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since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

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Saturday, September 20, 2014

Service matter - employment in NTPC - to the Land Oustees - No Paper Publications - However all participated - some were selected - some were rejected - filed writ that No paper publication was filed - high court allowed the same - Apex court , in the interim stage allowed the process of appointment subject to the result of appeal - Apex court held that 70 members who are not selected have no locus standi for questioning the non-publication in News papers - two persons who filed were selected as per interim directions - and in other writ petition 2 out 5 were selected - 3 were held for color blindness - asked for reconstitution of Medical board as the same medical officer and other medical officers gave certificate that 3 have no color blindness - Apex court set aside the High court order for fresh publication and for fresh selection = CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8487 OF 2014 (arising out of SLP (C) No. 31026 of 2011) |NTPC KAHALAGAON & ORS. |…..APPELLANT(S) | | | | |VERSUS | | |NAKUL DAS & ORS. |…..RESPONDENT(S) = 2014 - Sept.- Month - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41886

Service matter - employment in NTPC - to the Land Oustees - No Paper Publications - However all participated - some were selected - some were rejected - filed writ that No paper publication was filed - high court allowed the same - Apex court , in the interim stage allowed the process of appointment subject to the result of appeal -  Apex court held that 70 members who are not selected have no locus standi for questioning the non-publication in News papers - two persons who filed were selected as per interim directions - and in other writ petition 2 out 5 were selected - 3 were held for color blindness - asked for reconstitution of Medical board as the same medical officer and other medical officers gave certificate that 3 have no color blindness - Apex court set aside the High court order for fresh publication and for fresh selection =

  the NTPC had prepared  a  plan  for
the recruitment of labour in such plant, with preference  to  be  given,  in
various classes of such labour, to persons whose  lands  had  been  acquired
for the construction of the said  plant  (Land  Oustees).   Thereafter,  the
NTPC ran into  industrial  relations  problems  as  the  said  Land  Oustees
demanded a larger share of preference  in  the  employment  in  the  various
classes  of  posts.   Accordingly,  the  NTPC  made   adjustments   to   the
recruitment procedure on 28.05.1986.   Subsequently,  it  ran  into  further
labour problems such as Bandhs, Gheraos, etc. by the said Land Oustees.   On
this account, the appellant was suffering huge loss on a daily basis.  As  a
result, the NTPC resolved to exclusively employ  Land  Oustees  in  all  the
specific labour classes.  This decision was communicated to  the  Government
of India vide letter dated 20.07.1998.  Thereafter, there was  the  creation
of new vacancies due to expansion of  the  said  Plant.   The  NTPC  took  a
decision to allot these newly created posts entirely to the  class  of  Land
Oustees.  This decision was communicated  to  the  Parliamentary  Committee,
and  as  per  the  same,  the  local  Employment  Exchanges  were  notified.
Further, the NTPC sent requests to all the  concerned  District  Magistrates
to publish information about the said vacancies.  On these basis,  the  NTPC
received applications, conducted  interview  procedures  and  appointed  the
successful candidates to the vacant posts, being all Land Oustees.=

 The position which emerges from the aforesaid narration of  events  is
this:
The  persons  who  were  selected  were  admittedly  eligible  to  be
considered as they were also Land Oustees.
No doubt,  the  posts  were  not
advertised by publication in the newspapers.
Facts remains  that  only  two
persons namely respondent Nos.1 and 2  made  a  grievance  in  this  behalf.
These two persons have also been considered for the posts under  the  orders
of this Court.  However, they have failed  in  the  selection.  
Others  who
were selected have already joined the posts.
In  a  matter  like  this,  no
useful purpose would be served in carrying out the directions  of  the  High
Court to have fresh selection process after issuing  advertisements  in  the
newspapers.

18.   We may record at this stage that about  70  other  persons  have  also
filed I.A.'s supporting the stand of respondent Nos.1 and  2.  
However,  it
is of significance to mention that all these persons had  duly  participated
in the selection process but could not make their mark  and  failed  to  get
selected.  
Therefore, these persons have no right  to  raise  any  grievance
about non-publication of the advertisement in the newspapers.

19.   Having regard to  these  peculiar  facts  and  aforesaid  developments
during the pendency of these appeals,
we find that there is no necessity  to
carry out any fresh selection process as directed by the High Court  in  the
impugned judgment.  The appeals are allowed and the direction is set aside.

      Civil Appeal @ S.L.P. (C) No.4686/2012
      Leave granted.

20.   This appeal is filed by five persons  who  also  participated  in  the
selection process and were selected.

21.   Pursuant to the orders dated 09.05.2013 directing NTPC to appoint  the
selected candidates, two out of the aforesaid  five  appellants  have  given
the appointment.
However, cases of other three appellants are  rejected  as
in the medical examination conducted, they  are  found  medically  unfit  as
suffering from 'colour blindness'.
They are  appellants  Nos.1,  4  and  5.
Learned counsel appearing for these appellants submitted that their  medical
examination was done in haste; they had  made  representation  to  the  NTPC
regarding constitution of Medical Board to re-examine their cases  to  which
NTPC was not agreeing; they had got themselves medically examined  from  the
same hospital and same doctor namely  NTPC,  Kahalagaon  Hospital  and  also
outside doctor and they had duly certified that these  appellants  were  not
suffered from 'colour blindness'.
Additional  affidavit  dated  26th  June,
2005 is filed including the result of their medical  examination  from  Out-
Patient Department of NTPC, Kahalagaon Hospital, as well as opinion of  some
private Doctors in support of the aforesaid submission.

22.   Having regard to the aforesaid facts, we are of the  opinion  that  it
would be in the interest of justice that NTPC  constitutes  another  Medical
Board for re-examination of these three appellants and decide their fate  on
the basis of the opinion given and take  further  action  on  the  basis  of
opinion given by the reconstitute Medical Board.

23.   This appeal is disposed of on the aforesaid terms.
2014 - Sept.- Month - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41886

                                                           NON-REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8487 OF 2014
                 (arising out of SLP (C) No. 31026 of 2011)

|NTPC KAHALAGAON & ORS.                           |…..APPELLANT(S)       |
|                                                 |                      |
|VERSUS                                           |                      |
|NAKUL DAS & ORS.                                 |…..RESPONDENT(S)      |

                                   W I T H

                     CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8489-8490 OF 2014
              (arising out of SLP (C) No. 33518-33519 of 2011)

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8488 OF 2014
                  (arising out of SLP (C) No. 4686 of 2012)

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8491 OF 2014
                 (arising out of SLP (C) No. 33772 of 2013)

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8492 OF 2014
                 (arising out of SLP (C) No. 33784 of 2013)


                               J U D G M E N T

A.K. SIKRI, J.
Civil Appeal @ SLP(C) no. 31026 of 2011
Civil Appeal @ SLP(C) No. 33518-33519 of 2011
Civil Appeal @ SLP(C) No. 33772 of 2013
Civil Appeal @ SLP(C) No. 33784 of 2013

      Leave granted.

2.    Civil Appeal arising out of Special Leave  Petition  (Civil)  No.31026
of 2011 is treated as lead case and the background  facts  culled  therefrom
are briefly mentioned below :

                 The appellant  in  this  case  is  National  Thermal  Power
Corporation,  Kahalagaon  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  'NTPC').   It
established a Super Thermal Power  Plant  in  the  District  of  Kahalagaon,
Bihar in the year 1986.  While doing so, the NTPC had prepared  a  plan  for
the recruitment of labour in such plant, with preference  to  be  given,  in
various classes of such labour, to persons whose  lands  had  been  acquired
for the construction of the said  plant  (Land  Oustees).   Thereafter,  the
NTPC ran into  industrial  relations  problems  as  the  said  Land  Oustees
demanded a larger share of preference  in  the  employment  in  the  various
classes  of  posts.   Accordingly,  the  NTPC  made   adjustments   to   the
recruitment procedure on 28.05.1986.   Subsequently,  it  ran  into  further
labour problems such as Bandhs, Gheraos, etc. by the said Land Oustees.   On
this account, the appellant was suffering huge loss on a daily basis.  As  a
result, the NTPC resolved to exclusively employ  Land  Oustees  in  all  the
specific labour classes.  This decision was communicated to  the  Government
of India vide letter dated 20.07.1998.  Thereafter, there was  the  creation
of new vacancies due to expansion of  the  said  Plant.   The  NTPC  took  a
decision to allot these newly created posts entirely to the  class  of  Land
Oustees.  This decision was communicated  to  the  Parliamentary  Committee,
and  as  per  the  same,  the  local  Employment  Exchanges  were  notified.
Further, the NTPC sent requests to all the  concerned  District  Magistrates
to publish information about the said vacancies.  On these basis,  the  NTPC
received applications, conducted  interview  procedures  and  appointed  the
successful candidates to the vacant posts, being all Land Oustees.

