LawforAll

advocatemmmohan

My photo
since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

Just for legal information but not form as legal opinion

WELCOME TO MY LEGAL WORLD - SHARE THE KNOWLEDGE

Monday, October 6, 2014

Circumstantial Evidence - Proof of the same - lower court convicted the accused - Apex court held that It is to be emphasized at this stage that except the so-called recoveries, there is no other circumstances worth the name which has been proved against these two appellants. It is a case of blind murder. There are no eyewitnesses. Conviction is based on the circumstantial evidence. In such a case, complete chain of events has to be established pointing out the culpability of the accused person. The chain should be such that no other conclusion, except the guilt of the accused person, is discernible without any doubt. Insofar as these two appellants are concerned, there is no circumstance attributed except that they were with Rajinder Thakur till Sainj and the alleged disclosure leading to recoveries, which appears to be doubtful. When we look into all these facts in entirety in the aforesaid context, we find that not only the chain of events is incomplete, it becomes somewhat difficult to convict the appellant only on the basis of the aforesaid recoveries.=CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 632 OF 2011 |VIJAY THAKUR |.....APPELLANT(S) | |VERSUS | | |STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH |.....RESPONDENT(S) | = 2014 - Sept. Month - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=41937

 Circumstantial Evidence - Proof of the same - lower court convicted the accused - Apex court held that It is to be emphasized at this stage that except the  so-called  recoveries, there is no other  circumstances  worth  the  name  which  has  been  proved against these two appellants.  It is a case of blind murder.  There  are  no eyewitnesses.  Conviction is based on the circumstantial evidence.  In  such a case, complete chain of events has to  be  established  pointing  out  the
culpability of the accused person.  The chain should be such that  no  other conclusion, except the guilt of the accused person, is  discernible  without any doubt.  Insofar as these two  appellants  are  concerned,  there  is  no circumstance attributed except that they  were  with  Rajinder  Thakur  till Sainj and the alleged disclosure leading to recoveries, which appears to  be doubtful.  When we look into all these facts in entirety  in  the  aforesaid context, we find that not  only  the  chain  of  events  is  incomplete,  it becomes somewhat difficult to convict the appellant only  on  the  basis  of the aforesaid recoveries.=


These  two  appeals  arise  out  of  concurrent  order  of
conviction passed by the courts below convicting these two appellants,  viz.
Vijay Thakur and Surjeet Khachi, along with third accused, namely,  Rajinder
Thakur under Section 302 read with Section 34  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code,
1860 and sentencing all of them to undergo imprisonment for life and  pay  a
fine of  ?5,000, etc.  The appellants are also  convicted  for  the  offence
under Section 392 read with Section 34 IPC and are  given  the  sentence  of
five years and fine of ?2,000 each with a default clause  in  case  fine  is
not paid.=
It is to be emphasized at this stage that except the  so-called  recoveries,
there is no other  circumstances  worth  the  name  which  has  been  proved
against these two appellants.  It is a case of blind murder.  There  are  no
eyewitnesses.  Conviction is based on the circumstantial evidence.  In  such
a case, complete chain of events has to  be  established  pointing  out  the
culpability of the accused person.  The chain should be such that  no  other
conclusion, except the guilt of the accused person, is  discernible  without
any doubt.  Insofar as these two  appellants  are  concerned,  there  is  no
circumstance attributed except that they  were  with  Rajinder  Thakur  till
Sainj and the alleged disclosure leading to recoveries, which appears to  be
doubtful.  When we look into all these facts in entirety  in  the  aforesaid
context, we find that not  only  the  chain  of  events  is  incomplete,  it
becomes somewhat difficult to convict the appellant only  on  the  basis  of
the aforesaid recoveries.

2014 - Sept. Month - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=41937
                                                             NON-REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 632 OF 2011


|VIJAY THAKUR                             |.....APPELLANT(S)              |
|VERSUS                                   |                               |
|STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH                |.....RESPONDENT(S)             |


                                   W I T H
                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 633 OF 2011

                               J U D G M E N T


A.K. SIKRI, J.
                  These  two  appeals  arise  out  of  concurrent  order  of
conviction passed by the courts below convicting these two appellants,  viz.
Vijay Thakur and Surjeet Khachi, along with third accused, namely,  Rajinder
Thakur under Section 302 read with Section 34  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code,
1860 and sentencing all of them to undergo imprisonment for life and  pay  a
fine of  ?5,000, etc.  The appellants are also  convicted  for  the  offence
under Section 392 read with Section 34 IPC and are  given  the  sentence  of
five years and fine of ?2,000 each with a default clause  in  case  fine  is
not paid.

As correctness of the narration of this prosecution  case  recorded  by  the
High Court is not in dispute,  we  may  state  the  prosecution  version  by
borrowing from the said judgment.  It is as under:

(a)   Deceased Santosh Kumar, son of Bir Chand (PW-1),  was  employed  as  a
driver by Ganga Ram (PW-2) to drive his Maruti van, which he  had  purchased
only few days prior to the date of occurrence, i.e. August  21,  2004.   The
van had yet not been registered  with  the  Registration  Authority,  though
application for registration had been moved.  On August 21,  2004,  all  the
three appellants were looking for a taxi as they wanted to  escort  a  truck
carrying timber.  They got lift in a truck at Narkanda for  going  to  Sainj
to hire a taxi.  The truck by which they went to Sainj was being  driven  by
Rajesh Kumar (PW-30).  It was carrying merchandise belonging to  PW-30.   At
Sainj, the appellants hired Maruti van of PW-2 on  which  the  deceased  had
been engaged as a driver.  The van started from Sainj for Narkanda  late  in
the evening.  On the way, deceased Dharam Pal,  an  electrician  working  at
Kingar, was approached by the deceased to accompany  him.   Dharam  Pal  too
boarded the van.   Thereafter,  the  deceased,  along  with  his  van,  went
missing.  PW-2, who is the owner of the van, started searching for him.

(b)   On August 25, 2004, PW-2 met PW-1  at  Luhri  and  asked  him  if  the
deceased had visited his house.  PW-1 replied him  in  the  negative.   PW-1
and PW-2 started searching for the deceased  and  the  van.   A  report  was
lodged on August 24, 2004, with the Police Station, Kumarsain by PW-2  about
deceased having gone missing along with Maruti van.  An entry  was  made  in
the Rojnamcha and the same is exhibited as Ex. PW-47/A.

(c)   On August 26, 2004, one Shano Devi (PW-18) spotted two dead bodies  in
Thachru Nallah, which falls by the side of  the  road  connecting  to  Sainj
with  Narkanda.   She  informed  her  co-villagers.  Police   was   informed
telephonically.  Entry regarding telephonic  information  was  made  in  the
Daily Diary and marked as Exhibit PW-37/A.  ASI Sada Nand  (PW-49)  went  to
the spot accompanied by PW-1, PW-2 and one Talru  Ram  (PW-3),  who  is  the
father of deceased Dharam Pal.  Dead bodies were identified to be  those  of
Santosh Kumar and Dharam Pal.  Both of them had been  strangulated,  one  by
means of a string of jacket's hood and another by means of  a  handkerchief.
Also, there were injuries on their heads.  A danda (Exhibit  P-1)  was  also
found lying on the spot.

(d)   PW-1 made a statement under  Section  154  of  the  Code  of  Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (for short. 'Cr.P.C.')  to  PW-49,  which  is  exhibited  as
Ex.PW-49/A.  It was sent to the  Police  Station  for  registration  of  the
case, where FIR (Exhibit PW-48/A) was recorded by ASI Rattan Chand  (PW-48).
 Inquest was conducted by PW-49 and Forms (Exhibits  PW-1/A,  1/B  and  1/C)
were  filled  in.   Dead  bodies  were  sent  to  Community  Health  Centre,
Kumarsain,  where  post-mortem  examination  was  conducted  by  a  team  of
doctors, consisting of Dr. Ramesh Chand Guleria (PW-32), Dr. N.K. Mehta (PW-
33) and Dr. Sumeet Attri (PW-43).  The doctors found injuries on  the  heads
of both the dead bodies and also that the necks of  the  deceased  had  been
tightened with a string of jacket's hood and a handkerchief.  They gave  the
opinion that the case of death, in both the cases,  was  head  injuries  and
asphyxia caused by strangulation.   Post-mortem  reports  are  exhibited  as
Exhibits PW-32/B and PW-32/D.

