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Monday, January 19, 2015

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 97 OF 2015 [Arising out of S.L.P.(Criminal) No. 6927/2013] Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan ... Appellant (s) Versus Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke and others ... Respondent (s)



                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                      CRIMINAL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION


                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 97 OF 2015
               [Arising out of S.L.P.(Criminal) No. 6927/2013]

Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan                     ... Appellant (s)

                                   Versus

Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke and others         ... Respondent (s)


                               J U D G M E N T

KURIAN, J.:


Leave granted.


Appellant is accused no.1 in C.R. No. 3446 of 2010  of  Bund  Garden  Police
Station in the State of Maharashtra. The case is  registered  by  the  Anti-
Corruption Bureau under Sections 7, 12, 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2)  of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as  'the  PC
Act').

Genesis  is  Annexure-P7-complaint  dated  22.11.2010  given  by  the  first
respondent. According to him, he had to pay an amount of Rs.75,000/- by  way
of bribe for getting a certificate for non-agricultural use of his land.  To
quote from the complaint:

"On 5th October 2009 an advertisement of "Bharat Petroleum Corporation  Ltd.
Pune" appeared in daily Lokmat and Loksatta  newspapers.  The  advertisement
was for giving dealership of Petrol Pump. I had duly applied to the  company
Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. for the same.  As  per  the  procedure  my
interview was arranged on 30th March 2010. I was selected for this work.  As
per the terms and conditions of Bharat Petroleum Corporation  Ltd.  Pune  it
was binding on me to submit a "non agricultural certificate" of my  land  at
Pimpalsuti, Tal Shirur,  District  Pune.  To  get  the  said  certificate  I
applied to the Maval Sub Divisional Officer and  Magistrate  Pune  on  dated
9/9/2010. After the application I fulfilled all the  documents  required  as
per their demand.

      After this today on date 22/11/2010  at  11/20  a.m.  I  went  to  the
office of Maval Sub Divisional Officer and  Magistrate  Pune  for  enquiring
about the non agricultural certificate which I had not received  till  then.
That time I met the clerk Shri Suhas Soma. He asked me to  meet  clerk  Shri
Landge. When I  personally  met  Shri  Langde  he  asked  me  to  meet  Shri
Sanjaysingh Chavan Sub Divisional Officer Maval. As  per  that  I  met  Shri
Sanjaysingh Chavan Sub divisional Officer Maval personally  in  his  office.
At that  time  he  asked  me  the  reason  as  to  why  I  require  the  non
agricultural land certificate. I told him the  reason  of  petrol  pump  and
also told him the area of land. After that he asked me  to  meet  the  clerk
Suhas Soma. After I went out of his office, he called his clerk  Suhas  Soma
in his cabin. After Shri Soma came out of the cabin he  asked  me  "At  what
extent you are ready to pay?". At that time I asked him "What  will  be  the
amount of challan?". That time he said that "Challan amount  is  meager,  an
additional amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- will have to be  paid  as  practice.  If
your matter was for house then I would have  requested  the  boss  for  less
amount. But as you are  going  to  do  business  you  should  not  have  any
objection to  pay  Rs.1,00,000/-.  At  that  time  I  requested  the  Office
Superintendent Mr. Soma that "this amount is huge, some concession be  given
to me". On that a compromise was made between me and him and he demanded  an
amount of Rs.75,000/- as a bribe."



 On the basis of the above complaint, the vigilance  arranged  a  trap.  The
First Information Report narrates the events as follows:
"As the complaint filed by the complainant Mr. Dattatraya  Phalke  is  of  a
crime which comes under Anti Corruption Act and  as  we  are  authorized  to
take cognizance of such crime on the basis of complaint filed by Mr.  Phalke
by deciding to arrange for a trap for arresting Mr.  Chavan,  Sub-Divisional
Officer and Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sub  Division  Maval,  Pune  and  Mr.
Soma, Office Superintendent  (Shirastedar),  Sub  Divisional  Office,  Maval
Pune while taking bribe from complainant Mr. Phalke and for that purpose  by
giving a written letter to  the  Hon'ble  Medical  Superintendent,  Regional
Mental Hospital, Yerawada, Pune from their office, the services  of  1)  Dr.
Amol Ranganath Jadhav, age 25 years,  Occupation-Service-  Medical  Officer,
Regional Mental Hospital, Yerawada, Pune-6, residing at C-43, B. J.  Medical
College Hostel, Near Collector Office, Pune-48, 2)  Dr.  Sham  Bandu  Badse,
age  55  years,  Occupation-Service,  Medical   Officer,   Regional   Mental
Hospital,  Yerawada,  Pune-6,  residing  at  Sunderban   Sadan,   Nandanwan,
Lohagon, Pune-48, got available as the Panch witnesses. The complainant  and
the Panch witnesses were introduced to each other. The  complaint  filed  by
the complainant was briefly stated to the Panchas. Accordingly, we gave  the
complaint filed by the complainant for reading to panch witnesses and  after
getting assured that the same is correct, they signed below it.  Thereafter,
it was unanimously decided to verify the complaint filed by the  complainant
Mr. Phalke in connection with  the  bribe  demanded  by  the  Sub-Divisional
Officer  and  Sub-Divisional  Magistrate,  Sub  Division  Maval,  Pune   Mr.
Sanjaysingh Chavan and Office Superintendent (Shirastedar).
      Thereafter on 22/11/2010 at 16.30  o'clock,  myself,  complainant  Mr.
Phalke, aforesaid two panchas,  Police  Inspector  Mr.  B.R.  Patil,  Police
inspector Shri Belsare from  the  office  of  Anti  Corruption  Bureau  came
walking via Sadhu Waswani Chowk and  went  to  new  administration  Building
Pune-1. At that time,  we  started  voice  recorder  from  our  custody  and
suppressed it and its mike below the shirt of complainant  and  started  the
recording button of the same. Thereafter as per  our  instructions,  firstly
complainant Mr. Phalke and Panch No. 1 Mr. Jadhav went to the office of  the
Sub-Divisional Officer and Sub-Divisional Magistrate,  Sub  Division  Maval,
Pune which is in the New Administrative building. Immediately  behind  them,
myself, Pancha No. 2 Mr. Bedase  and  police  officer  and  employees  stood
separately around the office of Sub-Divisional  Officer  and  Sub-Divisional
Magistrate Maval, Sub Division Pune so that no  doubt  will  be  created  to
anyone. After half an hour from the said place, complainant Shri Phalke  and
panch No.1 Mr. Jadhav came out. Thereafter, we all came back from  there  to
Pune Office of Anti  Corruption  Bureau.  After  coming  back  to  the  said
office, we took out the  recording  machine  placed  upon  complainant  Shri
Phalke and closed its button of recording and heard along with  the  panchas
the conversation which took  place  among  complainant  Mr.  Phalke,  public
servant Mr. Chavan and Mr. Soma and it revealed that the public servant  Mr.
Chavan and Mr.  Soma  have  demanded  a  bribe  of  Rs.  75,000/-  from  the
complainant  Mr.  Phalke.  With  the  consent   of   myself,   panchas   and
complainant,  it  was  decided  to  take  further  action   on   23/11/2010.
Accordingly, the  complainant  and  aforesaid  panchas  were  instructed  to
remain present  in  the  office  of  the  Anti-Corruption  Bureau,  Pune  on
23/11/2010 at 10.00 o'clock in the morning.
      On 23/11/2010 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning the  aforesaid  panchas,
complainant Mr. Phalke  appeared  in  the  Pune  office  of  Anti-Corruption
Bureau. Thereafter, the list of all the valuable things which were with  the
complainant Mr. Phalke was made. The complainant and panch  wintnesses  were
informed  about  the  Anthrasin  powder  and  ultraviolet  light   and   its
demonstration was also shown. Anthrasin powder was applied to all the  notes
of amount Rs. 75,000/- presented by the complainant for giving it  as  bribe
and the said notes were folded and kept in the  right  side  pocket  of  the
complainant's pant. Mr. S.K.  Satpute,  Police/614,  who  applied  Anthrasin
powder to the notes and who showed demonstration were  eliminated  from  the
action of trap. The detailed instructions were  given  to  panch  witnesses,
complainant and other officers/staff from team of trap regarding the  action
of trap. Accordingly, a  detailed  pre-trap  panchanama  was  drawn  in  our
office. The trap was arranged on 23/11/2010 at the office of  Sub-Divisional
Officer and Sub Divisional Magistrate Maval, Pune,  Sub-Division  1  in  the
new administration building when at about 12.02  o'clock  afternoon  in  the
presence of panch No.1 Mr. Jadhav,  the  public  servant  Mr.  Suhas  Ramesh
Soma, age 46 years,  Office  Superintendent  (Shirastedar),  Sub  Divisional
Office  Maval,  Sub  Division  Pune,  demanded  the  amount  of  bribe  from
complainant Mr. Phalke and personally opened the drawer  No.2  which  is  on
the right hand side of his table and asked complainant Mr.  Phalke  to  keep
the amount in it. Accordingly, as  complainant  Mr.  Phalke  kept  the  said
amount in the said drawer  the  public  servant  Mr.  Soma  was  caught  red
handed. When the documents/papers which came in contact of the bribe  amount
were examined in the lamp of ultraviolet light, then the faint bluish  shine
of anthrasin powder was seen upon it.   The  numbers  of  notes  from  bribe
amount were compared with the numbers of notes  mentioned  in  the  pre-trap
panchanama.  It was seen that they are  absolutely  accurate  with  all  the
numbers of notes mentioned in the pre-trap panchnama. As the said amount  of
bribe is the same  amount  which  public  servant  Mr.  Soma  received  from
complainant Mr. Phalke and as the shining of anthrasin powder  was  seen  on
it, the same  was  seized  and  sealed  in  presence  of  panchas.  All  the
conversations regarding demand  of  bribe  amount  between  complainant  Mr.
Phalke, public servant Shri Chavan and Soma was recorded and  it  was  heard
in the presence of panchas and its script was prepared and its  mention  has
been made in panchanama. Likewise, when an enquiry was made with Panch  No.1
Mr. Jadhav he told that public servant Mr. Soma personally said that he  has
received  the  said  amount  of  bribe  as  per  the  instructions  of   Mr.
Sanjaysingh Ramrao Chavan, age 44 years,  Sub-Divisional  Officer  and  Sub-
Divisional Magistrate, Maval Sub Division Pune. A detailed Panchnama of  all
the incidences which took place at  the  time  of  trap  was  drawn  in  the
presence of panchas and the copy of the same was  given  to  public  servant
Shri Sanjaysingh Chavan and Suhas Soma and their signatures were  obtained."



