Sections 409 read with Section 120B IPC and under Section 13(1)(c) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short the ‘PCA’).- with wrongful intention committed threft of jack tree wood worth about Rs.10,000/- CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.19 OF 2013 ANTONY CARDOZA …. Appellant Versus STATE OF KERALA …. Respondent

                                                              NON-REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.19 OF 2013



ANTONY CARDOZA                          …. Appellant

                                   Versus

STATE OF KERALA                              …. Respondent



                               J U D G M E N T



Uday U. Lalit, J.



1.    This appeal by special leave to appeal  arises  out  of  judgment  and
order dated 18.03.2011 passed by the High Court of Kerala  at  Ernakulam  in
Criminal Appeal No.249/2000(A) by which it was pleased to affirm  the  order
of  conviction  and  sentence  recorded  by  the   learned   Special   Judge
Thiruvananthapuram in CC No.3 of 1999.

2.    On 15.10.1997 FIR No.9 of  1997  was  registered  pursuant  to  Deputy
Superintendent  of   Police,   Vigilance   and   Anti   Corruption   Bureau,
Thiruvananthapuram reporting that in the vigilance inquiry it  was  revealed
to the following effect:
“A jack tree of about 40 years of age was cut and kept in  the  compound  of
10 Cents of land owned by  the  Kerala  State  Handicapped  persons  welfare
corporation Thiruvananthapuram at Pojoppura.  Shri Antony Cardoza,  Managing
Director of the Corporation got it removed and cut  into  convenient  pieces
on 24.06.1996 and took  it  to  his  residence  at  Alapuzha  on  25.06.1996
through  A Vasudevan Nair.  Shri Prabhakaran Nair, L.D. Accountant  met  the
expenses of Rs.690/- by way of labour charge  for  this  purpose  which  was
never  claimed  reimbursement   from  the  corporation.   Thus  Shri  Antony
Cardoza being  the  servant  of  the   Corporation  as  M.D.  with  wrongful
intention committed threft of jack tree wood worth about  Rs.10,000/-  which
was cut down and kept in the land of the corporation at Poojappura  and  Sh.
Prakahakaran Nair, L.D.  Accountant  intentionally  facilitated  Sh.  Antony
Cardoza in the commission of the offence punishable under  Section  381  and
109 IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(c) of PC Act, 1988.”

3.    In the investigation that followed the timber was found in the   house
of Shri Antony Cardoza, Managing  Director  of  the  Corporation,  i.e.  the
appellant, situated at Alappuzha.  Search list Ext.P9  bears  the  signature
of the wife of the appellant.   After  due  investigation  charge-sheet  was
filed against the appellant and Shri Prabhakaran Nair, L.D.  Accountant  for
having committed the  offences  punishable  under  Sections  409  read  with
Section 120B IPC and under Section 13(1)(c) read with Section 13(2)  of  the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for  short  the  ‘PCA’).    Pending  the
trial, Shri Prabhakaran Nair, the second  accused  expired  and  the  matter
abated against him.

4.     It was alleged by the Prosecution that an extent of 10 cents of  land
was allotted to the Kerala State  Handicapped  Persons  Welfare  Corporation
(‘the Corporation’ for short) for construction of a building for  its  head-
office  from  and  out  of  land  wherein  the  quarters  of  Juvenile  Home
Superintendent are located.  There was a jack tree, a  mango  tree  and  few
coconut trees in this piece of 10 cents of land.  Said  jack  tree  was  cut
and timber thereof was lying on the plot.  It was alleged that  the  accused
in  conspiracy   got   the   timber   removed   in   a   mini   lorry   from
Thiruvananthapuram and the timber  was  transported  to  the  house  of  the
present appellant at Alappuzah.  It was the case  of  the  prosecution  that
the timber was sawn and transported to the house of the appellant under  the
instructions of Shri Vasudevan Nair.  Reliance was placed  on  Ext.P1  being
photocopy of the letter written by the appellant in  his  own  hand  on  his
letterhead, bearing his signature and Ext.P6 being a letter written  in  the
hand of said Shri Vasudevan Nair on the letterhead of  the  Corporation.  ).
We have been informed that the distance between these two  places  is  about
140 KMs. In defence no explanation was offered  for  the  presence  of  sawn
timber in the house of the appellant nor did he  offer  any  explanation  as
regards Ext.P1 and P6.

5.    After considering the evidence on record, the trial court  found  that
the offences under Section 409 IPC read with Section 120B IPC so also  under
Section 13(1)(c) read  with  13(2)  of  the  PCA  were  proved  against  the
appellant. The appellant was thus convicted under  the  said  sections  vide
judgment and order  dated  24.03.2000  and  sentenced  to  undergo  rigorous
imprisonment for three years and to pay fine  of  Rs.5,000/-  under  Section
120B IPC read with Section 109 and 409 IPC.  He  was  further  sentenced  to
rigorous imprisonment for a term of  three  years  and  to  pay  a  fine  of
Rs.7,000/- under Section 409 IPC and to rigorous imprisonment for two  years
and to pay fine of Rs.8,000/-  under  Section  13(1)(c)  read  with  Section
13(2)  of  the  PCA.   The  substantive  sentences  were  directed  to   run
concurrently.

