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Sunday, January 18, 2015



                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                      CRIMINAL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION


                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 97 OF 2015
               [Arising out of S.L.P.(Criminal) No. 6927/2013]

Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan                     ... Appellant (s)

                                   Versus

Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke and others         ... Respondent (s)


                               J U D G M E N T

KURIAN, J.:


Leave granted.


Appellant is accused no.1 in C.R. No. 3446 of 2010  of  Bund  Garden  Police
Station in the State of Maharashtra. The case is  registered  by  the  Anti-
Corruption Bureau under Sections 7, 12, 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2)  of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as  'the  PC
Act').

Genesis  is  Annexure-P7-complaint  dated  22.11.2010  given  by  the  first
respondent. According to him, he had to pay an amount of Rs.75,000/- by  way
of bribe for getting a certificate for non-agricultural use of his land.  To
quote from the complaint:

"On 5th October 2009 an advertisement of "Bharat Petroleum Corporation  Ltd.
Pune" appeared in daily Lokmat and Loksatta  newspapers.  The  advertisement
was for giving dealership of Petrol Pump. I had duly applied to the  company
Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. for the same.  As  per  the  procedure  my
interview was arranged on 30th March 2010. I was selected for this work.  As
per the terms and conditions of Bharat Petroleum Corporation  Ltd.  Pune  it
was binding on me to submit a "non agricultural certificate" of my  land  at
Pimpalsuti, Tal Shirur,  District  Pune.  To  get  the  said  certificate  I
applied to the Maval Sub Divisional Officer and  Magistrate  Pune  on  dated
9/9/2010. After the application I fulfilled all the  documents  required  as
per their demand.

      After this today on date 22/11/2010  at  11/20  a.m.  I  went  to  the
office of Maval Sub Divisional Officer and  Magistrate  Pune  for  enquiring
about the non agricultural certificate which I had not received  till  then.
That time I met the clerk Shri Suhas Soma. He asked me to  meet  clerk  Shri
Landge. When I  personally  met  Shri  Langde  he  asked  me  to  meet  Shri
Sanjaysingh Chavan Sub Divisional Officer Maval. As  per  that  I  met  Shri
Sanjaysingh Chavan Sub divisional Officer Maval personally  in  his  office.
At that  time  he  asked  me  the  reason  as  to  why  I  require  the  non
agricultural land certificate. I told him the  reason  of  petrol  pump  and
also told him the area of land. After that he asked me  to  meet  the  clerk
Suhas Soma. After I went out of his office, he called his clerk  Suhas  Soma
in his cabin. After Shri Soma came out of the cabin he  asked  me  "At  what
extent you are ready to pay?". At that time I asked him "What  will  be  the
amount of challan?". That time he said that "Challan amount  is  meager,  an
additional amount of Rs. 1,00,000/- will have to be  paid  as  practice.  If
your matter was for house then I would have  requested  the  boss  for  less
amount. But as you are  going  to  do  business  you  should  not  have  any
objection to  pay  Rs.1,00,000/-.  At  that  time  I  requested  the  Office
Superintendent Mr. Soma that "this amount is huge, some concession be  given
to me". On that a compromise was made between me and him and he demanded  an
amount of Rs.75,000/- as a bribe."



 On the basis of the above complaint, the vigilance  arranged  a  trap.  The
First Information Report narrates the events as follows:
"As the complaint filed by the complainant Mr. Dattatraya  Phalke  is  of  a
crime which comes under Anti Corruption Act and  as  we  are  authorized  to
take cognizance of such crime on the basis of complaint filed by Mr.  Phalke
by deciding to arrange for a trap for arresting Mr.  Chavan,  Sub-Divisional
Officer and Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sub  Division  Maval,  Pune  and  Mr.
Soma, Office Superintendent  (Shirastedar),  Sub  Divisional  Office,  Maval
Pune while taking bribe from complainant Mr. Phalke and for that purpose  by
giving a written letter to  the  Hon'ble  Medical  Superintendent,  Regional
Mental Hospital, Yerawada, Pune from their office, the services  of  1)  Dr.
Amol Ranganath Jadhav, age 25 years,  Occupation-Service-  Medical  Officer,
Regional Mental Hospital, Yerawada, Pune-6, residing at C-43, B. J.  Medical
College Hostel, Near Collector Office, Pune-48, 2)  Dr.  Sham  Bandu  Badse,
age  55  years,  Occupation-Service,  Medical   Officer,   Regional   Mental
Hospital,  Yerawada,  Pune-6,  residing  at  Sunderban   Sadan,   Nandanwan,
Lohagon, Pune-48, got available as the Panch witnesses. The complainant  and
the Panch witnesses were introduced to each other. The  complaint  filed  by
the complainant was briefly stated to the Panchas. Accordingly, we gave  the
complaint filed by the complainant for reading to panch witnesses and  after
getting assured that the same is correct, they signed below it.  Thereafter,
it was unanimously decided to verify the complaint filed by the  complainant
Mr. Phalke in connection with  the  bribe  demanded  by  the  Sub-Divisional
Officer  and  Sub-Divisional  Magistrate,  Sub  Division  Maval,  Pune   Mr.
Sanjaysingh Chavan and Office Superintendent (Shirastedar).
      Thereafter on 22/11/2010 at 16.30  o'clock,  myself,  complainant  Mr.
Phalke, aforesaid two panchas,  Police  Inspector  Mr.  B.R.  Patil,  Police
inspector Shri Belsare from  the  office  of  Anti  Corruption  Bureau  came
walking via Sadhu Waswani Chowk and  went  to  new  administration  Building
Pune-1. At that time,  we  started  voice  recorder  from  our  custody  and
suppressed it and its mike below the shirt of complainant  and  started  the
recording button of the same. Thereafter as per  our  instructions,  firstly
complainant Mr. Phalke and Panch No. 1 Mr. Jadhav went to the office of  the
Sub-Divisional Officer and Sub-Divisional Magistrate,  Sub  Division  Maval,
Pune which is in the New Administrative building. Immediately  behind  them,
myself, Pancha No. 2 Mr. Bedase  and  police  officer  and  employees  stood
separately around the office of Sub-Divisional  Officer  and  Sub-Divisional
Magistrate Maval, Sub Division Pune so that no  doubt  will  be  created  to
anyone. After half an hour from the said place, complainant Shri Phalke  and
panch No.1 Mr. Jadhav came out. Thereafter, we all came back from  there  to
Pune Office of Anti  Corruption  Bureau.  After  coming  back  to  the  said
office, we took out the  recording  machine  placed  upon  complainant  Shri
Phalke and closed its button of recording and heard along with  the  panchas
the conversation which took  place  among  complainant  Mr.  Phalke,  public
servant Mr. Chavan and Mr. Soma and it revealed that the public servant  Mr.
Chavan and Mr.  Soma  have  demanded  a  bribe  of  Rs.  75,000/-  from  the
complainant  Mr.  Phalke.  With  the  consent   of   myself,   panchas   and
complainant,  it  was  decided  to  take  further  action   on   23/11/2010.
Accordingly, the  complainant  and  aforesaid  panchas  were  instructed  to
remain present  in  the  office  of  the  Anti-Corruption  Bureau,  Pune  on
23/11/2010 at 10.00 o'clock in the morning.
      On 23/11/2010 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning the  aforesaid  panchas,
complainant Mr. Phalke  appeared  in  the  Pune  office  of  Anti-Corruption
Bureau. Thereafter, the list of all the valuable things which were with  the
complainant Mr. Phalke was made. The complainant and panch  wintnesses  were
informed  about  the  Anthrasin  powder  and  ultraviolet  light   and   its
demonstration was also shown. Anthrasin powder was applied to all the  notes
of amount Rs. 75,000/- presented by the complainant for giving it  as  bribe
and the said notes were folded and kept in the  right  side  pocket  of  the
complainant's pant. Mr. S.K.  Satpute,  Police/614,  who  applied  Anthrasin
powder to the notes and who showed demonstration were  eliminated  from  the
action of trap. The detailed instructions were  given  to  panch  witnesses,
complainant and other officers/staff from team of trap regarding the  action
of trap. Accordingly, a  detailed  pre-trap  panchanama  was  drawn  in  our
office. The trap was arranged on 23/11/2010 at the office of  Sub-Divisional
Officer and Sub Divisional Magistrate Maval, Pune,  Sub-Division  1  in  the
new administration building when at about 12.02  o'clock  afternoon  in  the
presence of panch No.1 Mr. Jadhav,  the  public  servant  Mr.  Suhas  Ramesh
Soma, age 46 years,  Office  Superintendent  (Shirastedar),  Sub  Divisional
Office  Maval,  Sub  Division  Pune,  demanded  the  amount  of  bribe  from
complainant Mr. Phalke and personally opened the drawer  No.2  which  is  on
the right hand side of his table and asked complainant Mr.  Phalke  to  keep
the amount in it. Accordingly, as  complainant  Mr.  Phalke  kept  the  said
amount in the said drawer  the  public  servant  Mr.  Soma  was  caught  red
handed. When the documents/papers which came in contact of the bribe  amount
were examined in the lamp of ultraviolet light, then the faint bluish  shine
of anthrasin powder was seen upon it.   The  numbers  of  notes  from  bribe
amount were compared with the numbers of notes  mentioned  in  the  pre-trap
panchanama.  It was seen that they are  absolutely  accurate  with  all  the
numbers of notes mentioned in the pre-trap panchnama. As the said amount  of
bribe is the same  amount  which  public  servant  Mr.  Soma  received  from
complainant Mr. Phalke and as the shining of anthrasin powder  was  seen  on
it, the same  was  seized  and  sealed  in  presence  of  panchas.  All  the
conversations regarding demand  of  bribe  amount  between  complainant  Mr.
Phalke, public servant Shri Chavan and Soma was recorded and  it  was  heard
in the presence of panchas and its script was prepared and its  mention  has
been made in panchanama. Likewise, when an enquiry was made with Panch  No.1
Mr. Jadhav he told that public servant Mr. Soma personally said that he  has
received  the  said  amount  of  bribe  as  per  the  instructions  of   Mr.
Sanjaysingh Ramrao Chavan, age 44 years,  Sub-Divisional  Officer  and  Sub-
Divisional Magistrate, Maval Sub Division Pune. A detailed Panchnama of  all
the incidences which took place at  the  time  of  trap  was  drawn  in  the
presence of panchas and the copy of the same was  given  to  public  servant
Shri Sanjaysingh Chavan and Suhas Soma and their signatures were  obtained."



