Sec. 302 , 304 Part I & Sec.300 - Exception 4 - murder - heat of passion - High court reduced the sentence from life to 7 years - Apex court held that Then, can it be said that the crime has been committed in a heat of passion? If time is taken to cool down, then the crime cannot be said to have been committed in a heat of passion. It is the specific case of the prosecution, which in fact, has also been accepted by the High Court that “when her father Tikeswar abused them, the accused Khageswar being annoyed brought a budia from his house, which is nearby, and dealt blows to her father and the accused Dusasan brought a lathi and assaulted her father”. This clearly shows that both the convicts had sufficient time to cool down and therefore, it cannot be said that the crime was committed in a heat of passion.” The above observations fully support the view that the present case falls under Section 302, IPC. Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore that of the trial Court = CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2051 of 2014 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.1235 of 2012] STATE OF M.P. .…APPELLANT VERSUS SHIVSHANKAR ..... RESPONDENT= 2014 - Sept. Month - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41925

    Sec. 302 , 304 Part I & Sec.300 - Exception 4 - murder - heat of passion - High court reduced the sentence from life to 7 years - Apex court held that Then, can it be said that the crime has been  committed  in  a  heat  of passion? If time is taken to cool down, then the crime  cannot  be  said  to have been committed in a heat of passion. It is the  specific  case  of  the prosecution, which in fact, has also been accepted by the  High  Court  that “when her father Tikeswar abused them, the accused Khageswar  being  annoyed brought a budia from his house, which is nearby,  and  dealt  blows  to  her father and the accused Dusasan brought a lathi and  assaulted  her  father”. This clearly shows that both the convicts had sufficient time to  cool  down and therefore, it cannot be said that the crime was committed in a  heat  of passion.” The above observations fully support the view that the  present  case  falls under Section 302, IPC. Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High  Court and restore that of the trial Court =

Jabalpur  Bench  at
Gwalior in Criminal Appeal No.292 of 2005 altering  the  conviction  of  the
respondent from Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) to 304 Part-I  of
the  IPC  reducing  the  sentence  from  life   imprisonment   to   rigorous
imprisonment for seven years while upholding the sentence to pay a  fine  of
Rs.10,000/-,   in  default   to   undergo   two   years   further   rigorous
imprisonment.=

 “300. Murder.—*  *     *

Exception 4.—Culpable homicide is not murder  if  it  is  committed  without
premeditation in a sudden fight  in  the  heat  of  passion  upon  a  sudden
quarrel and without the offender’s having taken undue advantage or acted  in
a cruel or unusual manner.
[pic]Explanation.—It is immaterial in such  cases  which  party  offers  the
provocation or commits the first assault.”
From a plain reading of the aforesaid Exception it is evident that it  shall
be attracted only if the death is caused (i) without premeditation, (ii)  in
a sudden fight and (iii) in a heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel. If  all
these ingredients are satisfied, the Exception  will  come  into  play  only
when the court comes to the conclusion  that  the  offender  had  not  taken
undue advantage or acted in a cruel  or  unusual  manner.  Above  all,  this
section would be attracted when the fight had taken place  with  the  person
killed.

9. The aforesaid view finds support from a judgment of this Court  in  Pappu
v. State of M.P.2 in which it has been held as  follows:  (SCC  pp.  394-95,
para 13)
“13. … The help of Exception 4  can  be  invoked  if  death  is  caused  (a)
without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight;  (c)  without  the  offender’s
having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and  (d)
the fight must have been with the person killed.  To  bring  a  case  within
Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is  to  be
noted that the ‘fight’ occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300  IPC  is  not
defined in IPC. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires  that
there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in  this  case,  the
parties have worked  themselves  into  a  fury  on  account  of  the  verbal
altercation in the beginning. A fight is  a  combat  between  two  and  more
persons whether with or without weapons. It is  not  possible  to  enunciate
any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is  a
question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden  or  not  must  necessarily
depend upon the proved facts of each case.”

11. Then, can it be said that the crime has been  committed  in  a  heat  of
passion? If time is taken to cool down, then the crime  cannot  be  said  to
have been committed in a heat of passion. It is the  specific  case  of  the
prosecution, which in fact, has also been accepted by the  High  Court  that
“when her father Tikeswar abused them, the accused Khageswar  being  annoyed
brought a budia from his house, which is nearby,  and  dealt  blows  to  her
father and the accused Dusasan brought a lathi and  assaulted  her  father”.
This clearly shows that both the convicts had sufficient time to  cool  down
and therefore, it cannot be said that the crime was committed in a  heat  of
passion.”

The above observations fully support the view that the  present  case  falls
under Section 302, IPC.
Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High  Court
and restore that of the trial Court, i.e., 5th  Additional  Sessions  Judge,
Bhind, Madhya Pradesh in Sessions Trial  No.285  of  1999.   The  respondent
stands convicted under Section  302,  IPC  and  sentenced  to  undergo  Life
Imprisonment and to pay fine imposed by the  Courts  below,  in  default  to
undergo further imprisonment as directed by the Courts below.
 
2014 - Sept. Month - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41925

                                                       NON-REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2051 of 2014
       [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.1235 of 2012]


STATE OF M.P.                                  .…APPELLANT

VERSUS

SHIVSHANKAR                                   ..... RESPONDENT

                               J U D G M E N T



ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.
1.    Leave granted.
2.    This appeal has been  preferred  against  the  Judgment          dated
10th July, 2008 of the High Court  of  Madhya  Pradesh,  Jabalpur  Bench  at
Gwalior in Criminal Appeal No.292 of 2005 altering  the  conviction  of  the
respondent from Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) to 304 Part-I  of
the  IPC  reducing  the  sentence  from  life   imprisonment   to   rigorous
imprisonment for seven years while upholding the sentence to pay a  fine  of
Rs.10,000/-,   in  default   to   undergo   two   years   further   rigorous
imprisonment.
3.    The case  of  the  prosecution  is  that  on  2nd  March,  1999  after
celebration of Holi festival, sugar cakes (Batase)  were  being  distributed
in front of the house of the  complainant  by  Ramlachhin  Gurjar  (PW  10).
Complainant Remsewak (PW 4) and his brothers Ramnaresh (PW 6), Vinod (PW  7)
and deceased Satish were standing near  the  temple.   An  altercation  took
place on account of Mukesh taking some sugar cakes  without  the  permission
of PW 10.   The respondent slapped PW 4  and  his  brothers.   This  led  to
further altercation between the accused  and  the  complainant  party.   The
accused went inside his house, brought the licensed gun of his  brother  and
fired a shot hitting the deceased on the stomach.  Apart from  the  accused,
acquitted co-accused Shrichand and Shyamsunder had  Kattas  and  Mukesh  and
Badshah were having      12 bore single barrel  guns.   The  acquitted   co-
accused also fired in the air.  The  deceased  succumbed  to  his  injuries.
Thereafter, Ramsewak lodged First Information Report.  After  investigation,
the accused were sent up  for  trial.   The  prosecution  case  against  the
respondent was proved by three eye witnesses Ramsewak (PW 4), Ramnaresh  (PW
6) and Vinod (PW 7) who were brothers of  the  deceased,  apart  from  other
corroborating evidence.  The respondent was  convicted  under  Section  302,
IPC while others were acquitted.
4.    The respondent preferred an appeal before the High Court, but in  view
of clear evidence of firing  of  gun  shot  by  him  causing  death  of  the
deceased, only  challenge  was  to  the  nature  of  the  offence.   It  was
submitted that quarrel took place suddenly and the accused had no  intention
to cause the death of the deceased.  Firing in the air  by  the  co  accused
showed that the intention was not to cause the  death.   The  accused  fired
only one shot and in the circumstances no offence  under  Section  302,  IPC
was made out.
5.    The above plea prevailed with the High Court.  It was held as  follows
:
“10.   Considering the entire scenario of the case, it  is  clear  that  the
incident occurred  suddenly  and  without  premeditation  and  therefore  it
cannot be gathered that the intention of the appellant was to  intentionally
cause the death of  the  deceased  and  therefore,  the  conviction  of  the
appellant under Section 302 of I.P.C. is not sustainable  in  law.   But  at
the same time, it is equally important to note that  the  appellant  brought
the licensed gun from his house  and  then  he  fired  which  hit  over  the
abdomen of the deceased resulting into his  death.   Thus,  we  are  of  the
considered view that looking to the facts and circumstances, this is a  case
of culpable homicide not amounting  to  murder  which  is  punishable  under
Section 304 (part-I) of I.P.C.”

