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Thursday, May 7, 2015

whether such services provided by them would label them as Clearing & Forwarding Agents (for short, 'C&F Agents') and, thus, make them liable to service tax in accordance with the Finance Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'), as amended from time to time.= Movement of the coal is under the contract of sale between the coal company and Ambuja companies. Even the coal is loaded on to the railway wagons by the coal company. The goods are not under any legal detention from which they need to be freed by the appellant. Not only this, destination of the goods is known to the coal company and the railway rakes are placed by the coal company for the said destinations. The destination is the factories of the principal itself, namely, Ambuja companies, where the coal is to be delivered by the coal company as per pre- determined/agreed covenants between them. Therefore, there is no occasion for Ambuja companies to instruct the appellant to dispatch/forward the goods to a particular destination which is already fixed as per the contract between the coal company and the Ambuja companies. The appellant does not even undertake any loading operation. The primary job of the appellant, as per the contract between the appellant and the Ambuja companies, is of supervising and liaisoning with the coal company as well as the Railways to see that the material required by Ambuja companies is loaded as per the schedule. At no stage custody of the coal is taken by the appellant or transportation of the coal, as forwarders, is arranged by the appellant. We are, thus, of the clear opinion that the services rendered by the appellant would not qualify as C&F Agent within the meaning of Section 65(25) of the Act.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7215 OF 2004


|M/S. COAL HANDLERS PRIVATE LIMITED          |.....APPELLANT(S)          |
|VERSUS                                      |                           |
|COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE              |                           |
|RANGE KOLKATA – I                           |.....RESPONDENT(S)         |

                                   W I T H
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5159 OF 2013

                                    A N D

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9967 OF 2014


                               J U D G M E N T


A.K. SIKRI, J.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7215 OF 2004
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5159 OF 2013

                 Appellants in both these appeals are the assessees and  the
issue involved in these appeals is  common.   Both  the  appellants  provide
certain services as Agents under the contracts signed with their  respective
Principals.  The issue is as to  whether  such  services  provided  by  them
would label them as Clearing & Forwarding Agents (for short,  'C&F  Agents')
and, thus, make them liable to service tax in accordance  with  the  Finance
Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'), as amended  from  time  to
time.  Since the issue to be decided in both the appeals  is  identical  and
also arises almost in the  same  factual  background,  it  would  serve  our
purpose if we reproduce the facts from Civil Appeal No. 7215 of 2004.

The appellant in this case is providing certain  services  as  Agent.   Such
services are provided to  M/s.  Gujarat  Ambuja  Cements  Limited  and  M/s.
Ambuja Cements Eastern Limited  (hereinafter  collectively  referred  to  as
'Ambuja companies').   At  the  material  time,  these  were  public  sector
undertakings under the Government of Gujarat.  These  industries  need  coal
as a raw material for production of cement, which is the main  manufacturing
activity undertaken by the said companies.  Industries that need coal  as  a
raw material generally approach the Ministry of  Industries,  Government  of
India with their requirements.  The Ministry of Industries,  after  enquiry,
recommends to the Ministry of Coal the  quantity  that  is  required  to  be
supplied to such industries.  Thereafter, the Ministry of Coal, as  per  the
norms prescribed, allots the coal to these industries through the Long  Term
Linkage Committee indicating the coal companies and the location from  which
coal can be made available to them.  While fixing the locations  from  where
the coal is to be supplied to  such  companies,  the  Committee  takes  into
account the Railways commitment for movement of the coal.  The  Railways  is
responsible for placing of  rail  rakes  according  to  the  programme.   To
maintain constant liaison with the Railways for the actual placing  of  coal
rakes, such companies generally appoint its Agents.   The  aforesaid  Ambuja
companies, for this purpose, had appointed the appellant  for  this  purpose
and a contract was entered into between the said Ambuja  companies  and  the
appellant.  Under this Agency  agreement,  the  appellant  was  required  to
undertake the following activities on behalf of the Ambuja companies:
(i)   following up the allotment of coal rakes by the Railways;

(ii)  expediting and supervising the loading and labeling of rail
      wagons;

(iii) drawing the samples of coal loaded on the wagons;

(iv)  complying with the formalities relating to payments for
      freight to the Railways; and

(v)   dispatching of rail receipts to Ambuja companies.


The issue that arose for consideration was as to whether aforesaid  services
were liable to service tax under the provisions of the  Act.   By  the  said
Act, sub-section (25) was inserted in Section 65, which  defines  C&F  Agent
as under:
“(25) “clearing and forwarding agent” means any person  who  is  engaged  in
providing any service, either directly or  indirectly,  connected  with  the
clearing and forwarding operations in any manner to  any  other  person  and
includes a consignment agent;”

                 We may also note that the taxable service  as  provided  in
Section 65(48)(j) of the Act in relation to service of C&F Agent means  'any
service provided to  a  client,  by  a  clearing  and  forwarding  agent  in
relation to clearing and forwarding operations in any manner'.

It so happened that the appellant had filed an application for  registration
in Form ST-I under Section 69 of Chapter V of the Act on November  17,  1999
for  the  service  of  'handling  agents'  (C&F  Agent).   Certification  of
Registration was granted on November  18,  1999.   Thereafter,  on  May  30,
2000, the appellant surrendered the said  Registration  Certificate  on  the
ground that services rendered by them were not covered by Section 65(25)  of
the Act. The  application  for  surrender  was,  however,  rejected  by  the
Superintendent  of  Central  Excise  (SCE),  Service  Tax  Cell,  Kolkata-I,
Commissionerate on February 08, 2001 by passing the  Order-in-Original.  The
SCE, in that order,  took  the  view  that  the  services  rendered  by  the
appellant under the  aforesaid  contract  with  Ambuja  companies  would  be
covered by Section 65(25) of the Act and,  therefore,  exigible  to  service
tax.  Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant preferred an appeal  before
the Commissioner of  Central  Excise  (Appeals),  Kolkata,  which  was  also
dismissed by  the  Commissioner  on  November  05,  2002.   This  order  was
challenged by the  appellant  before  the  Customs,  Excise  &  Service  Tax
Appellate Tribunal (for short, 'CESTAT').

The CESTAT has also dismissed the appeal by the  impugned  order  dated  May
24, 2004 by observing that the matter is covered by its own judgment in  the
case of M/s. Prabhat Zarda Factory (India) Ltd. v. Commissioner  of  Central
Excise, Patna[1].  The Tribunal has noted in this behalf that  in  the  said
case the Bench of the Tribunal had considered the definition  of  C&F  Agent
and has held that such definition was very wide and  includes  any  service,
even provided indirectly.  It was also noted  that  the  said  judgment  was
delivered on February 09, 2002  and  thereafter  Finance  Act  of  2003  was
introduced and the new service, viz. 'Business Auxiliary Service'  appearing
in Section 65(19) was introduced.   The  said  service  is  in  relation  to
promotion or marketing of service provided by the client; any customer  care
service provided on behalf of the client and  any  incidental  or  auxiliary
support  service  such  as  billing,  collection  or  recovery  of  cheques,
accounts and remittance,  evaluation  of  prospective  customer  and  public
relation services,  and  includes  services  as  a  commission  agent.   The
CESTAT, however, held that the activities undertaken by the  appellant  were
not covered by the expression 'Business Auxiliary  Service',  which  include
Commission Agents, and stand exempted from  service  tax  with  effect  from
July  01,  2003  vide  Notification  No.  13/2003  dated  June   20,   2003.
Therefore, no such exemption was  available.   The  relevant  paras  of  the
impugned order containing the aforesaid discussion are as under:
“5)  The appellants have agreed that the issue involved  stands  decided  in
the case of Prabhat Zarda Factory (India) Ltd. (Supra).  The Tribunal  under
the said judgment has observed  that  as  per  definition  of  clearing  and
forwarding agent, he is a person who is engaged for providing  any  service,
either  directly  or  indirectly  connected  with  clearing  and  forwarding
operations in any manner to any  other  person  and  includes  a  commission
agent.  The use of  the  expression  “any”  and  “indirectly”  in  the  said
definition of clearing and forwarding agent, is indicative of the fact  that
the scope of the services to be provided by clearing  and  forwarding  agent
is quite wide.  He is not only the person who is actually dealing  with  the
goods, which has to be termed as clearing and forwarding agent, but even  if
the services are indirect and if the same are connected  with  the  clearing
and forwarding operations in any manner of the other persons,  he  would  be
covered within the scope of the said  definition.   The  appellants  in  the
instant case render their services in all the sections of pre  load  of  the
coal rakes i.e. obtaining consent on behalf of  their  customers,  sanctions
from the office of Executive Director-Rail Movement, supervising loading  of
the wagons, sending samples and assuring the proper quality and  quantities,
complying with the formalities relating to payments for freight.   As  such,
it is quite clear that  the  appellant  is  covered  by  the  definition  of
clearing and forwarding agent, as interpreted by the Tribunal in  the  above
referred case of Prabhat Zarda.

