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Friday, January 9, 2015

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. OF 2014 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) Nos. 2479-2487 of 2009) E. Bapanaiah …Appellant Versus Sri K.S. Raju etc. …Respondents

                                  REPORTABLE




                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


               CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.                    OF 2014
            (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) Nos. 2479-2487 of 2009)






      E. Bapanaiah                                     …Appellant


                                   Versus


      Sri K.S. Raju etc.                            …Respondents












                               J U D G M E N T






      Prafulla C. Pant, J.




            Leave granted.

   2. These appeals are directed against judgment and order dated  22.8.2008
      passed by the High Court of Judicature, Andhra  Pradesh,  in  Contempt
      Appeal Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of 2007 whereby said  Court
      has allowed all the Contempt Appeals setting  aside  the  order  dated
      3.8.2007 passed in Contempt Case No. 915 of 2002  wherein  K.S.  Raju,
      Promoter Director of M/s. Nagarjuna Finance  Limited,  Hyderabad,  and
      its other directors were convicted under Section  12  of  Contempt  of
      Courts Act, 1971, and each one of them was sentenced to suffer  simple
      imprisonment for a period of six months and were further  directed  to
      pay fine of Rs.2,000/- each.

   3. At the outset, we have no hesitation  to  observe  that  the  impugned
      order does not require interference to the extent the same  is  passed
      in Contempt Appeal No. 4 of 2007 filed by Minoo  R.  Shroof,  Contempt
      Appeal No. 5 of 2007 filed by Nimesh N. Kampani, Contempt Appeal No. 6
      of 2007 filed by C.D. Menon, Contempt Appeal No. 7 of  2007  filed  by
      A.P. Kurian, Contempt Appeal No. 8 of 2007  filed  by  Sridhar  Chary,
      Contempt Appeal No. 9 of 2007 filed by G.S. Raju, Contempt Appeal  No.
      10 of 2007 filed by P.K. Madhav, and Contempt Appeal No.  11  of  2007
      filed by L.V.V. Iyyer,  which were allowed for the reason that in  the
      Contempt Case No. 915 of 2002 they were not  the  respondents  against
      whom contempt case was filed.   There  were  only  three  respondents,
      namely, K.S. Raju, N. Selvaraj  and  M/s.  Nagarjuna  Finance  Limited
      through its Managing Director,  against  whom  contempt  petition  was
      filed under Section 12 read with Section  10  of  Contempt  of  Courts
      Act, 1971 by E. Bapanaiah (present appellant) before the  High  Court.
      Other eight directors had no opportunity to defend  themselves  before
      the conviction was  recorded  by  the  learned  Single  Judge  in  its
      concluding  paragraph  134  of  the  judgment  in  the  aforementioned
      Contempt Case No. 915 of 2002.

   4. It is only in respect of conviction of K.S. Raju, Promoter Director of
      Nagarjuna Finance Limited (for short “NFL”)  which  requires  in-depth
      examination as to whether the Division Bench of  the  High  Court  has
      rightly allowed the Contempt Appeal (No. 3 of  2007)  arising  out  of
      Contempt Case No. 915 of 2002, or not.

   5. Brief facts of the case are that the present appellant, E.  Bapanaiah,
      (one of the depositors who made deposits with NFL) filed the  contempt
      petition under Section 12 read with Section  10  of  the  Contempt  of
      Courts Act, 1971 for the alleged wilful disobedience  of  order  dated
      29.2.2000 and one  dated  21.8.2001  passed  by   Company  Law  Board,
      Southern Region Bench,  and  for  breach  of  undertakings/affidavits,
      including one filed by K.S. Raju (Promoter Director of NFL) before CLB
      and one given in Company Appeal No. 7 of 2001.  It is  stated  by  the
      present  appellant  that  the  respondent,  K.S.  Raju,  was  Promoter
      Director of  M/s.  Nagarjuna  Finance  Limited,  Hyderabad  (in  short
      “NFL”).  The said company, through its Directors, issued advertisement
      inviting  deposits  promising  good  returns  on  the  deposits   with
      attractive interest thereon, and  collected  the  huge  sum  from  the
      public.  The present appellant deposited ?.40,00,000/- (? forty lakhs)
      hoping that the same would multiply to  double  within  45  months  as
      projected in the advertisement.  The  said  amount  was  deposited  in
      eight fixed deposits of ?.5,00,000/- (? five lakhs) each for a  period
      of 45 months on 20.7.1997 and was due for  repayment  on  maturity  on
      28.4.2001.  However, when the NFL failed to  re-pay  the  sum  to  the
      depositors, an application (CP No. 35 of 2000) was filed under Section
      58-A of the Companies Act, 1956 before the Company Law Board, Southern
      Region Bench, for framing the  scheme  of  repayment  of  deposits  in
      instalments within a period of  48  months.   The  Company  Law  Board
      (CLB), exercising its suo motu powers, allowed the time to NFL on  the
      request of its directors to approve the scheme of  repayment.   During
      the pendency of  such  application  the  CLB  ordered  the  Directors,
      including the Promoter Director K.S. Raju, to file  affidavits  giving
      undertaking to the CLB that they would abide by the scheme and pay off
      the amount due to depositors.   On  the  assurance  as  given  in  the
      undertakings/affidavits filed by K.S.  Raju,  Promoter  Director,  and
      other Directors separately, the CLB passed order dated 29.2.2000.  But
      the Promoter Director and its group  companies  filed  Company  Appeal
      Nos. 9 of 2001 and 7 of 2001 against the said  order  dated  29.2.2000
      passed in CP No. 35 of 2000.   In  said  appeals,  on  behalf  of  the
      Company  an  undertaking  was  given  to  pay  half  of  first  year’s
      entitlement of the present appellant by 20.4.2002.  However, no amount
      was paid.  As such, the contempt petition was  filed  by  the  present
      appellant before the High Court for violation of  the  orders  of  the
      Company Law Board.

   6. According to the appellant, after the scheme was approved, K.S.  Raju,
      Promoter Director of NFL, started pleading that there  was  change  in
      the management of NFL, and sought to be relieved from his liability as
      the Promoter Director  of  NFL,  its  group  companies  and  from  the
      undertaking given by him to the CLB.  The CLB declined to relieve  the
      Promoter Director K.S. Raju from the undertaking given by him  and  it
      was directed that he should make the repayment as  per  the  repayment
      scheme.  The Company Appeals were  dismissed  by  the  High  Court  on
      3.1.2002.  NFL and its Promoter Director failed  to  comply  with  the
      order of the Company Law Board even after  dismissal  of  the  Company
      Appeals.  K.S. Raju, the then Promoter Director, was  responsible  for
      issuance of the advertisement inviting deposits from  the  public  and
      failed to repay the deposits as per the undertaking given  by  him  on
      behalf of the Company.  It is further alleged by the present appellant
      in the Contempt Petition before the High Court that K.S. Raju kept  on
      evading his liability, and attempted to shirk  the  responsibility  by
      taking plea that he had resigned from the directorship.

   7. A counter affidavit  was  filed  on  behalf  of  K.S.  Raju,  Promoter
      Director of NFL,  in  February,  2003  before  the  High  Court  which
      discloses that the said respondent disputed and denied  the  averments
      made in the Contempt Petition.  He pleaded that he had all respect for
      the Court and had no intention to commit the contempt  of  the  court.
      He further pleaded that long back he had left to function as  Managing
      Director of NFL.  It is further stated by him that he is neither in  a
      position to exercise any control over the Company nor  responsible  to
      make repayment of the deposits made in favour of NFL.  It was  further
      submitted by him before the learned single Judge  of  the  High  Court
      that in the order dated 29.2.2000 passed by the CLB, the Board did not
      rely on the assurance or undertaking given by the parties.   Only  the
      Managing Director was directed to file the undertaking,  as  such  the
      undertaking/affidavit given by the respondent K.S. Raju  was  not  the
      basis of the order dated 29.2.2000.  As such  it  was  contended  that
      there was no contempt of CLB or the Court.   It  was  further  pleaded
      that an agreement  was  entered  into  between  one  M/s.  Mahalakshmi
      Factorial Services Limited (for short  “MFSL”)  and  NFL  whereby  the
      control of NFL was handed over to MFSL, and  N.  Selvaraj  (respondent
      No. 2 in the Contempt Petition) was nominated as the  Chief  Executive
      Officer to look after the affairs of NFL.  Lastly, it was  pleaded  by
      respondent   K.S.   Raju   that   assuming   that   he    had    given
      undertaking/affidavit on which CLB passed the order said to have  been
      disobeyed, there is no personal liability on said respondent to  repay
      the amount in question.

   8. In  the  counter  affidavits  filed  on  behalf  of  NFL  (through  G.
      Venkatapathi, Executive Director) and N. Selvaraj (respondent No. 2 in
      the Contempt Petition) it was disclosed that Sridhar  Chary,  Managing
      Director, functioning for over a decade of NFL, was none else than the
      nominee of K.S. Raju, Promoter  Director.   It  was  also  pleaded  on
      behalf of NFL that out of Paid-up  Capital  of  ?.26.32  crores  group
      companies were holding ?.16.16 crores, i.e.,  approximately  61%.   It
      was also stated by NFL in its counter affidavit before the High  Court
      that under Articles 104 and 140 of the Articles  of  Association  K.S.
      Raju had power to  appoint  the  Managing  Director  and  other  three
      Directors as his nominees.  N.  Selvaraj  (respondent  No.  2  in  the
      Contempt petition) denied that he was nominee  of  MFSL.   He  further
      pleaded that there was no change in the management of NFL  during  his
      tenure as Managing Director, and he further told that  entire  control
      remained with K.S. Raju and his nominees.  The Executive Director,  G.
      Venkatapathi of NFL, filed additional counter affidavit in which it is
      clearly stated that the CLB passed the  order  on  the  basis  of  the
      undertakings and affidavits filed by the  Promoter  Director  and  the
      group companies.  The counter  affidavits  further  revealed  that  on
      special audit made in April, 2002, several irregularities  were  found
      to have been committed by  the  Management  resulting  in  failure  of
      recoveries in respect of loans advanced to various companies who  were
      not traceable on the addresses given.

   9. An additional counter affidavit  was  filed  by  K.S.  Raju,  Promoter
      Director, who was contesting the  contempt  petition  with  other  two
      respondents, in which he alleged that the representatives of MFSL have
      engineered and secured the audit report to save the Directors of  said
      company.

