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Tuesday, October 7, 2014

Environment Protection Act, 1986. - Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) were enacted (w.e.f.19th February, 1991) - The guidelines,-Hotels, Beach Resorts and Beach Bungalows in Goa - orders to demolish as the buildings were situated with in 500 meters from HTL permitted - High court allowed the Writ Pil - Apex court held that admittedly the all the buildings constructed before the commencement of the Act and guidelines which are not gazetted no force of law - all are prospective - and as such the apex court held that Violation of Article 21 on account of alleged environmental violation cannot be subjectively and individually determined when parameters of permissible/impermissible conduct are required to be legislatively or statutorily determined under Sections 3 and 6 of the Environment Protection Act, 1986 which has been so done by bringing into force the Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) Notification w.e.f. 19th February, 1991.In view of the foregoing discussion, the orders impugned in the writ petitions filed by the appellants cannot be sustained. Consequently, the said orders as well as each of the orders dated 13th July, 2000 passed by the High Court of Bombay will have to be set aside which we hereby do while allowing the appeals.=CIVIL APPEAL NOS.3434-3435 OF 2001 GULF GOANS HOTELS CO. LTD. & ANR. . ..APPELLANTS VERSUS UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ...RESPONDENTS = 2014 - Sept. Month - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=41945

 Environment  Protection Act, 1986. - Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) were enacted  (w.e.f.19th
February, 1991) - The   guidelines,-Hotels,  Beach  Resorts  and  Beach Bungalows in Goa - orders to demolish as the buildings were situated with in 500 meters from HTL permitted - High court allowed the Writ Pil - Apex court held that admittedly the all the buildings constructed before the commencement of the Act and guidelines which are not gazetted no force of law - all are prospective - and as such the apex court held that Violation of Article  21  on  account  of  alleged  environmental  violation cannot be  subjectively  and  individually  determined  when  parameters  of permissible/impermissible  conduct  are  required  to  be  legislatively  or statutorily determined under Sections 3 and 6 of the Environment  Protection Act, 1986 which has  been  so  done  by  bringing  into  force  the  Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) Notification w.e.f. 19th February, 1991.In view of the foregoing discussion,  the  orders  impugned  in  the writ petitions filed by the appellants cannot  be  sustained.  Consequently, the said orders as well as each of the orders dated 13th July,  2000  passed by the High Court of Bombay will have to be set aside  which  we  hereby  do while allowing the appeals.=

 The appellants are the owners  of  Hotels,  Beach  Resorts  and  Beach
Bungalows in Goa who have been facing the prospect of  demolition  of  their
properties for the last several decades.      =

 The respondent-
Goa Foundation had filed parallel writ petitions before the High  Court  for
demolition of the allegedly illegal constructions raised by the  appellants.
Both sets of writ petitions i.e. those filed by the appellants  against  the
orders of demolition by the State Authorities and the writ  petitions  filed
by the Goa Foundation seeking demolition of constructions raised by each  of
the appellants were heard together  by  the  Bombay  High  Court.
The  High
Court, by separate impugned orders dated 13th July,  2000,  had  upheld  the
orders passed by the authorities requiring the appellants  to  demolish  the
existing structures.
It is against the aforesaid orders passed by  the  High
Court that the present group of appeals have been filed upon grant of  leave
by this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.=

The constructions raised by the appellants are not per se  illegal  in
the conventional sense. They are not without permission and sanction of  the
competent authority.
What has  been  alleged  by  the  State  and  has  been
approved by the High Court is that such constructions are in  derogation  of
the environmental guidelines in force warranting demolition of the  same  as
a step to safeguard the environment of the beaches in Goa.
Specifically,  it
is the case of the State that the constructions in question are  between  90
to 200 meters from the High Tide Line (HTL) despite the fact that under  the
guidelines in force, which  partake  the  character  of  law,  constructions
within 500 meters of the HTL are prohibited except in rare situations  where
construction activity between 200 to 500 meters from the HTL  are  permitted
subject to observance of strict conditions. 
Admittedly,  all  constructions,
though completed on  different  dates  and  in  different  phases,  were  so
completed before the Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) were enacted  (w.e.f.19th
February, 1991) in exercise of the powers under the  Environment  Protection
Act, 1986.=
Though  the  Coastal
Regulation Zone  (CRZ)  Notification  under  the  Act  was  issued  on  19th
February, 1991 and admittedly is prospective in nature, till such time  that
the said notification came into force it is the guidelines  which  held  the
field being administrative instructions  having  the  effect  of  law  under
Article 73 of the Constitution.=
The   guidelines,   detailed
reference to which are made in the  succeeding  paragraphs  of  the  present
order, are not ‘law’ so as to  constitute  activities  contrary  thereto  as
acts of infringement of the law and hence illegal. Such  guidelines  do  not
confer the power of enforcement and lack the authority to  bring  about  any
penal consequences.
It may, therefore, be understood that a Govt. policy may acquire  the
“force of ‘law’” if it conforms to a certain form possessed  by  other  laws
in force and encapsulates a mandate and discloses a specific purpose. 
In the event the statute does  not  contain
any prescription  and  even  under  the  subordinate  legislation  there  is
silence in the matter, the legislation will take  effect  only  when  it  is
published through the customarily recognized official channel,  namely,  the
official gazette (B.K. Srivastava vs. State of  Karnataka)[14].  Admittedly,
the ‘guidelines’ were not gazetted. =
   We  cannot  appreciate  the  above  view.
Violation of Article  21  on  account  of  alleged  environmental  violation
cannot be  subjectively  and  individually  determined  when  parameters  of
permissible/impermissible  conduct  are  required  to  be  legislatively  or
statutorily determined under Sections 3 and 6 of the Environment  Protection
Act, 1986 which has  been  so  done  by  bringing  into  force  the  Coastal
Regulation Zone (CRZ) Notification w.e.f. 19th February, 1991.

23.     In view of the foregoing discussion,  the  orders  impugned  in  the
writ petitions filed by the appellants cannot  be  sustained.  Consequently,
the said orders as well as each of the orders dated 13th July,  2000  passed
by the High Court of Bombay will have to be set aside  which  we  hereby  do
while allowing the appeals.
2014 - Sept. Month - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=41945
                      REPORTABLE

                          IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                      CIVIL APPEAL  NOS.3434-3435 OF 2001

GULF GOANS HOTELS CO. LTD. & ANR.  .     ..APPELLANTS

                                   VERSUS

UNION OF INDIA & ORS.                           ...RESPONDENTS

                                    WITH
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.3438 OF 2001
                                    WITH
                     CIVIL APPEAL NOS.3436-3437 OF 2001
                                    WITH
                         CIVIL APEAL NO.3439 OF 2001

                               J U D G M E N T

RANJAN GOGOI, J.

1.    The appellants are the owners  of  Hotels,  Beach  Resorts  and  Beach
Bungalows in Goa who have been facing the prospect of  demolition  of  their
properties for the last several decades. The respondent-Goa Foundation is  a
non-  Governmental  body  who  claims  to  be  dedicated  to  the  cause  of
environmental and ecological well being of the State of Goa. The respondent-
Goa Foundation had filed parallel writ petitions before the High  Court  for
demolition of the allegedly illegal constructions raised by the  appellants.
Both sets of writ petitions i.e. those filed by the appellants  against  the
orders of demolition by the State Authorities and the writ  petitions  filed
by the Goa Foundation seeking demolition of constructions raised by each  of
the appellants were heard together  by  the  Bombay  High  Court.  The  High
Court, by separate impugned orders dated 13th July,  2000,  had  upheld  the
orders passed by the authorities requiring the appellants  to  demolish  the
existing structures. It is against the aforesaid orders passed by  the  High
Court that the present group of appeals have been filed upon grant of  leave
by this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

2.    The constructions raised by the appellants are not per se  illegal  in
the conventional sense. They are not without permission and sanction of  the
competent authority. What has  been  alleged  by  the  State  and  has  been
approved by the High Court is that such constructions are in  derogation  of
the environmental guidelines in force warranting demolition of the  same  as
a step to safeguard the environment of the beaches in Goa. Specifically,  it
is the case of the State that the constructions in question are  between  90
to 200 meters from the High Tide Line (HTL) despite the fact that under  the
guidelines in force, which  partake  the  character  of  law,  constructions
within 500 meters of the HTL are prohibited except in rare situations  where
construction activity between 200 to 500 meters from the HTL  are  permitted
subject to observance of strict conditions. Admittedly,  all  constructions,
though completed on  different  dates  and  in  different  phases,  were  so
completed before the Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) were enacted  (w.e.f.19th
February, 1991) in exercise of the powers under the  Environment  Protection
Act, 1986.