6.    The matter was carried by the appellant  in  appeal  before  the  High
Court of Kerala at Ernakulam.   It was submitted that for  a  charge  to  be
proved under Section 409 IPC entrustment of the property has to  be  proved.
After considering the entire evidence on  record  the  High  Court  observed
that letters Ext. P1 and P6 revealed that the wooden  logs  were  under  the
control of the appellant and that the entrustment and misappropriation  were
established and there was no doubt that the property was taken away  by  the
present appellant.  The High Court thus  affirmed  the  view  taken  by  the
trial court as regards conviction and sentence.

7.     The  appellant,  being  aggrieved,  filed  Special   Leave   Petition
challenging the decision of the High Court. Alongwith  the  application  for
release  on  bail,  certificates  as  regards  medical  ailments  that   the
appellant suffers from, were also appended. This Court while issuing  notice
on 30.06.2011 was pleased to order the release of  the  appellant  on  bail.
The special leave to appeal granted vide order dated 02.01.2013.

8.    Mr. P.H. Parekh, learned Senior Counsel appearing  for  the  appellant
submitted that the ingredients of Section 409 IPC were not attracted in  the
present case.  It was further submitted that the timber was simply lying  in
the house of the appellant and that the property was not  converted  to  his
use.   Mr. V. Shyamohan, learned Additional Standing counsel  appearing  for
the State of Kerala –respondent, emphasized that the timber was found  at  a
distance of 140 Kms.  and  such  timber  was  never  accounted  for  in  the
accounts of the Corporation.

9.    Having considered the submissions of  the  learned  counsel  and  gone
through the record, we are of the view that the ingredients of  the  offence
under Section 409  IPC  are  clearly  attracted  in  the  present  case.  As
Managing Director of the Corporation,  the  appellant  was  having  dominion
over the property in  question  in  his  capacity  of  public  servant.  The
removal of timber from the plot in question to the house  of  the  appellant
at a considerable distance and non-accounting thereof in the  books  of  the
Corporation are very clinching  and  relevant  circumstances.  We  therefore
uphold the order of conviction as recorded by the Courts below.

10.   However, regard being had to the age  and  medical  condition  of  the
appellant, we deem it appropriate to  reduce  the  substantive  sentence  on
each count to simple imprisonment for one  year  maintaining  the  order  as
regards  fine  and  sentence  in  default.  The  appellant  is  directed  to
surrender within three weeks to undergo the remaining sentence.  The  appeal
thus stands partly allowed in the aforesaid terms.


                 ………………………..J.
                                  (Dipak Misra)



                                  ………………………..J.
                                  (Uday Umesh Lalit)
New Delhi,
November 14,   2014
-----------------------
7

reduce the sentence to one year for the offence under Section 454 IPC and 18 months for the offence under Section 380 IPC =CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2298 OF 2014 RATNA @ RATAN LAL AND ANOTHER …. Appellants Versus STATE OF RAJASTHAN …. Respondent

                                                              NON-REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2298 OF 2014


RATNA @ RATAN LAL AND ANOTHER           …. Appellants

                                   Versus

STATE OF RAJASTHAN                      …. Respondent


                               J U D G M E N T


Uday U. Lalit, J.


1.    This appeal by special leave to appeal arises out  of  final  judgment
and order dated 06.02.2014 passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Judicature  for
Rajasthan at Jodhpur in Criminal Revision Petition No.165 of 1995  by  which
the High Court was pleased to dismiss  the  revision  and  affirm  the  view
taken by the Special Judge SC/ST, Udaipur in Criminal Appeal No.84 of 1992.

2.    This matter arises out of FIR No.1 of 1988  registered  on  06.01.1988
under Section 454 and 380 of the Indian Penal Code  (for  short  “the  IPC”)
with Police Station, Fateh Nagar, pursuant to PW14 Rupa submitting a  report
regarding  theft  at  his  house  situate  in  village  Lakha  Ka  Kheda  on
31.12.1987.  It was reported that some unknown persons had  committed  theft
at his house by breaking open the lock and that some pieces  of  silver  and
gold jewellery were stolen.  In the further report  submitted  on  the  same
day it was stated that the value of the articles and cash which  was  stolen
were to the tune of Rs.64,000/-.  The complainant PW14 Rupa suspected  Ratna
who is appellant No.1 herein.  During the course of investigation  Appellant
Nos.1 and 2, namely, Ratna and Uda  were  arrested  and  pursuant  to  their
statements under Section 27 of the Evidence Act,  namely,  Ext.P15  and  P16
respectively, the stolen articles were recovered.