  10. Learned Single Judge, after hearing the parties at length, came to the
      conclusion that NFL and its Promoter Director, K.S. Raju,  are  guilty
      of contempt of court.  Paragraphs 134 and  135  of  the  judgment  and
      order dated 3.8.2007 passed by the learned Single Judge read as under:
      -

           “134. The 1st and 3rd respondents/contemnors  are  found  guilty
           and liable to be convicted under Section 12 of the  Contempt  of
           Courts Act.  Accordingly, the 1st  respondent  as  well  as  the
           other directors of the 3rd respondent company are convicted  and
           sentenced to suffer simple imprisonment  for  a  period  of  six
           months, together with imposition of fine of  Rs.2,000/-  (Rupees
           two thousand  only).   The  1st  respondent  as  well  as  other
           directors of the 3rd  respondent  shall  be  detained  in  Civil
           Prison for the period of imprisonment as ordered above.

           135. Accordingly, C.C. is allowed.”

  11. Aggrieved by the order dated 3.8.2007 passed  by  the  learned  single
      Judge in Contempt Case No. 915 of 2002 respondent K.S. Raju,  Promoter
      Director, appears to have filed Contempt Appeal No. 3 of  2007  before
      the Division Bench of the High Court.  His appeal was taken  up  along
      with the appeals of the other Directors and disposed of vide  impugned
      order dated 22.8.2008  whereby  the  appeals  of  all  the  Directors,
      including that of K.S. Raju, were allowed.  Hence these appeals before
      us by the depositor E. Bapanaiah.

      (We have already observed in the beginning of this judgment that since
      the ‘other Directors’ were  neither  impleaded  by  name  nor  had  an
      opportunity to defend themselves,  as  such  setting  aside  of  their
      conviction and sentence by the Division Bench of  the  High  Court  in
      their appeals, requires no interference.  As such  further  discussion
      is confined to the issue of allowing of  K.S.  Raju  by  the  Division
      Bench of the High Court.)

  12. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at  length  and  perused
      the papers on record.

  13. It is not disputed that E. Bapanaiah made deposit of ?.40,00,000/-  (?
      forty lakhs)  in eight FDRs each of ?.5,00,000/- (? five  lakhs)  with
      NFL in response to the advertisement made by the said Company.  It  is
      also not disputed that respondent K.S. Raju was the Promoter  Director
      of   NFL,   Hyderabad.    Not   only   this,   the   filing   of   the
      undertaking/affidavit dated 14.2.2000 before the  Company  Law  Board,
      Southern Region Bench is not denied by the respondent K.S. Raju.   The
      said undertaking/affidavit reads as under: -

           “BEFORE THE COMPANY LAW BOARD SOUTHERN BENCH AT CHENNAI

                   Company Petition No.NAG6-33/45QA/SRB/99

           In the matter of the Companies Act, 1956 Section 58A(9)

           In the matter of the Reserve Bank of India  Act,  1934,  Section
           45QA

                                     AND

           In  the  matter  of  Nagarjuna  Finance   Limited,   Punjagutta,
           Hyderabad        … Petitioner

                                  AFFIDAVIT

           I, k.s. Raju, s/o Late Shri K V K Raju, aged 50 years,  residing
           at, ‘Digvijayam’, Plot No. 933A, Road  No.  47,  Jubilee  Hills,
           Hyderabad-500033,  do  hereby  solemnly  affirm  and  state   as
           follows:

           I am the promoter director of  Nagarjuna  Finance  Limited,  the
           petitioner in the Company Petition No. NAG6-33/45 QA/SRB/99.

           I as such hereby give assurance that Nagarjuna  Finance  Limited
           (NFL) shall make repayment  of  deposits  as  per  the  approved
           scheme by the Hon’ble Company Law Board in  the  above  petition
           for  deferment  of  repayment  of  deposits.   It   is   further
           reiterated that all steps shall be taken to cause NFL to  comply
           with aforesaid repayment schedule.

           The statements made are true to  my  knowledge  and  I  solemnly
           affirm that this declaration is true and that no part of  it  is
           false.




           Place: Hyderabad                        Sd/-
           Date: February 14, 2000                 K.S. Raju
                                                   Deponent”



  14.  Now we have to examine as to whether the defences taken by K.S. Raju,
      Promoter Director, that he committed no  wilful  disobedience  of  the
      order of the Company Law Board are acceptable or not.  It is  relevant
      to mention here that it is not the defence of K.S. Raju that repayment
      has been made by him or by NFL to the present appellant  E.  Bapanaiah
      (depositor).  That  being  so,  we  have  to  see  whether  there  was
      justification on the part of K.S. Raju,  Promoter  Director,  and  his
      Company (NFL) in not making repayment as per the  scheme  approved  by
      the CLB, as  directed by said authority.

  15. Learned counsel for the  respondent  K.S.  Raju  argued  that  in  the
      undertaking given by K.S. Raju, only this much has  been  stated  that
      the Company will make the payment, as such  it  is  not  the  personal
      liability of said  respondent.   But  needless  to  say  that  Company
      functions through its directors, in its operations.   Company  is  not
      such person which can be sent to jail.  It is the director controlling
      the affairs of Company through whom it has committed the disobedience,
      if any, and as such, such director has to suffer the  consequences  of
      disobedience if it is wilful.  We have already  discussed  above  that
      from the affidavits filed before the High Court, it is clear that K.S.
      Raju was not only the Promoter  Director  of  NFL,  but  the  Managing
      Director of said Company, working for a decade, was his  nominee,  and
      practically all the powers to run the NFL vested with K.S.  Raju,  the
      Promoter Director, and his nominees, whom he appointed under  Articles
      104 and 140 of Articles of Association.

  16. In our opinion, having considered the submissions of  learned  counsel
      for K.S. Raju, Promoter Director, and  considering  his  role  in  the
      operation of the Company, as discussed above, the  Division  Bench  of
      the High Court erred in law in holding  that  he  was  not  guilty  of
      wilful disobedience of the order of  the  CLB.   It  is  pertinent  to
      mention here that after giving undertaking dated 14.2.2000, respondent
      K.S. Raju submitted his resignation in September, 2000, which  clearly
      reflects that the same was done in  order  to  save  himself  and  his
      company, from making the repayment directed to be made by the CLB, and
      thereby dishonestly made  attempt  in  not  making  repayment  to  the
      depositor E. Bapanaiah.

  17. Sub-section (4) of Section 12 of the  Contempt  of  Courts  Act,  1971
      provides that ‘where the person found guilty of contempt of  court  in
      respect of any undertaking given to a court is a company, every person
      who, at the time the contempt was committed, was in charge of, and was
      responsible to, the  company  for  the  conduct  of  business  of  the
      company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty  of  the
      contempt and the punishment may be enforced, with  the  leave  of  the
      court, by the detention in civil prison of each of such  person’.   It
      further provides that ‘nothing contained  in  this  sub-section  shall
      render any such person liable to such punishment if he proves that the
      contempt was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised  all
      due diligence to prevent its commission’.

  18. It is not the case of respondent K.S.  Raju,  Promoter  Director,  who
      gave undertaking that he had no knowledge of the order of the CLB,  or
      that he made any attempt to prevent the disobedience of the order.

  19. Though it is contended by Mr. C.A. Sundaram,  learned  senior  counsel
      for K.S. Raju that liability to make repayment to the depositors stood
      transferred to MFSL with whom NFL entered into an agreement after  the
      order dated 29.2.2000 passed, but copy of the  order  dated  19.9.2000
      passed by the CLB (Annexure P-4) on  the  record  discloses  that  the
      liability continued with K.S. Raju and  group  of  his  companies,  as
      mentioned in direction No. 2 of the order which reads as under: -

                 “Heard Shri C.R. Murali, Practising  Chartered  Accountant
           and Authorized representative of the company  as  well  as  Shri
           L.V.V. Iyer, Director of the  company.   The  company  has  made
           payment of Rs.73 lakhs to the depositors between  17.7.2000  and
           19.9.2000.  The company has  considered  all  the  430  hardship
           cases; attended to complaints to nine depositors received at the
           Bench Office and disposed of 1424  complaints  received  at  his
           office by taking appropriate action as per the  Scheme  approved
           by the CLB.  According  to  Shri  Iyer,  the  company  finds  it
           difficult to make payment to the depositors in  accordance  with
           the  scheme  of  account  of  the  poor  rate  of  recovery   of
           receivables and for want of the  required  additional  expertise
           and infrastructure  for  recovery  of  the  monies  due  to  the
           company.  Hence, the management of the company has entered  into
           a strategic alliance with M/s.  Mahalakshmi  Factoring  Services
           Limited,  Bombay   (MFSL),   which   would   provide   necessary
           infrastructure  and  skills  to  accelerate   the   process   of
           realization  of  the  receivables  to  make  repayment  to   the
           depositors.  Accordingly,  additional  professionals  have  been
           inducted into  the  Board  of  the  Company  to  strengthen  the
           recovery and disbursement mechanism.  MFSL has agreed to  resume
           the responsibility in realizing the dues of the  company.   MFSL
           is involved in the management of the company, Shri N. Selvaraju,
           President of the Company and Shri  C.  Muthuswamy,  Director  of
           MFSL  have  filed  affidavits  undertaking  to   discharge   the
           obligations towards  the  depositors  in  terms  of  the  scheme
           approved by the CLB.

                 Taking into consideration the facts and  circumstances  of
           the case, submissions made on  behalf  of  the  company,  it  is
           ordered as under: -

              1. The Company shall –

                    i. make payment to the depositors in every  category  as
                       per the Scheme approved by the CLB;

                   ii. furnish additional particulars  of  the  cases  where
                       payments are due to the  depositors  and  the  actual
                       payment made by the company in such cases;

                  iii. attend to the complaints of nine depositors  received
                       at the bench office and report compliance;

              2. The affidavits filed by :

                    a) Shri K.S. Raju, Promoter Director of the Company;

                    b) M/s. New India Finance Ltd.

                    c) M/s. Chinnar Securities Pvt. Ltd.

                    d) M/s. Nagarjuna Housing Development Finance Ltd.

                    e) M/s. Nagarjuna Engineering &  Construction  Co.  Pvt.
                       Ltd.

                    f) M/s. Nagarjuna Holdings Private Limited

                    g) M/s. Paschim Holdings Pvt. Ltd.

                    h) M/s. K.S. Raju Associates & Holdings Pvt. Ltd.

                    i) M/s. Corporate Securities & Holdings Pvt. Ltd.

                    j) M/s. K.S. Raju Associates and Estates Pvt. Ltd.

                    k) M/s. K.R.R. Holdings Pvt. Ltd; and

                    l) Shri Sridhar Chari, Managing Director of the  company
                       assuring repayment of deposits by the company as  per
                       the scheme approved by the CLB shall remain in  force
                       till discharging the  obligations  in  terms  of  the
                       order dated 29.2.2000 of the CLB.