3.    The Parliamentary Committee devised a complete scheme/  procedure  for
appointments. It was of the opinion  that  in  the  ministerial  area,  NTPC
would not insist much for the experience of the candidates  falling  in  the
category of Land Oustees of priority group one.  As per the  Committee,  the
NTPC may induct people in the ministerial area and may  keep  them  on  such
positions for such time that one acquires the  requisite  experience.   Till
such time the requisite experience is attained, appointee was to be  treated
as on casual / muster roll employee.  However, no relaxation would  be  made
in the area as far as the job requirement  and  as  far  as  certificate  of
competency is concerned and a certificate of land would be  issued  was  the
Circle Officer Kahalagaon, which would duly be counter signed by  respective
LRDC.  The Committee was of the opinion that only one job would be  provided
to one member of a family falling in the priority group.  In  the  Interview
Board, apart from the representatives of the NTPC, Special Land  Acquisition
Officer, District Employment Officer were also to be  associated.   For  any
reason, if one was not in a position to attend the interview,  the  validity
of the interview so conducted was not to be challenged.

4.    It may be mentioned at this stage that the vacancy notified  were  101
against which 377 applicants, who were Land Oustees, were  considered.   Out
of these 101 posts, 69 were meant  for  Artisan  Trainee  (ITI  Fitter),  30
posts for Artisan Trainee (ITI Electrician) and 2  pots  for  Lab  Assistant
Trainee.  The NTPC availed the services of Indian Institute of  Psychometry,
Kolkata to conduct  the  written  tests.   Thereafter,  an  Interview  Board
comprising  of  representatives  from  the  State  Governments  /   Minority
Community and senior officers of the NTPC was  constituted  which  conducted
the interview of those candidates who have  passed  the  written  test.   In
this manner, selection of  101  persons  from  the  said  category  of  Land
Oustees was made.

5.    Before the selected persons could be  appointed,  two  writ  petitions
came to be filed in the  High  Court  of  Patna  challenging  the  aforesaid
selection.  One writ petition was filed by respondents Nos.1 and  2  herein.
Other was filed by some outsiders,  namely  those  who  were  not  the  Land
Oustees.  In  so  far  as  writ  petition  of  respondent  Nos.1  and  2  is
concerned,  their  main  grievance  was  that   the   method   for   calling
applications   only   through   Employment   Exchange   and   limiting   the
consideration of the candidates sponsored by  the  Employment  Exchange  was
not fair and there should have been a wider publicity  by  means  of  public
advertisement in the newspapers as well to make all such Land Oustees  aware
of the move of the NTPC for filling up of the said posts from  the  families
of Land Oustees.  It was contended that as  this  mode  of  advertising  the
vacancy through newspapers was not adopted, persons like  respondents  Nos.1
and 2 remained unaware of these vacancies and,  therefore,  they  could  not
apply for the posts and thereby, were left out of consideration.

6.    In so far as second writ petition filed by the  non  Land  Oustees  is
concerned, their challenge was  to  the  effect  that  100%  reservation  in
favour of Land Oustees was impermissible.

7.    The learned single Judge of the  High  Court  allowed  both  the  writ
petitions and interfered with the selection  and  appointment  made  by  the
NTPC.  Challenging the order of the learned single Judge, few  appeals  were
filed.  One was by the NTPC and other appeals were filed by those  who  were
selected but their selection was set aside  by  the  learned  single  Judge.
The Division Bench of the High  Court  has  decided  these  appeals  by  the
singular judgment dated 12.09.2011 which is impugned in these appeals.   The
High Court has modified the order of the single Judge partly.  In so far  as
writ petition of non Land Oustees is concerned,  their  contention  has  not
found favour with the Division  Bench  and  it  has  held  that  the  policy
decision of the NTPC in order to compensate for  the  loss  which  the  Land
Oustees had suffered was taken treating  such  Land  Oustees  as  a  special
class and such a decision could not be  treated  as  a  reservation  on  the
lines of  reservation  policy  provided  to  backward  classes.   Therefore,
restriction of 50% by treating a policy to be a policy  of  reservation  was
not justified.  On this count, the decision of the learned single Judge  has
been set aside, meaning thereby, the writ petitions filed by  the  outsiders
are dismissed.

8.    However, in so far as inaction of the  NTPC  in  not  advertising  the
posts by publication in newspapers is concerned, the decision of the  single
Judge is upheld by finding fault with the approach of the NTPC.  For  taking
this view, the Bench relied upon the judgment of this Court in the  case  of
Excise Superintendent, Malkapatnam v. K.B.N. Vishweshwara Rao, (1996) 6  SCC
216.  As  a  result  thereof,  direction  is  given  to  the  NTPC  to  give
opportunity to other eligible persons by giving advertisement in  newspapers
and complete  the  exercise  of  filling  up  of  101  posts  expeditiously,
preferably, within four months.

9.    Not satisfied with the aforesaid outcome of the writ appeal, the  NTPC
has filed the instant appeal.  Three other appeals arising out  of  SLP  (C)
No.33518-33519 of 2011, SLP (C) No.33772 of 2013 and  SLP  (C)  No.33784  of
2013 are filed by those candidates who were selected and  appointed  to  the
posts but their selection has been set aside.  Therefore, as  far  as  these
four appeals are concerned, they arise out of the same judgment of the  High
Court wherein aforesaid limited issue is to be considered namely whether  it
was incumbent  upon  the  NTPC  to  give  advertisement  in  the  newspapers
notifying the vacancies.

10.   It is the submission of the learned counsel appearing  for  NTPC  that
having regard to  the  facts  of  this  case  namely  where  requirement  is
confined to class/category of persons (Land Oustees in  the  present  case),
it would not be necessary to bring  out  advertisements  in  newspapers  and
recruitment through the Employment Exchange and local circulation of  Notice
would be consistent with the  principles  of  Articles  14  and  16  of  the
Constitution of India.  It was argued that the Land Oustees  reside  in  the
village  and  sub-divisional  towns  and  local  circulation  of  notice  in
addition to the requisition from the Employment  Exchange  was  appropriate.
Distinction was sought to  be  drawn  between  direct  recruitment  open  to
public and recruitment confined to a particular class/category  of  persons.
It was submitted that in the later category, this  Court  has  held  in  the
case of Nihal Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab, (2013) 14 SCC 65 that such  a
procedure making recruitment through the Employment Exchanges is  consistent
with the requirement of Articles 14 and 16 of  the  Constitution,  following
the judgment in the case of Union of India v.  N.  Hargopal,  (1987)  3  SCC
308.  The learned counsel also relied on the judgment in the  case  of  Arun
Tiwari & Ors. v. Zila Mansavi Shikshak Sangh & Ors., (1998) 2 SCC 332  where
the earlier judgments in the N. Hargopal and K.B.N. Visveshwara Rao,  (1996)
6 SCC 216 were duly considered.

11.   The learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 and 2,  on  the  other  hand,
sought to justify the order of the High Court,  based  on  the  judgment  of
this Court in N. Hargopal  and  K.B.N.  Visveshwara  Rao  (supra).   We  may
record that the learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 and 2 also ventured  to
submit that there were certain other irregularities as  well,  but  as  that
was not the foundation of their case nor is the  reason  for  setting  aside
the selections by the High Court, we declined to  look  into  those  alleged
irregularities.

12.   It would be pertinent to point out  at  this  stage  that  during  the
pendency of these proceedings,  some  subsequent  events  have  taken  place
which would demonstrate that it may not be  even  necessary  to  decide  the
issue involved.