6)  The appellants have alternative contention that they are covered by  the
new i.e. Business Auxiliary Service introduced vide  Finance  Act  of  2003.
However, we find that the said services are in the nature of promotional  or
marketing of the customers goods  or  in  the  nature  of  doing  the  other
routine type of jobs like billing or collection of cheques,  maintenance  of
accounts  and  evaluation  of  prospective  customers  and  public  relation
services.  The services being provided by the appellant  cannot  be  equated
to the above.  It is also seen that the expression  'commission  agent'  has
been explained by the Notification dated 20th June,  2003  reported  in  155
ELT N-171, vide paragraph 2.1.3 it has been clarified that C&F  agents  work
on commission basis do not fall under the definition of 'Business  Auxiliary
Service',  in  as  much  as  they  are  substantially  covered  within   the
definition C & F service.   It  has,  further,  been  clarified  that  under
Section 65A of Finance Act, 1994, it has also been provided that in case  of
overlap, a service would be classified under the head,  (a)  which  provides
most specific description,  (b)  in  case  of  a  composite  service  having
combination of different taxable  services,  the  service  which  give  them
their essential character and (c) in case the test of (a) and (b)  does  not
resolve, the service which comes earlier in the clauses of Section 65,  i.e.
the service that was subjected to  service  tax  earlier.   Since  Insurance
services and C & F Services are more  specific  description  and  were  also
subjected to service tax prior to imposition of tax  on  business  auxiliary
service, the insurance agents, C & F  agents  working  on  commission  basis
would fall under those respective categories.  From this, it follows that  a
particular service can be taxed only under one head of service.”


As is clear from the reading of  the  aforesaid  extracted  portion  of  the
order, the  Tribunal  has  rested  its  impugned  decision  on  its  earlier
judgment in the case of Prabhat Zarda (supra) and the reasons  contained  in
the said judgment are restated in support of the view taken by the  Tribunal
in the impugned judgment.

It so happened that the ratio of the decision in Prabhat Zarda  (supra)  was
doubted by another Bench of the Tribunal and the  said  Bench  referred  the
matter to the larger Bench.  On reference being made, the Full Bench of  the
Tribunal decided the issue and on the aforesaid aspect decision  in  Prabhat
Zarda (supra) has been overruled by it.  The judgment of the Full  Bench  is
known  as  Larsen  &  Toubro  Ltd.  v.  Commissioner  of   Central   Excise,
Chennai[2].  It gets revealed from the decision of  the  larger  Bench  that
after taking note of the  definition  of  'clearing  and  forwarding  agent'
(which has already been extracted above), the  larger  Bench  observed  that
the service should be connected with  clearing  and  forwarding  operations.
The 'clearing and forwarding' operations would be various activities  having
bearing on clearance of goods, which  would  involve  documentary  processes
and arrangements for transfer of goods to their destination,  which  process
may  also  involve  clearance  at  subsequent   stages   during   forwarding
operations.  In the opinion of the larger Bench, the procurer of  orders  on
commission  basis  renders  services  which  are  not  connected  with  such
clearing and forwarding operations, which have bearing on  the  movement  of
goods.   It  also  mentioned  that  normally  a  C&F  Agent  undertakes  the
following activities:
(i)   receiving the goods from the factories or premises of the
      principal or his agents;

(ii)  warehousing these goods;

(iii) receiving despatch orders from the principal;

(iv)  arranging despatch of goods as per the directions of the
      principal by engaging transport on his own or through the
      authorized transporters of the principal;

(v)   maintaining records of the receipt and despatch of goods
      and the stock available at the warehouse; and

(vi)  preparing invoices on behalf of the principal.

Since the appellant in that case was engaged  only  for  procuring  purchase
orders for vendor on commission basis and was not  engaged  in  any  of  the
above activities, the larger Bench concluded that the services  provided  by
the said appellant would not fall within the  definition  of  'clearing  and
forwarding agent' as contained in the Act.  The detailed discussion on  this
aspect runs as follows:

“9.3  An agent engaged only for procuring purchase orders for the vendor  on
commission basis does not engage in any of the  above  activities,  directly
or indirectly. Commission agent engaged to procure orders and not  entrusted
with the work of clearing and forwarding of the  goods  would  be  a  person
who, in the ordinary  course  of  business,  makes  contracts  for  sale  or
purchase of goods for  others.  The  definition  of  "commission  agent"  in
Section 2(aaa) of the Central Excise Act, 1944, would apply in  relation  to
service tax as it applies in relation to duty of excise by  virtue  of  Sub-
section (121) or Section 65 of the Act. Services  of  commission  agent  are
included in the  definition  of  "business  auxiliary  service"  under  Sub-
section (19) of Section 65 w.e.f. 1-7-2003,  which  includes  service  of  a
commission agent. As defined in  Explanation  (a)  to  Sub-section  (19)  of
Section 65 commission agent is a  person  who  acts  on  behalf  of  another
person and causes sale or purchase of goods,  or  provision  or  receipt  of
services, for consideration, and includes any person who,  while  acting  on
behalf of another person: deals with  goods  or  services  or  documents  of
title to such goods or services; or collects payment of sale price  of  such
goods or services; or guarantees for collection or payment  for  such  goods
or services; or undertakes any activities relating to such sale or  purchase
of such goods or services. This clearly shows  that  the  activity  of  mere
procurement of purchase orders for the principal on commission  basis  of  a
commission  agent  is  treated  separately  by  the  Parliament   from   the
activities of a clearing and forwarding agent. Activity of procuring  orders
is thus independent of clearing and forwarding operations. The agents  doing
these  activities  can  be  different.  Moreover,  clearing  and  forwarding
operations do not flow directly  or  indirectly  from  mere  procurement  of
orders. There  is  no  obligation  on  the  person  procuring  orders  as  a
commission agent for the principal, only by virtue of that agency, to  carry
out clearing and forwarding operations in respect of the goods which are  to
be supplied pursuant to the orders so procured.


10. It appears to us that the expressions "directly or indirectly"  and  "in
any manner" occurring in the definition of "clearing and  forwarding  agent"
cannot be isolated from the activity of clearing and forwarding  operations.
A person may undertake to provide service of procurement of orders as  agent
of the principal without  agreeing  to  provide  services  of  clearing  and
forwarding of the  goods.  Clearing  and  forwarding  has  a  very  specific
connotation in the context of movement of goods from the supplier  to  their
destination and agents undertaking clearing and  forwarding  operations  may
never have been concerned with procurement of orders  for  the  goods  which
are cleared and forwarded. A person entrusted with the  work  of  commission
agent  for  procuring  orders  for  the  principal  cannot  insist  on  also
providing services as clearing and forwarding  agent  in  respect  of  those
goods and it would be open for the principal to  engage  some  other  person
for the purpose of forwarding such goods. In cases where the buyer is  under
an obligation to take delivery of the  goods  from  the  vendor's  premises,
there would not be even any need on the part of the  vendor  to  engage  any
forwarding agent, nor can a person engaged for the purpose of  clearing  and
forwarding operations, insist on procuring orders for the principal  in  the
absence of any stipulation to that effect.

11. We, therefore, hold that  mere  procuring  or  booking  orders  for  the
principal by an agent on payment of commission basis  would  not  amount  to
providing services as "clearing and forwarding agent",  within  the  meaning
of the definition of that expression under Section  65(25)  of  the  Finance
Act, 1994, as has been held in the  decision  of  the  Tribunal  in  Prabhat
Zarda Factory (Pvt.) Ltd. v. CCE Patna reported in 2002  (145)  ELT  :  2002
(50) RLT 326 (CEGAT-KOL.). The decision  in  Prabhat  Zarda  Factory  (Pvt.)
Ltd. stands overruled to  the  extent  of  the  aforesaid  ratio  laid  down
thereunder. The reference is answered accordingly. All  these  appeals  will
now be placed before the concerned Division Bench for decision on merits  in
the light of this judgment and in accordance with law.
                                                           (emphasis added)”
Significantly, the Revenue accepted the aforesaid decision in  the  case  of
Larsen & Toubro (supra) and did not  file  any  appeal  thereagainst.   Even
otherwise, we find that the larger Bench of the Tribunal in  the  said  case
has rightly interpreted the definition of 'clearing  and  forwarding  agent'
contained in Section 65(25)  of  the  Act.   Notwithstanding  the  aforesaid
dicta of the larger Bench, learned senior counsel appearing for the  Revenue
submitted that judgment in Prabhat Zarda  (supra)  has  not  been  overruled
entirely, as is clear from the reading of para 11 of the judgment where  the
larger Bench has said that Prabhat Zarda (supra) 'stands  overruled  to  the
extent of the aforesaid ratio laid down thereunder'.  His endeavour  was  to
demonstrate that in the present case the Tribunal in the  impugned  judgment
had rightly  relied  upon  Prabhat  Zarda  (supra)  and  when  the  services
rendered by the appellant are looked into, it would clearly fall within  the
definition of 'clearing and forwarding agent' contained  in  Section  65(25)
of the Act.
            Let us, therefore, examine  whether  services  rendered  by  the
appellant would qualify it as C&F Agent?