6.    We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
7.    Learned counsel for the State submitted that the  view  taken  by  the
High Court is patently erroneous in law as the offence  under  Section  302,
IPC was clearly made out.  It was not a case  of  ‘fight’  as  the  deceased
side did not cause any assault nor had any weapon.  There was time  for  the
accused to cool down.  His conduct in going to his house  and  bringing  the
gun and thereafter  firing  from  the  said  gun  clearly  established  that
neither the firing was accidental, nor unintentional  nor  in  the  heat  of
sudden fight.  Thus the offence was clearly a murder falling  under  Section
302, IPC and not falling in  any  of  the  exceptions.   Reliance  has  been
placed on judgment of  this  Court  in  State  of  Orissa  Vs.  Khaga  Alias
Khageswar Naik & Ors. [1]         8.   Learned counsel  for  the  respondent
supported the view taken by the High Court.
9.    After due consideration of the rival submissions, we are of  the  view
that the High Court has clearly erred in  holding  that  the  offence  falls
under Section 304 Part-I, IPC.
10.   It is clear from the case of the prosecution mentioned above that  the
accused first slapped the complainant which was followed  by  verbal  abuses
and thereafter the accused  brought  the  licensed  gun  and  fired  at  the
deceased, who died.    It was, thus, a voluntary and intentional act of  the
accused which caused the death.  Intention is  a  matter  of  inference  and
when death is as a result of intentional firing, intention  to  cause  death
is patent unless the case falls under any of the exceptions.  We are  unable
to hold that the case falls  under  Exception  4  of  Section  300,  IPC  as
submitted by learned counsel for the respondent.  Exception 4  is  attracted
only when there is a fight or quarrel which requires mutual provocation  and
blows by both sides in which the offender does  not  take  undue  advantage.
In the present case, there is no giving  of  any  blow  by  the  complainant
side.  The complainant side did not have any weapon.  The  accused  went  to
his house and brought a gun.   There is neither  sudden  fight  nor  a  case
where the accused has not taken undue advantage.
In State of A.P. v. Rayavarapu Punnayya [2] , it was held :
“12. In the scheme of the Penal  Code,  “culpable  homicide”  is  genus  and
“murder” its specie. All “murder”  is  “culpable  homicide”  but  not  vice-
versa.   Speaking   generally,    “culpable    homicide”    sans    “special
characteristics of murder”, is “culpable homicide not amounting to  murder”.
For the purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity  of  this
generic offence, the Code practically recognises three degrees  of  culpable
homicide. The first is, what may be called, “culpable homicide of the  first
degree”. This is the greatest form of culpable homicide,  which  is  defined
in Section 300 as “murder”. The second may be termed as  “culpable  homicide
of the second degree”. This is punishable under the first  part  of  Section
304. Then, there is “culpable homicide of the third  degree”.  This  is  the
lowest type of culpable homicide and the  punishment  provided  for  it  is,
also, the lowest among  the  punishments  provided  for  the  three  grades.
Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable  under  the  second  part  of
Section 304.
13. The academic distinction between “murder”  and  “culpable  homicide  not
amounting to murder” has vexed the courts  for  more  than  a  century.  The
confusion is caused, if courts losing sight of the true  scope  and  meaning
of the terms used by the legislature in these sections, allow themselves  to
be drawn into minutae abstractions.  The  safest  way  of  approach  to  the
interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be  to  keep  in
focus the keywords used in the various clauses of Sections 299 and 300.”

 In Bhagwan Munjaji Pawade v. State of Maharashtra [3] , this Court held  as
under :

“6.  ….  It is true that some of[pic]the conditions  for  the  applicability
of Exception 4 to Section 300 exist here,  but  not  all.  The  quarrel  had
broken out suddenly, but there was no sudden fight between the deceased  and
the appellant. ‘Fight’ postulates a bilateral  transaction  in  which  blows
are exchanged. The deceased was unarmed. He did not cause any injury to  the
appellant or his companions. Furthermore no less than three  fatal  injuries
were inflicted by the appellant with an axe, which is  a  formidable  weapon
on the unarmed victim. Appellant, is therefore, not entitled to the  benefit
of Exception 4, either.”

                                                    In In Sridhar Bhuyan  v.
State of Orissa [4] , this Court held as under :

“7. For bringing in operation of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, it  has  to
be established that the  act  was  committed  without  premeditation,  in  a
sudden [pic]fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel  without  the
offender having taken undue advantage and not having acted  in  a  cruel  or
unusual manner.

8. The fourth exception of Section 300 IPC covers  acts  done  in  a  sudden
fight. The said exception deals with a case of prosecution  not  covered  by
the  first  exception,  after  which  its  place  would   have   been   more
appropriate. The exception is founded upon the same principle, for  in  both
there is absence of premeditation. But, while in the  case  of  Exception  1
there is total deprivation of self-control, in case of  Exception  4,  there
is only that heat of passion which clouds men’s sober reason and urges  them
to deeds which  they  would  not  otherwise  do.  There  is  provocation  in
Exception 4 as in Exception 1;  but  the  injury  done  is  not  the  direct
consequence of that provocation. In fact Exception 4  deals  with  cases  in
which notwithstanding that a blow may have been struck, or some  provocation
given in the origin of the dispute or in whatever way the quarrel  may  have
originated, yet the subsequent conduct of both parties puts them in  respect
of guilt upon equal footing. A “sudden  fight”  implies  mutual  provocation
and blows  on  each  side.  The  homicide  committed  is  then  clearly  not
traceable to unilateral provocation, nor  in  such  cases  could  the  whole
blame be placed on  one  side.  For  if  it  were  so,  the  exception  more
appropriately  applicable  would  be  Exception  1.  There  is  no  previous
deliberation or determination to fight. A fight suddenly  takes  place,  for
which both parties are more or less to be blamed. It  may  be  that  one  of
them starts it, but if the other had not aggravated it by  his  own  conduct
it would not have taken the serious  turn  it  did.  There  is  then  mutual
provocation and aggravation, and it is difficult to apportion the  share  of
blame which attaches to each  fighter.  The  help  of  Exception  4  can  be
invoked if death is caused: (a)  without  premeditation;  (b)  in  a  sudden
fight; (c) without the offender’s having taken undue advantage or  acted  in
a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the  person
killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned  in
it must be found. It is to be noted that the “fight” occurring in  Exception
4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in IPC. It takes two to  make  a  fight.
Heat of passion requires that there must be no  time  for  the  passions  to
cool down and in this case, the parties have worked themselves into  a  fury
on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is  a  combat
between two and more persons whether with or  without  weapons.  It  is  not
possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed  to  be  a
sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden  or
not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts  of  each  case.  For  the
application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that  there  was  a
sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation.  It  must  further  be  shown
that the offender has not taken undue advantage  or  acted  in  a  cruel  or
unusual manner. The expression “undue advantage” as used  in  the  provision
means “unfair advantage”.

      Similar observations were made in    State of Orissa  v.  Khaga  alias
Khageswar Naik and Ors.  (supra),  which reads as under :

“8. The rival submission necessitates examination of Exception 4 to  Section
300 IPC, same reads as follows:

“300. Murder.—*  *     *

Exception 4.—Culpable homicide is not murder  if  it  is  committed  without
premeditation in a sudden fight  in  the  heat  of  passion  upon  a  sudden
quarrel and without the offender’s having taken undue advantage or acted  in
a cruel or unusual manner.
[pic]Explanation.—It is immaterial in such  cases  which  party  offers  the
provocation or commits the first assault.”
From a plain reading of the aforesaid Exception it is evident that it  shall
be attracted only if the death is caused (i) without premeditation, (ii)  in
a sudden fight and (iii) in a heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel. If  all
these ingredients are satisfied, the Exception  will  come  into  play  only
when the court comes to the conclusion  that  the  offender  had  not  taken
undue advantage or acted in a cruel  or  unusual  manner.  Above  all,  this
section would be attracted when the fight had taken place  with  the  person
killed.

9. The aforesaid view finds support from a judgment of this Court  in  Pappu
v. State of M.P.2 in which it has been held as  follows:  (SCC  pp.  394-95,
para 13)
“13. … The help of Exception 4  can  be  invoked  if  death  is  caused  (a)
without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight;  (c)  without  the  offender’s
having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and  (d)
the fight must have been with the person killed.  To  bring  a  case  within
Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is  to  be
noted that the ‘fight’ occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300  IPC  is  not
defined in IPC. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires  that
there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in  this  case,  the
parties have worked  themselves  into  a  fury  on  account  of  the  verbal
altercation in the beginning. A fight is  a  combat  between  two  and  more
persons whether with or without weapons. It is  not  possible  to  enunciate
any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is  a
question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden  or  not  must  necessarily
depend upon the proved facts of each case.”

11. Then, can it be said that the crime has been  committed  in  a  heat  of
passion? If time is taken to cool down, then the crime  cannot  be  said  to
have been committed in a heat of passion. It is the  specific  case  of  the
prosecution, which in fact, has also been accepted by the  High  Court  that
“when her father Tikeswar abused them, the accused Khageswar  being  annoyed
brought a budia from his house, which is nearby,  and  dealt  blows  to  her
father and the accused Dusasan brought a lathi and  assaulted  her  father”.
This clearly shows that both the convicts had sufficient time to  cool  down
and therefore, it cannot be said that the crime was committed in a  heat  of
passion.”