13.   In the  special  leave  petitions  filed  by  the  NTPC  and  selected
candidates, notices were issued  and  when  these  petitions   came  up  for
hearing on 09.05.2013 after notice, following orders were passed:
      “SLP (c) No.33518-33519 of 2011

      Heard Learned counsel for the Petitioners.

      Looking to the facts and circumstances of the  case,  it  is  directed
that subject to final outcome of the  Special  Leave  Petition,  Eighty  Six
(86) persons are permitted to resume their duties, especially  when  it  has
been stated by NTPC that their working is adversely affected because of  non
availability of staff.

      SLP (C) No.31026 of 2011 and SLP (C) No.4686 of 2012

      Respondent Nos.1 and 2 in the above SLPs are the persons who have  not
been offered any appointment at this stage and their names are also  not  in
the waiting list.  The  petitioner  –  NTPC  is  directed  to  consider  the
eligibility of the said respondents and inform this Court whether  they  are
eligible for appointment or not.

      Rejoinder be filed within four weeks.

      List in the month of August, 2013 on a non-miscellaneous day.”


14.   At this stage, two of the  selected  candidates,  who  had  not  filed
separate SLP filed impleadment applications in  SLP  (C)  No.33518-33519  of
2011 which was allowed on 19.08.2013.   In  respect  of  these  two  persons
also, order was passed on 22.11.2013, directing  NTPC  to  appoint  them  as
well as they were at par with others who had  been  selected  and  in  whose
case order dated 09.05.2013 were already  passed.   Order  dated  22.11.2013
read as under:
      “Heard Mr. S.B. Mahayana, learned senior counsel in support  of  these
I.As..  He points out that two persons  whom  he  is  representing,  namely,
Bhaskar Bhushan and Dhirendra  Kumar  Singh  have  been  issued  appointment
orders.  This is on the footing that their  land  has  been  taken  over  by
NTPC.  Mr. Sunil Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing for NTPC  does  not
dispute it.  We have also heard Mr. Prem  Shankar  Sharma,  learned  counsel
appearing for respondent Nos. 1 & 2 in the  above  special  leave  petitions
and also appearing in support of other intervenors in the main SLP.  In  our
view,  as  observed  by  this  Court  in  order  dated   09.05.2013,   these
appointments will be subject to the  final  outcome  of  the  special  leave
petitions.   These  I.As.  Are  accordingly  disposed  of.   NTPC  will  act
accordingly.”


15.   The reading of the aforesaid two  orders  reflects  that  on  the  one
hand, all those who were selected in the  selection  process  undertaken  by
the NTPC were appointed.  On the  other  hand,  in  respect  of  respondents
Nos.1 and 2 herein who could not apply for the post, direction was given  to
the NTPC to consider their eligibility and inform  the  outcome  thereof  to
the Court.

16.   Respondent Nos.1 and 2 were thereafter considered for the post on  the
same yardstick which were  applied  by  the  NTPC  while  making  selections
earlier.  However, it is reported by the NTPC that these  two  persons  have
failed in the selection.

17.   The position which emerges from the aforesaid narration of  events  is
this:  The  persons  who  were  selected  were  admittedly  eligible  to  be
considered as they were also Land Oustees.  No doubt,  the  posts  were  not
advertised by publication in the newspapers.  Facts remains  that  only  two
persons namely respondent Nos.1 and 2  made  a  grievance  in  this  behalf.
These two persons have also been considered for the posts under  the  orders
of this Court.  However, they have failed  in  the  selection.   Others  who
were selected have already joined the posts.  In  a  matter  like  this,  no
useful purpose would be served in carrying out the directions  of  the  High
Court to have fresh selection process after issuing  advertisements  in  the
newspapers.

18.   We may record at this stage that about  70  other  persons  have  also
filed I.A.'s supporting the stand of respondent Nos.1 and  2.   However,  it
is of significance to mention that all these persons had  duly  participated
in the selection process but could not make their mark  and  failed  to  get
selected.  Therefore, these persons have no right  to  raise  any  grievance
about non-publication of the advertisement in the newspapers.

19.   Having regard to  these  peculiar  facts  and  aforesaid  developments
during the pendency of these appeals, we find that there is no necessity  to
carry out any fresh selection process as directed by the High Court  in  the
impugned judgment.  The appeals are allowed and the direction is set aside.
      Civil Appeal @ S.L.P. (C) No.4686/2012
      Leave granted.

20.   This appeal is filed by five persons  who  also  participated  in  the
selection process and were selected.

21.   Pursuant to the orders dated 09.05.2013 directing NTPC to appoint  the
selected candidates, two out of the aforesaid  five  appellants  have  given
the appointment.  However, cases of other three appellants are  rejected  as
in the medical examination conducted, they  are  found  medically  unfit  as
suffering from 'colour blindness'.  They are  appellants  Nos.1,  4  and  5.
Learned counsel appearing for these appellants submitted that their  medical
examination was done in haste; they had  made  representation  to  the  NTPC
regarding constitution of Medical Board to re-examine their cases  to  which
NTPC was not agreeing; they had got themselves medically examined  from  the
same hospital and same doctor namely  NTPC,  Kahalagaon  Hospital  and  also
outside doctor and they had duly certified that these  appellants  were  not
suffered from 'colour blindness'.  Additional  affidavit  dated  26th  June,
2005 is filed including the result of their medical  examination  from  Out-
Patient Department of NTPC, Kahalagaon Hospital, as well as opinion of  some
private Doctors in support of the aforesaid submission.

22.   Having regard to the aforesaid facts, we are of the  opinion  that  it
would be in the interest of justice that NTPC  constitutes  another  Medical
Board for re-examination of these three appellants and decide their fate  on
the basis of the opinion given and take  further  action  on  the  basis  of
opinion given by the reconstitute Medical Board.

23.   This appeal is disposed of on the aforesaid terms.


                                   …......................................J.
                                                            (J. Chelameswar)


                                   …......................................J.
                                                                (A.K. Sikri)




New Delhi;
September 05, 2014.

Extra - Judicial Confession - Both unidentified persons ran away on scooter with the money bag. - After more than 7 years i.e. on 18th July, 2006, a special team was constituted to apprehend the perpetrators of the crime. - application was moved for conducting Test Identification Parade (TIP) of the accused persons but the accused declined the same through separate statements Ex.PM/1 and Ex.PM/2. - Apex court held that We are conscious of the fact that extra-judicial confession by its very nature is rather a weak type of evidence and requires appreciation with great deal of care and caution. Where an extra-judicial confession is warranted by suspicious circumstances, its credibility becomes doubtful and it loses its importance. It is for this reason that Courts generally look for independent reliable corroboration before placing any reliance upon such a confession. (See Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) Supp (4) SCC 259, which was cited by the counsel for the appellants). However, we find that his statement is corroborated not by any circumstantial evidence but cast iron evidence in the form of two eye-witnesses. Furthermore, even if for the sake of arguments, we discard the testimony of PW-1, the evidence of two eye-witnesses who are found to be credible, is sufficient to uphold the conviction of the appellants.= CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.47 OF 2014 |PARGAN SINGH |…..APPELLANT(S) | | | | |VERSUS | | |STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR. |…..RESPONDENT(S) = 2014 - Sept. Month - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41885

 Extra - Judicial Confession - Both unidentified persons ran away on scooter with the  money  bag. -  After more than 7 years i.e. on 18th July, 2006, a  special  team  was constituted to  apprehend  the  perpetrators  of  the  crime. - application  was  moved  for conducting Test Identification Parade (TIP) of the accused persons  but  the accused declined the same through separate statements Ex.PM/1  and  Ex.PM/2. - Apex court held that   We  are  conscious  of  the
fact that extra-judicial confession by its very  nature  is  rather  a  weak type of evidence and requires appreciation  with  great  deal  of  care  and caution.  Where an extra-judicial  confession  is  warranted  by  suspicious circumstances,  its  credibility  becomes  doubtful   and it   loses   its importance.   It  is  for  this  reason  that  Courts  generally  look   for independent reliable corroboration before placing any reliance upon  such  a confession.  (See Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995)  Supp  (4)  SCC 259, which was cited by the counsel for the appellants).  However,  we  find that his statement is corroborated not by any  circumstantial  evidence  but cast iron evidence in the form of two eye-witnesses.  Furthermore,  even  if for the sake of arguments, we discard the testimony of  PW-1,  the  evidence of two eye-witnesses who are found to be credible, is sufficient  to  uphold the conviction of the appellants.=