It would be relevant to point out the definition of 'forwarding  agent',  as
known in legal parlance, from  Black's  Law  Dictionary  (Seventh  Edition),
which is as under:
“forwarding agent. 1. A person or company whose business is to  receive  and
ship goods for others –  Also  termed  freight-forwarder.   2.   A  freight-
forwarder who assembles less-than-carload shipments 'small  shipments'  into
carload shipments, thus taking advantage of lower freight rates.”

                 The Penguin Business Dictionary defines this expression  in
the following words:
“Forwarding agent.  A GENERAL AGENT who specializes in moving goods  from  a
factory or port of  entry  to  their  proper  destination.   Such  an  agent
normally owns the transport necessary  for  this  work  and  often  arranges
FREIGHT and customs formalities for his principal.”

                 In Fourth Edition of Halsbury's  Laws  of  England  (Volume
5),  the  characteristics  of  'forwarding  agents'  are  narrated  in   the
following manner:
“442.  Characteristics of forwarding agents.  A forwarding agent is one  who
carries on the business of arranging for the  carriage  of  gods  for  other
people.  It must be clearly understood that a forwarding agent  is  not,  in
general, a carrier: he does not obtain possession of the goods: and he  does
not undertake the delivery of them at the other end.  All that  he  does  is
to act as agent for the owner of the goods to  make  arrangements  with  the
people who do carry, such as shipowners, road hauliers, railway  authorities
and air carriers, and to make arrangements, so far as  they  are  necessary,
for the intermediate steps between the ship and the  rail,  the  customs  or
anything else.

            Although there is  a  clear  distinction  between  a  forwarding
agent and a carrier, the same person may carry on both activities  at  once,
and contract sometimes as one and sometimes as the other.  The fact  that  a
person describes himself as a forwarding agent is not conclusive: and it  is
a question of fact to be decided according  to  the  circumstances  of  each
case whether a person normally carrying on business as  a  forwarding  agent
contracts solely as agent so as  to  establish  a  direct  contractual  link
between his customer and a carrier (or possibly with several carriers,  each
undertaking a different part of the transit), or  whether  he  contracts  as
principal to carry  the  goods,  the  customer  appreciating  that  he  will
perform the contract vicariously through the employment of  sub-contractors.
 The nature of the carriage, the language used by the parties in  describing
the role of the person concerned, and any  course  of  dealing  between  the
parties will be relevant factors.

            Persons properly described as  shipping  and  forwarding  agents
frequently act as carriers themselves with respect to part of the  carriage,
for example, by performing collection  and  delivery  services  between  the
customers' premises, their own depots, and warehouses, docks  and  carriers'
depots.  In such cases they would have the rights  and  duties  of  carriers
with respect to such carriage as they undertake personally, but  the  rights
and duties of forwarding  agents  with  respect  to  the  remainder  of  the
transit.

443.   Rights  and  liabilities  of  forwarding  agents.   The  rights   and
liabilities of a forwarding agent are governed by the general principles  of
the law of agency: and so he is  entitled  to  be  indemnified  against  all
expenses incurred on behalf of his principal  and  to  be  paid  his  proper
charges for  his  services.   He  is  liable  for  failure  to  make  proper
arrangements for the  carriage  and  for  ancillary  matters  which  he  has
undertaken, such as customs clearance.  He is not liable  for  the  failings
of persons with whom he makes contracts on behalf of his  principal,  unless
he know of those failings and ought to have taken action  either  to  remedy
them or at least to inform his principal so that damage might be avoided  or
mitigated: thus he  is  under   no   duty   to   supervise  the  actions  of
carriers

whom he reasonably and properly expects to perform their normal  obligations
competently.

            In ordinary transactions a forwarding agent is  not  liable  for
failing to insure the  goods,  in  the  absence  of  instructions  from  his
customer to do so: but he may, in certain circumstances, be liable  for  not
consulting his customer and advising him as  to  the  proper  transport  and
insurance arrangements which should be made for valuable goods.

            A forwarding agent is not normally personally liable to pay  the
charges of carriers whom he engages to carry  the  gods  on  behalf  of  his
principal; but  there  is  a  custom  of  the  London  freight  market  that
forwarding agents incur personal liability to shipowners for the payment  of
freight or of dead freight for booked space left unfilled.

            A forwarding agent  who  tenders  dangerous  goods  to  carriers
without warning them of their nature or of the precautions which  should  be
taken in their carriage  is  personally  liable  to  the  carriers  for  any
resulting damage through breach of the implied warranty that the  goods  are
fit for carriage.”

From the reading of the definition contained  in  the  aforesaid  provision,
together with its dictionary meanings  contained  in  Legal  and  Commercial
dictionaries, it becomes apparent that in order to qualify as a  C&F  Agent,
such a person is to  be  found  to  be  engaged  in  providing  any  service
connected with 'clearing and forwarding operations'. Of course, once  it  is
found that such a person is providing the services which are connected  with
the clearing and forwarding  operations,  then  whether  such  services  are
provided directly or indirectly would be  of  no  significance  and  such  a
person would be covered by the definition.  Therefore, we have to see as  to
what would constitute clearing and forwarding operations.  As is clear  from
the plain  meaning  of  the  aforesaid  expression,  it  would  cover  those
activities which pertain to clearing of the goods and thereafter  forwarding
those goods to  a  particular  destination,  at  the  instance  and  on  the
directions of the principal.  In the context  of  these  appeals,  it  would
essentially include getting the coal cleared as an agent on  behalf  of  the
principal from the supplier of the coal (which would mean collieries in  the
present case) and  thereafter  dispatching/  forwarding  the  said  coal  to
different destinations as per the instructions of  the  principal.   In  the
process, it may include warehousing  of  the  goods  so  cleared,  receiving
dispatch orders from the principal, arranging dispatch of the goods  as  per
the instructions of the principal  by  engaging  transport  on  his  own  or
through the transporters  of  the  principal,  maintaining  records  of  the
receipt and dispatch of the goods and the stock available on the  warehouses
and preparing invoices on behalf  of  the  principal.     The  larger  Bench
rightly enumerated these activities which  the  C&F  Agent  is  supposed  to
perform.



On the facts of the present  case,  we  find  that  none  of  the  aforesaid
activities are performed  by  the  appellant.   There  is  no  role  of  the
appellant in getting the coal cleared from the collieries/ supplier  of  the
coal.  Movement of the coal is under the contract of sale between  the  coal
company and Ambuja companies.  Even the coal is loaded  on  to  the  railway
wagons by the coal company. The goods are  not  under  any  legal  detention
from which they  need  to  be  freed  by  the  appellant.   Not  only  this,
destination of the goods is known to the coal company and the railway  rakes
are placed by the coal company for the said destinations.   The  destination
is the factories of the principal itself, namely,  Ambuja  companies,  where
the  coal  is  to  be  delivered  by  the   coal   company   as   per   pre-
determined/agreed covenants between them.  Therefore, there is  no  occasion
for Ambuja companies to  instruct  the  appellant  to  dispatch/forward  the
goods to a  particular  destination  which  is  already  fixed  as  per  the
contract between the coal company and the Ambuja companies.   The  appellant
does not even undertake any loading  operation.   The  primary  job  of  the
appellant, as  per  the  contract  between  the  appellant  and  the  Ambuja
companies, is of supervising and liaisoning with the coal  company  as  well
as the Railways to see that the material required  by  Ambuja  companies  is
loaded as per the schedule.  At no stage custody of the  coal  is  taken  by
the appellant or transportation of the coal, as forwarders, is  arranged  by
the appellant.  We are,  thus,  of  the  clear  opinion  that  the  services
rendered by the appellant would not qualify as C&F Agent within the  meaning
of Section 65(25) of the Act.

In view of the  aforesaid  discussion,  the  appeals  are  allowed  and  the
impugned orders passed by the Tribunal are set aside by quashing the  demand
of service tax made from the appellants.
            No costs.