3.    The above basis on which the impugned action of the State  is  founded
has been sought to be answered by the appellants by contending that  at  the
relevant point of time when building permissions and sanctions were  granted
in respect of the constructions undertaken, the prohibition was with  regard
to construction within 90 meters from  the  HTL.  Admittedly,  none  of  the
constructions  are  within  the  said  divide.  The   guidelines,   detailed
reference to which are made in the  succeeding  paragraphs  of  the  present
order, are not ‘law’ so as to  constitute  activities  contrary  thereto  as
acts of infringement of the law and hence illegal. Such  guidelines  do  not
confer the power of enforcement and lack the authority to  bring  about  any
penal consequences.

4.    Having very broadly noticed the contours of the adjudication that  the
present case would require, we may now proceed to consider the stand of  the
rival parties with some elaboration. The Stockholm declaration  of  1972  to
which India was the party is the foundation of the State’s  claim  that  the
guidelines in question, being in  implementation  of  India’s  international
commitments, engraft a legal framework by executive action under Article  73
of the Constitution.   The  said  guidelines  are  in  conformity  with  the
Nation’s commitment to international values in the  matter  of  preservation
of the pristine  purity  of  sea  beaches  and  to  prevent  its  ecological
degradation. Such commitment to an established feature of International  Law
stands engrafted in the Municipal Laws of the country by incorporation.  The
guidelines commencing with the instructions conveyed by the  Prime  Minister
of India in a letter dated  27th  November,  1981  addressed  to  the  Chief
Minister of Goa; the environmental guidelines  for  development  of  beaches
published in July, 1983 by the Government of  India and the 1986  guidelines
issued  by  Inter  Ministerial  Committee  by  the  Ministry   of   Tourism,
Government of India by order dated 11th June, 1986 have been  stressed  upon
as containing  the  responses  of  the  Union  of  India  to  the  Stockholm
Declaration. It is contended that enactment of laws by  the  legislature  is
not exhaustive of the manner in which India’s International commitments  can
be furthered.  Executive action, in the absence of statutory enactments,  is
an alternative mode authorised under Article 73 of the Constitution. In  the
present case, the exercise of executive power is traceable to Entry  13  and
14 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The power to  give
effect to the guidelines and to penalize  violators  thereof  may  not  have
been available at the time when the guidelines  became  effective.  However,
with the enactment of the  Environment  Protection  Act,  1986  (hereinafter
referred to as ‘the Act’) with effect from 19th November, 1986,  sections  3
and 5 empowered the Central Government to pass necessary  orders  and  issue
directions which are penal in nature. It is in  the  exercise  of  the  said
power under the Act read with the guidelines  referred  to  above  that  the
orders impugned by the appellants  have  been  passed.  Though  the  Coastal
Regulation Zone  (CRZ)  Notification  under  the  Act  was  issued  on  19th
February, 1991 and admittedly is prospective in nature, till such time  that
the said notification came into force it is the guidelines  which  held  the
field being administrative instructions  having  the  effect  of  law  under
Article 73 of the Constitution.

5.    The stand of the State in support of  the  impugned  action  has  been
noticed at the outset for a better appreciation of  the  arguments  advanced
by  the  appellants.  Shri  K.  Parasaran,  Shri  C.U.Singh  and  Shri  Raju
Ramachandran, learned senior counsels who had  appeared  on  behalf  of  the
appellants in the different appeals under consideration have submitted  that
the purport and effect of the CRZ  Notification  published  on          19th
February, 1991 in exercise of the powers conferred by the Act and the  Rules
read together has been considered by this Court  in  Goan  Real  Estate  and
Construction Limited & Anr. vs. Union of India through  Secretary,  Ministry
of Environment & Ors.[1] to hold that: “Thus, the intention  of  legislature
while  issuing  the  Notification  of  1991  was   to   protect   the   past
actions/transactions which came into existence before the  approval  of  the
1991 Notification.” It is further submitted  that  in  Goan  Real  Estate  &
Construction  Ltd.  (supra)  construction  which  had  commenced  after  the
amendments made in the year 1994 to the notification  dated  19th  February,
1991 till the same were declared illegal on         18th April,  1996,  were
protected by this Court by holding that  though  the  amending  notification
was declared illegal by this Court –  “all  orders  passed  under  the  said
notification and actions taken pursuant to the said notification  would  not
be affected in any manner whatsoever.” (Para 38). According to  the  learned
counsels, the above is the approach that this  Court  had  indicated  to  be
appropriate for adoption while considering the Regulations  and  its  impact
on environmental issues in so far as  coastal  areas  and  sea  beaches  are
concerned.

6.  In so far as the guidelines of  1983  and  1986  are  concerned,  it  is
contended that the Stockholm Declaration saw the emergence  of  the  concept
of sustainable development in  full  bloom.  In  Vellore  Citizens’  Welfare
Forum vs. Union of  India  &  Ors.[2],  this  court  understood  Sustainable
Development to mean  “development  that  meets  the  needs  of  the  present
without compromising the ability of the future  generations  to  meet  their
own needs”. In Vellore Citizen’s Welfare Forum (supra), it is  further  held
that “Sustainable Development” as a balancing concept  between  ecology  and
development has been accepted as  a  part  of  customary  international  law
though its salient features are yet to be  finalised  by  the  international
law jurists. The Stockholm Declaration, naturally,  does  not  and  in  fact
could not have visualized specific and  precise  parameters  of  sustainable
development including prohibitory and permissible parameters  of  industrial
and business activities  on  the  sea  beaches  that  could  be  universally
applied across the board. The very text and the language of the  guidelines,
according to learned counsels, make it clear that there  is  no  mandate  of
law in any of the  said  guidelines  which  are  really  in  the  nature  of
evolving parameters embodying suggestions for identification of the  correct
parameters for enactment of laws in the future.  It  is  accordingly  argued
that the guidelines do not amount to  an  exercise  of  law  making  by  the
executive under Article 73 of the Constitution. In any case, the  guidelines
were never published or authenticated as required under Article  77  of  the
Constitution. Pointing  out  the  provisions  of  the  Air  (Prevention  and
Control of Pollution) Act, 1981, it is argued that  the  aforesaid  Act  was
enacted to implement the decisions taken  in  the  Stockholm  Conference  of
1972. Parliament though fully aware of the  resolutions and decisions  taken
in the Stockholm Conference as well as the commitments made by the India  as
a signatory thereto did not consider it necessary to enact  a  comprehensive
law to protect and safeguard ecology and environment until enactment of  the
Environment Protection Act  with  effect  from  18th  November,  1986.  Even
thereafter, the parameters for enforcement of  the  provisions  of  the  Act
insofar as the sea  coast  and  beaches  are  concerned  had  to  await  the
enactment of the CRZ Notification of 19th  February,  1991.  Shri  Parasaran
has particularly relied on  a  decision  of  this  Court  in  the  State  of
Karnataka & Anr. vs. Shri Ranganatha Reddy & Anr.[3] to  contend  that  even
if the court is to hold otherwise what would be called for is  a  “balancing
act” which would lean in favour of the protection  of  the  property  having
regard to the long period of  time  that  has  elapsed  since  the  impugned
action was initiated against the appellants.

7.     In reply, Shri Chitale, learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the
Union of India has placed before the Court the several documents  which  the
Union would like the Court to construe as the ‘law  in  force’  to  regulate
commercial/business activities on the  sea  beaches  in  order  to  maintain
environmental health and  ecological  balance.  It  is  contended  that  the
aforesaid  guidelines,  though  had  existed  all  along,   could   not   be
specifically enforced in the absence of statutory  powers  to  penalize  the
violations thereof.  Such  power,  learned  counsel  contends,  came  to  be
conferred with the enactment of the Environment Protection Act  with  effect
from 19th November, 1986. The guidelines which all along had laid  down  the
parameters for application of the provisions of the  Act  were  replaced  by
the CRZ Regulations  with  effect  from                      19th  February,
1991.  Learned  counsel  has  contended  that  the  guidelines  issued   are
traceable to the power of the Union executive under Entry 13 and 14 of  List
I of the Seventh Schedule read with Article 73 of the Constitution.  Learned
counsel has also drawn the attention of the Court to  its  earlier  decision
in the case of Gramophone Company of India Ltd. vs. Birendra Bahadur  Pandey
& Ors.[4] to contend that it was not necessary to enact a  specific  law  to
give effect to Stockholm  Declaration  inasmuch  as  the  understanding  and
agreement reached in the International  Convention  to  which  India  was  a
party stood embodied in the Municipal Laws of the country by application  of
the doctrine of incorporation.