(e)   On August 27, 2004, the Maruti van in question was found abandoned  at
Saproon on  Solan-Subathu  road.   It  was  taken  into  possession  by  ASI
Sukhdarshan Singh (PW-36), In-charge of Police Post Saproon.  Later on,  the
van was handed over to SI Rupinder Singh (PW-50), who  was  associated  with
the investigation of the case.

(f)   When no perceptible progress was achieved in the investigation of  the
case, a special team of police was constituted by Superintendent of  Police,
Shimla, vide order Exhibit -52/A.   Vijay  Kumar  (PW-50)  was  one  of  the
members of that team, who  arrested  the  present  appellants  and  Rajinder
Thakur on February 20, 2005.

(g)   During the course of their interrogation,  the  accused  persons  made
disclosure statements.  The appellant  Surjeet  Khachi,  in  his  disclosure
statement marked as Exhibit PW-11/B, stated that he had  thrown  one  Chunni
and one ribbon, which were there in  the  van,  at  a  place  called  Nanni,
falling in the area of Matiana.  On the basis of this disclosure  statement,
Chunni (Exhibit P-2) and ribbon (Exhibit P-3) were recovered and taken  into
possession vide Memo (Exhibit PW-2/B).  PW-2 identified the said Chunni  and
the ribbon to be the same which he had kept in  the  Maruti  van.    Surjeet
Khachi also made a disclosure that wrist watch of Rajinder Thakur  had  been
pledged with a shopkeeper of Kuthar in Solan District for payment  of  price
of 1½ litres of petrol, which had been purchased from him, when the fuel  in
the Maruti Van  completely  ran  dry.   On  the  basis  of  this  disclosure
statement, wrist watch (Exhibit P-4) was recovered from one Gian Chand  (PW-
16) of village Kuthar.  House  of  Rajinder  Thakur  was  searched  and  two
vouchers (Exhibits PW-54/O and PW-54/P), with regard to  purchase  of  wrist
watch, were recovered vide memo Exhibit PW-24/A.

(h)   Appellant Vijay Thakur made a disclosure statement, which led  to  the
recovery of Jacket (Exhibit P-5) from his house.   The  string  of  Jacket's
hood was found missing and it appeared that it was the same string by  which
the neck of deceased Dharam Pal was found tightened.

(i)   During the course of investigation, it also came  to  light  that  the
appellants and Rajinder Thakur went with the Maruti van to some remote  area
of Patiala District in Punjab and tried to sell it, but they could not  find
any buyer.  Then they came back and on  the  way,  when  the  fuel  ran  dry
completely, they purchased 1½ litres of petrol from PW-16.  After  the  fuel
was consumed, they abandoned the vehicle at Saproon on  Solan-Subathu  road.
Rajinder Thakur then tried to sell  the  Maruti  van  to  a  transporter  of
Dhalli, namely, Vikas Verma (PW-8).  PW-8 introduced Rajinder Thakur to  one
Sneh Bhagat (PW-42), who accompanied by Rajinder Thakur and Dharmender  (PW-
10), a driver, went to Saproon.   But  by  that  time  the  Maruti  van  had
already been seized by the Police under section 102 of Cr.P.C. and taken  to
Police Post Saproon.

After the completion of investigation, charge sheet was filed,  whereby  all
the three accused  persons  were  challaned.   Case  was  committed  by  the
concerned Judicial Magistrate to the Sessions  Court  after  complying  with
the requisite procedural formalities.  Charges were framed by  the  Sessions
Court and the matter went  for  trial  as  all  the  three  accused  persons
pleaded 'Not  Guilty'.   Prosecution  examined  various  witnesses  and  the
deposition  of  some  of  the  material  witnesses  examined.    After   the
conclusion of prosecution evidence, the statements of  the  accused  persons
under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. was recorded.  The appellants  denied  all  the
incriminating circumstances/material put to  them  and  depositions  of  the
various prosecution witnesses as well as documents placed  on  record.   The
accused persons specifically denied that they had hired  Maruti  van,  which
was driven by the deceased or that they have travelled by  that  van  on  or
about August 21, 2012.  They also denied having taken lift in the  truck  of
PW-30 from Narkanda to Sainj.  Similarly, there was a denial  by  them  that
they took the van to an area in Patiala District, Punjab or to Kuthar or  to
Solan District in Himachal Pradesh or attempted to sell the van.  They  also
pleaded  that  no  such  disclosure  statements  leading  to   the   alleged
discovered were made by them.

After recording his analysis of the evidence on  record,  in  light  of  the
arguments submitted by the counsel for the prosecution as  well  as  defence
counsel, the learned trial court came to  the  conclusion  that  prosecution
was able to successfully prove the guilt of all the three  accused  persons.
It is the accepted position that there are no eye-witnesses in  the  present
case and the case of  prosecution  is  completely  based  on  circumstantial
evidence. The Sessions Court arrived at the finding that  the  circumstances
which were proved by the prosecution made a complete chain, thereby  leading
to the hypothesis that all the persons were guilty. On  the  basis  of  this
conviction, sentences followed, as aforesaid.

All the three accused persons challenged the verdict of the trial  court  by
preferring common appeal, which  has  been  dismissed  by  the  High  Court,
affirming  the  decision  of  the  Sessions  Court.   The  High  Court   has
recapitulated  seven  circumstances  which,   according  to  it,  formed   a
complete chain leading to the irresistible conclusion of the  guilt  of  the
appellants in murdering  the  two  deceased  persons  and  robbing  deceased
Santosh Kumar of the  Maruti van which he was driving.  These  circumstances
are mentioned in para 15 of the impugned judgment, which read as under:
“a)   On 21st August, 2004, appellants took lift in a truck which was  being
driven by PW-30 Rajesh Kumar  and  in  which  PW-39  Raj  Kumar  Tayagi  was
present in the capacity of owner of the goods, which were being  carried  in
that truck, and they (appellants) de-boarded the truck at Sainj.

b)    Deceased Santosh Kumar had two passengers, who  wanted  to  travel  to
village Dalash by his taxi, but in the meanwhile, he was approached by  some
other passengers for being taken to Narkanda and,  so,  he  approached  PW-7
Sanjay Kumar, another taxi driver, to carry the two passengers to Dalash.

c)    Appellant Rajinder made an attempt to  sell  a  Maruti  Van  to  PW-44
Kartar Singh resident of a village in Patiala District.

d)    Appellants ran out of  fuel  at  Kuthar  in  Solan  District  on  24th
August, 2004 and they purchased 1½ litres of petrol from PW-16  Gian  Chand,
a shopkeeper and being short of money, they pledged the wrist-watch Ext.  P4
of appellant Rajinder Thakur with said Gian Chand (PW16).

e)    On 27th August, 2004, appellant Rajinder Thakur  went  to  PW-8  Vikas
Verma and asked him to help him sell the Maruti Van, who (the witness)  then
introduced him to PW-42 Sneh Bhagat and Sneh Bhagat  accompanied  by  driver
PW-10 Dharmender Singh and appellant Rajinder went  to  Saproon,  where  the
van was stated to be parked, but the van was not there as the same had  been
sized by Solan Police, before that, under Section 102 Cr.P.C.

f)    Appellant Surjeet Khachi made a disclosure statement, leading  to  the
discovery of Chunni Ext. P-2 and ribbon P-3, which PW-2 Ganga Ram  had  kept
in the Maruti Van.

g)    Appellant Vijay Kumar made a  disclosure  statement,  leading  to  the
discovery of Jacket Ext. P-5, the hood string of which was missing.”


Thereafter, the judgment of the High Court proceeds  to  dilate  upon  these
circumstances explaining as to how they stand proved  and  form  a  complete
chain of events leading to the conviction of the accused persons.

These two appeals are filed by two  out  of  the  three  convicted  persons.
Third accused, namely, Rajinder Thakur, has accepted  the  judgment  of  the
High Court.    Therefore,  our  discussion  in  the  instant  appeals  shall
confine to the alleged role and  culpability  of  only  the  two  appellants
before us.

We have  already  recapitulated  above  the  circumstances  which  are  held
against all the three accused persons, including  the  two  appellants,  who
are convicted.   We  may,  therefore,  in  the  first  instance,  start  our
discussion on the presumption that  all  these  circumstances  stand  proved
(though we may mention at this stage itself that  learned  counsel  for  the
appellants had argued that there is no sufficient evidence to implicate  the
two appellants insofar as  those  circumstances  are  concerned.   We  shall
advert to that aspect at a later stage).