              3. The arrangements made between the company  and  MFSL  shall
                 not be of any consequence  in  relation  to  the  repayment
                 schedule approved by the CLB.  The  company,  its  promoter
                 Director and Group Holding Companies shall continue  to  be
                 responsible for due compliance of the order stated supra.

              4. The progress made in implementation of the scheme  will  be
                 reviewed on 14.11.2000 at 10.30 p.m.”




  20. When an application under Section 634A of the Companies Act, 1956  was
      moved by the present appellant before the CLB, the Board, by  speaking
      order dated 21.8.2001, after considering rival  submissions,  observed
      in paragraphs 6 and 7 as under: -

           “6.   In regard to the plea of Shri Murali that  the  provisions
           of Section 634A cannot be invoked by the applicant,  it  may  be
           observed that this Section is explicit which runs as follows:

                 Sec. 634A: Any order made by the Company Law Board  may  be
                 enforced by that Board in the same manner as if it  were  a
                 decree made by a Court in a suit pending  therein,  and  it
                 shall be lawful for that Board to send, in the case of  its
                 inability to execute such order, to the  Court  within  the
                 local limits of whose jurisdiction, -

                    a) in the case  of  an  order  against  a  company,  the
                       registered office of the company is situated, or

                    b) in the case of an order against any other person, the
                       person concerned voluntarily resides, or  carries  on
                       business or personally works for gain.

           Section 634A is clear that as in the case of a court, the orders
           of the Company Law Board can be  enforced  by  it  in  the  same
           manner as if it were a decree made by  a  court.   This  section
           further permits the CLB, in case of its liability to execute the
           order, to seek the assistance  of  the  court  having  competent
           jurisdiction for execution of its order.  In view of this  there
           is no force in the argument of Shri Murali.

           7.    Taking into consideration the facts and  circumstances  of
           the case, the opportunity afforded to the Company and the  legal
           position stated hereinabove, I hereby  order  that  the  Company
           shall pay 30 per  cent  of  the  deposit  amount  together  with
           interest at the contracted rate upto the date  of  maturity  and
           thereafter till the date of payment at the rate of 14.5 per cent
           within 30 days of receipt  of  this  order,  failing  which  the
           applicant  is  at  liberty  to  move  the  Court,  within  whose
           jurisdiction the registered office of the Company is situated to
           execute the order of the CLB.”




  21. The above order appears to have been challenged in Company Appeal Nos.
      7 & 9 of 2001 by both the parties – depositor E.  Bapanaiah  and  NFL,
      respectively.  Both these company appeals were heard and  disposed  of
      by order dated 3.1.2002 by the High Court.  The concluding  paragraphs
      of the common order passed by the High Court in the  Company  Appeals,
      are quoted below: -

                 “In the  circumstances,  the  submission  of  the  learned
           counsel for the respondent company that it is entitled  to  wait
           till the  month  of  April  2002  cannot  be  accepted  and  the
           respondent company is therefore bound to make the payments every
           month as per the clause 11(f) read with clause 12  (iv)  of  the
           scheme.

                 Coming to  the  second  submission  made  by  the  learned
           counsel for the respondent company, though I do not  propose  to
           go into the larger question whether  the  nature  of  the  power
           exercised under Section 634A of the  Companies  Act  is  in  the
           nature of the power exercised as an executing court, but I  must
           say the impugned order is not in conformity  with  the  original
           order of the Company Law Board dated 29th February, 2000.   But,
           a combined reading of clause 1(i) and 12(iv) of the scheme,  the
           respondent company is bound to pay 30% of the amount due to  the
           petitioner  within  1  year  from  the  date  of  the   maturity
           (28.4.2001) spread over 12 equal monthly instalments.

                 Coming to the submission made by the learned  counsel  for
           the depositor, I do not see any reason why he  should  have  any
           grievance against the impugned order.  It is  open  for  him  as
           indicated by the Company Law Board in the impugned order to move
           the appropriate court for the execution  of  the  order  of  the
           Company Law Board dated 29th February 2000.

                  In  the  circumstances,  both  the  company  appeals  are
           dismissed.”




  22. However, after above order was passed by the High Court, a proviso  is
      added by Legislature to Section 634A of the Companies Act, 1956, which
      reads as under:-

           “Provided that the provision of this section shall not apply  on
           and after commencement of the Companies (Second Amendment)  Act,
           2002.”

      As such, on the date (3.8.2007) order passed by learned single  Judge,
      the depositor had no option of getting executed the order of CLB as  a
      decree passed in a suit, and present appellant  could  not  have  been
      asked to avail remedy under Section 634A of the Companies Act.

  23. No doubt, a company which defaults in  repayment  of  deposit  can  be
      dealt with as per provisions contained in sub-sections (9) and (10) of
      Section 58A of the Companies Act, 1956, which read as under: -

           “(9) Where a company has failed to repay  any  deposit  or  part
           thereof in accordance with the  terms  and  conditions  of  such
           deposit the Tribunal may, if it is satisfied, either on its  own
           motion or on the  application  of  the  depositor,  that  it  is
           necessary so to do to safeguard the interests  of  the  company,
           the depositors or in the public interest direct, by  order,  the
           company to make  repayment  of  such  deposit  or  part  thereof
           forthwith or within such time and subject to such conditions  as
           may be specified in the order:

                 Provided that the Tribunal may  before  making  any  order
           under this sub-section give a reasonable  opportunity  of  being
           heard to the company and the other  persons  interested  in  the
           matter.

           (10) Whoever fails to comply with any order made by the Tribunal
           under sub-section (9)  shall  be  punishable  with  imprisonment
           which may extend to three years and shall also be  liable  to  a
           fine of not less than rupees five hundred for every  day  during
           which such non-compliance continues.”

      (Expression  “Tribunal”  was  substituted  in  the   above   mentioned
      provisions vide Act No. 11 of 2003 in  place  of  words  “Company  Law
      Board”)

  24. During arguments it is stated before us by the learned counsel for the
      parties that the prosecution was also launched against the  respondent
      K.S. Raju but he was discharged.  However, Special Leave  Petition  is
      said to have been pending in said matter.   We are of  the  view  that
      the depositors cannot be left without remedy  merely  for  the  reason
      that prosecution could have been launched against the company.

  25. Powers of the High Courts to punish for contempt including the  powers
      to punish for  contempt  of  itself  flow  from  Article  215  of  the
      Constitution of India.  Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
      empowers the High Courts to punish contempts of its subordinate courts
      which reads as under: -

           “10. Power of High Court  to  punish  contempts  of  subordinate
           courts. – Every High Court shall  have  and  exercise  the  same
           jurisdiction, powers and authority, in accordance with the  same
           procedure and  practice,  in  respect  of  contempts  of  courts
           subordinate to  it  as  it  has  and  exercises  in  respect  of
           contempts of itself:

                 Provided that no High Court shall  take  cognizance  of  a
           contempt alleged to have been committed in respect  of  a  court
           subordinate to it where such contempt is an  offence  punishable
           under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).”

  26. As to the question whether CLB is a court subordinate to High Court or
      not, in Canara Bank v. Nuclear Power Corporation  of  India  Ltd.  and
      others[1], this Court has held that CLB in the proceedings  before  it
      under  Section  111  of  the  Companies  Act  since  performs   curial
      functions, hence it is a “court” within the meaning of Section 9-A  of
      Special  Court  (Trial  of  Offences  Relating  to   Transactions   in
      Securities) Act, 1992.  In  Sk.  Mohammedbhikhan  Hussainbhai  v.  The
      Manager Chandrabhanu Cinema[2], the Gujarat High Court has  taken  the
      view that if the High Court is an appellate court  of  some  authority
      under a statute, such authority can be  deemed  to  be  a  subordinate
      court within the ambit of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and, therefore,
      the High Court can exercise powers of dealing with  contempt  of  such
      authority provided the act of contempt was not punishable for offences
      under Indian Penal Code. In N. Venkata Swamy Naidu v. Sri  Surya  Teja
      Constructions Pvt. Ltd. and others[3], High Court  of  Andhra  Pradesh
      observed as under: -

           “28. Under Section 10F of the Companies  Act  1956,  any  person
           aggrieved by any decision or order of the Company Law Board  may
           file an appeal to the High Court, within  sixty  days  from  the
           date of communication of the decision or order  of  the  Company
           Law Board, on any question of law arising out of such an  order.
           The Company Law Board is thus judicially subordinate to the High
           Court and, even if its administrative control  is  held  not  to
           vest in the High Court under Article 235 of the Constitution  of
           India, it would nonetheless be a Court subordinate to  the  High
           Court under Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act.”

  27. The present case relates to a civil contempt  wherein  an  undertaking
      given to  Company  Law  Board  is  breached.   Normally,  the  general
      provisions made under the Contempt of Courts Act are  not  invoked  by
      the High Courts for forcing a party  to  obey  orders  passed  by  its
      subordinate courts for the simple reason  that  there  are  provisions
      contained in Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to get executed its  orders
      and decrees.  It is settled principle of  law  that  where  there  are
      special law and general law,  the  provisions  of  special  law  would
      prevail over general law.  As such, in normal circumstances  a  decree
      holder cannot take recourse of Contempt of Courts Act else it is  sure
      to throw open a floodgate of litigation under  contempt  jurisdiction.
      It is not the object of the Contempt of  Courts  Act  to  make  decree
      holders rush to the High Courts simply for the reason that the  decree
      passed by the subordinate court is not obeyed.  However, there  is  no
      such procedure prescribed to execute order of CLB  particularly  after
      proviso is added to Section 634A of  the  Companies  Act,  1956,  vide
      Companies (Second Amendment) Act, 2002.

  28. Therefore, having considered submissions of learned  counsel  for  the
      parties, and material on record, and further considering the  relevant
      provisions of law and the cases referred above, and exercising  powers
      under Article 136 read with Article 142 of the Constitution, we  think
      it just and proper to interfere with the order passed by the  Division
      Bench of the High Court whereby the  Division  Bench  erroneously  set
      aside the finding and sentence awarded by  the  learned  single  Judge
      against K.S. Raju.  In our  opinion,  respondent  K.S.  Raju  wilfully
      disobeyed the order of CLB and breached the undertaking given to  CLB,
      and thereby committed Contempt of Court subordinate to High  Court  as
      such the Division Bench of the High Court has erred in law in allowing
      the Contempt Appeal No. 3 of 2007 filed by K.S. Raju and setting aside
      his conviction and sentence,  recorded  against  him  by  the  learned
      Single Judge in Contempt Case No. 915 of 2002.