The investigating officer submitted his report under Section 173(2)  of  the
Code of Criminal  Procedure,  1973  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  "Cr.PC")
though wrongly mentioned as 169 Cr.PC. To quote from the closure report:

"From overall investigation  of  the  said  crime  and  from  documents  and
evidence received, for filing case under  Section  7,  12,  13(1)  (D)  r/w.
13(2) of Prevention of  Corruption  Act,  1988  as  per  the  provisions  in
Confidential Circular  No.CDR/1099/Pra.Kra.62/99/11-A  dated  03/04/2000  of
the Maharashtra Government,  General  Administration,  against  the  Accused
public servant herein (1)  Shri  Sanjaysinh  Ramrao  Chavan,  Sub-Divisional
Officer and Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Maval  Sub-Division,  District  Pune,
(2) Shri Suhas  Ramesh  Soma,  Awal  Karkoon  (Shirastedar),  Sub-Divisional
Officer Office, Maval Sub-Division, Pune, when report was submitted  by  the
then Investigating Officer Shri  P.B.  Dhanvat,  Assistant  Commissioner  of
Police, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau,  Pune  vide
outward No.PBG/ACP/DSP/ACB/Pune/2011-283 dated 21/02/2011  to  the  Director
General, Anti-Corruption  Bureau,  Maharashtra  State,  Mumbai  through  the
Deputy Commissioner  of  Police/Superintendent  of  Police,  Anti-Corruption
Bureau, Pune for writing to the  Competent  Officer  Maharashtra  Government
(Revenue  and  Forests)  Mantralaya,  Mumbai,  of  APS  for  obtaining  pre-
prosecution approval/sanction as required under Section 19 of Prevention  of
Corruption    Act,    1988,    and    the    Deputy    Superintendent     of
Police/Superintendent of Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Pune has  vide  his
Outward No.CR/438/Pune/2010-1591 dated 20/05/2011 sent such  report  to  the
Director General, Anti-Corruption Bureau, M.S.  Mumbai,  after  scrutinizing
the investigation documents  of  the  crime,  the  Director  General,  Anti-
Corruption Bureau, Maharashtra State, Mumbai  has  issued  orders  vide  his
Order No.CR/438/Pune/2010-4812 dated 03/06/2011  that  "since  there  is  no
evidence available to the extent of filing  charge-sheet  against  APS  Shri
Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan,  Sub-Divisional  Officer  and  Magistrate,  Maval,
District Pune in the said trap case, decision is taken not  to  file  charge
sheet against him and by taking legal action against him, for preparing  and
sending proposal of Departmental Inquiry to the Competent Officer and  since
evidence is available against APS  Shri  Suhas  Ramesh  Soma,  Awal  Karkoon
(Shirastedar), Sub-Divisional Officer Office, Maval, District  Pune,  orders
are  issued  for  submitting  pre-prosecution  sanction  proposal   to   his
Competent Officer for filing prosecution in  Competent  Court  against  him.
The  said  Orders  are  received   vide   O.No.CR/438/Pune/2010-1846   dated
09/06/2011 of the Deputy Commissioner of  Police/Superintendent  of  Police,
Anti-Corruption Bureau, Pune and  Xerox  copy  of  abovementioned  order  is
submitted herewith for perusal.

Therefore, if approved, it is requested to  acquit  accused  public  servant
Shri Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan, Sub-Divisional Officer and Magistrate,  Maval
Sub-Division, Pune, (Class-1) from the said offence as per  Section  169  of
Criminal Procedure Code."



 Learned Magistrate on  15.01.2012,  after  notice  also  to  the  de  facto
complainant, accepted the closure report. To quote the relevant portion fro-
m the order:

"7.   ... Record shows that the complainant lodged report. If  complaint  is
perused, it appears that role of accused No. 1 is  to  the  effect  that  on
22.11.2010 when complainant met accused No.1, he inquired about the  purpose
for which N.A. certificate was required and  he  asked  the  complainant  to
meet accused No.2. The complaint shows the demand of  money  and  acceptance
was made by accused  No.  2.  Accused  No.  1  has  filed  bunch  of  papers
consisting of his  representation  for  false  implication,  so  also  other
relevant  papers.  He  has  placed  on  record  the  application  for   N.A.
Certificate  filed  by  the  complainant's  wife,  then  all  correspondence
between the complainant and office of the accused  No.1  to  show  that  the
application of the complainant's wife was under process. Besides  this,  the
accused No.1 has also filed copy of his leave application  showing  that  he
was on medical leave  for  six  days  from  15.11.2010  to  20.11.2010  with
permission to suffix Sunday falling on 21.11.2010. The applicant  has  filed
the tickets to show that he travelled during this period. The applicant  has
also placed on record a news item published in Daily  Lokmat  on  24.11.2010
(sic) in which it is mentioned that  when  the  amount  of  Rs.75,000/-  was
accepted, the accused No. 1 was not in his office and  it  was  accepted  by
accused No. 2 Suhas Soma.

8.    It is to be considered that Anti-Corruption Bureau  has  filed  papers
and given reasons why decision not to proceed  against  accused  No.  1  was
taken. If these papers are perused, it appears that the Director General  of
Police, Anti-Corruption Bureau has considered the relevant papers and  after
considering all aspects, passed a well-reasoned order. It is also  mentioned
that the  vague  conversation  between  the  complainant  and  accused  No.1
recorded  at  the  time  of  so-called  verification  will  not   help   the
Prosecution and there is absolutely no evidence  of  demand  and  acceptance
against the accused No.1. It cannot be said that  the  Director  General  of
Anti-Corruption Bureau did not apply his mind to the documents  before  him.
When the order was passed giving reason and, as it is a speaking  order,  it
cannot be said that the direction given by the Director General  of  Police,
Anti-Corruption Bureau for submitting report under Section  169  of  Cr.P.C.
is bad in law.

                    xxx         xxx        xxx        xxx

12.   I am well aware that in view of judgment in Vasanti  Dubey  Vs.  State
of Madhya Pradesh, the Court can discard  closure  report  and  may  proceed
under Section 190 r.w. 156 of Cr.P.C. or it may  take  cognizance  upon  the
complaint and direct inquiry under Section 202 Cr.P.C. However, after  going
through the case papers, it is found that  the  authority  under  the  Anti-
Corruption Bureau has come to  the  correct  conclusion  that  there  is  no
sufficient ground to proceed against the accused No.1. As a result of  this,
I accept the report under Section 169 of Cr.P.C.

The proceedings  against  accused  No.1  are  closed  and  accused  No.1  is
discharged."



Dissatisfied, the first respondent - de facto  complainant,  approached  the
High Court in Revision leading to the impugned judgment. The High Court  set
aside the order passed by the learned Magistrate and directed  the  Director
General of Police to forward the request for  sanction  for  prosecution  to
the competent authority. The trial court was also  directed  to  follow  the
legal course in the matter. To quote paragraphs-10 to  15  of  the  impugned
judgment:

"4.     The   crux   of   the   matter   is,   the   conversation    between
complainant/applicant and accused no.1 on 22.11.2010  was  recorded  by  the
applicant as was directed by the Investigating Agency, which  clearly  prima
facie reveals demand by accused-respondent no.1.

                    xxx         xxx        xxx        xxx

10.   The  legal  Advisor  has  presumably  a  legal  knowledge,  could  not
adversely comment on supplementary statement  of  the  complainant  recorded
during the trap, as the supplementary statement is signed by panch  witness.
He could have, prima facie, indicated his legal knowledge  in  proper  frame
which is lacking. He has no business at the end  of  report  to  write  that
case against accused no. 2 is weak, as this report could  be  flashed,  used
and raised as a defence by the concerned in the prosecution.  Such  unwanted
effort will frustrate and fracture the prosecution.
11.    Affidavit  of  Shri.  Hemant  V.Bhat  though  supports  the  accused-
respondent, however, he should have also equally gone  through  the  papers,
he had no reason to accept the doubtful  findings  of  CFSL  in  respect  of
recorded conversation between the complainant and  accused-respondent  no.1.
He has given reference to the Manual. There should not  be  contest  to  the
Manual, however, it has been  twisted  for  the  benefits  of  the  accused-
respondent no.1.
12.   The learned Special Judge, basically travelled through the  report  or
the opinion of the Advocate which was  not  expected.  He  was  swayed  away
himself by accepting the defences. He should have gone through the  root  of
the matter, applied his  mind.  There  should  not  be  dearth  to  a  legal
thought. He could have seen brazen  attempt  of  a  colourable  exercise  of
power by a mighty officer, but the learned Special Judge missed the track.
13.   Reference to the Judgment  of  "Vasanti  Dubey  Vs.  State  of  Madhya
Pradesh ((2012)2 SCC 731)", was certainly misplaced. In the  said  case  the
Judge dealing with the matter was  frustrated  by  the  persistent  negative
report furnished by the police. However, on appreciation  of  material,  the
Supreme Court recorded, already  there  were  findings  of  Lokayukta  of  a
particular State of no material against the said accused. The learned  Judge
should not have ignored this aspect.
14.   The Hon'ble Supreme Court in  the  matter  of  "State  of  Maharashtra
Through CBI Vs. Mahesh G. Jain" in Criminal Appeal no. 2345 of 2009  decided
on May 28, 2013 also indicated about the parameters concerning sanction.
15.   In the result, the order  of  the  learned  Special  Judge,  accepting
report under Section 169 of the Cr.P.C.  is  set  aside.  The  report  under
Section 169 of Cr.P.C.  is  rejected.  The  learned  Special  Judge  or  the
Investigator to follow the legal  course  in  the  matter.  Learned  DGP  to
forward case papers to appropriate Sanctioning Authority to pass  orders  in
accordance with law. Observations are prima facie in nature."


Heard learned counsel appearing for  the  parties.  Learned  Senior  Counsel
submits that the appellant has unblemished service since  1995  and  he  has
been falsely implicated in this case so as to tarnish his  image  and  spoil
his career. The legal advisor in the Anti-Corruption Bureau  was  a  retired
Judge of the special court for trying offences under the PC Act, and on  his
legal advice only, the Director General of Police  came  to  the  conclusion
that there was no  ground  for  proceeding  against  the  appellant.  It  is
further submitted that  the  Magistrate  of  competent  jurisdiction,  after
going through the entire records and having taken an informed  decision  not
to proceed against the  appellant,  the  High  Court  is  not  justified  in
setting aside the said order merely because another view is  also  possible.
Learned Counsel for the respondents on the other hand submit that  the  High
Court in revision was fully justified in looking  into  the  merits  of  the
case and directing to  proceed  against  the  appellant.  Whether  there  is
evidence so as to ultimately enter conviction is not what is required to  be
seen at the time of taking cognizance; what  is  required  is  only  to  see
whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding in the case.

At the outset, we make it clear that wherever the reference is made  by  the
investigating officer or the courts to 169 Cr.PC, the same has  to  be  read
as a reference to Section 173 Cr.PC. Section  169  Cr.PC  provides  for  the
release of the accused when evidence is deficient,  whereas  the  report  on
completion of investigation is under Section 173 Cr.PC. For easy  reference,
we may quote the relevant provision:

"169. Release of accused when evidence deficient.-If, upon an  investigation
under this Chapter, it appears to  the  officer  in  charge  of  the  police
station that there  is  no  sufficient  evidence  or  reasonable  ground  of
suspicion to justify the forwarding of the accused  to  a  Magistrate,  such
officer shall, if such person is in custody, release him on his executing  a
bond, with or without sureties, as such officer may direct,  to  appear,  if
and when so required, before a Magistrate empowered to  take  cognizance  of
the offence on a police report, and to try the accused  or  commit  him  for
trial."



What is submitted by the investigating officer on 05.07.2011 is  in  fact  a
report on completion of investigation under Section 173 Cr.PC.

Two questions arise for consideration:

i.    Once the Magistrate of competent jurisdiction, on  proper  application
of mind, decides to accept the closure report submitted by the police  under
Section 173(2) Cr.PC, whether the High Court is justified in  setting  aside
the same in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction merely  because  another
view may be possible?

ii.   Whether the High Court  is  within  its  jurisdiction  to  direct  the
investigating officer to make a request for sanction  for  prosecution  from
the competent authority?