The investigating officer submitted his report under Section 173(2)  of  the
Code of Criminal  Procedure,  1973  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  "Cr.PC")
though wrongly mentioned as 169 Cr.PC. To quote from the closure report:

"From overall investigation  of  the  said  crime  and  from  documents  and
evidence received, for filing case under  Section  7,  12,  13(1)  (D)  r/w.
13(2) of Prevention of  Corruption  Act,  1988  as  per  the  provisions  in
Confidential Circular  No.CDR/1099/Pra.Kra.62/99/11-A  dated  03/04/2000  of
the Maharashtra Government,  General  Administration,  against  the  Accused
public servant herein (1)  Shri  Sanjaysinh  Ramrao  Chavan,  Sub-Divisional
Officer and Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Maval  Sub-Division,  District  Pune,
(2) Shri Suhas  Ramesh  Soma,  Awal  Karkoon  (Shirastedar),  Sub-Divisional
Officer Office, Maval Sub-Division, Pune, when report was submitted  by  the
then Investigating Officer Shri  P.B.  Dhanvat,  Assistant  Commissioner  of
Police, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau,  Pune  vide
outward No.PBG/ACP/DSP/ACB/Pune/2011-283 dated 21/02/2011  to  the  Director
General, Anti-Corruption  Bureau,  Maharashtra  State,  Mumbai  through  the
Deputy Commissioner  of  Police/Superintendent  of  Police,  Anti-Corruption
Bureau, Pune for writing to the  Competent  Officer  Maharashtra  Government
(Revenue  and  Forests)  Mantralaya,  Mumbai,  of  APS  for  obtaining  pre-
prosecution approval/sanction as required under Section 19 of Prevention  of
Corruption    Act,    1988,    and    the    Deputy    Superintendent     of
Police/Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Pune has  vide  his
Outward No.CR/438/Pune/2010-1591 dated 20/05/2011 sent such  report  to  the
Director General, Anti-Corruption Bureau, M.S.  Mumbai,  after  scrutinizing
the investigation documents  of  the  crime,  the  Director  General,  Anti-
Corruption Bureau, Maharashtra State, Mumbai  has  issued  orders  vide  his
Order No.CR/438/Pune/2010-4812 dated 03/06/2011  that  "since  there  is  no
evidence available to the extent of filing  charge-sheet  against  APS  Shri
Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan,  Sub-Divisional  Officer  and  Magistrate,  Maval,
District Pune in the said trap case, decision is taken not  to  file  charge
sheet against him and by taking legal action against him, for preparing  and
sending proposal of Departmental Inquiry to the Competent Officer and  since
evidence is available against APS  Shri  Suhas  Ramesh  Soma,  Awal  Karkoon
(Shirastedar), Sub-Divisional Officer Office, Maval, District  Pune,  orders
are  issued  for  submitting  pre-prosecution  sanction  proposal   to   his
Competent Officer for filing prosecution in  Competent  Court  against  him.
The  said  Orders  are  received   vide   O.No.CR/438/Pune/2010-1846   dated
09/06/2011 of the Deputy Commissioner of  Police/Superintendent  of  Police,
Anti-Corruption Bureau, Pune and  Xerox  copy  of  abovementioned  order  is
submitted herewith for perusal.

Therefore, if approved, it is requested to  acquit  accused  public  servant
Shri Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan, Sub-Divisional Officer and Magistrate,  Maval
Sub-Division, Pune, (Class-1) from the said offence as per  Section  169  of
Criminal Procedure Code."



 Learned Magistrate on  15.01.2012,  after  notice  also  to  the  de  facto
complainant, accepted the closure report. To quote the relevant portion fro-
m the order:

"7.   ... Record shows that the complainant lodged report. If  complaint  is
perused, it appears that role of accused No. 1 is  to  the  effect  that  on
22.11.2010 when complainant met accused No.1, he inquired about the  purpose
for which N.A. certificate was required and  he  asked  the  complainant  to
meet accused No.2. The complaint shows the demand of  money  and  acceptance
was made by accused  No.  2.  Accused  No.  1  has  filed  bunch  of  papers
consisting of his  representation  for  false  implication,  so  also  other
relevant  papers.  He  has  placed  on  record  the  application  for   N.A.
Certificate  filed  by  the  complainant's  wife,  then  all  correspondence
between the complainant and office of the accused  No.1  to  show  that  the
application of the complainant's wife was under process. Besides  this,  the
accused No.1 has also filed copy of his leave application  showing  that  he
was on medical leave  for  six  days  from  15.11.2010  to  20.11.2010  with
permission to suffix Sunday falling on 21.11.2010. The applicant  has  filed
the tickets to show that he travelled during this period. The applicant  has
also placed on record a news item published in Daily  Lokmat  on  24.11.2010
(sic) in which it is mentioned that  when  the  amount  of  Rs.75,000/-  was
accepted, the accused No. 1 was not in his office and  it  was  accepted  by
accused No. 2 Suhas Soma.

8.    It is to be considered that Anti-Corruption Bureau  has  filed  papers
and given reasons why decision not to proceed  against  accused  No.  1  was
taken. If these papers are perused, it appears that the Director General  of
Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau has considered the relevant papers and  after
considering all aspects, passed a well-reasoned order. It is also  mentioned
that the  vague  conversation  between  the  complainant  and  accused  No.1
recorded  at  the  time  of  so-called  verification  will  not   help   the
Prosecution and there is absolutely no evidence  of  demand  and  acceptance
against the accused No.1. It cannot be said that  the  Director  General  of
Anti-Corruption Bureau did not apply his mind to the documents  before  him.
When the order was passed giving reason and, as it is a speaking  order,  it
cannot be said that the direction given by the Director General  of  Police,
Anti-Corruption Bureau for submitting report under Section  169  of  Cr.P.C.
is bad in law.

                    xxx         xxx        xxx        xxx

12.   I am well aware that in view of judgment in Vasanti  Dubey  Vs.  State
of Madhya Pradesh, the Court can discard  closure  report  and  may  proceed
under Section 190 r.w. 156 of Cr.P.C. or it may  take  cognizance  upon  the
complaint and direct inquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C. However, after  going
through the case papers, it is found that  the  authority  under  the  Anti-
Corruption Bureau has come to  the  correct  conclusion  that  there  is  no
sufficient ground to proceed against the accused No.1. As a result of  this,
I accept the report under Section 169 of Cr.P.C.

The proceedings  against  accused  No.1  are  closed  and  accused  No.1  is
discharged."



