DRT - Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 -whether a suit containing a “counter-claim” or claiming a “set-off” filed by a debtor can be heard and tried before the Debt Recovery Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as ‘DRT’) under the RDB Act or must be tried by a Civil Court alone. - Apex court held that there is a difference opinion between several Benches of this court - directed the registry to place the case before CJ = CIVIL APPEAL Nos.8973-8973 OF 2014 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) Nos. 975-976 of 2012) Bank of Rajasthan Ltd. …. Appellant Versus VCK Shares & Stock Broking Services Ltd. …. Respondent = 2014 - Sept.Month - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41930

DRT - Recovery of  Debts  due  to  Banks  and  Financial  Institutions  Act,  1993 -whether a suit containing a  “counter-claim” or claiming a “set-off” filed by a debtor can be heard and tried before  the Debt Recovery Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as ‘DRT’) under the RDB  Act or must be tried by a Civil Court alone. - Apex court held that there is a difference opinion between several Benches of this court - directed the registry to place the case before CJ =
whether  having  regard  to  the
Recovery of  Debts  due  to  Banks  and  Financial  Institutions  Act,  1993
[hereinafter referred to as ‘RDB Act’], a suit containing a  “counter-claim”
or claiming a “set-off” filed by a debtor can be heard and tried before  the
Debt Recovery Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as ‘DRT’) under the RDB  Act
or must be tried by a Civil Court alone. =
There is a difference of  opinion  between
several Benches of this Court on the issue.  This  is  likely  to  create  a
doubt as to the true position in law, hence we consider  it  appropriate  to
refer the following questions of law to a larger Bench:
Whether an independent suit filed by a borrower against a Bank or  Financial
Institution, which  has  applied  for  recovery  of  its  loan  against  the
plaintiff under the DRB Act, is liable to be  transferred  and  tried  along
with the application under the RDB Act by the DRT?
If the answer is in the affirmative, can  such  transfer  be  ordered  by  a
court only with the consent of the plaintiff?
Is the jurisdiction of a Civil Court to try  a  suit  filed  by  a  borrower
against a Bank or Financial Institution ousted by virtue of  the  scheme  of
the RDB Act in relation to proceedings for recovery of debt  by  a  Bank  or
Financial Institution? =
In view of above, the Registry is directed to place the  papers  before  the
Hon'ble Chief Justice of India for taking appropriate action  in  accordance
with law.
2014 - Sept.Month - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41930          
                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                     CIVIL APPEAL Nos.8973-8973 OF 2014
      (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) Nos. 975-976 of 2012)




            Bank of Rajasthan Ltd.                                   ….
Appellant


                                   Versus

VCK Shares & Stock Broking Services Ltd.                …. Respondent







                                 1 JUDGMENT



S. A. BOBDE, J.


 Leave granted.
In these appeals, the question before us is whether  having  regard  to  the
Recovery of  Debts  due  to  Banks  and  Financial  Institutions  Act,  1993
[hereinafter referred to as ‘RDB Act’], a suit containing a  “counter-claim”
or claiming a “set-off” filed by a debtor can be heard and tried before  the
Debt Recovery Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as ‘DRT’) under the RDB  Act
or must be tried by a Civil Court alone.
The appellant – Bank filed an application for recovery under Section  19  of
the  RDB  Act  before  the  DRT  for  a  recovery  certificate  against  the
respondent  for  Rs.  8,62,41,973.36/-.   Though  the   respondent   entered
appearance before the DRT, it filed Civil Suit No. 77  of  1998  before  the
Calcutta High Court against the appellant claiming  a  decree  for  sale  of
pledged shares and payment of sale proceeds to the  respondent.   After  the
appellant sold pledged shares for a total  sum  of  Rs.  5,77,68,000/-,  the
respondent filed  Civil  Suit  No.  129  of  1999  praying  inter  alia  for
following reliefs:
A declaration that sale of shares of BFL Software Ltd. was void;

A decree for return of pledged  shares  in  respect  of  overdraft  facility
account and in default to pay Rs. 48.95 crores; and

A declaration that no sum was payable by the respondent to the appellant  in
respect  of  Term  Loan  dated  27.07.1994  and  overdraft   Account   dated
19.09.1995 and that the appellant is not entitled to a decree for a  sum  of
Rs. 8,62,41,973.36 from the respondent.

The appellant filed an application in C.S. No. 129  of  1999  for  rejecting
the suit on the ground that the High Court did not have  jurisdiction  since
the subject matter was within the exclusive jurisdiction of  the  DRT.   The
Single Judge allowed that application and directed that the suits  be  taken
off from the file of the High Court.  The Division  Bench  stayed  operation
of the Order of the Single Judge.
Since  the  DRT  held  that  the  appellant’s  claim  for  Rs.
6,04,17,777.36 was satisfied, it directed inter alia  to  return  the  title
deeds of the pledged shares.  On the counter claim, the DRT  held  that  the
respondent was entitled to  recover  Rs.  6,88,187.49
from the appellant within 4 weeks.
The appellant’s petition under Article 227 of the  Constitution  before  the
High Court of Calcutta challenging the DRT order dismissing the  appellant’s
appeal against the DRT order was dismissed in default.   The Division  Bench
allowed the appeal filed by the respondent against the order of  the  Single
Judge taking off the suits from the file of the High Court.   This  Judgment
of the High Court is questioned in these appeals.
In United Bank of  India,  Calcutta  vs.  Abhijit  Tea  Co.  Pvt.  Ltd.  and
Others[1], a two-Judge Bench of this Court took the view  that  as  per  the
legislative scheme of the RDB Act, jurisdiction was  indeed  conferred  upon
the Tribunal to try “counter-claim” and “set-off” by Section 19 of  the  RDB
Act and that all such counter-claims and set-offs, including  a  cross  suit
filed independently should be tried by a Debt Recovery Tribunal.  The  Court
was considering a case where the borrower-company had filed  an  application
that suit filed by the Bank should  remain  on  the  Original  Side  of  the
Calcutta High Court.  That application was  allowed  by  the  Single  Judge.
Against this order the  Bank  had  preferred  the  Special  Leave  Petition.
Though the RDB Act had not come into force when the suit was  filed  by  the
Bank,  the  debtor-company  had  filed  the  application  and  resisted  the
transfer of the suit.  This Court took the view that the above pleas  raised
by the respondent-company are all inextricably  connected  with  the  amount
claimed by the Bank and therefore directed transfer of the suit.
In a later decision in Indian Bank vs. ABS Marine Products  (P)  Ltd.[2],  a
Bench of two Judges of this Court took the view  that  the  jurisdiction  of
the Civil Courts is not barred in regard to any suit  filed  by  a  borrower
against a bank for any relief.  That jurisdiction is barred only  in  regard
to applications by a bank or a financial institution  for  recovery  of  its
debt.  The Bench also held that though a ‘counter-claim’ and ‘set  off’  may
be made under sub-sections (6) and (11) of Section 19 of  the  DRB  Act,  no
jurisdiction is conferred on  the  Tribunal  to  try  independent  suits  or
proceedings initiated by borrowers.
It held that what is  provided  and  permitted  is  a  cross-action  by  the
respondent in a pending application filed by a bank.  It was held  that  the
borrower had the option to file a separate suit before the Civil  Court  and
the counter-claim before the Tribunal was not the  only  remedy.   Referring
to the earlier Judgment in Abhijit’s[3] case  (supra),  the  Bench  observed
that an independent suit can be deemed to be  a  counter-claim  and  can  be
transferred to the Tribunal only if the following conditions are satisfied:
The subject-matter of the  bank’s  suit,  and  the  suit  of  the  defendant
against the bank, is inextricably connected in the sense that  the  decision
in one would affect the decision in the other.

Both parties (the plaintiff in the suit  against  the  bank  and  the  bank)
should agree for the independent suit being considered  as  a  counter-claim
in the bank’s application before the Tribunal, so that  both  can  be  heard
and disposed of by the Tribunal.