At the stage of taking cognizance of a case what is to be  seen  is  whether
there is sufficient ground for taking judicial notice of an offence  with  a
view to initiate further  proceedings.  In  S.K.  Sinha,  Chief  Enforcement
Officer v.  Videocon  International  Ltd.  and  others[1],  this  Court  has
analysed the process and it has been held as follows:

"19. The expression "cognizance" has not been defined in the Code.  But  the
word (cognizance) is of indefinite import. It  has  no  esoteric  or  mystic
significance in criminal law. It merely means "become  aware  of"  and  when
used with reference to a court or a Judge, it connotes "to  take  notice  of
judicially". It indicates the point when  a  court  or  a  Magistrate  takes
judicial notice of an  offence  with  a  view  to  initiate  proceedings  in
respect of such offence said to have been committed by someone.
20. "Taking cognizance" does not involve any formal action of any  kind.  It
occurs as soon as a Magistrate applies his mind to the suspected  commission
of an offence.  Cognizance  is  taken  prior  to  commencement  of  criminal
proceedings. Taking of cognizance is  thus  a  sine  qua  non  or  condition
precedent for holding a valid trial. Cognizance is taken of an  offence  and
not of an offender. Whether or not a Magistrate has taken cognizance  of  an
offence depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and no  rule  of
universal application can be laid down as to when a Magistrate can  be  said
to have taken cognizance."



The above view has been further endorsed in Bhushan  Kumar  and  another  v.
State (NCT of Delhi) and another[2] holding that:

"11. In Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon  International  Ltd.  (SCC  p.
499, para 19) the expression "cognizance" was explained  by  this  Court  as
[pic]"it merely means 'become aware of' and when used with  reference  to  a
court or a Judge, it connotes 'to take notice of judicially'.  It  indicates
the point when a court or a Magistrate takes judicial notice of  an  offence
with a view to initiating proceedings in respect of  such  offence  said  to
have been committed by someone." It  is  entirely  a  different  thing  from
initiation of proceedings; rather it  is  the  condition  precedent  to  the
initiation of proceedings by the Magistrate  or  the  Judge.  Cognizance  is
taken of cases and not of persons. Under Section 190 of the Code, it is  the
application of  judicial  mind  to  the  averments  in  the  complaint  that
constitutes cognizance. At this stage, the Magistrate has  to  be  satisfied
whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding and not whether  there  is
sufficient ground for conviction.  Whether  the  evidence  is  adequate  for
supporting the conviction can be determined only at the  trial  and  not  at
the stage of enquiry. If there is sufficient ground for proceeding then  the
Magistrate is empowered for issuance of process under  Section  204  of  the
Code."


In Smt. Nagawwa  v.  Veeranna  Shivalingappa  Kinjalgi  and  others[3],  the
extent to which the Magistrate can go at the stage of taking cognizance  has
been discussed. To quote:

"5. ... It is true that in coming to a decision  as  to  whether  a  process
should be  issued  the  Magistrate  can  take  into  consideration  inherent
improbabilities appearing on the face of the complaint or  in  the  evidence
led by the complainant in support of the allegations but  there  appears  to
be a very thin line of demarcation between a probability  of  conviction  of
the accused and establishment  of  a  prima  facie  case  against  him.  The
Magistrate has been given an undoubted discretion  in  the  matter  and  the
discretion has to be judicially exercised by him. Once  the  Magistrate  has
exercised his discretion it is not for the High Court, or even  this  Court,
to substitute its own discretion for that of the Magistrate  or  to  examine
the case on merits with a view to find out whether or  not  the  allegations
in the complaint, if proved, would  ultimately  end  in  conviction  of  the
accused. ..."


Cognizance is a process where the court takes judicial notice of an  offence
so as to initiate proceedings in respect of the alleged  violation  of  law.
The offence is investigated by the police. No doubt, the court is not  bound
by the report submitted by the police under Section 173(2) of Cr.PC. If  the
report is that no case is made out,  the  Magistrate  is  still  free,  nay,
bound, if a case according to him is made out,  to  reject  the  report  and
take cognizance. It is also open  to  him  to  order  further  investigation
under  Section  173(8)  of  Cr.PC.  In  the  case  before  us,  the  learned
Magistrate went through the entire records of the case, not limiting to  the
report filed by the police and has passed a reasoned order holding  that  it
is not a fit case to take cognizance for the purpose of issuing  process  to
the appellant. Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or  the
view  taken  by  the  court  is  wholly  unreasonable  or  there   is   non-
consideration of any relevant material or there is  palpable  misreading  of
records, the revisional court is not justified in setting aside  the  order,
merely because another view is possible. The revisional court is  not  meant
to  act  as  an  appellate  court.  The  whole  purpose  of  the  revisional
jurisdiction is to preserve  the  power  in  the  court  to  do  justice  in
accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence.  Revisional  power
of the court under Sections 397 to 401 of Cr.PC is not to  be  equated  with
that of an appeal. Unless the  finding  of  the  court,  whose  decision  is
sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or  untenable  in  law  or  is
grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision  is  based
on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or  where  the
judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily  or  capriciously,  the  courts
may  not  interfere  with  decision  in   exercise   of   their   revisional
jurisdiction.

The  whole  purpose  of  taking  cognizance  of  an  offence  under  Section
190(1)(b) Cr.PC is to commence proceedings under Chapter XVI  of  the  Cr.PC
by issuing process under Section 204 Cr.PC to the accused  involved  in  the
case. No doubt, it is not innocence but  involvement  that  is  material  at
this stage. Once the legal requirements to constitute  the  alleged  offence
qua one of the accused are lacking, there is no point in  taking  cognizance
and proceeding further as against him.

It is to  be  noted  that  in  the  first  complaint  filed  by  the  second
respondent - the de facto  complainant,  there  is  no  allegation  for  any
demand for bribe by the appellant. The allegation of demand is  specifically
against accused no.2 only. That allegation against the appellant  is  raised
only subsequently. Be that as it may, the  only  basis  for  supporting  the
allegation is the conversation that is said to  be  recorded  by  the  voice
recorder.  The  Directorate  of  Forensic  Science  Laboratories,  State  of
Maharashtra vide Annexure-B report has stated that the conversation  is  not
in  audible  condition  and,  hence,  the  same  is   not   considered   for
spectrographic analysis. Learned Counsel for  the  respondents  submit  that
the conversation has been translated and the same has been verified  by  the
panch  witnesses.  Admittedly,  the  panch  witnesses  have  not  heard  the
conversation, since they  were  not  present  in  the  room.  As  the  voice
recorder is itself not subjected to analysis, there is no point  in  placing
reliance  on  the  translated  version.  Without   source,   there   is   no
authenticity for the translation. Source and authenticity are  the  two  key
factors for an electronic evidence, as held by this Court in Anvar  P.V.  v.
P.K. Basheer and others[4].

The Magistrate, having seen the records and having heard  the  parties,  has
come to the conclusion that no offence is made  out  against  the  appellant
under the provisions of the PC Act so as to prosecute  him.  Even  according
to the High Court, "the crux of the matter is the conversation  between  the
complainant and the  accused  no.1  of  22.11.2010".  That  conversation  is
inaudible and the same is not to be taken in evidence. Therefore,  once  the
'crux'  goes,  the  superstructure  also  falls,  lacking  in  legs.  Hence,
prosecution becomes a futile exercise as  the  materials  available  do  not
show that an offence is made  out  as  against  the  appellant.  This  part,
unfortunately, the  High  Court  missed.  "Summoning  of  an  accused  in  a
criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be  set  into  motion
as a matter of course. ..."(Pepsi  Foods  Limited  and  another  v.  Special
Judicial  Magistrate  and  others[5],  Paragraph-28).  The  process  of  the
criminal court shall not be permitted to be used as a weapon of  harassment.
"Once it is found that there is no material on record to connect an  accused
with the crime, there is no meaning in prosecuting him. It would be a  sheer
waste of public time and  money  to  permit  such  proceedings  to  continue
against  such  a  person"(See  State  of  Karnataka  v.  L.  Muniswamy   and
others[6]. Unmerited and undeserved prosecution is an  infringement  of  the
guarantee under Article 21 of the Constitution of  India.  "...  Article  21
assures every person right to life and personal liberty. The  word  personal
liberty is of the widest amplitude covering variety of rights which goes  to
constitute personal liberty of a citizen. Its deprivation shall be  only  as
per procedure prescribed in the Code and the  Evidence  Act  conformable  to
the mandate of the Supreme law, the Constitution.  ..."(State  of  Bihar  v.
P.P. Sharma, IAS and another[7], Paragraph-60).

Once the prosecution is of the view that no  case  is  made  out  so  as  to
prosecute an accused, unless the court finds otherwise, there  is  no  point
in making a request for sanction for  prosecution.  If  the  prosecution  is
simply vexatious, sanction for prosecution is not to  be  granted.  That  is
one of the main  considerations  to  be  borne  in  mind  by  the  competent
authority while considering whether the sanction is to be  granted  or  not.
In Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat[8], this  Court  has  in
unmistakable terms made  it  clear  that  no  court  can  issue  a  positive
direction to an authority to give sanction for prosecution. To quote:


"32. By issuing a direction to the Secretary to  grant  sanction,  the  High
Court closed all other alternatives to the Secretary and  compelled  him  to
proceed only in one direction and  to  act  only  in  one  way,  namely,  to
sanction the prosecution of the appellant. The Secretary was not allowed  to
consider whether it would be feasible to prosecute  the  appellant;  whether
the complaint of Harshadrai of illegal gratification which was sought to  be
supported  by  "trap"  was  false  and  whether  the  prosecution  would  be
vexatious particularly as it was in the knowledge  of  the  Government  that
the firm had been blacklisted once and there was demand for some  amount  to
be paid to the Government by the firm in connection with this contract.  The
discretion not to sanction the prosecution was thus taken away by  the  High
Court."


The High Court exceeded in its jurisdiction in substituting  its  views  and
that too without any legal basis. The impugned order  is  hence  set  aside.
Appeal is allowed.






                                  ........................................J.
                                     (KURIAN JOSEPH)



                                    ......................................J.
                                                (ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE)
New Delhi;
January 16, 2015.
-----------------------
[1]    (2008) 2 SCC 492
[2]    (2012) 5 SCC 424
[3]    (1976) 3 SCC 736
[4]    2014 (10) SCALE 660
[5]    (1998) 5 SCC 749
[6]    (1977) 2 SCC 699
[7]    1992 Supp(1) SCC 222
[8]    (1997) 7 SCC 622

-----------------------
                                                                  REPORTABLE


CIVIL APPEAL No. 7513 OF 2009 NATIONAL BANK LIMITED ...... APPELLANT VERSUS GHANSHYAM DAS AGARWAL & ORS. ..... RESPONDENTS

                                                                  REPORTABLE



                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CIVIL APPEAL No. 7513  OF 2009


NATIONAL BANK LIMITED                               ...... APPELLANT

      VERSUS

GHANSHYAM DAS AGARWAL & ORS.        ..... RESPONDENTS



                               J U D G M E N T


VIKRAMAJIT SEN,J.