Both unidentified persons ran away on scooter with the  money  bag.Complainant
Naveen Kumar and other persons arranged the vehicle  and  sent  Varun  Kumar
and Kamaljit Singh to Civil Hospital, Phagwara.  When  the  complainant  was
going to police station to report the matter, the police party met  him  and
his statement was got recorded by ASI Iqbal Singh  (Investigating  Officer),
Police Station City Bhagwara at 6.00 p.m. on the same day.   Ruqa  was  sent
to the police station on the  basis  of  which  FIR  was  registered.   Then
Investigating Officer alongwith complainant and police party went to  Chadha
Market, City Phagwara and saw the dead body of Varun Kumar and  one  injured
Kamaljit Singh at the  spot.   The  injured  was  sent  to  Civil  Hospital,
Phagwara.  Inquest proceedings were prepared and  the  dead  body  of  Varun
Kumar was sent for postmortem examination.  Blood stained earth  was  lifted
from the spot and the same was taken into police possession after  preparing
a sealed parcel.  Vespa scooter lying  at  the  spot  was  also  taken  into
police possession.  As can be seen from the aforesaid  statement  of  Naveen
Sharma, the two perpetrators of the aforesaid crime were sikh gentlemen  but
unknown to the complainant or other persons.  The Police tried to trace  the
culprits but was unsuccessful for number of years.

4.    After more than 7 years i.e. on 18th July, 2006, a  special  team  was
constituted to  apprehend  the  perpetrators  of  the  crime.   As  per  the
prosecution version, the investigating  officer  (I.O.)  received  a  secret
information on 24.07.2006 that the two appellants herein were  actually  the
persons who had committed the said crime.=

Further  allegation  of  the  prosecution  is  that  on
02.08.2006, one Vishwa  Mitter  (PW-1)  informed  the  I.O.  that  both  the
accused had confessed  before  him  that  they  had  shot  the  persons  and
committed the aforesaid robbery.  His statement was recorded by the I.O.  on
02.08.2006 to this effect.  
On 07.08.2006, a naka  was  laid  and  at  about
6:45 p.m. both the accused were seen coming on a  scooter  which  was  being
driven by Pargan Singh and Harminder  Singh  was  sitting  on  the  pillion.
Both the accused were apprehended and arrested.   
On  08.08.2006,  both  the
accused were produced  before  the  Court  and  application  was  moved  for
conducting Test Identification Parade (TIP) of the accused persons  but  the
accused declined the same through separate statements Ex.PM/1  and  Ex.PM/2.
Statements of  witnesses  were  recorded.  =

In any case, we are of the opinion that both  the  courts  below  have
believed the statement of PW-1 who was the Pradhan of his  Mohalla  and  not
only a respectable person and had no axe to grind.   We  see  no  reason  to
differ with the conclusions of the two courts below accepting the  statement
of PW-1 to the effect that these  two  appellants  had  made  extra-judicial
confession before him.  More so, we find that his  version  is  corroborated
by the two eye-witnesses namely PW-1 and PW-2.   We  are  conscious  of  the
fact that extra-judicial confession by its very  nature  is  rather  a  weak
type of evidence and requires appreciation  with  great  deal  of  care  and
caution.  Where an extra-judicial  confession  is  warranted  by  suspicious
circumstances,  its  credibility  becomes  doubtful   and   it   loses   its
importance.   It  is  for  this  reason  that  Courts  generally  look   for
independent reliable corroboration before placing any reliance upon  such  a
confession.  (See Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995)  Supp  (4)  SCC
259, which was cited by the counsel for the appellants).  However,  we  find
that his statement is corroborated not by any  circumstantial  evidence  but
cast iron evidence in the form of two eye-witnesses.  Furthermore,  even  if
for the sake of arguments, we discard the testimony of  PW-1,  the  evidence
of two eye-witnesses who are found to be credible, is sufficient  to  uphold
the conviction of the appellants.

22.   For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the opinion  that  these  appeals
are bereft of any merit and are accordingly dismissed.

2014 - Sept. Month - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41885

                                                                 REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                        CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.47 OF 2014


|PARGAN SINGH                               |…..APPELLANT(S)                 |
|                                           |                                |
|VERSUS                                     |                                |
|STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR.                     |…..RESPONDENT(S)                |

                                    WITH

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1929 OF 2014
               (arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.4071 of 2013)


|HARMINDER SINGH                            |…..APPELLANT(S)                 |
|                                           |                                |
|VERSUS                                     |                                |
|STATE OF PUNJAB                            |…..RESPONDENT(S)                |



                               J U D G M E N T

A.K. SIKRI, J.


                 Leave granted in Special Leave Petition (Criminal)  No.4071
of 2013.


2.    By these appeals, the two appellant  challenge  the  veracity  of  the
judgment of the High Court dated 13.12.2012   whereby  the  High  Court  has
dismissed their appeals which were  preferred  against  the  judgment  dated
25.09.2008 and order of sentence dated 27.09.2008  passed  by  the  Sessions
Judge, Kapurthala,  Punjab.   The  Sessions  Judge  had,  by  the  aforesaid
judgment, convicted the  appellants  under  Section  302,  397  as  well  as
Section 307 IPC read with Section 34 IPC.  For  the  offence  under  Section
302  IPC,  both  the  appellants  were  given  the  sentence   of   rigorous
imprisonment of life and fine of Rs.50,000/- each and in default of  payment
of fine, they have to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for  two  years.
For conviction under Section 307 IPC read with Section 34 IPC,  sentence  of
10 years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs.25,000/-  is  imposed  and  in
default  of  payment  of  fine,  they  have  to  undergo  further   rigorous
imprisonment for one year.  Likewise, for offences under  Section  397  IPC,
rigorous imprisonment for a period  of  10  years  is  imposed.   All  these
sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

3.    The prosecution case, as contained in  the  chargesheet  presented  in
the trial court, runs as under:
                 One Naveen Sharma reported the matter  to  the  Police,  on
the basis of which FIR was registered, that  on  25.03.1999  at  about  5:00
p.m., he had gone to Bank of Punjab on scooter No.PB-08-5477.   Varun  Kumar
alias Kaka was accompanying him though he was driving his  own  scooter  LML
Vespa.  Both of them reached the Bank and withdrew a sum of Rs.4 lakhs  from
the Bank.  Varun Kumar placed the bag containing money in front  of  scooter
and they started coming back to their  office  which  is  at  Gandhi  Chowk,
Phagwara.  Varun Kumar was ahead of Naveen Sharma.   When  they  reached  at
Chadha Market at about 5.30 p.m., one black colour scooter came  from  their
backside on which two sikh gentlemen with trimmed beard,  one  was  tall  in
height and other was of middle  height,  both  of  them  wearing  pants  and
shirts, started firing with pistol on Varun Kumar which hit  him  and  Varun
Kumar fell down from the scooter.  The person  sitting  on  the  pillion  of
scooter, snatched the money bag from Varun Kumar which was also  having  one
cheque book and they turned back their scooter. Then  Kamaljit  Singh  tried
to stop them but out of whom one sikh gentleman,  who  was  sitting  on  the
pillion, fired with pistol  on  Kamaljit  Singh  and  he  fell  down.   Both
unidentified persons ran away on scooter with the  money  bag.   Complainant
Naveen Kumar and other persons arranged the vehicle  and  sent  Varun  Kumar
and Kamaljit Singh to Civil Hospital, Phagwara.  When  the  complainant  was
going to police station to report the matter, the police party met  him  and
his statement was got recorded by ASI Iqbal Singh  (Investigating  Officer),
Police Station City Bhagwara at 6.00 p.m. on the same day.   Ruqa  was  sent
to the police station on the  basis  of  which  FIR  was  registered.   Then
Investigating Officer alongwith complainant and police party went to  Chadha
Market, City Phagwara and saw the dead body of Varun Kumar and  one  injured
Kamaljit Singh at the  spot.   The  injured  was  sent  to  Civil  Hospital,
Phagwara.  Inquest proceedings were prepared and  the  dead  body  of  Varun
Kumar was sent for postmortem examination.  Blood stained earth  was  lifted
from the spot and the same was taken into police possession after  preparing
a sealed parcel.  Vespa scooter lying  at  the  spot  was  also  taken  into
police possession.  As can be seen from the aforesaid  statement  of  Naveen
Sharma, the two perpetrators of the aforesaid crime were sikh gentlemen  but
unknown to the complainant or other persons.  The Police tried to trace  the
culprits but was unsuccessful for number of years.