In State Bank of India vs. Ranjan Chemicals  Ltd.  and  Another[4],  a  two-
Judge Bench considered the matter from the perspective  of  whether  it  was
just and proper to order a joint trial of two cases i.e. one before the  DRT
and another  before  the  Civil  Court.  The  two-Judge  Bench  referred  to
Abhijit’s[5] case  (supra)  and  observed  that  though  a  borrower-company
always had an option to sue the bank in a civil court, it does  not  in  any
manner affect the power  of  the  Court  to  order  a  joint  trial  of  the
applications.  There was no warrant of curtailing the power of the Court  to
order a joint trial by introducing a restriction that it can  be  done  only
if there was consent by both sides, though a claim in  an  independent  suit
could be considered as a claim for set-off and a  counter-claim  within  the
meaning of Section 19 of the RDB  Act.  In  such  an  eventuality  the  only
question was whether in the interest of justice, convenience of parties  and
avoidance of multiplicity, the suit should be transferred to the DRT  to  be
tried as a cross-suit. Thus the Bench leaving Ranjan Chemicals Case held  in
effect that the consent of the parties for transfer of the suit to  the  DRT
was not necessary, as held in the Indian Bank Case (supra).
In a subsequent decision of this Court by another two-Judge Bench  in  Nahar
Industrial  Enterprises  Limited  vs.  Hong  Kong   and   Shanghai   Banking
Corporation[6], the issue cropped up again.  The Court considered the  three
authorities referred to above  i.e.  United  Bank  of  India,  Calcutta  vs.
Abhijit Tea Co.  Pvt.  Ltd.  and  Others[7];  Indian  Bank  vs.  ABS  Marine
Products (P) Ltd.[8] and State Bank of India vs. Ranjan Chemicals  Ltd.  and
Another[9]. The two-Judge Bench in  this  case  i.e.  Nahar’s  case  (supra)
observed that in  the  Indian  Bank’s  case,  the  Court  had  come  to  the
conclusion that the respective claims of the parties were  not  inextricably
connected and therefore the transfer of a suit to the Tribunal can  only  be
on the basis of the consent of the parties.   The Bench in Indian Bank  case
had held that the claims can  be  transferred  only  if  the  following  two
conditions exists:
Inextricable connection of the subject matter of the two proceedings; and
The agreement of both parties that the suit should  be  transferred  to  the
Tribunal.
It further directed that the Bench in Ranjan Chemicals[10]  case  was  bound
by the decision in the Indian Bank Case[11] being a co-ordinate  Bench,  and
therefore, could not have taken a contrary view by holding  that  the  Court
can consider a suit to be a  claim  of  ‘set-off’  and  transferred  to  the
Tribunal for being tried jointly with the application filed by the  bank  as
a cross-suit and that too without the consent of parties.  The  Bench,  vide
para 60, held as under:
“We are in agreement with all the above observations of this Court.   Ranjan
Chemicals[12] was bound by the decision rendered in Indian Bank[13] being  a
coordinate Bench.  It could not have taken a contrary view.”
Though having  so  observed,  the  Bench  apparently  did  not  consider  it
appropriate to have the matter decided by a larger Bench.  It was held  that
if all suits whether  inextricably  connected  with  the  application  filed
before the DRT by the  Bank  are  transferred,  the  same  would  amount  to
ousting the jurisdiction of the civil court indirectly and  consent  of  the
plaintiff is necessary for transferring  the  suits.   This  finding  is  in
consonance with the observation of the Court in the Indian  Bank’s  Case[14]
but  is  at  variance  with  the  Judgment  in  Ranjan  Chemicals[15]  case.
According to the last judgment i.e. Nahar’s  case[16],  the  Bench  deciding
Ranjan Chemicals case could not have taken a contrary view but was bound  by
the decision rendered in the  Indian  Bank  case.   Many  other  aspects  of
variance and consonance have been pointed out to us but we  have  not  dealt
with them in view of the one aspect alone, which has been highlighted.
Mr. Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel  appearing for the appellant  relied
upon the decision of this Court in Jit  Ram  v.  State  of  Haryana[17]  and
Union of India v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd.[18],  where  in  paragraph  12,
this Court observed as follows:
“………..We find it difficult to understand how a Bench of two  Judges  in  Jit
Ram case could possibly overturn or disagree with what was said  by  another
Bench of two Judges in Motilal Sugar Mills case[19]. If  the  Bench  of  two
Judges in Jit Ram case found themselves unable to agree with  the  law  laid
down in Motilal Sugar Mills case, they could have referred Jit Ram  case  to
a larger Bench, but we do not think it was right on their  part  to  express
their disagreement with the enunciation of the law by a coordinate Bench  of
the same Court in Motilal Sugar Mills. We  have  carefully  considered  both
the decisions in Motilal Sugar Mills case  and  Jit  Ram  case  and  we  are
clearly of the view that what has been laid  down  in  Motilal  Sugar  Mills
case represents the correct law in regard  to  the  doctrine  of  promissory
estoppel and we express our disagreement with the observations  in  Jit  Ram
case to the extent that they conflict with  the  statement  of  the  law  in
Motilal Sugar Mills case and introduce reservations cutting  down  the  full
width and amplitude of the propositions of law laid down in that case.”

Shri Divan submitted that the Bench deciding Ranjan Chemical’s Case[20]  had
decided at variance with the Judgment in Indian Bank  case[21].   They  were
Benches of coordinate strength and the latter ought  to  have  referred  the
matter to a larger Bench instead of taking a  contrary  view.   The  learned
senior counsel also pointed out that this, in fact is the exact  observation
of the Bench in Nahar’s case[22] which did not also consider it  appropriate
to refer the issues to a larger Bench.
Mr. Jaideep Gupta, learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the  respondent
submitted that the matter  does  not  call  for  a  reference  as  there  is
complete consistency in the views of the Court in Indian Bank  case  (supra)
and Nahar case (supra) since both the judgments have  taken  the  view  that
the jurisdiction of the civil courts has not been ousted and  a  suit  filed
before the civil court can be transferred to the DRT only with  the  consent
of both parties.  According to the learned counsel, Nahar’s case (supra)  is
the last word on the point and it must be taken  to  lay  down  the  correct
law, and in any case the law which is binding.
It is not possible to accede to  the  submissions  made  on  behalf  of  the
respondent as pointed out above.  There is a difference of  opinion  between
several Benches of this Court on the issue.  This  is  likely  to  create  a
doubt as to the true position in law, hence we consider  it  appropriate  to
refer the following questions of law to a larger Bench:
Whether an independent suit filed by a borrower against a Bank or  Financial
Institution, which  has  applied  for  recovery  of  its  loan  against  the
plaintiff under the DRB Act, is liable to be  transferred  and  tried  along
with the application under the RDB Act by the DRT?
If the answer is in the affirmative, can  such  transfer  be  ordered  by  a
court only with the consent of the plaintiff?
Is the jurisdiction of a Civil Court to try  a  suit  filed  by  a  borrower
against a Bank or Financial Institution ousted by virtue of  the  scheme  of
the RDB Act in relation to proceedings for recovery of debt  by  a  Bank  or
Financial Institution?
At this stage, Shri Diwan, learned senior counsel for the  appellant  prayed
for stay of further proceedings in the two suits being Civil Suit No. 77  of
1998 and Civil Suit No. 129  of  1999,  both  titled  “VCK  Shares  &  Stock
Broking Services Ltd.  Vs. Bank of Rajasthan” pending before the High  Court
of Calcutta.  The suits are apparently pending since the years 1998  &  1999
and due to various proceedings, which have been taken out  by  the  parties,
have virtually remained stationary.  We are informed that the suits  are  at
the stage of amendment of the pleadings, which have not  been  carried  out.
Suffice it to say that there is virtually no progress in the suits and  much
progress is not likely to  take  place  for  a  long  time.   Moreover,  the
respondent – plaintiff has made a monetary claim, the satisfaction of  which
can be appropriately ensured by  any  order  which  may  be  passed  in  the
proceedings.  We thus see no reason  to  direct  stay  of  the  suits.   The
interim relief prayed for the same is rejected.
In view of above, the Registry is directed to place the  papers  before  the
Hon'ble Chief Justice of India for taking appropriate action  in  accordance
with law.