Dissatisfied, the first respondent - de facto  complainant,  approached  the
High Court in Revision leading to the impugned judgment. The High Court  set
aside the order passed by the learned Magistrate and directed  the  Director
General of Police to forward the request for  sanction  for  prosecution  to
the competent authority. The trial court was also  directed  to  follow  the
legal course in the matter. To quote paragraphs-10 to  15  of  the  impugned
judgment:

"4.     The   crux   of   the   matter   is,   the   conversation    between
complainant/applicant and accused no.1 on 22.11.2010  was  recorded  by  the
applicant as was directed by the Investigating Agency, which  clearly  prima
facie reveals demand by accused-respondent no.1.

                    xxx         xxx        xxx        xxx

10.   The  legal  Advisor  has  presumably  a  legal  knowledge,  could  not
adversely comment on supplementary statement  of  the  complainant  recorded
during the trap, as the supplementary statement is signed by panch  witness.
He could have, prima facie, indicated his legal knowledge  in  proper  frame
which is lacking. He has no business at the end  of  report  to  write  that
case against accused no. 2 is weak, as this report could  be  flashed,  used
and raised as a defence by the concerned in the prosecution.  Such  unwanted
effort will frustrate and fracture the prosecution.
11.    Affidavit  of  Shri.  Hemant  V.Bhat  though  supports  the  accused-
respondent, however, he should have also equally gone  through  the  papers,
he had no reason to accept the doubtful  findings  of  CFSL  in  respect  of
recorded conversation between the complainant and  accused-respondent  no.1.
He has given reference to the Manual. There should not  be  contest  to  the
Manual, however, it has been  twisted  for  the  benefits  of  the  accused-
respondent no.1.
12.   The learned Special Judge, basically travelled through the  report  or
the opinion of the Advocate which was  not  expected.  He  was  swayed  away
himself by accepting the defences. He should have gone through the  root  of
the matter, applied his  mind.  There  should  not  be  dearth  to  a  legal
thought. He could have seen brazen  attempt  of  a  colourable  exercise  of
power by a mighty officer, but the learned Special Judge missed the track.
13.   Reference to the Judgment  of  "Vasanti  Dubey  Vs.  State  of  Madhya
Pradesh ((2012)2 SCC 731)", was certainly misplaced. In the  said  case  the
Judge dealing with the matter was  frustrated  by  the  persistent  negative
report furnished by the police. However, on appreciation  of  material,  the
Supreme Court recorded, already  there  were  findings  of  Lokayukta  of  a
particular State of no material against the said accused. The learned  Judge
should not have ignored this aspect.
14.   The Hon'ble Supreme Court in  the  matter  of  "State  of  Maharashtra
Through CBI Vs. Mahesh G. Jain" in Criminal Appeal no. 2345 of 2009  decided
on May 28, 2013 also indicated about the parameters concerning sanction.
15.   In the result, the order  of  the  learned  Special  Judge,  accepting
report under Section 169 of the Cr.P.C.  is  set  aside.  The  report  under
Section 169 of Cr.P.C.  is  rejected.  The  learned  Special  Judge  or  the
Investigator to follow the legal  course  in  the  matter.  Learned  DGP  to
forward case papers to appropriate Sanctioning Authority to pass  orders  in
accordance with law. Observations are prima facie in nature."


Heard learned counsel appearing for  the  parties.  Learned  Senior  Counsel
submits that the appellant has unblemished service since  1995  and  he  has
been falsely implicated in this case so as to tarnish his  image  and  spoil
his career. The legal advisor in the Anti-Corruption Bureau  was  a  retired
Judge of the special court for trying offences under the PC Act, and on  his
legal advice only, the Director General of Police  came  to  the  conclusion
that there was no  ground  for  proceeding  against  the  appellant.  It  is
further submitted that  the  Magistrate  of  competent  jurisdiction,  after
going through the entire records and having taken an informed  decision  not
to proceed against the  appellant,  the  High  Court  is  not  justified  in
setting aside the said order merely because another view is  also  possible.
Learned Counsel for the respondents on the other hand submit that  the  High
Court in revision was fully justified in looking  into  the  merits  of  the
case and directing to  proceed  against  the  appellant.  Whether  there  is
evidence so as to ultimately enter conviction is not what is required to  be
seen at the time of taking cognizance; what  is  required  is  only  to  see
whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding in the case.

At the outset, we make it clear that wherever the reference is made  by  the
investigating officer or the courts to 169 Cr.PC, the same has  to  be  read
as a reference to Section 173 Cr.PC. Section  169  Cr.PC  provides  for  the
release of the accused when evidence is deficient,  whereas  the  report  on
completion of investigation is under Section 173 Cr.PC. For easy  reference,
we may quote the relevant provision:

"169. Release of accused when evidence deficient.-If, upon an  investigation
under this Chapter, it appears to  the  officer  in  charge  of  the  police
station that there  is  no  sufficient  evidence  or  reasonable  ground  of
suspicion to justify the forwarding of the accused  to  a  Magistrate,  such
officer shall, if such person is in custody, release him on his executing  a
bond, with or without sureties, as such officer may direct,  to  appear,  if
and when so required, before a Magistrate empowered to  take  cognizance  of
the offence on a police report, and to try the accused  or  commit  him  for
trial."



What is submitted by the investigating officer on 05.07.2011 is  in  fact  a
report on completion of investigation under Section 173 Cr.PC.

Two questions arise for consideration:

i.    Once the Magistrate of competent jurisdiction, on  proper  application
of mind, decides to accept the closure report submitted by the police  under
Section 173(2) Cr.PC, whether the High Court is justified in  setting  aside
the same in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction merely  because  another
view may be possible?

ii.   Whether the High Court  is  within  its  jurisdiction  to  direct  the
investigating officer to make a request for sanction  for  prosecution  from
the competent authority?

At the stage of taking cognizance of a case what is to be  seen  is  whether
there is sufficient ground for taking judicial notice of an offence  with  a
view to initiate further  proceedings.  In  S.K.  Sinha,  Chief  Enforcement
Officer v.  Videocon  International  Ltd.  and  others[1],  this  Court  has
analysed the process and it has been held as follows:

"19. The expression "cognizance" has not been defined in the Code.  But  the
word (cognizance) is of indefinite import. It  has  no  esoteric  or  mystic
significance in criminal law. It merely means "become  aware  of"  and  when
used with reference to a court or a Judge, it connotes "to  take  notice  of
judicially". It indicates the point when  a  court  or  a  Magistrate  takes
judicial notice of an  offence  with  a  view  to  initiate  proceedings  in
respect of such offence said to have been committed by someone.
20. "Taking cognizance" does not involve any formal action of any  kind.  It
occurs as soon as a Magistrate applies his mind to the suspected  commission
of an offence.  Cognizance  is  taken  prior  to  commencement  of  criminal
proceedings. Taking of cognizance is  thus  a  sine  qua  non  or  condition
precedent for holding a valid trial. Cognizance is taken of an  offence  and
not of an offender. Whether or not a Magistrate has taken cognizance  of  an
offence depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and no  rule  of
universal application can be laid down as to when a Magistrate can  be  said
to have taken cognizance."



The above view has been further endorsed in Bhushan  Kumar  and  another  v.
State (NCT of Delhi) and another[2] holding that:

"11. In Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon  International  Ltd.  (SCC  p.
499, para 19) the expression "cognizance" was explained  by  this  Court  as
[pic]"it merely means 'become aware of' and when used with  reference  to  a
court or a Judge, it connotes 'to take notice of judicially'.  It  indicates
the point when a court or a Magistrate takes judicial notice of  an  offence
with a view to initiating proceedings in respect of  such  offence  said  to
have been committed by someone." It  is  entirely  a  different  thing  from
initiation of proceedings; rather it  is  the  condition  precedent  to  the
initiation of proceedings by the Magistrate  or  the  Judge.  Cognizance  is
taken of cases and not of persons. Under Section 190 of the Code, it is  the
application of  judicial  mind  to  the  averments  in  the  complaint  that
constitutes cognizance. At this stage, the Magistrate has  to  be  satisfied
whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding and not whether  there  is
sufficient ground for conviction.  Whether  the  evidence  is  adequate  for
supporting the conviction can be determined only at the  trial  and  not  at
the stage of enquiry. If there is sufficient ground for proceeding then  the
Magistrate is empowered for issuance of process under  Section  204  of  the
Code."


In Smt. Nagawwa  v.  Veeranna  Shivalingappa  Kinjalgi  and  others[3],  the
extent to which the Magistrate can go at the stage of taking cognizance  has
been discussed. To quote:

"5. ... It is true that in coming to a decision  as  to  whether  a  process
should be  issued  the  Magistrate  can  take  into  consideration  inherent
improbabilities appearing on the face of the complaint or  in  the  evidence
led by the complainant in support of the allegations but  there  appears  to
be a very thin line of demarcation between a probability  of  conviction  of
the accused and establishment  of  a  prima  facie  case  against  him.  The
Magistrate has been given an undoubted discretion  in  the  matter  and  the
discretion has to be judicially exercised by him. Once  the  Magistrate  has
exercised his discretion it is not for the High Court, or even  this  Court,
to substitute its own discretion for that of the Magistrate  or  to  examine
the case on merits with a view to find out whether or  not  the  allegations
in the complaint, if proved, would  ultimately  end  in  conviction  of  the
accused. ..."