  29. For the reasons, as discussed above, we allow the present appeal filed
      against respondent K.S. Raju, and set aside the impugned order of  the
      Division Bench of High  Court.   Accordingly,  order  dated  3.8.2007,
      passed in Contempt Case No. 915 of 2002, to the extent  of  conviction
      and sentence recorded against K.S. Raju (respondent) stands  restored.
      However, exercising powers under Article 142 of  the  Constitution  of
      India, to do complete justice between the parties, we allow sixty days
      time to respondent K.S. Raju, with effect from pronouncement  of  this
      judgment to repay the entire  amount  to  the  depositor/appellant  as
      directed by CLB, and if within the said period of sixty  days  payment
      is not made to the depositor/appellant, respondent K.S. Raju shall  be
      taken into custody to serve out  sentence as recorded against  him  by
      the learned Single Judge vide order dated 3.8.2007  in  Contempt  Case
      No. 915 of 2002.  If the amount is paid to the  present  appellant  as
      directed by this Court  within  sixty  days,  the  sentence  shall  be
      reduced to the extent of fine only.  Rest of the appeals filed by  the
      depositor in respect of all other directors, who were not impleaded by
      name before the High Court in the contempt Case No. 915 of  2002,  and
      acquitted by the impugned order  passed  by  Division  Bench  of  High
      Court, are dismissed.




                                                              ………………………………J.
                                                            [Vikramajit Sen]






                                                              ………………………………J.
                                                [Prafulla C. Pant]


      New Delhi;
      November 07, 2014.
-----------------------
[1] 1975 Supp (3) SCC 81
[2] AIR 1986 Guj 209
[3] 2008 CriLJ 227

CIVIL APPEAL No. 10024 OF 2014 (Arising out of S.L.P.(c) No. 24317 of 2013) Dr. Balwant Singh Appellant(s) Versus Commissioner of Police & Ors. Respondent(s)

                                                                  Reportable

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CIVIL APPEAL No. 10024  OF 2014
                (Arising out of S.L.P.(c) No. 24317 of 2013)


      Dr. Balwant Singh
Appellant(s)


Versus


Commissioner of Police & Ors.                      Respondent(s)



                               J U D G M E N T

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

      1.    Leave granted

2.    This appeal arises out of an order  dated  21.05.2013  passed  by  the
Division Bench of  the High Court of  Judicature  for  Rajasthan  at  Jaipur
Bench, Jaipur in D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ)  No.  378  of  2013  which
arises out of an order dated 25.02.2013 passed by the learned  Single  Judge
in  S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2273 of 2013.
3.    By impugned order, the Division Bench disposed of the appeal filed  by
the appellant herein in the light of the assurance given  by  the  State  to
settle the controversy raised by the appellant in the writ  petition/appeal.

4.    Dissatisfied with the impugned order, the  appellant  has  filed  this
appeal by way of special leave before this Court.
5.    This Court issued notice to the respondents. On being served,  learned
counsel for the  respondents  filed  counter  affidavit  on  behalf  of  the
respondents.
6.    Heard learned counsel for the parties.
7.    In order to appreciate the  issue  involved  in  this  appeal,  it  is
necessary to mention the facts in brief.
8.     The  appellant  (writ  petitioner)  is   the   resident   of   Jaipur
(Rajasthan). He retired as Director General of  Police  in  March  1995.  To
settle  after  retirement,  the  appellant  constructed  his  house   in   a
residential colony opposite to Vidhyut  Bhawan  in  Jyoti  Nagar  in  Jaipur
city. The locality and, in  particular,  the  location  of  the  appellant's
house is very near to “Vidhan Sabha" (State Assembly Building).
9.     The  appellant  to  his  misfortune  noticed  that  very  frequently,
thousand/hundreds of people  belonging  to  political/non-political  parties
would gather on the road approaching to Vidhan Sabha, which is in  front  of
his house, with agitated mood and would undertake their “Protests March”  or
"Dharna" or "Procession" for ventilating their  grievances.  The  protestors
then would use indiscriminately loudspeakers by erecting temporary stage  on
the road and go on delivering speeches one after the  other  throughout  the
day which sometimes used to continue for  indefinite  period  regardless  of
time. Since there used to be a gathering  of  thousand/hundreds  of  people,
the demonstrators would indiscriminately make use of the compound  walls  of
nearby houses including that of the appellant’s  house  to  ease  themselves
frequently at any time.
10.   In order to regulate  such  events  and  to  maintain  law  and  order
situation, the State and Police Administration used to  put  barricades  and
depute hundreds of  police  personnel  to  see  that  no  untoward  incident
occurs. These barricades used to be installed just in front of the gates  of
the houses of the residents including  the  appellant's  house.  The  police
personnel like others would also use the walls  of  the  residential  houses
including that of the  appellant's  house  to  ease  and  nobody  was  in  a
position to tell them not to do such activities in front  of  their  houses.
The appellant also noticed that these  activities  had  gained  considerable
momentum making living of  the  residents  of  that  area  a  miserable  one
because neither they were in a position to stay comfortably  and  peacefully
inside the house or do any work due to constant noise pollution nor were  in
a position to come out of their house due to  constant  fear  of  insecurity
and restrictions put by the State.
11.   The appellant was one of the most affected  persons  whose  living  in
his house had become impossible due  to  these  activities  and  finding  no
solution  to  the  problem  faced,  compelled  him  to  first  approach  the
Commissioner of Police and make  an  oral  complaint  but  finding  that  no
action was taken, filed a written complaint on 21.11.2011 (Annexure P-1).
12.    In  the  complaint,  the  appellant   narrated   the   aforementioned
grievances in detail and  requested  the  Commissioner  of  Police  to  take
immediate effective remedial steps to prevent such events.

13.   Since the Commissioner of Police  did  not  take  any  action  on  the
complaint, the appellant,  on  06.03.2012,  filed  a  complaint  before  the
National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), New Delhi under the  provisions  of
the Human Rights Commission Act,  2005  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  “the
Act”). The NHRC forwarded the appellant's complaint to the  Rajasthan  State
Human Rights Commission (RSHRC) for taking appropriate action in  accordance
with law. The RSHRC, on receipt  of  the  complaint,   registered  the  same
being Petition No. 12/17/1720 and by order dated 24.09.2012  partly  allowed
the appellant's petition and  directed  the  Additional  Home  Secretary  to
order the concerned officials to  effectively  stop  interference  with  the
right of the appellant herein to lead an independent and peaceful  life  and
ensure that :


“1.    The crowd of demonstrators does not assemble, on both roads  opposite
to the petitioner’s house during the assembly sessions.

2.    The demonstrators are not allowed to  use  high  powered  loudspeakers
during day and night.

The road is not closed  after  stopping  traffic  and  traffic  movement  is
maintained in a sustained and orderly manner.

The policemen are stopped from urinating in the proximity  of  the  wall  of
the petitioner’s house from the side of  the  M.L.A.’s  complex  during  the
Assembly Sessions.

No barricading is done on the road opposite to, and near, the house  of  the
petitioner.”

14.   Despite issuance of the aforementioned directions, the State  did  not
ensure its compliance and on the other hand, some  miscreants  attacked  the
appellant’s house and hence out of disgust, the appellant was  compelled  to
file writ petition being S.B.Civil Writ Petition No.  2273  of  2013  before
the High Court of Rajasthan Bench at Jaipur, seeking appropriate reliefs  by
issuance  of  writ  of  prohibition/mandamus  against  the  State  and   its
authorities to protect the interest of the appellant, his property  and  his
peaceful living.
15.   Learned single Judge,  by  order  dated  25.02.2013  disposed  of  the
appellant's writ petition observing that since the State has  already  taken
all necessary steps in the light of the directions given  by  the  RSHRC  in
their order dated 24.09.2012 and hence no more orders are called for in  the
writ petition.
16.   Learned Single Judge, in the concluding part of  his  order,  observed
as under:
“……..I am of the considered view that no order on the reliefs prayed for  by
the petitioner be passed as the  State  Government  has  already  taken  all
requisite action within its powers to ensure that the  peace  and  quiet  of
the petitioner living in his residential house at Jyoti  Nagar  locality  in
proximity to Vidhan Sabha is not unduly disturbed.   It  would  be  expected
that  measures  detailed  by  the  Additional  Advocate   General   in   his
submissions before this Court would be implemented strictly.”


17.   The appellant, felt aggrieved, filed intra  court  appeal  before  the
Division Bench of the High Court  out  of  which  this  appeal  arises.  The
Division Bench, by impugned order, more or less on the same lines  on  which
the learned Single Judge had disposed of  the  writ  petition,  decided  the
appellant's appeal.

18.   The Division Bench in the concluding part of their order  observed  as
under:
       “In  view  of  that  assurance  extended  on  behalf  of  the   State
Government, the learned single Judge  has  already  reached  the  conclusion
that the directions issued by the Human Rights Commission, Rajasthan in  its
order dated 24.9.2012, have  substantially  been  complied  with.   At  this
stage, the Division Bench of this Court cannot  give  further  direction  in
the appeal.  The State Government obviously  shall  also  comply  with  such
order and act in conformity with assurance given  before  the  single  Bench
and take special care to ensure that peace  and  quiet  of  the  petitioner,
living in his residential house at Jyoti  Nagar  locality  in  proximity  to
Vidhan Sabha is not unduly disturbed.”

