2000,
the appellant filed     W.P.(C) No.6466 of 2002 before  the  High  Court  of
Delhi.  Vide impugned order dated 02.12.2004, the High Court  dismissed  the
writ petition observing that the  appellant  has  no  legitimate  claim  for
payment of pay and allowances from a retrospective date on the principle  of
“no work no pay”.  The Review Application No.55 of  2005  also  came  to  be
dismissed on 18.03.2005. This appeal assails the correctness  of  the  above
orders passed in the writ petition and also the review application.
5.          Contention of the appellant is that subsequently when the  fresh
DPC was held on 15.03.2000, the appellant was declared fit for promotion  to
the rank of Naib Subedar w.e.f. 01.01.2000 with ante-dated seniority  w.e.f.
01.08.1997 and  while  so,  the  appellant  was  arbitrarily  deprived  from
getting pay and allowances and other benefits from 01.08.1997 and hence  the
appellant is entitled to get his pay and  allowances  for  the  period  from
01.08.1997 till the date of his  actual  promotion  on  13.11.2000.  It  was
submitted that the respondents erroneously denied pay and allowances to  the
appellant when they themselves have granted him ante-dated seniority  w.e.f.
01.08.1997.
6.          Learned Senior Counsel for the respondents       Mr. A.K.  Panda
contended that although the order imposing punishment on the  appellant  was
passed by the Summary Court Martial on 03.06.1992 but the same was  commuted
only on 17.08.1994 and therefore  the  period  of  five  years  was  rightly
counted w.e.f. 17.08.1994 and therefore the appellant was  not  eligible  to
be considered for promotion prior to 17.08.1999.  It was  further  submitted
that on 01.08.1997, when the appellant’s case came up for promotion  to  the
rank of Naib Subedar, he did not meet the criteria for promotion as  he  had
incurred two red ink entries during preceding five  years  and  rightly  the
appellant was not  given  the  pay  and  allowances  from  01.08.1997  which
benefit was given to him w.e.f. 13.11.2000 when he actually joined the  said
rank of Naib  Subedar,  but  to  avoid  any  injustice,  his  seniority  was
maintained from 01.08.1997 alongwith his batchmates.
7.          We have  carefully  considered  the  rival  contentions  of  the
parties and perused the impugned judgment and the materials on record.
8.          By perusal of the  records  it  is  seen  that  considering  the
petition dated 31.08.1992 submitted  by  the  appellant  against  the  order
dated 03.06.1992 passed in the SCM, the Central Government  vide  its  order
dated 17.08.1994 commuted the punishment of reduction of rank and  one  year
rigorous imprisonment to severe  reprimand  and  remitted  the  sentence  of
dismissal  directing  reinstatement  of  the  appellant.   However,  it  was
mentioned in the said order dated 17.08.1994 the period between the date  of
dismissal and date of reinstatement in service will not be treated  as  duty
and the appellant will not be paid pay and allowances due  to  him  for  the
said period.  Order dated 17.08.1994 does not specifically  state  the  date
from which the commutation of punishment shall take effect.   The  appellant
rejoined the duty on 29.10.1994 and from that date he is taken to have  been
reinstated. In the  ASC  records  (Sup.),  letter  No.6442/  TB3/ST12  dated
23.07.1997, it is clearly mentioned that the punishment  was  set  aside  by
the Court and was reinstated into service and his name was again  placed  in
the original place in the seniority list. In the said letter it was  further
stated that the award  of  punishment  for  the  second  time  for  loss  of
temporary identity card will not affect the  appellant’s  promotion  to  the
rank of Naib Subedar.  However, as noticed  earlier,  in  the  DPC  held  on
01.08.1997, the appellant’s case was not considered, observing that  he  was
having two red ink entries during the last five years and the appellant  was
denied promotion to the rank of Naib Subedar w.e.f. 01.08.1997.
9.          It is pertinent to note that  the  case  of  the  appellant  was
again examined in consultation with Judge Advocate General (JAG)  Department
and vide  letter  No.77701/DPC/  Q/II/ST-12  dated  17.05.2000  of  the  DPC
proceedings,  the  Department  opined  that  the  date  of  commutation   of
punishment would only be from 03.06.1992, the date on which  punishment  was
announced and not from 17.08.1994. We may usefully  refer  to  the  relevant
portion of the said DPC proceedings which reads as under:
“The case was examined in consultation with JAG Deptt  this  HQ.  JAG  Deptt
has opined that Govt. order dated 17 Aug 94 does not specifically spell  out
the date from which the commutation of punishment  shall  take  effect.   In
the absence of any specific date, the order of the Govt. would be deemed  to
have been taken from the date of original sentence was  passed.   Therefore,
the date of commutation of punishment would be from 03 June 92 (the date  on
which punishment was announced) and not 17 Aug 94.”