4.    After more than 7 years i.e. on 18th July, 2006, a  special  team  was
constituted to  apprehend  the  perpetrators  of  the  crime.   As  per  the
prosecution version, the investigating  officer  (I.O.)  received  a  secret
information on 24.07.2006 that the two appellants herein were  actually  the
persons who had committed the said crime.  On  receiving  this  information,
I.O. conducted the raids at the houses of these accused  persons  but  could
not  arrest  them.   Further  allegation  of  the  prosecution  is  that  on
02.08.2006, one Vishwa  Mitter  (PW-1)  informed  the  I.O.  that  both  the
accused had confessed  before  him  that  they  had  shot  the  persons  and
committed the aforesaid robbery.  His statement was recorded by the I.O.  on
02.08.2006 to this effect.  On 07.08.2006, a naka  was  laid  and  at  about
6:45 p.m. both the accused were seen coming on a  scooter  which  was  being
driven by Pargan Singh and Harminder  Singh  was  sitting  on  the  pillion.
Both the accused were apprehended and arrested.   On  08.08.2006,  both  the
accused were produced  before  the  Court  and  application  was  moved  for
conducting Test Identification Parade (TIP) of the accused persons  but  the
accused declined the same through separate statements Ex.PM/1  and  Ex.PM/2.
Statements of  witnesses  were  recorded.   After  necessary  investigation,
challan against the appellants was presented before the Court.

5.    The trial court framed the charges against these  appellants  for  the
offences under Section 302, 307 and 397 IPC read with Section 34  IPC.   The
appellants pleaded innocence and claimed trial.   The  prosecution  examined
as many as 14 witnesses.  It is not necessary to  mention  about  deposition
of all these witnesses.  Material witnesses are PW-1 (Vishwa  Mitter),  PW-2
(Kamaljit Singh – an  injured  eye  witness),  PW-3  (Naveen  Sharma  –  the
complainant and eye witness), PW-5 (Dr. Kamaljit Singh  –  Medical  Officer)
who has conducted the postmortem examination  of  the  dead  body  of  Varun
Kumar on 26.03.1999 along with two other Doctors i.e. PW-6 (Dr. Ajay  Kumar,
Medical Officer, Civil  Hospital,  Phagwara),  Dr.  Gurdit  Singh,  who  had
medically examined Kamaljit Singh, the  injured  person,  PW-10  (ASI  Iqbal
Singh) and PW-12 (SI Inder Singh) who deposed  regarding  the  investigation
of the case.

6.    PW-1 had mainly stated about the extra-judicial confession  which  the
appellants had allegedly made to him on  30th  July,  2006.   PW-2  Kamaljit
Singh who sustained injury and had seen the occurrence,  deposed  about  the
incident that occurred on  25th  March,  1999.   PW-5  Dr.  Kamaljit  Singh,
Medical Officer, Civil Hospital, Phagwara, deposed regarding conducting  the
postmortem examination on the dead body of Varun Kumar on  26.03.1999  along
with Dr. Ajay Kumar and Dr. Gurdit Singh and found a lacerated wound 1.75  x
1.5 cm round to oval inverted margins situated just on left side of  midline
in the area of described upper half of  scapula  and  back  bone.   Blackish
staining with burned margins  present.   In  the  opinion  of  the  doctors,
injuries were ante-mortem in nature and the cause of death in this case  was
severe haemorrhage and shock and injury to  vital  organs  lung,  liver  and
major vessels which was sufficient to cause  death  in  ordinary  course  of
nature.  PW-6 Dr. Ajay Kumar, Medical  Officer,  Civil  Hospital,  Phagwara,
mainly  deposed  regarding  conducting  the  medico  legal  examination   of
Kamaljit Singh and found the following injuries:-

1.  Multiple lacerated wounds 8 in number of size 3 mm x 3  mm  x  2  mm  in
front of right shoulder.  Red in colour and  bleeding  from  the  wound  was
present.

2.  Lacerated wounds four in numbers of size 3 mm x 3 mm x 2 mm in front  of
right side of neck.  Bleeding from the  wound  was  present.   It  was  kept
under observations and advised x-ray on nect.

3.  Three lacerated wounds 3 mm x 3 mm x 3 mm below the lower leg  and  chin
on right side.  Bleeding from the wound was  present.   It  was  kept  under
observation and advised x-ray.

4.  Four lacerated wounds 3 mm x 3 mm x 2 mm one above  and  one  below  the
right eye, two  on  its  lateral  side.   Bleedings  from  the  wounds  were
present, upper and lower eye lids  were  swollen  and  blackened.   Eye  was
closed.  It was kept under observation.  X-ray was advised and eye check  up
was advised.

5.  Lacerated wound on right side and below the tongue, which was 4 mm  x  4
mm.  Bleeding from the mouth was present.   Toungue  was  edematous.   X-ray
was advised and kept under observation.

All injuries were caused with fire arm.


7.    After the prosecution concluded  its  evidence,  the  appellants  were
examined under Section 313 of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  and  were
confronted with the incriminating evidence which had come on record  against
them.   They denied the correctness of  the  evidence  and  maintained  that
they were innocent.  No defence evidence was, however, led by  them.   After
hearing the arguments, the trial court  convicted  and  sentenced  both  the
appellants, which has been upheld by the High Court, as mentioned above.

8.    A perusal of the judgment of the High  Court  reveals  that  the  High
Court has accepted the version of PW-2 on the ground that he was an  injured
eye witness to  the  occurrence  and,  therefore,  his  presence  cannot  be
doubted.  It is further observed  by  the  High  Court  that  similarly  the
presence of Naveen Sharma, the complainant (PW-3)  also  cannot  be  doubted
who had reported the matter to the Police within no time  and  the  FIR  was
prompt one.  In the opinion of the High Court, the testimony  of  both  PW-2
and PW-3 was consistent on material points;  that  there  were  no  material
improvements or material contradictions which could shake  the  veracity  of
their version.

9.    The defence had strongly  pleaded  before  the  High  Court  that  the
statements of PW-2 and PW-3 identifying the appellant in the Court  was  not
credible as the persons who committed the offence  were  admittedly  unknown
to these witnesses.  Therefore, it was not possible to  remember  the  faces
of said criminals after a period of  7  years.   This  argument  is  brushed
aside by the High Court on the ground that the  appellants  had  refused  to
take part in the  TIP.   Plea  of  the  appellants  that  their  refusal  to
participate in the identification parade was because of the reason that  the
Police had already shown their  faces  to  these  witnesses  in  the  Police
Station after their arrest, also did not find by the High  Court  to  be  of
any merit.  Another reason given by the High Court in accepting the  version
of PW-2 and PW-3 is  that  there  is  no  enmity  or  motive  of  these  eye
witnesses to  deposed  falsely  against  these  appellants  and  that  their
version was corroborated by the medical evidence in  this  case.   Likewise,
statement of PW-1 Vishwa Mitter who is stated to be Pradhan of  Mohalla  has
been accepted as he would not be telling a lie that the appellants had  made
extra judicial confession before him about the  incident.   Thus,  observing
that there was no reason  for  these  witnesses  to  falsely  implicate  the
appellants and to let off the actual culprits, the High Court took the  view
that these witnesses were truthful and trustworthy.  These are, then,  other
reasons recorded by the courts below in convicting the two appellants.

10.   It is clear from the above that the conviction is primarily  based  on
the depositions of PW-1 to PW-3.  PW-1 is the person  who  stated  that  the
two appellants had confessed their guilt before him and PW-2  and  PW-3  are
the eye witnesses who have identified the appellants.