Particular emphasis was laid on the views expressed by this Court in Para  5
of the decision  in  Gramophone  Company  of  India  (supra)  which  may  be
extracted below:-

“5. There can be no question that nations must march with the  international
community and the municipal law must  respect  rules  of  international  law
even as  nations  respect  international  opinion.  The  comity  of  nations
requires that  rules  of  international  law  may  be  accommodated  in  the
municipal law even without express legislative  sanction  provided  they  do
not run into conflict with Acts of Parliament. But when  they  do  run  into
such conflict, the sovereignty and the integrity of  the  Republic  and  the
supremacy of the constituted legislatures in making  the  laws  may  not  be
subjected to external rules except to the extent  legitimately  accepted  by
the constituted legislatures themselves. The doctrine of incorporation  also
recognises  the  position  that  the  rules   of   international   law   are
incorporated into national law and considered to be  part  of  the  national
law, unless they are in conflict  with  an  Act  of  Parliament.  Comity  of
nations or no, municipal law must prevail  in  case  of  conflict.  National
courts cannot  say  yes  if  Parliament  has  said  no  to  a  principle  of
international law. National courts will endorse international  law  but  not
if it conflicts with national law.  National  courts  being  organs  of  the
national State and not organs  of  international  law  must  perforce  apply
national law if international law conflicts with  it.  But  the  courts  are
under an obligation within legitimate limits, to so interpret the  municipal
statute as to avoid confrontation with the comity of  nations  or  the  well
established principles of international law. But if conflict is  inevitable,
the latter must yield.”


8.    Shri Sanjay Parikh, learned counsel appearing for the respondent  NGO,
Goa Foundation, has submitted that the Prime Minister’s  letter  dated  27th
November, 1981; the 1983 guidelines as well as guidelines of  1986  have  to
be  construed  to  be  law  within  the  meaning  of  Article  73   of   the
Constitution. Placing reliance on the decision of this Court  in  Vishaka  &
Ors. vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.,[5], Shri Parikh has  submitted  that  in
framing the guidelines to ensure prevention of  sexual  harassment  at  work
place this Court has placed reliance on the  fact  that  the  Government  of
India has ratified some of the resolutions adopted in the convention on  the
elimination of all forms of discrimination against women and had made  known
its commitments to the cause of women’s human rights  in  the  Fourth  World
Conference of Women held in Beijing. Similarly, relying on the  observations
of this Court in Para 52 in Vineet Narain  &  Ors.  vs.  Union  of  India  &
Anr.[6], it is contended that “it is the duty of the executive to  fill  the
vacuum by executive orders because its field is  coterminous  with  that  of
the legislature.” Shri Parikh has also relied on a judgment of  old  vintage
in Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur & Ors. vs. The State of Punjab[7]  to  contend
that the  executive  power  of  the  union  is  wide  and  expansive  and  –
“comprises both the determination of the policy as well as carrying it  into
execution. This  evidently  includes  the  initiation  of  legislation,  the
maintenance of order, the promotion of  social  and  economic  welfare,  the
direction of foreign policy, in fact the carrying on or supervision  of  the
general administration of the State.” (sub-para of Para 13).

9.     Shri Parikh has further contended that  commitments  of  the  country
made at an international forum which are in  tune  with  the  constitutional
philosophy i.e. to preserve and maintain ecology and  environment,  must  be
understood to have been incorporated in the Municipal Laws  of  the  country
and executive decisions to the above effect  will  fill  in  the  void  till
effective statutory exercise is made which in the instant case came  in  the
form of CRZ Notification dated 19th February, 1991.

10.     Shri Parikh has also submitted that passage  of  time  resulting  in
astronomical  rise  of  property  value;  use  of  the  otherwise  illegally
constructed property during the pendency of the present proceeding and  such
other events cannot be the basis of any claim in equity  for  protection  of
the product of an apparently illegal act. Reliance in  this  case  has  been
placed on a decision of this Court in Fomento Resorts  &  Hotels  Limited  &
Anr. vs. Minguel Martins & Ors.[8] .

11.     The  cases  of  the  respective  parties  having  been  noticed  the
necessary discourse may now commence. In Bennett Coleman & Co. vs. Union  of
India[9], a ‘Newsprint Policy’, notified by the Central Govt.  for  imposing
conditions on import of newsprint came to be challenged  on  the  ground  of
violation  of  fundamental  rights.  Beg,  J.,  in  a  concurring  judgment,
observed:
“What is termed “policy” can become justiciable when it exhibits  itself  in
the shape of even purported “law”. According  to  Article  13(3)(a)  of  the
Constitution,  “law”  includes  “any  Ordinance,   order,   bye-law,   rule,
[pic]regulation, notification, custom or usage having in  the  territory  of
India the force of law”. So long as policy remains  in  the  realm  of  even
rules framed for the guidance of executive  and  administrative  authorities
it may bind those authorities as declarations of what they are  expected  to
do under it. But, it cannot bind citizens  unless  the  impugned  policy  is
shown     to      have      acquired      the      force      of      “law”.
                         (para 93 – emphasis added)

12.   The question ‘what is “law”? has perplexed  many  a  jurisprude;  yet,
the search for the elusive definition continues. It may be unwise  to  posit
an answer to the question; rather, one may proceed by examining  the  points
of consensus in jurisprudential theories. What appears to be common  to  all
these theories is the notion that law must possess a certain  form;  contain
a clear mandate/explicit command which may be  prescriptive,  permissive  or
penal and the law must also seek to achieve a clearly identifiable  purpose.
While the form itself or absence thereof will not be determinative  and  its
impact  has  to  be  considered  as  a  lending  or  supporting  force,  the
disclosure of a clear mandate and purpose is indispensable.

13.    It may, therefore, be understood that a Govt. policy may acquire  the
“force of ‘law’” if it conforms to a certain form possessed  by  other  laws
in force and encapsulates a mandate and discloses a specific purpose. It  is
from the aforesaid prescription that  the  guidelines  relied  upon  by  the
Union of India in this case, will have to be examined to  determine  whether
the same satisfies the minimum elements of law. The said guidelines are -
1.   Directives to the State Governments  in  letter  dated  27th  November,
1981 of the then Prime Minister;
2.    Notification dated 22nd July, 1982 of  the  Governor  setting  up  the
Ecological Development Council for Goa, inter alia, for  scrutiny  of  beach
construction within 500 meters of HTL;

3.    Environmental Guidelines for Development of Beaches of July 1983;

4.  Order dated 11th June, 1986 of Under  Secretary,  Ministry  of  Tourism,
also addressed to Chief Secretary, Govt.  of  Goa,  constituting  an  inter-
Ministerial Committee for considering tourist projects within 500 meters.