It is against the aforementioned order of the Division Bench, the  appellant
(writ petitioner) has filed this appeal.
19.   The respondents have filed their  counter  affidavit.  The  State,  on
affidavit, has stated that it is their duty to ensure that no harm,  injury,
damage or inconvenience/nuisance of any nature is caused  to  the  life  and
property of any citizen on account of any action  and  activities  of  other
person(s) or/and State  authorities  and  all  personal/fundamental/property
rights guaranteed and recognized in law to every citizen  are  protected  to
enable him to lead a meaningful life with dignity  and  peace  and  to  also
enjoy his property.  It is further stated that in compliance  to  the  order
passed  by  RSHRC,  the  State  has  issued  directions  for  ensuring   its
compliance which are as under:

      “a. Deputy Commissioner of Police has been put in charge of  the  area
in order to ensure law  and  order  in  and  around  the  residence  of  the
petitioner.

  b.  Barricading  at  appropriate  distance  from  the  residence  of   the
petitioner so that  the  movement  of  the  residents  as  well  as  of  the
petitioner is not restricted as such and also because of  the  demonstration
in specific. When the legislative assembly  is  in  session  barricading  is
done at least 60 feet away from the residence of the petitioner.

 c. Mobile public toilets (two vehicles) have been placed by  the  Rajasthan
Municipal Corporation in the concerned area so that  hygiene  is  maintained
in and around the area which has been  affected  by  regular  demonstration.
Further all cautions have been taken that the public  uses  such  facilities
and neither police personnel on duty nor  the  demonstrator  may  spoil  the
walls of the petitioner by  urinating.

d. Prior permission as per the Rules  are  being  given  by  the  office  of
Deputy Commissioner of Police, Jaipur  (South)  to   the  demonstrators  and
District Collector is directed to ensure that while  giving  permission  for
demonstration it may also check that no instruments are allowed  which  may
violate the Rules or cause noise pollution.”

20.   It is with this background, the question  arises  as  to  whether  the
directions issued so far need any further modification and if  so,  to  what
extent.
21.   The law on  nuisance  is  well  settled.   Nuisance  in  any  form  as
recognized in the law of Torts - whether private,  public  or  common  which
results in affecting anyone's personal or/and property rights  gives  him  a
cause of action/right to seek remedial measures  in  Court  of  law  against
those who caused such nuisance to him and  further  gives  him  a  right  to
obtain necessary reliefs both  in  the  form  of  preventing  committing  of
nuisance and appropriate damages/compensation for the loss, if sustained  by
him, due to causing of such nuisance. (See - Ratanlal  Dhirajlal  -  Law  of
Torts by G.P.Singh - 26th Edition pages-621,637,640).
22.   We may, at this stage, consider apposite to  take  note  of  law  laid
down by this Court in Noise Pollution(V), In  Re  -  Implementation  of  the
Laws for restricting use of loudspeakers and  high  volume  producing  sound
systems, (2005) 5 SCC 733, as in our considered  view,  it  has  a  material
bearing over the issue, which is the subject matter of this appeal.

23.   This Court while  entertaining  the  PIL  filed  by  one  Organization
called "Forum, Prevention of environmental  and  sound  pollution"  had  the
occasion to examine the issue in relation to  nuisance  of  noise  pollution
caused to the people at large due to  use  of  equipments/apparatus/articles
etc.  The  noise  pollution  caused  generates  different  kinds  of  sounds
thereby constantly creates irritation and disturbance to the  people.  Since
it was a continuing wrong all over the country and  hence,  this  Court,  in
great detail, examined the  issue  in  the  light  of  the  citizens  rights
guaranteed under Articles 19(1), 21 and 25 of  the  Constitution  of  India,
read with all laws/rules/regulations relating to pollution, including  penal
laws governing this issue.
24.   Chief Justice R.C. Lahoti (as His Lordship  then  was),  speaking  for
the Bench in concluding para of the order,  issued  directions  to  all  the
States directing them to ensure that noise pollution caused due  to  use  of
various apparatus/ articles/ activities must be  curbed  and  controlled  by
resorting to  methods  and  modes  specified  in  several  rules/regulations
dealing the subject.   These directions are extracted herein below:

“XII. Directions
It is hereby directed as under:
(i) Firecrackers
174. 1. On a comparison of the  two  systems  i.e.  the  present  system  of
evaluating firecrackers on the basis of noise levels, and  the  other  where
the firecrackers shall be evaluated on the basis  of  chemical  composition,
we feel that the latter method is more  practical  and  workable  in  Indian
circumstances. It shall be followed unless and until replaced  by  a  better
system.
2. The Department of Explosives (DOE)  shall  undertake  necessary  research
activity for the purpose and come out with the chemical  formulae  for  each
type  or  category  or  class  of  firecrackers.  DOE  shall   specify   the
proportion/composition as well as the maximum permissible  weight  of  every
chemical used in manufacturing firecrackers.
[pic]3. The Department of Explosives may divide the  firecrackers  into  two
categories— (i) sound-emitting firecrackers, and (ii)  colour/light-emitting
firecrackers.
4. There shall be a complete ban  on  bursting  sound-emitting  firecrackers
between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. It is not necessary to impose restrictions as  to
time on bursting of colour/light-emitting firecrackers.
5. Every manufacturer shall on the box of each firecracker  mention  details
of its chemical contents and that it satisfies the requirement as laid  down
by DOE. In case of a failure on the part of the manufacturer to mention  the
details or in cases where the contents of the box do not match the  chemical
formulae as stated on the box, the manufacturer may be held liable.
6. Firecrackers for the  purpose  of  export  may  be  manufactured  bearing
higher  noise  levels  subject  to  the  following   conditions:   (i)   the
manufacturer should be permitted to do so only when he has an  export  order
with him and not otherwise; (ii) the noise  levels  for  these  firecrackers
should conform to the noise standards prescribed in  the  country  to  which
they are intended to be exported  as  per  the  export  order;  (iii)  these
firecrackers should have a different colour packing, from those intended  to
be sold in India;  (iv)  they  must  carry  a  declaration  printed  thereon
something like “not for sale in India” or “only for export  to  country  AB”
and so on.


(ii) Loudspeakers
175. 1. The  noise  level  at  the  boundary  of  the  public  place,  where
loudspeaker or public address system or any  other  noise  source  is  being
used shall not exceed 10 dB(A) above the ambient  noise  standards  for  the
area or 75 dB(A) whichever is lower.
2. No one shall beat a drum or tom-tom or blow a trumpet or  beat  or  sound
any instrument or use any sound amplifier at night (between 10.00  p.m.  and
6 a.m.) except in public emergencies.
3. The peripheral noise level of  privately-owned  sound  system  shall  not
exceed by more than 5 dB(A) than the ambient air-quality standard  specified
for the area in which it is used, at the boundary of the private place.
(iii) Vehicular noise
176. No horn should be allowed to be used at night (between 10  p.m.  and  6
a.m.) in residential area except in exceptional circumstances.
(iv) Awareness
177. 1.  There  is  a  need  for  creating  general  awareness  towards  the
hazardous effects of noise pollution. Suitable chapters may be added in  the
textbooks which  teach  civic  sense  to  the  children  and  youth  at  the
initial/early-level of education. Special talks and  lectures  be  organised
in the [pic]schools to highlight the menace of noise pollution and the  role
of the children and younger generation in preventing it.  Police  and  civil
administration should be trained to understand the various methods  to  curb
the problem and also the laws on the subject.
2. The State must play an active role  in  this  process.  Resident  Welfare
Associations, service  clubs  and  societies  engaged  in  preventing  noise
pollution as a part of their projects need to  be  encouraged  and  actively
involved by the local administration.
3. Special public awareness campaigns in anticipation of  festivals,  events
and ceremonial occasions whereat firecrackers are likely to  be  used,  need
to be carried out.
The abovesaid guidelines are issued in exercise of power conferred  on  this
Court under Articles 141 and 142 of the Constitution. These would remain  in
force  until  modified  by  this  Court  or  superseded  by  an  appropriate
legislation.
(v) Generally
178. 1. The States shall make provision  for  seizure  and  confiscation  of
loudspeakers, amplifiers and  such  other  equipment  as  are  found  to  be
creating noise beyond the permissible limits.
2. Rule 3 of the Noise Pollution (Regulation and Control) Rules, 2000  makes
provision for specifying ambient air-quality standards in respect  of  noise
for different areas/zones, categorisation of the areas for  the  purpose  of
implementation  of  noise  standards,  authorising   the   authorities   for
enforcement  and  achievement  of   laid   down   standards.   The   Central
Government/State  Governments  shall  take  steps  for  laying   down   such
standards and notifying the  authorities  where  it  has  not  already  been
done.”

25.   We note with concern that though the aforesaid directions were  issued
by this Court on 18.07.2005 for ensuring compliance by all  the  States  but
it  seems  that  these  directions  were  not  taken  note  of   much   less
implemented, at least, by the State of Rajasthan in letter and  spirit  with
the result that the residents of Jaipur city had to suffer the  nuisance  of
noise pollution apart from other related peculiar issues mentioned above  so
far as the appellant's case is concerned.
26.   Needless to reiterate that once this Court decides  any  question  and
declares the law and issues necessary directions then it is the duty of  all
concerned to follow the law laid down and comply the  directions  issued  in
letter and spirit by virtue of mandate  contained  in  Article  141  of  the
Constitution.
27.    In  our  considered  view,  in  the  light   of   the   authoritative
pronouncement rendered by this Court on the issue of noise pollution in  the
case of Noise Pollution (V), In Re (supra), it is  not  necessary  for  this
Court to again  deal  with  the  same  issue  except  to  issue  appropriate
directions for its compliance.
28.   We, accordingly, direct the respondents to  ensure  strict  compliance
of the directions contained in Para 174 to  178  of  the  judgment  of  this
Court  in  Noise  Pollution  (V),  In  Re  (supra),  and  for  ensuring  its
compliance, whatever remedial steps which are required to be  taken  by  the
State and their concerned department(s), the same be taken at  the  earliest
to  prevent/check  the  noise  pollution  as  directed  in   the   aforesaid
directions.
29.    Now  so  far  as  the  disturbance  created   by   the   police/state
officials/people at large in the appellant’s peaceful living  in  his  house
is concerned, in our considered view, they do result in adversely  affecting
 the appellant’s rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the  Constitution  as
held by this Court in  Noise Pollution  (V),  In  Re  (supra)  and  also  in
Ramlila Maidan Incident in Re, (2012) 5 SCC  1.   The  RSHRC  and  the  writ
Court were, therefore, justified in entertaining  the  complaint  under  the
Act and the writ petition under Article 226 of  the  Constitution  of  India
and in consequence justified  in  giving  appropriate  directions  mentioned
above while disposing the appellant's complaint/writ petition.
30.   We, however, note that the State  was  right  on  their  part  in  not
contesting   the   appellant's   complaint/writ    petition    by    raising
technical/legal grounds  finding  the  appellant's  grievance  made  in  his
complaint to be genuine and then rightly came out with remedial  suggestions
to deal with the situation arising in the case.
31.   Indeed, this reminds us of the subtle  observations  made  by  Justice
M.C. Chagla, Chief Justice of Bombay High Court in Firm Kaluram Sitaram  Vs.
The Dominion of India, AIR 1954 Bombay 50, wherein while deciding  the  case
between the  citizen on the one hand and State on  the  other,  the  learned
Chief Justice in his distinctive style of  writing  reminded  the  State  of
their duty towards the citizens while contesting his rights  qua  State  and
made the following observations.
“….we have often had occasion to say  that  when  the  State  deals  with  a
citizen it should not ordinarily rely on technicalities, and  if  the  State
is satisfied that the case of the citizen is a just one, even  though  legal
defences may be open to it, it  must  act,  as  has  been  said  by  eminent
judges, as an honest person……….”