1     Notice was ordered in the Special Leave Petition (now Appeal)  on  9th
July, 2007, but while doing so, this Court had specifically clarified  that:
 "Pending further orders the impugned order passed by the High  Court  shall
continue  to  operate".  The  impugned  Order  decreed  the  suit  filed  by
Ghanshyam Das Agarwal, who is hereinafter referred  to  as  'the  Exporter',
for a sum of USD 352,250 against the Appellant Bank (Defendant  No.3  before
the Trial Court/Single Judge) in favour of the Bank of India, which  is  the
Exporter's Bank.  The remaining claim has been relegated  for  Trial.    The
impugned Order further clarifies that upon the payment  of  these  decreetal
dues the injunction granted by the  Debt  Recovery  Tribunal  by  its  Order
dated April 10, 2002 shall stand vacated; and upon this payment  the  Orders
of injunction passed by the Calcutta High Court on 22nd December,  1999  and
14th January, 2000 shall also  stand  vacated.    The  impugned  Order  goes
further to state that the decreetal amount shall be satisfied  from  out  of
the funds lying with the American  Express  Bank  Limited,  Defendant  No.2.
To this extent  the  decreetal  amount  also  stands  satisfied.    It  also
transpires that the Defendant No.4, M/s. Sarumeah & Sons,  a  proprietorship
concern, has, consequent on the death of the sole  proprietor,  been  struck
off from the array of parties.   In any event, since claims are  posited  on
a Letter of Credit furnished by the Appellant, albeit, on  the  instructions
of  its  now  non-existent  constituent,  namely,  M/s.  Sarumeah  &   Sons,
(hereinafter nomenclatured  as  the  'Importer')  the  latter  is  really  a
proforma or at best, a proper party, to the extent that the  claim  pertains
to the subject Letter  of  Credit  (L.C.).    The  decreetal  amount  stands
satisfied and the Plaintiff/Exporter  should  be  pragmatic  enough  not  to
expect any further recovery owing to  the  legal  dissolution  of  the  sole
proprietorship concern, i.e., the Importer.    In  essence,  therefore,  the
question raised by the Appellant  is  reduced  to  an  academic  one,  which
Courts normally abjure from  answering.    However,  since  Leave  has  been
granted, we feel curially  compelled  to  briefly  delve  into  the  factual
matrix of the dispute.

2     On 20th April, 1999, on the request of  the  Importer,  the  Appellant
had opened a Letter of Credit for the aforementioned sum of USD  352,250  on
Bank of India, Calcutta (Negotiating  Bank)  in  favour  of  the  Plaintiff-
Exporter; the American Express Bank Ltd. Calcutta, is Defendant No.4 in  the
said civil suit bearing CS No.678 of 1999,  as  the  advising  Bank  of  the
Appellant.   The  contract  was  placed  on  the  Plaintiff/Exporter  for  a
consignment of non-basmati rice to be exported from India  to  the  Importer
in Bangladesh by railroad.   One of the terms of the Letter  of  Credit  was
that one set of non-negotiable shipping documents would be  couriered  after
the consignment was  despatched  to  the  opener  of  the  LC,  namely,  the
Appellant before us. This was done on 11th May, 1999 and thereupon the  Bill
of Exchange drawn by the Exporter was  discounted  by  its  banker,  namely,
Bank of India, which thereupon  drew  another  Bill  of  Exchange  upon  the
Importer.  It is alleged that the Appellant received  the  documentation  on
19th May, 1999, and on that very day pointed out the  existence  of  certain
discrepancies therein to the Negotiating Bank.    The  Appellant's  case  is
that it received a letter from the Importer on 1st June, 1999, stating  that
the documents were not acceptable and  that  the  goods  were  damaged,  and
there were also shortages therein.   In its telex  dated  24th  June,  1999,
the Appellant suppressed the stand of the Importer and stated as follows:-
"RE YR TLX MSG NO. 2288 DTD 24/6/99 CONCERNING PAYMENT OF YR BILL UNDER  OUR
L/C NO. 02-133-99.  PLS BE INFMD THAT THE DOCTS HV NOT BEEN ACCEPTED BY  THE
IMPORTER TILL DATE (.) MEANTIME WE HOLD YR DOCTS.  AT  YR  ENTIRE  RISK  AND
DISPOSAL (.)"


3     The Negotiating Bank,  viz.,  Bank  of  India,  thereafter,  raised  a
demand on the Appellant for the said sum of USD 352,250 by its  telex  dated
12th July, 1999 in response to which the Appellant  again,  as  we  see  it,
evasively and with mala fide intent, mentioned that the Importer was out  of
station and that they would revert to the subject  upon  his  arrival.    On
18th July, 1999, the Appellant addressed a telex to Bank of India  informing
it that the consignment was located at Darshana Land  Custom  and  that  the
Importer and Exporter were in dialogue with each other.  Eventually, by  its
telex dated 26th August, 1999, the Appellant informed  Bank  of  India  that
the documents had not been accepted by the  Importer.    The  Appellant  has
admitted in its Written Statement that the documentation was received by  it
on 19th May, 1999 and returned  to  the  Bank  of  India  as  late  as  10th
October, 1999.   It has also been admitted by  the  Appellant  that  in  the
interregnum, without prior information to the Negotiating  Bank  or  to  the
Exporter, it had certified photocopies of  the  shipping  documents  to  its
constituent, i.e., the Importer, ostensibly for  customs  purposes.    These
documents have not been returned to the Appellant and,  obviously  on  their
strength, the Importer has managed to clear the entire consignment from  the
Darshana Railway Authority.   The say of the  Appellant  is  that  this  was
achieved through the C&F Agent of the Importer by  producing  a  forged  NOC
and  endorsement  on  the  reverse  of  the  photocopies  of  the   shipping
documents, certified by the  Appellant.    Any  reasonably  diligent  Banker
would be alive to the possibility of the misuse of  documents  certified  by
it, even if we are to assume that it was not privy to the fraud.    We  have
earlier noted and we emphasise that  the  Appellant  had  evaded  mentioning
that without the permission of or information to either the Exporter or  the
Bank of India, it had provided  its  certification  to  photocopies  of  the
documentation  which,  in  the  event  (and  as  any  prudent  Banker  would
anticipate), were misused by the  Importer  to  have  the  rice  consignment
released to him.   In  trans-border  or  international  transactions,  trade
depends almost entirely on the faith  reposed  in  banking  institutions  to
secure the price of the exported goods, commodities etc.   The Exporter  can
legally and reliably expect that the Bankers will  watch  its  interests  by
ensuring that the exported consignment shall be released to the  buyer  only
on the transmission of the price of the  shipment  as  secured  through  the
Letter of Credit.   Heavy and fiduciary responsibility, therefore, rests  on
the Opening Bank which  furnishes  the  Letter  of  Credit  to  ensure  that
payment  is  secured  unless  the  documentation  is  defective  and/or  the
invocation of the Letter of Credit is discrepant.   In  every  legal  system
spanning our globe, jural opinion  is  unanimous  to  the  effect  that  the
Opening Bank cannot disregard, delay or dilute its  responsibility  to  make
payment strictly and promptly as obligated by the terms  of  the  Letter  of
Credit.  This Bank owes a duty to all concerned to ensure  that  any  action
taken by it would not enable or conduce the frustration of  the  obligations
contained in a Letter of Credit,  as  recognised  by  International  Banking
norms or extant Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary  Credits  (UCP)
500.  As we see it, therefore, keeping in perspective  that  the  Importer's
Bank  i.e.,  Appellant  before   us,   should   not   have   certified   the
documentation, reasonably anticipating or being  aware  of  the  possibility
that this certification could be abused.   Law assures the Exporter and  its
Bank to repose in the expectation, nay,  certainty,  that  the  consignment,
which is the subject-matter of the Letter of Credit, is not usurped  by  the
Importer/Consignee  or  its  agents,  without  remitting  payment   to   the
consignor's Bank.   This is a strict liability cast on the bank which  opens
the Letter of Credit, since otherwise International trade and commerce  will
virtually and indubitably come to a standstill.

4     It is only when irretrievable injury is bound  to  result  and  it  is
plainly evident that there is egregious fraud  strictly  ascribable  to  the
beneficiary of the LC, that a reason to insulate a party before  it  against
liability and that too, comes about only  through  the  prompt  intervention
and interdiction of a Court of law.  This Court has consistently adhered  to
this position of law even through the passage of several  decades.   The  LC
has the effect of creating a bargain between the banker and  the  vendor  of
goods, a deemed nexus between the Seller and  the  Issuing  Bank,  rendering
the latter liable to the Seller to pay the purchase price  or  to  accept  a
Bill of Exchange upon tender of the documents envisaged  and  stipulated  in
the LC (See Tarapore and Co. vs. V.O.  Tractors  Export,  AIR  1970  SC  891
where  Halsbury's  Law  of  England  have   been   relied   upon).     These
observations have been repeated in United Commercial Bank vs. Bank of  India
[1981 (2) SCC 766], U.P. Coop.  Federation  Ltd.  vs.  Singh  Consultants  &
Engineers (P)Ltd. [1988 (1)  SCC  174],  Federal  Bank  Ltd.  vs.  V.M.  Jog
Engineering Ltd. [2001 (1) SCC 663, Himadri Chemicals  Industries  Ltd.  vs.
Coal Tar Refining Co. [2007 (8) SCC 110].   The Opening Bank must only  look
to assure itself that the  invocation  is  in  terms  of  the  LC,  and  the
completion of this exercise has consistently been circumscribed to  a  short
period, which in the case in hand is one week as per Article  13  B  of  UCP
500.