3.    In the trial the prosecution  examined  fourteen  witnesses  to  bring
home the charge under Section 454 and 380 of the IPC  against  –  Ratna  and
Uda.  Accepting the case of the prosecution and holding inter alia that  the
recovery of stolen articles stood proved, the learned trial court  convicted
both the accused under Sections 454  and  380  IPC  and  sentenced  them  to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for  3  years  and  7  years  respectively  on
aforesaid counts with imposition of fine of Rs.2500/- against  each  of  the
accused  on  both  counts,  with  further  sentence  of  six  months  simple
imprisonment in default of payment of fine.  It was ordered  that  both  the
sentences shall run concurrently.  In  the  appeal  preferred  by  both  the
accused,  the  learned  Special  Judge,  SC/ST  ANP,  Udaipur  affirmed  the
conviction on both counts but reduced the sentence to  two  years  and  five
years respectively on each of the aforesaid counts maintaining  the  quantum
of fine and sentence  in  default.   The  revision  preferred  by  both  the
accused before the High Court was dismissed maintaining the  conviction  and
sentence as recorded by the appellate court which led to the filing  of  the
present appeal by special leave.

4.    We have heard Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, learned counsel for the  appellants
and Mr. Rajeev Kr. Singh, learned counsel appearing  for  the  respondent  –
State.  Having gone through the record with the assistance  of  the  learned
Advocates, we are not persuaded to take a different view  on  the  issue  of
conviction of the appellants.  We, however,  deem  it  appropriate,  in  the
light of the facts of the case, including the length of time the matter  has
taken, to reduce the sentence to one year for the offence under Section  454
IPC and 18 months for the offence under Section  380  IPC,  maintaining  the
sentence of fine and default sentence, as  recorded  by  the  courts  below.
Substantive sentences on both counts shall  run  concurrently.   The  appeal
stands partly allowed in the aforesaid terms.



                                  ………………………..J.
                                  (Dipak Misra)




                 ………………………..J.
                                  (Uday Umesh Lalit)
New Delhi,
November 14,  2014
-----------------------
4

Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. stood fully complied with and so the petitioners are not entitled to statutory bail under Section 167(2) of Cr.P.C. =SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.7733 OF 2014 ABDUL AZEEZ P V. AND OTHERS …. Petitioners Versus NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY …. Respondent

                                                              Non-Reportable

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

              SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.7733 OF 2014


ABDUL AZEEZ P V. AND OTHERS             …. Petitioners

                                   Versus

NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY           …. Respondent



                                  O R D E R


1.    The petitioners herein are accused Nos.1 to  21  in  Crime  No.276  of
2013 of Mayyil Police Station, registered under Sections  143,  147,  153(B)
r/w Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, u/s 5(1) r/w Section  25(1)(a)  of
the Arms Act, u/s 4 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act and under  Section
18  of  the  Unlawful  Activities  Prevention  Act   (“UAPA”   for   short).
Subsequently Section 153(A) of IPC and Section 13(1)(a)(b)  and  Section  18
of the UAPA were also invoked and  the  case  was  transferred  to  National
Investigating Agency (for short ‘NIA’) for further investigation.

2.    The petitioners were arrested on 24.04.2013  and  since  then  are  in
custody.  After completion of investigation charge-sheet was  filed  by  the
NIA on 19.10.2013 against the petitioners.  The  charge-sheet,  inter  alia,
stated the allegations against each of the petitioners and the materials  on
the basis of which  such  allegations  were  leveled.   It  also  stated  in
paragraphs 18.2 and 18.3 that requisite sanction under Sections 18  and  18A
of the UAPA was accorded by the Ministry  of  Home  Affairs,  Government  of
India, vide order dated 17.10.2013 and also that sanction  under  Section  7
of the Explosive Substances Act was accorded  by  the  District  Magistrate,
Kannur vide his order dated 15.10.2013.  In paragraph 18.6  of  the  charge-
sheet it was stated to the following effect:
“Foreign bank transaction details are to be  collected  and  the  call  Data
Records  have  to  be  further  analysed.   Records  pertaining  to   Thanal
Foundation  Trust  need  to  be  collected  and  verified.   Hence,  further
investigation  is  inevitable  and  is  in  progress.   Additional  list  of
witnesses,  additional  statements  of  witnesses  and  additional  list  of
documents will be filed in  due  course.   Hence  it  is  also  prayed  that
further investigation u/s 173(8) Cr.P.C. may kindly be permitted.”