The above observations fully support the view that the  present  case  falls
under Section 302, IPC.
Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the High  Court
and restore that of the trial Court, i.e., 5th  Additional  Sessions  Judge,
Bhind, Madhya Pradesh in Sessions Trial  No.285  of  1999.   The  respondent
stands convicted under Section  302,  IPC  and  sentenced  to  undergo  Life
Imprisonment and to pay fine imposed by the  Courts  below,  in  default  to
undergo further imprisonment as directed by the Courts below.

                                                            ..…………………………….J.
                                                         [ V. GOPALA GOWDA ]


                                                          ….………………………………..J.
NEW DELHI                             [ ADARSH KUMAR GOEL ]
            September 16, 2014
ITEM NO.1B-For Judgment     COURT NO.14               SECTION IIA

               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Crl.A. …..../2014 arising from petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal
(Crl.)  No(s).  1235/2012

 STATE OF M.P.                                      Petitioner(s)

                                VERSUS

SHIVSHANKAR                                        Respondent(s)


Date : 16/09/2014 This petition was called on for Judgment today.


For Petitioner(s)
                     Mr. C. D. Singh,Adv.


For Respondent(s)       Mr. Vipin Kumar, Adv.
                     Mr. Deepak Goel,Adv.


            Hon'ble Mr. Justice Adarsh Kumar Goel  pronounced  the  judgment
of  the  Bench  comprising  Hon'ble  Mr.  Justice  V.Gopala  Gowda  and  His
Lordship.
            Delay condoned.
            Leave granted.
            The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed order.


    (VINOD KUMAR)                               (MALA KUMARI SHARMA)
      COURT MASTER                                COURT MASTER
            (Signed Non-Reportable judgment is placed on the file)

-----------------------
[1]     (2013) 14 SCC 649
[2]     (1976) 4 SCC 382
[3]     (1978) 3 SCC 330
[4]     (2004) 11 SCC 395

Criminal complaint under sec.406 and sec.6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act - against the Grand father( Their relationship with the husband of the complainant was remote as grand father of the appellant No.1 was brother of grand father of the husband of the complainant. ) - petition to quash the complaint against them - High court rejected - Apex court held that In the FIR, the appellants have not been named and in the criminal complaint they have been named without attributing any specific role to them.The Court has, thus, to be careful in summoning distant relatives without there being specific material. Only the husband, his parents or at best close family members may be expected to demand dowry or to harass the wife but not distant relations, unless there is tangible material to support allegations made against such distant relations. Mere naming of distant relations is not enough to summon them in absence of any specific role and material to support such role. and as such set aside the order of High court and quashed the proceedings against the petitioners only = CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2055 of 2014 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.4656 of 2011] KAILASH CHANDRA AGRAWAL & ANR. ..... APPELLANTS VERSUS STATE OF U.P. & ORS. ..... RESPONDENTS = 2014 - Sept. Month - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41924

 Criminal complaint under sec.406 and sec.6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act - against the Grand father( Their relationship  with  the husband of the complainant was remote as grand father of the appellant  No.1 was brother of grand father of the husband  of  the  complainant. ) - petition to quash the complaint against them - High court rejected - Apex court held that  In the  FIR,
the appellants have not been named and in the criminal complaint  they  have been named without attributing any specific role to them.The Court has, thus, to be  careful  in  summoning  distant  relatives without there being specific material.  Only the husband, his parents or  at best close family members may be expected to demand dowry or to  harass  the wife but not  distant  relations,  unless  there  is  tangible  material  to support allegations made against such distant  relations.   Mere  naming  of distant relations is not enough to summon them in absence  of  any  specific role and material to support such role. and as such set aside the order of High court and quashed the proceedings against the petitioners only =

 declining
to quash the proceedings against the appellants under  Section  406  of  the
Indian Penal Code and Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.=

    We have gone through the FIR and the criminal complaint.
In the  FIR,
the appellants have not been named and in the criminal complaint  they  have
been named without attributing any specific role to them.
The  relationship
of the appellants with the husband of the complainant is distant.
In  Kans Raj vs. State of Punjab & Ors.[1], it was observed:-
“5………A tendency has, however, developed for roping in all relations  of  the
in-laws of the deceased wives in the matters of dowry deaths which,  if  not
discouraged, is likely to affect the case of the  prosecution  even  against
the real culprits. In their over enthusiasm and anxiety to  seek  conviction
for maximum people, the parents of  the  deceased  have  been  found  to  be
making efforts for involving other relations  which  ultimately  weaken  the
case of the prosecution even against the real accused  as  appears  to  have
happened in the instant case.”

      The Court has, thus, to be  careful  in  summoning  distant  relatives
without there being specific material.
Only the husband, his parents or  at
best close family members may be expected to demand dowry or to  harass  the
wife but not  distant  relations,  unless  there  is  tangible  material  to
support allegations made against such distant  relations.   Mere  naming  of
distant relations is not enough to summon them in absence  of  any  specific
role and material to support such role.


10.   The parameters for quashing proceedings in a  criminal  complaint  are
well known.
If there are triable issues, the Court is not  expected  to  go
into the veracity of the rival versions but where on the  face  of  it,  the
criminal proceedings are abuse of  Court’s  process,  quashing  jurisdiction
can be exercised.  
Reference may be made to  K.  Ramakrsihna  and  Ors.  vs.
State of Bihar and Anr.[2], Pepsi Foods Ltd. and Anr. vs.  Special  Judicial
Magistrate and Ors.[3], State of Haryana and Ors. vs.  Ch.  Bhajan  Lal  and
Ors.[4] and Asmathunnisa  vs.  State  of  A.P.  represented  by  the  Public
Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., Hyderabad and Anr.[5].

11.   Applying the above tests, the proceedings  in  the  present  case  are
clearly the abuse of the Court’s process.

12.   Accordingly, we allow this appeal and quash  the  proceedings  against
the appellants, without  expressing  any  opinion  about  the  case  of  the
complainant against the other accused.


   2014 - Sept. Month - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41924

                                                          NON-REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2055 of 2014
       [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.4656 of 2011]


KAILASH CHANDRA AGRAWAL & ANR.             ..... APPELLANTS

VERSUS

STATE OF U.P. & ORS.                                ..... RESPONDENTS


                               J U D G M E N T



ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.

1.    Leave granted.

2.      This   appeal    has    been    preferred    against    the    Order
dated 2nd May, 2011 of the High Court of Judicature of  Allahabad  declining
to quash the proceedings against the appellants under  Section  406  of  the
Indian Penal Code and Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

3.      The   case   of   the   complainant   in    the    FIR    registered
on 4th May, 2010 in the Bhelupur Police Station  at  Varanasi  is  that  her
marriage was solemnised on 30th April, 2005.  Her brothers who lived  abroad
gave lot of dowry and cash in the marriage but her family could  not  fulfil
more demands raised by the elder brother of her husband’s  father,  who  was
the head of the joint family on account  of  which  family  members  of  her
husband were not satisfied and tortured her.  On  account  of  torture,  she
came to her parents house with her child on  1st  March,  2009  she  gave  a
complaint          on 27th April, 2010 leading to registration  of  the  FIR
                        on 4th May, 2010.  She also filed complaint  in  the
Court of Additional  Chief  Judicial  Magistrate,  Varanasi.   In  the  said
complaint, the appellants were summoned  vide  Order  dated  30th  November,
2010.

4.    Aggrieved by the said summons, the appellants  moved  the  High  Court
under Section 482 OF THE Code of Criminal  Procedure    (Cr.P.C.)  with  the
plea that the summoning was not justified as neither they were named in  the
FIR  got  registered  by  the  complainant  nor  any  individual  role   was
attributed to them in the criminal complaint.  Their relationship  with  the
husband of the complainant was remote as grand father of the appellant  No.1
was brother of grand father of the husband  of  the  complainant.   In  such
remote relationship, the appellants will have no  interest  in  raising  any
demand for dowry or  causing  any  harassment  to  the  complainant.   Their
implication was thus, clear abuse of the process of the Court.
5.    The High Court dismissed the petition with the  observation  that  the
statement of the complainant under Sections 200 and 202,  Cr.P.C.  disclosed
the commission of offence and thus there was no illegality in the  order  of
summoning.

6.    We have heard learned counsel for the parties.

7.    Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that marriage took  place
in the year 2005 and a child was born on 15th January, 2009.  Complaint  was
filed in the year 2010 after filing of divorce petition by  the  husband  of
the complainant on 24th April, 2010.  In the  FIR,  initially  filed,  there
was no allegation against the appellants but in  the  subsequent  complaint,
the appellants were also named as accused without  any  specific  allegation
against them. Thus, requiring the appellants to  face  criminal  proceedings
was nothing but abuse of the Court’s process.