5     It is quite evident  to  us  that  it  is  this  reasoning  which  has
persuaded the Division Bench of the Calcutta  High  Court  in  the  impugned
Order to comprehensively consider  and  construe  the  stand  taken  by  the
Appellant in the Dhaka  Suit  as  constituting  a  clear  admission  of  the
Appellant Bank's liability.   We must immediately  clarify  that  the  Dhaka
Suit had been filed by the Importer praying for an  injunction  against  the
Appellant as well  as  the  Bank  of  America  Ltd.  restraining  them  from
releasing any payment relating to the subject consignment of  rice  exported
to him in Bangladesh by the Exporter from Calcutta. There was no  impediment
or embargo on the Appellant stating in  the  pleadings  in  the  Dhaka  Suit
those facts which it now seeks to proffer, viz. that  it  had  no  liability
whatsoever and that it did not take any action  which  enabled  or  conduced
the release of the consignment without first securing and remitting  payment
in terms of the LC opened  by  it.    Indeed,  a  holistic  perusal  of  the
Written Statement filed by the Appellant in the Dhaka  litigation  discloses
that it had correctly spelt out the factual matrix, and the position it  had
adopted therein was in consonance with law pertaining to  legal  obligations
of the Opening Bank with regard to the Letter of  Credit  furnished  by  it.
It is also noteworthy that the Written Statement  was  filed  in  the  Dhaka
litigation after the Appellant had complete knowledge of  the  subject  suit
filed against the Appellant/Exporter in the Calcutta High Court, which  suit
is the springboard of the present Appeal.  It also needs clarification  that
in the Dhaka Suit Defendants 1 and 2 correspond to the Appellant,  Defendant
No. 3 therein is American Express Bank Ltd., i.e., Respondent  No.3  herein,
Defendant No. 4, i.e., Bank  of  India,  is  Respondent  No.2  herein,   and
Defendant No. 5 is Respondent No.1 in this Appeal, i.e.,  the  Plaintiff  in
the  Calcutta  Suit.   The  following  paragraphs  from  the  said   Written
Statement if the Appellant in the Dhaka Suit are worthy of reproduction:
"13.  That the statements made in paragraph No. 7 of the plaint are  matters
of record and the matter of strict proof, the onus  of  which  lies  on  the
Plaintiff.  Moreover, it is stated that the request of  the  Plaintiff,  the
Defendant No. 2 certified the photocopy  of  Non-negotiable  copies  of  the
shipping documents and handed over the same alongwith customs  purpose  copy
of LCAF without NOC to the Plaintiff for  customs  assessment  purpose.  But
the Plaintiff never returned the said  documents  to  the  Defendant  No.  2
Bank.   But the Plaintiff cleared the entire consignment from  the  Daranana
railway Authority through its C & F Agent M/s  Anwar  Hossian  by  producing
forged NOC and endorsement  on  the  back  side  of  the  photocopy  of  the
shipping documents.
.....
17. That the statements made in paragraph No. 11 of the plaint  are  matters
of record and as such the Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 do not offer  any  comments
with regard to them.  However, it is mentioned here that the  Defendant  No.
2 received the discrepant shipping documents on  19.05.99  and  communicated
with the negotiating bank i.e. Defendant No. 4 as well as the Defendant  No.
5 Importer for rectification of the  discrepancies.   But  on  10.10.99  the
Defendant No. 5 returned the  entire  sets  of  shipping  documents  to  the
negotiating bank i.e. Defendant No. 4 and mentioned here that  the  importer
i.e. Plaintiff had taken delivery of the imported  goods  against  the  said
shipping documents of letter of Credit No. 02-133-99 from  Railway  Station,
Darshana during the period from 16.05.99 to  01.06.99  through  its  C  &  F
Agent M/s Anwar Hossian by forged documents. So question of  discrepancy  in
the documents is immaterial and  irrelevant  and  as  such  the  application
filed by the Plaintiff/petitioner for temporary injunction is liable  to  be
dismissed.
18.   That the statements made in  paragraph  No.  12,  13  and  14  of  the
application are false fabricated, mala fide, concocted and hence  denied  by
Defendant Nos.1 and  2  it  is  stated  that  Defendant  No.2  returned  the
shipping documents to the beneficiary's bank i.e. the Defendant  No.  4  due
to discrepancy therein and  requested  to  stop  payment  against  the  said
shipping  documents  of  the  L/C  No.  02-133-99.   The  Defendant  No.   4
communicated the same to the Defendant No. 5.  But the Defendant No. 5  i.e.
supplier returned  the  entire  shipping  documents  and  alleged  that  the
Plaintiff has already taken delivery of the goods against the said  shipping
documents of the L/C No. 02-133-99.   It may  be  mentioned  here  that  the
Defendant No.5 i.e. the supplier a suit  as  Plaintiff  in  this  matter  in
Calcutta High Court  being suit Nos. C.S. 678 of 1999 against  (1)  Bank  of
India  (2)  American  Express  Bank  Calcutta  (3)  National  Bank  Limited,
Khatungonj all are Defendant Nos. 4,3,2  respectively in this suit  and  (4)
M/s Saru Meah & Sons Plaintiff in this suit.  The  supplier  i.e.  Defendant
No.5 in this case obtained temporary injuries from Calcutta  High  Court  in
suit No. C.S.  678  of  1999  restraining  American  Express  Bank  Limited,
Calcutta i.e. Defendant Nos. 3 in this suit  from  disturbing  sums  without
leaving a sum of Rs.1.54 crore equivalent to more or  less  US$  3,52,250.00
in Nostro A/D  No.412800566  maintained  with  them  by  the  National  Bank
Limited.  The Defendant No.1 of suit No. C.S. No.678 of 1999 i.e.  Defendant
No. 4 in this onus requested the National Bank Limited,  to  make  immediate
payment to the Plaintiff of Suit No.678 of 1999 i.e. Defendant No.5 in  this
suit i.e. supplier through its  corresponding  bank  American  Express  Bank
i.e. Defendant No.3.   The Defendant No.1 of the suit  No.  C.S.  No.678  of
1999 made such request to the Defendant No.1 of this  suit  on  the   ground
that the goods against the shipping documents  had  already  been  delivered
and consumed by the Defendant No.4 i.e. Plaintiff in this  suit.    Now  the
Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 are under deligation to  reimburse  the  payments  to
the supplier's corresponding bank i.e. Defendant No.3.   So the  application
filed by the Plaintiff for temporary injunction is liable to be dismissed."

A perusal of paragraph 18 of the Written Statement filed  by  the  Appellant
in the Dhaka litigation discloses that its position was that it  was  "under
obligation to reimburse the payments to the  supplier's  corresponding  bank
i.e., Defendant No.3" (Bank of America Ltd. therein).    This  admission  of
fact  is  clear,  and  in  consonance  with  the  law  pertaining  to  legal
obligations concerning Letters of  Credit,  obliges  it  to  remit  payments
contemplated therein.   Assuming that the Appellant did not  take  any  mala
fide action so as to enable the Importer to have  the  consignment  released
without  authority,  it  was   in   clear   violation   of   its   fiduciary
responsibility as the Opener of a Letter of Credit.  Therefore,  insofar  as
the factual matrix is  concerned,  the  Appellant  had  correctly  made  the
statement  pertaining  to  its  liability  in  the  Dhaka  Suit,  which  can
legitimately be taken as an admission in the Calcutta Suit.

6     The interim Order, it may be recalled, did not restrain  or  interdict
the operation of the impugned Judgment and has in  actuality,  rendered  the
Appeal infructuous, since the LC amounts have left the Appellant's  coffers.
 In view of the admission of fact made by the Appellant, we think the  Court
was correct in concluding in the impugned Judgment that a money  decree  for
the sum secured by the subject Letter of Credit (for USD 352,250) should  be
passed.   The Appeal is without merit and is dismissed with costs.



............................................J.
                                          [VIKRAMAJIT SEN]




............................................J.
                                          [ARUN MISHRA]
New Delhi;
January 14, 2015.
























-----------------------
13


Friday, January 16, 2015

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 412 OF 2015 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.5236/2014) K.V.S. RAM .. Appellant Versus BANGALORE METROPOLITAN ..Respondent TRANSPORT CORPN.


                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURIDISCTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 412 OF 2015
                  (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.5236/2014)


K.V.S. RAM                                              .. Appellant

                                   Versus

BANGALORE METROPOLITAN                           ..Respondent
TRANSPORT CORPN.

                               J U D G M E N T

R. BANUMATHI, J.

Leave granted.
2.          This appeal by special leave arises out of  the  judgment  dated
3.9.2012 passed by the High Court of Karnataka,  in and by which,  the  High
Court  dismissed  the  appeal  filed  by  the   appellant-workman   thereby,
confirming the  termination of the appellant.
3.          Brief facts which led to  the  filing  of  this  appeal  are  as
under:-  The  appellant  was  appointed  on  the  post  of   Driver  in  the
Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation on 3.9.1985 and was working  on
the same post since then.  The appellant was served with article  of  charge
dated 3.9.1990 alleging that he  had  secured  appointment  by  producing  a
false transfer certificate.  An enquiry was initiated on 15.7.1992  and  the
appellant submitted his explanation to the aforesaid charges.   The  Enquiry
Officer submitted his report on 13.3.2002 holding the appellant  guilty  for
his misconduct.  After affording opportunity to the appellant to show  cause
against the proposed  punishment,  the  disciplinary  authority  passed  the
order imposing  punishment  of  dismissal  from  service  vide  order  dated
1.10.2004.
4.          Aggrieved by the order of dismissal,  the  appellant  raised  an
industrial dispute bearing I.D.No.39/2005 before the III  Additional  Labour
Court, Bangalore.  The Labour Court vide award dated 14.2.2007 directed  the
management of the corporation to reinstate the  appellant  in  his  original
post with continuity of service but without  backwages.   The  Labour  Court
modified the punishment directing  withholding  of  four  annual  increments
with cumulative  effect.   In  the  Labour  Court,  appellant  has  produced
notarized copies of orders passed by the respondent-Corporation  in  respect
of other workmen, who have committed similar  misconduct  but  were  awarded
lesser punishments.  Referring to Exs. W.5 to W.11 which are  the  notarized
copies of the orders passed in respect of other workmen who  have  committed
similar misconduct, Labour Court held that those workmen were reinstated  in
service with minor punishment  of  withholding  of  few  annual  increments,
whereas the  appellant  was  imposed  grave  punishment  of  dismissal  from
service and thus was discriminated.  Referring to another  judgment  of  the
High Court in W.P.No.17316/2005 (L/K) dated 8.8.2005, Labour Court  observed
that when similarly situated workmen were imposed lesser punishment and  the
appellant cannot be discriminated by imposing punishment of  dismissal  from
service and the Labour Court in exercise of  its  discretion  under  Section
11A  set  aside  the  punishment  imposed  on  the  appellant  and  directed
reinstatement of the appellant without backwages.
5.          Being aggrieved, respondent-corporation filed  a  writ  petition
before the High Court.  Vide order dated 31.1.2008,   learned  Single  Judge
of the High Court allowed the writ petition holding that the  punishment  of
dismissal from service was proportionate to the  proved  misconduct  against
the appellant.  Aggrieved  by  the  same,  the  appellant-workman  preferred
appeal before the Division Bench challenging the  legality  and  correctness
of the said order.  The Division Bench dismissed the  appeal  filed  by  the
appellant on the ground that the charges levelled against the appellant  are
serious in nature and that the punishment of dismissal from service  imposed
by the disciplinary authority was just  and  proper.  In  this  appeal,  the
appellant assails the correctness of the above judgment.
6.          Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the High  Court
erroneously held that the long delay of twelve years in holding the  enquiry
is not fatal to the case, although it is clearly evident that no  reasonable
explanation is forthcoming for the  inordinate  delay  of  twelve  years  in
concluding the disciplinary proceedings.    It was  further  submitted  that
in the similar cases of other workmen who produced bogus  certificate,  they
were  reinstated  in  the  service  withholding  of  few   increments   with
cumulative effect and while so, the appellant alone cannot be  discriminated
by imposing harsh punishment of dismissal from service.
7.          Per  contra,  learned  counsel  for  the  respondent-Corporation
contended that the finding of guilt was based on  appreciation  of  evidence
on record and having regard to the gravity of the charges, the Labour  Court
was not  justified  in  interfering  with  the  punishment  imposed  by  the
disciplinary authority and the learned Single Judge as well as the  Division
Bench of the High Court rightly set aside the award  passed  by  the  Court.