32.   We are in complete agreement with the aforementioned statement of  law
laid down in Firm Kaluram Sitaram (supra) as far back as  in  1954.  In  our
considered view, the Constitution, inter alia, casts a  duty  on  the  State
and their authorities  to  ensure  that  every  citizen's  cherished  rights
guaranteed to him under the Constitution are respected  and  preserved,  and
he/she   is   allowed  to  enjoy  them  in  letter  and  spirit  subject  to
reasonable restrictions put on  them,  as  dreamt  by  the  framers  of  the
Constitution.  Intervention of the Court is called for at  the  instance  of
citizen when these rights are violated by fellow citizens or  by  any  State
agency.
33.   We have perused the steps suggested by  the  State  in  their  counter
affidavit and find that if the steps suggested by the State are  implemented
in letter and spirit and further  the  implementation  is  observed  in  its
proper perspective by the State  and  its  authorities  from  time  to  time
coupled with any other good suggestions, if noticed, while implementing  the
suggestions, then  most  of  the  problems  presently  being  faced  by  the
appellant and many others  like  him  in  the  concerned  area(s)  would  be
reduced to a large extent.
34.   We, accordingly, direct the respondents to  ensure  strict  compliance
of the conditions/steps mentioned in Paras 5  (a)  to  (d)  of  the  Counter
Affidavit  extracted  above  and  while  ensuring  its  compliance,  if  the
respondents consider that it needs some  amendment(s)  for  ensuring  better
implementation then in such eventuality, the same  be  done  in  the  larger
interest of the  residents  of  the  concerned  area  and  equally  for  the
benefits of the residents of different parts in the State. Needless to  say,
while implementing the directions, its objective should always be to  ensure
that the rights of the citizens are not affected adversely by  any  kind  of
nuisance as mentioned above.
35.   In view of the  foregoing  discussion  and  the  directions  contained
above, the appeal succeeds and is allowed in  part.  Impugned  order  stands
modified to the extent mentioned above.



                               ……………………………………………………J.
                                          [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA]


                                       .….…...............................J.
                                                       [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]

New Delhi;
November 07, 2014.

-----------------------
22


CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9996 OF 2014 [Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 480 of 2012] Census Commissioner & Others ... Appellants Versus R. Krishnamurthy ... Respondent

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9996 OF 2014
               [Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 480 of 2012]


      Census Commissioner & Others                 ... Appellants
                                   Versus
      R. Krishnamurthy                                        ... Respondent

                               J U D G M E N T

      Dipak Misra, J.
           The present appeal depicts  and,  in  a  way,  sculpts  the  non-
      acceptance of conceptual limitation in every  human  sphere  including
      that of adjudication.  No adjudicator or a Judge can conceive the idea
      that the sky is the limit or for that matter there is  no  barrier  or
      fetters in one’s individual perception, for judicial vision should not
      be allowed to  be  imprisoned  and  have  the  potentiality  to  cover
      celestial zones.  Be it ingeminated,  refrain  and  restrain  are  the
      essential virtues in the arena of adjudication because they  guard  as
      sentinel so  that  virtuousness  is  constantly  sustained.   Not  for
      nothing,  centuries back Francis Bacon[1] had to say thus:-
           “Judges ought to be more learned than witty, more  reverend  than
           plausible, and more advised than confident.   Above  all  things,
           integrity is their portion and proper virtue......Let the  judges
           also remember that Solomon’s throne was  supported  by  lions  on
           both sides: let them be lions, but yet lions under the throne.”


  2. Almost half a century  back  Frankfurter,  J.[2]  sounded  a  note  of
     caution:-
           “For the Highest exercise of  judicial  duty  is  to  subordinate
           one’s personal pulls and one’s views to the law of which  we  are
           all guardians-those impersonal convictions that make a society  a
           civilized community, and not the victims of personal rule.”


  3. In this context, it is seemly to reproduce the warning of Benjamin  N.
     Cardozo in The Nature  of  the  Judicial  process[3]  which  rings  of
     poignant and inimitable expression:-
            “The Judge even when he is free, is still not wholly  free.   He
            is not to innovate at pleasure.   He  is  not  a  knight  errant
            roaming at will in pursuit of his own  ideal  of  beauty  or  of
            goodness.  He  is  to  draw  his  inspiration  from  consecrated
            principles.  He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague
            and unregulated benevolence.  He is  to  exercise  a  discretion
            informed by tradition, methodized  by  analogy,  disciplined  by
            system, and subordinated to ‘the primordial necessity  of  order
            in social life’.”


  4. In Tata Cellular V. Union of India (1994) 6  SCC  651,  while  dealing
     with the concept of judicial review, this Court referred to a  passage
     worded by Chief Justice Neely, which is as follows:-
        ‘I have very few illusions about my own limitations as a judge  and
        from those limitations I generalize to the inherent limitations  of
        all appellate courts reviewing rate cases.  It must  be  remembered
        that this Court sees approximately 1262  cases  a  year  with  five
        judges.  I am not an accountant,  electrical  engineer,  financier,
        banker, stock broker, or systems management  analyst.   It  is  the
        height of folly to expect judges intelligently  to  review  a  5000
        page  record  addressing  the   intricacies   of   public   utility
        operation.’


  5. The fundamental intention of referring to the aforesaid statements may
     at various times in the  history  of  law  is  to  recapitulate  basic
     principles that have to be followed by a Judge, for certain sayings at
     times become necessitous to be told and re-narrated.  The present case
     exposits such a situation, a sad one.
  6. The chronology has its own relevance in the instant case.  One Dr.  E.
     Sayedah preferred W.P No. 25785 of 2005 in the High  Court  of  Madras
     for issue of a writ of certiorari for quashment of the order passed by
     the  Central  Administrative  Tribunal  in  O.A.  No.3/2002   on   the
     foundation that when there is no Scheduled  Tribe  population  in  the
     Union  Territory  of  Pondicherry  and  there   is   no   Presidential
     notification under Article 342 of  the  Constitution  of  India  there
     cannot be any reservation  for  Scheduled  Tribe  in  the  said  Union
     Territory and, therefore, the appointment  of  the  applicant  in  the
     Original Application who was appointed solely  on  the  base  that  he
     belonged to Scheduled Tribe was  illegal.   However,  the  High  Court
     declined to interfere with the appointment considering the  length  of
     service but observed that the  appointee  was  not  entitled  for  any
     reservation in promotion.  The High Court also recorded certain  other
     conclusions which are really not relevant  for  the  present  purpose.
     The direction that really propelled the problem is as follows:-
           “When it is the position that after 1931, there  had  never  been
           any caste-wise enumeration or tabulation and when there  can  not
           be any dispute that  there  is  increase  in  the  population  of
           SC/ST/OBC manifold after  1931,  the  percentage  of  reservation
           fixed on the basis of population in  the  year  1931  has  to  be
           proportionately increased, by conducting caste-wise census by the
           Government in the interest of the weaker sections of the society.
            We direct the Census Department of the Government  of  India  to
           take all such measures towards conducting the  caste-wise  census
           in the country at the earliest and in a time bound manner, so  as
           to achieve the goal of social justice in its true sense, which is
           the need of the hour.”


      7.    At this juncture, to continue the chronology, it is pertinent to
      mention that a Writ Petition No. 21172/2009 was filed before the  High
      Court of Judicature at Madras, which was  disposed  of  on  21.1.2010.
      While disposing of the writ petition, the High Court had  directed  as
      follows:
           “6.   The second respondent, has filed a counter and in paragraph
           5 thereof, it is stated that the second respondent have taken  up
           the matter with the Ministry of Social Justice  and  Empowerment,
           as the issues relating to SCs,  STs  and  OBCs;  are  within  the
           domain  of  that  Ministry.   The   learned   counsel   for   the
           respondents,  on  the  instructions  of  the  Regional  Director,
           Chennai from the office of the second respondent, states that the
           petitioner will got a reply from  the  respondents  within  eight
           weeks from today.  We hope that the respondents will consider the
           representation of the petitioner Association in  all  seriousness
           and send them an appropriate reply.”


      8.    Be it stated, the Registrar General and Census Commissioner  was
      the respondent no.2 therein.  After the writ petition was disposed of,
      the representation preferred by  Mr.  K.  Balu,  President,  Advocates
      Forum for Social Justice, was disposed and the order was  communicated
      to the writ petitioner.  It reads as follows:-
           “2.   Caste-wise enumeration in the census has been given up as a
           matter of policy from 1951 onwards.  In pursuance of this  policy
           decision, castes other than Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
           have not been enumerated in all  the  Censuses  since  1951.   In
           Census 2011 also no question on enumeration of castes other  than
           Scheduled Castes and Scheduled  Tribes  has  been  included.   As
           such, the first phase of Census  2011  enumeration,  namely,  the
           Houselisting and Housing Census  is  commencing  on  the  1st  of
           April, 2010.    The forms required for this phase of  the  Census
           has already been printed in many States and  Instruction  Manuals
           required for training the enumerators has also been finalized and
           printed.  The second phase of  Census  2011,  namely,  Population
           Enumeration, is due to be conducted in February 2011.   The  data
           gathered in the first phase (April to September 2010)  is  linked
           to the data to  be  collected  in  February-March  2011.   Hence,
           enumerating castes other  than  Scheduled  Castes  and  Scheduled
           Tribes will not be possible in that phase also.  As such,  it  is
           not possible to include any question relating to the  enumeration
           of Castes other than Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the
           Census of India 2011.


           3.    As regards the policy decision whether  castes  other  than
           the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes should  be  enumerated,
           the manner in which such enumeration should be done and by  whom,
           the matter has been referred to the nodal Ministry, i.e. Ministry
           of Social Justice and Empowerment.”


     9.     At this juncture, it may be noticed that the  Writ  Petition(C)
     No. 132/2010 was filed before this Court by one Kishore Govind Kanhere
     Vidharbha and Another seeking the similar relief, which  was  disposed
     of on 13.09.2010 by passing the following order:
           “Learned counsel for the petitioners states that as  the  purpose
           of the writ petition stands worked out, he would like to withdraw
           the petition.  The writ petition is,  accordingly,  dismissed  as
           withdrawn.”