Circumstance mentioned at (a) above  would  show  that  the  appellants  had
taken lift in a truck from Narkanda and they alighted  from  this  truck  at
Sainj.  As per circumstance (b) above, at  Sainj,  deceased   Santosh  Kumar
was present with a van of which he was the driver employed by PW-2.  He  had
two passengers who wanted to travel to  village  Dalash.   However,  he  was
approached  by  'some  other  passengers'  for  being  taken  to   Narkanda.
Therefore, Santosh Kumar approached PW-7 Sanjay Kumar and requested  him  to
carry the said two passengers to  Dalash,  meaning  thereby,  he  had  taken
'some other passengers'  to  Narkanda.   PW-7  has  not  seen  those  'other
passengers'.  The number of 'other passengers' is also not  given.   In  his
statement, he does not say that he had  seen  the  appellants  and  Rajinder
Thakur, whom  deceased  Santosh  Kumar  was  going  to  carry  in  his  van.
Therefore, at this stage, insofar  as  the  appellants  are  concerned,  the
chain has broken.  It may be that the chain continues  insofar  as  Rajinder
Thakur is concerned,  having  regard  to  circumstance  (c),  (d)  and  (e),
inasmuch as, those circumstances are attributed to accused  Rajinder  Thakur
who was found in possession of the Maruti Van which was being driven by  the
deceased and he was making attempts to sell the said van.  Likewise,  it  is
Rajinder Thakur who had approached PW-8 Vikas Verma and asked  him  to  help
him sell the said van and Vikas had introduced him  to  PW-42  Sneh  Bhagat.
Again, it is Rajinder Thakur who had gone  with  the  said  van  to  Saproon
where the van was stated to be parked.  Thus, it is clear that when  attempt
was made by Rajinder Thakur to sell the said Maruti Van  and  he  was  going
from place to place for this purpose, the two appellants were not with  him.
 No doubt, reading of circumstance (d) above gives an  impression  that  all
the three accused persons were there at Kuthar in Solan District  when  they
ran out of fuel and they had purchased 1½ litres of petrol from  PW-16  Gian
Chand.  However, on reading the statement of PW-16,  it  becomes  abundantly
clear that he has stated that “last  year  one  boy  came  to  my  shop  and
demanded petrol from me.  I had provided him petrol about  one  and  a  half
litres which was taken from Dinesh Kumar.  That boy had  pledged  his  wrist
watch with me”.  Therefore, it is clear that even PW-16 has  mentioned  that
one person had gone to him to  buy  the  petrol.   Circumstance  (d)  above,
therefore, has to be confined to one person and in the chain of  events,  he
appears to be Rajinder Thakur.  Thereafter, as  per  circumstances  (f)  and
(g), these two appellants had made a disclosure statement which has  led  to
some recoveries.  We shall deal with that aspect at the  appropriate  stage.
What we are emphasising at this stage is that if  the  disclosure  statement
is ignored for the time being, the only circumstance against the  appellants
is that they had travelled with  Rajinder Thakur up to  Sainj.   Thereafter,
there is nothing against these two appellants.  Insofar  as  the  appellants
are concerned, the link is broken at that stage itself.  It is not known  as
to whether they were together or not and there is no credible  evidence  (or
for that matter, any evidence at all) to show that they were  with  Rajinder
Thakur.  On the contrary, as per  the  evidence  coming  on  record,  it  is
Rajinder Thakur alone who is found in possession of  the  Maruti  Van  which
was being driven by the deceased and it is he who was  trying  to  sell  the
said vehicle.

Keeping  in  mind  the  aforesaid  position,  we  now  discuss  the  alleged
disclosure statements made by the two appellants.  As per  the  prosecution,
appellant  Surjeet  Khachi  made  a  disclosure  statement  leading  to  the
recovery of Chunni (Exhibit P-2) and Ribbon (Ex. P-3), which PW-2  had  kept
in the Maruti Van. Alleged disclosure of this kind of material  is  somewhat
intriguing. It  is  not  the  weapon  of  crime.   Chunni  and  Ribbon  were
allegedly kept in the Maruti Van as it was a new vehicle.  As per PW-2  (who
is the owner of the vehicle),  one  Chunni  and  Ribbon  were  kept  in  the
vehicle and appellant Surjeet Khachi had led the Police to where  they  were
concealed and, accordingly, they were recovered  from  the  said  place  and
taken into possession.  One fails to understand as  to  what  would  be  the
purpose of removing  the  said  Chunni  and  Ribbon  from  the  vehicle  and
throwing them at some place.  It is well known that  in  this  part  of  the
country, Chunni and Ribbon (as sacred objects representing blessings of  Maa
Durga) are tied, particularly when  the  vehicle  is  new.   But  they  were
neither used for the commission of crime, nor any purpose could be  achieved
in removing them from the van.  Further, as per the prosecution case,  after
these were recovered, they were taken into possession vide Memo Exhibit  PW-
2/B.  A reading of Exhibit PW-2/B would show that they were  recovered  from
Nallah from the opposite side of the road.  This recovery was  alleged  made
on 26.02.2005, that is more than six months after the incident,  which  took
place on August 21, 2004. If one  presumes  that  after  removing  the  said
Chunni and Ribbon, the accused had thrown it at  the  aforesaid  place,  one
fails to understand as to how the said two things were lying intact at  that
open place for so many months.  It seems that this recovery  is  shown  just
to rope in the appellant Surjeet Khachi as well.

RE. - PETROL
            To  the  same  effect  are  our  observations  qua  the  alleged
recovery of wrist watch of Rajinder Thakur.   It  is  shown  that  appellant
Surjeet Khachi had made a  disclosure  statement  wrist  watch  of  Rajinder
Thakur had been pledged with a shopkeeper of Kuthar in  Solan  District  for
payment of price of 1½ litres of petrol, which had been purchased from  him,
when the fuel in the Maruti Van completely ran dry.  Curiously, as  per  the
prosecution's own version, based on the testimony of PW-6 Gian  Chand,  from
whom the petrol was purchased, the said van was  being  driven  by  Rajinder
Thakur, who had purchased petrol from him.  He has very clearly stated  that
it was only Rajinder Thakur in the said van  and  did  not  name  these  two
appellants.  This aspect has been mentioned  in  circumstance  (d)  and  the
evidence in this respect has already been analysed above to  show  that  the
said evidence concerns only to  Rajinder  Thakur.   From  this,  it  can  be
clearly discerned that even  this  disclosure  statement  is  attributed  to
appellant Surjeet Khachi just to rope him as an accused  person.  Otherwise,
for the reasons stated above, this disclosure  statement  does  not  inspire
any confidence.  The  High  Court  has  failed  to  notice  these  important
aspects which make the alleged disclosure statements suspectful.

Coming to the alleged disclosure of the appellant Vijay Kumar,  a  discovery
of jacket (Exhibit P-5) is attributed to him.  This recovery was  sought  to
be proved from the statement of PW-23, who has  said  that  appellant  Vijay
Kumar had made a disclosure statement that he had kept  the  jacket  in  his
house and the statement was recorded as Exhibit  PW-3/C.   However,  in  his
cross-examination,  he  has  admitted  that  document  Exhibit  PW-3/C   was
prepared 10-15 minutes prior to the recovery  of  clothes  and  he  was  not
there when recovery was effected.  He had seen the clothes  when  they  were
with the Police.  Therefore, recovery of jacket on the disclosure  statement
made by accused Vijay Kumar also becomes doubtful.  In  such  circumstances,
it would be too risky to convict these two appellants solely  on  the  basis
of alleged disclosure, which recovery is  also  shrouded  with  elements  of
doubts.  As already discussed above, there is no  other  circumstance  which
relate these two appellants to the commission of the offence.