8.          We have carefully considered the rival contentions  and  perused
the impugned judgment and other materials on record.
9.          The appellant joined the services  of  the  corporation  in  the
year 1985.  In the year 1990, charges  were  framed  against  the  appellant
alleging that he had secured appointment by producing  a  false  certificate
and enquiry  was  initiated  in  the  year  1992  and  the  Enquiry  Officer
submitted his report only in  the  year  2002,  nearly  twelve  years  after
framing of charges.  Even though the Enquiry Officer  submitted  his  report
on 13.3.2002, order of dismissal from service was passed only on  1.10.2004.
 Enquiry report was thus submitted after a lapse of twelve years  and  there
was a delay of twelve years in conducting and completing  the  enquiry.   As
pointed out by the Labour Court, there  was  no  plausible  explanation  for
such inordinate delay in completing the enquiry.   The  appellant  continued
in service from 1990 to 2004.  Having allowed the appellant-workman to  work
for fourteen years, by the time punishment of  dismissal  from  service  was
imposed on the appellant, the appellant had reached the age  of  forty  five
years.  As observed by the Labour Court, the appellant having crossed  forty
five years, he could not have sought for alternative  employment.   Further,
as seen from Exs. W.5 to W.11, similarly placed workmen were ordered  to  be
reinstated with lesser punishment of stoppage of few increments.  While  so,
there is no reason as to  why  for  the  similar  misconduct  the  appellant
should be imposed harsh punishment of dismissal from service.
10.         It is settled proposition of  law  that  while  considering  the
management's decision to dismiss or terminate the  services  of  a  workman,
the Labour Court can interfere with the  decision  of  the  management  only
when it is satisfied that  the  punishment  imposed  by  the  management  is
highly disproportionate to the degree of guilt  of  the  workman  concerned.
Considering the  delay  in  completing  the  enquiry  and  the  age  of  the
appellant and the fact that similarly situated workmen were reinstated  with
lesser punishment, the Labour Court ordered reinstatement,  in  exercise  of
its discretion under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act.
11.         In the Writ Petition, while  setting  aside  the  award  of  the
Labour Court, learned Single Judge placed  reliance  upon  the  judgment  of
this Court passed in the case of Punjab Water Supply Sewerage Board  &  Anr.
vs.  Ramsajivan & Anr., reported in 2007 (2) SCC (L&S) 668 =  (2007)  9  SCC
86 and also another judgment of the High Court and observed  that  a  person
who practices fraud for securing employment cannot perpetuate on the  ground
of delay  and  the  learned  Single  Judge  faulted  the  Labour  Court  for
exercising discretion under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes  Act  and
interfering  with  the  punishment  of  dismissal  from  service.   In   our
considered view, in exercise of its power of superintendence  under  Article
227 of the Constitution of India, the High  Court  can  interfere  with  the
order of the Tribunal, only, when there has been a patent perversity in  the
orders of tribunal and courts subordinate to it  or  where  there  has  been
gross and manifest failure of justice or the  basic  principles  of  natural
justice have  been  flouted.   In  our  view,  when  the  Labour  Court  has
exercised its discretion keeping in view the  facts  of  the  case  and  the
cases of similarly situated workmen,  the  High  Court  ought  not  to  have
interfered with the exercise of discretion by the Labour Court.
12.         In Syed Yakoob vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan, AIR  1964  SC  477,   the
Constitution Bench of this Court considered the scope of  the  High  Court's
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in cases involving  challenge  to
the  orders  passed  by  the  authorities  entrusted   with   quasi-judicial
functions under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939.  Speaking for the majority  of
the Constitution Bench, Gajendragadkar, J. observed as under: (AIR pp.  479-
80, para 7)
"7.   ...A writ of  certiorari  can  be  issued  for  correcting  errors  of
jurisdiction committed by inferior courts  or  tribunals;  these  are  cases
where  orders  are  passed  by  inferior   courts   or   tribunals   without
jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure  to  exercise
jurisdiction.   A  writ  can  similarly  be  issued  where  in  exercise  of
jurisdiction conferred on it,  the  court  or  tribunal  acts  illegally  or
improperly, as for  instance,  it  decides  a  question  without  giving  an
opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the  order,  or  where  the
procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed  to  principles  of
natural justice.  There is, however,  no  doubt  that  the  jurisdiction  to
issue a writ of certiorari is  a  supervisory  jurisdiction  and  the  court
exercising  it  is  not  entitled  to  act  as  an  appellate  court.   This
limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by  the  inferior
court or tribunal as a result of the  appreciation  of  evidence  cannot  be
reopened or questioned in writ  proceedings.   An  error  of  law  which  is
apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ,  but  not  an
error of fact, however, grave it may appear to be.  In regard to  a  finding
of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued  if  it
is shown that in recording the said finding, the  Tribunal  had  erroneously
refused to admit  admissible  and  material  evidence,  or  had  erroneously
admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced  the  impugned  finding.
Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on  no  evidence,   that  would  be
regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of  certiorari.
 In dealing with this category of cases, however, we  must  always  bear  in
mind that a finding of fact recorded by the tribunal  cannot  be  challenged
in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant  and
material  evidence  adduced  before  the  Tribunal   was   insufficient   or
inadequate to sustain the impugned finding.  The adequacy or sufficiency  of
evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the  said
finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the  said
points cannot be agitated before a writ court.  It is  within  these  limits
that the jurisdiction conferred on the High  Courts  under  Article  226  to
issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised."
               (Emphasis supplied)
13.         In the case of Iswarlal Mohanlal  Thakkar  vs.  Paschim  Gujarat
Vij Company Ltd. & Anr., (2004) 6 SCC 434,  it was held as under:-
"15. We find the judgment and award of the labour court  well  reasoned  and
based on facts and evidence on record. The  High  Court  has  erred  in  its
exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of  India  to  annul
the findings of the labour court in its award as  it  is  well  settled  law
that the [pic]High Court cannot exercise its power under Article 227 of  the
Constitution as an appellate court or reappreciate evidence and  record  its
findings on the contentious points. Only if there is a serious error of  law
or the findings recorded suffer from error apparent on record, can the  High
Court quash the order of a lower court. The  Labour  Court  in  the  present
case has satisfactorily exercised its  original  jurisdiction  and  properly
appreciated the facts  and  legal  evidence  on  record  and  given  a  well
reasoned order  and  answered  the  points  of  dispute  in  favour  of  the
appellant. The High Court had no reason to interfere with the  same  as  the
award of the Labour Court was based on sound  and  cogent  reasoning,  which
has served the ends of justice.

16. It is relevant to mention that  in  Shalini  Shyam  Shetty  v.  Rajendra
Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329 with regard to the limitations of  the  High
Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227, it was  held  in  para
49 that: (SCC p. 348)
"49. (m) ... The power of interference under [Article 227] is to be kept  to
the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt  and
the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted  in  order  to  maintain
public  confidence  in  the  functioning  of  the   tribunals   and   courts
subordinate to the High Court."
It was also held that: (SCC p. 347, para 49)
"49. (c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its  power
of superintendence under Article 227 of  the  Constitution,  interfere  with
the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can  it,  in  exercise
of this power, act as a court of appeal over the  orders  of  the  court  or
tribunal subordinate to it."

14.         Emphasizing that while exercising  jurisdiction  under  Articles
226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India, Courts are to keep in view  the
goals set out in the Preamble and in  Part  IV  of  the  Constitution  while
construing social welfare legislations, in Harjinder Singh vs. Punjab  State
Warehousing Corporation,  (2010) 3 SCC 192, this Court has  held  as  under:

"21.  Before concluding, we consider it  necessary  to  observe  that  while
exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227  of  the  Constitution
in matters like the present one, the High Courts are duty-bound to  keep  in
mind  that  the  Industrial  Disputes  Act  and  other  similar  legislative
instruments are social welfare legislations and the same are required to  be
interpreted keeping in view the  goals  set  out  in  the  Preamble  of  the
Constitution and the provisions contained in Part IV thereof in general  and
Articles 38, 39(a) to (e), 43 and 43-A in  particular,  which  mandate  that
the State should secure a social order for the promotion of welfare  of  the
people, ensure equality between men and women and equitable distribution  of
material resources of the community to subserve the  common  good  and  also
ensure  that  the  workers  get  their  dues.  More  than  41   years   ago,
Gajendragadkar, J. opined that:
"10. ...The concept of social and economic justice is a  living  concept  of
revolutionary import; it gives sustenance to the rule  of  law  and  meaning
and significance to the ideal of welfare State.
(State of Mysore v. Workers of Gold Mines, AIR 1958 SC 923 at page 928  para
10)"

15.         Once the Labour Court has exercised the  discretion  judicially,
the High Court can interfere with the award, only if it  is  satisfied  that
the award of the Labour Court is vitiated by any fundamental flaws.   We  do
not find that the award passed by the Labour Court  suffers  from  any  such
flaws.  While interfering with the award  of  the  Labour  Court,  the  High
Court did not keep in view the  parameters  laid  down  by  this  Court  for
exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Articles 226 and/or 227  of
the Constitution of India and the impugned judgment cannot be sustained.
16.         In the result, the appeal is allowed and the  impugned  judgment
passed by the High Court is set aside and the award  passed  by  the  Labour
Court is restored. In the facts and circumstances of the case,  we  make  no
order as to costs.

                                           ...............................J.
                                                           (V. Gopala Gowda)


                                           ...............................J.
                                                              (R. Banumathi)
New Delhi;
January 14, 2015


ITEM NO.1C-For Judgment     COURT NO.11               SECTION XV

               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C)  No(s).  5236/2014

(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 03/09/2012 in WA
No. 390/2008 passed by the High Court Of Karnataka At Bangalore)

K.V.S.RAM                                          Petitioner(s)

                                VERSUS

BANGALORE METROPOLITAN TRANSPORT CORP              Respondent(s)

Date : 14/01/2015 This petition was called on for pronouncement of JUDGMENT
today.


For Petitioner(s)
                     Mr. V. N. Raghupathy,Adv.

For Respondent(s)
                     Mr. S. N. Bhat,Adv.


            Hon'ble Mrs. Justice R. Banumathi  pronounced  the  judgment  of
the Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice V. Gopala Gowda  and  Hon'ble  Mrs.
Justice R. Banumathi.
            Delay condoned.
            Leave granted.
            The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed order.


    (VINOD KR. JHA)                               (RENU DIWAN)
      COURT MASTER                                COURT MASTER
            (Signed Reportable judgment is placed on the file)

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.409-410 OF 2015 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 20840-41/2014) Vijaya Ukarda Athor (Athawale) ..Appellant Versus State of Maharashtra and Ors. ..Respondents

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLALTE JURISDICTION

                      CIVIL APPEAL NOS.409-410 OF 2015
               (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 20840-41/2014)