Cognizance is a process where the court takes judicial notice of an  offence
so as to initiate proceedings in respect of the alleged  violation  of  law.
The offence is investigated by the police. No doubt, the court is not  bound
by the report submitted by the police under Section 173(2) of Cr.PC. If  the
report is that no case is made out,  the  Magistrate  is  still  free,  nay,
bound, if a case according to him is made out,  to  reject  the  report  and
take cognizance. It is also open  to  him  to  order  further  investigation
under  Section  173(8)  of  Cr.PC.  In  the  case  before  us,  the  learned
Magistrate went through the entire records of the case, not limiting to  the
report filed by the police and has passed a reasoned order holding  that  it
is not a fit case to take cognizance for the purpose of issuing  process  to
the appellant. Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or  the
view  taken  by  the  court  is  wholly  unreasonable  or  there   is   non-
consideration of any relevant material or there is  palpable  misreading  of
records, the revisional court is not justified in setting aside  the  order,
merely because another view is possible. The revisional court is  not  meant
to  act  as  an  appellate  court.  The  whole  purpose  of  the  revisional
jurisdiction is to preserve  the  power  in  the  court  to  do  justice  in
accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence.  Revisional  power
of the court under Sections 397 to 401 of Cr.PC is not to  be  equated  with
that of an appeal. Unless the  finding  of  the  court,  whose  decision  is
sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or  untenable  in  law  or  is
grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision  is  based
on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or  where  the
judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily  or  capriciously,  the  courts
may  not  interfere  with  decision  in   exercise   of   their   revisional
jurisdiction.

The  whole  purpose  of  taking  cognizance  of  an  offence  under  Section
190(1)(b) Cr.PC is to commence proceedings under Chapter XVI  of  the  Cr.PC
by issuing process under Section 204 Cr.PC to the accused  involved  in  the
case. No doubt, it is not innocence but  involvement  that  is  material  at
this stage. Once the legal requirements to constitute  the  alleged  offence
qua one of the accused are lacking, there is no point in  taking  cognizance
and proceeding further as against him.

It is to  be  noted  that  in  the  first  complaint  filed  by  the  second
respondent - the de facto  complainant,  there  is  no  allegation  for  any
demand for bribe by the appellant. The allegation of demand is  specifically
against accused no.2 only. That allegation against the appellant  is  raised
only subsequently. Be that as it may, the  only  basis  for  supporting  the
allegation is the conversation that is said to  be  recorded  by  the  voice
recorder.  The  Directorate  of  Forensic  Science  Laboratories,  State  of
Maharashtra vide Annexure-B report has stated that the conversation  is  not
in  audible  condition  and,  hence,  the  same  is   not   considered   for
spectrographic analysis. Learned Counsel for  the  respondents  submit  that
the conversation has been translated and the same has been verified  by  the
panch  witnesses.  Admittedly,  the  panch  witnesses  have  not  heard  the
conversation, since they  were  not  present  in  the  room.  As  the  voice
recorder is itself not subjected to analysis, there is no point  in  placing
reliance  on  the  translated  version.  Without   source,   there   is   no
authenticity for the translation. Source and authenticity are  the  two  key
factors for an electronic evidence, as held by this Court in Anvar  P.V.  v.
P.K. Basheer and others[4].

The Magistrate, having seen the records and having heard  the  parties,  has
come to the conclusion that no offence is made  out  against  the  appellant
under the provisions of the PC Act so as to prosecute  him.  Even  according
to the High Court, "the crux of the matter is the conversation  between  the
complainant and the  accused  no.1  of  22.11.2010".  That  conversation  is
inaudible and the same is not to be taken in evidence. Therefore,  once  the
'crux'  goes,  the  superstructure  also  falls,  lacking  in  legs.  Hence,
prosecution becomes a futile exercise as  the  materials  available  do  not
show that an offence is made  out  as  against  the  appellant.  This  part,
unfortunately, the  High  Court  missed.  "Summoning  of  an  accused  in  a
criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be  set  into  motion
as a matter of course. ..."(Pepsi  Foods  Limited  and  another  v.  Special
Judicial  Magistrate  and  others[5],  Paragraph-28).  The  process  of  the
criminal court shall not be permitted to be used as a weapon of  harassment.
"Once it is found that there is no material on record to connect an  accused
with the crime, there is no meaning in prosecuting him. It would be a  sheer
waste of public time and  money  to  permit  such  proceedings  to  continue
against  such  a  person"(See  State  of  Karnataka  v.  L.  Muniswamy   and
others[6]. Unmerited and undeserved prosecution is an  infringement  of  the
guarantee under Article 21 of the Constitution of  India.  "...  Article  21
assures every person right to life and personal liberty. The  word  personal
liberty is of the widest amplitude covering variety of rights which goes  to
constitute personal liberty of a citizen. Its deprivation shall be  only  as
per procedure prescribed in the Code and the  Evidence  Act  conformable  to
the mandate of the Supreme law, the Constitution.  ..."(State  of  Bihar  v.
P.P. Sharma, IAS and another[7], Paragraph-60).

Once the prosecution is of the view that no  case  is  made  out  so  as  to
prosecute an accused, unless the court finds otherwise, there  is  no  point
in making a request for sanction for  prosecution.  If  the  prosecution  is
simply vexatious, sanction for prosecution is not to  be  granted.  That  is
one of the main  considerations  to  be  borne  in  mind  by  the  competent
authority while considering whether the sanction is to be  granted  or  not.
In Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat[8], this  Court  has  in
unmistakable terms made  it  clear  that  no  court  can  issue  a  positive
direction to an authority to give sanction for prosecution. To quote:


"32. By issuing a direction to the Secretary to  grant  sanction,  the  High
Court closed all other alternatives to the Secretary and  compelled  him  to
proceed only in one direction and  to  act  only  in  one  way,  namely,  to
sanction the prosecution of the appellant. The Secretary was not allowed  to
consider whether it would be feasible to prosecute  the  appellant;  whether
the complaint of Harshadrai of illegal gratification which was sought to  be
supported  by  "trap"  was  false  and  whether  the  prosecution  would  be
vexatious particularly as it was in the knowledge  of  the  Government  that
the firm had been blacklisted once and there was demand for some  amount  to
be paid to the Government by the firm in connection with this contract.  The
discretion not to sanction the prosecution was thus taken away by  the  High
Court."


The High Court exceeded in its jurisdiction in substituting  its  views  and
that too without any legal basis. The impugned order  is  hence  set  aside.
Appeal is allowed.






                                  ........................................J.
                                     (KURIAN JOSEPH)



                                    ......................................J.
                                                (ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE)
New Delhi;
January 16, 2015.
-----------------------
[1]    (2008) 2 SCC 492
[2]    (2012) 5 SCC 424
[3]    (1976) 3 SCC 736
[4]    2014 (10) SCALE 660
[5]    (1998) 5 SCC 749
[6]    (1977) 2 SCC 699
[7]    1992 Supp(1) SCC 222
[8]    (1997) 7 SCC 622

-----------------------
                                                                  REPORTABLE


CIVIL APPEAL NO.518 OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO.36433 OF 2013) SEC. TO GOV. INFORMATION PUB. REL. DEP. & ORS. ...APPELLANTS VERSUS JOHN MARIA JESUDOSS ...RESPONDENT

NON-REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.518  OF  2015
                  (ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO.36433 OF 2013)



SEC. TO GOV. INFORMATION PUB. REL. DEP. & ORS.        ...APPELLANTS

VERSUS

JOHN MARIA JESUDOSS                                       ...RESPONDENT


J U D G M E N T

ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.