3.     The petitioners filed Criminal M.C.  No.100  of  2013  on  22.10.2013
before the learned Special  Court,  NIA  Cases  submitting  that  they  were
entitled to get statutory bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of  Criminal
Procedure (for short “ Cr.P.C.”)  inasmuch as the investigating  agency  had
failed to file the final report within 180 days.  It was  further  submitted
that the  bank  account  details  and  mobile  phone  call  details  of  the
petitioners, as stated in the charge-sheet itself, were yet to  be  verified
and that the charge-sheet filed on 19.10.2013 was not  a  final  report   as
contemplated under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C.  The submissions were  negated  by
the learned Special Court by its order dated  04.11.2013  holding  that  the
petitioners were  not  entitled  to  statutory  bail  under  Section  167(2)
Cr.P.C., which view was challenged by  filing  Criminal  Appeal  No.1711  of
2013 in the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam.  The High Court went  through
paragraph Nos.17.1., 17.2, 17.3 and 17.8 of the charge-sheet and found  that
the materials so disclosed and adverted to  in  the  charge-sheet  did  show
that it was a final report.  The High Court,  thus,  dismissed  the  appeal.
The present special leave petition has been  filed  to  challenge  the  view
taken by the High Court.

4.    Having gone through the charge-sheet, we are not persuaded to  take  a
different view.  The materials adverted to show that it was a  final  report
on the facets investigated into by the investigating  agency.   Furthermore,
the requisite sanctions as required under Sections 18 and 18A  of  the  UAPA
and so also under Section 7  of  the  Explosive  Substances  Act  were  also
accorded by the concerned authorities.  The  charge-sheet  so  filed  before
the learned Special Court was complete in all respects so as to  enable  the
learned Special Court to take cognizance  in  the  matter.   Merely  because
certain facets of the matter called for further investigation  it  does  not
deem such report anything  other  than  a  final  report.   In  our  opinion
Section 167(2) of  Cr.P.C.  stood  fully  complied  with  and  as  such  the
petitioners are not entitled to  statutory  bail  under  Section  167(2)  of
Cr.P.C.

5.    The special leave petition is, therefore, dismissed.


                                                               ………………………..J.
                                   (Dipak Misra)



                                  ………………………..J.
                                  (Uday Umesh Lalit)

New Delhi,
November 14, 2014
-----------------------
4

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2402 OF 2014 [ Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.6197 of 2014] K. Subramani … Appellant(s) versus K. Damodara Naidu … Respondent(s)

                                                                  REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                     CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  2402  OF 2014
[ Arising out of  SLP (Crl.) No.6197 of 2014]




K. Subramani                            …     Appellant(s)

                                   versus

K. Damodara Naidu                   …    Respondent(s)



                               J U D G M E N T

C. NAGAPPAN, J.



Leave granted.



This appeal is preferred against judgment and order dated 10.10.2013  passed
by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in  Criminal  Appeal  No.368  of
2009   wherein the High Court set aside the judgment  of  acquittal  of  the
trial court and remanded the case to the trial court for retrial.

                                      1

The respondent herein/complainant and the appellant/accused were working  as
lecturers  in  a  Government  College  at  Bangalore.   The  case   of   the
complainant is that the accused borrowed a loan of Rs.14 lakhs  in  cash  on
1.12.1997 from him to start granite business, promising to  repay  the  same
with 3%  interest per month on demand and  issued  post-dated  cheque  dated
30.11.2000 for sum of Rs.29,12,000/- which included principal  and  interest
and few days prior to presentation of the cheque on its  due  date  to  bank
for encashment, the accused requested him not to  present  the  cheque   and
took extension of time of another three  years  for  repayment  and  finally
issued a cheque dated 16.08.2005 for a sum of Rs.73,83,552/- which  included
principal and interest. The complainant presented the  cheque  on  19.8.2005
for encashment to his banker and  it  was  dishonored  with  an  endorsement
‘fund  insufficient’ and the complainant issued legal  notice  on  12.9.2005
demanding  repayment within 15 days from the date  of  its  receipt  thereof
and accused  sent reply but  failed  to  comply  with  the  demand  and  the
complainant lodged complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable  Instrument
Act, against the accused.



In the trial the complainant examined himself as PW1 and examined  CWs1  and
2 on his side and marked documents Exh. P1 to  P23.   The  accused  examined
himself as DW1 and marked documents Exhs. D1 to D5.  The  trial  court  held
that the complainant had no source of income to lend a sum  of  Rs.14  lakhs
to the accused and he failed to prove  that  there  is  legally  recoverable
debt payable by the accused to him and that in discharge of  said  liability
he issued the cheque and accordingly acquitted the accused  for the  alleged
offence  under  Section  138  of  N.I.  Act.   Aggrieved  by  the  same  the
complainant preferred appeal in the High Court in Criminal Appeal No.368  of
2009, and the High Court heard the appeal along  with  9  other  appeals  by
framing two legal issues which are as under:

“  i) Whether an action under Section 138 of the N.I. Act  for  dishonor  of
cheque is the complainant required to establish his  financial  capacity  to
lend money?

ii) Will not presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act  accrues  to  the
benefit of the complainant unless the accused rebuts that presumption?”