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9967 OF 2014
                 The Commissioner of Service Tax, Kolkata, is  aggrieved  by
the orders dated August 21, 2013 passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Calcutta,
which has dismissed the appeal of the  Revenue  by  the  impugned  judgment,
refusing to entertain the said appeal which was  preferred  by  the  Revenue
against orders dated April 02, 2013 passed by CESTAT.  In  the  said  appeal
before the CESTAT, it had taken the view, in the  case  of  same  appellant,
that the appellant was not liable to pay any  service  tax  as  it  was  not
covered by the definition of C&F Agent as contained  in  Section  65(25)  of
the Act.  The appeal preferred by the Revenue  was  dismissed  by  the  High
Court on the ground that Civil Appeal No. 5159 of 2013 is  pending  in  this
Court.  Since the said appeal of the  appellant  is  allowed  by  us,  as  a
consequence, this  appeal  warrants  to  be  dismissed  and  it  is  ordered
accordingly.
                 No costs.

                             .............................................J.
                                                                (A.K. SIKRI)



                             .............................................J.
                                                     (ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN)

NEW DELHI;
MAY 05, 2015.
-----------------------
[1]   2002 (145) ELT 222
[2]   2006 (3) STR 321 (Tri.-LB) :: 2006 (110) ECC 634 :: 2006 ECR 634 Tri
Delhi

As per the appellant, since the LCDs were classifiable under Chapter Heading 9013.80, in view of Notification No. 16/2000, and particularly Entry/S.No. 304 of the table of the said Notification, the goods classified under Heading 9013.80 attracted Nil rate of basic custom duty. That was the reason for claiming assessment at Nil rate insofar as basic duty is concerned. However, the case of the respondent/custom authorities is that on verification it was found that the goods were not simple liquid crystal. On the contrary, these were LCD Modules and Elastomeric LCD Displays and were part of Energy Meter. The relevant invoices also described the goods as “electronic part for energy meter”. The drawing and literature which were provided did not specify the purpose.= In accordance with Chapter Note 5, measuring or checking optical appliances, instruments and machines are excluded from this heading and fall in heading 90.31. Chapter Note 4, however, classifies certain refracting telescopes in this heading and not in heading 90.05. It should, moreover, be noted that optical instruments and appliances can fall not only in headings 90.01 to 90.12 but also in other headings of this Chapter (in particular, heading 90.15, 90.18 or 90.27). This heading includes: (1) Liquid crystal devices consisting of a liquid crystal layer sandwiched between two sheets or plates of glass or plastics, whether or not fitted with electrical connections, presented in the piece or cut to special shapes and not constituting articles described more specifically in other headings of the Nomenclature. xx xx xx” As per this, LCD would be covered by 'other devices' mentioned in 9013.80. That is precisely the case of the appellant. The upshot of the aforesaid discussion leads to the conclusion that the view taken by the Tribunal in the impugned judgment is unsustainable in law. We, thus, allow the appeal, set aside the orders of the authorities below and hold that LCDs imported by the appellant were classifiable under Chapter Heading 9013.80.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7526 OF 2004


|M/S. SECURE METERS LTD.                    |.....APPELLANT(S)            |
|VERSUS                                     |                             |
|COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS                    |                             |
|NEW DELHI                                  |.....RESPONDENT(S)           |


                               J U D G M E N T


A.K. SIKRI, J.
                 The appellant is engaged in the manufacture of  electricity
meters. In September 2000, the appellant imported a  consignment  consisting
of LCD Modules (Printed Circuit Boards) and  Liquid  Crystal  Display  (LCD)
from Hong Kong.  The classification of the LCD Module  is  not  in  dispute.
The dispute in the instant case relates  to  classification  of  LCDs.   The
appellant sought  clearance  of  LCDs  under  Chapter  Heading  9013.80  and
claimed assessment at Nil rate (basic duty),  16%  additional  duty  and  4%
SAD.  As per the appellant, since the LCDs were classifiable  under  Chapter
Heading 9013.80, in view  of  Notification  No.  16/2000,  and  particularly
Entry/S.No. 304 of the table of the said Notification, the goods  classified
under Heading 9013.80 attracted Nil rate of basic  custom  duty.   That  was
the reason for claiming assessment at Nil rate  insofar  as  basic  duty  is
concerned.  However, the case of the respondent/custom authorities  is  that
on verification it was found that the goods were not simple liquid  crystal.
 On the contrary, these were LCD Modules and Elastomeric  LCD  Displays  and
were part of Energy Meter.  The relevant invoices also described  the  goods
as “electronic part for energy meter”.  The  drawing  and  literature  which
were provided did not specify the purpose.

The Deputy Commissioner,  Customs  (Adjudicating  Authority),  thus,  passed
orders dated 31.08.2001 holding that LCDs were  classifiable  under  Chapter
Heading 9028.90 and not under 9013.80 as  claimed  by  the  appellant.   For
classifying the goods under the aforesaid category, recourse  to  Rule  3(c)
of the General Rules for the Interpretation of the First Schedule  –  Import
Tariff was taken by the  Adjudicating  Authority.  The  Deputy  Commissioner
observed that even if he considered the  goods  to  be  devices,  then  only
those LCD devices/displays which do not  constitute  articles  provided  for
more specifically in other heading would cover in Chapter Heading 9013  and,
accordingly, he took the view that  the  goods  are  specific  part  of  the
electricity meter and, thus,  classified  the  same  under  Chapter  Heading
9028.90 as parts of electricity meter.

The aforesaid order of the Adjudicating Authority has been affirmed  by  the
Commissioner as well as CESTAT resulting into dismissal of appeals filed  by
the appellant herein.  The decision of CESTAT reveals that appellant  relied
upon  its  earlier  decision  in  the  case  of  CCE,  Bombay  v.  Universal
Information Commn. Equipment Ltd.[1] However, the  Tribunal  has  held  that
the aforesaid decision is not applicable to the facts of the  present  case.
The Tribunal has accepted the contention of the Revenue  that  the  invoices
issued by the supplier of the goods specifically mentioned that  these  were
parts of electronic energy meters and even the appellant had  admitted  that
these goods had to be issued as parts of energy meter.

Since the appellant claims that the LCDs fall under Chapter Heading  9013.80
and the argument of the Revenue is that these are rightly  classified  under
Heading 9028.90, we may first take note of these Chapter Headings:
|Tariff Item      |  |Description of Goods                   |
|(1)              |  |(2)                                    |
|                 |  |                                       |
|9013             |  |Liquid Crystal Devices not constituting|
|                 |  |articles provided for more specifically|
|                 |  |in other headings; lasers, other than  |
|                 |  |laser diodes; other optical appliances |
|                 |  |and instruments, not specified or      |
|                 |  |included elsewhere in this Chapter     |
|                 |  |                                       |
|9013.80          |  |Other devices, appliances and          |
|                 |  |instruments;                           |
|                 |  |                                       |
|901380.10        |  |Liquid Crystal Devices (LCD)           |
|                 |  |                                       |
|9028             |  |Gas, Liquid or electricity supply or   |
|                 |  |production meters, including           |
|                 |  |calibrating meters therefor            |
|                 |  |                                       |
|9028.90          |  |Parts and accessories                  |
|                 |  |                                       |
|9028.90.10       |  |For electricity meters                 |


One thing is clear.  Both the tariff items  under  which  classification  is
sought by the appellant as well as the authorities, fall under  Chapter  90.
Therefore, it would be advisable to refer  to  the  relevant  provisions  of
Note 2 to Chapter 90 as these notes are inserted to guide how the goods  are
to be classified under this Chapter.  Heading of Chapter 90 is as follows:
“Optical, photographic,  cinematographic,  measuring,  checking,  precision,
medical  or  surgical  instruments  and  apparatus;  parts  and  accessories
thereof”


Note 1 of this Chapter stipulates certain items which are not covered  under
this Chapter.  Obviously, this Note does  not  concern  us  in  the  present
appeal.  Note 2, which is material for  the  purposes  of  this  appeal,  is
reproduced below:
“  2.  Subject  to  Note  1  above,  parts  and  accessories  for  machines,
apparatus, instruments or articles of this  Chapter  are  to  be  classified
according to the following rules:

(a)  Parts and accessories which are goods included in any of  the  headings
of this Chapter or of Chapter 84, 85 or 91 (other than  heading  No.84,  85,
85.48 or 90.33) are in all  cases  to  be  classified  in  their  respective
headings;

(b)  other parts and accessories, if suitable for use solely or  principally
with a particular kind of  machine,  instrument  or  apparatus,  or  with  a
number of machines, instruments or apparatus of the same heading  (including
a machine, instrument or apparatus of heading No.  90.10,  90.13  or  90.31)
are to be classified with the machines, instruments  or  apparatus  of  that
kind;

(c) all other parts and accessories are to  be  classified  in  heading  No.
90.33.”