8.    On 27th June, 2011, while issuing notice  this  Court  stayed  further
proceedings in the criminal complaint.

9.    We have gone through the FIR and the criminal complaint.  In the  FIR,
the appellants have not been named and in the criminal complaint  they  have
been named without attributing any specific role to them.  The  relationship
of the appellants with the husband of the complainant is distant.   In  Kans
Raj vs. State of Punjab & Ors.[1], it was observed:-
“5………A tendency has, however, developed for roping in all relations  of  the
in-laws of the deceased wives in the matters of dowry deaths which,  if  not
discouraged, is likely to affect the case of the  prosecution  even  against
the real culprits. In their over enthusiasm and anxiety to  seek  conviction
for maximum people, the parents of  the  deceased  have  been  found  to  be
making efforts for involving other relations  which  ultimately  weaken  the
case of the prosecution even against the real accused  as  appears  to  have
happened in the instant case.”

      The Court has, thus, to be  careful  in  summoning  distant  relatives
without there being specific material.  Only the husband, his parents or  at
best close family members may be expected to demand dowry or to  harass  the
wife but not  distant  relations,  unless  there  is  tangible  material  to
support allegations made against such distant  relations.   Mere  naming  of
distant relations is not enough to summon them in absence  of  any  specific
role and material to support such role.


10.   The parameters for quashing proceedings in a  criminal  complaint  are
well known.  If there are triable issues, the Court is not  expected  to  go
into the veracity of the rival versions but where on the  face  of  it,  the
criminal proceedings are abuse of  Court’s  process,  quashing  jurisdiction
can be exercised.  Reference may be made to  K.  Ramakrsihna  and  Ors.  vs.
State of Bihar and Anr.[2], Pepsi Foods Ltd. and Anr. vs.  Special  Judicial
Magistrate and Ors.[3], State of Haryana and Ors. vs.  Ch.  Bhajan  Lal  and
Ors.[4] and Asmathunnisa  vs.  State  of  A.P.  represented  by  the  Public
Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., Hyderabad and Anr.[5].

11.   Applying the above tests, the proceedings  in  the  present  case  are
clearly the abuse of the Court’s process.

12.   Accordingly, we allow this appeal and quash  the  proceedings  against
the appellants, without  expressing  any  opinion  about  the  case  of  the
complainant against the other accused.

                                                         .……..…………………………….J.
                                                         [ V. GOPALA GOWDA ]

                                                         .….………………………………..J.
NEW DELHI                          [ ADARSH KUMAR GOEL ]
            September 16, 2014
ITEM NO.1A-For Judgment       COURT NO.14               SECTION II

               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Crl.A.No......../2014 arising from Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal
(Crl.)  No(s).  4656/2011

 KAILASH CHANDRA AGRAWAL & ANR                      Petitioner(s)

                                VERSUS

STATE OF U.P.& ORS.                                Respondent(s)


Date : 16/09/2014 This petition was called on for Judgment today.


For Petitioner(s)
                     Mr. Shekhar Kumar,Adv.

For Respondent(s)
                     Ms. Shomila Bakshi,Adv.
                     Mrs. Mona K. Rajvanshi,Adv.
                     Mr. M. R. Shamshad,Adv.

            Hon'ble Mr. Justice Adarsh Kumar Goel  pronounced  the  judgment
of  the  Bench  comprising  Hon'ble  Mr.  Justice  V.Gopala  Gowda  and  His
Lordship.
            Leave granted.
            The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed order.


    (VINOD KUMAR)                               (MALA KUMARI SHARMA)
      COURT MASTER                                COURT MASTER
            (Signed Non-Reportable judgment is placed on the file)


-----------------------
[1]    (2000) 5 SCC 207
[2]    (2000) 8 SCC 547
[3]    (1998) 5 SCC 749
[4]    (1992) Suppl 1 SCC 335
[5]    (2011) 11 SCC 259

Amendment of Preliminary Decree Sec.152 C.P.C.& Or.18, rule 2 of C.P.C. - suit for partition to the property of step brother against the deceased real sister and against the legal heirs of his real brother and against purchaser - trial court dismissed the suit as time barred and as the defendant 12 purchaser perfected his title - High court set aside the decree of lower court and allowed the appeal and passed preliminary decree declaring that plaintiff is entitled for 1/4th share and legal heirs of his real brother are entitled to 1/4th share and legal heirs of real sister entitled to 1/2 share - amendment petitions filed High court allowed the same - objection that the defendants never asked for partition and separate possession of their extents - Apex court held that under or.18, rule 2 of C.P.C. - it is the duty of court to allot shares of each and every party share in a partition suit and as such dismissed the appeal = CIVIL APPEAL NOs.2352-2354 OF 2008 SRIHARI (DEAD) THROUGH LR. SMT. CH.NIVEDITHA REDDY .…APPELLANT VERSUS SYED MAQDOOM SHAH & ORS. ……RESPONDENTS = 2014 - Sept. Month - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41922

Amendment of Preliminary Decree Sec.152 C.P.C. & Or.18, rule 2 of  C.P.C. - suit for partition to the property of step brother against the deceased real sister and against the legal heirs of his real brother and against purchaser - trial court dismissed the suit as time barred and as the defendant 12 purchaser perfected his title - High court set aside the decree of lower court and allowed the appeal and passed preliminary decree declaring that plaintiff is entitled for 1/4th share and legal heirs of his real brother are entitled to 1/4th share and legal heirs of real sister entitled to 1/2 share - amendment petitions filed High court allowed the same - objection that the defendants never asked for partition and separate possession of their extents - Apex court held that  under or.18, rule 2 of C.P.C. - it is the duty of court to allot shares of each and every party share in a partition suit and as such dismissed the appeal  = 

whereby  the
      High Court - exercising powers under Section 152 of the
      Code of Civil Procedure,1908 (hereinafter referred as ‘the Code’), has
      allowed the applications, and 
directed  that  the  preliminary  decree
      passed in A.S. No. 734 of 1991,  be  amended  
allotting  and  dividing
      half share of Syed Makdoom Shah (defendant  No.11)  and  
Syed  Hussain
      Shah in the suit schedule property in addition to 1/4th share of legal
      heirs of plaintiff Khadar Nawaz Khan (since dead) and 
1/4th  share  of
      the legal heirs of defendant Feroz Khan (died on 22.1.1978). =

Trial court dismissed the suit - where as High court in appeal decreed the suit
After hearing the parties, the  Appellate  Court  re-appreciated
      the evidence and came to the conclusion and observed as under:
               
“It is  not  disputed  that  the  original  owner  of  the
              property is one Qamaruddin Ali  Khan  and  from  him,  Khader
              Hussain Khan purchased the same.
The  appellant  late  Feroz
              Khan and Shahzadi Bee are the  step  brother  and  sister  of
              Khader Hussain Khan.
 It  is  also  not  disputed  that  the
              properties are matrooka properties.
It is also not  disputed
              that Khader Hussain Khan died as a  bachelor  leaving  behind
              him Shahzadi Bee, his sister and step  brothers,  Feroz  Khan
              and the appellant Khader Nawaz  Khan.  
After  the  death  of
              Khader Hussain Khan, the only heirs are late Feroz  Khan  and
              Khadar Nawaz Khan i.e. the appellant and Shahazadi  Bee.  
It
              is also not disputed that the suit properties being  matrooka
              properties, under Muslim Laws, the property devolves  on  all
              the three heirs of Khader Hussain Khan  viz.,  Shahzadi  Bee,
              Feroz Khan and Khadar Nawaz Khan.
When once  the  properties
              devolved on these three persons, who are  the  successors  of
              Khader Hussain Khan, they are entitled to claim from  out  of
              the shares in accordance with Muslim Law  and  they  are  co-
              owners of the property.
It is not disputed that when  a  co-
              heir is found to be in possession of the  properties,  it  is
              presumed to be on behalf of the  other  co-owners  and  joint
              title and the possession of one co-heir is to  be  considered
              in Law as possession of all the  co-heirs.  
The  co-heir  in
              possession cannot render his possession adverse to the  other
              co-heirs not in possession.
Therefore, on the death of Khader
              Hussain Khan, late Feroz  Khan,  Khadar  Nawaz  Khan,  Khadar
              Nawaz Khan the appellant, Shahzadi Bee, who succeeded as  co-
              heirs, are entitled to joint  possession  and  even  assuming
              that Feroz Khan  was  in  possession  of  the  property,  his
              possession is on behalf of  Shahzadi  Bee  and  Khadar  Nawaz
              Khan, who are the co-heirs/co-owners along with him.
At this
              stage, it is relevant to refer Ex.A-2 which was relied on  in
              the Judgment in CCCA No.142 of 1976 filed by  Krishna  Murthy
              against late Feroz Khan and  the  1st  respondent.
 In  this
              appeal, a reference was made to  the  succession  certificate
              granted to late Feroz Khan and Shahzadi  Bee,  the  appellant
              i.e. Khadar Nawaz Khan.
The relevant portion has been marked as Ex.A-2 in the present
              suit.  It reads: “Letter No. 745 dated  7th  Tir  1356  Fasli
              shows that  the  succession  for  three  survey  numbers  was
              sanctioned in the name of the plaintiff.
His younger brother
              Khadar Nawaz Khan and sister Shahzadi Bee are  shown  as  co-
              sharers (Shikami)”.  From a reading of Ex.A-2,  it  is  clear
              that the possession obtained under Muslim Law was  recognized
              by granting succession certificate in favour of all the three
              co-heirs.
The learned Judge, forgetting  the  legal  position  obtained
              under the Muslim Law and relying on various  documents,  held
              that late Feroz Khan was the exclusive possessor and pattadar
              of the suit land.
The documents on which he relied are Ex.B-
              7, Pahani Patrika for the year 1970-71, Ex.B-23 Khasra Pahani
              for the year 1954-55, Ex.B-24 certified copy of Faisal Patti,
              Ex.B-25 certified copy of Pahani Pathrika and Ex.B-26 to B-26
              certified copies  of  Pahani  Pathrikas.  
On  the  basis  of
              various entries made in  the  revenue  records,  the  learned
              Judge held that late Feroz Khan was in  exclusive  possession
              of the property.
 It is true that in all the entries  in  the
              revenue   records,   late   Feroz   Khan   and   his    legal
              representatives  and  the  respondents  were  shown  as   the
              possessors of the land. 
However, they are only entries  made
              in the revenue  records.   In  other  words,  these  are  the
              entries relating to  mutation  proceedings  effected  on  the
              death of the original owner and also on the  death  of  Feroz
              Khan and after purchase by the defendant no.12”.