From above referred proceedings, it is clear that the respondents  took  the
view that the date of commutation of punishment would  be  from  03.06.1992,
the date on which the punishment was awarded  and  not  on  17.08.1994,  the
date on which the punishment was commuted.
10.         As per the policy of the respondents, an  individual  cannot  be
considered for promotion to the rank of Naib Subedar, if he has earned  more
than three red ink entries during the entire service and more than  one  red
ink entry in the preceding five years of service.   It  is  noticeable  that
when the case of the appellant came up for consideration on 01.08.1997,  the
first punishment/red ink entry had already expired i.e.  on  03.06.1997  and
only one red ink entry made on 18.02.1995 was on the  record;  but  the  DPC
appears to have erred in ignoring the same. Considering the  genuineness  of
the representations made by the appellant, DPC again  considered  the  claim
of the appellant and granted him promotion w.e.f. 01.01.2000 to the rank  of
Naib Subedar with a further direction that the seniority  of  the  appellant
will  be  maintained  alongwith  his  batchmates  from   01.08.1997.    When
appellant was granted ante-dated seniority w.e.f. 01.08.1997  alongwith  his
batchmates, we find no reason  as  to  why  he  should  be  denied  pay  and
allowances in the promotional post as Naib Subedar  w.e.f.  01.08.1997  till
the date of his actual promotion on 13.11.2000.   The  High  Court  has  not
properly appreciated these aspects and erred in holding that on  01.08.1997,
the appellant was not eligible to be  considered  for  promotion.  When  the
respondents themselves have taken the view that the Order of the  Government
would be deemed to have taken from the date of original sentence was  passed
i.e.   03.06.1992   and   not   from   17.08.1994,   the   date   on   which
commutation/remission was granted by the Government, the High Court was  not
right in holding that the appellant was not eligible to  be  considered  for
promotion on 01.08.1997 and the impugned order cannot be sustained.
11.         The respondents have advanced the argument that  the  denial  of
pay and allowances is on the principle of “no work no pay” and no  injustice
has been done to the appellant since he  has  not  actually  worked  in  the
promotional post of  Naib  Subedar  during  the  aforesaid  period.  It  was
submitted that the benefit of pay and allowances was rightly awarded  w.e.f.
13.11.2000, the date on which the appellant actually  assumed  the  rank  of
Naib Subedar but his seniority was maintained so as to protect his  interest
in his further promotions.
12.          In  normal  circumstances  when  retrospective  promotions  are
effected, all benefits flowing therefrom, including monetary benefits,  must
be extended to an employee who has been denied promotion  earlier.   So  far
as monetary benefits with regard to  retrospective  promotion  is  concerned
that depends upon case to  case.   In  State  of  Kerala  &  Ors.  vs.  E.K.
Bhaskaran Pillai, (2007) 6 SCC 524, this Court held that  the  principle  of
“no work no pay” cannot be accepted as a rule of thumb and the  matter  will
have to be considered on a case to case basis and in para (4), it  was  held
as under:-
“… We have considered the decisions cited on behalf of both  the  sides.  So
far as the situation with regard to  monetary  benefits  with  retrospective
promotion is concerned, that depends upon case to case.  There  are  various
facets which have to be considered. Sometimes  in  a  case  of  departmental
enquiry or in criminal case it depends on  the  authorities  to  grant  full
back wages  or  50  per  cent  of  back  wages  looking  to  the  nature  of
delinquency involved in the matter or in criminal cases where the  incumbent
has been acquitted by giving benefit of doubt or full  acquittal.  Sometimes
in the matter when the person is superseded and he has challenged  the  same
before court or tribunal and he succeeds in that and direction is given  for
reconsideration of his case  from  the  date  persons  junior  to  him  were
appointed, in that case the court may grant  sometimes  full  benefits  with
retrospective effect  and  sometimes  it  may  not.  Particularly  when  the
administration has wrongly denied his due then in that  case  he  should  be
given full benefits including monetary benefit subject to  there  being  any
change in law or  some  other  supervening  factors.  However,  it  is  very
difficult to set down any hard-and-fast rule.  The  principle  “no  work  no
pay” cannot be accepted as a rule  of  thumb.  There  are  exceptions  where
courts have granted monetary benefits also.”