                                                   ................……………….J.
                                                                     [RANJAN
GOGOI]


                                                          ……....……….………………J.
                                                             [S.A. BOBDE]

New Delhi,
September 17, 2014

-----------------------
[1]
      [2] (2000) 7 SCC 357
[3]
      [4] (2006) 5 SCC 72
[5]
      [6] (2000) 7 SCC 357
[7]
      [8] (2007) 1 SCC 97
[9]
      [10] (2000) 7 SCC 357
[11]
      [12]  (2009) 8 SCC 646
[13]
      [14] (2000) 7 SCC 357
[15]
      [16] (2006) 5 SCC 72
[17]
      [18] (2007) 1 SCC 97
[19]
      [20] (2007) 1 SCC 97
[21]
      [22] (2006) 5 SCC 72
[23]
      [24] (2007) 1 SCC 97
[25]
      [26] (2006) 5 SCC 72
[27]
      [28] (2006) 5 SCC 72
[29]
      [30] (2007) 1 SCC 97
[31]
      [32] (2009) 8 SCC 646
[33]
      [34]  (1981) 1 SCC 11
[35]
      [36] (1985) 4 SCC 369
[37]
      [38] (1979) 2 SCC 409
[39]
      [40] (2007) 1 SCC 97
[41]
      [42] (2006) 5 SCC 72
[43]
      [44] (2009) 8 SCC 646

Section 7 & Section 13(d)(i)(ii)(iii) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Trial court convicted the accused - High court confirmed the same - Apex court held that the Special Judge had convicted the appellant-The appellant is said to be 60 years old and suffering from heart disease, facial nerve palsy and speech disorder. Copies of medical reports have been filed in this regard. We are of the view that the imposition of minimum sentence prescribed for the offences for which the conviction is made would meet the ends of justice. In the result the sentence of one year rigorous imprisonment imposed on the appellant-accused for the conviction under Section 7 of the Act is set aside and instead he is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of six months and the sentence of fine and default sentence imposed on him for the said conviction is retained. Sentence of two years rigorous imprisonment imposed on the appellant-accused for the conviction under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act is set aside and instead he is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year and the sentence of fine and default sentence imposed on him for the said conviction is retained. The sentences are to run concurrently. The Criminal appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above.= CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1864 OF 2011 Somabhai Gopalbhai Patel … Appellant versus State of Gujarat … Respondent = 2014 - Sept. Month - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41954

 Section 7 & Section 13(d)(i)(ii)(iii) read with Section 13(2)   of the  Prevention  of Corruption Act, 1988  - Trial court convicted the accused - High court confirmed the same - Apex court held that  
the Special Judge had convicted the  appellant-The appellant is said to be  60  years  old  and suffering  from heart disease, facial nerve palsy and speech disorder.   Copies  of  medical
reports have been filed in this  regard.   We  are  of  the  view  that  the imposition  of minimum sentence prescribed for the offences  for  which  the conviction is made would meet the ends of justice. In the result the sentence of one year rigorous imprisonment imposed on  the
appellant-accused for the conviction under Section  7  of  the  Act  is  set aside and instead he is sentenced to undergo  rigorous  imprisonment  for  a period of six months and the sentence of fine and default  sentence  imposed on him for the said conviction is retained.  Sentence of two years  rigorous imprisonment imposed on  the  appellant-accused  for  the  conviction  under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section  13(2)  of  the  Act  is  set  aside  and instead he is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment  for  a  period  of one year and the sentence of fine and default sentence imposed  on  him  for the said conviction is retained.  The sentences  are  to  run  concurrently.
The Criminal appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above.=

accused  for the offence  punishable
under Section 7 of the  Prevention  of
Corruption Act, 1988, and sentenced him to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment  of
one year and to pay  a  fine  of  Rs.1000,  in  default  to  undergo  simple
imprisonment  for  six  months  and
further  convicted  him
under  Section 13(d)(i)(ii)(iii) read with Section 13(2) of the said Act and sentenced  him
to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment   for a period    of two years and  to  pay
a fine of Rs.1500, in default to undergo simple imprisonment for six  months
with stipulation that the sentences  would run concurrently.=
High court confirmed the appeal

Now before the Apex court
Grounds raised 
There is no evidence to prove demand and  voluntary  acceptance  of  illegal
gratification

The recovery of the currency notes  from  the  accused  had  also  not  been
proved inasmuch as panchas are not independent witnesses and their  evidence
did not merit any acceptance.

Without prejudice to the  above  contentions  it  is  also  urged  that  the
sentence awarded to the appellant is unreasonably  excessive   and  deserves
reduction.
whether  there  is  sufficient
legal evidence on record to bring home the guilt of the  appellant  for  the
offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2)  of  the  Act.=

The accused has not  substantiated  the  said  plea  by  producing  any
document relating to tax due and it appears to be only an afterthought.  The
Courts below have rightly not accepted the said explanation offered by  him.
 We have no hesitation in stating  that  the  accused  miserably  failed  to
dislodge the presumption under Section 20 of the  Act.   Thus  analysed  and
understood, there remains no shadow of doubt that the appellant-accused  had
demanded the bribe and accepted the same to  provide  the  documents  sought
for by the complainant.  Therefore, the conviction recorded by  the  learned
trial judge which has been affirmed by the learned single Judge of the  High
Court does not warrant any interference.

What remains is the plea made on behalf of the appellant  for  reduction  of
sentence.  The appellant is said to be  60  years  old  and  suffering  from
heart disease, facial nerve palsy and speech disorder.   Copies  of  medical
reports have been filed in this  regard.   We  are  of  the  view  that  the
imposition  of minimum sentence prescribed for the offences  for  which  the
conviction is made would meet the ends of justice.



In the result the sentence of one year rigorous imprisonment imposed on  the
appellant-accused for the conviction under Section  7  of  the  Act  is  set
aside and instead he is sentenced to undergo  rigorous  imprisonment  for  a
period of six months and the sentence of fine and default  sentence  imposed
on him for the said conviction is retained.  Sentence of two years  rigorous
imprisonment imposed on  the  appellant-accused  for  the  conviction  under
Section 13(1)(d) read with Section  13(2)  of  the  Act  is  set  aside  and
instead he is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment  for  a  period  of
one year and the sentence of fine and default sentence imposed  on  him  for
the said conviction is retained.  The sentences  are  to  run  concurrently.
The Criminal appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above.
 2014 - Sept. Month - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41954

                                                          REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1864 OF 2011


Somabhai Gopalbhai Patel                …     Appellant

                                   versus

State of Gujarat                            …    Respondent


                               J U D G M E N T

C. NAGAPPAN, J.



This appeal is preferred against the judgment dated 14.2.2011 passed by  the
learned single Judge of the High Court of Gujarat at  Ahmedabad  whereby  it
has confirmed the  judgment  of  conviction  and  sentence  dated  21.3.1997
passed by the learned Special Judge,  Banaskandha  at  Palampur  in  Special
Case No.215 of 1992, wherein the Special Judge had convicted the  appellant-
accused  for the offence  punishable  under Section 7 of the  Prevention  of
Corruption Act, 1988, and sentenced him to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment  of
one year and to pay  a  fine  of  Rs.1000,  in  default  to  undergo  simple
imprisonment  for  six  months  and  further  convicted  him  under  Section
13(d)(i)(ii)(iii) read with Section 13(2) of the said Act and sentenced  him
to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment   for a period    of two years and  to  pay
a fine of Rs.1500, in default to undergo simple imprisonment for six  months
with stipulation that the sentences  would run concurrently.



Briefly the facts are  stated  thus:  PW1  Girishbhai  is  the  son  of  PW2
Ranchhodbhai and they owned 28  bighas  of  agricultural   land  in  village
Ratanpur.  There was a borewell in the said land fitted  with  10  HP  motor
and it was not bailing out  sufficient  water  and  hence  they  planned  to
replace it with 15 HP motor.  In order to  submit  an  application  for  the
said purpose to the Electricity Board, they needed  documents  like  village
form No.7, 12, 8-A,  map  from  revenue  record  and  certificate  regarding
sufficiency of the water in the  borewell,  and  therefore,  PW1  Girishbhai
approached the appellant/accused Somabhai Gopalbhai Patel  who  was  Talati-
cum-Mantri  at Ratanpur village and requested   for  issuance  of  documents
and the accused asked PW1 Girishbhai to come with money and meet him in  his
office at Ratanpur.  When PW1 inquired the accused as to how much  money  he
has to bring, the accused told him to pay the amount as per his desire.  PW1
Girishbhai lodged Exh.12 complaint in the office of  Anti-Corruption  Bureau
at Palanpur against the accused.  The  Investigation  Officer  on  receiving
the complaint on 20.11.1991 sought assistance of  two  Panch  witnesses  who
were  government  servants  and  made  them  to  understand  the  case   and
thereafter experiment of  U.V.  lamp  was  carried  out  with  the  help  of
anthrecene powder. Thereafter the complainant  produced  currency  notes  of
Rs.300 comprising of two notes of  Rs.100  denomination  and  two  notes  of
Rs.50 deomination  and  a  preliminary  part  of  Panchnama  was  drawn  and
signature of Panchas were taken and anthracene powder was   applied  to  the
said notes in the presence of Panch  witnesses.   PW1  Girishbhai  took  the
said currency notes in his shirt pocket and alongwith  PW3  Ismailbhai  went
in his scooter to the office of the  Ratanpur  Panchayat.  The  accused  was
sitting in his chair in the office and both  of   them  occupied  chairs  in
front of the accused. PW1 Girishbhai  told  the  accused  that  as  per  the
earlier talk he had come to take the documents and the accused  handed  over
the documents and PW1 Girishbhai asked the accused as to what is the  amount
he should give for it and the accused told him to pay whatever he  wants  to
give.  PW1 Girishbhai gave Rs.250/- and the  accused put  the  same  in  his
left side shirt pocket. On giving signal, the raiding party came  there  and
the experiment of U.V. lamp was carried out on the hands  and shirt   pocket
of the accused and light blue fluorescent marks of anthrecene were found  on
the right hand thumb and the pocket also. Pancha No.2 took out the  currency
notes from the left side pocket of the accused and on those  currency  notes
light blue florescent marks of anthrecene powder were found and the  numbers
tallied with the numbers mentioned on the first part of the Panchnama.   The
second copy of the panchnama was  prepared  and  the  Investigation  Officer
carried out further investigation and after  obtaining  requisite  sanction,
laid the chargesheet against the accused.