It is to be emphasized at this stage that except the  so-called  recoveries,
there is no other  circumstances  worth  the  name  which  has  been  proved
against these two appellants.  It is a case of blind murder.  There  are  no
eyewitnesses.  Conviction is based on the circumstantial evidence.  In  such
a case, complete chain of events has to  be  established  pointing  out  the
culpability of the accused person.  The chain should be such that  no  other
conclusion, except the guilt of the accused person, is  discernible  without
any doubt.  Insofar as these two  appellants  are  concerned,  there  is  no
circumstance attributed except that they  were  with  Rajinder  Thakur  till
Sainj and the alleged disclosure leading to recoveries, which appears to  be
doubtful.  When we look into all these facts in entirety  in  the  aforesaid
context, we find that not  only  the  chain  of  events  is  incomplete,  it
becomes somewhat difficult to convict the appellant only  on  the  basis  of
the aforesaid recoveries.

      In Mani v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2008) 1  SCR  228,  this  Court  made
following pertinent observation on this very aspect:
“21.  The discovery is a weak kind of evidence and cannot be  wholly  relied
upon on and conviction in such a serious matter cannot  be  based  upon  the
discovery.  Once the discovery  fails,  there  would  be  literally  nothing
which would support the prosecution case....”

      There is a  reiteration  of  the  same  sentiment  in  Manthuri  Laxmi
Narsaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2011) 14  SCC  117  in  the  following
manner:
“6.  It is by now well settled that in a  case  relating  to  circumstantial
evidence the chain of circumstances has to be spelt out by  the  prosecution
and if even one link in the  chain  is  broken  the  accused  must  get  the
benefit thereof.  We are of the opinion that the present is in fact  a  case
of no evidence.”

      Likewise, in Mustkeem alias Sirajudeen v. State of  Rajasthan,  (2011)
11 SCC 724, this Court observed as under:
“24.  In a most celebrated case of this Court, Sharad Birdhichand  Sarda  v.
State of  Maharashtra,  (1984)  4  SCC  116,  in  para  153,  some  cardinal
principles regarding the appreciation of circumstantial evidence  have  been
postulated.  Whenever the case  is  based  on  circumstantial  evidence  the
following  features  are  required  to  be  complied  with.   It  would   be
beneficial to repeat the same salient  features  once  again  which  are  as
under: (SCC p.185)

“(i) The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt  is  to  be  drawn
must or should be and not merely 'may be' fully established;

(ii) The facts so established should be consistent only with the  hypothesis
of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be  explainable
on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty;

(iii) The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency;

(iv) They should exclude every possible hypothesis  except  the  one  to  be
proved; and

(v) There must be a chain of evidence  so  complete  as  not  to  leave  any
reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the  innocence  of  the
accused and must show that in all human probability the act must  have  been
done by the accused.”


25.  With regard to Section 27 of the Act, what is  important  is  discovery
of the material object at the disclosure of the accused but such  disclosure
alone would not automatically lead to the conclusion that  the  offence  was
also committed by the accused.  In fact,  thereafter,  burden  lies  on  the
prosecution to establish a close link  between  discovery  of  the  material
object and its use in the commission of the  offence.   What  is  admissible
under Section 27 of the Act is the information leading to discovery and  not
any opinion formed on it by the prosecution.”

                 It is settled  position  of  law  that  suspicion,  however
strong, cannot take the character of proof.

We, therefore, have no hesitation in  allowing  these  appeals  and  setting
aside the conviction and sentence of the two appellants  under  Section  302
read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.  We order  accordingly.
 The appellants are directed to be released  from  jail  forthwith,  if  not
required in any other case.



                             .............................................J.
                                                            (J. CHELAMESWAR)


                             .............................................J.
                                                                (A.K. SIKRI)

NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 19, 2014.

Medical Seats - Defects are rectified pending only for inspection and verification and certification - time is going to be lapsed by 30-9-2014 - Apex court granted interim orders and held that Notwithstanding any direction given in the case of Priya Gupta (supra), if undertakings as stated hereinabove are filed by the institutions managing medical colleges for the academic year 2014-15, admissions shall be given to the students from the merit list prepared by the States and they shall be charged fees prescribed by the Government Medical Colleges of their respective States. It is also clarified that there would be no further counselling in respect of the students who are to be given admission, even if it might result into some heart burning among other students, but in the peculiar facts of the case, we give this direction. In no case, the admission shall be given after 30th September, 2014. This order shall also apply to all the institutions which had filed their petitions earlier for renewal of their recognition for the academic year 2014-15, but their petitions were rejected or withdrawn for whatever reason, provided undertakings as stated hereinabove are filed by President/Chairman and the Secretary of those institutions. when several seats for medical admission are likely to remain vacant for the academic year 2014-15, we are of the view that these matters require urgent consideration and we are giving these interim directions under the provisions of Article 142 of the Constitution of India.All those petitions shall be deemed to have been revived and this order shall be deemed to have been passed in those cases also. This order shall only be in respect of renewal of recognition and not for creation of additional seats or for new colleges. We also record that the Union of India has supported the petitioners in the interest of students. We also direct the Union of India to give wide publicity to this order in print as well as electronic media in the interest of the concerned students. It is directed that the list of students getting admission in pursuance of this order shall be placed on record of this Court by 1st October, 2014 by the concerned institutions and a copy thereof shall also be sent to the MCI. These matters shall be treated as part-heard and shall be notified for further hearing in the month of December, 2014.=WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 469 OF 2014 HIND CHARITABLE TRUST SHEKHAR HOSPITAL PVT. LTD. PETITIONER(s) VERSUS UNION OF INDIA & ORS. RESPONDENT(s) = 2014- Sept.Month - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41936

  Medical Seats - Defects are rectified pending only for inspection and verification and certification - time is going to be lapsed by 30-9-2014 - Apex court granted interim orders  and held that Notwithstanding any direction given in the case of Priya Gupta  (supra),  if undertakings as stated hereinabove are filed by  the  institutions  managing medical colleges for the academic year 2014-15, admissions  shall  be  given to the students from the merit list prepared by the States  and  they  shall be charged fees prescribed by  the  Government  Medical  Colleges  of  their respective States. It is also clarified that there would be no further counselling  in  respect of the students who are to be given admission, even if it might result  into some heart burning among other students, but in the peculiar  facts  of  the case, we give this direction. In no case, the admission shall be given after 30th  September,  2014.  This order shall also apply  to  all  the  institutions  which  had  filed  their petitions earlier for renewal of their recognition  for  the  academic  year 2014-15, but  their  petitions  were  rejected  or  withdrawn  for  whatever reason,  provided  undertakings  as  stated   hereinabove   are   filed   by President/Chairman and  the  Secretary  of  those  institutions.  when several seats for medical admission are  likely  to  remain vacant for the academic year 2014-15, we are of the view that these  matters require urgent consideration and we  are  giving  these  interim  directions under the provisions of Article 142 of the Constitution of India.All  those petitions shall be deemed to have been  revived  and  this  order  shall  be deemed to have been passed in those cases also.  This order  shall  only  be in respect of renewal of recognition and  not  for  creation  of  additional seats or for new colleges. We also record that the Union of India has supported the petitioners in  the interest of students.  We also direct  the  Union  of  India  to  give  wide publicity to this order  in  print  as  well  as  electronic  media  in  the
interest of the concerned students. It is directed that the list of students getting admission in  pursuance  of this order shall be placed on record of this Court by 1st October,  2014  by the concerned institutions and a copy thereof shall  also  be  sent  to  the MCI.   These matters shall  be  treated  as  part-heard  and  shall  be notified for further hearing in the month of December, 2014.=

There is one more reason for passing this interim order.  We  are  conscious
of the fact that number of physicians in our country is much less than  what
is required and because of non-renewal of  recognition  of  several  medical
colleges, our citizens would be deprived of a good number of physicians  and
therefore, we are constrained to pass this order,  whereby  at  least  there
would be some increase in the number of physicians  after  five  years.   
We
are running against time because the last  date  for  giving  admissions  to
MBBS Course for the academic year 2014-15 is 30th September, 2014.
We also desire to reconsider the directions  given  by  this  Court  in  the
judgment of Priya Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh [(2012) 7 SCC 433], but  at
this juncture, as we do  not  have  sufficient  time  to  decide  all  these
petitions finally, we are passing this interim order  and  the  matter  with
regard to reconsideration of the aforestated judgment  would  be  considered
while finally disposing of this group of petitions. =