13.          We  are  conscious  that  even  in  the  absence  of  statutory
provision, normal rule is “no work no pay”. In appropriate  cases,  a  court
of law may take into account all the facts in their  entirety  and  pass  an
appropriate order in consonance with law. The principle of “no work no  pay”
would  not  be  attracted  where  the  respondents  were  in  fault  in  not
considering the case of the appellant for promotion  and  not  allowing  the
appellant to work on a post of Naib Subedar carrying higher  pay  scale.  In
the facts of the  present case when  the  appellant  was  granted  promotion
w.e.f.  01.01.2000  with  the  ante-dated  seniority  from  01.08.1997   and
maintaining his seniority alongwith his batchmates, it would  be  unjust  to
deny him higher pay and allowances  in  the  promotional  position  of  Naib
Subedar.
14.         The impugned orders passed by the High Court are set  aside  and
this appeal is allowed. The respondents shall release  the  arrears  of  pay
and allowances to the appellant for the  period  from  01.08.1997  till  the
date of his actual promotion that is 13.11.2000 in the promotional  post  of
Naib Subedar within eight weeks from today. No order as to costs.

                                                                …………………………J.
                                             (T.S. THAKUR)


                                                                …………………………J.
                                             (R. BANUMATHI)
New Delhi;
July  31, 2015
-----------------------
12





The petitioner was tried for which is known as “Bombay Blast Case’ and stood convicted in the year 2007. Almost 22 years have passed since 1993 when the incident occurred. We have not perceived any error in the issue of the death warrant as per our order dated 29.07.2015 passed in W.P. (Crl) No.129 of 2015. The only exception which has been enthusiastically carved out by Mr. Grover, learned Senior Counsel and Mr. Chaudhry, learned counsel is that they are entitled to get 14 days’ time to assail the rejection of the mercy petition. When the first mercy petition was rejected on 11.04.2014, there was sufficient time available to the petitioner to make arrangement for his family members to meet him in prison and make necessary worldly arrangements. There was adequate time to prepare himself to meet his Maker and to make peace with himself. We have been apprised by Mr. Rohatgi, learned Attorney General for India that the family was allowed to meet the petitioner whenever they desired as per the Jail Manual. 13. The residuary part of the submissions put forth by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner can still challenge the rejection of his mercy petition. On a first glance, the aforesaid submission may look quite attractive, but in the present case the same does not have much commendation because the rejection of the first mercy petition by the President of India could have been assailed before this Court, but it was not done. We have been apprised that the copy of the order of rejection of the mercy petition has been sent to the petitioner, but the fact remains that after the rejection of the first mercy petition, despite sufficient time, the petitioner chose not to challenge the same. We do not think that it is a case of such nature where it can be said that legal remedy was denied to the petitioner. True it is, the first mercy petition was submitted by the brother of the petitioner, but as the facts would clearly show, he was aware of the same. Learned Attorney General would contend that the petitioner, in fact, had written a letter to the concerned Superintendent of Jail pertaining to the same. Regard being had to the totality of facts and circumstances of this case, we are not inclined to accept the submission that the present mercy petition was preferred by the petitioner for the first time and, therefore, 14 days’ time should be granted so that he can do the needful as per law. In our considered opinion, to grant him further time to challenge the rejection of the second mercy petition for which we have to stay the execution of the death warrant dated 30.04.2015 would be nothing but travesty of justice. 14. Resultantly, we do not perceive any merit in this writ petition and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

                     WRIT PETITION (CRL.) NO.135 OF 2015


Yakub Abdul Razak Memon                            ...Petitioner

                                   Versus

State of Maharashtra and Anr.                         ...Respondents





                               J U D G M E N T


Dipak Misra, J.