   The learned trial judge framed the charges in  respect  of  the  offences
mentioned hereinbefore.  The accused pleaded not guilty  and  sought  to  be
tried.  The prosecution examined  six  witnesses  and  produced  documentary
evidence.  The accused was  examined  under  Section  313  of  the  Code  of
Criminal Procedure and answers  were recorded.  Exh.  50  is  the  statement
given by him.  The trial court  found the accused guilty of the charges  and
convicted and sentenced him as stated supra.  The accused  preferred  appeal
and the High Court dismissed the same by impugned judgment.  That  is  under
challenge before us.



The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has raised challenge to  the
impugned judgment, inter alia, but primarily on the following grounds:



There is no evidence to prove demand and  voluntary  acceptance  of  illegal
gratification



The recovery of the currency notes  from  the  accused  had  also  not  been
proved inasmuch as panchas are not independent witnesses and their  evidence
did not merit any acceptance.



Without prejudice to the  above  contentions  it  is  also  urged  that  the
sentence awarded to the appellant is unreasonably  excessive   and  deserves
reduction.



Reliance was placed on the following decisions of this Court : 1. A.  Subair
vs. State of Kerala (2009) 6 SCC 587;  2. State of Kerala  and  another  vs.
C.P. Rao (2011) 6 SCC 450; 3. Banarsi Dass vs. State  of  Haryana  (2010)  4
SCC 450 and 4. B.Jayaraj vs. State of A.P. 2014 (4) SCALE 81.



Per contra the learned counsel appearing for the State  contended  that  the
judgment of conviction and sentence  is  duly  supported  by  the  oral  and
documentary evidence produced by the prosecution and does not call  for  any
interference.   Emphasis was made to the version  of  panch  witnesses,  the
scientific proof and the testimony of  the  Investigation  Officer  and  the
principle of presumption was pressed into service to bring home the  charges
leveled against the accused. In support of the   submission   reliance   was
placed on the decision of this Court  in  Narendra  Champaklal  Trivedi  vs.
State of Gujarat (2012) 7 SCC 80.



The primary requisite of an offence under Section 13(1)(d)  of  the  Act  is
proof of demand or request of a valuable thing or pecuniary  advantage  from
the public servant.  In the first two decisions relied  on  by  the  learned
counsel for the appellant cited supra, on  facts,  the  complainant  in  the
case was not examined and this Court  held  that  there  is  no  substantive
evidence to prove the factum of demand.  The  complainant   in  the  present
case has been examined  and hence those decisions would not be of  any  help
to the appellant  herein.   In the remaining two decisions relied on by  the
learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  referred  to  supra,  on  facts,  the
complainant did not support the prosecution case insofar as demand  made  by
the accused is concerned and disowned his complaint and declared hostile  by
the prosecution and in such circumstances,  this  Court  held  that  in  the
absence of any proof of demand for illegal gratification the use of  corrupt
or illegal means or abuse of position as a  public  servant  to  obtain  any
valuable thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be held to be established.



 The core question in this appeal is  as  to  whether  there  is  sufficient
legal evidence on record to bring home the guilt of the  appellant  for  the
offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2)  of  the  Act.
The prosecution examined the complainant Girishbhai as PW1 in the  case  and
in his examination-in-chief he has testified that he met the  Talati  namely
the accused and asked him to issue the documents he has applied for and  the
Talati asked him to come with money and meet him in his office  at  Ratanpur
and the Talati had not told him as to how much money he  has  to  bring  and
since Talati was asking for bribe from him, he went to  the  office  of  ACB
and informed the demand of bribe made by accused  to  the  police  inspector
and also gave Exh. 12 complaint  which  bears  his  signature.   It  is  his
further testimony that the  police  inspector  on  receiving  the  complaint
sought assistance of two panch-witnesses who were  made  to  understand  the
case and he gave two currency  notes  of  Rs.100  in  denomination  and  two
currency notes of Rs.50  in  denomination   and  the  Investigation  Officer
noted the numbers of the said currency notes and a  powder  was  applied  to
the said notes and as per instruction he had put the notes in his left  side
pocket of the shirt and along with one panch witness went to the  office  of
Talati at Ratanpur in his scooter.  According  to  the  complainant,  Talati
was sitting in his chair in the office and they also  took  their  seats  in
front of him and he demanded the documents and the accused handed  over  the
same in the presence of panch witness and at that time he asked the  accused
as to what amount he has to give to him and thereafter he put Rs.250 on  his
table and the accused told him that he has to take about Rs.100 but he  went
from there and gave signal upon which the raiding  party  came  in  and  the
Investigation Officer took the currency notes  from  the  accused.  At  this
point  of  time  during  the  chief  examination,  public  prosecutor  asked
permission of the Court to put questions in the nature of  cross-examination
to PW1 and permission was granted.  It is relevant to  point  out  that  PW1
was not declared hostile but the  prosecution  sought  permission  to  cross
examine him and that was granted.  As  seen  above  in  the  examination-in-
chief  itself  PW1  Girishbhai  has  supported  the  prosecution   case   by
testifying about the demand of money made by the accused and the  giving  of
Rs.250 by him to the accused.  There is also corroboration in  the  form  of
testimony  of  shadow  witness.   PW  3  Ismailbhai  was  summoned  by   the
Investigation Officer to act as Panch witness and  made  to  understand  the
case as well as the experiment of U.V. lamp and he  has  testified  that  he
went along with the complainant  PW1  Girishbhai  in  his  scooter   to  the
office of Ratanpur panchayat and they went in and found  the  Talati  namely
the accused sitting in his chair and they sat opposite to him.   It  is  his
further testimony that PW1 Girishbhai told  the  accused  that  as  per  the
earlier talk he had come to take the documents and the accused  handed  over
the same to him and PW1 Girishbhai asked  him  as  to  how  much  amount  he
should give him for it and the accused told him to pay whatever he wants  to
give and PW1 further asked him as to whether Rs.250  would  be  proper   and
the accused said it would be o.k. and thereupon PW1 Girishbhai  took  Rs.250
from his shirt pocket and gave it to the accused and  the  accused  put  the
same in his left pocket by his right hand and PW1 Girishbhai  went  out  and
gave signal  while  he  was  sitting  there.   PW3  Ismailbhai  has  further
testified that  the raiding party rushed in and in the light of  U.V.  Lamp,
light blue colour was shining on the right thumb of  the  accused  and  also
inside his shirt pocket and the other panch witness took the currency  notes
from the pocket of the accused and the light  blue  fluorescent  marks  were
found in the light of U.V. Lamp on the currency notes  and  the  numbers  of
the said notes were tallied with the numbers of the notes mentioned  in  the
first part of the panchnama and the  documents  namely  Exh.  6  to  9  were
seized along with other articles by the Investigation Officer.



The shadow witness has clearly stated in his testimony about the  demand  of
bribe and giving of the same to the accused.  Nothing   has   been   brought
on record  to doubt the presence of the shadow witness. His testimony  fully
corroborates  the  testimony  of  the  complainant  namely  PW1  Girishbhai.
Though the prosecution was permitted to  put  questions  in  the  nature  of
cross-examination to PW1, he  was  never  declared  hostile.   In  fact,  as
already  seen,  PW1  Girishbhai  has  fully  supported  the  case   of   the
prosecution by testifying  about the demand of  illegal  gratification  made
by the accused  to  him  and  acceptance  of  the  same.  In  our  view  the
prosecution has established the demand and the acceptance of the amount   by
the accused  as illegal gratification.