11.   Before us, it was argued with all  vehemence  by  Mr.  Shreepal  Singh
(who appeared for appellant Pargan Singh) and  Shri  Shiv  Kumar  Suri  (who
argued for the appellant Harminder Singh) that the entire prosecution  story
was a suspect in the manner in which it was woven and the  circumstances  in
which it was created.  Drawing our attention to the cross-examination of PW-
2 Kamaljit Singh it was argued that he had  accepted  that  on  8th  August,
2006, he had visited the Police Station and at that time, Police  asked  him
to identify the accused persons in the Police Station.   From  statement  of
this witness, the submission raised by the learned counsel for  the  defence
was that since PW-2 had already visited the  Police  Station  on  06.08.2006
and the appellants faces were  shown  to  him,  there  could  not  have  any
purpose of Test Identification Parade  thereafter  inasmuch  as  application
for Test Identification Parade was moved before the Magistrate only  on  8th
August, 2006.  It was further argued that even as per these witnesses,  they
had not seen the  appellants  before  the  said  occurrence.   It  was  thus
pleaded that when they were totally unknown faces to PW-2 and PW-3  and  the
incident lasted for one and half minute, it was  beyond  comprehension  that
these two persons  would  remember  the  faces  of  the  perpetrators.   The
learned counsel, thus, argued that the appellants  were  falsely  framed  in
the said crime which was not committed by them.

12.   Learned counsel for the respondent/State, on the other hand, made  his
submissions on the same lines on which  conclusions  are   recorded  by  the
Courts below.  He argued that PW-1 and PW-2 were the eye-witnesses  and  out
of them, PW-2 was even an injured  eye-witness.   Therefore,  there  was  no
reason to disbelieve their testimonies, which aspect was dealt with  by  the
two courts below  in  sufficient  details  and  the  finding  of  facts  was
recorded to the effect that their statements were worthy  of  credence.   He
further submitted that 90 seconds was more than sufficient  time  for  these
witnesses to observe the assailants namely the appellants herein and  absorb
them in their memory, more so, when these  witnesses  are  attacked  by  the
said appellants.  He further submitted  that  the  High  Court  has  rightly
pointed out that PW-1 before  whom  confession  was  made,  was  a  reliable
witness as he was an independent witness.  The argument  of  the  appellants
that their faces were shown by the Police to PW-2 in the Police Station  and
that was the reason to refuse to  participate  in  the  Test  Identification
Parade, was also refuted with the submission that  no  such  case  was  ever
pleaded in the courts below.

13.   We have considered the aforesaid submissions  with  reference  to  the
record.

14.   Let us first discuss the testimonies of PW-2 and PW-3 who  are  stated
to be the eye-witnesses.  Both of them have narrated the incident in  unison
and their version is almost the same.  PW-2, who  is  the  injured  witness,
has even in his  cross-examination,  narrated  that  deceased  was  attacked
first by the accused and after firing the shot at him, the accused fired PW-
2 when they were flee with the bag of money.   The occurrence lasted for  1½
minutes.  He has further stated  that  few  seconds  after  the  receipt  of
injury, he became unconscious and  regain  consciousness  after  4  days  of
receipt of the injury.  The testimony  of  this  witness  is  sought  to  be
discredited by arguing that when the incident lasted for  only  90  seconds,
it was difficult to remember the faces  of  the  accused  persons  after  7½
years  of  the  incident,  particularly   in   the   absence   of   previous
acquaintance.
15.   Before entering upon the discussion on this aspect  specific  to  this
case, we would like to make some  general  observations  on  the  theory  of
“memory”.  Scientific understanding of how  memory  works  is  described  by
Geoffrey R. Loftus while commenting upon  the  judgment  dated  January  16,
2002 rendered in the case of Javier  Suarez  Medina  v.  Janie  Cockrell  by
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit in Case No.01-10763.   He  has
explained that a  generally  accepted  theory  of  this  process  was  first
explicated in detail by Neisser (1967)  and  has  been  continually  refined
over the intervening quarter-century.  The basic tenets of  the  theory  are
as follows: First, memory does not work like  a  video  recorder.   Instead,
when a person  witnesses  some  complex  event,  such  as  a  crime,  or  an
accident, or a wedding, or a basketball game, he or she  acquires  fragments
of information from the environment.  These fragments  are  then  integrated
with other information from other sources.  Examples of  such  sources  are:
information previously stored in memory that  leads  to  prior  expectations
about what will  happen,  and  information-both  information  from  external
sources, and information generated internally in  the  form  of  inferences-
that is  acquired  after  the  event  has  occurred.   The  result  of  this
amalgamation  of  information  is  the  person's  memory  for   the   event.
Sometimes this memory is accurate, and other times  it  is  inaccurate.   An
initial memory of some event,  once  formed,  is  not  “cast  in  concrete.”
Rather,  a  memory  is  a  highly  fluid  entity  that  changes,   sometimes
dramatically, with the passage of time.  Every time a witness  thinks  about
some event-revisits his or her memory  of  it-the  memory  changes  in  some
fashion.  Such changes take many forms.  For instance, a  witness  can  make
inferences about how things probably happened, and these  inferences  become
part of the memory.  New information that is consistent with  the  witness's
beliefs about what must have happened can be  integrated  into  the  memory.
Details that do not seem to fit a coherent story of  what  happened  can  be
stripped away.  In short, the memory possessed by the witness at some  later
point (e.g., when the witness testifies in court)  can  be  quite  different
from the memory that the witness  originally  formed  at  the  time  of  the
event.  Memory researchers  study  how  memory  works  using  a  variety  of
techniques.  A common technique is to try to  identify  circumstances  under
which memory is  inaccurate  versus  circumstances  under  which  memory  is
accurate.  These efforts have revealed  four  major  sets  of  circumstances
under  which  memory  tends  to  be  inaccurate.   The  first  two  sets  of
circumstances involve what is happening at  the  time  the  to-be-remembered
event is originally experienced, while the second two sets of  circumstances
involve things that happen after the event has  ended.   The  first  set  of
circumstances involves the state of the environment at the  time  the  event
is experienced.  Examples of  poor  environmental  conditions  include  poor
lighting, obscured or interrupted vision, and  long  viewing  distance.   To
the degree that environmental conditions are poor, there is relatively  poor
information on which to base an initial perception and the  memory  that  it
engenders to begin with.  This will ultimately result in a  memory  that  is
at best incomplete and, as will be described in more  detail  below,  is  at
worst systematically distorted.  The second set  of  circumstances  involves
the state of the observer at the time the event  is  experienced.   Examples
of suboptimal observer states include high  stress,  perceived  or  directly
inflicted  violence,  viewing  members  of  different  races,  and  diverted
attention.  As with poor environmental factors, this will ultimately  result
in a memory that is at best incomplete and, as will  be  described  in  more
detail below, is at  worst  systematically  distorted.   The  third  set  of
circumstances involves  what  occurs  during  the  retention  interval  that
intervenes between the to-be-remembered event and the time the person  tries
to remember aspects of the event.  Examples  of  memory-distorting  problems
include a  lengthy  retention  interval,  which  leads  to  forgetting,  and
inaccurate information learned by the person during the  retention  interval
that can get incorporated into the person's memory for the  original  event.
The fourth set of circumstances involves errors introduced at  the  time  of
retrieval, i.e., at the time the person is trying to  remember  what  he  or
she experienced.  Such problems include biased tests and leading  questions.
 They can lead to a biased report  of  the  person's  memory  and  can  also
potentially change and bias the memory itself.
16.   While discussing the present case, it is to be borne in mind that  the
manner in which the incident occurred and description  thereof  as  narrated
by PW-2, has not been questioned on the ground that narration should not  be
believed because of lapse of time.   Instead,  the  appellants  have  joined
issue on a very limited aspects viz.  their  identification  on  the  ground
that faces of the culprits could not have been remembered after 7½ years  of
the occurrence as memory fades by that time.

17.   We are of the opinion that under the given circumstances  and  keeping
in view the nature of incident, 90 seconds  was  too  long  a  period  which
could enable the eye-witness (PW-2) to watch the accused persons and such  a
horrible experience would not be easily forgotten.  Death of  a  friend  and
near death experience by the witness himself would be etched in  the  memory
for  long.   Therefore,  faces  of  accused  persons  would  not  have  been
forgotten even after 7½ years.