Relying on the ratio laid down by this Court in  the  decision  in  Rangappa
vs. Sri Mohan  [(2010) 11 SCC 441] the High Court answered the  first  issue
in the negative and the second issue in the affirmative.   It  further  held
that the orders of acquittal recorded by the trial court in all the  appeals
 suffer from legal infirmity as the prosecution has  been   undone  only  on
the ground that complainant had not proved his capacity to  lend  money  and
hence those orders are liable to be set aside.  Accordingly it  allowed  the
appeals and set aside the respective judgments  of  acquittal  and  remanded
the cases to courts concerned directing  retrial.   The  present  appeal  is
preferred challenging the said judgment.





The learned counsel appearing for the  appellant/respondent  contended  that
the High Court erroneously clubbed a  batch  of  10  criminal  appeals   and
formulated two questions of  law  and  insofar  as  the  present  appeal  is
concerned  the trial court  never  proceeded  on  the  assumption  that  the
presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act would enure to the benefit  of
the complainant only  if  he  proves  his  financial  capacity  and  on  the
contrary the trial court had for reasons recorded  found  that  the  accused
has rebutted the presumption by placing cogent evidence that  there  was  no
legally recoverable debt or liability and the complainant  had  no  capacity
to  lend  huge  amount  of  Rs.14  lakhs  and,  accordingly,  dismissed  the
complaint by acquitting the accused.  It is his further contention that  the
High Court without going into the merits proceeded  to  remand  the  present
case to the trial court for being retried and it has caused great  prejudice
to the appellant herein and hence the impugned judgment is liable to be  set
aside.



Learned counsel for  the  respondent/complainant  submitted  that  the  High
Court answered the legal issues involved and has remanded the  case  to  the
trial court for fresh consideration and no exception can  be  taken  to  the
impugned judgment.



Three Judge Bench of this Court in the decision  in  Rangappa  case  (supra)
laid down that the presumption mandated by  Section  139  of  the  N.I.  Act
includes a presumption that there exists   a  legally  enforceable  debt  or
liability and that is a  rebuttable  presumption  and  it  is  open  to  the
accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of  a  legally  enforceable
debt  or liability can be contested. Relying on  the  said  ratio  the  High
Court answered the two legal issues raised by it in the  impugned  judgment.
Though  the  criminal  appeals  were  preferred  against  the  judgment   of
acquittal passed in all the cases arising under  Section  138  of  the  N.I.
Act, the factual matrix and the evidence adduced were different.   The  High
Court after answering the two legal issues did not consider  the  merits  of
each case individually and has simply remanded   the  matter  to  the  trial
court for fresh consideration.





In the present  case  the  complainant  and  the  accused  were  working  as
Lecturers in a Government college at the relevant time and the alleged  loan
of Rs.14 lakhs is claimed to have been paid by  cash  and  it  is  disputed.
Both   of   them  were governed by the Government  Servants’  Conduct  Rules
which prescribes  the mode of lending and borrowing.  There  is  nothing  on
record to show that the prescribed mode was followed. The source claimed  by
the complainant is  savings from his salary and  an  amount  of  Rs.5  lakhs
derived by him from sale of site No.45 belonging to  him.   Neither  in  the
complaint nor in the chief-examination of  the  complainant,  there  is  any
averment with regard to the sale price of site No.45.   The  concerned  sale
deed was also  not  produced.  Though  the  complainant  was  an  income-tax
assessee he had admitted in his evidence that he had not shown the  sale  of
site No.45 in his income-tax return. On the  contrary  the  complainant  has
admitted in his evidence that in the year 1997 he had  obtained  a  loan  of
Rs.1,49,205/- from L.I.C. It is pertinent to note that the alleged  loan  of
Rs.14 lakhs is claimed to have been  disbursed  in  the  year  1997  to  the
accused.  Further  the  complainant  did  not  produce  bank  statement   to
substantiate his claim.  The trial court took into account the testimony  of
the wife of the complaint in another criminal  case  arising  under  Section
138  of  the  N.I.  Act  in  which  she  has   stated   that   the   present
appellant/accused  had  not  taken  any  loan  from  her  husband.    On   a
consideration of entire oral and documentary evidence  the trial court  came
to the conclusion that the complainant had no  source of income  to  lend  a
sum of Rs.14 lakhs to the accused and he  failed  to  prove  that  there  is
legally recoverable debt payable by the accused to him.



In our view the said conclusion of the trial court has been  arrived  at  on
proper appreciation of material evidence on record.  The  impugned  judgment
of remand made by the High Court in this case is  unsustainable  and  liable
to be set aside.