In the same way the recovery of the currency notes from  the  possession  of
the  accused  stood  proved  by  the  testimonies   of  PW3  Ismailbhai  PW6
Madarsing and the Investigation Officer  PW7.   The  serial  number  of  the
currency notes recovered tallied with the  serial  numbers  written  in  the
first part of the panchanama and on the experiment of U.V.  Lamp  anthracene
powder  was found on the toe of right thumb of the accused  and  the  pocket
of his shirt. The accused in his statement given under Section  313  Cr.P.C.
has stated that a sum of Rs.100 was due towards land revenue tax  from   the
complainant and he had only  taken the said  amount  from  him  towards  the
tax. The accused has not  substantiated  the  said  plea  by  producing  any
document relating to tax due and it appears to be only an afterthought.  The
Courts below have rightly not accepted the said explanation offered by  him.
 We have no hesitation in stating  that  the  accused  miserably  failed  to
dislodge the presumption under Section 20 of the  Act.   Thus  analysed  and
understood, there remains no shadow of doubt that the appellant-accused  had
demanded the bribe and accepted the same to  provide  the  documents  sought
for by the complainant.  Therefore, the conviction recorded by  the  learned
trial judge which has been affirmed by the learned single Judge of the  High
Court does not warrant any interference.



What remains is the plea made on behalf of the appellant  for  reduction  of
sentence.  The appellant is said to be  60  years  old  and  suffering  from
heart disease, facial nerve palsy and speech disorder.   Copies  of  medical
reports have been filed in this  regard.   We  are  of  the  view  that  the
imposition  of minimum sentence prescribed for the offences  for  which  the
conviction is made would meet the ends of justice.



In the result the sentence of one year rigorous imprisonment imposed on  the
appellant-accused for the conviction under Section  7  of  the  Act  is  set
aside and instead he is sentenced to undergo  rigorous  imprisonment  for  a
period of six months and the sentence of fine and default  sentence  imposed
on him for the said conviction is retained.  Sentence of two years  rigorous
imprisonment imposed on  the  appellant-accused  for  the  conviction  under
Section 13(1)(d) read with Section  13(2)  of  the  Act  is  set  aside  and
instead he is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment  for  a  period  of
one year and the sentence of fine and default sentence imposed  on  him  for
the said conviction is retained.  The sentences  are  to  run  concurrently.
The Criminal appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above.


                                                             …….…………………...J.
(Madan B. Lokur)


                                                               .…………………………J.
(C. Nagappan)



New Delhi;
September 24, 2014.

Sec. 7 and Sec. 13(1) (d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - High court acquitted the accused under sec.7 but convicted under sec.3(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act - complainant not supported the case of prosecution - no evidence - evidence of I.O. and Ex. P 1 marked complaint can be considered as proof of evidence - mere possession of amount can be considered as demand of bribe - Apex court held that When PW1 Ramesh himself had disowned what he has stated in his initial complaint in Exh.P1 before PW4 Inspector Santosh Kumar and there is no other evidence to prove that the accused had made any demand, the evidence of PW3 Kumaraswamy and the contents of Exh.P1 complaint cannot be relied upon to conclude that the said material furnishes proof of demand allegedly made by the accused. The High Court was not correct in holding the demand alleged to be made by the accused as proved. Mere possession and recovery of the currency notes from the accused without proof of demand will not bring home the offence under Section 13(1)(d) of the Act and the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant are liable to be set aside. For the aforesaid reasons the appeal is allowed and the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant/accused under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act are set aside and he is acquitted of the charges. Bail bond, if any furnished by the appellant, be released.=CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1578 OF 2011 M.R. Purushotham … Appellant versus State of Karnataka … Respondent = 2014 - Sept. Month - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41953

 Sec. 7 and Sec. 13(1) (d)  read with  Section  13(2) of the  Prevention  of  Corruption  Act,  1988 - High court acquitted the accused under sec.7 but convicted under sec.3(1)(d)  read with  Section  13(2)  of  the  Act  - complainant not supported the case of prosecution - no evidence - evidence of I.O. and Ex. P 1 marked complaint can be considered as proof of evidence - mere possession of amount can be considered as demand of bribe - Apex court held that When PW1 Ramesh himself had disowned what he  has  stated  in  his  initial complaint in Exh.P1 before PW4 Inspector  Santosh  Kumar  and  there  is  no other evidence to prove that the accused had made any demand,  the  evidence of PW3 Kumaraswamy and the contents of Exh.P1  complaint  cannot  be  relied upon to conclude that the said material furnishes proof of demand  allegedly
made by the accused.  The High Court was not correct in holding  the  demand alleged to be made by the accused as proved.  Mere possession  and  recovery of the currency notes from the accused without  proof  of  demand  will  not bring home the offence under Section 13(1)(d) of the Act and the  conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant are liable to be set aside.
For the aforesaid reasons the appeal is  allowed  and  the  conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant/accused under  Section  13(1)(d)  read with Section 13(2) of the Act are set aside  and  he  is  acquitted  of  the charges.  Bail bond, if any furnished by the appellant, be released.=

The  High  Court  in
the impugned judgment found the appellant/accused not guilty of the  offence
under Section 7 of the  Prevention  of  Corruption  Act,  1988  (hereinafter
referred as “the Act”) but guilty of offences under  Section  13(1)(d)  read
with  Section  13(2)  of  the  Act  and  sentenced  him  to  undergo  simple
imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine  of  Rs.5000/-,  in  default  to
undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months.=

In this context the recent decision of a three Judge bench  of
this Court in B. Jayaraj  vs.  State of Andhra Pradesh reported  in  2014(4)
Scale 81 is relevant and it is held as follows :
“8. In the present case, the complainant did  not  support  the  prosecution
case in so far as demand by the accused is concerned.  The  prosecution  has
not examined any other witness, present at  the  time  when  the  money  was
allegedly handed over to the accused by the complainant, to prove  that  the
same was pursuant to any demand made by the accused.  When  the  complainant
himself had disowned what he had stated in the  initial  complaint  (Exbt.P-
11) before LW-9, and there is no other evidence to prove  that  the  accused
had made any demand, the evidence of PW-1 and the contents of  Exhibit  P-11
cannot be relied upon to come to the  conclusion  that  the  above  material
furnishes proof of the demand  allegedly  made  by  the  accused.   We  are,
therefore, inclined to hold that the learned trial  court  as  well  as  the
High Court was not correct in holding the demand alleged to be made  by  the
accused as proved.  The only other material available  is  the  recovery  of
the tainted currency notes from the possession  of  the  accused.   In  fact
such possession is admitted by the accused  himself.   Mere  possession  and
recovery of the currency notes from the  accused  without  proof  of  demand
will not bring home the offence under Section 7.  The  above  also  will  be
conclusive in so  far  as  the  offence  under  Section  13(1)(d)(i)(ii)  is
concerned  as  in  the  absence  of  any  proof  of   demand   for   illegal
gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or abuse of  position  as
a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage  cannot
be held to be established.”

The above decision is squarely applicable to the facts of the present  case.

 When PW1 Ramesh himself had disowned what he  has  stated  in  his  initial
complaint in Exh.P1 before PW4 Inspector  Santosh  Kumar  and  there  is  no
other evidence to prove that the accused had made any demand,  the  evidence
of PW3 Kumaraswamy and the contents of Exh.P1  complaint  cannot  be  relied
upon to conclude that the said material furnishes proof of demand  allegedly
made by the accused.  
The High Court was not correct in holding  the  demand
alleged to be made by the accused as proved.
Mere possession  and  recovery
of the currency notes from the accused without  proof  of  demand  will  not
bring home the offence under Section 13(1)(d) of the Act and the  conviction
and sentence imposed on the appellant are liable to be set aside.
7.    For the aforesaid reasons the appeal is  allowed  and  the  conviction
and sentence imposed on the appellant/accused under  Section  13(1)(d)  read
with Section 13(2) of the Act are set aside  and  he  is  acquitted  of  the
charges.  Bail bond, if any furnished by the appellant, be released.