Notwithstanding any direction given in the case of Priya Gupta  (supra),  if
undertakings as stated hereinabove are filed by  the  institutions  managing
medical colleges for the academic year 2014-15, admissions  shall  be  given
to the students from the merit list prepared by the States  and  they  shall
be charged fees prescribed by  the  Government  Medical  Colleges  of  their
respective States.
The State Authorities, i.e., the Directorate  of  Medical
Education & Research, of the  respective  States  shall  send  students,  in
order of their merit, to the medical colleges run by the petitioners,  which
are situated within their States, within one week from the date  of  receipt
of a copy of this order and the said students shall be admitted to the  MBBS
Course in accordance with the rules and regulations  of  the  MCI  and  also
regulations dated  16.04.2010  framed  by  the  Medical  Council  of  India,
provided undertakings  as  mentioned  above  are  filed  on  behalf  of  the
concerned institutions.
It is also clarified that there would be no further counselling  in  respect
of the students who are to be given admission, even if it might result  into
some heart burning among other students, but in the peculiar  facts  of  the
case, we give this direction.
In no case, the admission shall be given after 30th  September,  2014.  
This
order shall also apply  to  all  the  institutions  which  had  filed  their
petitions earlier for renewal of their recognition  for  the  academic  year
2014-15, but  their  petitions  were  rejected  or  withdrawn  for  whatever
reason,  provided  undertakings  as  stated   hereinabove   are   filed   by
President/Chairman and  the  Secretary  of  those  institutions.
All  those
petitions shall be deemed to have been  revived  and  this  order  shall  be
deemed to have been passed in those cases also.  This order  shall  only  be
in respect of renewal of recognition and  not  for  creation  of  additional
seats or for new colleges.
We also record that the Union of India has supported the petitioners in  the
interest of students.  We also direct  the  Union  of  India  to  give  wide
publicity to this order  in  print  as  well  as  electronic  media  in  the
interest of the concerned students.
It is directed that the list of students getting admission in  pursuance  of
this order shall be placed on record of this Court by 1st October,  2014  by
the concerned institutions and a copy thereof shall  also  be  sent  to  the
MCI.
            These matters shall  be  treated  as  part-heard  and  shall  be
notified for further hearing in the month of December, 2014.

2014- Sept.Month - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41936

                                                                REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                    CIVIL ORIGINAL/APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                   WRIT PETITION (CIVIL)  NO.  469 OF 2014

      HIND CHARITABLE TRUST SHEKHAR HOSPITAL
      PVT. LTD.                                         PETITIONER(s)

                                VERSUS

UNION OF INDIA & ORS.                       RESPONDENT(s)
                                    WITH
      W.P.(C) No. 700/2014
W.P.(C) No. 705/2014
W.P.(C) No. 706/2014
W.P.(C) No. 707/2014
SLP(C)  No. 21765/2014
SLP(C)  No. 22755/2014
SLP(C)  No. 22756/2014
SLP(C)  No. 22757/2014
SLP(C)  No. 22758-22759/2014
SLP(C)  No. 22974/2014
W.P.(C) No. 784/2014
SLP(C)  No. 23512/2014
SLP(C)  No. 23777/2014
W.P.(C) No. 757/2014
W.P.(C) No. 799/2014
SLP(C)  No. 22785/2014
SLP(C)  No. 23476/2014
SLP(C)  No. 23547/2014
SLP(C)  No. 24150-24151/2014
SLP(C)  No. 24154/2014
T.P.(C) No. 1217/2014
SLP(C)  No. 24665/2014
SLP(C)  No. 24913/2014
W.P.(C) No. 819/2014
SLP(C)  No. 24686/2014
SLP(C)  No. 25763/2014
                                  O R D E R

      Heard the learned senior counsel appearing for both the sides.
Looking  at  the  peculiar  facts  and  circumstances  of  the   case   and,
especially, when several seats for medical admission are  likely  to  remain
vacant for the academic year 2014-15, we are of the view that these  matters
require urgent consideration and we  are  giving  these  interim  directions
under the provisions of Article 142 of the Constitution of India.
There is one more reason for passing this interim order.  We  are  conscious
of the fact that number of physicians in our country is much less than  what
is required and because of non-renewal of  recognition  of  several  medical
colleges, our citizens would be deprived of a good number of physicians  and
therefore, we are constrained to pass this order,  whereby  at  least  there
would be some increase in the number of physicians  after  five  years.   We
are running against time because the last  date  for  giving  admissions  to
MBBS Course for the academic year 2014-15 is 30th September, 2014.
We also desire to reconsider the directions  given  by  this  Court  in  the
judgment of Priya Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh [(2012) 7 SCC 433], but  at
this juncture, as we do  not  have  sufficient  time  to  decide  all  these
petitions finally, we are passing this interim order  and  the  matter  with
regard to reconsideration of the aforestated judgment  would  be  considered
while finally disposing of this group of petitions.
It has been submitted on behalf of the learned senior counsel appearing  for
all the petitioners/ respondents, who are managing  medical  colleges,  that
the defects which had been recorded at the time of the  last  inspection  by
the  representatives  of  the  Medical  Council  of  India  have  been  duly
rectified and at present, the defects pointed out  in  the  reports  do  not
exist.  The said fact can be ascertained only by having a  fresh  Compliance
Verification/Inspection.   However,  the  stand   taken   by   the   Central
Government and the Medical Council of India is to the effect  that  no  such
inspection can be undertaken in the  present  academic  session  because  of
paucity of time and it would violate the time schedule  laid  down  by  this
Court in the case of Priya Gupta (supra).
The learned senior counsel appearing for the Medical Council  of  India  has
also submitted that the petitioners do not have any legal right for  getting
renewal of the  recognition,  especially  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the
Verification/Inspection  Reports  are  not  available  for  the  period   in
question.  The learned senior counsel has relied upon some of the  Judgments
to substantiate his case and according to him, it  would  not  be  just  and
proper to permit the said medical colleges to take fresh batch of students.
Looking at the peculiar facts of  the  case  and  the  circumstances  stated
hereinabove,  we  direct   the   petitioners   to   file   undertakings   by
President/Chairman and Secretary of the  petitioners'  institutions  running
medical colleges within 10 days from today, to the effect that there  is  no
defect in the medical colleges run by them and they would  also  state  that
their deposit with the MCI, which is around Rs.10 crores,  be  forfeited  by
way of penalty if the statement made in  the  undertaking  is  found  to  be
incorrect at the time of the next inspection. A draft undertaking  has  been
given to this Court.  A copy of the undertaking, which  might  be  filed  by
the institutions, shall be served upon the office of the Medical Council  of
India as well as to the Ministry of Health  and  Family  Welfare,  Govt.  of
India, New Delhi.

We also record the fact that in the recent  past,  the  Medical  Council  of
India has renewed recognition of Government Medical Colleges  on  the  basis
of undertakings and therefore, we see no reason not to  permit  the  private
colleges to admit students on the  basis  of  undertakings  given  by  their
office bearer as a special case.

Notwithstanding any direction given in the case of Priya Gupta  (supra),  if
undertakings as stated hereinabove are filed by  the  institutions  managing
medical colleges for the academic year 2014-15, admissions  shall  be  given
to the students from the merit list prepared by the States  and  they  shall
be charged fees prescribed by  the  Government  Medical  Colleges  of  their
respective States. The State Authorities, i.e., the Directorate  of  Medical
Education & Research, of the  respective  States  shall  send  students,  in
order of their merit, to the medical colleges run by the petitioners,  which
are situated within their States, within one week from the date  of  receipt
of a copy of this order and the said students shall be admitted to the  MBBS
Course in accordance with the rules and regulations  of  the  MCI  and  also
regulations dated  16.04.2010  framed  by  the  Medical  Council  of  India,
provided undertakings  as  mentioned  above  are  filed  on  behalf  of  the
concerned institutions.
It is also clarified that there would be no further counselling  in  respect
of the students who are to be given admission, even if it might result  into
some heart burning among other students, but in the peculiar  facts  of  the
case, we give this direction.
In no case, the admission shall be given after 30th  September,  2014.  This
order shall also apply  to  all  the  institutions  which  had  filed  their
petitions earlier for renewal of their recognition  for  the  academic  year
2014-15, but  their  petitions  were  rejected  or  withdrawn  for  whatever
reason,  provided  undertakings  as  stated   hereinabove   are   filed   by
President/Chairman and  the  Secretary  of  those  institutions.  All  those
petitions shall be deemed to have been  revived  and  this  order  shall  be
deemed to have been passed in those cases also.  This order  shall  only  be
in respect of renewal of recognition and  not  for  creation  of  additional
seats or for new colleges.
We also record that the Union of India has supported the petitioners in  the
interest of students.  We also direct  the  Union  of  India  to  give  wide
publicity to this order  in  print  as  well  as  electronic  media  in  the
interest of the concerned students.
It is directed that the list of students getting admission in  pursuance  of
this order shall be placed on record of this Court by 1st October,  2014  by
the concerned institutions and a copy thereof shall  also  be  sent  to  the
MCI.
            These matters shall  be  treated  as  part-heard  and  shall  be
notified for further hearing in the month of December, 2014.
                                                   .......................J.
                                                             [ANIL R. DAVE ]


                                                   .......................J.
                                                            [VIKRAMAJIT SEN]


                                                   .......................J.
                                                          [UDAY UMESH LALIT]

      New Delhi;
      September 18, 2014.