      The issue that had seen the end after the day’s  drill  at  4.15  p.m.
yesterday, i.e., 29.07.2015, appears  to  have  unending  character  because
precisely after ten hours, about 3.15 a.m. on 30.07.2015, it has risen  like
a phoenix possibly harbouring the idea that it has the potentiality to  urge
for a second lease of life as put forth by Mr. Anand Grover, learned  Senior
Counsel  and  Mr.  Yug  Chaudhry,  learned  counsel,   appearing   for   the
petitioner,  stating  that  the  assail  has  become  inevitable  after  the
President of India in  exercise  of  his  power  under  Article  72  of  the
Constitution has rejected the mercy petition preferred  by  the  petitioner.
Be it stated, it is contended by the  learned  counsel  for  the  petitioner
that by virtue of the rejection of the mercy  petition,  the  death  warrant
issued on 30.4.2015 would be executed today, without waiting  for  14  days,
and hence, there should be a grant of stay.
2.    We may mention that, before the ink in the earlier judgment has  dried
up, the present writ petition has been filed  by  the  petitioner  assailing
the legal justifiability of the execution warrant  dated  30.04.2015  issued
by the Presiding officer, Designated TADA Court, Mumbai,  for  execution  of
the petitioner at 7.00 a.m. on 30.07.2015 and further to direct the stay  of
the petitioner’s execution till the instant writ petition is disposed of.
3.    We do not have to adumbrate the facts in entirety as the facts of  the
instant case have been elaborately stated in W.P. (Crl.)  No.  129  of  2015
which has been dismissed on 29.07.2015.  In the earlier writ  petition,  the
prayer, in quintessentiality, was made for setting aside the  death  warrant
issued by the Designated TADA Court, Mumbai.  The grounds were many  but  we
must state with certitude that they  did  not  find  favour  with  us.   Mr.
Grover, learned Senior Counsel would submit that it might  appear  that  the
prayers in the present petition are the same and anyone may foster the  idea
that an effort has been made in a  contrived  manner  to  procrastinate  the
date of execution of the convict, but  it  is  not  so.   He  would  further
submit that by the occurrence of subsequent events  that  took  place  after
the pronouncement of the judgment, fresh grounds have  emerged  which  could
not have been conceived of at the time when the matter was  argued.   It  is
urged that though the prayer is  the  same,  yet  the  grounds  are  totally
different.
4.    At this juncture, the subsequent  event  which  has  been  accentuated
upon by Mr.  Grover,  learned  Senior  Counsel  and  Mr.  Chaudhry,  learned
counsel, needs to be noted.  After we dismissed the  earlier  writ  petition
being W.P.(Crl) No. 129 of 2015, the President of India rejected  the  mercy
petition of the petitioner.   The fulcrum of the submission  of  Mr.  Grover
is that the petitioner is entitled in law to challenge the same albeit on  a
limited  ground and,  therefore,  a  three-Judge  Bench  of  this  Court  in
Shatrughan Chauhan & Anr. V. Union of India & ors.[1] has, upon  perusal  of
various jail manuals which exhibited discrepancies, intended to  rationalise
by laying down a minimum  period  so  that  the  convict  can  make  certain
arrangements.  To put it succinctly, when  a  mercy  petition  is  rejected,
there has to be a minimum period of 14  days  between  its  rejection  being
communicated to the petitioner and his family  and  the  scheduled  date  of
execution.  That apart, minimum period of 14 days is stipulated between  the
communication of the death warrant to the petitioner and the scheduled  date
of execution.
5.    Mr. Grover, learned  senior  Counsel  appearing  for  the  petitioner,
would contend that both the conditions are  to  be  satisfied  as  they  are
cumulative in nature.  There can be no cavil over the same.  First,  to  the
second condition.  The death warrant was  issued  on  30.04.2015  which  was
admittedly received by the petitioner on 13.07.2015  and  the  date  of  its
execution is 30.07.2015, i.e., today.  Thus, one of the facets is met  with.
 As far as the first aspect is concerned, in the earlier judgment passed  in
W.P.(Crl) No. 129/2015, this Court has held thus:-
“After the judgment was pronounced on 21.03.2013, an application for  review
was filed, which was dismissed by  circulation  on  30.07.2013.   After  the
rejection of the  application  for  review,  Suleman,  the  brother  of  the
petitioner,  represented  under  Article  72  of  the  Constitution  to  the
President of India on 06.08.2013, claiming benefits under Article  72(1)  of
the  Constitution.    The   petitioner   on   07.08.2013,   wrote   to   the
Superintendent,  Central  Jail,  Nagpur,  informing  him  about  receipt  of
petition by the office of  the  President  of  India.   On  02.09.2013,  the
Government of India forwarded the mercy petition of  the  convict  addressed
to the President of India, to  the  Principal  Secretary,  Home  Department,
Mahrashtra, as per the procedure.   The  Governor  of  Maharashtra  rejected
representation  on  14.11.2013  and  on  30.09.2013,  the  State  Government
informed the Central Government about rejection of  the  mercy  petition  by
the governor of Maharashtra.  On receipt of the said communication from  the
State Government on 10.03.2014,  the  summary  of  the  case/mercy  petition
prepared by the Ministry of  Home  Affairs  under  the  signatures  of  Home
Minister  was  forwarded  to  the  Petitioner.   The  said   rejection   was
communicated  to  the  stipulation  that  the  convict  be   informed   and,
accordingly, on 26.05.2014, the petitioner was informed about the  rejection
of mercy petition by the President of India.”