the  Appellate
      Court held that merely for the reason that the plaintiff did not raise
      any objection and did  not  participate  in  various  proceedings,  it
      cannot be said that he stood  ousted  from  the  co-ownership  in  the
      property inherited from Khader  Hussain  Khan.  
The  Appellate  Court
      further held that in fact plaintiff appears to have  no  knowledge  of
      the proceedings in which he was not a party.  It further observed that
      the joint possession over the land in suit  of  other  co-sharers  was
      also with the plaintiff.
The Appellate Court after holding  that  the
      property was jointly  owned  by  the  parties  decreed  the  suit  for
      partition vide its judgment and decree dated 25.1.1999.


      9.    It appears that three applications  viz.  A.S.M.P.  No.11880  of
      2004, A.S.M.P. No. 1098 of 2005 and  A.S.M.P.  No.1099  of  2005  were
      moved on behalf of the defendants for declaration of their  shares  in
      the preliminary decree passed in A.S No. 734 of  1991  arisen  out  of
      Suit No.471 of 1987. 
The High Court  by exercising powers contained in
      Section 151, and Section 152  read  with  Section  153  of  the  Code,
      disposed of these applications vide order  dated  21.4.2005  which  is
      challenged before us.
The High Court  by  its  order  dated  21.4.2005
      allowed the above mentioned applications and directed that half  share
      belonging to Syed  Maqdoom  Shah  and  Syed  Hussain  Shah  (heirs  of
      Shahzadi Bee), 1/4th share of Basheer Khatoon,  Quadir  Hussain  Khan,
      Rabia Khan, Razia Moiuddin, Dr. Masood Nawaz and Mohammad  Yousuf  Ali
      Khan (heirs of Khadar Nawaz Khan), and 1/4th share of  Habib  Khatoon,
      Moin Khatoon, Zehra Khatoon, Tehera Khatoon, Sughra  Sameena  Khatoon,
      Kaneez  Fatima  Khatoon,   Butool   Khatoon,    Aysha   Khatoon    and
      Khaderalikhan (heirs of Feroz Khan) be partitioned.

Whether the High Court has acted within the scope of  Section  152  of
      the Code or not, we have to see as  to  what  were  the  pleadings  of
      parties, what was the decree passed, and what was the correction  made
      in it. =

15. The relevant part in paragraph 12 of the plaint of Original  Suit  No.
      471 of 1987 filed by Khader Nawaz Khan for partition, reads as under:
           
              “     Hence it  is  prayed  that,  kindly  the  suit  of  the
              plaintiff be decreed as follows:


                   a)  A  preliminary  decree  be  passed   declaring   the
                      plaintiff is entitled for 1/4th share in the matrooka
                      properties i.e.  land  Survey  Nos.  41,  42  and  43
                      admeasuring  Ac  49-24  guntas  situated  at  Kokapet
                      Village, Rajendranagar Revenue  Mandal,  RR  District
                      and a Commissioner  be  appointed  for  partition  be
                      delivered to the  plaintiff  to  the  extent  of  his
                      share, if due to any legal hitch the court finds that
                      the property is not partition able then the  property
                      be put in auction and sale proceeds be  paid  to  the
                      plaintiff to the extent of his  1/4th  share  in  the
                      interest of justice.
                   b) Cost of the suit to be awarded;
                   c) Any other relief or reliefs which  the  plaintiff  is
                      legally entitled to the same”.

      16.    Defendant no. 11 Syed Maqdoom Shah (respondent  No.1  in  these
      appeals) at the end of para 12 of his written statement,  has  pleaded
      and  prayed as under:
             “Hence it is prayed that the suit of plaintiff may  be  decreed
             along with the share of defendant no.11  as  shown  under  para
             no.6.  Further the amount of Rs.2,082/- spent by the  defendant
             no. 11 during last  28 years as shown above at para no.  7  and
             it may be decreed from the share of  the  plaintiff  and  other
             defendants or otherwise  give  4  acres  of  land  in  lieu  of
             Rs.2,182/- from the share of the plaintiff and other defendants
             in addition to his own share to meet the ends of justice”.

           Para 6 of which reference is given in above quoted para as
      pleaded by defendant no.11 reads as under:
             “The shares ascertained as given by the  plaintiff  under  para
             (6) are correct”.


    17        In para 6 of the plaint, shares are mentioned as under:


             “ 6)   That, the shares of the parties are as follows:


             The defendants No. 10 and 11 are entitled for half share to the
             extent of their mother Shahzadi Bee.


             The plaintiff  is  entitled  for  1/4th  share  in  the  entire
             property.


             The defendant no. 1 to 9 are entitled for 1/4th share only”.

    18.      Now we re-produce the last sentence  of  judgment  and  order
      passed by the Appellate Court – High Court of Andhra Pradesh in  first
      appeal A.S. No. 734 of 1991 whereby suit for partition is decreed –
             “The suit is accordingly decreed and  appeal  is  allowed  with
             costs”.

    19.    By the impugned order dated 21.4.2005 exercising  powers  under
      Section 152 of the Code, the First Appellate Court has now directed as
      under:
             “Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, these  applications
             are allowed and the decree  in  A.S.  No.  734  of  1991  dated
             25.1.1996 is directed to be amended allotting and dividing half
             share in the suit schedule property to the petitioners 1 and 2,
             one-fourth share to respondents 1 to 6  herein  and  one-fourth
             share to respondents 7 to 15 herein.  There shall be  no  order
             as to costs”.

   20.   Had the appellate court, not decreed the suit with discussion of
      evidence after rejecting the plea of the defendant  No.12  as  to  his
      claim of ownership, and had the defendants 1 to  11  not  pleaded  for
      separation of their shares with admission of share of the plaintiff as
      decreed by the Appellate Court , it could have been said that the High
      Court erred in declaring shares of the plaintiff or the defendants  by
      resorting to Section 152 of the Code.
 But in the present  case  since
      there is  a clear finding of shares of the parties in the judgment and
      order dated 25.1.1996,  as  such  by  clarifying  the  decree  by  the
      impugned order, in our opinion the High Court has committed no mistake
      of law.
In this connection, we would like to re-produce sub-rule  (2)
      of Rule 18 of Order XX of the Code, which reads as under:
             “18. Decree in suit  for  partition  of  property  or  separate
             possession of a share therein --
             Where the Court passes a decree
             for the partition of property or for the separate possession of
             a share therein, then,--
                 xxx      xxx           xxx        xxx
              (2) if and in so far as  such  decree  relates  to  any  other
             immovable property or to movable property, the  Court  may,  if
             the partition or separation cannot be conveniently made without
             further inquiry, pass a preliminary decree declaring the rights
             of the several parties, interested in the property  and  giving
             such further directions as may be required”.

       Above quoted sub-rule clearly indicates that in the preliminary decree
      not only the right of the plaintiff but rights and interests of others
      can also be declared.
      21.   At the end, we would also like to refer the case of  Shub  Karan
      Bubna alias Shub Karan vs. Sita Saran Bubna and Others  (2009)  9  SCC
      689 wherein it is explained that “partition” is  a  redistribution  or
      adjustment  of  pre-existing  rights,   among   co-owners/coparceners,
      resulting in a division of land or other properties  jointly  held  by
      them into different lots or  portions  and  delivery  thereof  to  the
      respective allottees. The effect  of such division is that  the  joint
      ownership is terminated and the respective  shares  vest  in  them  in
      severalty.
      22.      This Court has earlier also reiterated in U.P.SRTC vs. Imtiaz
      Hussain (2006) 1 SCC 380 has reiterated  that the basis  of  provision
      of Section 152 of the Code is found on the maxim 'actus curiae neminem
      gravabit' i.e. an act of Court shall prejudice no  man.  
As  such  an
      unintentional mistake of the Court which may prejudice  the  cause  of
      any party must be rectified.
However, this  does  not  mean  that  the
      Court is allowed to go into the merits of the case to alter or add  to
      the terms of the original decree or to give a finding which  does  not
      exist in the body of the judgment sought to be corrected.
      23.   For the reasons as discussed above, we  do  not  find  force  in
      these appeals which are  liable  to  be  dismissed.  Accordingly,  the
      appeals are dismissed.  No order as to costs.