2014 - Sept. Month - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41953

                                                             NON-REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1578 OF 2011


M.R. Purushotham                        …     Appellant

                                   versus

State of Karnataka                          …    Respondent


                               J U D G M E N T


C. NAGAPPAN, J.


1.    This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 4.1.2011 passed  by
the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal Appeal no.1130 of  2007
reversing the judgment of acquittal dated 8.12.2006 in  Special  Case  no.36
of 2001 passed by the Principal Special Judge, Mandya.  The  High  Court  in
the impugned judgment found the appellant/accused not guilty of the  offence
under Section 7 of the  Prevention  of  Corruption  Act,  1988  (hereinafter
referred as “the Act”) but guilty of offences under  Section  13(1)(d)  read
with  Section  13(2)  of  the  Act  and  sentenced  him  to  undergo  simple
imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine  of  Rs.5000/-,  in  default  to
undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months.
2.     The  case  of  the  prosecution  in  brief  is  as  follows  :    The
appellant/accused was working as Second Division Surveyor in the  office  of
Assistant  Director  of  Land  Records,  Nagamangala  and  on  18.2.2000  he
demanded an illegal gratification of Rs.500/- from PW1 Ramesh  for  issuance
of survey sketch pertaining to Survey no.255 of Hullenahalli village and  it
is further alleged that though the accused had  surveyed  the  land  on  the
application of the complainant he was postponing issuance of survey  sketch,
to force PW1 Ramesh to pay bribe.  PW1 Ramesh  lodged  Exh.P1  complaint  on
18.2.2000 with Lokayukta Police on which a case came  to  be  registered  in
Crime no.1/2000 on the file of  Mandya  Lokayukta  Police  Station  for  the
alleged offences under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2)  of  the
Act.  A trap was organized and PW2 Sridhar and PW3  Kumaraswamy,  Government
servants, were directed to  be  present  as  panch  witnesses.   PW1  Ramesh
produced a sum of Rs.500/- i.e. five currency notes  of  Rs.100/-  each  and
the numbers of the said currency notes were  recorded  in  the  presence  of
panch witnesses and the currency  notes  got  smeared  with  phenolphthalein
powder.  The complainant Ramesh took  the  powder  smeared  notes  and  went
along with PW3 Kumaraswamy to  the  house  of  the  appellant/accused.   PW2
Sridhar and PW4 Inspector Santosh Kumar stood outside the said  house.   The
accused was watching T.V. inside the room and on seeing them, he  asked  PW1
Ramesh as to whether he has  brought  what  he  had  asked  and  PW1  Ramesh
answered yes and gave the currency notes of Rs.500/- and accused  took  them
by his right hand and kept the same on his table and directed PW1 Ramesh  to
come on Monday for obtaining copy of the Re-Survey.  They came out  and  PW1
Ramesh gave the signal, immediately PW4 Inspector Santosh Kumar  along  with
PW2 Sridhar went inside the house and in the solution  of  clean  water  and
sodium carbonate the right hand fingers of the  accused  was  immersed  upon
which it turned into light pink color and on  verification  the  numbers  of
the currency notes which were lying on  the  table  were  tallied  with  the
numbers of the notes written in Exh.P2 Mahazar.  All  the  formalities  were
completed and after  obtaining  sanction  charge  sheet  came  to  be  filed
against accused.
3.     The Trial Court framed charges under Sections 7, 13(1)(d)  read  with
Section  13(2)  of  the  Act  and  the  accused  pleaded  not  guilty.   The
prosecution examined four witnesses and marked Exh.P1 to P10 and M.Os. 1  to
10.  The Trial Court held that the  prosecution  has  failed  to  prove  the
charges against the accused and acquitted him.  The State  preferred  appeal
and the High Court in the impugned judgment held that  the  prosecution  has
failed to prove the offence under Section 7 of the Act and at the same  time
it proved the commission of offence under Section 13(1)(d)  by  the  accused
and consequently set aside the judgment of acquittal for said  offences  and
convicted the appellant/accused for the  offence  punishable  under  Section
13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act  and  sentenced  him  as  stated
above.  The said judgment is under challenge in this appeal.
4.    We heard Ms. Kiran Suri, learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the
appellant and  Mr.  V.N.  Raghupathy,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the
respondent State.
5.  PW1 Ramesh, the complainant did not support the  prosecution  case.   He
disowned making the complaint in Exh.P1 and stated  in  his  examination-in-
chief that the accused had not demanded anything from him  and  he  did  not
know what is written  in  Exh.P1  and  the  police  have  not  recorded  his
statement in respect to this case.  He  was,  therefore,  declared  hostile.
However, PW3 Kumaraswamy, panch  witness  has  testified  that  after  being
summoned by PW4 Inspector  Santosh  Kumar  on  18.2.2000,  the  contents  of
Exh.P1 were explained to him in the  presence  of  the  complainant  and  he
accompanied the complainant to  the  house  of  the  accused,  wherein,  the
complainant  gave  the  sum  of  Rs.500/-  to   the   accused   as   illegal
gratification.   It  is  on  the  aforesaid  basis  that  the  liability  of
appellant/accused for commission of the offences  alleged  was  held  to  be
proved, notwithstanding the fact that in his evidence  the  complainant  PW1
Ramesh had not supported the prosecution case.
6.    In such type of cases the prosecution has to prove that  there  was  a
demand and there was acceptance of illegal  gratification  by  the  accused.
As already seen the complainant PW1 Ramesh did not support  the  prosecution
case insofar as demand by the accused is concerned.  No other  evidence  was
adduced by the prosecution to prove the demand made by the accused with  the
complainant.  In this context the recent decision of a three Judge bench  of
this Court in B. Jayaraj  vs.  State of Andhra Pradesh reported  in  2014(4)
Scale 81 is relevant and it is held as follows :
“8. In the present case, the complainant did  not  support  the  prosecution
case in so far as demand by the accused is concerned.  The  prosecution  has
not examined any other witness, present at  the  time  when  the  money  was
allegedly handed over to the accused by the complainant, to prove  that  the
same was pursuant to any demand made by the accused.  When  the  complainant
himself had disowned what he had stated in the  initial  complaint  (Exbt.P-
11) before LW-9, and there is no other evidence to prove  that  the  accused
had made any demand, the evidence of PW-1 and the contents of  Exhibit  P-11
cannot be relied upon to come to the  conclusion  that  the  above  material
furnishes proof of the demand  allegedly  made  by  the  accused.   We  are,
therefore, inclined to hold that the learned trial  court  as  well  as  the
High Court was not correct in holding the demand alleged to be made  by  the
accused as proved.  The only other material available  is  the  recovery  of
the tainted currency notes from the possession  of  the  accused.   In  fact
such possession is admitted by the accused  himself.   Mere  possession  and
recovery of the currency notes from the  accused  without  proof  of  demand
will not bring home the offence under Section 7.  The  above  also  will  be
conclusive in so  far  as  the  offence  under  Section  13(1)(d)(i)(ii)  is
concerned  as  in  the  absence  of  any  proof  of   demand   for   illegal
gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or abuse of  position  as
a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage  cannot
be held to be established.”

The above decision is squarely applicable to the facts of the present  case.
 When PW1 Ramesh himself had disowned what he  has  stated  in  his  initial
complaint in Exh.P1 before PW4 Inspector  Santosh  Kumar  and  there  is  no
other evidence to prove that the accused had made any demand,  the  evidence
of PW3 Kumaraswamy and the contents of Exh.P1  complaint  cannot  be  relied
upon to conclude that the said material furnishes proof of demand  allegedly
made by the accused.  The High Court was not correct in holding  the  demand
alleged to be made by the accused as proved.  Mere possession  and  recovery
of the currency notes from the accused without  proof  of  demand  will  not
bring home the offence under Section 13(1)(d) of the Act and the  conviction
and sentence imposed on the appellant are liable to be set aside.
7.    For the aforesaid reasons the appeal is  allowed  and  the  conviction
and sentence imposed on the appellant/accused under  Section  13(1)(d)  read
with Section 13(2) of the Act are set aside  and  he  is  acquitted  of  the
charges.  Bail bond, if any furnished by the appellant, be released.