We  have  reproduced  the  whole  paragraph  as  they  state  the  facts  in
completeness.  Before we proceed with regard to the necessity for  grant  of
14 days’ time after receipt of communication of the rejection of  the  mercy
petition, it is appropriate to refer to paragraph 241.7  of  the  Shatrughan
Chauhan’s case (supra) which reads as follows:-
“241.7.  Some Prison Manuals do not provide for any minimum  period  between
the rejection of the mercy petition being communicated to the  prisoner  and
his family and the scheduled date of execution.  Some Prison Manulas have  a
minimum period of 1 day, others have a minimum period of  14  days.   It  is
necessary that a minimum  period  of  14  days  be  stipulated  between  the
receipt of communication of the rejection of  the  mercy  petition  and  the
scheduled date of execution for the following reasons:
(a)   It allows the prisoner to prepare himself mentally for  execution,  to
make his peace with God, prepare his will and settle other earthly  affairs.

(b)   It allows the prisoner to have a  last  and  final  meeting  with  his
family members. It  also  allows  the  prisoners’  family  members  to  make
arrangements to travel to the prison which  may  be  located  at  a  distant
place and meet the prisoner for the last time.   Without  sufficient  notice
of the scheduled date  of  execution,  the  prisoners’  right  to  avail  of
judicial remedies will be thwarted and they will be prevented from having  a
last and final meeting with their families.”