2014 - Sept. Month - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41922 REPORTABLE



                 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                  CIVIL APPEAL NOs.2352-2354 OF 2008



      SRIHARI     (DEAD) THROUGH LR.
      SMT. CH.NIVEDITHA REDDY                    .…APPELLANT

                       VERSUS




       SYED MAQDOOM SHAH   & ORS.  ……RESPONDENTS




                             J U D G M E N T



      PRAFULLA C.PANT,J.




      1.    All  these  three   appeals  are  directed  against  the  common
      judgment and order dated 21.4.2005 passed by the High Court of  Andhra
      Pradesh in A.S.M.P. No.11880 of  2004, A.S.M.P. No. 1098 of  2005  and
      A.S.M.P. No.1099 of 2005 (moved in A.S. No. 734 of 1991)  whereby  the
      High Court                  exercising powers under Section 152 of the
      Code of Civil Procedure,1908 (hereinafter referred as ‘the Code’), has
      allowed the applications, and directed  that  the  preliminary  decree
      passed in A.S. No. 734 of 1991,  be  amended  allotting  and  dividing
      half share of Syed Makdoom Shah (defendant  No.11)  and  Syed  Hussain
      Shah in the suit schedule property in addition to 1/4th share of legal
      heirs of plaintiff Khadar Nawaz Khan (since dead) and 1/4th  share  of
      the legal heirs of defendant Feroz Khan (died on 22.1.1978).


      2.    Brief facts of the case are that one  Qamaruddin  Ali  Khan  was
      original owner and pattadar of agricultural land bearing S.Nos. 41  to
      43 situated in Village Kokapet.  The  land  was  purchased  by  Khadar
      Hussain Khan through a registered sale deed,  who  died  in  the  year
      1942.  Khadar Hussain Khan died  issueless  as  an  unmarried  person,
      leaving behind his real sister Shahzadi  Bee  and  two  step  brothers
      namely Feroz Khan and Khadar Nawaz Khan (plaintiff).   Khadar  Hussain
      Khan remained in possession  and  enjoyed  the  property  in  suit  as
      absolute owner till his death in the year 1942 (year 1352 Fasli).   It
      is pleaded by the plaintiff that after death of  Khadar  Hussain  Khan
      the property was succeeded by his real sister Shahzadi  Bee,  and  two
      step brothers namely Feroz Khan (died on 22.1.1978)  and Khadar  Nawaz
      Khan (plaintiff).  On the death of Feroz Khan in the  year  1978,  his
      share is inherited by his widow Habib  Khatoon  (Defendant  No.1)  and
      children Moin  Khatoon  (Defendant  No.2),  Zehra  Khatoon  (Defendant
      No.3),  Tehera  Khatoon  (Defendant  No.4),  Sughra  Sameena   Khatoon
      (Defendant No.5), Kaneez  Fatima  Khatoon  (Defendant  No.6),   Butool
      Khatoon  (Defendant  No.7),   Aysha  Khatoon  (Defendant   No.8)   and
      Khaderalikhan (Defendant No.9).  A suit  (O.S.No.  471  of  1987)  was
      instituted by plaintiff  Khadar Nawaz Khan for partition of his  1/4th
      share from plot S. Nos. 41 to 43 measuring area Ac.49.24 gts  situated
      in aforesaid village Kokapet.   It is further pleaded by the plaintiff
      that after death of Feroz Khan, plaintiff and defendant nos. 1  to  11
      are in joint possession of the property.  It is alleged  by  him  that
      defendant no. 12 (Srihari) had no concern with the  property  in  suit
      but he is trying to claim right over the property on the basis of some
      document said  to  have  been  executed  by  one  of  the  co-sharers.
      Therefore the plaintiff  felt that he is unable to enjoy his property,
      in joint possession with the original co-sharers as such he filed suit
      for  partition of his 1/4th share.


      3.    Defendant Nos. 1 to 9 and defendant No. 11 in substance admitted
      the case of the plaintiff.(Defendant  No.10  during  the  pendency  of
      proceeding has died and his heirs are on record.)   Defendant  No.  11
      filed his written statement and defendant Nos.1 to 9 adopted the same.
       It is admitted to defendant Nos.1 to 9  and  defendant  no.  11  that
      after the death of Khadar Hussain Khan, the property in suit  devolved
      and was inherited by  his  real  sister  Shahzadi  Bee  and  two  step
      brothers namely Feroz Khan and Khadar Nawaz Khan.   However,  mutation
      was done in the name of Feroz Khan being  elder  male  member  in  the
      family, and names of Shahzadi Bee and Khadar  Nawaz  Khan  were  shown
      ‘shikmi’.  It is further pleaded by the aforesaid defendants  that  on
      the death of Feroz Khan on 22.1.1978, defendant  Nos.  1  to  9  (i.e.
      widow and children of the deceased) inherited  his  share.   Defendant
      No.11  is the son of Shahzadi  Bee  (real  sister  of  Khadar  Hussain
      Khan).  It is also admitted by the aforesaid defendants that defendant
      No.12 Srihari had no concern  with  the  property  in  suit.    It  is
      further pleaded by aforesaid defendants (Nos.1 to 11) that the land in
      question  is  to  be  partitioned  between  the  plaintiffs  and   the
      defendants.


      4.    Defendant No.12 Srihari, filed his  separate  written  statement
      and contested the suit.  Denying the allegations made in  the  plaint,
      he pleaded that the suit property is  not  joint  family  property  of
      plaintiff and the defendant Nos. 1 to 11. He further pleaded that  the
      plaintiff has filed the suit in collusion with defendant Nos.1 to  11.
      However, defendant no.12 admitted that the property in suit originally
      belonged to Qamaruddin Ali Khan which was purchased by Khadar  Hussain
      Khan through registered sale deed, and for  valid  consideration.   He
      (defendant No.12) pleaded in his written statement that on  the  death
      of Khadar Hussain Khan, his step brother Feroz Khan (husband of  Habib
      Khatoon defendant No.1 and father of defendant nos. 2 to 9)  inherited
      the property by virtue of Succession Certificate No. 812 of 1357 Fasli
      issued by Director of Settlements.  It is pleaded by  defendant  no.12
      that Feroz Khan perfected his title over the land  in  suit  being  in
      exclusive possession as an absolute owner in the year 1965-66.  It  is
      pointed out that there had been some litigation under Section  145  of
      Code of Criminal Procedure between Firoz Khan and one  Krishna  Murthy
      but the same was closed. It is also pleaded by  defendant  no.12  that
      Feroz Khan thereafter instituted a suit (O.S. No. 31 of 1966)  in  the
      Court of IIIrd Additional Judge, City Civil Court,  Hyderabad  against
      Krishna Murthy for injunction which was renumbered as O.S.No.  512  of
      1973  in  the  Court  of  Vth  Additional  Judge,  City  Civil  Court,
      Hyderabad.  In the said suit Feroz Khan (husband of defendant No.1 and
      father of defendant nos. 2 to 9)  entered  into  settlement,  and  the
      entire land of S.Nos. 42 and 43 and portion of S.41  vested  with  the
      defendant no.12.  It is further pleaded  that  in  pursuance  of  said
      settlement, defendant no.12 was impleaded  as  second  plaintiff  with
      Feroz Khan (plaintiff no.1 of Suit No. 512 of 1973).   Finally,  Feroz
      Khan who was in need of money offered to sell land measuring  Ac.18.25
      gts of S.No.43 and executed agreement of sale on 23.3.1973.  Said suit
      No. 512 of 1973 was disposed of by IVth Additional Judge,  City  Civil
      Court, Hyderabad holding that defendant No.12 (who was plaintiff  No.2
      in suit No. 512 of 1973) and Feroz Khan (plaintiff No.1 of said  suit)
      were the owners of the land.  Aggrieved by said  judgment  and  decree
      dated 30.9.1976, Krishna Murthy (defendant  of  said  case)  filed  an
      appeal No. CCA 142 of 1976 in the High Court.  The  legal  proceedings
      referred above were finally decided in favour of the vendor.   In  the
      second round of litigation, defendant No.12 filed O.S.No.164  of  1981
      before Vth Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad for permanent
      injunction restraining defendant nos. 1 to 9,  and  present  plaintiff
      from selling or otherwise disposing of the land  covered  by  S.43  of
      Kokapet Village, except to the defendant no.12 (who was  plaintiff  of
      Suit No. 164 of 1981).  Present defendant nos.1 to  9  contested  Suit
      No. 164 of 1981  and  the  same  was  decreed  in  favour  of  present
      defendant no.12, and the defendants of said suit were restrained  from
      transferring the suit land to third  party.   Aggrieved  by  the  said
      judgment and decree, present  defendant  nos.  1  to  9  filed  appeal
      bearing No. AS 66 of  1984  before  Chief  Judge,  City  Civil  Court,
      Hyderabad which was dismissed by the said Court  on  27.11.1984.   The
      appeal filed by Krishna Murthy bearing CCCA No. 142 of 1976  was  also
      dismissed by the High Court on 11.12.1985. Thereafter,  defendant  No.
      12 filed Original Suit No. 150 of 1986  for  specific  performance  of
      agreement of sale dated 23.3.1973 in  respect  of  land  Ac.18.25  gts
      covered by S.No.43 of Village Kokapet.  In pursuance to the  order  in
      said case possession of the land in question was jointly delivered  to
      defendant no. 12 and defendant nos. 1 to 9  by  the  Bailiff  and  the
      suit was decreed by M.M. West on  2.11.1987  directing  the  defendant
      nos. 1 to  9 to execute  sale  deed  in  favour  of  defendant  No.12.
      Present plaintiff Khadar Nawaz Khan never attempted to  get  impleaded
      in the aforesaid litigations.  It is alleged by  the  defendant  no.12
      that after colluding with defendant no. 1 to defendant no.9, plaintiff
      has filed the present suit for partition to deprive defendant no.12 of
      his rights.