  In the result this appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment insofar  as
the appellant is concerned is  set  aside  and  the  judgment  of  acquittal
passed by the trial court is restored.


                                                              …………………………….J.
                                        (V. Gopala Gowda)


                                                               ……………………………J.
                                        (C. Nagappan)
New Delhi;
November  13, 2014
ITEM NO.1A-For Judgment    COURT NO.11               SECTION IIB

               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A

                             RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Criminal Appeal No. …..../2014 arising from SLP (Crl.)  No(s).  6197/2014

K SUBRAMANI                                        Appellant(s)

                                VERSUS

K DAMODARA NAIDU                                   Respondent(s)

Date : 13/11/2014 This petition was called on for JUDGMENT today.



For Petitioner(s)       Mrs. Vaijayanthi Girish,Adv.

For Respondent(s)       M/s. Nuli & Nuli



          UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following

                             O R D E R

            Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Nagappan pronounced the judgment  of  the
Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice V.Gopala Gowda and His Lordship.

            Leave granted.

            The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed order.



    (VINOD KUMAR)                               (MALA KUMARI SHARMA)
COURT MASTER                                 COURT MASTER

            (Signed Reportable judgment is placed on the file)

undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice system = CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2401 OF 2014 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.5947 of 2013) State of Madhya Pradesh ….Appellant(s) Versus Surendra Singh …Respondent(s)

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2401  OF 2014
                 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.5947 of 2013)

State of Madhya Pradesh                 ….Appellant(s)
                                   Versus
Surendra Singh                    …Respondent(s)

                                  JUDGMENT
M.Y. EQBAL, J.
1.     Leave granted.
2.    State of Madhya Pradesh has preferred this  appeal  by  special  leave
against the judgment and order dated  22.8.2012  passed  by  learned  Single
Judge of High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at  Gwalior,  who  allowed  the
appeal,  preferred  by  the  respondent-accused,  in  part  maintaining  his
conviction but reducing the sentence awarded  by  the  trial  court  to  the
period already undergone  subject  to  depositing  further  compensation  of
Rs.2,000/- to the widow/mother of the deceased.

3.    The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 11.5.1998  a  ward  boy  of
Sabalgarh Hospital lodged a written report at Sabalgarh  police  station  to
the effect that one Vijay Singh of village Mangroli died in accident  caused
by a  jeep  bearing  registration  no.SP  7H  6045.   Thereafter,  case  was
investigated and challan was filed against the respondent-accused,  who  was
driver of the jeep and the accident occurred due to his rash  and  negligent
driving.  After completion of trial, the Judicial Magistrate,  First  Class,
Sabalgarh convicted the respondent-accused for the offence punishable  under
Sections 279, 337, 304-A of the Indian  Penal  Code  and  sentenced  him  to
undergo six months and two years  rigorous  imprisonment  respectively  with
fine of Rs.2,500/-.  Aggrieved by the order  of  conviction  passed  by  the
trial court, respondent filed appeal before the Additional  Sessions  Judge,
Sabalgarh, who upheld the order of conviction passed by the trial court.

4.    Aggrieved by the judgment of conviction, the respondent-accused  moved
the High Court in revision.  Learned counsel  for  the  respondent  assailed
the order and in the alternative submitted before the High  Court  that  the
accused, who is a poor person, has already served substantive part  of  jail
sentence and prayed that his sentence may be reduced to the  period  already
undergone and the  amount  of  fine  may  reasonably  be  enhanced.  Learned
counsel for the State objected and submitted  that  revisional  jurisdiction
of the High Court is limited and  no  interference  is  called  for  in  the
concurrent findings recorded by the courts below.   The  High  Court  partly
allowed revision petition of the accused maintaining findings of  conviction
of the accused with the modification to the extent that  the  jail  sentence
awarded to the accused is reduced to the period  already  undergone  subject
to  depositing  further  compensation  of   Rs.2,000/-    payable   to   the
widow/mother of the deceased Vijay Singh.

5.    Dissatisfied with the  order  of  the  High  Court,  State  of  Madhya
Pradesh has preferred  this  appeal  contending  that  the  High  Court  has
limited revisional jurisdiction and ought not to have  interfered  with  the
concurrent findings of the courts below.  It is further contended that  High
Court has erred in passing impugned order of partly  allowing  the  revision
petition of the accused without taking into  consideration  the  gravity  of
the act committed by the respondent, whereby an innocent man lost  his  life
due to negligence of the respondent.