1.    Leave granted.
2.    This appeal has been preferred against the judgment  and  Order  dated
15th June, 2012 passed by the High Court of Madras in  Writ  Appeal  No.1099
of 2012.
3.    The respondent was  employed  as  a  Junior  Assistant  in  Government
Central  Press  since  1988.   On  15th  February,  1995,  the  disciplinary
proceedings were initiated against him alleging that he  was  not  attending
his official duties regularly, he failed to submit the personal register  to
the Superintendent and that  he  frequently  applied  for  leave,  adversely
affecting the discipline of other co-workers.
A second charge sheet dated 28th January, 1997, was served on  him  alleging
interpolation in  the  attendance  register  falsely  showing  that  he  had
attended the office on 10th January,  1997  and  that  he  left  the  office
before time unauthorisedly.  After enquiry, the charge in the  first  charge
sheet having been proved, Order dated 17th April, 1997 was  passed  removing
him from service.  It was observed in the order that  the  appellant  failed
to submit any written explanation; enquiry report  dated  19th  March,  1996
was submitted against him; a copy whereof was sent to  him  on  24th  April,
1996 to which  he  did  not  give  any  reply.   On  appeal,  the  appellate
authority vide Order dated  1st  September,  1997,  modified  the  order  of
punishment of removal from service to  reduction  of  pay  by  five  stages.
Thereafter, vide Order dated
1st December,  1997,  the  disciplinary  authority  passed  fresh  order  of
removal from service on the basis  of  second  charge  sheet  based  on  the
alleged misconduct on 10th  January,  1997  which  charge  was  held  proved
during disciplinary enquiry.  It was observed that the order of removal  was
passed on 25th June, 1997 but the same was held in abeyance  on  account  of
pendency of appeal against Order dated
17th April, 1997.  Since Order dated 17th April, 1997 had been set aside  in
appeal and the order of removal based on the second charge sheet, which  had
been kept in abeyance, was considered necessary  to  be  issued.   The  said
order was affirmed by the appellate authority on
24th February, 1998.  Against the said order, the respondent preferred  O.A.
No.4377 of 2001 before the Tamil  Nadu  Administrative  Tribunal  which  was
transferred to the High Court on abolition of the Tamil Nadu  Administrative
Tribunal in 2007 and was  registered  as  Writ  Petition  No.4446  of  2007.
Learned single Judge of the High Court allowed the  said  writ  petition  on
21st December, 2011 with back wages and all other benefits.   The  order  of
single Judge has been affirmed by the Division Bench.
4.    We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
5.    Learned counsel for the appellant  submitted  that  interference  with
the order of removal dated 1st December,  1997  was  not  justified  on  the
assumption that the order dated 1st September, 1997 was a  bar  to  pass  an
order of removal.  The said order dated 1st September,  1997  arose  out  of
the first charge sheet  dated  15th  February,  1995  relating  to  distinct
misconduct of habitually leaving  the  office  without  any  intimation  and
frequently applying for leave.  The impugned order dated 1st December,  1997
arose out of the second charge sheet dated 28th January,  1997  relating  to
misconduct on 10th January, 1997 by leaving the  office  without  permission
and tempering of official record.
6.    Learned counsel for the respondent supported the  impugned  order  and
also submitted that even if misconduct alleged in the  second  charge  sheet
was  taken  to  be   distinct,   order   of   removal   was   shocking   and
disproportionate to the charge  and  thus,  the  order  of  the  High  Court
reinstating the respondent with back wages was fully justified.
7.    We have given anxious consideration to the rival submissions.
8.    The question for consideration is whether order dated
21st December, 2011 passed by the learned Single Judge as  affirmed  by  the
Division Bench vide impugned order dated 15th  June,  2012  reinstating  the
respondent with back wages and other benefits
is justified.
9.    It will be appropriate to reproduce the misconduct alleged in the  two
charge sheets.  The alleged misconduct in the first charge sheet dated  15th
February, 1995 is as follows :
"1. The individual is not sincere in attending the official duty  and  after
signing the attendance register habitually  leave  the  office  without  any
intimation.

2. Failure to submit the personal register to the superintendent.

3.  Frequently  applying  leave.   His  sincerity   adversely   affect   the
discipline of other co-workers."

The alleged misconduct in the second charge sheet dated 28th  January,  1997
is as follows :
"1. Indulging in correction of official records to his personal advantage.

2. On coming late to  the  office  on  10.1.1997  and  without  getting  the
permission of his superior signed the running not file  for  the  attendance
register that he has attended the office.

3. After signing the register that he has attended the office  he  went  out
of the office and never returned for the whole day."

10.   It is clear from the record that the misconduct alleged  in  both  the
charge sheets is the subject matter of separate enquiries, and was  held  to
be proved.  The first order of the  disciplinary  authority  is  dated  17th
April, 1997 while the second order of the disciplinary  authority  is  dated
1st December, 1997.  The appellate order dated 1st  September,  1997  is  in
appeal against the order dated 17th April, 1997. Thus,  there  is  error  in
assuming that order dated 1st September, 1997 became final  and  conclusive,
as  regards  the  misconduct  alleged  in  the  second  charge  sheet.   The
observations in the impugned order of learned single Judge are as follows :
"In view of the disciplinary  proceedings  attained  finality  by  an  order
dated 01.09.1997 of  the  second  respondent  modifying  the  punishment  of
dismissal into one by reinstating the petitioner  in  service  and  reducing
the pay by five stages and postponement of increment  for  five  years,  the
respondents 2 and 3 have no jurisdiction to pass the impugned orders on  the
same disciplinary proceedings.  Hence, the impugned orders are liable to  be
set aside  and  accordingly,  the  same  are  quashed.   The  petitioner  is
entitled to backwages and other benefits since he was  illegally  terminated
from service.  The respondents are  directed  to  reinstate  the  petitioner
with backwages and other benefits within a period of six (6) weeks from  the
date of receipt of a copy of this order."

The above order is clearly based on erroneous assumption  that  order  dated
1st December, 1997 was in respect of the same misconduct as was  covered  by
the order dated 1st  September,  1997.   The  fact  remains  that  both  the
orders are in respect of different misconducts.  The  finding  of  proof  of
misconduct is not  under  challenge.   Faced  with  the  situation,  learned
counsel for the respondent submitted that even if a  separate  and  distinct
misconduct is proved, the order of removal could  not  be  justified  having
regard to the nature of alleged misconduct.
11.   We are of the view that while the High Court erroneously assumed  that
the order dated 1st December, 1997 was vitiated on account  of  disciplinary
proceedings having attained finality on  the  passing  of  order  dated  1st
September, 1997, what attained  finality  was  the  disciplinary  proceeding
initiated by first charge sheet and not those  initiated  by  second  charge
sheet.  Thus, distinct  punishment  in  respect  of  misconduct  covered  by
second  charge  sheet  could  be  validly  imposed.    Thus,  the  order  of
reinstatement with back  wages  and  other  benefits  cannot  be  sustained.
However, we  do  find  merit  in  the  submission  made  on  behalf  of  the
respondent that even if distinct punishment was to be imposed, it could  not
be the order of removal.  Undoubtedly, misconduct of unauthorisedly  leaving
the office has been subject matter  of  two  independent  charge  sheets  on
different  occasions  and  on  both  occasions   the   charges   have   been
established.  There is also an allegation of tempering with the  record  but
that charge also relates to covering up of the  unauthorized  absence.   The
order of punishment of  removal  from  service  was  passed  17  years  ago.
Having regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of  the
view that  the  impugned  order  of  removal  ought  to  be  set  aside  and
substituted by order of  compulsory  retirement.   We  would  have  directed
compulsory retirement from the date of removal i.e. 1st December,  1997  but
since this may be few days earlier to  completion  of  ten  years  from  and
deprive the respondent of  proportionate  terminal  benefits,  the  date  of
compulsory retirement will be  the  date  on  completion  of  ten  years  of
service.
12.   Accordingly, this appeal  is  partly  allowed  to  the  above  extent,
substituting the order of removal by order of compulsory retirement.


                    ......................................................J.
                                  (T.S. THAKUR)



                    ......................................................J.
                                  (ADARSH KUMAR GOEL)


NEW DELHI
JANUARY 16, 2015

-----------------------


6


CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 99 OF 2015 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL) NO.1491 of 2012) MANOHAR SINGH ...APPELLANT VERSUS STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ORS. ...RESPONDENTS

NON-REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                      CRIMINAL  APPEAL NO. 99   OF 2015
                 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL) NO.1491 of 2012)


MANOHAR SINGH                                             ...APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ORS.                       ...RESPONDENTS


                               J U D G M E N T

ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.
1.    Leave granted.
2.    This appeal has been preferred against the judgment  and  order  dated
23rd November, 2011 passed by the High  Court  of  Rajasthan  at  Jaipur  in
Criminal Revision No.6 of 2009 by the complainant against the  acquittal  of
the respondents of offences other than Section 323 of the Indian Penal  Code
("IPC") and grant of  probation  to  them  setting  aside  the  sentence  of
imprisonment imposed by the trial Court. As many as 13  accused  were  tried
on the allegations that they assaulted and caused injuries to PW-5-  Manohar
Singh, appellant, Devi Singh PW-4, Maan Singh PW-11 and Karan Singh PW-1  on
29th October, 1980 at around 2 P.M. with a view to  disturb  the  possession
of the complainant party on the agricultural land in question.
3.    The trial Court convicted the accused including  respondent  Nos.2  to
11 and one Mool Singh son of Jaswant Singh who died during pendency  of  the
proceedings.  Respondent  Nos.2  to  11  were  convicted  and  sentenced  as
follows :
|Sl.N|Name of the     |Convicted and Sentence Imposed                   |
|o.  |accused         |                                                 |
|1.  |Ladu Singh      |Under Section 323 IPC to undergo RI for three    |
|    |                |months; Under Section 326 IPC to undergo RI for  |
|    |                |four years and to pay fine of Rs.2,000/- and in  |
|    |                |default to undergo further imprisonment of three |
|    |                |months;  Under Section 324 IPC to undergo RI for |
|    |                |one year and to pay fine of Rs.500/- and in      |
|    |                |default to undergo further imprisonment of one   |
|    |                |month.                                           |
|2.  |Mange Singh,    |Under Section 325 IPC to   undergo RI for two    |
|    |Hanuman Singh   |years and to pay fine of Rs.1,000/- and in       |
|    |son of Udai     |default to undergo further imprisonment of two   |
|    |Singh, Sumer    |months; Under Section 323 IPC to undergo RI for  |
|    |Singh and Tej   |three months.                                    |
|    |Singh           |                                                 |
|3.  |Chotu Singh     |Under Section 324 IPC to undergo RI for one year |
|    |                |and to pay fine of Rs.500/- and in default to    |
|    |                |undergo further imprisonment of  one month; Under|
|    |                |Section 323, IPC to undergo RI for three months  |
|4.  |Mool Singh,     |Under Section 323, IPC, to undergo RI for three  |
|    |Anand Singh,    |months.                                          |
|    |Sohan Singh,    |                                                 |
|    |Hanuman Singh   |                                                 |
|    |S/o Jaswant     |                                                 |
|    |Singh and       |                                                 |
|    |Bhanwar Singh   |                                                 |