It is not in dispute that the goods in question which are  imported  by  the
appellant are LCDs.  It is also not in dispute that these devices  are  used
in electricity supply meters.   Since  the  LCDs  are  used  for  electronic
supply meters by the appellant, the Revenue  has  taken  the  view  that  it
would fall in tariff item No. 9028.90 as that entry  specifically  includes,
amongst others, electricity supply meters.  As LCDs are used as part of  the
electricity supply meters, they are held to  be  covered  under  sub-heading
9028.90 by the Revenue.  It  may  be  emphasised  that  in  coming  to  this
conclusion, the authorities below have been influenced by the fact that  the
goods imported are actually used as parts of electronic  energy  meters  and
the appellant has even admitted the same.

Challenging the  aforesaid  view  of  the  authorities,  submission  of  Mr.
Lakshmikumaran, learned counsel appearing for the appellant,  is  that  when
the specific  description  of  the  goods  in  question,  namely,  LCDs,  is
distinctly covered by another tariff item  which  is  9013,  it  has  to  be
classified in that entry and the factum of its use as part or  accessory  in
the electronic energy meters would be of no consequence and,  therefore,  it
cannot be held to  be  covered  by  tariff  item  9028.90.  The  submission,
precisely, was that whenever a particular item of goods falls in a  specific
tariff item, it has to be classified under the said tariff item and  not  in
other item where it can be used as part thereof.

Mr. Lakshmikumaran has also placed heavy reliance upon Note  2  attached  to
Chapter 90 and argued that as per Note 2(a), parts  and  accessories,  which
has goods included in any of the headings of said Chapter 90 (or of  Chapter
84, 85 or 91), are to be classified in their respective headings.

Ms.   Kiran   Suri,   learned   senior    counsel    appearing    for    the
respondent/department, argued, per contra, that in the  present  case  goods
were specifically meant for use as parts in electric meters, which  is  even
accepted by the appellant.  Therefore, Note 2 would not apply in this  case.
 She submitted that under these circumstances it  is  the  General  Rule  of
Interpretation that would apply and referred to Rule 3  of  the  said  Rules
and contended  that  if  the  goods  are  classifiable  under  two  or  more
headings,  on  the  application  of  Rule  2(b)  of  the  General  Rules  of
Interpretation, then the classification has to be in the  manner  stipulated
in Rule 3 of the General Rules.  Rules 2 and 3 are as under:
“2. (a) Any reference in a heading to an article shall be taken  to  include
a reference to that article incomplete  or  unfinished,  provided  that,  as
presented, the incomplete or unfinished article has the essential  character
of the complete or finished article.  It shall also be taken  to  include  a
reference to that article complete or finished (or falling to be  classified
as complete or finished by virtue of this  rule)  presented  unassembled  or
dis-assembled.

(b)  Any reference in a heading to a material or substance  shall  be  taken
to include a reference to mixtures  or  combinations  of  that  material  or
substance with other materials or substances.  Any reference to goods  of  a
given material or substance shall be taken to include a reference  to  goods
consisting  wholly  or  partly  of  such   material   or   substance.    The
classification of goods consisting of more than one  material  or  substance
shall be according to the principles of rule 3.

3.  When by application of rule 2(b) or for any  other  reason,  goods  are,
prima facie, classifiable under two or more headings,  classification  shall
be effected as follows:

(a) The heading which  provides  the  most  specific  description  shall  be
preferred to headings providing a more general description.   However,  when
two or more headings each refer to part only of the materials or  substances
contained in mixed or composite goods or to part only of the items in a  set
put up for retail sale,  those  headings  are  to  be  regarded  as  equally
specific in relation to those gods,  even  if  one  of  them  gives  a  more
complete or precise description of the goods.

(b)  Mixtures, composite goods consisting of different materials or made  up
of different components, and goods put up in sets  for  retail  sale,  which
cannot be classified by reference to (a), shall be  classified  as  if  they
consisted of the material or component  which  gives  them  their  essential
character, insofar as this criterion is applicable.

(c)  When goods cannot be classified by reference to (a) or (b), they  shall
be classified under the heading which occurs last in numerical  order  among
those which equally merit consideration.”

She argued that as per Rule 3(a) of the Rules, it was incumbent to  classify
the goods in that heading which provides 'the most specific description'  in
contrast with the heading providing for a  more  general  description.   She
also referred to the following portion of the assessment order made  by  the
Commissioner of Customs to buttress her aforesaid submission:
“Even if we ignore the above definition of device and consider the  imported
parts i.e. Liquid Crystal  Displays  to  be  “devices”,  only  those  liquid
crystal devices/displays which do not constitute article provided  for  more
specifically in other headings will be  covered  in  CTH  90.13.   In  other
words, liquid crystal devices/displays which do not specifically  form  part
of a specific type of equipment will be classified  here.   General  purpose
LCD, for example the one displaying only 0-9 numbers, which can be  attached
to several devices/equipments and cannot be specifically covered in any  one
heading as parts are to  be  classified  here  if  they  are  considered  as
devices.   Had  the   intention   been   to   cover   all   Liquid   Crystal
Devices/displays in CTH 90.13 there was no need for the description -

“Liquid  Crystal  Devices  not  constituting  articles  provided  for   more
specifically in other headings.”

And “Liquid Crystal Device” would have been sufficient  instead.   The  only
way to make Liquid  Crystal  Device/display  more  specifically  covered  in
other heading is to make it a part of a  specific  articles  as  in  present
case.

There can be an argument whether being part of a  specific  goods  can  make
LCD more specifically covered in that  heading  as  part  of  the  specified
equipment as compared to CTH 90.13, but there can  be  no  doubt  that  such
situation certainly  makes  it  classifiable  in  other  heading  (e.g.  CTH
9029.90 in present case).  And when any good is classifiable in two or  more
headings, then as per Rule 3(c) of General  Rules  for  Interpretation,  the
heading which occurs last in numeric order is to be preferred.”

We have given  due  consideration  to  the  aforesaid  submissions  made  by
learned counsel for the parties.

We may point out at the outset that Rule 3 of the General  Rules,  which  is
sought to be invoked by the Department, would be seen and  examined  if  the
classification cannot be determined according to the terms of  the  headings
and relevant Section and Chapter Notes thereof.  It is clearly  provided  in
Rule 1 of the General Rules itself, which reads as under:
“Classification  of  goods  in  this  Schedule  shall  be  governed  by  the
following principles:

1.  The titles of Sections, Chapters and sub-Chapters are provided for  ease
of reference only; for legal purposes, classification  shall  be  determined
according to the terms of the headings and any relative Section  or  Chapter
Notes and, provided  such  headings  or  Notes  do  not  otherwise  require,
according to the following provisions:

                         xx          xx         xx”

                 It is manifest from the reading of this Rule that  we  will
have to first undertake the exercise of finding out as to whether the  goods
in question can be classified, taking aid of  the  Chapter  Notes  on  which
reliance is placed.  This position is  made  amplified  in  Commissioner  of
Central Excise, Nagpur v. Simplex Mills Co. Ltd.[2], this  Court  held  that
the Rules for the Interpretation of  the  Schedule  to  the  Central  Excise
Tariff Act, 1985 have been framed pursuant to the powers under Section 2  of
that Act.  The relevant para is reproduced below:

“11. The Rules for the Interpretation of the Schedule to the Central  Excise
Tariff Act, 1985 have been framed pursuant to the powers under Section 2  of
that Act.  According to Rule 1  titles  of  sections  and  chapters  in  the
Schedule are provided for ease of reference only.  But for  legal  purposes,
classification “shall be determined according to the terms of  the  headings
and any relevant section or chapter notes”.  If neither the heading nor  the
notes suffice to clarify the scope of a heading, then it must  be  construed
according to the other following provisions contained in the Rules.  Rule  1
gives primacy to the section and chapter  notes  along  with  terms  of  the
headings.  They should be first applied.  If no clear picture  emerges  then
only can one resort to the subsequent rules.   The  appellants  have  relied
upon Rule 3.  Rule 3 must be understood only in the context of sub-rule  (b)
of Rule 2 which says inter alia that the classification of goods  consisting
of more than one material or substance shall be according to the  principles
contained in Rule 3.  Therefore when goods  are  prima  facie,  classifiable
under two or more headings, classification shall be  effected  according  to
sub-rules (a), (b) and (c) of Rule 3 and in that order.  The  sub-rules  are
quoted:

“3. (a)  The heading which provides the most specific description  shall  be
preferred to heading providing a more general  description.   However,  when
two or more headings each refer to part only of the materials or  substances
contained in mixed or composite goods or to part only  of  the  items  in  a
set, those headings are to be regarded as equally specific  in  relation  to
those goods,  even  if  one  of  them  gives  a  more  complete  or  precise
description of the goods.

(b)  Mixtures, composite goods consisting of different materials or made  up
of different  components,  and  goods  put  up  in  sets,  which  cannot  be
classified by reference to (a), shall be classified as if they consisted  of
the material or  component  which  gives  them  their  essential  character,
insofar as this criterion is applicable.