14.  The genesis  of  the  Executive’s  decision  to  restrict  construction
activity within 500 meters of  the  HTL  can  be  traced  to  the  Stockholm
Conference. It is India’s participation in the conference that  led  to  the
introduction of  Articles  48A  and  51A(g)  in  the  Constitution  and  the
enactment of several legislations like the Air Act 1981,Forest  Conservation
Act, 1980, Environment Protection Act,  1986  etc.  all  of  which  seek  to
protect, preserve and safeguard the environment. It may be possible to  view
the aforesaid guidelines as “affirmative action”,  aimed  at  implementation
of Articles 21 and 48A of  the  Constitution  and,  therefore,  outlining  a
visible purpose.  The  search  for  a  clear,  unambiguous  and  unequivocal
command to regulate the conduct of the citizens in the said guidelines  must
also be equally fruitful. However,  we  are  unable  to  find  in  the  said
guidelines any expressed or clearly defined dicta. In fact, having read  and
considered the guidelines, we  are  left  with  a  reasonable  doubt  as  to
whether what has  been  spelt  out  therein  are  not  mere  suggestions  or
opinions expressed in the process of a continuing  exploration  to  identify
the correct parameters that would effectuate the purpose  i.e.  safeguarding
and protecting the environment (sea beaches)  from  human  exploitation  and
degradation. The above is particularly significant in view of the fact  that
the Stockholm Declaration in its core  resolutions,  merely  enunciate  very
broad propositions  and  commitments  including  those  concerning  the  sea
beaches  as  distinguished  from  specific  parameters   that   could   have
application, without variation or exception, to all the signatories  to  the
declaration.  The  Stockholm  Conference  having   nowhere   expressed   any
internationally approved parameters of acceptable  distance  from  the  HTL,
incorporation of any such feature of international values in  the  Municipal
Laws of the country  cannot  arise  even  on  the  principle  enunciated  in
Gramophone Company of India (supra). The position  is  best  highlighted  by
noticing in a little detail the objectives sought  to  be  achieved  in  the
Stockholm Conference and the core principles adopted therein so far as  they
are relevant to the issues in hand.
“The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,  met  at  Stockholm
from 5 to 16 June, 1972, to consider the  need  for  a  common  outlook  and
common principles to inspire and guide the  peoples  of  the  world  in  the
preservation and enhancement of the human environment -
The Conference called upon Governments and peoples to exert  common  efforts
for the preservation and improvement  of  the  human  environment,  for  the
benefit of all the people and for their posterity.”

Extract of the relevant Principles –
“Principle 7- States shall take all possible steps to prevent  pollution  of
the seas by substances that are liable to create hazards  to  human  health,
to harm living  resources  and  marine  life,  to  damage  amenities  or  to
interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea.

Principle 11 - The environmental policies of all States should  enhance  and
not  adversely  affect  the  present  or  future  development  potential  of
developing countries, nor  should  they  hamper  the  attainment  of  better
living conditions for all, and appropriate steps should be taken  by  States
and international  organizations  with  a  view  to  reaching  agreement  on
meeting  the  possible  national  and  international  economic  consequences
resulting from the application of environmental measures.


Principle  14-  Rational  planning  constitutes  an   essential   tool   for
reconciling any conflict between the needs of development and  the  need  to
protect and improve the environment.


Principle 23- Without prejudice to such criteria as may be  agreed  upon  by
the  international  community,  or  to  standards  which  will  have  to  be
determined nationally, it will be essential in all  cases  to  consider  the
systems of values  prevailing  in  each  country,  and  the  extent  of  the
applicability of standards which are valid for the most  advanced  countries
but which may be inappropriate  and  of  unwarranted  social  cost  for  the
developing countries.


Principle  24-  International  matters   concerning   the   protection   and
improvement of the environment should be handled in a cooperative spirit  by
all countries, big and small, on an equal footing.


Cooperation  through  multilateral  or  bilateral  arrangements   or   other
appropriate means is essential to effectively control, prevent,  reduce  and
eliminate adverse environmental effects resulting from activities  conducted
in all spheres, in such a way that due account is taken of  the  sovereignty
and interests of all States.”

15.     Article 77 of the  Constitution  provides  the  form  in  which  the
Executive must make and authenticate its orders and  decisions.  Clause  (1)
of Article 77 provides that all executive action of the Government  must  be
expressed to be taken in the name of the President.  The  celebrated  author
H.M.Seervai in Constitutional Law of India,  4th  Edition,  Volume  2,  1999
describes the consequences of Government orders or  instructions  not  being
in accordance with Clauses (1) or (2) of Article  77  by  opining  that  the
same would deprive of the orders of the immunity conferred by the  aforesaid
clauses and they may be open to challenge on the ground that they  have  not
been made by or under the authority of  the  President  in  which  case  the
burden would be on the Government to show that they were, in fact, so  made.
In the present case, the said burden has not been discharged in  any  manner
whatsoever.  The  decision  in  Air  India  Cabin   Crew   Association   vs.
Yeshaswinee Merchant[10], taking a somewhat different view can, perhaps,  be
explained by the  fact  that  in  the  said  case  the  impugned  directions
contained in the Government  letter  (not  expressed  in  the  name  of  the
President) was in exercise of the statutory power under Section  34  of  the
Air Corporations Act, 1953. In the present  case,  the  impugned  guidelines
have not been issued under any existing statute.

16.  Clause (2) of Article  77  also  provides  for  the  authentication  of
orders and instruments in a manner as may be prescribed  by  the  Rules.  In
this regard, vide S.O. 2297 dated  3rd  November,  1958   published  in  the
Gazette of India, the President has issued the  Authentication  (Orders  and
Other  Instruments)  Rules,  1958.  The  said  Rules  have  been  superseded
subsequently in 2002. Admittedly, the provisions of the said Rules  of  1958
had not been followed in the present case insofar  as  the  promulgation  of
the guidelines is concerned.

17.    In  the  absence  of  due  authentication  and  promulgation  of  the
guidelines, the contents thereof cannot  be  treated  as  an  order  of  the
Government and would really represent an expression of opinion. In law,  the
said guidelines and its binding effect  would  be  no  more  than  what  was
expressed by this Court in State of Uttaranchal vs. S.K.  Vaish[11]  in  the
following paragraph of the report :

“It is settled law that all executive actions of  the  Government  of  India
and the Government of a State are required to be taken in the  name  of  the
President or the Governor of  the  State  concerned,  as  the  case  may  be
[Articles 77(1) and 166(1)]. Orders and other instruments made and  executed
in the name of the President or the Governor of a State,  as  the  case  may
be, are required to be authenticated in the manner specified  in  the  rules
made by the President or the Governor, as the case may  be  [Articles  77(2)
and 166(2)]. In other words, unless an order is expressed  in  the  name  of
the President or the Governor and is authenticated in the manner  prescribed
by the rules, the same cannot be treated  as  an  order  on  behalf  of  the
Government.”  [Para 23]

“A noting recorded in the file is merely a noting  simpliciter  and  nothing
more.  It  merely  represents  expression  of  opinion  by  the   particular
individual. By no stretch of imagination, such noting can be  treated  as  a
decision of the Government. Even if  the  competent  authority  records  its
opinion in the file on the merits of the  matter  under  consideration,  the
same cannot be  termed  as  a  decision  of  the  Government  unless  it  is
sanctified and acted upon by issuing an order in  accordance  with  Articles
77(1) and (2) or Articles 166(1) and (2). The noting in the file or  even  a
decision gets culminated into an order affecting right of the  parties  only
when it is expressed in the name of the President or the  Governor,  as  the
case may be, [pic]and authenticated in the manner provided in Article  77(2)
or Article 166(2). A noting or even a decision  recorded  in  the  file  can
always be reviewed/reversed/overruled or overturned  and  the  court  cannot
take cognizance of the earlier noting or decision for exercise of the  power
of judicial review.”      [Para 24]


18.     It is also essential that what is  claimed  to  be  a  law  must  be
notified or made public in order to bind the citizen. In Harla vs. State  of
Rajasthan[12] while dealing with the vires of the Jaipur  Opium  Act,  which
was enacted by a resolution passed  by  the  Council  of  Ministers,  though
never published in the Gazette, this Court had observed :-
“Natural justice requires that before a law can become operative it must  be
promulgated or published. It must be broadcast in some recognisable  way  so
that all men may know what it is, or, at the very least, there must be  some
special role or regulation or customary channel by  or  through  which  such
knowledge  can  be  acquired  with  the  exercise  of  due  and   reasonable
diligence. The thought that a decision reached in the secret recesses  of  a
chamber to which  the  public  have  no  access  and  to  which  even  their
accredited representatives have no access and of  which  they  can  normally
know nothing, can nevertheless affect their lives, liberty and  property  by
the mere passing of a Resolution  without  anything  more  is  abhorrent  to
civilised man.”        [Para 10]