18.   Whether a  particular  event  or  the  faces  of  a  person  could  be
remembered would depend upon the circumstances under which those  faces  are
seen.  One cannot lose sight of the fact that here is a case where  the  two
accused persons are the assailants who had shot dead Varun Kumar,  companion
of PW-2.  Thereafter, they had fired at PW-2 as  well.   For  PW-2,  it  was
clearly a horror scene resulting into traumatic experience.  In a case  like
this, even when these two assailants had remained before  his  face  for  90
seconds, these 90  seconds  was  sufficiently  long  time  to  observe  them
closely and the person encountering such an event  would  not  forget  those
faces even for a life time, what to talk for 7½ years that have  elapsed  in
between.  We would like to support our hypothesis with an anecdote.  Once  a
friend of Einstein, the  renowned  scientist  who  invented  the  theory  of
relativity, asked him to explain that theory.  Mr. Newton explained it in  a
simple manner for common man's understanding as under: If a boy  is  sitting
with his girlfriend/lover, he would feel the time fly away  and  60  minutes
would seem as 60 seconds.  On the other hand, if a person  puts  his  finger
in a hot boiling water, 60 seconds would feel like 60 minutes.  This is  the
theory of relativity.

19.   In the present case, the circumstances on  which  the  PW-2  seen  the
accused persons even for 90 seconds, that was  sufficient  to  absorb  their
faces.  In contrast, things would be different if  it  is  a  case  of  some
large get together where two unknown persons have a chance  meeting  for  90
seconds.  Therefore, we reject the  argument  of  learned  counsel  for  the
appellants that PW-2 could not recollect the face of  the  appellants  after
7½ years and thus, he was not telling the truth.  We have to  keep  in  mind
that PW-2 suffered serious injury because of the shot fired at  him  by  the
assailants and seriousness of the injury has resulted into conviction  under
Section 307 IPC as well.   The testimony of an injured  witness  requires  a
higher degree of  credibility  and  there  have  to  be  strong  reasons  to
describe the same.  The appellants have not been able  to  demonstrate  that
the  courts  below  unreasonably  reached   the   conclusion   as   to   the
admissibility  of  the  testimony  of  PW-2.   Apart  from  a  very   feeble
submission that this witness identified the appellants 7½  years  after  the
incident, their arguments do not address the issue of whether  testimony  of
PW-2 was false.  We are, thus, not at all impresses by this argument of  the
learned counsel for the appellants.  Except that PW-3 is not an injured eye-
witness, he has also seen the occurrence and the reasons  given  in  support
of attaching credibility to the statement of PW-2 would apply  in  his  case
as well.

20.   We also do not find any merit in the argument of  the  appellants  qua
their refusal  to  participate  in  the  Test  Identification  Parade.   The
argument that PW-2 was shown the faces of the appellants in  Police  Station
after their arrest is raised for the first time before us and  that  too  at
the hearing of the case.  No reason was  given  as  to  why  the  appellants
refused to participate in Test Identification Parade before the trial  court
at the time of refusal or even in their statements  recorded  under  Section
313 of the Cr.P.C.  It was not an argument raised at  the  time  of  hearing
before the trial court or even before the High Court  when  we  examine  the
matter in the aforesaid prospective, the argument advanced  by  the  learned
counsel for the appellants to discredit the testimony of  PW-1,  also  pales
into insignificance.

21.   In any case, we are of the opinion that both  the  courts  below  have
believed the statement of PW-1 who was the Pradhan of his  Mohalla  and  not
only a respectable person and had no axe to grind.   We  see  no  reason  to
differ with the conclusions of the two courts below accepting the  statement
of PW-1 to the effect that these  two  appellants  had  made  extra-judicial
confession before him.  More so, we find that his  version  is  corroborated
by the two eye-witnesses namely PW-1 and PW-2.   We  are  conscious  of  the
fact that extra-judicial confession by its very  nature  is  rather  a  weak
type of evidence and requires appreciation  with  great  deal  of  care  and
caution.  Where an extra-judicial  confession  is  warranted  by  suspicious
circumstances,  its  credibility  becomes  doubtful   and   it   loses   its
importance.   It  is  for  this  reason  that  Courts  generally  look   for
independent reliable corroboration before placing any reliance upon  such  a
confession.  (See Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995)  Supp  (4)  SCC
259, which was cited by the counsel for the appellants).  However,  we  find
that his statement is corroborated not by any  circumstantial  evidence  but
cast iron evidence in the form of two eye-witnesses.  Furthermore,  even  if
for the sake of arguments, we discard the testimony of  PW-1,  the  evidence
of two eye-witnesses who are found to be credible, is sufficient  to  uphold
the conviction of the appellants.

22.   For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the opinion  that  these  appeals
are bereft of any merit and are accordingly dismissed.



                                   …......................................J.
                                                            (J. Chelameswar)



                                   …......................................J.
                                                                (A.K. Sikri)
New Delhi;
September 05, 2014.

Arbitration - whether the Arbitrator could have decided the issues which were not arbitrable. - No - Apex court held that Section 7(3) of the Act clearly specifies that the contract with regard to arbitration must be in writing. Thus, so far as the disputes which have been referred to in Clause 39 of the contract are concerned, it was not open to the Arbitrator to arbitrate upon the said disputes as there was a specific clause whereby the said disputes had been “excepted”. - In the instant case, the respondent authorities had raised an objection relating to the arbitrability of the aforestated issue before the Arbitrator and yet the Arbitrator had rendered his decision on the said “excepted” dispute. In our opinion, the Arbitrator could not have decided the said “excepted” dispute.- We, therefore, hold that it was not open to the Arbitrator to decide the issues which were not arbitrable and the award, so far as it relates to disputes regarding non-arbitrable disputes is concerned, is bad in law and is hereby quashed.-The Award was made on 21.9.2002 and therefore, we uphold the portion of the award so far as it pertains to the disputes which were arbitrable, but so far as the portion of the arbitral award which determines the rate for extra work done by the contractor is concerned, we quash and set aside the same.- Needless to say that it would be open to the contractor to take appropriate legal action for recovery of payment for work done, which was not forming part of the contract because the said issue decided by the Arbitrator is now set aside.= CIVIL APPEAL NO.534 OF 2007 M/s Harsha Constructions … Appellant Versus Union of India & Ors. … Respondents = 2014 - Sept.Month - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41883

  Arbitration -  whether  the  Arbitrator  could  have decided the issues which were not arbitrable. - No - Apex court held that Section 7(3) of the Act clearly specifies that the contract with  regard  to arbitration must be in writing.  Thus, so far as  the  disputes  which  have been referred to in Clause 39 of the contract  are  concerned,  it  was  not open to the Arbitrator to arbitrate upon the said disputes as  there  was  a specific clause whereby the said disputes  had  been  “excepted”. - In  the instant case, the respondent authorities had raised  an  objection  relating to the arbitrability of the aforestated issue before the Arbitrator and  yet the Arbitrator had rendered his decision on  the  said  “excepted”  dispute. In our opinion, the Arbitrator could not have decided  the  said  “excepted” dispute.- We, therefore, hold that it was not open to the  Arbitrator  to  decide the issues which were not arbitrable and the award, so far as it relates  to disputes regarding non-arbitrable disputes is concerned, is bad in  law  and is hereby quashed.-The Award was made on 21.9.2002 and  therefore,  we  uphold  the portion of the award so far as  it  pertains  to  the  disputes  which  were arbitrable,  but  so  far  as  the  portion  of  the  arbitral  award  which determines the rate for extra work done by the contractor is  concerned,  we quash and set aside the same.- Needless to say that it would  be  open  to  the  contractor  to  take appropriate legal action for recovery of payment for work  done,  which  was not forming part of the contract because  the  said  issue  decided  by  the Arbitrator is now set aside.=


 The Union of India had entered into a contract for construction  of  a  road
bridge at a  level crossing and in the said  contract  there  was  a  clause
with regard to arbitration.
The issue with which we are  concerned  in  the
instant case, in a nutshell, is as under:-
“When  in  a  contract  of  arbitration,  certain  disputes  are   expressly
“excepted”, whether the Arbitrator can arbitrate  on  such  excepted  issues
and what are the consequences if the Arbitrator decides such issues?”