(c)  When goods cannot be classified by reference to (a) or (b), they  shall
be classified under the heading which occurs last  in  the  numerical  order
among those which equally merit consideration.”

            Before we advert to this core  issue,  let  us  understand  what
constitutes LCDs and its functions, with adequate clarity.

In Bloomsbury Dictionary of 'Science  for  Everyone',  LCD  and  LED  (light
emitting diode) are described in the following manner:
“LCD AND LED

The two principal methods of forming  number  sand  letters  on  instruments
such as calculators and digital watches.  A basic pattern of seven  bars  is
used to form the digits 0 to 9 and several letters.  To form  other  letters
and symbols, more than seven bars are required.

In the LED (light-emitting diode), the bars are made  of  a  substance  that
permits an electric current to  flow  through  in  one  direction  only.   A
substance used in this way is called a diode.  As  the  current  flows,  the
diode gives off red, blue, yellow, or other  coloured  light,  depending  on
the compound of which it is made.   For  example,  gallium  phosphide  (GaP)
emits a green glow.  Electric circuits in the  instrument  selectively  turn
on the current to the bars to form the various numbers and letters.

In the LCD (liquid crystal display), the bars are made of  liquid  crystals.
These are a kind of hybrid material, not quite a  liquid  and  not  quite  a
solid.  They can't be  poured  readily,  as  with  liquids,  nor  are  their
molecules locked in place, as with true solids.  But the  molecules  can  be
rotated slightly by an electric current.  When no current  flows,  the  bars
are not noticeable, because they reflect light to the  same  extent  as  the
rest of the display surface.  But when a current flows through  a  bar,  its
molecules rotate and its ability to reflect  light  is  reduced.   That  bar
appears darker than the area around  it  and  forms  part  of  a  number  or
letter.

You can produce  a  similar  darkening  effect,  called  polarization,  with
Polaroid sunglasses.  Hold the glasses several centimeters from one eye  and
look through one lens at a shiny,  sunlit  surface.   Rotate  the  lens  and
observe the darkening.

Liquid crystals can be made to order to do a particular job.   For  example,
one kind of crystal is sensitive to slight temperature changes.  It is  used
in thermometers where the number representing the temperature appears,  then
disappears, to be succeeded by a higher or lower number as  the  temperature
changes.”

                 The basic pattern of digits or letters which is  formed  in
these LCDs is as follows:
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
a c e f h I j l p u

            As is clear from the above, in the LCD  the  bars  are  made  of
liquid crystals which are neither liquid nor solid entirely,  but  a  hybrid
material of the  two.   The  molecules  are  rotated  slightly  by  electric
current making a particular bar darker  than  the  area  around  it  thereby
forming part of a number or letter.

Keeping in mind the aforesaid nature of product in question,  we  revert  to
the tariff entries.  It  cannot  be  disputed  that  LCDs  are  specifically
provided in tariff item 9013.  The only condition is that such  LCDs  should
not constitute 'articles' provided more specifically in other headings.   In
the present case, it is also not  in  dispute  that  LCDs  imported  by  the
appellant did not constitute any such 'article' which is  more  specifically
provided in other headings.  On the contrary, the Revenue wants  to  include
in the same Chapter, i.e. Chapter  90,  though  under  Entry  9028.90.10  as
“parts and accessories”.  The only reason  for  including  the  goods  under
Chapter Heading 9028 is that the LCDs were to be  used  in  the  electricity
supply meters.  However, Entry 9028  does  not  pertain  to  LCDs  but  gas,
liquid, etc.  and  includes  electricity  supply  meters  as  well.   Merely
because these LCDs are to be used as parts in the  said  electricity  supply
meters, can it be said that they are to be included in  Entry  9028?   Here,
Note 2 of this Chapter Notes becomes important since LCDs are  used  in  the
electricity supply meters only as parts thereof.
            Note 2(a) stipulates that parts and accessories which are  goods
included in the heading of the said Chapter, i.e.  Chapter  90,  are  to  be
classified in their respective headings.  Going  by  the  plain  reading  of
Note 2(a) it is clear that LCDs, which are goods and are used  as  parts  in
the final product  mentioned  in  Chapter  90,  namely,  electricity  supply
meters, are to be classified in its respective heading. Respective  heading,
which is specifically provided, is 9013.

It was sought to be argued by Ms. Kiran Suri that as  per  Note  2(b),  when
these LCDs are used solely for particular  instrument,  namely,  electricity
supply meter, it has to be classified with the said  meter  and,  therefore,
Chapter Entry 9028 would get attracted.  However, this argument loses  sight
of the fact that  Note  2(b)  relates  to  'other  parts  and  accessories',
namely, it would apply to those parts and accessories for  which  Note  2(a)
is inapplicable.  Once we find that in the present case Note  2(a)  squarely
applies, the irresistible conclusion is that the goods  will  be  classified
in tariff item 9013, which is the specific heading for these goods.

In Collector of Central Excise v. Delton Cables Ltd. & Anr.[3],  this  Court
has held, while interpreting Notes 2(a) and  2(b)  of  Chapter  Heading  85,
which is virtually to the same effect, that Note 2(b) would  apply  only  if
the items  in  question  were  not  specifically  classifiable  under  their
respective headings.  Para 4 of the said judgment, to this effect, reads  as
under:
“4.  It is clear from a reading of the two clauses to the section note  that
clause (b) would only apply once it was found that  the  items  in  question
were not specifically classifiable under their respective headings.  As  has
been clearly said by the Collector (Appeals)

“from the sequence of the paragraphs given under Section Note 2 it is  clear
that the question of switching over to Section  Note  2(b)  can  arise  only
after ensuring that the parts are not covered  by  Section  Note  2(b)  [sic
Section Note 2(a)] which begins with the expression  “other  parts”  meaning
thereby that the parts which are not covered by Section Note 2(a)  would  be
considered  for  coverage  by  Section  Note  2(b).   One  cannot  therefore
directly jump over to Section Note 2(b) without exhausting  the  possibility
of Section Note 2(a).”


The aforesaid view of ours gets strengthened from Part-III of Chapter  Notes
to Chapter 90.  We may mention here that after studying the  Chapter  Notes,
Note 2 whereof is reproduced above, there are  certain  guidelines  provided
under the caption 'General'.  Part-I thereof deals with General Content  and
Arrangement of the Chapter; Part-II  deals  with  Incomplete  or  Unfinished
Machines, Apparatus, etc.; and Part-III deals with  Parts  and  Accessories.
We are reproducing here this portion in order to show how  it  supports  the
view which we have proposed to take as indicated above:
                        “(III) PARTS AND ACCESSORIES

Subject to Chapter Note 1, parts or  accessories  identifiable  as  suitable
for use solely or principally with the machines, appliances, instruments  or
apparatus of this Chapter are classified with  those  machines,  appliances,
etc.

This general rule does not, however, apply to:

(1)  Parts or accessories which in themselves  constitute  articles  falling
in any particular heading of this Chapter or of Chapter 84, 85 or 91  (other
than the  residual  heading  84,  85,  85.48  heading  84.14;  transformers,
electro-magnets, capacitors,  resistors,  relays,  lamps  or  valves,  etc.,
remain classified in Chapter 85; the optical elements of  heading  90.01  or
90.02 remain  in  the  headings  cited  regardless  of  the  instruments  or
apparatus to which they are to be fitted;  a  clock  or  watch  movement  is
always classified in Chapter 91; a  photographic  camera  falls  in  heading
90.06 even if it is of a kind  designed  for  use  with  another  instrument
(microscope, stroboscope, etc.)

(2)  Parts or accessories  suitable  for  use  with  several  categories  of
machines,  appliances,  instruments  or  apparatus  falling   in   different
headings of this Chapter are classified in heading 90.33,  unless  they  are
in themselves complete instruments, etc., specified in another heading  (see
paragraph (1) above).”

This contains a general explanation to Chapter  Note  2  and  mentions  that
where parts or accessories  identifiable  as  suitable  for  use  solely  or
principally with the machines, appliances, etc., they are to  be  classified
with  those  machines/appliances.  However,  what  is  important   is   that
immediately thereafter it is clarified that  this  general  rule  would  not
apply in certain circumstances.  Sub-para of the above takes  things  beyond
the pale of any doubt by making  it  crystal  clear  that  those  parts  and
accessories  which  in  themselves  constitute  'article'  falling  in   any
particular heading of this Chapter, the general  rule  will  not  apply  and
said article would fall in that particular heading.   To  demonstrate  this,
examples which are given, eminently fit into the case at hand.