6.    We have heard learned counsel for  the  parties  appearing  on  either
side.

7.    In the instant case, after proper appreciation of evidence  the  trial
court came to the conclusion that the accused had  endangered  the  life  of
Vijay by driving the jeep on a public road in a rash and  negligent  manner.
The accused dashed the jeep against a pulia first and then against  a  Babul
tree.  As a result of such accident Vijay Singh, who was travelling  in  the
jeep got injured and died, and another person Mangilal, who was also in  the
jeep, received injuries.  We are of the opinion that  the  trial  court  has
not committed any illegality in passing the order of conviction and  in  the
appeal preferred by the accused findings of the trial court  were  affirmed.
However, without proper appreciation of the evidence  and  consideration  of
gravity of the offence, learned Single Judge of the High Court  shown  undue
sympathy by modifying the conviction to the period already undergone.

8.    In our considered opinion, the High Court while passing  the  impugned
order has completely failed to follow  the  principles  enunciated  by  this
Court  in  catena  of  decisions.   Undue  sympathy  by  means  of  imposing
inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice  system  to  undermine
the public confidence in the efficacy of law and the society  cannot  endure
long under serious threats.  If the courts do not protect the  injured,  the
injured would then resort to personal vengeance.   Therefore,  the  duty  of
any court is to award proper sentence having regard to  the  nature  of  the
offence and the manner in which it was committed. (See Sevaka  Perumal   vs.
State of Tamil Nadu,  (1991) 3 SCC 471)

9.    In the case of Dhananjoy Chatterjee @ Dhana vs. State of West  Bengal,
(1994) 2 SCC 220, this Court held as under:
“In recent years, the rising crime rate-particularly violent  crime  against
women has made the criminal sentencing by the courts a subject  of  concern.
Today  there  are  admitted  disparities.  Some  criminals  get  very  harsh
sentences while many receive grossly different sentence for  an  essentially
equivalent crime and a shockingly large number even go  unpunished,  thereby
encouraging the criminal and  in  the  ultimate  making  justice  suffer  by
weakening the system's credibility. Of course, it is  not  possible  to  lay
down any cut and dry formula relating to  imposition  of  sentence  but  the
object of sentencing should be to see that the crime does not go  unpunished
and the victim of crime as  also  the  society  has  the  satisfaction  that
justice has been done to it.  In  imposing  sentences,  in  the  absence  of
specific legislation, Judges must consider  variety  of  factors  and  after
considering all those factors and taking an over-all view of the  situation,
impose sentence which they consider to be an  appropriate  one.  Aggravating
factors cannot be ignored and similarly mitigating circumstances  have  also
to be taken into consideration.
In our opinion, the measure of punishment in a given case must  depend  upon
the atrocity of the crime; the conduct of the criminal and  the  defenceless
and unprotected state of the victim. Imposition  of  appropriate  punishment
is the manner in which the courts respond to the society's cry  for  justice
against the criminals. Justice demands that courts should impose  punishment
fitting to the crime so that the courts reflect  public  abhorrence  of  the
crime. The courts must not only keep in view the rights of the criminal  but
also the rights of the victim of  crime  and  the  society  at  large  while
considering imposition of appropriate punishment.”

10.   While considering this aspect, the Apex Court in the  case  of  Mahesh
and others vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1987) 3 SCC 80, remarked that,
“…it will be a mockery of justice to permit these appellants to  escape  the
extreme penalty of law when faced with such evidence and  such  cruel  acts.
To give the lesser punishment for the appellants  would  be  to  render  the
Justice system of this country suspect. The common man will  lose  faith  in
courts. In such cases,  he  understands  and  appreciates  the  language  of
deterrence more than the reformative jargon. When we say  this,  we  do  not
ignore the need for a reformative approach in the sentencing process. ….”

11.   In the case of Hazara Singh versus Raj Kumar, (2013) 9 SCC  516,  this
Court has observed that it is the duty of the courts  to  consider  all  the
relevant factors to impose an  appropriate  sentence.  The  legislature  has
bestowed upon the judiciary  this  enormous  discretion  in  the  sentencing
policy,  which  must  be  exercised  with  utmost  care  and  caution.   The
punishment awarded should be directly proportionate to the  nature  and  the
magnitude of the offence. The  benchmark  of  proportionate  sentencing  can
assist the Judges in arriving at a fair and impartial verdict.   This  Court
further observed that the cardinal principle of sentencing  policy  is  that
the sentence imposed  on  an  offender  should  reflect  the  crime  he  has
committed and it should be proportionate to  the  gravity  of  the  offence.
This Court has repeatedly stressed the central role  of  proportionality  in
sentencing of offenders in numerous cases.