4.    On appeal,  the  Court  of  Sessions  set  aside  the  conviction  for
offences other than the  one  under  Section  323  IPC  but  maintained  the
conviction under Section 323 IPC.  The sentence  of  imprisonment  was  also
set aside and  the  accused  were  granted  probation  subject  to  fine  of
Rs.5,000/- which was to be paid to the victim.
5.    The injured PWs, namely,  Karan  Singh,  Devi  Singh  and  Maan  Singh
entered into the compromise and compounded the  offence  qua  them  but  the
appellant filed a revision in the High Court which was dismissed.
6.    We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
7.    Learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  submitted  that  the  Court  of
Sessions erred in setting aside  the  conviction  for  offences  other  than
Section 323 and also erred in  granting  benefit  of  probation.   The  fine
imposed was not adequate and having regard to number of injuries  and  their
nature, adequate compensation ought to have been  granted.    The  appellant
received as many as 10 injuries including an incised wound in  the  parietal
region by sharp edged weapon, a muscle deep injury on the front of left  leg
and a bone  deep  injury  just  above  the  front  of  left  leg.   Even  if
technically, the injury could be held to be simple instead of grievous,  the
sentence should have been adequate and in any case, due  compensation  ought
to have been  granted.   Thus,  the  High  Court  erred  in  dismissing  the
revision petition.
8.    Learned counsel for the accused pointed out that the  respondent  Devi
Singh  has  died  during  pendency  of  the  proceedings  in   this   Court.
Interference by this Court  was  not  called  for  at  this  stage  when  35
                            years have passed after the occurrence.  In  any
case, it may not be appropriate to give any sentence of imprisonment to  any
of the accused and at best compensation may be directed to be  paid  by  the
accused or the State to the appellant.
9.    After giving due consideration to the rival  submissions,  we  are  of
the view that while it may not be appropriate  to  impose  the  sentence  of
imprisonment at this stage, having  regard  to  the  nature  and  extent  of
injuries, the appellant-complainant deserves to be duly compensated.
10.   We find that the Court of Sessions and the High Court have  not  fully
focused on the need to compensate the victim which can now be  taken  to  be
integral to just sentencing.  Order of sentence in  a  criminal  case  needs
due application of mind.  The Court has to give attention not  only  to  the
nature  of  crime,   prescribed   sentence,   mitigating   and   aggravating
circumstances to strike just balance in needs of  society  and  fairness  to
the accused, but also to keep in mind  the  need  to  give  justice  to  the
victim of crime.  In spite of legislative  changes  and  decisions  of  this
Court, this aspect at times escapes attention.  Rehabilitating victim is  as
important as punishing the accused.  Victim's plight cannot be ignored  even
when a crime goes unpunished for want of adequate evidence.
11.   In the present case, following injuries were found  on  the  appellant
by Dr. A.P. Modi, PW-2:-

"1.   Bruise 6 cm x 4 cm down of right forearms.


 2.   Bruise 8 cm x 2 cm front of right arms.


3.    Bruise 8 cm x 2 cm front of right arms.


4.    Bruise 10 cm x 2 cm right supra scupular region.


5.    Swelling of right shoulder with tenderness.


6.    Bruise 15 cm x 2 cm on the middle of the back.


7.    Abbression 1 cm x 1 cm left forearms.


8.    Incised boon 2.5 x 0.5 x muscle deep fost of left leg.


9.    Lancirated boon 3 x 1 cm x bone deep above injury  no.8.


10.   Incised boon 8 cm x 0.5 x bone deep on right parital region."


Just compensation to the victim  has  to  be  fixed  having  regard  to  the
medical and other expenses, pain and suffering, loss of  earning  and  other
relevant  factors.   While  punishment  to  the  accused  is   one   aspect,
determination of just compensation to the victim is the  other.   At  times,
evidence is not available in  this  regard.   Some  guess  work  in  such  a
situation is inevitable.  Compensation is payable under Section 357 and 357-
A.  While under section 357, financial capacity of the  accused  has  to  be
kept in mind, Section 357-A under which  compensation  comes  out  of  State
funds, has to be invoked to make up the requirement of just compensation.
12.   We may refer to some recent decisions on the subject.
In State of Gujarat and anr. vs. Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat[1],
it was observed:
"46. One area which is totally overlooked  in  the  above  practice  is  the
plight of the victims. It is a recent trend  in  the  sentencing  policy  to
listen to the wailings of the victims. Rehabilitation of the  prisoner  need
not be by closing the eyes towards the suffering victims of the  offence.  A
glimpse at the field of victimology reveals two types of victims. The  first
type consists of direct victims, i.e., those who are alive and suffering  on
account of the harm inflicted by the prisoner while  committing  the  crime.
The second type comprises of indirect victims  who  are  dependants  of  the
direct victims of crimes who undergo sufferings due to deprivation of  their
breadwinner.

94. In recent years, the right to reparation for  victims  of  violation  of
human rights is gaining ground.  The  United  Nations  Commission  of  Human
[pic]Rights has circulated draft Basic  Principles  and  Guidelines  on  the
Right  to  Reparation  for  Victims  of  Violation  of  Human  Rights.  (see
annexure)"

13.   In  Ankush  Shivaji  Gaikwad  vs.  State  of  Maharashtra[2],  it  was
observed:
"30. In Hari Singh v. Sukhbir Singh [(1988) 4 SCC 551 : 1998 SCC (Cri)  984]
this Court lamented the failure of the courts in  awarding  compensation  to
the victims in terms of Section 357(1) CrPC. The Court  recommended  to  all
courts to exercise the power available under Section 357 CrPC  liberally  so
as to meet the ends of justice. The Court said: (SCC pp. 557-58, para 10)

"10.  ...  Sub-section  (1)  of  Section  357  provides   power   to   award
compensation to victims of the offence out of the sentence of  fine  imposed
on accused. ... It is an important provision but courts have seldom  invoked
it. Perhaps due to ignorance of the object of it. It empowers the  court  to
award compensation to victims  while  passing  judgment  of  conviction.  In
addition to conviction, the court may order the accused to pay  some  amount
by way of compensation to victim who has suffered by the action of  accused.
It may be noted that this power of  courts  to  award  compensation  is  not
ancillary to other sentences but it is in addition thereto. This  power  was
intended to do something to reassure the  victim  that  he  or  she  is  not
forgotten in the criminal justice system. It  is  a  measure  of  responding
appropriately to crime as well of reconciling the victim with the  offender.
It is, to some extent, a constructive approach to crimes.  It  is  indeed  a
step forward in our criminal justice system.  We,  therefore,  recommend  to
all courts to exercise this power liberally  so  as  to  meet  the  ends  of
justice in a better way."
  (emphasis supplied)

31. The amount of compensation, observed this Court, was  to  be  determined
by the courts depending upon the facts and circumstances of each  case,  the
nature of the crime, the justness of the  claim  and  the  capacity  of  the
accused to pay.

32. In Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab [(1978) 4 SCC 111 :  1978  SCC  (Cri)
549], Balraj v. State of U.P [(1994) 4 SCC 29 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 823],  Baldev
Singh v. State of Punjab [(1995) 6 SCC 593 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1132], Dilip  S.
Dahanukar v. Kotak Mahindra Co. Ltd. [(2007) 6 SCC 528 : (2007) 3 SCC  (Cri)
209]  [pic]this  Court  held  that  the  power  of  the  courts   to   award
compensation to  victims  under  Section  357  is  not  ancillary  to  other
sentences but in addition thereto and that imposition of fine  and/or  grant
of compensation to a great extent must  depend  upon  the  relevant  factors
apart from such fine or compensation being just and reasonable. In Dilip  S.
Dahanukar case this Court even favoured an inquiry albeit summary in  nature
to determine the paying capacity of the offender. The Court  said:  (SCC  p.
545, para 38)

"38. The purpose of imposition of fine and/or grant  of  compensation  to  a
great extent must be considered having  the  relevant  factors  therefor  in
mind. It may be compensating the person in one way or the other. The  amount
of compensation sought to be imposed,  thus,  must  be  reasonable  and  not
arbitrary. Before issuing a direction to pay compensation, the  capacity  of
the accused to pay the same must be judged. A fortiori, an enquiry  in  this
behalf even in a summary way, may be necessary. Some reasons, which may  not
be very elaborate, may also have to be  assigned;  the  purpose  being  that
whereas  the  power  to  impose  fine  is  limited  and  direction  to   pay
compensation can be made for one or the other factors enumerated out of  the
same;  but  sub-section  (3)  of  Section  357  does  not  impose  any  such
limitation  and  thus,  power  thereunder  should  be  exercised   only   in
appropriate cases. Such a jurisdiction cannot be exercised at the whims  and
caprice of a Judge."