19.   The Court  in  Harla  vs.  State  of  Rajasthan  (supra)  noticed  the
decision in Johnson vs. Sargant & Sons[13] and particularly the following:-
 “The principle underlying this question has been judicially  considered  in
England. For example, on a somewhat lower plane, it was held in  Johnson  v.
Sargant, (1918) 1 K.B. 101: 87 L.J. K.B. 122  that  an  order  of  the  Food
Controller under the Beans, Peas and Pulse (Requisition)  Order  1917,  does
not become operative  until  it  is  made  known  to  the  public,  and  the
differences between an Order  of  that  kind  and  an  Act  of  the  British
Parliament is stressed. The difference  is  obvious.  Acts  of  the  British
Parliament are publicly enacted. The debates are open to the public and  the
acts are passed by the accredited  representatives  of  the  people  who  in
theory can be trusted to see that their  constituents  know  what  has  been
done. They also  receive  wide  publicity  in  papers  and,  now,  over  the
wireless. Not so Royal Proclamations and Orders of a Food Controller and  so
forth. There must therefore be promulgation and publication in their  cases.
The mode of publication can vary; what is a good method in one  country  may
not necessarily be the best in another. But reasonable publication  of  some
sort there must be.”   (Para 11)

20.    It will not be  necessary  to  notice  the  long  line  of  decisions
reiterating the aforesaid view.  So  far  as  the  mode  of  publication  is
concerned, it has been consistently held by this Court that such  mode  must
be as prescribed by the statute. In the event the statute does  not  contain
any prescription  and  even  under  the  subordinate  legislation  there  is
silence in the matter, the legislation will take  effect  only  when  it  is
published through the customarily recognized official channel,  namely,  the
official gazette (B.K. Srivastava vs. State of  Karnataka)[14].  Admittedly,
the ‘guidelines’ were not gazetted.

21.   If the guidelines relied upon by Union of India in  the  present  case
fail to satisfy the essential and vital parameters/requirements  of  law  as
the trend of the above discussion would go  to  show,  the  same  cannot  be
enforced to the prejudice of the appellants as has been done in the  present
case. For the same reason, the issue raised with regard to the authority  of
the Union to enforce  the  guidelines  on  the  coming  into  force  of  the
provisions of the Environment Protection Act so as to bring into effect  the
impugned consequences, adverse to  the  appellants,  will  not  require  any
consideration.

22.      An argument had  been  offered  by  Shri  Parikh,  learned  counsel
appearing for the  respondent,  Goa  Foundation,  that  while  dealing  with
issues concerning ecology and environment, a strict  view  of  environmental
degradation, which Shri Parikh would contend has  occurred  in  the  present
case, should be adopted having regard to the rights of  a  large  number  of
citizens to enjoy a pristine and pollution free  environment  by  virtue  of
Article 21 of  the  Constitution.  We  cannot  appreciate  the  above  view.
Violation of Article  21  on  account  of  alleged  environmental  violation
cannot be  subjectively  and  individually  determined  when  parameters  of
permissible/impermissible  conduct  are  required  to  be  legislatively  or
statutorily determined under Sections 3 and 6 of the Environment  Protection
Act, 1986 which has  been  so  done  by  bringing  into  force  the  Coastal
Regulation Zone (CRZ) Notification w.e.f. 19th February, 1991.

23.     In view of the foregoing discussion,  the  orders  impugned  in  the
writ petitions filed by the appellants cannot  be  sustained.  Consequently,
the said orders as well as each of the orders dated 13th July,  2000  passed
by the High Court of Bombay will have to be set aside  which  we  hereby  do
while allowing the appeals.

                                          ……………………………J.
                                           [RANJAN GOGOI]


                                         …………………..………..J.
                                          [M.Y.EQBAL]
New Delhi;
September 22, 2014.
-----------------------
[1]    2010 (5) SCC 388; in para 31
[2]     (1996) 5 SCC 647 Para 10
[3]    (1977 (4) SCC 471)
[4]    1984 (2) SCC 534
[5]    1997 (6) SCC 241 para 13
[6]    1998 (1) SCC 226
[7]    AIR 1955 SC 549
[8]    2009 (3) SCC 571
[9]    [(1972) 2 SCC 788 – 5J]
[10]   (2003) 6 SCC 277 – para 72
[11]   (2011) 8 SCC 670
[12]   [AIR 1951 SC 467]
[13]   [(1918) 1 KB 101]
[14]   (1987) 1 SCC 658

-----------------------
29


Specific performance of an agreement of sale sec.16 and sec.20 – agreement of sale proved – trial court decreed the suit – High court reversed by using it’s discretions not judicially – Apex court held that The High Court has taken a very peculiar view that the plaintiff-appellant and also consider the default clause in the agreement itself shows the non willingness of the defendant in executing the agreement of sale and found that the plaintiff filed the suit which was premature and simple because properties value was raised pending suit, no suit be dismissed conditions may be imposed and as such Apex court directed to pay 25 lakhs for obtaining specific performance of decree =CIVIL APPEAL NO.9047 OF 2014 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.2271 of 2012) K. Prakash …Appellant (s) Versus B.R. Sampath Kumar …Respondent(s) = 2014 – Sept. Month -http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=41947

Specific performance of an agreement of sale sec.16 and sec.20 – agreement of sale proved – trial court decreed the suit – High court reversed by using it’s discretions not judicially – Apex court held that The High Court has taken a very peculiar view that  the  plaintiff-appellant and also consider the default clause in the agreement itself shows the non willingness of the defendant in executing the agreement of sale  and found that the plaintiff filed the suit which was premature and simple because properties value was raised pending suit, no suit be dismissed conditions may be imposed and as such Apex court directed to pay 25 lakhs for obtaining specific performance of decree =

The trial court, therefore, came to the conclusion that  there  is  a  valid
agreement to sell the suit property executed by the defendant in  favour  of
the plaintiff on receipt of the advance consideration.

The High Court has taken a very peculiar view that  the  plaintiff-appellant
filed the suit which was premature.  For better appreciation,  the  relevant
portion of para 8 of the judgment passed by  the  High  Court  is  extracted
hereinbelow:-

  “It is not in dispute that the agreement is dated 15.12.2003.   Under  the
agreement, both the parties  have  agreed  that  the  sale  deed  should  be
executed within one year from that day, that is on  or  before   15.12.2004.
But the suit is filed on 9.7.2004, that is within about 7  months  from  the
date of the agreement.  Absolutely, no reasons are  forthcoming  as  to  why
the suit was filed prematurely.

The High Court further held that in the agreement (Exhibit P-1) the  parties
have agreed that if the sale deed could not be executed  by  the  defendant,
he will repay a sum of Rs,. 10,90,000/-, According to the  High  Court,  the
recital in the agreement shows  that it was not executed  by  the  defendant
with free mind and volition rather he was  under  pressure  while  executing
those documents.



We have given our thoughtful consideration in the  matter  and  perused  the
pleading and evidence.  We are of the view  that  the  High  Court  has  not
approached the issue in its right  perspective  and  has  committed  serious
error of law in holding that the agreement was  executed  by  the  defendant
without free mind and volition and under some pressure.  The  agreement  was
executed on  15.12.2003  wherein  it  has  been  mentioned  that  the  total
consideration amount was 16,10,000/- and out of that part  consideration  of
sum of Rs. 5,45,000/- was paid.  The said agreement was followed by  another
letter dated 21.1.2004, executed by the  respondent,

Section 20 of the Act specifically provides that the  court’s
jurisdiction to grant decree of specific performance  is  discretionary  but
not arbitrary.  Discretion must be exercised in accordance  with  the  sound
and reasonable judicial principles.