                                                             …….…………………...J.
(Madan B. Lokur)


                                                               .…………………………J.
(C. Nagappan)

New Delhi;
September 24, 2014

Sec.4.5 A and 6 -Section 17(1)/17(4) - Land Acquisition Act -Once Company withdraw her intention to take the land acquired ,the very purpose of all procedure becomes infructuous including directions to refund of the amount - High court quashed the notifications as there is no emergency and with out hearing the objections of tenure holders under sec.5 A - directed to refund the amount - Apex court held that as the company by way of affidavit withdraw from taking lands due to non availability of Gas supply , In these circumstances no further question survives for consideration. We need not go into the question raised on behalf of the tenure holders that once the proceedings were vitiated by fraud and colourable exercise of power, such proceedings could not be revived The direction requiring the Collector to proceed with the enquiry under Section 5A of the Act has been rendered infructuous. Further direction that the tenure holders who had received any amount from the Company and wanted to file objections were liable to refund the same and those who had no objection could seek exemption from refund failing which the Collector could recover the amount paid by the Company as arrears of land revenue also does not survive. Since notification under Section 6 of the Act could no longer be issued at this stage, the question of any tenure holder having or not having objection does not survive for consideration as enquiry under Section 5A of the Act could serve no purpose when notification under Section 6 of the Act can no longer be issued. Direction of the High Court could, thus, no longer be given effect to. In view of the above, the appeals are disposed of as infructuous without prejudice to any other remedy for the Company to recover the amount, if any, paid and for tenure holders to claim damages, if any, from the Company in any other proceedings.= CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 8791-8818 of 2014 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) Nos.36425-36452 of 2009] RELIANCE POWER LTD. …….. APPELLANT VERSUS BABU SINGH AND ORS. ETC. ETC. ….. RESPONDENTS = 2014- Sept. Month - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41928

Sec.4.5 A and 6 -Section 17(1)/17(4) -  Land Acquisition Act -Once Company withdraw her intention to take the land acquired ,the very purpose of all procedure becomes infructuous including directions to refund of the amount - High court quashed the notifications as there is no emergency and with out hearing the objections of tenure holders under sec.5 A - directed to refund the amount - Apex court held that as the company by way of affidavit withdraw from taking lands due to non availability of Gas supply ,  In   these   circumstances   no   further   question   survives   for consideration.  We need not go into the question raised  on  behalf  of  the tenure holders  that  once  the  proceedings  were  vitiated  by  fraud  and colourable exercise of power, such proceedings  could  not   be  revived  The direction requiring the Collector to  proceed with the enquiry under Section 5A of the Act has been rendered  infructuous. Further direction that the tenure holders who had received any amount  from the Company and wanted to file objections were liable  to  refund  the  same and those who had no objection could  seek  exemption  from  refund  failing which the Collector could recover the amount paid by the Company as  arrears of land revenue also does not survive.  Since notification under  Section  6
of the Act could no longer be issued at this  stage,  the  question  of  any tenure  holder  having  or  not  having  objection  does  not  survive   for consideration as enquiry under Section 5A of the Act could serve no  purpose when notification under Section 6 of  the  Act  can  no  longer  be  issued. Direction of the High Court could, thus, no longer be given effect to.  In view of the above, the  appeals  are  disposed  of  as  infructuous without prejudice to any  other  remedy  for  the  Company  to  recover  the amount, if any, paid and for tenure holders to claim damages, if  any,  from the Company in any other proceedings.=

High court - The  operative  part  of the order is as follows:-
“1.   The notification dated 11th February, 2004 under Section 4 of the  Act
is partly quashed to the extent it invokes Section 17(1)/17(4) and  mentions
the acquisition as an acquisition  for  “public  purpose”.   All  subsequent
proceedings  consequent  to  the  notification  dated  11th  February,  2004
including the notification  under  Section  6  dated  25th  June,  2004  are
quashed.

2.    The Collector shall proceed with  the  inquiry  under  Section  5A  in
continuation of the notification dated 11th February, 2004 and proceed  with
the proceedings in accordance with the provisions of the  Act.   The  notice
be issued by the Collector inviting objection under Section 5A  of  the  Act
in newspaper having wide circulation by not giving less than 30 days  period
for filing objection.

3.    The notification under Section 4 dated 29th  August,  2006  is  partly
quashed insofar as it invokes Section 17(1)  and  17(4)  of  the  Act.   All
subsequent proceedings consequent to the  notification  dated  29th  August,
2006 including the notification under Section 6 dated  20th  February,  2007
are quashed.

4.    The Collector shall proceed with  the  inquiry  under  Section  5A  in
continuation of the notification dated 29th August, 2006  and  proceed  with
the proceedings in accordance with the provisions of the  Act.   The  notice
be issued by the Collector inviting objection under Section 5A  of  the  Act
in newspaper having wide circulation by not giving less than 30 days  period
for filing objection.

5.    As a result of quashing of the notification dated 25th June, 2004  and
20th February, 2007, the petitioners are liable to refund  the  compensation
received from the respondents.  However, we provide that it  shall  be  open
for those tenure holders, who have  no  objection  to  the  acquisition,  to
indicate so in their objection to be filed under Section 5A in  which  event
they may seek exemption from the Collector for refunding  the  compensation.
The Collector shall proceed to decide the objection under Section 5A of  the
Act of  only  those  tenure  holders  who  have  refunded  the  compensation
received by them.

6.    The Collector may recover the compensation as arrears of land  revenue
from the tenure holders who before the Collector do not in writing  indicate
their no objection with the acquisition.

7.    The Collector in the proceedings for acquisition and  hearing  of  the
objection under Section 5A of the Act shall be entitled to pass such  orders
and take such proceedings as may be necessary with regard to  refund/deposit
of the compensation.

8.    We further direct the Collector to get the  substance  of  this  order
published in all the leading newspapers, both  in  English  and  Hindi,  for
information to all concerned.”=

 But  before  pronouncement  of  the  judgment,  an
affidavit has been filed on behalf of the Company seeking to  surrender  all
rights in respect of the land covered by the above notifications dated  11th
February, 2004 and 29th  August,  2006,  stating  that  on  account  of  the
difficulty in securing domestic natural gas  to  run  the  plant  which  was
sought to be set up, it will not be feasible for the Company to utilise  the
land for the purpose for which the same was acquired.=
we  find
that the impugned judgment was rendered
on 4th December, 2009, and no stay has been  granted  by  this  Court.   The
State has not chosen to challenge the findings recorded by the  High  Court.
On  this  ground  itself,  proceedings  lapse  as  limitation  for   issuing
notifications under Section 6 of the Act or for making award in  respect  of
proceedings initiated vide notifications of Section  4   of  the  Act  dated
11th February, 2004 and 29th August, 2006 has expired.


6.     In   these   circumstances   no   further   question   survives   for
consideration.  We need not go into the question raised  on  behalf  of  the
tenure holders  that  once  the  proceedings  were  vitiated  by  fraud  and
colourable exercise of power, such proceedings  could  not   be  revived  in
view of law laid down in  Vyalikaval  Housebuilding  Coop.  Society  vs.  V.
Chandrappa & Ors.[1], Greater Noida  Industrial  Development  Authority  vs.
Devendra Kumar & Ors.[2]. The direction requiring the Collector to  proceed
with the enquiry under Section 5A of the Act has been rendered  infructuous.
 Further direction that the tenure holders who had received any amount  from
the Company and wanted to file objections were liable  to  refund  the  same
and those who had no objection could  seek  exemption  from  refund  failing
which the Collector could recover the amount paid by the Company as  arrears
of land revenue also does not survive.  Since notification under  Section  6
of the Act could no longer be issued at this  stage,  the  question  of  any
tenure  holder  having  or  not  having  objection  does  not  survive   for
consideration as enquiry under Section 5A of the Act could serve no  purpose
when notification under Section 6 of  the  Act  can  no  longer  be  issued.
Direction of the High Court could, thus, no longer be given effect to.

7.    In view of the above, the  appeals  are  disposed  of  as  infructuous
without prejudice to any  other  remedy  for  the  Company  to  recover  the
amount, if any, paid and for tenure holders to claim damages, if  any,  from
the Company in any other proceedings.

2014- Sept. Month - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41928

                                                              NON-REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                     CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 8791-8818 of 2014
     [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) Nos.36425-36452 of 2009]


RELIANCE POWER LTD.                                 …….. APPELLANT

VERSUS

BABU SINGH AND ORS. ETC. ETC.               ….. RESPONDENTS


                                    WITH

                     CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 8819-8831 OF 2014
              [Arising out of SLP (C) Nos.36616-36628 of 2009]

                                    WITH

                     CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 832-8833 OF 2014
                [Arising out of SLP (C) Nos.171-172 of 2010]
                                    WITH

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8834 OF 2014
                  [Arising out of SLP (C) No.1937 of 2010]

                                    WITH

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.8835 OF 2014
                  [Arising out of SLP (C) No.29549 of 2010]

                                    WITH

                      WRIT PETITION (C) NO.304 OF 2010

                                    WITH

                     CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 8836-8839 OF 2014
              [Arising out of SLP (C) Nos.35239-35242 of 2012]


                               J U D G M E N T



ADARSH KUMAR GOEL J.