It is urged by Mr. Grover, learned Senior Counsel and Mr. Chaudhry,  learned
counsel that the first mercy petition was submitted by Suleman,  brother  of
the petitioner, on 06.08.2013 which stood  rejected  on  11.04.2014  by  the
President  of  India  and  that  was  communicated  to  the  petitioner   on
26.05.2014, but the petitioner had not submitted any mercy petition.
6.    There is no  dispute  over  the  fact  that  the  petitioner  had  not
submitted any representation invoking the  authority  of  the  President  of
India under Article 72 of the Constitution of India.  However, it is not  in
dispute that his brother had submitted.  It is also beyond dispute that  the
petitioner does not disown the submission of the petition by his brother  on
his behalf.  In fact, he had communicated  to  the  Superintendent,  Central
Jail, Nagpur, on 07.08.2013, informing him about receipt of the petition  by
the office of the President of India so as to pursue  the  same.   The  said
mercy petition as has been indicated earlier stood rejected  on  11.04.2014.
The petitioner did not think it appropriate to challenge  the  rejection  of
the mercy petition by the President of India.  He accepted his fate.
7.    Be it stated here, the mercy petition was preferred on  6.08.2013  and
prior  to  that,  the  review  petition  was  dismissed  by  circulation  on
30.07.2013 by the two-Judge Bench  of  this  Court  which  had  decided  the
appeal on 21.03.2013.  As is evident, the  constitutional  validity  of  the
rule relating to review was called  in  question  before  this  Court.   The
Constitution Bench in Mohd. Arif alias Ashfaq v.  Registrar,  Supreme  Court
of India and Ors.[2] dealing with the said rule opined that in death  cases,
the matter should be heard by a three-Judge Bench and  the  review  petition
should be heard in the open  court  by  giving  maximum  time  limit  of  30
minutes to the convict.
8.    Since the petitioner  had  not  filed  a  curative  petition,  he  was
entitled to seek reopening of  the  review  petition,  as  per  the  liberty
granted to certain categories of cases in Mohd. Arif Alias  Ashfaq  (supra).
Accordingly, his review petition was heard by a  three-Judge  Bench  in  the
open Court.  After rejection of the said review petition on  09.04.2015,  he
filed a  curative  petition  on  22.05.2015  which  also  got  dismissed  on
21.07.2015.  At this stage, it is  imperative  to  state  that  despite  the
Constitution  Bench  saying  that  there  shall  be  oral  hearing  of   the
application for review for a  maximum  period  of  30  minutes,  the  review
petition was heard for almost ten days.  The purpose of mentioning the  same
is that ample opportunity was afforded to the petitioner.
9.     After rejection of the  curative  petition  on  the  21.07.2015,  the
petitioner submitted a mercy petition to  the  Governor,  Maharashtra  which
was received on 22.07.2015.  He also submitted  another  mercy  petition  to
the President of India which was received by the President of India at  2.00
p.m. on 29.07.2015.  Both these mercy petitions have been rejected.
10.   It is submitted by Mr. Grover, learned Senior  Counsel,  that  as  per
the principle stated  in  Shatrughan  Chauhan  (supra),  the  petitioner  is
entitled to claim commutation of death sentence to life imprisonment on  the
basis of supervening circumstances.  For the said purpose, he  has  referred
to paragraphs 28 and 29 of the decision in Shatrughan Chauhan (supra)  which
read as under:-
“28.  The petitioners herein have  asserted  the  following  events  as  the
supervening circumstances, for  communication  of  death  sentence  to  life
imprisonment:
Delay
Insanity
Solitary confinement
Judgments declared per incuriam
Procedural laspses

29.   All the petitioners have  more  or  less  asserted  on  the  aforesaid
grounds which, in their opinion, the executive had failed to  take  note  of
while rejecting the mercy petitions filed by  them.   Let  us  discuss  them
distinctively and come to a conclusion whether  each  of  the  circumstances
exclusively or together warrants the communication of  death  sentence  into
life imprisonment.”