      5.    The trial court on the basis of the  pleadings  of  the  parties
      framed as many as eight  issues,  and  after  recording  evidence  and
      hearing the parties gave the finding that  Feroz  Khan  had  perfected
      title over the land in suit, and the  plaintiff  is  not  entitled  to
      partition. On the issue of limitation, the trial court held  that  the
      suit is barred by limitation.  With the  above  findings  trial  court
      (Additional Subordinate Judge/R.R. District) dismissed the  suit  vide
      judgment and decree dated 16.10.1990.
      6.      Aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 16.10.1990 in  O.S.
      No. 471 of 1987, the plaintiff  Khadar  Nawaz  Khan  filed  an  appeal
      before the High Court  of  Judicature  at  Andhra  Pradesh  which  was
      registered as appeal No. 734 of 1991.
      7.    After hearing the parties, the  Appellate  Court  re-appreciated
      the evidence and came to the conclusion and observed as under:
                 “It is  not  disputed  that  the  original  owner  of  the
              property is one Qamaruddin Ali  Khan  and  from  him,  Khader
              Hussain Khan purchased the same.  The  appellant  late  Feroz
              Khan and Shahzadi Bee are the  step  brother  and  sister  of
              Khader Hussain Khan.   It  is  also  not  disputed  that  the
              properties are matrooka properties.  It is also not  disputed
              that Khader Hussain Khan died as a  bachelor  leaving  behind
              him Shahzadi Bee, his sister and step  brothers,  Feroz  Khan
              and the appellant Khader Nawaz  Khan.   After  the  death  of
              Khader Hussain Khan, the only heirs are late Feroz  Khan  and
              Khadar Nawaz Khan i.e. the appellant and Shahazadi  Bee.   It
              is also not disputed that the suit properties being  matrooka
              properties, under Muslim Laws, the property devolves  on  all
              the three heirs of Khader Hussain Khan  viz.,  Shahzadi  Bee,
              Feroz Khan and Khadar Nawaz Khan.  When once  the  properties
              devolved on these three persons, who are  the  successors  of
              Khader Hussain Khan, they are entitled to claim from  out  of
              the shares in accordance with Muslim Law  and  they  are  co-
              owners of the property.  It is not disputed that when  a  co-
              heir is found to be in possession of the  properties,  it  is
              presumed to be on behalf of the  other  co-owners  and  joint
              title and the possession of one co-heir is to  be  considered
              in Law as possession of all the  co-heirs.   The  co-heir  in
              possession cannot render his possession adverse to the  other
              co-heirs not in possession. Therefore, on the death of Khader
              Hussain Khan, late Feroz  Khan,  Khadar  Nawaz  Khan,  Khadar
              Nawaz Khan the appellant, Shahzadi Bee, who succeeded as  co-
              heirs, are entitled to joint  possession  and  even  assuming
              that Feroz Khan  was  in  possession  of  the  property,  his
              possession is on behalf of  Shahzadi  Bee  and  Khadar  Nawaz
              Khan, who are the co-heirs/co-owners along with him.  At this
              stage, it is relevant to refer Ex.A-2 which was relied on  in
              the Judgment in CCCA No.142 of 1976 filed by  Krishna  Murthy
              against late Feroz Khan and  the  1st  respondent.   In  this
              appeal, a reference was made to  the  succession  certificate
              granted to late Feroz Khan and Shahzadi  Bee,  the  appellant
              i.e. Khadar Nawaz Khan.
              The relevant portion has been marked as Ex.A-2 in the present
              suit.  It reads: “Letter No. 745 dated  7th  Tir  1356  Fasli
              shows that  the  succession  for  three  survey  numbers  was
              sanctioned in the name of the plaintiff.  His younger brother
              Khadar Nawaz Khan and sister Shahzadi Bee are  shown  as  co-
              sharers (Shikami)”.  From a reading of Ex.A-2,  it  is  clear
              that the possession obtained under Muslim Law was  recognized
              by granting succession certificate in favour of all the three
              co-heirs.


              The learned Judge, forgetting  the  legal  position  obtained
              under the Muslim Law and relying on various  documents,  held
              that late Feroz Khan was the exclusive possessor and pattadar
              of the suit land.  The documents on which he relied are Ex.B-
              7, Pahani Patrika for the year 1970-71, Ex.B-23 Khasra Pahani
              for the year 1954-55, Ex.B-24 certified copy of Faisal Patti,
              Ex.B-25 certified copy of Pahani Pathrika and Ex.B-26 to B-26
              certified copies  of  Pahani  Pathrikas.   On  the  basis  of
              various entries made in  the  revenue  records,  the  learned
              Judge held that late Feroz Khan was in  exclusive  possession
              of the property.  It is true that in all the entries  in  the
              revenue   records,   late   Feroz   Khan   and   his    legal
              representatives  and  the  respondents  were  shown  as   the
              possessors of the land.  However, they are only entries  made
              in the revenue  records.   In  other  words,  these  are  the
              entries relating to  mutation  proceedings  effected  on  the
              death of the original owner and also on the  death  of  Feroz
              Khan and after purchase by the defendant no.12”.


      8.    After further discussing the evidence on record,  the  Appellate
      Court held that merely for the reason that the plaintiff did not raise
      any objection and did  not  participate  in  various  proceedings,  it
      cannot be said that he stood  ousted  from  the  co-ownership  in  the
      property inherited from Khader  Hussain  Khan.   The  Appellate  Court
      further held that in fact plaintiff appears to have  no  knowledge  of
      the proceedings in which he was not a party.  It further observed that
      the joint possession over the land in suit  of  other  co-sharers  was
      also with the plaintiff.  The Appellate Court after holding  that  the
      property was jointly  owned  by  the  parties  decreed  the  suit  for
      partition vide its judgment and decree dated 25.1.1999.


      9.    It appears that three applications  viz.  A.S.M.P.  No.11880  of
      2004, A.S.M.P. No. 1098 of 2005 and  A.S.M.P.  No.1099  of  2005  were
      moved on behalf of the defendants for declaration of their  shares  in
      the preliminary decree passed in A.S No. 734 of  1991  arisen  out  of
      Suit No.471 of 1987. The High Court  by exercising powers contained in
      Section 151, and Section 152  read  with  Section  153  of  the  Code,
      disposed of these applications vide order  dated  21.4.2005  which  is
      challenged before us. The High Court  by  its  order  dated  21.4.2005
      allowed the above mentioned applications and directed that half  share
      belonging to Syed  Maqdoom  Shah  and  Syed  Hussain  Shah  (heirs  of
      Shahzadi Bee), 1/4th share of Basheer Khatoon,  Quadir  Hussain  Khan,
      Rabia Khan, Razia Moiuddin, Dr. Masood Nawaz and Mohammad  Yousuf  Ali
      Khan (heirs of Khadar Nawaz Khan), and 1/4th share of  Habib  Khatoon,
      Moin Khatoon, Zehra Khatoon, Tehera Khatoon, Sughra  Sameena  Khatoon,
      Kaneez  Fatima  Khatoon,   Butool   Khatoon,    Aysha   Khatoon    and
      Khaderalikhan (heirs of Feroz Khan) be partitioned.