The King’s Bench in Rookey’s Case [77 ER 209;  (1597)  5  Co.Rep.99]  it  is
said :
“Discretion is a science, not to act arbitrarily  according  to  men’s  will
and private affection: so the discretion which is exercised here, is  to  be
governed by rules of law and equity, which are to oppose, but each,  in  its
turn, to be subservient to  the  other.   This  discretion,  in  some  cases
follows the law implicitly, in others or allays the rigour of it, but in  no
case does it contradict or overturn the grounds or  principles  thereof,  as
has  been  sometimes  ignorantly  imputed  to  this  Court.    That   is   a
discretionary power, which neither this nor any other Court,  not  even  the
highest, acting in a judicial capacity  is  by  the  constitution  entrusted
with”

      The Court of Chancery in Attorney General  vs. Wheat  [(1759)  1  Eden
177; 28 ER 652] followed the Rooke’s case and observed :
      “the law is clear and courts of equity ought to  follow  it  in  their
judgments  concerning  titles  to   equitable   estates;   otherwise   great
uncertainty and confusion would ensue.  And  though  proceedings  in  equity
are said to be secundum discretionem boni vin, yet when  it  is  asked,  vir
bonus est quis? The answer is, qui consulta partum, qui leges juraq  servat.
 And as it is said in Rooke’s case, 5  Rep.  99  b,  that  discretion  is  a
science  not  to  act  arbitrarily  according  to  men’s  will  and  private
affection: so the discretion which is exercised here, is to be  governed  by
rules of law and equity, which are to oppose, but each, in its turn,  to  be
subservient to the other.  This discretion, in some cases  follows  the  law
implicitly, in others or allays the rigour of it, but in  no  case  does  it
contradict or overturn the  grounds  or  principles  thereof,  as  has  been
sometimes ignorantly imputed to this Court.  That is a discretionary  power,
which neither this nor any other Court, not even the highest,  acting  in  a
judicial capacity is by the constitution entrusted with.   This  description
is full and judicious, and what ought to be imprinted on the mind  of  every
judge.”
   However, the court may take notice of the fact that  there  has  been  an
increase in the price of the property and considering the  other  facts  and
circumstances of the case, this Court while  granting  decree  for  specific
performance can impose such condition which may to  some  extent  compensate
the  defendant-owner  of  the  property     

      As discussed above the agreement was entered into between  the  parties
in 2003 for sale of the property for a total consideration of Rs.16,10,000/-
.  Ten years have passed by and now the price of the property in  that  area
where it  situates has increased by not less than five  times.   Keeping  in
mind the factual position we are of the view that the appellant  should  pay
a total  consideration  of  Rs.25  lakhs,  being  the  price  for  the  said
property.

   We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside  the  judgment  and  order
passed by the High Court and restore the judgment and decree  of  the  trial
court with the modification that on payment of  Rs.25  lakhs,  less  already
paid by the plaintiff, the defendant-owner shall execute a  registered  sale
deed within a period of three months from today.

2014 – Sept. Month -http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=41947

                                                          REPORTABLE

                          IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.9047 OF 2014
       (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.2271 of 2012)


K. Prakash                              …Appellant (s)

                                  Versus

B.R. Sampath Kumar                      …Respondent(s)



                                  JUDGMENT

M.Y. Eqbal, J.:

      Leave granted.

2.    This appeal by special leave is  directed  against  the  judgment  and
order dated 23.8.2011 passed by the High Court of Karnataka whereby  Regular
First Appeal No.396 of 2007 of the respondent  was  allowed,  reversing  the
judgment  of  the  trial  court  and  dismissing  the  suit   for   specific
performance of the agreement filed by the plaintiff-appellant.

The facts of the case lie in a narrow compass.

All disputes pertain to a self  acquired  property  of  the  father  of  the
respondent.  The respondent’s father had four sons and three daughters.   On
31.7.1988, transfer of Khata was executed by all  brothers  and  sisters  in
the name of the respondent.  After the demise of  their  parents,  partition
seems to have taken place on 14.12.2000 among brothers and sisters  and  the
property in question is said to have fallen to the share of  defendant,  who
was required to pay a sum of Rs.1,25,000/-  to  each  of  the  brothers  and
sisters in lieu of their shares in the suit house.  The plaintiff  had  paid
Rs.1,25,000/- to all his brothers and sisters except brother Selva Pillai.



 The respondent herein executed an Agreement  for  Sale  in  favour  of  the
appellant on 15.12.2003 agreeing to sell the schedule property for  a  total
sale consideration of Rs.16,10,000/-.  The schedule property is  located  at
Bangalore, admeasuring 30 x 45 feet with  built  up  area  of  1700  sq.ft.,
consisting of ground floor and first floor including out house.  The  ground
floor is occupied by the respondent and the first floor is occupied  by  the
appellant. as a mortgagee.  The out-house is occupied by the brother of  the
defendant-respondent namely Sheshadri (as mortgagee).   It  is  relevant  to
note that an amount of Rs.3,75,000/-  was  paid  by  the  appellant  to  the
respondent as requested by the respondent and Sheshadri,  who  is  occupying
the  out-house portion, has paid Rs.1,65,000/- as a  mortgage  consideration
to the respondent while occupying  the  house.   Agreement  further  reveals
that the aforesaid amounts shall be treated as advance  amount  received  by
the respondent under the agreement of sale.  The understanding  between  the
parties is that the  mortgage  consideration  need  not  be  repaid  by  the
respondent  to  the  mortgagees  including  Sheshadri   and   his   mortgage
consideration will be repaid by the prospective vendee i.e.  the  appellant.
However, on the  date  of  execution  of  sale  agreement,  only  a  sum  of
Rs.5,000/- was paid by the appellant to the respondent.  Thus, in all a  sum
of Rs.5,45,000/- is said to have been paid by the appellant.  The  plaintiff
could raise loan of Rs.3 lakh  by  securing  property.  The  remaining  sale
consideration of Rs.7,65,000/- was payable  to  the  respondent  within  one
year from the date of the agreement, and in case respondent fails to  comply
with any of the conditions in the  agreement,  he  would  repay  double  the
amount i.e. Rs.10,90,000/- to the appellant.

Although prescribed time was one year,  litigation  seems  to  have  started
between the parties within three months.  Repeated complaints were filed  by
the appellant against the respondent before  the  police  authorities.    At
last, appellant-plaintiff moved a suit on 9.7.2004 praying for a  decree  of
specific performance on the ground that the respondent-defendant has  denied
the execution of the sale deed.  The sum and  substance  of  the  appellant-
plaintiff’s case is that the defendant-respondent has failed to perform  his
part of the contract though the appellant-plaintiff was  ready  and  willing
to perform his part of the contract.

The defendant-respondent denying Agreement  Ex.P1  pleaded  in  his  written
statement that there being difference of opinion  between  himself  and  his
brothers, he was in highly disturbed state of mind and  when  he  approached
the appellant for suggestion and help, appellant took his signature  on  the
alleged agreement of sale and he signed it since he had  implicit  faith  in
the appellant.  The appellant-plaintiff had assured that  B.R.  Sheshadri  -
brother of the respondent-defendant, who was living in the out-house,  would
be made to vacate the premises in the guise of  interest  being  created  in
favour of appellant in the property.  It has also been  contended  that  the
respondent had no intention to execute the agreement of sale or to sell  the
property and the  agreement  was  entered  into  only  for  the  purpose  of
securing the loan and the property was  mortgaged  as  a  security  for  the
loan.



After hearing argument on both sides, the trial court decreed  the  suit  in
favour of  the  plaintiff-appellant  with  a  direction  to  the  defendant-
respondent to execute the absolute sale deed in  favour  of  the  plaintiff,
free  from  all  claims  and  encumbrances,   by   receiving   the   balance
consideration of Rs.10,65,000/- and to hand over  the  vacant  and  peaceful
possession of the suit Schedule Property to  the  plaintiff.   Aggrieved  by
the decision, the defendant-respondent preferred an appeal before  the  High
Court, which passed the impugned order  setting  aside  the  decree  of  the
trial court and dismissing the suit for specific performance.   Hence,  this
appeal by special leave by the plaintiff.


Mr. Sanjay Parikh, learned counsel appearing  on  behalf  of  the  appellant
contended that instead of adverting to and re-appreciating the  evidence  on
record,  the  High  Court  erred  in  arriving  at  the  findings  based  on
conjectures and surmises.  The appellant-plaintiff  has  complied  with  the
provisions of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act by  establishing  his
willingness to perform his part of  the  contract  whereas  the  respondent-
defendant failed to do so.  It is further contended that the respondent  has
admitted  by  way  of  affidavit  dated  10.10.2006  that  he  executed  the
Agreement of sale dated  15.12.2003  and  also  by  letter  dated  21.1.2004
further admitted that  he  has  executed  aforesaid  agreement  and  he  had
already received a sum of Rs.5,45,000/- as part payment of  the  total  sale
consideration.  At the instance of appellant, on  16.2.2004  Syndicate  Bank
issued two cheques one  for  Rs.10,65,000/-  in  favour  of  the  respondent
towards balance amount of sale consideration and another  for  Rs.1,19,840/-
in favour of  Sub-Registrar,  Rajajinagar,  Bangalore  for  payment  of  the
registration charges of the said sale deed.  As  contended,  on  failure  of
the respondent to reply legal notice of the appellant and execute  the  sale
deed in favour of the appellant, the  appellant  had  to  move  a  suit  for
relief of specific performance  directing  the  respondent  to  receive  the
balance sale consideration to execute an absolute sale  deed  in  favour  of
the appellant.  Learned counsel drew our attention to the exhibits  and  the
evidence of the defendant-respondent and submitted that the appellate  court
has committed serious illegality in ignoring these  materials  and  reversed
the finding of the trial court.