Sunday, October 5, 2014

Appointment of dealers for superior kerosene oil and light diesel oil (SKO-LDO) - whether, on the cancellation of the allotment of a dealership or distributorship for petroleum products in favour of the first ranked or first empanelled candidate, there is an automatic allotment in favour of the second ranked or second empanelled candidate, subject to fulfillment of the conditions of allotment. Apex court held that In our opinion, in view of the decisions of this Court, if the allotment is tainted due to political connections or patronage or other extraneous considerations, the entire selection process is vitiated and, therefore the second ranked or second empanelled candidate is not entitled to an automatic allotment of a dealership or distributorship in his or her favour.= CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8980 OF 2014 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 313 of 2012) Chairman cum Managing Director Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and Ors. ….Appellants Vs. Sunita Kumari & Anr. ….Respondents =2014- sept, month- http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=41934

Appointment of dealers for superior kerosene oil and light diesel  oil  (SKO-LDO) - whether,  on  the  cancellation  of  the allotment of a dealership  or  distributorship  for  petroleum  products  in favour of the first ranked  or  first  empanelled  candidate,  there  is  an
automatic allotment in favour of the  second  ranked  or  second  empanelled candidate, subject to fulfillment of the conditions  of  allotment. Apex court held that In  our opinion, in view of the  decisions  of  this  Court,  if  the  allotment  is tainted due to  political  connections  or  patronage  or  other  extraneous considerations, the entire selection process is vitiated and, therefore  the second  ranked  or  second  empanelled  candidate  is  not  entitled  to  an automatic allotment of  a  dealership  or  distributorship  in  his  or  her favour.=

  On 10th July 2000, an advertisement  was  issued  by  the  appellants,
that is, Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (for short ‘IOC’) for  the  appointment
of dealers for superior kerosene oil and light diesel  oil  (SKO-LDO).   The
appointment was reserved for women belonging to  Scheduled  Castes  and  was
for Warisnagar, District Samastipur (Bihar).
4.    Several applications appear to have been received in response  to  the
advertisement and on 24th July, 2001, a panel  of  selected  candidates  was
prepared by the IOC in order of merit.  The panel was as follows:-
Smt. Neelam Kumari
Smt. Sunita Kumari (respondent no.1 herein)
Kumari Anju Chaudhary

5.    Sometime in the beginning of August, 2002 a news item appeared on  the
front page of the Indian Express to the effect that all over the country,  a
large number of dealerships or distributorships were allotted in respect  of
several petroleum products  to persons  close  to  political  functionaries.
The news item implied that the allotments were not on merits but on  account
of political considerations to favour the allottees.
6.    The news item resulted in a public outcry and on 5/9 August, 2002  the
Government  of  India  passed  an  order  cancelling  all   allotments   for
dealerships in  petroleum  products  with  effect  from  1st  January,  2000
including of SKO-LDO dealerships.=
 The allotment of dealerships in respect of  the  State  of  Bihar  was
considered by this Court Mukund Swarup Mishra v. Union of  India[3]  in  the
light of the Report given by the Committee. It was  held  therein  that  the
allotment made to Neelam  Kumari  was  not  on  merits  but  for  extraneous
considerations.  As  a  result  the  allotment  made  in  her  favour  stood
cancelled.
11.   Following the cancellation  of  the  allotment  in  favour  of  Neelam
Kumari, a writ petition was filed by Sunita Kumari in the Patna  High  Court
being CWJC No. 7186 of 2008 next in the list of selected candidates for  the
SKO-LDO dealership in Warisnagar.   In  her  writ  petition,  Sunita  Kumari
claimed that since she was the second ranked selected  candidate,  the  SKO-
LDO dealership should be awarded to her after  the  cancellation  of  Neelam
Kumari’s dealership.=

Decision of the High Court


12.   The writ petition filed by Sunita Kumari  was  allowed  by  a  learned
Single Judge of the Patna High Court by his judgment and  order  dated  15th
April, 2009.  While allowing the writ  petition  the  learned  Single  Judge
held that Sunita Kumari was entitled to be treated as the  first  empanelled
candidate upon the cancellation  of  the  dealership  in  favour  of  Neelam
Kumari.
13.   Feeling aggrieved by the  decision  rendered  by  the  learned  Single
Judge, a Letters Patent Appeal being LPA No. 307 of 2010  was  preferred  by
the IOC before the Division Bench of the Patna High Court. By  the  impugned
judgment and order dated 10th February, 2011 the  Division  Bench  dismissed
the appeal of IOC and upheld the decision of the learned Single Judge.
14.   It is under these circumstances, that the present appeal has  come  up
before us.
=
The controversy has now been set at  rest  in  Awadesh  Mani  Tripathi
where a three-judge Bench has taken the view that if the  selection  process
is  vitiated  due  to  political  considerations  or  patronage   or   other
extraneous considerations, there is no automatic allotment in favour of  the
second empanelled candidate when  the  selection  of  the  first  empanelled
candidate is cancelled. This is because the entire  selection  process  gets
vitiated and not just one selection or allotment. If the  selection  process
is itself vitiated,  there  is  no  question  of  going  down  the  list  of
empanelled candidates. We respectfully accept and follow this view. We  make
it clear that if an individual selection is cancelled  on  merits,  such  as
lack of eligibility or erroneous calculation of marks that  is  cancellation
for reasons other  than  political  considerations  or  patronage  or  other
extraneous considerations, then the entire selection process  would  not  be
vitiated and the law laid down in Raj Bala would be applicable.
27.   Under these circumstances, in our opinion, the decisions  rendered  in
Raj Bala and Anil Kumar Singh  fall  in  one  category  since  they  do  not
concern themselves with mass cancellations or  have  any  reference  to  the
Committee as in the present case  and  also  because  the  entire  selection
process was not vitiated by political considerations or patronage  or  other
extraneous considerations. These cases dealt with one-off cancellations.  On
the other hand, Ramesh Chand Trivedi and Awadesh Mani  Tripathi  fall  in  a
different category altogether. The decision in Ritu Mahajan is  contrary  to
Awadesh Mani Tripathi and so we must hold that it  does  not  lay  down  the
correct  law  with  regard  to  the  allotment  of   a   dealership   or   a
distributorship in favour  of  the  second  empanelled  candidate  in  cases
concerning blanket cancellations or in cases when the  allotment  in  favour
of the first empanelled candidate is cancelled, the  allotment  having  been
made  for  political  considerations  or  patronage  or   other   extraneous
considerations.
  Since the present case concerns itself  with  the  mass  cancellations
and the Report of the Committee, we are bound by the decision taken  by  the
three-Judge Bench in Awadesh Mani Tripathi.  Accordingly we hold,  following
that decision that when the allotment of the dealership  or  distributorship
in favour of the first empanelled candidate is cancelled as a result of  the
Report of the Committee appointed in Onkar Lal Bajaj, which Report has  been
accepted by this Court, the selection process itself is  vitiated.  In  such
an event, there is no question of  the  second  empanelled  candidate  being
automatically granted the dealership or  distributorship  in  place  of  the
first empanelled candidate.  The entire panel of  selected  candidates  must
stand cancelled and a fresh selection process must be initiated.
29.   In view of our conclusion,  the  impugned  order  of  the  High  Court
directing allotment of the dealership in SKO-LDO in favour of Sunita  Kumari
is quashed. The appeal is allowed. No costs.
2014- sept, month- http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=41934


                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  8980  OF 2014
               (Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 313 of 2012)


Chairman cum Managing Director
Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. and Ors.                       ….Appellants

                                     Vs.
Sunita Kumari & Anr.                                         ….Respondents


                                    WITH


                      S.L.P. (Civil) No. 31006 of 2012

Rajesh Kumar Tiwary                                      …Petitioner

                                     Vs.
The Union of India & Ors.
….Respondents


                               J U D G M E N T

Madan B. Lokur, J.