Vijaya Ukarda Athor (Athawale)                              ..Appellant

                                   Versus

State of Maharashtra and Ors.                    ..Respondents

                               J U D G M E N T

R. BANUMATHI, J.

Delay condoned.  Leave granted.
2.          These appeals arise out of the impugned Order  dated  18.03.2013
passed by the High Court of Bombay Bench at Nagpur, in W.P. No.1341 of  2013
and Order dated 22.11.2013 passed in the Review Application No.511  of  2013
in Writ Petition No.1341 of 2013, whereby the High Court dismissed the  Writ
Petition  and  also  the  Review  Application  thereby  declining  to  issue
direction  to  consider  the  case  of  the  appellant   for   compassionate
appointment.
3.          The issue relates to the compassionate appointment  between  the
rival claimants.  Late Ukarda Athor (Athwale), who was working  as  a  clerk
in Municipal Corporation, Amravati, had two wives  namely  Shantabai  Ukarda
Athor and Kuntabai Ukarda Athor.  He died  on  18.06.1997.   The  appellant-
Vijaya Ukarda Athor (Athawale), is daughter of Late Ukarda Pundlikrao  Athor
(Athawale) through the first wife, 3rd respondent is the son of Late  Ukarda
Athor through the second wife.  Smt. Shantabai Ukarda Athor, mother  of  the
appellant, filed a Regular Civil Suit No.40 of 2001 in the  Court  of  Civil
Judge (Junior Division), Anjanagaon-Surji, Dist.  Amravati,  seeking  for  a
declaration being the legal heirs of deceased Ukarda Athor,  they  have  the
right in the property, pension and funds of deceased Ukarda  Athor  and  the
said suit was decreed by the judgement dated 15.01.2005. In  the  Succession
Case No.6/1998 Dated 24.09.2007  filed  under  Section  372  of  the  Indian
Succession Act, 1925, the Civil Judge (J.D.),  Distt.  Amravati,  interalia,
ordered that the mother of the appellant would be entitled for  the  benefit
of the pension of the deceased.  In the  succession  case,  it  was  further
ordered that the appellant and her mother would be entitled to  1/4th  share
each of total amount of GPF and other funds of Ukarda Athor.  On  25.5.2009,
respondent No.3 moved an application seeking compassionate appointment.   On
19.4.2012, the appellant filed an objection application,  raising  objection
for  consideration  of  job  application  filed  by  respondent   No.3   and
requesting the authorities not to give him  the  compassionate  appointment.
The Municipal Corporation vide order dated 18.09.2012  appointed  respondent
No.3- Sagar Ukarda  thereby  declaring  the  appellant  ineligible  for  the
compassionate appointment as she has already got married.
4.          Aggrieved by the order of non-grant  of  appointment,  appellant
herein filed a Writ Petition No.1341  of  2013  before  the  High  Court  of
Bombay.   Vide  order  dated  18.03.2013,  the  High  Court  dismissed   the
aforesaid writ petition holding  that  on  the  date  of  appointment,   the
appellant was a married daughter and the policy decision was  taken  by  the
State Government on 26.2.2013 for  grant  of  compassionate  appointment  to
married daughter and before the said date the  appellant  was  not  eligible
for any appointment.  The appellant filed a review  application  before  the
High Court which was also dismissed vide order dated 22.11.2013.   In  these
appeals, the appellant assails the above orders.
5.          Learned counsel for the appellant contended that at the time  of
death of her father Mr. Ukarda Athor (dated 18.06.1997)  the  appellant  who
was  then  a  minor,   submitted  an  application  seeking  appointment   on
29.12.1997  and  again  after  attaining  majority,  the  appellant   sought
compassionate appointment for the post of clerk vide her  application  dated
19.03.1998, filed in a prescribed proforma.  However, for a  long  time,  no
appointments  took  place  in  the  respondent-Corporation.    It  was  also
submitted that appellant got married in 2009, but still she would take  care
of the needs  of  her  widowed  mother  and  there  is  no  bar  for  giving
compassionate appointment to a married daughter and rejecting the  claim  of
a married daughter who  is  otherwise  suitable  for  seeking  compassionate
employment defies any logic.  It was submitted that the High Court  did  not
keep in view that the appointment has been sought on  compassionate  grounds
for the post of clerk ever since the death of appellant's father as per  the
well settled proposition laid down by the Supreme Court.  It  was  contended
that the compassionate appointment given  to  respondent  No.3,  who  is  an
illegitimate son of the deceased-employee is not sustainable.
6.           The  learned  counsel  for  the  second  respondent-Corporation
submitted that the appointment on compassionate ground cannot be claimed  as
a matter of right but  can  be  claimed  only  in  terms  of  the  Rules  or
Regulations framed in this regard.  Placing reliance upon the  judgments  of
this Court in the case of  Shreejith  L.  vs.  Deputy  Director  (Education)
Kerala and Ors., (2012) 7  SCC  248  and  The  Chief  Commissioner,  Central
Excise and Customs, Lucknow & Ors. vs. Prabhat Singh, 2013  (1)  SCALE  506,
it was submitted that where  the  norms  have  been  laid  down  for  making
compassionate appointments, the same have to be strictly followed.
7.          The learned counsel further submitted that when the  application
for compassionate appointment was considered as  per  Government  Resolution
dated 26.10.1994, only unmarried daughter was eligible to be considered  for
compassionate appointment. Learned counsel urged that the  State  Government
has taken a Policy Decision only on 26.02.2013,  as per  which  the  married
daughters would  also  be  eligible  for  consideration  for  the  grant  of
compassionate appointment subject to the fulfilment of  certain  conditions.
 The learned counsel further contended  that  before  26.02.2013  since  the
appellant was not eligible to be considered for  compassionate  appointment,
the High Court rightly dismissed the writ petition and the  impugned  orders
do not suffer from any infirmity warranting interference.
8.          The learned counsel for the respondent No.3 submitted that  even
though respondent No.3 is the son of  a  deceased  employee  out  of  second
wedlock and illegitimate child, yet there is no denying  the  fact  that  he
remains the son of deceased-Ukarda Athor and therefore, the respondent  No.3
was entitled to the same treatment as is available to  the  child  of  first
marriage.  It was submitted that as the illegitimate  son  of  the  deceased
the 3rd respondent is entitled to get appointment  on  compassionate  ground
subject  to  the  fulfilment  of  certain  criteria  as  laid  down  by  the
authorities and in consideration of the status of the  respondent  No.3  and
the Policy Decision of the State Government,  rightly  respondent  No.3  was
given the  appointment  and  the  High  Court  rightly  dismissed  the  writ
petition and also the review application and the impugned orders warrant  no
interference.
9.          We have carefully considered the rival contentions  and  perused
the impugned order and other materials on record.
10.         The fact that the appellant is the daughter  through  the  first
wife-Shantabai Athor and respondent No.3 is the son through the second wife-
Kuntabai Athor of Late Ukarda Athor are not in dispute.  Ukarda  Athor  died
on  18.06.1997.  According  to  the  appellant,  her  mother  submitted   an
application  dated  29.12.1997  stating  that  her  daughter  Vijaya  Athor-
appellant who is aged seventeen years and then  a  minor  studying  in  10th
standard,  should  be  given  compassionate  appointment  when  she  attains
majority.  According to the appellant after she attained  majority  she  has
submitted  another  application   on   19.03.1998,   seeking   compassionate
appointment; but for quite sometime, the same  was  not  considered  by  the
authorities.  The appellant was married in the year 2009. The contention  of
the appellant is that her  application  for  compassionate  appointment  was
kept pending  by  the  authorities  without  any  justifiable  reason.   But
according  to  the  respondent  No.2-Corporation,   giving   employment   in
government service on compassionate ground was then governed by  "Government
Resolution,       General       Administration        Department,        No.
Comp.1093/2335/M.No.90/93/Eight, dated 26 October, 1994". As  per  the  said
Resolution only the unmarried daughter of the  deceased  would  be  eligible
for the appointment as per Rules.  Reliance is placed on  clause  (3)(a)  of
Government Resolution which reads as under:
"(3)  (a).   Husband/wife,  son  or  unmarried  daughter  of  the  deceased/
prematurely retired government employee OR son/unmarried  daughter  lawfully
adopted, before death/premature  retirement,  shall  be  deemed  to  be  the
relatives eligible to be appointed as per  rules.   Except  them,  no  other
relative shall get the benefit under this scheme."


      The State Government has taken a Policy  Decision  on  26.02.2013  and
held  that  the  married  daughters  are  also  entitled  for  compassionate
appointment subject to certain conditions.
11.         In our considered view, the questions viz.: (i)  the  effect  of
"Government  Resolution,  General  Administration  Department,   No.   Comp.
1093/2335/M. No.90/93/Eight, dated 26.10.1994 and effect of  Clause  (3)(a);
(ii) the plea that the appellant submitted  application  on  29.12.1997  and
19.03.1998, that the same was not considered by the  authorities  for  quite
sometime;  (iii)  at  the  time  when  the  applications  for  compassionate
appointment was considered in 2012 whether 3rd respondent  was  eligible  to
be  considered;  (iv)  the  effect  of  subsequent  policy  decision   dated
26.02.2013 taken by the State Government as per which the  married  daughter
is also eligible to get  compassionate  appointment;  and  (v)   such  other
relevant  questions which are to  be  examined.   In  our  considered  view,
instead of this Court examining the above questions, the  matter  is  to  be
remitted back to the High Court for considering the above questions  in  the
light of the facts and circumstances of the case.
12.         In the result, the impugned Orders of the  High  Court  in  Writ
Petition No.1341 of 2013 dated 18.03.2013 and Review Application No. 511  of
2013 dated 22.11.2013 are set aside and the  appeals  are  allowed  and  the
matter is remitted back to the High Court for consideration  of  the  matter
afresh. The High Court shall give sufficient opportunity  to  the  appellant
and the respondents and consider the  matter  afresh  expeditiously  and  in
accordance with law.

                                             .............................J.
                                                           (V. Gopala Gowda)



                                             .............................J.
                                                              (R. Banumathi)
New Delhi;
January 14, 2015

ITEM NO.1B-For Judgment    COURT NO.11               SECTION IX

               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C)  No(s).  20840-20841/2014

(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order  dated  18/03/2013  in  WP
No. 1341/2013,22/11/2013 in MA No. 511/2013,22/11/2013 in WP  No.  1341/2013
passed by the High Court Of Bombay At Nagpur)

VIJAYA UKARDA ATHOR(ATHAWALE)                      Petitioner(s)
                                VERSUS
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS                    Respondent(s)

Date : 14/01/2015 These  petitions  were  called  on  for  pronouncement  of
JUDGMENT today.

For Petitioner(s)       Mr. Sanjai Kumar Pathak,Adv.
                     Mr. Ashish Kumar Sinha, Adv.
                        Mr. Arpit Rai, Adv.

For Respondent(s)       Mr. Shankar Chillarge, Adv.
                     Mr. Aniruddha P. Mayee,Adv.

                        Mr. Suhas Kadam, Adv.
                     For M/s Lemax Lawyers & Co.

            Hon'ble Mrs. Justice R. Banumathi  pronounced  the  judgment  of
the Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice V. Gopala Gowda  and  Hon'ble  Mrs.
Justice R. Banumathi.
            Delay condoned.
            Leave granted.
            The appeals are allowed in terms of the signed order.

    (VINOD KR. JHA)                               (RENU DIWAN)
      COURT MASTER                                COURT MASTER
            (Signed Reportable judgment is placed on the file)

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 415 OF 2015 (arising out of SLP(C) No.21799 of 2014) SUNIL ... APPELLANT VERSUS SAKSHI @ SHWETA & ANR. ... RESPONDENTS

                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 415 OF 2015
                  (arising out of SLP(C) No.21799 of 2014)

SUNIL                                         ... APPELLANT

                                   VERSUS
SAKSHI @ SHWETA & ANR.                  ... RESPONDENTS


                               J U D G M E N T


SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.

      Leave granted.

2.    This appeal has been preferred by the  appellant-husband  against  the
judgment dated 9th July, 2014 passed by  the  Division  Bench  of  the  High
Court of Karnataka,  Dharwad  Bench  in  M.F.A.  No.22031/2013(FC).  By  the
impugned judgment the High Court while allowing the appeal preferred by  the
1st respondent-wife, set aside  the  decree  passed  by  the  Family  Court,
Belgaum  by  imposing  costs  of  Rs.25,000/-on  the  appellant-husband  and
directed the Family Court to lodge a complaint through  Sheristedar  of  the
Court with the jurisdictional Police against the appellant-husband  for  the
offences punishable under Sections 193, 417,419, 426,  464,465  and  468  of
IPC.