Per contra, Mr. Vishwanath  Shetty,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  on
behalf of respondent, submitted that taking advantage  of  financial  crises
and disturbed state of mind of the respondent, the appellant  suggested  him
to execute an agreement of sale and without revealing its contents took  his
signature on the agreement, which was made only for nominal purpose  and  he
had no intention to sell the property.  It is  further  contended  that  the
appellant had concocted and fabricated the agreement. It is alleged  by  the
respondent that since appellant did not perform his part  of  the  contract,
the entire alleged agreement stood cancelled.  Prevailing circumstances  had
forced  respondent  to  write  aforesaid  letter  dated  21.1.2004   calling
appellant to pay the entire  amount.   Alleged  agreement  and  letter  were
created by the appellant under suspicious circumstances and mental  pressure
of the defendant-respondent, and as such, they are not  legally  enforceable
for a decree under Section 16(c)  read  with  Section  20  of  the  Specific
Relief Act, 1963.  The High Court has held that there was  payment  of  only
Rs.5000/- to the defendant as against the claim of  the  plaintiff  that  he
has paid a sum of Rs.5,45,000/- under Ex.P1 and P2.   It  has  been  further
contended on behalf of the respondent that the market value of the  property
in the year 2003 in Bangalore was much  more  to  the  consideration  amount
contained in Ex. P1 and P2.  The whole transaction was  nothing  but  farce.
Respondent contends that  taking  into  consideration  all  aspects  of  the
matter, the High Court is right in  reversing  the  judgment  of  the  trial
court, which had ignored the material evidence on record with regard to  the
conduct of the plaintiff-appellant.



While deciding the issue as to whether the agreement  dated  15.12.2003  was
executed by the defendant in favour of the  plaintiff-appellant,  the  trial
court has gone through the pleading and evidence and  discussed  the  matter
in detail. The trial court found that after the agreement  executed  between
the parties on  15.12.2003  the  defendant-respondent  issued  letter  dated
21.1.2004 calling upon the plaintiff to get ready with  the  entire  balance
amount on or before 15.4.2004  and  also  mentioned  that  in  default,  the
agreement  dated  15.12.2003 will stand cancelled  and  the  advance  amount
shall be forfeited. The trial court further found  that  the  plaintiff  had
paid an amount of Rs. 3,75,000/-  to  the  defendant  for  the  property  in
occupation of the plaintiff taken  on  lease  and  the  defendant  in  cross
examination had admitted that the plaintiff  occupied  the  first  floor  as
mortgagee and that the plaintiff has paid  the  amount  of   Rs.  3,75,000/-
(exhibit P-3).  The  trial  court  further  found  that  the  defendant  was
examined as DW-1 and he admitted the signature  of  himself,  his  wife  and
signature of plaintiff.  He further admitted in cross  examination  that  he
had read the papers and signed the same.   The defendant  also  handed  over
copies of the title deeds and the encumbrance certificate to  the  plaintiff
on lease basis and also Exhibit P-1 and P-2, the trial  court  came  to  the
conclusion that the defendant entered into an agreement  of  sale  with  the
plaintiff for a consideration of Rs. 16,10,000/- and that the amount of  Rs.
5,45,000/- was paid as an advance towards the sale  of  the  said  property.
Further the defendant (DW-1) admitted the receipt of the legal notice  dated
12.3.2004 (exhibit P-3) but he did not reply the said notice.



The trial court also discussed the defence taken  by  the  defendant  during
cross examination that the  suit property has fallen to  the  share  of  the
defendant and that all his brothers and  sisters  are  residing  separately.
The trial court, therefore, came to the conclusion that  there  is  a  valid
agreement to sell the suit property executed by the defendant in  favour  of
the plaintiff on receipt of the advance consideration.

The High Court has taken a very peculiar view that  the  plaintiff-appellant
filed the suit which was premature.  For better appreciation,  the  relevant
portion of para 8 of the judgment passed by  the  High  Court  is  extracted
hereinbelow:-

  “It is not in dispute that the agreement is dated 15.12.2003.   Under  the
agreement, both the parties  have  agreed  that  the  sale  deed  should  be
executed within one year from that day, that is on  or  before   15.12.2004.
But the suit is filed on 9.7.2004, that is within about 7  months  from  the
date of the agreement.  Absolutely, no reasons are  forthcoming  as  to  why
the suit was filed prematurely.  In the meanwhile, the plaintiff  approached
the Police for enforcement  of the contract.   The  same  is  clear  in  the
matter on record Ex.P.11 dated 08.2.2004 is  the  complaint  lodged  by  the
plaintiff before the Deputy Police  Commissioner.  In  the  said  complaint,
he has clearly stated that though  the  defendant  agreed  for  selling  his
property on  15.12.2003, the plaintiff has not come forward to  execute  the
sale deed and that the plaintiff has been delaying  the  execution  of  sale
deed since four days prior to the filing of the  complaint.   The  plaintiff
requested the Deputy Police Commissioner to call the defendant and  to  take
action by directing him to execute the sale deed as agreed.  He also  sought
for protection by filing the said complaint.

      Ex.P.12 is the complaint dated 3.3.2004 filed by the plaintiff  before
the Police Commissioner, Bangalore city.  In the said  complaint  also,  the
plaintiff has alleged that defendant is refusing to execute  the  sale  deed
in his favour and that therefore, the Commissioner should  intervene in  the
manner for getting the sale deed executed in favour of the plaintiff.

      Ex.P.13 is the  complaint  dated  11.4.2004  filed  by  the  plaintiff
before the  Police  Inspector,  Subramanyanagar  Police  Station,  Bangalore
(subsequently police station).  In the said complaint, he  has  stated  that
defendant and his family members have threatened to kill the  plaintiff  and
his family members and  therefore,  action  should  be  taken  against  the4
defendant.  However, Inspector  of  Police  has  issued  an  endorsement  on
11.3.2004, as per Ex.P.14 to the effect that dispute between the parties  is
of civil nature and the complainant  was  directed  to  get  his  grievances
redressed  before  the  jurisdictional  Civil  Court.   Ex.P.15  is  another
complaint of similar nature.   Ex.P.16  is  an  endorsement  issued  by  the
Police officer to the wife  of  the  complainant  intimating  her  that  the
complaint lodged by her on 12.3.2004, is received  and  for  any  grievance,
she can approach the Subramanyanagar Police Station.  Further,  in  Ex.P.17,
the Inspector of Police has intimated the plaintiff that the  defendant  has
denied the agreement of sale and that  he  had  signed  the  sale  agreement
under mental pressure.  Again by issuing such an endorsement, the  Inspector
has directed the plaintiff to get his grievances redressed before the  Civil
Court.  Cr.P.C.107  proceedings  were  initiated   before   the   Tehsildar,
Bangalore, against the parties as is  clear  from  Ex.P.18.   based  on  the
complaints, two charge sheets were  lodged  against  the  defendant  as  per
Ex.P.19 and 21; the same  are  pending  consideration  before  the  Criminal
Court.  These facts clearly go to show that  the  plaintiff  has  approached
the police repeatedly by making  one  or  the  other  allegations  that  too
within the span of 2 to 4 months of the agreement.  He  has  approached  the
Commissioner of Police  and Deputy  Commissioner  of  police  seeking  their
interference in the matter  for  getting  the  sale  deed  executed  in  his
favour.”



The High Court further held that in the agreement (Exhibit P-1) the  parties
have agreed that if the sale deed could not be executed  by  the  defendant,
he will repay a sum of Rs,. 10,90,000/-, According to the  High  Court,  the
recital in the agreement shows  that it was not executed  by  the  defendant
with free mind and volition rather he was  under  pressure  while  executing
those documents.