      10.   We have heard learned counsel for the parties  and  perused  the
      papers on record.


      11.   On behalf of defendant No.12 Srihari (appellant before  us),  it
      is argued that the impugned order passed by the High Court  is  beyond
      the scope of Section 152 (read with Section 151 and  Section  153)  of
      the Code.  In support of his argument he relied in the case  of  State
      of Punjab vs. Darshan Singh AIR 2003 SC 4179:  (2004) 1  SCC  328  and
      Bijay Kumar Saraogi  vs.   State  of  Jharkhand   (2005)  7  SCC  748.
      Before further discussion, we think  just  and  proper  to  quote  the
      relevant provision of law under which impugned order appears  to  have
      been passed  by  the  High  Court.   Section  152  of  Code  of  Civil
      Procedure, 1908 reads as under:


                   "Amendment of judgments, decrees or orders. -   Clerical
           or arithmetical mistakes in  judgments,  decrees  or  orders  or
           errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission  may
           at any time be corrected by the Court either of its  own  motion
           or on the application of any of the parties."




      12.   From the language of Section 152 of the Code, as  quoted  above,
      and also from the interpretation of the section given in the  case  of
      State of Punjab vs. Darshan Singh (supra), the section  is  meant  for
      correcting the clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees
      or orders or errors  arising  therein  from  any  accidental  slip  or
      omission.  It is true that the powers under Section 152  of  the  Code
      are neither to be equated with the power of review nor can be said  to
      be akin to review or even said to clothe  the  Court  under  guise  of
      invoking after the result  of  the  judgment  earlier  rendered.   The
      corrections contemplated under the section  are  of   correcting  only
      accidental omissions or mistakes and not all omissions  and  mistakes.
      The omission sought to be corrected which goes to the  merits  of  the
      case is beyond the scope of  Section  152.   In  Bijay  Kumar  Saraogi
      (supra) also it has been reiterated that Section 152 of the  Code  can
      be invoked for the limited purpose of correcting  clerical  errors  or
      arithmetical mistakes in judgments or accidental omissions.
      13.      Now we have to examine whether by  the  impugned  order,  the
      High Court has only corrected the clerical, arithmetical or accidental
      omission in the decree passed or not.  To appreciate the  same,  first
      we think it necessary to mention  as  to  what  the  word  “expression
      accidental omission” means.  In Master Construction Co. (P)  Ltd.  Vs.
      State of Orissa and Another AIR 1966 SC 1047, expression –  accidental
      slip or omission has been explained as an  error  due  to  a  careless
      mistake or omission unintentionally made.  It is further  observed  in
      the said case that there is another  qualification,  namely,  such  an
      error shall be apparent on the face of the record, that is to say,  it
      is not an error which depends for its discovery,  elaborate  arguments
      on questions of fact or law.


  14. Whether the High Court has acted within the scope of  Section  152  of
      the Code or not, we have to see as  to  what  were  the  pleadings  of
      parties, what was the decree passed, and what was the correction  made
      in it.


  15. The relevant part in paragraph 12 of the plaint of Original  Suit  No.
      471 of 1987 filed by Khader Nawaz Khan for partition, reads as under:
              “     Hence it  is  prayed  that,  kindly  the  suit  of  the
              plaintiff be decreed as follows:


                   a)  A  preliminary  decree  be  passed   declaring   the
                      plaintiff is entitled for 1/4th share in the matrooka
                      properties i.e.  land  Survey  Nos.  41,  42  and  43
                      admeasuring  Ac  49-24  guntas  situated  at  Kokapet
                      Village, Rajendranagar Revenue  Mandal,  RR  District
                      and a Commissioner  be  appointed  for  partition  be
                      delivered to the  plaintiff  to  the  extent  of  his
                      share, if due to any legal hitch the court finds that
                      the property is not partition able then the  property
                      be put in auction and sale proceeds be  paid  to  the
                      plaintiff to the extent of his  1/4th  share  in  the
                      interest of justice.


                   b) Cost of the suit to be awarded;
                   c) Any other relief or reliefs which  the  plaintiff  is
                      legally entitled to the same”.


      16.    Defendant no. 11 Syed Maqdoom Shah (respondent  No.1  in  these
      appeals) at the end of para 12 of his written statement,  has  pleaded
      and  prayed as under:
             “Hence it is prayed that the suit of plaintiff may  be  decreed
             along with the share of defendant no.11  as  shown  under  para
             no.6.  Further the amount of Rs.2,082/- spent by the  defendant
             no. 11 during last  28 years as shown above at para no.  7  and
             it may be decreed from the share of  the  plaintiff  and  other
             defendants or otherwise  give  4  acres  of  land  in  lieu  of
             Rs.2,182/- from the share of the plaintiff and other defendants
             in addition to his own share to meet the ends of justice”.


                  Para 6 of which reference is given in above quoted para as
      pleaded by defendant no.11 reads as under:
             “The shares ascertained as given by the  plaintiff  under  para
             (6) are correct”.




      17        In para 6 of the plaint, shares are mentioned as under:


             “ 6)   That, the shares of the parties are as follows:


             The defendants No. 10 and 11 are entitled for half share to the
             extent of their mother Shahzadi Bee.


             The plaintiff  is  entitled  for  1/4th  share  in  the  entire
             property.


             The defendant no. 1 to 9 are entitled for 1/4th share only”.




      18.      Now we re-produce the last sentence  of  judgment  and  order
      passed by the Appellate Court – High Court of Andhra Pradesh in  first
      appeal A.S. No. 734 of 1991 whereby suit for partition is decreed –
             “The suit is accordingly decreed and  appeal  is  allowed  with
             costs”.


      19.    By the impugned order dated 21.4.2005 exercising  powers  under
      Section 152 of the Code, the First Appellate Court has now directed as
      under:
             “Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, these  applications
             are allowed and the decree  in  A.S.  No.  734  of  1991  dated
             25.1.1996 is directed to be amended allotting and dividing half
             share in the suit schedule property to the petitioners 1 and 2,
             one-fourth share to respondents 1 to 6  herein  and  one-fourth
             share to respondents 7 to 15 herein.  There shall be  no  order
             as to costs”.




      20.   Had the appellate court, not decreed the suit with discussion of
      evidence after rejecting the plea of the defendant  No.12  as  to  his
      claim of ownership, and had the defendants 1 to  11  not  pleaded  for
      separation of their shares with admission of share of the plaintiff as
      decreed by the Appellate Court , it could have been said that the High
      Court erred in declaring shares of the plaintiff or the defendants  by
      resorting to Section 152 of the Code.  But in the present  case  since
      there is  a clear finding of shares of the parties in the judgment and
      order dated 25.1.1996,  as  such  by  clarifying  the  decree  by  the
      impugned order, in our opinion the High Court has committed no mistake
      of law.  In this connection, we would like to re-produce sub-rule  (2)
      of Rule 18 of Order XX of the Code, which reads as under:
             “18. Decree in suit  for  partition  of  property  or  separate
             possession of a share therein --Where the Court passes a decree
             for the partition of property or for the separate possession of
             a share therein, then,--
                 xxx      xxx           xxx        xxx
              (2) if and in so far as  such  decree  relates  to  any  other
             immovable property or to movable property, the  Court  may,  if
             the partition or separation cannot be conveniently made without
             further inquiry, pass a preliminary decree declaring the rights
             of the several parties, interested in the property  and  giving
             such further directions as may be required”.


      Above quoted sub-rule clearly indicates that in the preliminary decree
      not only the right of the plaintiff but rights and interests of others
      can also be declared.
      21.   At the end, we would also like to refer the case of  Shub  Karan
      Bubna alias Shub Karan vs. Sita Saran Bubna and Others  (2009)  9  SCC
      689 wherein it is explained that “partition” is  a  redistribution  or
      adjustment  of  pre-existing  rights,   among   co-owners/coparceners,
      resulting in a division of land or other properties  jointly  held  by
      them into different lots or  portions  and  delivery  thereof  to  the
      respective allottees. The effect  of such division is that  the  joint
      ownership is terminated and the respective  shares  vest  in  them  in
      severalty.
      22.      This Court has earlier also reiterated in U.P.SRTC vs. Imtiaz
      Hussain (2006) 1 SCC 380 has reiterated  that the basis  of  provision
      of Section 152 of the Code is found on the maxim 'actus curiae neminem
      gravabit' i.e. an act of Court shall prejudice no  man.   As  such  an
      unintentional mistake of the Court which may prejudice  the  cause  of
      any party must be rectified. However, this  does  not  mean  that  the
      Court is allowed to go into the merits of the case to alter or add  to
      the terms of the original decree or to give a finding which  does  not
      exist in the body of the judgment sought to be corrected.
      23.   For the reasons as discussed above, we  do  not  find  force  in
      these appeals which are  liable  to  be  dismissed.  Accordingly,  the
      appeals are dismissed.  No order as to costs.

                            ….…………………………………………..J
                            (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)





                          ………………………………………………J
                           (PRAFULLA C. PANT)

NEW DELHI,
SEPTEMBER 16, 2014.