1.    Leave granted.   The interlocutory applications are allowed.
2.    These appeals arise out of the land acquisition proceedings  initiated
by the State of U.P. under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act,  1894
[for short ‘the Act’].  By the impugned judgment,  the  High  Court  quashed
the two  notifications  Dated  25th  June,  2004  and  20th  February,  2007
underSection 6 of the Act and partly quashed notifications under     Section
4     of     the     Act     dated     11th     February,      2004      and
29th August, 2006 to  the  extent  of  invocation  of  urgency  clause  with
liberty to the State  to  proceed  with  the  hearing  of  objections  under
Section  5A  of  the  Act  and  with  further  direction  as  to  refund  of
compensation already received by the land owners.   The  operative  part  of
the order is as follows:-

“1.   The notification dated 11th February, 2004 under Section 4 of the  Act
is partly quashed to the extent it invokes Section 17(1)/17(4) and  mentions
the acquisition as an acquisition  for  “public  purpose”.   All  subsequent
proceedings  consequent  to  the  notification  dated  11th  February,  2004
including the notification  under  Section  6  dated  25th  June,  2004  are
quashed.

2.    The Collector shall proceed with  the  inquiry  under  Section  5A  in
continuation of the notification dated 11th February, 2004 and proceed  with
the proceedings in accordance with the provisions of the  Act.   The  notice
be issued by the Collector inviting objection under Section 5A  of  the  Act
in newspaper having wide circulation by not giving less than 30 days  period
for filing objection.

3.    The notification under Section 4 dated 29th  August,  2006  is  partly
quashed insofar as it invokes Section 17(1)  and  17(4)  of  the  Act.   All
subsequent proceedings consequent to the  notification  dated  29th  August,
2006 including the notification under Section 6 dated  20th  February,  2007
are quashed.

4.    The Collector shall proceed with  the  inquiry  under  Section  5A  in
continuation of the notification dated 29th August, 2006  and  proceed  with
the proceedings in accordance with the provisions of the  Act.   The  notice
be issued by the Collector inviting objection under Section 5A  of  the  Act
in newspaper having wide circulation by not giving less than 30 days  period
for filing objection.

5.    As a result of quashing of the notification dated 25th June, 2004  and
20th February, 2007, the petitioners are liable to refund  the  compensation
received from the respondents.  However, we provide that it  shall  be  open
for those tenure holders, who have  no  objection  to  the  acquisition,  to
indicate so in their objection to be filed under Section 5A in  which  event
they may seek exemption from the Collector for refunding  the  compensation.
The Collector shall proceed to decide the objection under Section 5A of  the
Act of  only  those  tenure  holders  who  have  refunded  the  compensation
received by them.

6.    The Collector may recover the compensation as arrears of land  revenue
from the tenure holders who before the Collector do not in writing  indicate
their no objection with the acquisition.

7.    The Collector in the proceedings for acquisition and  hearing  of  the
objection under Section 5A of the Act shall be entitled to pass such  orders
and take such proceedings as may be necessary with regard to  refund/deposit
of the compensation.

8.    We further direct the Collector to get the  substance  of  this  order
published in all the leading newspapers, both  in  English  and  Hindi,  for
information to all concerned.”



3.    Though most of the appeals have been preferred by
M/s Reliance Power Ltd. [formerly known as Reliance Energy Generation  Ltd.]
[for short ‘the Company’] at whose instance the land in question was  sought
to be acquired, against part quashing of acquisition  proceedings,  some  of
the land owners have also appealed to this Court  with  the  grievance  that
having  held  that  the  proceedings  were  initiated  on  the  grounds   of
illegality and fraud, the High Court ought to have quashed  the  acquisition
proceedings in entirety.

4.    The appeals were heard and judgment reserved
on  6th  August,  2014.   But  before  pronouncement  of  the  judgment,  an
affidavit has been filed on behalf of the Company seeking to  surrender  all
rights in respect of the land covered by the above notifications dated  11th
February, 2004 and 29th  August,  2006,  stating  that  on  account  of  the
difficulty in securing domestic natural gas  to  run  the  plant  which  was
sought to be set up, it will not be feasible for the Company to utilise  the
land for the purpose for which the same was acquired.


5.    While we note the submissions made on behalf of the Company,  we  find
that the impugned judgment was rendered
on 4th December, 2009, and no stay has been  granted  by  this  Court.   The
State has not chosen to challenge the findings recorded by the  High  Court.
On  this  ground  itself,  proceedings  lapse  as  limitation  for   issuing
notifications under Section 6 of the Act or for making award in  respect  of
proceedings initiated vide notifications of Section  4   of  the  Act  dated
11th February, 2004 and 29th August, 2006 has expired.


6.     In   these   circumstances   no   further   question   survives   for
consideration.  We need not go into the question raised  on  behalf  of  the
tenure holders  that  once  the  proceedings  were  vitiated  by  fraud  and
colourable exercise of power, such proceedings  could  not   be  revived  in
view of law laid down in  Vyalikaval  Housebuilding  Coop.  Society  vs.  V.
Chandrappa & Ors.[1], Greater Noida  Industrial  Development  Authority  vs.
Devendra Kumar & Ors.[2].  The direction requiring the Collector to  proceed
with the enquiry under Section 5A of the Act has been rendered  infructuous.
 Further direction that the tenure holders who had received any amount  from
the Company and wanted to file objections were liable  to  refund  the  same
and those who had no objection could  seek  exemption  from  refund  failing
which the Collector could recover the amount paid by the Company as  arrears
of land revenue also does not survive.  Since notification under  Section  6
of the Act could no longer be issued at this  stage,  the  question  of  any
tenure  holder  having  or  not  having  objection  does  not  survive   for
consideration as enquiry under Section 5A of the Act could serve no  purpose
when notification under Section 6 of  the  Act  can  no  longer  be  issued.
Direction of the High Court could, thus, no longer be given effect to.

7.    In view of the above, the  appeals  are  disposed  of  as  infructuous
without prejudice to any  other  remedy  for  the  Company  to  recover  the
amount, if any, paid and for tenure holders to claim damages, if  any,  from
the Company in any other proceedings.

8.    WRIT PETITION (C) NO.304 OF 2010
      In view of the order passed in  Civil  Appeal  Nos….........  of  2014
(arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) Nos.36425-36452  of  2009  etc.),
this writ petition is also disposed of in the same terms.

                                                              …………………………….J.
                                                             [ T.S. THAKUR ]

                                                             ……………………………..J.
                                                             [ C. NAGAPPAN ]

                                                            ………………………………..J.
NEW DELHI                             [ ADARSH KUMAR GOEL ]
September  16, 2014

ITEM NO.1E-For Judgment   COURT NO.14         SECTION XI

               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C)  No(s).  36425-36452/2009

RELIANCE POWER LTD.FORM.R.E.GENERAN.LTD.     Petitioner(s)

                                VERSUS

BABU SINGH & ORS.ETC.ETC.                    Respondent(s)

WITH
SLP(C) No. 36616-36628/2009
 SLP(C) No. 171-172/2010
 W.P.(C) No. 304/2010
 SLP(C) No. 1937/2010
 SLP(C) No. 29549/2010
 SLP(C) No. 35239-35242/2012

Date : 16/09/2014 These petitions were called on for JUDGMENT today.


For Petitioner(s)
                     Mr. E. C. Agrawala,Adv.

                     Mr. Rameshwar Prasad Goyal,Adv.
                     Mr. Rishi Malhotra,Adv.
                     Mr. Ashok K. Mahajan,Adv.
                     Mr. Abinash Kumar Mishra,Adv.

For Respondent(s)
                           Mr. A.V. Balan, Adv.
                           Mr. V.S. Lakshmi, Adv.

                           Dr. Surat Singh, Adv.
                           Mr. Ashok Mahajan, Adv.
                           Mr. Anil Kumar Tandale,Adv.

                     Mr. Rishi Malhotra,Adv.

                     Mr. Anuvrat Sharma,Adv.
                     Mr. Aftab Ali Khan,Adv.
                           Mr. Ravi Kumar Tomar,Adv.
                           Mr. Abinash Kumar Mishra,Adv.


        Hon'ble Mr. Justice Adarsh Kumar Goel  pronounced  the  judgment  of
the Bench comprising Hon'ble Mr. Justice T.S. Thakur,  Hon'ble  Mr.  Justice
C. Nagappan and His Lordship.
            Leave granted.
            The appeals are disposed of  as  infructuous  in  terms  of  the
signed order.
            Writ Petition (C) No.304 of 2010 is also disposed  of  in  terms
of the signed order.


    (VINOD KUMAR)                               (MALA KUMARI SHARMA)
      COURT MASTER                                COURT MASTER
            (Signed Non-Reportable judgment is placed on the file)
-----------------------
[1]    (2007) 9 SCC 304
[2]    (2011) 12 SCC 375