What is submitted today is that the petitioner can challenge  the  rejection
of the mercy petition only when it is  formally  served  on  him,   for  the
counsel for the petitioner have only come  to  know  from  the  news  report
about the rejection of the mercy petition by the President of India.   Thus,
14 days’ time has not been granted and he has been deprived of the right  to
assail the same.  As has been  stated  earlier,  the  said  stand  has  been
sought to be highlighted on the basis of the  reasons  stated  in  paragraph
241.7 of the case  of  Shatrughan  Chauhan  (supra).   Pyramiding  the  said
submission, it is propounded by Mr. Grover, learned Senior Counsel  and  Mr.
Chaudhry, learned counsel that in the absence of  any  time  to  assail  the
rejection of the mercy petition, the execution of death warrant deserves  to
be stayed.
11.   The question that emerges for consideration is whether on  the  ground
of not granting of 14 days’ time from the date of receipt  of  communication
of rejection of the mercy petition, should the warrant which is going to  be
executed at 7.00 a.m. on 30.07.2015 be stayed.  Mr. Mukul  Rohatgi,  learned
Attorney General for India, appearing for the respondent, would submit  that
the mercy petition is considered by the President of India  in  exercise  of
his power under Article 72 of the Constitution of  India  and  when  he  has
rejected the mercy petition after due  consideration  of  all  the  relevant
facts on earlier occasion, if such kind of repetitive  mercy  petitions  are
allowed to be submitted and further challenge to the rejection of  the  same
is permitted, the danger of the concept of ad  infinitum  would  enter  into
the field.  Mr. Rohatgi would further contend that at the  drop  of  a  hat,
everybody can add a new fact or a new development and expect  the  President
of  India  to  deal  with  it  as  contemplated  under  Article  72  of  the
Constitution of India and, thereafter, challenge the  same  in  a  court  of
law.
12.   The instant petition is a clear expose  of  the  manipulation  of  the
principle of rule of law.  The petitioner was tried for which  is  known  as
“Bombay Blast Case’ and stood convicted in the year 2007.  Almost  22  years
have passed since 1993 when the incident occurred.  We  have  not  perceived
any error in the  issue  of  the  death  warrant  as  per  our  order  dated
29.07.2015 passed in W.P. (Crl) No.129 of 2015.  The  only  exception  which
has been enthusiastically carved out by Mr. Grover, learned  Senior  Counsel
and Mr. Chaudhry, learned counsel is that they are entitled to get 14  days’
time to assail the rejection of the mercy petition.  When  the  first  mercy
petition was rejected on 11.04.2014, there was sufficient time available  to
the petitioner to make arrangement for his family members  to  meet  him  in
prison and make necessary worldly arrangements.  There was adequate time  to
prepare himself to meet his Maker and to make peace with himself.   We  have
been apprised by Mr. Rohatgi, learned Attorney General for  India  that  the
family was allowed to meet the petitioner whenever they desired as  per  the
Jail Manual.
13.   The residuary part  of  the  submissions  put  forth  by  the  learned
counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner can  still  challenge  the
rejection  of  his  mercy  petition.   On  a  first  glance,  the  aforesaid
submission may look quite attractive, but in the present case the same  does
not have  much  commendation  because  the  rejection  of  the  first  mercy
petition by the President of India could  have  been  assailed  before  this
Court, but it was not done.  We have been apprised  that  the  copy  of  the
order of rejection of the mercy petition has been sent  to  the  petitioner,
but the fact remains that after the rejection of the first  mercy  petition,
despite sufficient time, the petitioner chose not  to  challenge  the  same.
We do not think that it is a case of such nature where it can be  said  that
legal remedy was denied to the petitioner.  True  it  is,  the  first  mercy
petition was submitted by the brother of the petitioner, but  as  the  facts
would clearly show, he was aware of  the  same.   Learned  Attorney  General
would contend that the petitioner, in fact, had  written  a  letter  to  the
concerned Superintendent of Jail pertaining to the same.  Regard  being  had
to the totality of  facts  and  circumstances  of  this  case,  we  are  not
inclined to accept the submission  that   the  present  mercy  petition  was
preferred by the petitioner for the first  time  and,  therefore,  14  days’
time should be granted so that he can do the needful as  per  law.   In  our
considered opinion, to grant him further time to challenge the rejection  of
the second mercy petition for which we have to stay  the  execution  of  the
death warrant dated 30.04.2015 would be nothing but   travesty  of  justice.

14.   Resultantly, we do not perceive any merit in this  writ  petition  and
the same is, accordingly, dismissed.

                                                    ......................J.
                                                               [Dipak Misra]


                                                   .......................J.
                                                          [Prafulla C. Pant]


                                                     .....................J.
                                                               [Amitava Roy]
New Delhi
July 30, 2015









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[1]    (2014) 3 SCC 1
[2]    (2014) 9 SCC 737

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