     10.    Presently, we shall proceed to state how  the  purpose  of  the
     writ petition had worked out.  The respondent,  R.  Krishnamurthy  had
     preferred Writ Petition(C) No. 10090/2010 which stood disposed  of  by
     Division Bench by the impugned order.  As is  manifest,  the  Division
     Bench has referred to its  earlier  decision  passed  in  W.P.(C)  No.
     25785/2005 and after reproducing the paragraph from the said judgment,
     opined as follows:-
           “Since the relief sought for in the present  writ  petition  has
           already been answered in the affirmative by issuing a  direction
           to the authorities to take all measures towards  conducting  the
           caste-wise census in the  country,  we  are  of  the  considered
           opinion that this petition  is  also  entitled  to  be  allowed.
           Accordingly, this writ petition is allowed on the same terms.”


      11.   Criticizing the aforesaid direction, it is submitted by Mr. R.S.
      Suri, learned senior counsel  that  the  High  Court  on  the  earlier
      occasion had issued a direction without making the Census Commissioner
      as a party and further there was no justification for issuance of such
      a direction.  As far as the impugned order is concerned, it  is  urged
      by  Mr.  Suri  that  the  direction  issued  by  the  Division   Bench
      tantamounts to interference in  a  policy  decision  as  framed  under
      Section 8 of the Census Act, 1940, (for brevity ‘the Act’) as  amended
      in 1993.   Learned  senior  counsel  would  contend  that  the  policy
      stipulates for carrying out the census which includes scheduled castes
      and scheduled tribes, but not the other castes.  He  would  urge  that
      many a High Court have dismissed similar writ petitions and, in  fact,
      this Court in WP(C) No. 133/2009 have declined to  interfere  and  the
      same was dismissed as withdrawn.  It  is  proponed  by  him  the  view
      expressed by the  High  Court  is  absolutely  vulnerable  and  hence,
      deserved to be lancinated.
      12.   Despite service of notice,  there  has  been  no  appearance  on
      behalf of the respondent.
      13.   To appreciate the submissions canvassed by the  learned  counsel
      for the appellant, it is necessary to refer to Section 8 of  the  Act,
      which reads as follows: -
           “Section 8 – Asking of questions and obligation to answer


           (1)   A census officer may ask all such questions of all  persons
           within the limits of the local area for which he is appointed as,
           by instructions issued in this behalf by the [Central Government]
           and published in the Official Gazette, he may be directed to ask.


           (2)   Every person of whom  any  question  is  asked  under  sub-
           section(1) shall be legally bound to answer such question to  the
           best of his knowledge or belief:


                 Provided that no person shall be bound to state the name of
                 any female member of his household, and no woman  shall  be
                 bound to state the name of her husband or deceased  husband
                 or of any other person  whose  name  she  is  forbidden  by
                 custom to mention.”


      14.   On the foundation of  the  aforesaid  provision,  the  competent
      authority  of  the  Central  Government,  in  exercise  of  the  power
      conferred by sub-section(1) of section 8 of the Census Act, had issued
      a Notification on 13.1.2000 which relates to  instructions  meant  for
      Census Officers.  Clause 8 of the said Notification being relevant  is
      reproduced below:
           “8.   Information relating to the head of the household
            (a)  Name of the head of the household
            (b)  Male – 1/Female – 2
           (c)   If SC(Scheduled Caste) or ST (Scheduled Tribe)  or  Other?
                 SC(Scheduled Caste)-1/ST(Scheduled Tribe)-2/Other-3”


      15.   After the said census  was  carried  out,  another  Notification
      dated 25.2.2010 was issued.  Clause 10 of the said Notification  reads
      as follows:
           “10.  If Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe/Others.
      16.   After the Notification in the year 2010 was issued,  the  Office
      of  the  Registrar  General  and  Census   Commissioner   issued   the
      Instruction Manual for Houselisting and Housing Census.  In  Paragraph
      1.2, the historical background has been stated.  It is as follows:
            “Historical background of Indian Census
           1.2 The Indian  Census  has  a  rich  tradition  and  enjoys  the
           reputation of being one of the  best  in  the  world.  The  first
           Census in  India  was  conducted  in  the  year  1872.  This  was
           conducted at different points of time in different parts  of  the
           country. In 1881 a  Census  was  taken  for  the  entire  country
           simultaneously. Since then, Census has been conducted  every  ten
           years, without a break. Thus, the Census of India  2011  will  be
           the fifteenth in this unbroken series since 1872 and the  seventh
           after  independence.  It  is  through  the  missionary  zeal  and
           dedication of Enumerators like  you  that  the  great  historical
           tradition of  conducting  the  Census  uninterruptedly  has  been
           maintained in spite of several adversities like wars,  epidemics,
           natural calamities, political unrest, etc. Participation  in  the
           Census by the people of India is indeed a true reflection of  the
           national spirit of unity in diversity.”


      17.   Thereafter, the Instruction Manual provides  for  objectives  of
      conducting a census.  We think it appropriate to reproduce the same:
           “1.3  India is a welfare State.  Since  independence,  Five  Year
            Plans, Annual  Plans  and  various  welfare  schemes  have  been
            launched for the benefit of the common man.  All  these  require
            information  at  the  grass  root  level.  This  information  is
            provided by the Census.


         4.  Have  you  ever  wondered  how   the   number   of   seats   in
            Parliamentary/Assembly  Constituencies,  Panchayats  and   other
            local bodies are determined? Similarly, how  the  boundaries  of
            such constituencies are demarcated? Well the answer to  that  is
            also the Census. These are just a few examples. Census  provides
            information on a large number of areas. Thus, you are not merely
            collecting information; you are actually a  part  of  a  massive
            nation building activity.


         5. The Houselisting and Housing Census has immense  utility  as  it
            will provide comprehensive  data  on  the  conditions  of  human
            settlements,  housing  deficit  and  consequently  the   housing
            requirement to be taken care of in the  formulation  of  housing
            policies. This will  also  provide  a  wide  range  of  data  on
            amenities and assets available to  the  households,  information
            much needed by  various  departments  of  the  Union  and  State
            Governments and other non-Governmental agencies for  development
            and planning at the local level as  well  as  the  State  level.
            This would also provide the base for Population Enumeration.


         6. Population Enumeration provides valuable information  about  the
            land and its people at a  given  point  of  time.   It  provides
            trends in the population and its various characteristics,  which
            are an essential  input  for  planning.   The  Census  data  are
            frequently required to develop  sound  policies  and  programmes
            aimed at fostering the welfare of the country  and  its  people.
            This data source has  become  indispensable  for  effective  and
            efficient public administration besides  serving  the  needs  of
            scholars, businessmen, industrialists,  planners  and  electoral
            authorities,  etc.   Therefore,  Census  has  become  a  regular
            feature in progressive counties,  whatever  be  their  size  and
            political set up.  It is  conducted  at  regular  intervals  for
            fulfilling  well-defined  objectives.   One  of  the   essential
            features of  Population  Enumeration  is  that  each  person  is
            enumerated and her/his individual particulars are collected at a
            well-defined point of time.”

      18.   From the aforesaid, it is graphically vivid that at no point  of
      time, the Central Government had  issued  a  Notification  to  have  a
      census conducted on the caste basis.   What  is  reflectible  is  that
      there is census of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes,  but  census
      is not done in respect of other  castes  or  on  caste  basis.    That
      apart, the instructions elaborately spell out the  necessity  and  the
      purpose.  It is reflectible of the concern pertaining to  assimilation
      of certain  datas  that  would  help  in  nation-building,  trends  of
      population,  availability  of  requisite  inputs  for   planning   and
      fostering the welfare of the country.  Be it noted, the  Notifications
      dated 13.01.2000  and  25.02.2010  enumerate  collection  of  many  an
      information  including  household  number,  total  number  of  persons
      normally residing in the household (persons, males, females), name  of
      the head of the household, ownership status of the  house,  number  of
      married couple(s) living in the household,  main  source  of  drinking
      water, availability of drinking water source, main source of lighting,
      latrine within the premises, type of latrine  facility,  waster  water
      outlet,  bathing   facility,   kitchen,   fuel   used   for   cooking,
      Radio/Transistor,   Television,   Computer/Laptop,    Telephone/Mobile
      phone, Bicycle, Scooter/Motor Cycle/ Moped, Car/Jeep/Van, and availing
      banking services, etc.  Thus, the  Central  Government  has  framed  a
      policy and the policy,  as  is  demonstrable,  covers  many  an  arena
      keeping in view certain goals and objectives.
      19.   As we evince from the sequence of events, the High Court in  the
      earlier judgment had issued the  direction  relating  to  carrying  of
      census in a particular manner by adding certain facets though the  lis
      was absolutely different.  The appellant, the  real  aggrieved  party,
      was not arrayed as a party-respondent.  The issue was squarely  raised
      in the subsequent writ petition where the Census  Commissioner  was  a
      party and the earlier order was repeated.   There can be no shadow  of
      doubt that earlier order is not binding on the appellant as he was not
      a party to the said lis.  This view of ours  gets  fructified  by  the
      decision in H.C. Kulwant  Singh  and  others  V.  H.C.  Daya  Ram  and
      others[4] wherein this Court, after  referring  to  the  judgments  in
      Khetrabasi Biswal V. Ajaya Kumar Baral & Ors.[5],  Udit  Narain  Singh
      Malpaharia V. Board of Revenue[6], Prabodh Verma & Ors. Vs.  State  of
      U.P. & Ors.[7] and Tridip Kumar Dingal &  Ors.  V.  State  of  W.B.  &
      Ors.[8] has ruled thus:
           “..... if a person who is likely to suffer from the order of  the
           court and has not been impleaded as a party has a right to ignore
           the said order  as  it  has  been  passed  in  violation  of  the
           principles of natural justice.”