The  aforesaid  view  of  ours  gets  further  cemented  on  going   through
Explanatory Notes issued by the World Customs  Organization.   Volume  4  of
the  Second  Edition  (1996),  which   covers   Chapters   85-97,   contains
explanatory note in respect of item mentioned at 90.13, with  which  we  are
directly concerned herein.  Relevant portion thereof reads as under:
“90.13 – LIQUID CRYSTAL DEVICES NOT CONSTITUTING ARTICLES PROVIDED FOR  MORE
SPECIFICALLY IN OTHER HEADINGS:  LASERS,  OTHER  THAN  LASER  DIODES;  OTHER
OPTICAL APPLIANCES AND INSTRUMENTS, NOT SPECIFIED OR INCLUDED  ELSEWHERE  IN
THIS CHAPTER.

|9013.10  |- |Telescopic sights for fitting to    |
|         |  |arms; periscopes; telescopes        |
|         |  |designed to form parts of machines, |
|         |  |appliances, instruments or apparatus|
|         |  |of this Chapter or Section XVI      |
|         |  |                                    |
|9013.20  |- |Lasers, other than laser diodes     |
|         |  |                                    |
|9013.80  |- |Other devices, appliances and       |
|         |  |instruments                         |
|         |  |                                    |
|9013.90  |- |Parts and accessories               |

In  accordance  with  Chapter  Note  5,  measuring   or   checking   optical
appliances, instruments and machines are  excluded  from  this  heading  and
fall  in  heading  90.31.   Chapter  Note  4,  however,  classifies  certain
refracting telescopes in this heading and not in heading 90.05.  It  should,
moreover, be noted that optical instruments  and  appliances  can  fall  not
only in headings 90.01 to 90.12 but also in other headings of  this  Chapter
(in particular, heading 90.15, 90.18 or 90.27).  This heading includes:

(1) Liquid crystal devices consisting of a liquid crystal  layer  sandwiched
between two sheets or plates of glass or plastics,  whether  or  not  fitted
with electrical connections, presented  in  the  piece  or  cut  to  special
shapes and not constituting articles described more  specifically  in  other
headings of the Nomenclature.

                         xx          xx         xx”

                 As per this,  LCD  would  be  covered  by  'other  devices'
mentioned in 9013.80.  That is precisely the case of the appellant.


The upshot of the aforesaid discussion leads  to  the  conclusion  that  the
view taken by the Tribunal in the  impugned  judgment  is  unsustainable  in
law.  We, thus, allow the appeal, set aside the orders  of  the  authorities
below and hold that LCDs imported by the appellant were  classifiable  under
Chapter Heading 9013.80.


                             .............................................J.
                                                                (A.K. SIKRI)



                             .............................................J.
                                                     (ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN)

NEW DELHI;
MAY 05, 2015.
-----------------------
[1]

      1997 (94) ELT 543
[2]   (2005) 3 SCC 51
[3]   (2005) 12 SCC 284

The High Court allowed the writ petition and recorded as follows:- “Now, we are called upon to decide whether language of the qualification clause is a mandatory character or not. We are of the view that this clause is mandatory in all sense since words “must have” used in the said notification in clear terms it indicate so. Hence, going thereby first preference shall be given to all the candidates having qualification of Shorthand English by higher grade and in the event no candidate is available from higher grade, next lower grade candidate has to be considered. To be very specific, no initiative shall be made to invite any application from the candidates possessing qualification of English Shorthand by lower grade, until required number of candidates having qualification of Shorthand by lower grade is found to be unsuitable. Thus, at the first instance, respondent no. 3 was not eligible to be considered when a number of Shorthand English by higher-grade candidates were found being considered. Selection ought to have been kept confined to candidates having qualification of English Stenography by higher grade, after having found non-suitability amongst those candidates, candidates of the category of third respondent should have been invited.” 7. We regret to say that it is rather difficult to understand the substance of the above extracted para, we hazard a guess that in substance, the High Court held that so long as the candidates who have passed the English Shorthand Higher Grade Examination are available, candidates with shorthand lower grade can not be considered. 8. There is no finding by the High Court that suitable candidates with Shorthand higher grade are available. If the procedure required by the High Court was to be followed, there would be avoidable wastage of time. 9. On the other hand, learned counsel for the appellant pointed to the copy of the answer script of the first respondent herein. It consists of innumerable errors. We only hope that it is not the desire of the High Court that such candidates are required to be appointed merely because they have the higher grade qualification. In the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the selection process should not have been interfered with.

                                                              NON-REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  4201 OF 2015
               (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 12662 of 2014)


K. Radhika                                   …..Appellant

            Versus

T. Rajya Laxmi & Others                            …..Respondents





                             J U D G M E N T



Chelameswar, J.

1.    Leave granted.


2.    All the respondents have been served but none appears  for  anyone  of
the respondents.

3.    Aggrieved by a judgment of the  Andhra  Pradesh  High  Court  in  Writ
Petition No. 37437 of 2012 dated  2nd  April,  2014,  the  third  respondent
therein preferred the appeal.

4.    The facts leading to the impugned judgment are as follows:

      On 27.12.2011,  a  notification  was  issued  by  the  office  of  the
Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad inviting applications to  fill  up  5
posts of the Personal Assistants by  direct  recruitment  in  A.P.  Judicial
Ministerial Service, in the unit of Metropolitan Sessions Judge,  Hyderabad.
The notification prescribed the following qualifications:-
“1.   Must have passed Intermediate  Examination  conducted  by  A.P.  State
Board of Intermediate Education or any equivalent Examination.

2.    Must have passed A.P.  Government  Technical  Examination  in  English
Shorthand by Higher Grade, provided that if candidates, who have passed  the
examination by the Higher Grade are not available,  those  who  have  passed
the examination by Lower Grade will be considered.

3.    Must have passed Typewriting examination in English  by  Higher  Grade
conducted by the State  Board  of  Technical  Education  and  Training  A.P.
Hyderabad.

4.    Preference  will  be  given  to  the  persons,  who  possess  Computer
knowledge.”

5.    44 candidates applied in response to the notification.  The  selection
process consisted of a written examination followed  by  an  interview.   In
the said selection process, the appellant was declared selected.

6.    Challenging the selection  of  the  appellant,  the  first  respondent
herein filed the above-mentioned  writ  petition  on  the  ground  that  the
appellant herein was having only the  qualification  of  a  lower  grade  in
shorthand whereas the first respondent  herein  passed  the  examination  in
English shorthand by higher grade  and,  therefore,  the  selection  of  the
appellant is contrary to the selection  process  and  arbitrary.   The  High
Court allowed the writ petition and recorded as follows:-
“Now, we are called upon to decide whether  language  of  the  qualification
clause is a mandatory character or not.   We  are  of  the  view  that  this
clause is mandatory in all sense since words “must have” used  in  the  said
notification in clear terms it indicate  so.   Hence,  going  thereby  first
preference shall be given to all  the  candidates  having  qualification  of
Shorthand English  by  higher  grade  and  in  the  event  no  candidate  is
available  from  higher  grade,  next  lower  grade  candidate  has  to   be
considered.  To be very specific, no initiative shall be made to invite  any
application  from  the  candidates  possessing  qualification   of   English
Shorthand by  lower  grade,  until  required  number  of  candidates  having
qualification of Shorthand by lower grade is found to be unsuitable.   Thus,
at the first instance, respondent no. 3 was not eligible  to  be  considered
when a number of Shorthand English by  higher-grade  candidates  were  found
being considered.  Selection ought to have been kept confined to  candidates
having qualification of English Stenography by higher  grade,  after  having
found non-suitability amongst those candidates, candidates of  the  category
of third respondent should have been invited.”


7.    We regret to say  that  it  is  rather  difficult  to  understand  the
substance of the above extracted para, we hazard a guess that in  substance,
the High Court held that so long as  the  candidates  who  have  passed  the
English Shorthand Higher Grade Examination are  available,  candidates  with
shorthand lower grade can not be considered.

8.    There is no finding by the High Court that  suitable  candidates  with
Shorthand higher grade are available.  If  the  procedure  required  by  the
High Court was to be followed, there would be avoidable wastage of time.

9.    On the other hand, learned counsel for the appellant  pointed  to  the
copy of the answer script of the first respondent  herein.  It  consists  of
innumerable errors.   We only hope that it is not the  desire  of  the  High
Court that such candidates are required to be appointed merely because  they
have the higher grade qualification.    In the circumstances, we are of  the
opinion that the selection process should not have been interfered with.