3.    The factual matrix of the case leading to the filing  of  the  present
appeal is as follows:

      The 1st respondent-wife got married to the appellant-husband  on  10th
July, 2005. Out of their wedlock, the wife had given birth to a male  child.
On 26th March, 2012, the appellant-husband filed a  petition  under  Section
13(1)(i-a) and (i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act,  1955,  for  dissolution  of
marriage. On 26th March, 2012, notice was ordered to be issued to the  wife.
As per report of the process server dated 20th April, 2012, notice  sent  to
the wife through Court was returned unserved on  the  ground  that  she  had
gone to Bangalore. On 21st April, 2012, notice was re-issued to the wife  by
RPAD. It was returned unserved with an endorsement 'refused'.  The case  was
listed on 12th June, 2012. Since notice issued to  1st  respondent-wife  was
returned as refused, the Family Court held service of notice on the wife  as
sufficient. Counsel for the appellant-husband prayed  time  for  settlement.
The case was adjourned to 5th July, 2012, but the appellant-husband and  his
counsel were absent and the case  was  adjourned  to  30th  July,  2012  for
settlement; on which date the appellant-husband was present and reported  no
settlement. The 1st respondent-wife was placed ex parte  and  the  case  was
adjourned to 22nd August, 2012 for  appellant-husband's  evidence.  On  22nd
August, 2012, the case was adjourned to 17th September,  2012.  As  per  the
order sheet dated 17th September, 2012, the appellant-husband  and  the  1st
respondent-wife were present. Sri B.M. Chougale filed  vakalatnama  for  the
1st respondent-wife and an application under Order IX Rule 7 of  C.P.C.  was
filed praying to set aside the ex parte order dated  30th  July,  2012.  The
said application was allowed, the ex parte order was set aside and the  case
was adjourned to 27th September, 2012 for  conciliation.  The  parties  were
absent  on  27th  September,  2012  and  5th  November,  2012.The  case  was
adjourned to 27th November, 2012, on which date  the  appellant-husband  was
present. The 1st respondent-wife was absent. The Family Court adjourned  the
case to 3rd January, 2013 for appellant-husband's  evidence  observing  that
1st respondent-wife did not file  objections.  On  7th  January,  2013,  the
appellant-husband was  present.  He  filed  affidavit  evidence.  Appellant-
husband got himself examined as P.W-1 and got marked Exs.P1  to  P4.  Cross-
examination of P.W-1 was taken as nil. Evidence on the side  of  respondent-
wife was closed and adjourned the case to 21st January, 2013 for  arguments.
On 28th January, 2013, after  hearing  arguments  of  the  counsel  for  the
appellant-husband, the case was posted for judgment on 6th  February,  2013.
Accordingly, on 6th February, 2013, the Family Court  allowed  the  petition
and dissolved the marriage of the parties.

4.    The 1st respondent-wife challenged the judgment of the dissolution  of
marriage before the High Court on the following grounds:

(i)   that she had no knowledge about the case  filed by her husband;

that she never appeared before the Family Court;

that she did not engage any Counsel in the case  and  file  application  for
setting aside the ex parte order;

that the blank Vakalatnama taken at the time  of  settlement  from  her  for
mutual divorce has been made use of;

that she came to know about the decree of dissolution of marriage only  when
the husband refused to fulfil the terms of an  amicable  settlement  and  on
6.4.2013,  she  engaged  Sri.  Vithoba  Neelakant  Savanth,  Advocate,   and
obtained certified copy of the petition, entire order sheet,  deposition  of
P.W-1 and copy of the impugned judgment dated 6.2.2013; and

that the husband played fraud on the Family Court and  obtained  the  decree
of dissolution of marriage.

Additional ground was taken that when the police  proceeded  for  arrest  of
father-in-law of the 1st  respondent-wife  and  others  in  connection  with
criminal case, they came forward for settlement and offered to give  a  flat
measuring 800 to 850 sq.ft. at Belgaum, etc. and that on 18th  August,  2012
in the presence of elders, the parties  returned  the  ornaments  etc.,  the
appellant-husband agreed to give Rs.45 lakhs and flat,  the  wife  consented
for mutual divorce and gave a Vakalatnama to the  husband  through  one  Sri
Shripad Raikar, but the wife was kept in dark as to the  filing  of  divorce
petition by the husband. The said Vakalatnama alleged to have  been  misused
by the husband in the Matrimonial  Case  No.86/2012  by  giving  it  to  his
counsel's senior-Sri B.M.  Chougale,  without  1st  respondent's  knowledge.
She took further plea that she never appeared before the Family  Court  much
less on 17th  September,  2012  to  20th  September,  2012  as  she  was  in
Mangalore during the said period. Thus, it  was  alleged  that  the  husband
obtained the decree of divorce by playing fraud on the Family Court.

5.    The aforesaid submission was opposed by the counsel for the  appellant
and record of the Matrimonial Case No.86/2012 was called for.

6.    The High Court by the impugned judgment framed the following  question
for determination:

      "Whether the impugned judgment and decree call for our interference?"


7.    After perusing the records  in  MC  No.86/2012  referring  to  certain
pages of the Matrimonial Case No.86  of  2012,  the  High  Court  found  the
following papers were available:

(a)   affidavit evidence of P.W-1;

(b)   application filed under Section 13 of the  Family  Court  Act  by  the
husband seeking permission to engage the Counsel;

(c)   vakalath filed by Ms. Beena Gururaj Achar for the husband;

(d)    vakalath  filed  by  Sri  B.M.  Chougale  and  Sri  Sunil   Kakatkar,
Advocates, for the wife;

(e)   process memo;

(f)   application dated 17.9.2012 filed under Order IX Rule 7 of CPC by  the
wife;

(g)   affidavit of the wife annexed to the application;

(h)   application filed by the wife under Section 13  of  the  Family  Court
Act seeking  permission  to  engage  Counsel  to  defend  her(wife)  in  the
Matrimonial Case;

(i)   list of documents filed by the Advocate for the  husband  (but  signed
by the Advocate for the wife);

(j)   index dated 26.3.2011 filed along with the  divorce  petition  by  the
Advocate for the husband.



8.    Taking into consideration the memorandum of divorce petition filed  by
the appellant-husband and the  cause  title,  the  High  Court  doubted  the
filing of the Vakalatnama signed by the wife with  her  affidavit  and  made
the following observation:

"If these papers were to be seen  in  juxtaposition  with  page  No.21  (the
memorandum of divorce petition) particularly the  cause  title,  it  reveals
that the space, punctuation marks (like comma  and  colon)  and  underlining
used while typing the name of the Court in the cause  title  are  identical.
For the purpose of immediate reference, the same is excerpted hereunder:



       IN THE COURT OF THE JUDGE, FAMILY COURT, BELGAUM, AT : BELGAUM



There is no explanation as to how and where the papers  were  prepared.  The
above circumstances support the case  of  the  appellant/wife.  The  grounds
urged by the wife cannot be rejected. Hence, we hold  that  all  the  above-
said case papers are the print out from one and the same  computer  software
and the husband has made use of the blank vakalath signed by  the  wife  for
engaging  senior  Counsel  of  his  Advocate  and  obtained  a   decree   of
dissolution of his marriage with the appellant and to  deprive  her  rights.
Thus, it indicates that  the  respondent/husband  herein  has  played  fraud
etc., upon the Family Court so as to get a decree of divorce in  his  favour
and against the wife and it is a fit case to initiate  criminal  proceedings
against the respondent/ husband."



9.    In view of such doubt regarding filing of Vakalatnama, the High  Court
set aside the judgment and decree dated 6th  February,  2013  passed  in  MC
No.86/2012 by the Family Court at Belgaum.

10.   Learned counsel appearing  on  behalf  of  the  appellant  denied  the
allegation of fraud played by the appellant-husband.

11.   Learned counsel appearing on behalf  of  the  respondent  opposed  the
prayer and submitted that the appellant-husband all the  time  tortured  and
harassed the wife-1st respondent for which she has also lodged  a  complaint
before the Market Police  Station  Belgaum  on  13th  December,  2013  under
Section 498(A), 494, 495 r/w 34 IPC for concealment of  the  first  marriage
and marrying during the pendency of appeal leading to bigamy.

12.    After  giving  our  careful  consideration  to  the  facts  and   the
circumstances of the case and the submission made  by  the  learned  counsel
for the parties, we find that the High Court exceeded its  jurisdiction  and
recorded its finding on presumption, surmises and conjectures.

13.   The only question framed by the High Court as apparent from  paragraph
5 of the impugned judgment is "Whether  the  impugned  judgment  and  decree
call for our interference?" No question as to whether the  appellant-husband
played fraud on the Family Court and obtained the decree of  dissolution  of
marriage or whether the appellant-husband committed any  offence  punishable
under the provisions of Indian Penal Code was framed by the High Court.

14.   In the present case the main allegation made by  the  1st  respondent-
wife is that the husband played fraud on the Family Court and  obtained  the
decree of dissolution  of  marriage.  In  support  of  such  submission  she
submitted that she had not engaged any counsel in the case  and  that  blank
Vakalatnama was taken at the time of settlement  for  their  mutual  divorce
and that she never appeared before the Family Court. The High  Court  failed
to notice that this is a case in which there is a disputed question of  fact
which cannot be decided without framing a proper issue  and  in  absence  of
evidence on record.

15.   There is a disputed question of  fact  as  apparent  from  the  Family
Court order dated 17th  September,  2012  wherein  the  Court  recorded  the
presence of the appellant-husband and  the  1st  respondent-wife  and  after
hearing their arguments, set aside the ex parte  order  and  put  forth  the
matter for conciliation. The  relevant  portion  of  the  order  dated  17th
September, 2012 reads as follows:

"Ptr present

Resp present

Sri. BMC filed vakalath for resp with permission and I.A. u/O 9 R 7 CPC

Heard. IA is allowed Exparte order of resp is set aside.

For conciliation by 27-09-12."



16.   The High  Court  giving  reference  to  the  plaint  and  the  written
statement presumed  that  1st  respondent-wife  never  appeared  before  the
Family Court and failed to notice the aforesaid order dated 17th  September,
2012 which make it clear that 1st respondent-wife, who  was  the  respondent
in the said case, was present in the  court  and  one  Shri  B.M.  Chougale,
Advocate filed Vakalatnama for the 1st respondent-wife with  permission.  It
is clear from the record that only after hearing both  the  parties  the  ex
parte order against 1st respondent-wife was set aside. The matter  was  then
sent for conciliation to 27th September, 2012. On 27th September,  2012  and
5th November, 2013, the parties were absent. The case was adjourned to  27th
November, 2012 on which date the appellant-husband was present and  the  1st
respondent-wife was absent. The Family  Court  adjourned  the  case  to  3rd
January,  2013  for  appellant-husband's   evidence   observing   that   1st
respondent-wife  had  not  filed  objections.  On  7th  January,  2013,  the
appellant-husband was present. He  filed  affidavit  evidence,  got  himself
examined as P.W.-1 and got marked Exs.P1 to P4. This  fact  was  noticed  by
the High Court at paragraph 2 where brief facts of the case leading  to  the
filing of the appeal was dealt with, which in fact  has  been  reflected  in
our preceding paragraphs  wherein  factual  matrix  of  the  case  has  been
noticed.

17.   It cannot be presumed that the Family Court in its  order  dated  17th
September, 2012 wrongly noted the presence of the appellant-husband and  the
1st respondent-wife. In fact, this part of the  order  sheet  has  not  been
referred by the High Court while coming to a conclusion that the  appellant-
husband has played fraud upon the  Family  Court  as  to  get  a  decree  of
divorce in his favour. Merely, because of the fact that  print  out  of  the
case papers of both the parties have  been  taken  from  one  and  the  same
computer software it cannot be presumed that  blank  Vakalatnama  signed  by
the 1st respondent-wife was misused by the appellant-husband  or  he  played
fraud and used the same to engage some other senior  counsel.  Such  finding
of the High Court is not based on  evidence  but  on  mere  presumption  and
conjecture.



18.   For the reason aforesaid, we have no other option  but  to  set  aside
the impugned judgment dated 9th July, 2014 passed by the Division  Bench  of
the High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench in M.F.A.  No.22031/2013(FC).  It
is accordingly set aside. The appeal is allowed. There shall be no order  as
to costs.

                                              ............................J.
                             (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)



                                               ...........................J.
                                      (N.V. RAMANA)
NEW DELHI;
JANUARY 14, 2015.


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