33. The long line of judicial pronouncements of this Court recognised in  no
uncertain terms a paradigm shift in the approach towards victims  of  crimes
who were held entitled to reparation, restitution or compensation  for  loss
or injury suffered by them.  This  shift  from  retribution  to  restitution
began in the mid-1960s and gained momentum in  the  decades  that  followed.
Interestingly the clock appears to have come full circle  by  the  lawmakers
and courts going back in a great  measure  to  what  was  in  ancient  times
common place. Harvard Law Review (1984) in an article on Victim  Restitution
in Criminal Law Process:  A  Procedural  Analysis  sums  up  the  historical
perspective of the concept of restitution in the following words:

"Far from being  a  novel  approach  to  sentencing,  restitution  has  been
employed as a punitive sanction throughout history.  In  ancient  societies,
before the conceptual separation of civil and criminal law, it was  standard
practice to require an offender to reimburse the victim or  his  family  for
any loss caused by the offense. The primary purpose of such restitution  was
not to compensate the victim, but  to  protect  the  offender  from  violent
retaliation by the victim or the community. It was  a  means  by  which  the
offender could buy back the peace he had  broken.  As  the  State  gradually
established a monopoly over the institution of punishment,  and  a  division
between civil and criminal law emerged, the victim's right  to  compensation
was incorporated into civil law."

46. The amendments to Cr.PC brought about in 2008  focused  heavily  on  the
rights of victims in a criminal trial, particularly in  trials  relating  to
sexual offences. Though the 2008  amendments  left  Section  357  unchanged,
they introduced Section 357-A under which the Court is empowered  to  direct
the State to pay compensation to the victim in such cases where

"the compensation awarded  under  Section  357  is  not  adequate  for  such
rehabilitation, or where the cases end in acquittal  or  discharge  and  the
victim has to be rehabilitated".

Under this provision, even if the accused is not tried but the victim  needs
to be rehabilitated, the victim may request  the  State  or  District  Legal
Services  Authority  to  award  him/her  compensation.  This  provision  was
introduced due to the recommendations made by the Law  Commission  of  India
in its 152nd and 154th Reports in 1994 and 1996 respectively.

48. The question then is whether the plenitude of the power  vested  in  the
courts under Sections 357 and 357-A, notwithstanding, the courts can  simply
ignore the provisions or neglect the exercise of a power that  is  primarily
meant to be exercised for the benefit of the victims of crimes that  are  so
often committed though less frequently punished  by  the  courts.  In  other
words, whether courts have a duty to advert  to  the  question  of  awarding
compensation to the victim and record reasons  while  granting  or  refusing
relief to them?

49. The language of Section 357 CrPC at a glance may not  suggest  that  any
obligation is cast upon a court  to  apply  its  mind  to  the  question  of
compensation. Sub-section (1) of Section 357 states  that  the  Court  "may"
order for the whole or any part of a fine recovered to  be  applied  towards
compensation in the following cases:

(i) To any person who has suffered loss or injury by the  offence,  when  in
the opinion of the court, such compensation would  be  recoverable  by  such
person in a civil court.

(ii) To a person  who  is  entitled  to  recover  damages  under  the  Fatal
Accidents Act, when there is a conviction  for  causing  death  or  abetment
thereof.

(iii) To a bona fide purchaser of property, which has become the subject  of
theft, criminal misappropriation, criminal breach  of  trust,  cheating,  or
receiving or retaining  or  disposing  of  stolen  property,  and  which  is
ordered to be restored to its rightful owner.

50. Sub-section (3) of Section 357 further empowers  the  court  by  stating
that it "may" award compensation even  in  such  cases  where  the  sentence
imposed does not include a  fine.  The  legal  position  is,  however,  well
established that cases may arise where a provision is mandatory despite  the
use of language that makes it discretionary. We may at the outset, refer  to
the [pic]oft-quoted passage from Julius v. Lord Bishop of Oxford  [(1880)  5
AC 214 : (1874-80) All ER Rep 43 (HL)]  wherein  the  Court  summed  up  the
legal position thus: (AC pp. 222-23)

"... The words 'it shall be lawful' are not equivocal. They  are  plain  and
unambiguous. They are words merely making  that  legal  and  possible  which
there would otherwise be no right or authority to do. They confer a  faculty
or power, and they do not of themselves do more than  confer  a  faculty  or
power. But there may be something in the nature of the  thing  empowered  to
be done, something in the object for which it is to be  done,  something  in
the conditions under which it is to be done, something in the title  of  the
person or persons for whose benefit the power is to be exercised, which  may
couple the power with a duty, and make it the duty of  the  person  in  whom
the power is reposed, to exercise that power when called upon to do so."

54. Applying the tests which emerge from the above cases to Section 357,  it
appears to us that the provision confers a power coupled with a duty on  the
courts to apply its mind to the question of awarding compensation  in  every
criminal case. We say so because in the background and context in  which  it
was introduced, the power to award compensation  was  intended  to  reassure
the victim that he or she is not forgotten in the criminal  justice  system.
The victim would remain forgotten in the criminal justice system if  despite
the legislature having gone so far as to enact specific provisions  relating
to victim compensation, courts choose to ignore  the  provisions  altogether
and do not even apply  their  mind  to  the  question  of  compensation.  It
follows that unless Section 357 is read  to  confer  an  obligation  on  the
courts to apply their mind to the question of compensation, it would  defeat
the very object behind the introduction of the provision.

58. This Court has through a line of cases beginning with  Hari  Singh  case
held that  the  power  to  award  compensation  under  Section  357  is  not
ancillary to other sentences but in addition thereto. It  would  necessarily
follow that the court has a duty to  apply  its  mind  to  the  question  of
awarding compensation under Section 357 too. Reference may also be  made  to
the decision of this Court in State of A.P. v. Polamala Raju [(2000)  7  SCC
75 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1284] wherein a three-Judge  Bench  of  this  Court  set
aside a judgment of the High  Court  for  non-application  of  mind  to  the
question of sentencing. In that case, this Court reprimanded the High  Court
for having reduced the sentence of the accused convicted under  Section  376
IPC from 10 years' imprisonment to 5 years  without  recording  any  reasons
for the same. This Court said: (SCC pp. 78-79, paras 9 & 11)

"9. We are of the considered  opinion  that  it  is  an  obligation  of  the
sentencing court to consider all relevant facts  and  circumstances  bearing
on the question of sentence and impose  a  sentence  commensurate  with  the
gravity of the offence. ...
                                *     *     *
11. To say the least, the order contains no reasons, much less  'special  or
adequate reasons'. The sentence has been  reduced  in  a  rather  mechanical
manner without proper application of mind."

61. Section 357 Cr.PC confers a duty on the court to apply its mind  to  the
question of compensation in every  criminal  case.  It  necessarily  follows
that the court must disclose that it has applied its mind to  this  question
in every criminal case. In Maya Devi v. Raj Kumari Batra [(2010) 9  SCC  486
:  (2010)  3  SCC  (Civ)  842]  this  Court  held  that  the  disclosure  of
application of mind is best demonstrated by recording reasons in support  of
the order or conclusion. The Court observed: (SCC p. 495, paras 28-30)

"28. ... There is nothing like a power without any  limits  or  constraints.
That is so even when a court or other authority  may  be  vested  with  wide
discretionary power, for even discretion has  to  be  exercised  only  along
well recognised and sound juristic  principles  with  a  view  to  promoting
fairness, inducing transparency and aiding equity.

29. What then are the safeguards against an  arbitrary  exercise  of  power?
The first and the most effective check against  any  such  exercise  is  the
well-recognised legal principle that orders can be made only after  due  and
proper application of mind. Application of mind  brings  reasonableness  not
only to  the  exercise  of  power  but  to  the  ultimate  conclusion  also.
Application of mind in turn is best demonstrated by disclosure of the  mind.
And disclosure is best demonstrated by recording reasons in support  of  the
order or conclusion.