Leave granted in S.L.P. (Civil) No. 313 of 2012.
The question for consideration  is  whether,  on  the  cancellation  of  the
allotment of a dealership  or  distributorship  for  petroleum  products  in
favour of the first ranked  or  first  empanelled  candidate,  there  is  an
automatic allotment in favour of the  second  ranked  or  second  empanelled
candidate, subject to fulfillment of the conditions  of  allotment.  In  our
opinion, in view of the  decisions  of  this  Court,  if  the  allotment  is
tainted due to  political  connections  or  patronage  or  other  extraneous
considerations, the entire selection process is vitiated and, therefore  the
second  ranked  or  second  empanelled  candidate  is  not  entitled  to  an
automatic allotment of  a  dealership  or  distributorship  in  his  or  her
favour.
The facts
3.    On 10th July 2000, an advertisement  was  issued  by  the  appellants,
that is, Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (for short ‘IOC’) for  the  appointment
of dealers for superior kerosene oil and light diesel  oil  (SKO-LDO).   The
appointment was reserved for women belonging to  Scheduled  Castes  and  was
for Warisnagar, District Samastipur (Bihar).
4.    Several applications appear to have been received in response  to  the
advertisement and on 24th July, 2001, a panel  of  selected  candidates  was
prepared by the IOC in order of merit.  The panel was as follows:-
Smt. Neelam Kumari
Smt. Sunita Kumari (respondent no.1 herein)
Kumari Anju Chaudhary

5.    Sometime in the beginning of August, 2002 a news item appeared on  the
front page of the Indian Express to the effect that all over the country,  a
large number of dealerships or distributorships were allotted in respect  of
several petroleum products  to persons  close  to  political  functionaries.
The news item implied that the allotments were not on merits but on  account
of political considerations to favour the allottees.
6.    The news item resulted in a public outcry and on 5/9 August, 2002  the
Government  of  India  passed  an  order  cancelling  all   allotments   for
dealerships in  petroleum  products  with  effect  from  1st  January,  2000
including of SKO-LDO dealerships.
7.    The blanket cancellation led to a spate of writ petitions being  filed
all over the country since several thousand allottees  were  affected.  Soon
thereafter, transfer petitions were filed to transfer the cases  pending  in
various High Courts to this Court. These  transfer  petitions  were  allowed
and the writ petitions taken up for consideration.
8.    This Court then heard the allottees  as  well  as  the  Government  of
India and in Onkar Lal Bajaj v. Union of India[1] it was observed  that  the
news item and subsequent news items in the Indian Express  made  a  specific
reference  to  413   allegedly   tainted   dealership   or   distributorship
allotments.   After  considering  all  aspects  of  the  case,  this   Court
appointed a Committee of two retired judges to examine these 413  allotments
and determine, on a preliminary examination of the  facts  and  records,  if
the allotments were made  on  merits  and  not  as  a  result  of  political
connections or patronage or other extraneous considerations.
9.    The Committee examined the records of the  allotments  made  and  also
heard the  aggrieved  parties  and  submitted  its  Report  to  this  Court.
Objections were filed to the Report and they were  considered  and  rejected
in Mukund Swarup Mishra v. Union of India.[2]  This  Court  also  considered
the allotment of dealerships made in  respect  of  some  States  and  passed
appropriate  orders.   The  case  was  then  adjourned  for  taking  up  the
allotments made in other States including the State of Bihar.
10.   The allotment of dealerships in respect of  the  State  of  Bihar  was
considered by this Court Mukund Swarup Mishra v. Union of  India[3]  in  the
light of the Report given by the Committee. It was  held  therein  that  the
allotment made to Neelam  Kumari  was  not  on  merits  but  for  extraneous
considerations.  As  a  result  the  allotment  made  in  her  favour  stood
cancelled.
11.   Following the cancellation  of  the  allotment  in  favour  of  Neelam
Kumari, a writ petition was filed by Sunita Kumari in the Patna  High  Court
being CWJC No. 7186 of 2008 next in the list of selected candidates for  the
SKO-LDO dealership in Warisnagar.   In  her  writ  petition,  Sunita  Kumari
claimed that since she was the second ranked selected  candidate,  the  SKO-
LDO dealership should be awarded to her after  the  cancellation  of  Neelam
Kumari’s dealership.

Decision of the High Court


12.   The writ petition filed by Sunita Kumari  was  allowed  by  a  learned
Single Judge of the Patna High Court by his judgment and  order  dated  15th
April, 2009.  While allowing the writ  petition  the  learned  Single  Judge
held that Sunita Kumari was entitled to be treated as the  first  empanelled
candidate upon the cancellation  of  the  dealership  in  favour  of  Neelam
Kumari.
13.   Feeling aggrieved by the  decision  rendered  by  the  learned  Single
Judge, a Letters Patent Appeal being LPA No. 307 of 2010  was  preferred  by
the IOC before the Division Bench of the Patna High Court. By  the  impugned
judgment and order dated 10th February, 2011 the  Division  Bench  dismissed
the appeal of IOC and upheld the decision of the learned Single Judge.
14.   It is under these circumstances, that the present appeal has  come  up
before us.

Discussion
15.   It was submitted by learned counsel for the IOC that in  view  of  the
decisions of this Court in Awadesh Mani Tripathi v. Union  of  India[4]  and
Bharat Petroleum Corporation  Ltd.  v.  Ramesh  Chand  Trivedi[5]  when  the
allotment of a dealership is cancelled due to  an  illegality  in  selecting
and preparing the panel  of  successful  candidates,  the  entire  selection
process  is  vitiated.  Therefore,  merely  because  the  first   empanelled
candidate is found ineligible or the allotment  in  his  or  her  favour  is
otherwise cancelled, it would not automatically result in the  allotment  of
the dealership in favour of the next empanelled candidate.
16.   Learned counsel for Sunita Kumari on the other  hand  relied  on  Ritu
Mahajan v.  Indian Oil Corporation[6], Raj Bala v.  Union  of  India[7]  and
Anil Kumar Singh  v.  The  Chairman,  Dealers  Selection  Board.[8]  It  was
contended, on the basis of  these  decisions  that  when  the  allotment  in
favour of the first empanelled candidate is cancelled, the  next  empanelled
candidate is entitled to an automatic allotment.
17.   Raj Bala was the first  such  case  in  which  the  second  empanelled
candidate was awarded the dealership on its cancellation in respect  of  the
first empanelled candidate. That case, however, did not  deal  with  blanket
cancellations such as the one we are concerned with.  In  that  sense,  that
case is somewhat dissimilar to the present case. The facts in Raj Bala  were
that the first empanelled candidate was held eligible for an allotment of  a
distributorship of petroleum products by the High  Court  but  this  finding
was set aside in appeal by a three-judge Bench of this Court.  It  was  then
held:
“Having regard to the ineligibility of the 7th respondent,  who  was  placed
first on the merit list, the distributorship ought to have been  awarded  to
the appellant, who was second in the merit list.  Having regard to what  has
transpired, we think it  appropriate  to  direct  that  the  7th  respondent
should cease to act as a dealer for the  2nd  respondent,  pursuant  to  the
award of the dealership to him as aforesaid,  on  and  from  1st  September,
1995 and that on and from that date the  2nd  respondent  should  award  the
dealership to the appellant who would be entitled  to  conduct  business  by
reason thereof from that date.  The appellant shall, of course,  be  obliged
to fulfil all  necessary  conditions  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  second
respondent.”