We have given our thoughtful consideration in the  matter  and  perused  the
pleading and evidence.  We are of the view  that  the  High  Court  has  not
approached the issue in its right  perspective  and  has  committed  serious
error of law in holding that the agreement was  executed  by  the  defendant
without free mind and volition and under some pressure.  The  agreement  was
executed on  15.12.2003  wherein  it  has  been  mentioned  that  the  total
consideration amount was 16,10,000/- and out of that part  consideration  of
sum of Rs. 5,45,000/- was paid.  The said agreement was followed by  another
letter dated 21.1.2004, executed by the  respondent,  the  contents  whereof
are reproduced herein-below:-

                      “21.01.2004

“That on this 22nd day of January, 2004, I have executed  the  agreement  of
sale in favour of Sri K.Prakash, in respect of the  House  bearing  No.2558,
11th Main Road, Subramanyanagara, Bangalore-560 010, to sell the same for  a
total  sale  consideration  of  Rs.16,10,000/-  (Rupees  Sixteen  Lakhs  Ten
thousand only). In all I have received a sum of Rs.5,45,000/-  (Rupees  Five
Lakhs Forty Five Thousand  only)  from  K.  Prakash  and  the  balance  sale
consideration to be paid on or before 15.04.2004  evening,  failing  to  pay
the balance sale consideration as per the agreement dated 15.12.2004.   This
Agreement stands cancel. I agree for the same.

Sd/-                                    Sd/-
(Sampath Kumar)
Vendor                            (K.Prakash)
                                  (Purchaser)
Sd/-
(Kanthamani)


WITNESSES:                   WITNESSES
  Sd/-                                  1) Sd/-
  Sd/-                                  2)  Sd/-
  Sd/-                                  3)   Sd/-”



Indisputably, remedy for specific performance is an equitable  remedy.   The
Court while granting relief for specific performance exercise  discretionary
jurisdiction.  Section 20 of the Act specifically provides that the  court’s
jurisdiction to grant decree of specific performance  is  discretionary  but
not arbitrary.  Discretion must be exercised in accordance  with  the  sound
and reasonable judicial principles.

The King’s Bench in Rookey’s Case [77 ER 209;  (1597)  5  Co.Rep.99]  it  is
said :
“Discretion is a science, not to act arbitrarily  according  to  men’s  will
and private affection: so the discretion which is exercised here, is  to  be
governed by rules of law and equity, which are to oppose, but each,  in  its
turn, to be subservient to  the  other.   This  discretion,  in  some  cases
follows the law implicitly, in others or allays the rigour of it, but in  no
case does it contradict or overturn the grounds or  principles  thereof,  as
has  been  sometimes  ignorantly  imputed  to  this  Court.    That   is   a
discretionary power, which neither this nor any other Court,  not  even  the
highest, acting in a judicial capacity  is  by  the  constitution  entrusted
with”

      The Court of Chancery in Attorney General  vs. Wheat  [(1759)  1  Eden
177; 28 ER 652] followed the Rooke’s case and observed :
      “the law is clear and courts of equity ought to  follow  it  in  their
judgments  concerning  titles  to   equitable   estates;   otherwise   great
uncertainty and confusion would ensue.  And  though  proceedings  in  equity
are said to be secundum discretionem boni vin, yet when  it  is  asked,  vir
bonus est quis? The answer is, qui consulta partum, qui leges juraq  servat.
 And as it is said in Rooke’s case, 5  Rep.  99  b,  that  discretion  is  a
science  not  to  act  arbitrarily  according  to  men’s  will  and  private
affection: so the discretion which is exercised here, is to be  governed  by
rules of law and equity, which are to oppose, but each, in its turn,  to  be
subservient to the other.  This discretion, in some cases  follows  the  law
implicitly, in others or allays the rigour of it, but in  no  case  does  it
contradict or overturn the  grounds  or  principles  thereof,  as  has  been
sometimes ignorantly imputed to this Court.  That is a discretionary  power,
which neither this nor any other Court, not even the highest,  acting  in  a
judicial capacity is by the constitution entrusted with.   This  description
is full and judicious, and what ought to be imprinted on the mind  of  every
judge.”


17.   The principles which can be enunciated is  that  where  the  plaintiff
brings a suit for  specific  performance  of  contract  for  sale,  the  law
insists  a  condition  precedent  to  the  grant  of  decree  for   specific
performance that  the  plaintiff  must  show  his  continued  readiness  and
willingness to perform his part of  the  contract  in  accordance  with  its
terms from the date of contract to the date of hearing.  Normally, when  the
trial court exercises its discretion in one way or other after  appreciation
of entire evidence and materials on record, the appellate court  should  not
interfere unless it is established that the discretion  has  been  exercised
perversely, arbitrarily  or  against  judicial  principles.   The  appellate
court should also not exercise its discretion against the grant of  specific
performance on extraneous considerations or sympathetic considerations.   It
is true, as contemplated under Section 20 of the Specific Relief  Act,  that
a party is not entitled to get a  decree  for  specific  performance  merely
because it is lawful to do so.  Nevertheless once an agreement  to  sell  is
legal and validly proved and further requirements for getting such a  decree
is established then the Court has to exercise its discretion  in  favour  of
granting relief for specific performance.

    Mr.  Shetty,  lastly  submitted  that   grant  of  decree  for  specific
performance in favour of the appellant will cause a great hardship  for  the
reason not only because of the lesser price shown in the agreement but  also
because of the rise in price which have been increased ten times  the  price
agreed between the parties.
   Subsequent rise in price will not be  treated  as  a  hardship  entailing
refusal of the decree for specific performance. Rise in price  is  a  normal
change of  circumstances  and,  therefore,  on  that  ground  a  decree  for
specific performance cannot be reversed.

   However, the court may take notice of the fact that  there  has  been  an
increase in the price of the property and considering the  other  facts  and
circumstances of the case, this Court while  granting  decree  for  specific
performance can impose such condition which may to  some  extent  compensate
the  defendant-owner  of  the  property.   This  aspect  of  the  matter  is
considered by a three Judge Bench  of  this  Court  in  Nirmala  Anand   vs.
Advent Corporation (P) Ltd. and Others,  (2002) 8 SCC 146, where this  Court
held :-

“6. It is true that grant of decree of  specific  performance  lies  in  the
discretion of the court and it is also well settled that it  is  not  always
necessary to grant specific performance simply for the  reason  that  it  is
legal to do so. It is further well settled that the court in its  discretion
can impose any reasonable  condition  including  payment  of  an  additional
amount by one party to the  other  while  granting  or  refusing  decree  of
specific performance. Whether the purchaser shall  be  directed  to  pay  an
additional amount to the seller or converse would depend upon the facts  and
circumstances of a case. Ordinarily, the plaintiff is not to be  denied  the
relief of specific performance only on account of  the  phenomenal  increase
of price during the pendency of litigation. That may be, in  a  given  case,
one  of  the  considerations  besides  many  others   to   be   taken   into
consideration for refusing the decree of specific performance. As a  general
rule, it cannot be held that ordinarily the plaintiff cannot be  allowed  to
have, for her alone, the entire benefit of phenomenal increase of the  value
of the property during the pendency of the litigation. While  balancing  the
equities, one of the considerations to be kept in view is as to who  is  the
defaulting party. It is also to be borne in mind whether a party  is  trying
to take undue advantage over the other as also  the  hardship  that  may  be
caused to the defendant by directing  specific  performance.  There  may  be
other circumstances on which parties may not have any control. The  totality
of the circumstances is required to be seen.”


     As discussed above the agreement was entered into between  the  parties
in 2003 for sale of the property for a total consideration of Rs.16,10,000/-
.  Ten years have passed by and now the price of the property in  that  area
where it  situates has increased by not less than five  times.   Keeping  in
mind the factual position we are of the view that the appellant  should  pay
a total  consideration  of  Rs.25  lakhs,  being  the  price  for  the  said
property.

   We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside  the  judgment  and  order
passed by the High Court and restore the judgment and decree  of  the  trial
court with the modification that on payment of  Rs.25  lakhs,  less  already
paid by the plaintiff, the defendant-owner shall execute a  registered  sale
deed within a period of three months from today.



                                                               ………………………….J.
                                                              [ M.Y. Eqbal ]



                                                               …………………………….J
                                                      [Pinaki Chandra Ghose]
New Delhi
September 22, 2014