12.   In  Shailesh Jasvantbhai vs. State of Gujarat, (2006) 2 SCC 359, the
Apex Court opined that
“7. The law regulates social interests, arbitrates  conflicting  claims  and
demands.  Security  of  persons  and  property   of   the   people   is   an
[pic]essential  function  of  the  State.  It  could  be  achieved   through
instrumentality of criminal law.  Undoubtedly,  there  is  a  cross-cultural
conflict where living law must find answer to the  new  challenges  and  the
courts are required to mould the sentencing system to meet  the  challenges.
The contagion of lawlessness would undermine social  order  and  lay  it  in
ruins. Protection of society and stamping out criminal  proclivity  must  be
the object of law which must be achieved by imposing  appropriate  sentence.
Therefore, law as a cornerstone of the edifice of ‘order’  should  meet  the
challenges confronting the society. Friedman in his Law in Changing  Society
stated that: ‘State of criminal  law  continues  to  be—as  it  should  be—a
decisive reflection of  social  consciousness  of  society.’  Therefore,  in
operating the sentencing system, law should adopt the  corrective  machinery
or deterrence based  on  factual  matrix.  By  deft  modulation,  sentencing
process be stern where it should  be,  and  tempered  with  mercy  where  it
warrants to be. The facts and given circumstances in each case,  the  nature
of the crime, the manner in which it was planned and committed,  the  motive
for commission of the crime, the conduct  of  the  accused,  the  nature  of
weapons used and all other attending circumstances are relevant facts  which
would enter into the area of consideration.
8. Therefore, undue sympathy to impose inadequate  sentence  would  do  more
harm to the justice  system  to  undermine  the  public  confidence  in  the
efficacy of law and  society  could  not  long  endure  under  such  serious
threats. It is, therefore, the duty of every court to award proper  sentence
having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in  which  it  was
executed or committed, etc.”


13.   A three-Judge Bench of this  Court  in  Ahmed  Hussein  Vali  Mohammed
Saiyed vs. State of Gujarat, (2009) 7 SCC 254, observed as follows:
“99. … The object of awarding appropriate sentence should be to protect  the
society and to deter the criminal from achieving the avowed object  to  (sic
break the) law by imposing appropriate sentence. It  is  expected  that  the
courts would operate the sentencing system so as  to  impose  such  sentence
which reflects the conscience of the society and the sentencing process  has
to be stern where it should be. Any  liberal  attitude  by  imposing  meagre
sentences or taking too sympathetic view merely on account of lapse of  time
in respect of such offences will  be  resultwise  counterproductive  in  the
long run and against the interest of society which needs  to  be  cared  for
and strengthened by string of deterrence inbuilt in the sentencing system.
100. Justice demands that courts  should  impose  punishment  befitting  the
crime so that the courts reflect public abhorrence of the crime.  The  court
must not only keep in view the rights of the victim of  the  crime  but  the
society  at  large  while  considering   the   imposition   of   appropriate
[pic]punishment. The court will  be  failing  in  its  duty  if  appropriate
punishment is not awarded for a crime which  has  been  committed  not  only
against the individual victim but also against the  society  to  which  both
the criminal and the victim belong.”

14.   We again  reiterate  in  this  case  that  undue  sympathy  to  impose
inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice  system  to  undermine
the public confidence in the efficacy of law. It is the duty of every  court
to award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and  the
manner in which it was executed or  committed.  The  sentencing  courts  are
expected to consider all relevant facts and  circumstances  bearing  on  the
question of sentence and proceed to impose a sentence commensurate with  the
gravity of the offence.  The court must not only keep in view the rights  of
the victim of the crime but also the society at large while considering  the
imposition of appropriate punishment.  Meagre  sentence  imposed  solely  on
account of lapse of time without considering the degree of the offence  will
be counter-productive in the long  run  and  against  the  interest  of  the
society.


15.   In a recent decision in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh vs.  Bablu
- Criminal Appeal No.1845 of  2014,  after  considering  and  following  the
earlier decisions, this Court reiterated  the  settled  proposition  of  law
that one of the prime objectives  of  criminal  law  is  the  imposition  of
adequate, just, proportionate punishment which  commensurate  with  gravity,
nature of crime and the manner in  which  the  offence  is  committed.   One
should keep in mind the social interest and conscience of the society  while
considering the determinative factor of  sentence  with  gravity  of  crime.
The punishment should not be so lenient that it  shocks  the  conscience  of
the society.  It is, therefore, solemn duty of the court to strike a  proper
balance while awarding the sentence as awarding lesser  sentence  encourages
any criminal and, as a result of the same, the society suffers.

16.   In view of the  above,  we  set  aside  the  impugned  order  reducing
sentence to the period  already  undergone  and,  to  avoid  miscarriage  of
justice, this appeal is allowed restoring the sentence imposed by the  trial
court.  The respondent is  directed  to  surrender  within  two  weeks  from
today, failing which, the trial Judge is directed to take appropriate  steps
for sending him to prison to undergo the remaining period of sentence.

                                                              …………………………….J.
                                                                (M.Y. Eqbal)




                                                              …………………………….J.
                                                         (Shiva Kirti Singh)
New Delhi,
November 13, 2014.