18.   Anil Kumar Singh also did not pertain to  blanket  cancellations  made
by the Government in 2002 nor did it pertain to the  case  referred  to  the
Committee. However, a Bench of two learned Judges relied upon Raj  Bala  and
held  that  once  a  person  to  whom  the  allotment  is  made  has  become
ineligible, the distributorship must be awarded to the person who is  second
in the merit list.
19.   In Ritu Mahajan a two-Judge  Bench  dealt  with  the  allotment  of  a
retail outlet dealership arising out of an advertisement issued by  the  IOC
on 22nd June, 2000. It had been alleged that the allottee (Rani  Gauba)  was
illegally given the allotment. The allotment was one  of  the  many  in  the
blanket cancellations and was a case referred to the  Committee  set  up  by
this Court in Onkar Lal Bajaj.  The Committee found that  the  allotment  in
favour of Rani Gauba was indeed illegal and that view  was  upheld  by  this
Court.  Ritu Mahajan then claimed a right to the allotment in place of  Rani
Gauba. In the final paragraph of the judgment, her prayer was  accepted  and
it was held as follows:-
“In that view of the matter, the  selection  of  the  fifth  respondent  for
allotment of retail outlet dealership at Dhariwal is set  aside  and  Indian
Oil Corporation  Respondent 1 is hereby directed to make  allotment  of  the
said retail outlet  dealership  at  Dhariwal  in  favour  of  the  appellant
immediately.  The appeal is allowed accordingly.”

20.   It will be seen that this Court proceeded on the basis that there  was
an entitlement for an automatic allotment in favour of  Ritu  Mahajan  after
the retail outlet dealership in favour of Rani Gauba was cancelled.
21.   These three decisions proceed on the basis that when an  allotment  is
cancelled  in  favour  of  the  first  empanelled  candidate,  there  is  an
automatic allotment in favour of the second empanelled candidate. The  first
two decisions did not deal with blanket cancellations while  the  third  one
did.
22.   In Ramesh Chand Trivedi a two-judge Bench dealt with a  case  referred
to the Committee and took the view that when the allotment in favour of  the
first person in the panel is set aside  due  to  some  irregularity  in  the
selection and preparation of the panel, the decision taken to have  a  fresh
selection does not call for interference. This view was taken on  the  basis
that the select panel is itself vitiated.  Therefore,  the  two-judge  Bench
declined to make the allotment of the distributorship to the  next  eligible
applicant as prayed for by Ramesh Chand Trivedi.
23.   Awadesh Mani Tripathi  concerned  itself  with  blanket  cancellations
that were referred to the Committee set up by this Court.  In that  case,  a
three-judge Bench took the view that “when the merit list  prepared  by  the
Selection Board was found to be vitiated due to the influence of  extraneous
considerations, the petitioner who  was  placed  at  no.  2  cannot  seek  a
mandamus for allotment of LPG distributorship. Any  such  direction  by  the
Court would amount to  perpetuation  of  the  illegality  committed  by  the
Selection Board.”
24.   It is clear from a perusal of the decisions mentioned above  that  the
view taken by this Court is that when the selection of the first  empanelled
candidate for  the  allotment  of  a  dealership  or  a  distributorship  is
cancelled, the next empanelled candidate ought  to  be  automatically  given
the allotment subject to the fulfillment of all necessary  conditions.  This
is clear from the decisions rendered by this Court  in  Raj  Bala  in  1995,
Anil Kumar Singh in 2003 and Ritu Mahajan in 2009.

25.   This Court has, however, taken a different view  particularly  in  the
case of mass cancellations which were dealt with by the Committee set up  by
this Court.  The view taken by a two-judge Bench was that if  the  allotment
of the dealership or distributorship  in  favour  of  the  first  empanelled
candidate  is  cancelled  then  the  second  empanelled  candidate  is   not
automatically entitled to the allotment (Ramesh Chand  Trivedi  contrary  to
Ritu Mahajan).

26.   The controversy has now been set at  rest  in  Awadesh  Mani  Tripathi
where a three-judge Bench has taken the view that if the  selection  process
is  vitiated  due  to  political  considerations  or  patronage   or   other
extraneous considerations, there is no automatic allotment in favour of  the
second empanelled candidate when  the  selection  of  the  first  empanelled
candidate is cancelled. This is because the entire  selection  process  gets
vitiated and not just one selection or allotment. If the  selection  process
is itself vitiated,  there  is  no  question  of  going  down  the  list  of
empanelled candidates. We respectfully accept and follow this view. We  make
it clear that if an individual selection is cancelled  on  merits,  such  as
lack of eligibility or erroneous calculation of marks that  is  cancellation
for reasons other  than  political  considerations  or  patronage  or  other
extraneous considerations, then the entire selection process  would  not  be
vitiated and the law laid down in Raj Bala would be applicable.
27.   Under these circumstances, in our opinion, the decisions  rendered  in
Raj Bala and Anil Kumar Singh  fall  in  one  category  since  they  do  not
concern themselves with mass cancellations or  have  any  reference  to  the
Committee as in the present case  and  also  because  the  entire  selection
process was not vitiated by political considerations or patronage  or  other
extraneous considerations. These cases dealt with one-off cancellations.  On
the other hand, Ramesh Chand Trivedi and Awadesh Mani  Tripathi  fall  in  a
different category altogether. The decision in Ritu Mahajan is  contrary  to
Awadesh Mani Tripathi and so we must hold that it  does  not  lay  down  the
correct  law  with  regard  to  the  allotment  of   a   dealership   or   a
distributorship in favour  of  the  second  empanelled  candidate  in  cases
concerning blanket cancellations or in cases when the  allotment  in  favour
of the first empanelled candidate is cancelled, the  allotment  having  been
made  for  political  considerations  or  patronage  or   other   extraneous
considerations.
28.   Since the present case concerns itself  with  the  mass  cancellations

and the Report of the Committee, we are bound by the decision taken  by  the
three-Judge Bench in Awadesh Mani Tripathi.  Accordingly we hold,  following
that decision that when the allotment of the dealership  or  distributorship
in favour of the first empanelled candidate is cancelled as a result of  the
Report of the Committee appointed in Onkar Lal Bajaj, which Report has  been
accepted by this Court, the selection process itself is  vitiated.  In  such
an event, there is no question of  the  second  empanelled  candidate  being
automatically granted the dealership or  distributorship  in  place  of  the
first empanelled candidate.  The entire panel of  selected  candidates  must
stand cancelled and a fresh selection process must be initiated.
29.   In view of our conclusion,  the  impugned  order  of  the  High  Court
directing allotment of the dealership in SKO-LDO in favour of Sunita  Kumari
is quashed. The appeal is allowed. No costs.

Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 31006 of 2012

30.   In this case, the  allotment  of  LPG  dealership/distributorship  was
advertised for Bihiya, District Bhojpur (Bihar).
31.   After completing the selection  process,  the  IOC  prepared  a  panel
consisting of the following applicants in order of merit:-
Kameshwar Prasad Singh
Rangi Lal Rai
Rajesh Kumar Tiwary (Petitioner herein)


32.   The allotment of  the  dealership/distributorship  was  in  favour  of
Kameshwar Prasad Singh but it was quashed, pursuant to the decision of  this
Court in Mukund Swarup Mishra.
33.   Rajesh Kumar Tiwary claimed that Rangi Lal Rai was  not  eligible  for
an  allotment  and  therefore  being  the  third  empanelled  candidate  the
allotment should be made in his favour.  On  this  basis  he  filed  a  writ
petition in the Patna High Court being CWJC No. 18809  of  2008.  A  learned
Single Judge  of  the  High  Court  dismissed  Rajesh  Kumar  Tiwary’s  writ
petition by following the decision rendered in another case, that  is,  CWJC
No. 9362 of 2009 and Mukund Swarup Mishra.
34.   In appeal, being LPA No. 1291 of 2012  the  High  Court  followed  the
decision rendered by this Court in Ramesh Chand Trivedi and found  no  merit
in the appeal by the impugned  judgment  and  order  dated  13th  September,
2012.
35.   In view of our discussion in Sunita Kumari (supra) there is  no  merit
in this petition and it is accordingly dismissed.  No costs.



                                                                 .………………………J
                                                      ( Madan B. Lokur )



New Delhi;                                     ……………….……J
September 18, 2014                                ( C. Nagappan )

-----------------------
[1]    (2003) 2 SCC 673
[2]    (2007) 2 SCC 536
[3]    (2008) 15 SCC 243

[4]    (SLP (C) No. 34226/2009 decided on 23rd April, 2013)
[5]    (Civil Appeal No. 8586 of 2010 decided on 4th October, 2010)
[6]    (2009) 3 SCC 506
[7]    (Civil Appeal No.7718 of 1995  decided on 23rd August, 1995)
[8]    (Civil Appeal Nos.2012-2014 of 2003  decided on 3rd March, 2003)