10.   We, therefore, allow the appeal  and  set  aside  the  judgment  under
appeal.  No costs.

                                         …................................J.
                                             (J. Chelameswar)


                                           …….............................J.
                                                      (Adarsh Kumar Goel)

New Delhi
May 5, 2015



-----------------------
5


Tuesday, May 5, 2015

Suit for specific performance / refund of amount - Plaintiff deposited nearly 78 lakhs as earnest money -balance is to be paid with in 3 months from date of acceptance - due to uncertain events requested for extention of time - Defendant appointed two committees for studying both committees recommended for extention of time - pending consideration of recommendations - issued a letter of cancellation dated 6.10.1993 and consequent forfeiture of earnest money was made without putting the appellant on notice that it has to deposit the balance 75% premium of the plot within a certain stated time. -Single judge decreed the suit for refund of earnest money as the property was re auctioned for more than 3 1/2 times value pending suit -Division Bench reversed the order - Apex court held that In the absence of such notice, there is no breach of contract on the part of the appellant and consequently earnest money cannot be forfeited. and further held that like Sections 73 and 75 of Indian Contract Act , compensation is payable for breach of contract under Section 74 only where damage or loss is caused by such breach.- where as in this case defendant fetched good value than sold earlier - Hence the defendant can not forfeit the amount and is liable to refund the same - allowed the appeal and dismissed the order of Division Bench and restored the order of Single Judge - 2015 S.C. MSKLAWREPORTS


 As  per  the  terms  and
conditions  of  the  auction,  the  appellant,  being  the  highest  bidder,
deposited a sum of Rs.78,00,000/- (Rupees Seventy Eight  Lakhs),  being  25%
of the bid amount, with the DDA, this being earnest money  under  the  terms
of the conditions of auction.
as per the one of the terms
(iv) In case of default, breach or non-compliance of any of  the  terms  and
conditions of the auction  or  mis  -representation  by  the  bidder  and/or
intending purchaser, the earnest money shall be forfeited.

within 3 months  thereof,  pay  to  the  Delhi  Development  Authority,  the
balance 75% amount of the bid...

 On 18.2.1982, the  DDA  acknowledged  the  receipt  of  Rs.78,00,000/-
(Rupees Seventy Eight Lakhs), accepted the appellant's bid and directed  the
appellant to deposit the remaining 75% by 17.5.1982.  
However, as there  was
a general recession in the industry, the  appellant  and  persons  similarly
placed made representations sometime in May, 1982  for  extending  the  time
for payment of the  remaining  amount

High  Powered  Committee  recommended  that  the  time  for
payment be extended and specifically mentioned the  appellant's  name  as  a
person who should be given more time to pay  the  balance  amount.  
 Despite
the fact that on 14.5.1984 the  DDA  accepted  the  recommendations  of  the
second High Powered Committee, nothing  happened  till  1.12.1987.  
Several
letters had been written by the appellant to DDA from 1984 to  1987  but  no
answer was forthcoming by the DDA.

The appellant then filed a suit for specific performance on  17.2.1994
and in the alternative for recovery of damages and recovery of  the  earnest
amount of Rs.78,00,000/- (Rupees Seventy Eight Lakhs).  
 Shortly  after  the
suit was filed, on  23.2.1994,  the  DDA  re-auctioned  the  premises  which
fetched a sum  of  Rs.11.78  Crores  (Rupees  Eleven  Crores  Seventy  Eight
Lakhs).

The learned Single Judge by  a  judgment  and  order  dated  10.9.2007
dismissed the appellant's suit for  specific  performance  and  damages  but
ordered refund of the earnest money forfeited together  with  9%  per  annum
interest.

 The present case is one where defendant no.1 has not even  suffered  a
loss.  
The plot was to be purchased by the plaintiff at Rs.3.12  crores  and
it was finally sold to a third party at Rs.11.78 crores, i.e.  almost  three
and a half times the price. 
 During this period defendant no.1 continued  to
enjoy the earnest money of the plaintiff of Rs.78.00 lacs.

 It is in view thereof that  the  matter  went  as
far as setting up of two committees to repeatedly examine the matter and  to
come to a conclusion.  The case of defendant  no.1  was  that  the  material
produced by the plaintiff and such similar persons gave rise to a  cause  to
extend the time  for  making  the  payment  subject  to  certain  terms  and
conditions. 

In view of the  prolonged  period,  exchange  of  communications,  the
plaintiff making various offers but not complying with  the  initial  terms,
defendant no.1 taking its own time in the decision making process, I  am  of
the considered view that the plaintiff is entitled  to  the  refund  of  the
earnest money of Rs.78.00 lacs but no further amount is liable  to  be  paid
to the plaintiff."

 DDA appealed against the Single Judge's judgment to a  Division  Bench
of the Delhi High Court.  
The Division Bench set aside the judgment  of  the
Single Judge holding that the forfeiture of the earnest  money  by  the  DDA
was in order.

It now remains to deal with the  impugned  judgment  of  the  Division
Bench.

  The Division Bench followed the judgment of Tilley v. Thomas, (1867  3
Ch.A 61) and distinguished the judgment in Webb v. Hughes, V.C.M. 1870.   It
further went on to follow Anandram Mangturam v. Bholaram Tanumal,  ILR  1946
Bom 218 and held:
"The decision holds that the principle of law is that where,  by  agreement,
time is made of the essence of the  contract,  it  cannot  be  waived  by  a
unilateral act of a party and unless there is consensus ad-idem between  the
parties and a new date is agreed to, merely because a party  to  a  contract
agrees to consider time being extended for the opposite  party  to  complete
the contract, but ultimately refuses to accord concurrence  would  not  mean
that the party has by conduct waived the date originally agreed as being  of
the essence of the contract." (At para 32)

 In our judgment, Webb's case would directly apply to the  facts  here.
In that case, it was held:
  "But if time be made the essence of the contract, that may  be  waived  by
the conduct of the purchaser; and if the time is once allowed to  pass,  and
the parties go on negotiating for completion of the purchase, then  time  is
no longer of the essence of the contract.  But, on the other hand,  it  must
be borne in mind that a purchaser is not bound to wait an  indefinite  time;
and if he finds, while the negotiations are going on, that a long time  will
elapse before the contract can be completed, he may in a  reasonable  manner
give notice to the vendor, and fix a period at which the business is  to  be
terminated."

 Based on the facts of this case,  the  Single  Judge  was  correct  in
observing that the letter of cancellation  dated  6.10.1993  and  consequent
forfeiture of earnest money  was  made  without  putting  the  appellant  on
notice that it has to deposit the balance 75% premium of the plot  within  a
certain stated time.  In the absence of such notice, there is no  breach  of
contract on the part of the appellant and consequently earnest money  cannot
be forfeited.

 in S. Brahmanand v. K.R. Muthugopal, (2005) 12 SCC 764 the
Supreme Court held:
"34. Thus, this was a situation where the original  agreement  of  10-3-1989
had a "fixed date" for performance, but by the subsequent  letter  of  18-6-
1992 the defendants made a request  for  postponing  the  performance  to  a
future date without fixing  any  further  date  for  performance.  This  was
accepted by the plaintiffs by their act of forbearance and not insisting  on
performance forthwith. There is nothing  strange  in  time  for  performance
being extended, even though originally  the  agreement  had  a  fixed  date.
Section 63 of the Contract  Act,  1872  provides  that  every  promisee  may
extend time for the performance  of  the  contract. 
 Such  an  agreement  to
extend time need not necessarily be reduced to writing, but  may  be  proved
by oral evidence or, in some cases, even by evidence  of  conduct  including
forbearance on the part of the other party.

 We now come  to  the  reasoning  which  involves  Section  74  of  the
Contract Act.
   Section 74 occurs in Chapter 6 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872  which
reads "Of the consequences of breach of contract".
 It is in fact  sandwiched
between Sections 73 and 75 which deal with compensation for loss  or  damage
caused by breach of contract and compensation for damage which a  party  may
sustain through non-fulfillment of a contract after  such  party  rightfully
rescinds such contract.   
It is important to note that like Sections 73  and
75, compensation is payable for breach of contract  under  Section  74  only
where damage or loss is caused by such breach.

The Division Bench held:
"38. The learned Single Judge has held  that  the  property  was  ultimately
auctioned in the year 1994 at a price which fetched DDA  a  handsome  return
of Rupees 11.78 crores and there being no damages suffered by DDA, it  could
not forfeit the earnest money.

The Division Bench has gone wrong in principle.  As has  been  pointed
out above, there has been no breach of contract by the  appellant.  Further,
we cannot accept the view of the Division Bench that the fact that  the  DDA
made a profit from re-auction is irrelevant, as that would fly in  the  face
of the most  basic  principle  on  the  award  of  damages  -  namely,  that
compensation can only be given for damage or loss suffered.   If  damage  or
loss is not suffered, the law does not provide for a windfall.

The DDA  having
chosen to fight the present appellant tooth  and  nail  even  on  refund  of
earnest money, when there was no breach of contract or loss  caused  to  it,
stands on a different footing. We, therefore, turn down this plea as well.

 In the result, the appeal is allowed.  The judgment and order  of  the
Single Judge is restored.  Parties will bear their own costs. =2015 S.C. MSKLAWREPORTS