      20.   The earlier decision being not a binding precedent,  it  can  be
      stated with certitude that the impugned judgment has really  compelled
      the appellant to question the defensibility of the same.
      21.   The centripodal question  that  emanates  for  consideration  is
      whether the High Court could have issued such  a  mandamus  commanding
      the appellant to carry out a census in a particular manner.  The  High
      Court has tried to inject the concept of social  justice  to  fructify
      its direction.  It is evincible  that  the  said  direction  has  been
      issued without any deliberation and being oblivious of  the  principle
      that the courts on very  rare  occasion,  in  exercise  of  powers  of
      judicial review, would interfere with a policy decision.  Interference
      with the policy decision and issue of a mandamus to frame a policy  in
      a particular manner are absolutely different.  The Act  has  conferred
      power on the Central Government to issue  Notification  regarding  the
      manner in which the census has to  be  carried  out  and  the  Central
      Government has issued Notifications, and the competent  authority  has
      issued directions.  It is not  within  the  domain  of  the  Court  to
      legislate.  The courts do interpret the law and in such interpretation
      certain  creative  process  is  involved.    The   courts   have   the
      jurisdiction to declare the law as unconstitutional.  That too,  where
      it is called for.  The court may also fill  up  the  gaps  in  certain
      spheres applying the doctrine of constitutional silence  or  abeyance.
      But, the courts are  not  to  plunge  into  policy  making  by  adding
      something to the policy by way of issuing a writ of  mandamus.   There
      the judicial restraint is called for remembering what we  have  stated
      in the beginning.  The courts are required to  understand  the  policy
      decisions framed  by  the  Executive.   If  a  policy  decision  or  a
      Notification is arbitrary, it may invite the frown of  Article  14  of
      the Constitution.  But when the Notification was not under assail  and
      the same is in consonance with the Act, it is really unfathomable  how
      the High Court could issue directions as to  the  manner  in  which  a
      census would be carried out by adding  certain  aspects.   It  is,  in
      fact, issuance of a direction for  framing  a  policy  in  a  specific
      manner.  In this context, we may refer to a three-Judge Bench decision
      in Suresh Seth V. Commr., Indore Municipal  Corporation[9]  wherein  a
      prayer was made before this Court to issue directions for  appropriate
      amendment in the M.P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 so that a person
      may be debarred  from  simultaneously  holding  two  elected  offices,
      namely, that of a Member of the Legislative Assembly  and  also  of  a
      Mayor of a Municipal Corporation.  Repelling the said submission,  the
      Court held:
           “In our opinion, this is a  matter  of  policy  for  the  elected
           representatives of people to decide  and  no  direction  in  this
           regard can be issued by the Court.  That apart this Court  cannot
           issue any direction to the legislature  to  make  any  particular
           kind of enactment.  Under out  constitutional  scheme  Parliament
           and Legislative Assemblies exercise sovereign power to enact laws
           and no outside power or authority can issue a direction to  enact
           a particular piece of legislation.  In Supreme  Court  Employees’
           Welfare Assn. v. Union of India[10] (SCC para  51)  it  has  been
           held that no court can direct a legislature to enact a particular
           law.   Similarly,  when  an  executive  authority   exercises   a
           legislative power by way of a subordinate legislation pursuant to
           the  delegated  authority  of  a  legislature,   such   executive
           authority cannot be asked to  enact  a  law  which  it  has  been
           empowered to do under the delegated legislative authority.   This
           view has been reiterated in state of J & K v A.R. Zakki[11].   In
           A.K. Roy v. Union of India[12] it was held that no  mandamus  can
           be issued to  enforce  an  Act  which  has  been  passed  by  the
           legislature.”


      22.   At this juncture, we may refer to certain authorities about  the
      justification  in  interference  with  the  policy   framed   by   the
      Government.  It needs no special emphasis to state  that  interference
      with the policy, though is permissible in law, yet the policy  has  to
      be scrutinized with ample circumspection.   In N.D. Jayal and Anr.  V.
      Union of India & Ors.[13], the Court has observed that in the  matters
      of policy, when the  Government  takes  a  decision  bearing  in  mind
      several aspects, the Court should not interfere with the same.
      23.   In Narmada Bachao Andolan V. Union of  India[14],  it  has  been
      held thus:
                 “It is now well settled that the courts, in the exercise of
           their jurisdiction, will not transgress into the field of  policy
           decision. Whether to have an infrastructural project or  not  and
           what is the type of project to be undertaken and how it has to be
           executed, are part of policy-making process and  the  courts  are
           ill-equipped to adjudicate on a policy  decision  so  undertaken.
           The court, no doubt, has a duty to see that in the undertaking of
           a decision, no law is violated and  people’s  fundamental  rights
           are not transgressed upon except to the extent permissible  under
           the Constitution.”




      24.   In this context, it is fruitful to refer  to  the  authority  in
      Rusom Cavasiee Cooper V. Union  of  India[15],  wherein  it  has  been
      expressed thus:


           “It is again not for this Court to consider the  relative  merits
           of the different political theories or economic policies...  This
           Court has the power to strike down a law on the ground of want of
           authority, but the Court will not sit in appeal over  the  policy
           of Parliament in enacting a law”.


      25.   In Premium Granites V. State of Tamil  Nadu[16],  while  dealing
      with the power of the courts in interfering with the policy  decision,
      the Court has ruled that it is not the domain of the court  to  embark
      upon unchartered ocean of public policy in an exercise to consider  as
      to whether a particular public policy  is  wise  or  a  better  public
      policy could be evolved. Such exercise must be left to the  discretion
      of the executive and legislative authorities as the case may  be.  The
      court is called upon to consider the validity of a public policy  only
      when  a  challenge  is  made  that  such  policy  decision   infringes
      fundamental rights guaranteed by the  Constitution  of  India  or  any
      other statutory right.
      26.   In M.P. Oil Extraction and Anr. V. State of M.P. &  Ors.[17],  a
      two-Judge Bench opined that:


           “.......... The executive authority of the State must be held  to
           be within its competence to frame a policy for the administration
           of the State. Unless the policy framed is  absolutely  capricious
           and, not being informed by any reason whatsoever, can be  clearly
           held to be arbitrary and  founded  on  mere  ipse  dixit  of  the
           executive functionaries  thereby  offending  Article  14  of  the
           Constitution  or  such  policy   offends   other   constitutional
           provisions or comes into conflict with any  statutory  provision,
           the Court cannot and should not outstep its limit and tinker with
           the policy decision of the executive functionary of the State.”


      27.   In State of M.P. V. Narmada Bachao  Andolan  &  Anr.[18],  after
      referring to the State of Punjab V.  Ram Lubhaya Bagga[19], the  Court
      ruled thus:
           “The Court cannot strike down a  policy  decision  taken  by  the
           Government merely because it feels that  another  decision  would
           have been fairer or more scientific  or  logical  or  wiser.  The
           wisdom and  advisability  of  the  policies  are  ordinarily  not
           amenable to judicial review unless the policies [pic]are contrary
           to  statutory  or  constitutional  provisions  or  arbitrary   or
           irrational or an abuse of power. (See Ram Singh Vijay  Pal  Singh
           v. State of U.P.[20],  Villianur  Iyarkkai  Padukappu  Maiyam  v.
           Union of India[21] and State of Kerala v. Peoples Union for Civil
           Liberties[22].)”


      28.   From the aforesaid pronouncement of law, it is clear as noon day
      that it is not within the domain of  the  courts  to  embark  upon  an
      enquiry  as  to  whether  a  particular  public  policy  is  wise  and
      acceptable or whether a better policy could be evolved.  The court can
      only interfere if the policy framed is absolutely  capricious  or  not
      informed by reasons  or  totally  arbitrary  and  founded  ipse  dixit
      offending the basic requirement of Article  14  of  the  Constitution.
      In certain matters, as often said, there can be opinions and  opinions
      but the Court is not expected to sit as an appellate authority  on  an
      opinion.
      29.   As has been stated earlier, the Central Government had issued  a
      Notification prescribing the series of informations  to  be  collected
      during the census.  It covers many  areas.   It  includes  information
      relating to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and does  not  refer
      to any other caste.  In such a situation, it is extremely difficult to
      visualize that the High Court, on the first occasion, without having a
      lis before it in that regard, could even have  thought  of  issuing  a
      command to the Census Department to take  all  such  measures  towards
      conducting the caste-wise census in the country  so  that  the  social
      justice in its true sense, which is the need of  the  hour,  could  be
      achieved.  This, irrefragably, is against the power conferred  on  the
      court.  The High Court had not only travelled beyond the  lis  in  the
      first round of litigation, but had really  yielded  to  some  kind  of
      emotional  perspective,  possibly  paving  the  adventurous  path   to
      innovate.  It is legally impermissible.  On the second occasion, where
      the controversy squarely arose, the High Court did not confine to  the
      restrictions put on the jurisdiction and further without any  kind  of
      deliberation,  repeated  the  earlier   direction.    The   order   is
      exceptionally  cryptical.   That   apart,   it   is   legally   wholly
      unsustainable.  The High Court, to say the least, had no justification
      to pave such a path and we have no hesitation  in  treating  the  said
      path as a colossal transgression of power of judicial review, and that
      makes the order sensitively susceptible.
      30.   Consequently, the appeal is allowed, the  judgments  and  orders
      dated 24.10.2008 and 12.5.2010 passed in W.P.(C)  No.  25785/2005  and
      W.P.(C) No. 10090/2010  respectively are set aside.  There shall be no
      order as to costs.


                                                  ........................J.
                                                               (DIPAK MISRA)




                                  ........................................J.
                                                     (ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN)




                                          ................................J.
                                                          (UDAY UMESH LALIT)
      NEW DELHI;
      NOVEMBER 07, 2014
-----------------------
[1] BACON, Essays: Of Judicature in I The Works of Francis Bacon (Montague,
Basil, Esq. ed., Philadelphia: A Hart, late Carey & Hart, 1852), pp. 58-59.

[2] FRANKFURTEER, Felix in Clark, Tom C., “ Mr. Justice Frankfurter: ‘A
Heritage for all Who Love the Law’” 51 A.B.A.J. 330, 332 (1965)
[3]  Yale University Press 1921 Edn.,  Pg- 114
[4] JT 2014 (8) SC 305
[5] (2004) 1 SCC 317
[6]  AIR 1963 SC 786
[7]  (1984) 4 SCC 251
[8]  (2009) 1 SCC 768
[9] (2005) 13 SCC 287
[10] (1989) 4 SCC 187
[11] 1992 Supp (1) SCC 548
[12] (1982) 1 SCC 271
[13] (2004) 9 SCC 362
[14] (2000) 10 SCC 664
[15]  (1970) 1 SCC 248
[16]  (1994) 2 SCC 691
[17]  (1997) 7 SCC 592
[18]  (2011) 7 SCC 639
[19]  (1998) 4 SCC 117
[20] (2007) 6 SCC 44
[21] (2009) 7 SCC 561
[22] (2009) 8 SCC 46