30. Recording of reasons in cases where the  order  is  subject  to  further
appeal is very important from yet another angle. An appellate court  or  the
authority ought  to  have  the  advantage  of  examining  the  reasons  that
prevailed with the court or the  authority  making  the  order.  Conversely,
absence of reasons in an appealable order deprives the  appellate  court  or
the authority of that advantage and casts an onerous responsibility upon  it
to examine and determine the question on its own."
                                                         (emphasis supplied)

66. To sum up: while the award or refusal of compensation  in  a  particular
case may be within the court's discretion, there exists a mandatory duty  on
the court to apply  its  mind  to  the  question  in  every  criminal  case.
Application of mind to the question is best disclosed by  recording  reasons
for awarding/refusing compensation. It is axiomatic that  for  any  exercise
involving application of  mind,  the  Court  ought  to  have  the  necessary
material which it  would  evaluate  to  arrive  at  a  fair  and  reasonable
conclusion. It is also beyond dispute that  the  occasion  to  consider  the
question of award of compensation  would  logically  arise  only  after  the
court records a conviction of the accused. Capacity of the  accused  to  pay
which constitutes an important aspect of any order under  Section  357  CrPC
would involve a certain enquiry albeit summary unless of  course  the  facts
as emerging in the  course  of  the  trial  are  so  clear  that  the  court
considers it unnecessary to do so. Such an enquiry can precede an  order  on
sentence to enable the court to  take  a  view,  both  on  the  question  of
sentence and compensation that it may in its wisdom decide to award  to  the
victim or his/her family."

14.   In Suresh and Anr. vs. State of Haryana, Criminal  Appeal  No.420/2012
decided on 28th November, 2014, it was observed:-
"14.     We are of the view that it is the duty of  the  Courts,  on  taking
cognizance of a criminal offence, to ascertain  whether  there  is  tangible
material to show commission of crime, whether  the  victim  is  identifiable
and whether the victim of crime needs immediate financial relief.  On  being
satisfied on an application or on its own motion, the Court ought to  direct
grant  of  interim  compensation,  subject  to  final   compensation   being
determined later.  Such duty continues at every stage  of  a  criminal  case
where compensation ought to be given and has not  been  given,  irrespective
of the application by the victim.   At the stage  of  final  hearing  it  is
obligatory on the part of the Court to advert to the provision and record  a
finding whether a case for grant of compensation has been made out  and,  if
so,  who  is  entitled  to  compensation  and  how  much.   Award  of   such
compensation can be interim.  Gravity of offence  and  need  of  victim  are
some of the guiding factors to be  kept  in  mind,  apart  from  such  other
factors as may be found relevant  in  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  an
individual case.  We are also of the view that there  is  need  to  consider
upward  revision  in  the  scale   for   compensation   and   pending   such
consideration to adopt the scale notified by the  State  of  Kerala  in  its
scheme, unless the scale awarded by any other State or  Union  Territory  is
higher.  The  States  of  Andhra  Pradesh,  Madhya  Pradesh,  Meghalaya  and
Telangana are directed  to  notify  their  schemes  within  one  month  from
receipt of a copy of this order.   We  also  direct  that  a  copy  of  this
judgment be forwarded to National Judicial  Academy  so  that  all  judicial
officers in the country can be  imparted  requisite  training  to  make  the
provision operative and meaningful."

15.      In K.A. Abbas H.S.A. vs. Sabu Joseph and anr.[3], it was observed:-



 "26. From the above line of cases, it becomes very clear, that, a  sentence
of imprisonment can be  granted  for  default  in  payment  of  compensation
awarded under Section 357(3) CrPC. The whole purpose of the provision is  to
accommodate the interests of the victims in  the  criminal  justice  system.
Sometimes the situation becomes such that there  is  no  purpose  served  by
keeping a person behind bars.  Instead  directing  the  accused  to  pay  an
amount of compensation to the victim or affected party can  ensure  delivery
of total justice. Therefore, this grant  of  compensation  is  sometimes  in
lieu of sending a person  behind  bars  or  in  addition  to  a  very  light
sentence  of  imprisonment.  Hence   on   default   of   payment   of   this
[pic]compensation, there must be a just recourse. Not  imposing  a  sentence
of imprisonment would mean allowing the accused to get away  without  paying
the compensation and imposing another fine would be impractical as it  would
mean imposing a fine upon  another  fine  and  therefore  would  not  ensure
proper enforcement of the order of  compensation.  While  passing  an  order
under Section 357(3), it is  imperative  for  the  courts  to  look  at  the
ability and the capacity of the accused to pay the same amount as  has  been
laid down by the cases above, otherwise the  very  purpose  of  granting  an
order of compensation would stand defeated."

16.   In the present case, in the absence of any evidence about the  medical
expenses, loss of earning etc. and the financial capacity  of  the  accused,
we are of the view that the appellant needs to be paid a sum of  Rs.50,000/-
as compensation under Section 357(3) within  two  months  by  the  surviving
respondents.  In default the  surviving-respondents  will  undergo  rigorous
imprisonment for three months.  Since compensation is being directed  to  be
paid, we set aside the sentence of fine of Rs.5,000/-.


      Accordingly, the appeal is allowed in above terms.

                    ......................................................J.
                                          (T.S. THAKUR)



                    ......................................................J.
                                            (ADARSH KUMAR GOEL)

NEW DELHI
JANUARY 16, 2015

-----------------------
[1]    (1998) 7 SCC 392
[2]    (2013) 6 SCC 770
[3]    (2010) 6 SCC 230

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                                      7


Sec.45 of Evidence Act - When it is said that there is no bar to a court to compare the disputed finger impression with the admitted finger impression, it goes without saying that it can record an opinion or finding on such comparison, only after an analysis of the characteristics of the admitted finger impression and after verifying whether the same characteristics are found in the disputed finger impression. The comparison of the two thumb impressions cannot be casual or by a mere glance. Further, a finding in the judgment that there appeared to be no marked differences between the admitted thumb impression and disputed thumb impression, without anything more, cannot be accepted as a valid finding that the disputed signature is of the person who has put the admitted thumb impression. Where the Court finds that the disputed finger impression and admitted thumb impression are clear and where the court is in a position to identify the characteristics of finger prints, the court may record a finding on comparison, even in the absence of an expert's opinion. But where the disputed thumb impression is smudgy, vague or very light, the court should not hazard a guess by a casual perusal. The decision in Muralilal (supra) and Lalit Popli (supra) should not be construed as laying a proposition that the court is bound to compare the disputed and admitted finger impressions and record a finding thereon, irrespective of the condition of the disputed finger impression. When there is a positive denial by the person who is said to have affixed his finger impression and where the finger impression in the disputed document is vague or smudgy or not clear, making it difficult for comparison, the court should hesitate to venture a decision based on its own comparison of the disputed and admitted finger impressions. Further even in cases where the court is constrained to take up such comparison, it should make a thorough study, if necessary with the assistance of counsel, to ascertain the characteristics, similarities and dissimilarities. Necessarily, the judgment should contain the reasons for any conclusion based on comparison of the thumb impression, if it chooses to record a finding thereon. The court should avoid reaching conclusions based on a mere casual or routine glance or perusal. -2015 S.C.(2008) msklawreports

Sec.45 of Evidence Act - When it is said that there is no bar to a court to compare the disputed finger impression with the admitted finger impression, it goes without saying that it can record an opinion or finding on such comparison, only after an analysis of the characteristics of the admitted finger impression and after verifying whether the same characteristics are found in the disputed finger impression. The comparison of the two thumb impressions cannot be casual or by a mere glance. Further, a finding in the judgment that there appeared to be no marked differences between the admitted thumb impression and disputed thumb impression, without anything more, cannot be accepted as a valid finding that the disputed signature is of the person who has put the admitted thumb impression. Where the Court finds that the disputed finger impression and admitted thumb impression are clear and where the court is in a position to identify the characteristics of finger prints, the court may record a finding on comparison, even in the absence of an expert's opinion. But where the disputed thumb impression is smudgy, vague or very light, the court should not hazard a guess by a casual perusal. The decision in Muralilal (supra) and Lalit Popli (supra) should not be construed as laying a proposition that the court is bound to compare the disputed and admitted finger impressions and record a finding thereon, irrespective of the condition of the disputed finger impression. When there is a positive denial by the person who is said to have affixed his finger impression and where the finger impression in the disputed document is vague or smudgy or not clear, making it difficult for comparison, the court should hesitate to venture a decision based on its own comparison of the disputed and admitted finger impressions. Further even in cases where the court is constrained to take up such comparison, it should make a thorough study, if necessary with the assistance of counsel, to ascertain the characteristics, similarities and dissimilarities. Necessarily, the judgment should contain the reasons for any conclusion based on comparison of the thumb impression, if it chooses to record a finding thereon. The court should avoid reaching conclusions based on a mere casual or routine glance or perusal. -2015 S.C.(2008) msklawreports