For the purpose of considering the issue, in our  opinion,  certain  clauses
incorporated in the contract are relevant and those clauses  are  reproduced
hereinbelow :-

“Clause 39.  Any  item  of  work  carried  out  by  the  Contractor  on  the
instructions of the Engineer which is not included in the accepted  schedule
of rates shall be executed at the  rates  set  forth  in  the  “Schedule  of
Rates, South Central Railway” modified by the tender  percentage  and  where
such items are not contained in the latter at the rates agreed upon  between
the Engineer and the Contractor before the execution of such items  of  work
and the Contractor shall be bound to notify  the  Engineer  at  least  seven
days before the necessity arises for the execution of  such  items  of  work
that the accepted schedule of rates does not include a  rate  or  rates  for
the extra work involved.

    The rates payable for such items     shall be decided at the meeting  to
be held between the Engineer and the contractor in  as  short  a  period  as
possible after the need for the special item has come  to  the  notice.   In
case the contractor fails to attend the meeting after being notified  to  do
so or in the event of no settlement being arrived at the  Railway  shall  be
entitled to execute the extra works by other means and the contractor  shall
have no claim for loss or  damage  that  may  result  from  such  procedure.
Provided that if the Contractor commences work or incurs any expenditure  in
regard thereto before the rates are determined and  agreed  upon  as  lastly
mentioned, then and in such a case the Contractor shall only be entitled  to
be paid in respect of the work carried out or expenditure  incurred  by  him
prior to the date of the rates as aforesaid according to the rates as  shall
be fixed by the Engineer.  However, if the contractor is not satisfied  with
the decision of the Engineer in this respect he  may  appeal  to  the  Chief
Engineer within 30 days of getting the decision of  the  Engineer  supported
by the analysis of the rates claimed. The Chief  Engineer's  decision  after
hearing both the parties in the matter would be final  and  binding  on  the
contractor and the Railway.”

“Clause-63.  All disputes and differences of  any  kind  whatsoever  arising
out of or in connection with the contract whether  during  the  progress  of
the  work  or  after  its  completion  and  whether  before  or  after   the
determination of the contract shall be referred by  the  Contractor  to  the
Railway and the Railway shall within a reasonable time after receipt of  the
contractor's presentation make and notify decisions on all matters  referred
to by the contractor in writing provided that matters  for  which  provision
has been made in Clause  18,  22(5),  39,  45(a),  55,  55-A(5),  61(2)  and
62(1)(xiii)(B)(e)(b) of the General Conditions of contract or in any  Clause
of the Special conditions of the  contract  shall  be  deemed  as  'Excepted
matters'  and  decisions  thereon  shall  be  final  and  binding   on   the
contractor; provided further that excepted matters shall stand  specifically
excluded from the purview  of  the  arbitration  clause  and  shall  not  be
referred to arbitration.” =

Upon perusal of Clause 63 of the aforestated contract, it is  quite  clear
that the matters for which provision had been made  in  Clauses  18,  22(5),
39, 45(a), 55,  55-A(5),  61(2)  and  62(1)(xiii)(B)(e)(b)  of  the  General
Conditions of Contract were “excepted matters”  and  they  were  not  to  be
referred to the arbitrator. =

 In the instant case, we are concerned with  a  dispute  which  had  arisen
with regard to the amount payable to the contractor  in  relation  to  extra
work done by the contractor.=

The learned Arbitrator decided all  the  disputes  under  his  Award  dated
21.9.2002 though  the  contractor  had  objected  to  arbitrability  of  the
disputes which were not referable to the Arbitrator as per Clause 39 of  the
Contract.   
Being aggrieved by the Award, Union of India  had  preferred  an
appeal before the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad under Section  34
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter  referred  to  as
“the Act”) and the said appeal  was  allowed,  whereby  the  Award  was  set
aside.

Before the City Civil Court, in the appeal filed under  Section  34  of  the
Act, the following two issues had been framed :-

(a)   Whether the dispute was in relation to an “excepted  matter”  and  was
not arbitrable?

(b)  Whether the claimant  was  entitled  to  the  amounts  awarded  by  the
Arbitrator?

11.   The Court decided the appeal in favour of the respondent  and  against
the contractor.  
Being aggrieved by the order dated 8.4.2005 passed  by  the
XIVth Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court,  Hyderabad,  CMA  No.476  of
2005 was filed by the contractor before the High Court and 
 the  High  Court
was pleased to dismiss the same by  virtue  of  the  impugned  judgment  and
therefore, the contractor has filed this appeal.=

whether  the  Arbitrator  could  have
decided the issues which were not arbitrable.

20.  Arbitration arises from a contract  and  unless  there  is  a  specific
written contract, a contract with regard to arbitration cannot be  presumed.
Section 7(3) of the Act clearly specifies that the contract with  regard  to
arbitration must be in writing.
Thus, so far as  the  disputes  which  have
been referred to in Clause 39 of the contract  are  concerned,  it  was  not
open to the Arbitrator to arbitrate upon the said disputes as  there  was  a
specific clause whereby the said disputes  had  been  “excepted”. 
 Moreover,
when the law specifically makes a provision with regard to  formation  of  a
contract in a particular  manner,  there  cannot  be  any  presumption  with
regard to a contract if the  contract  is  not  entered  into  by  the  mode
prescribed under the Act.

21.  If a non-arbitrable dispute is referred to an Arbitrator  and  even  if
an issue is framed by the Arbitrator in relation to such a dispute,  in  our
opinion, there cannot be a presumption or a conclusion to  the  effect  that
the parties had agreed to  refer  the  issue  to  the  Arbitrator.   In  the
instant case, the respondent authorities had raised  an  objection  relating
to the arbitrability of the aforestated issue before the Arbitrator and  yet
the Arbitrator had rendered his decision on  the  said  “excepted”  dispute.
In our opinion, the Arbitrator could not have decided  the  said  “excepted”
dispute.

22.  We, therefore, hold that it was not open to the  Arbitrator  to  decide
the issues which were not arbitrable and the award, so far as it relates  to
disputes regarding non-arbitrable disputes is concerned, is bad in  law  and
is hereby quashed.

23.   We also take note of the fact that the contract had been entered  into
by the parties on 24.4.1995 and the contractual work had been  finalised  on
31.3.1997.  The Award was made on 21.9.2002 and  therefore,  we  uphold  the
portion of the award so far as  it  pertains  to  the  disputes  which  were
arbitrable,  but  so  far  as  the  portion  of  the  arbitral  award  which
determines the rate for extra work done by the contractor is  concerned,  we
quash and set aside the same.

24.   Needless to say that it would  be  open  to  the  contractor  to  take
appropriate legal action for recovery of payment for work  done,  which  was
not forming part of the contract because  the  said  issue  decided  by  the
Arbitrator is now set aside.

25.   For the reasons recorded hereinabove, the  appeal  is  partly  allowed
with no order as to costs.
    
2014 - Sept.Month - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41883
                        REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                         CIVIL APPEAL NO.534 OF 2007





M/s Harsha Constructions          … Appellant







                 Versus


Union of India & Ors.             … Respondents





                               J U D G M E N T

1


2


3 ANIL R. DAVE, J.



Aggrieved by the judgment dated 9th September, 2005 delivered  by  the  High
Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad, in  CMA  No.476  of  2005,
this appeal has been  filed  by  M/s  Harsha  Constructions,  a  contractor,
against Union of India and its authorities.  Hereinafter, the appellant  has
been described as a 'Contractor'.

The Union of India had entered into a contract for construction  of  a  road
bridge at a  level crossing and in the said  contract  there  was  a  clause
with regard to arbitration.  The issue with which we are  concerned  in  the
instant case, in a nutshell, is as under:-


“When  in  a  contract  of  arbitration,  certain  disputes  are   expressly
“excepted”, whether the Arbitrator can arbitrate  on  such  excepted  issues
and what are the consequences if the Arbitrator decides such issues?”





For the purpose of considering the issue, in our  opinion,  certain  clauses
incorporated in the contract are relevant and those clauses  are  reproduced
hereinbelow :-

“Clause 39.  Any  item  of  work  carried  out  by  the  Contractor  on  the
instructions of the Engineer which is not included in the accepted  schedule
of rates shall be executed at the  rates  set  forth  in  the  “Schedule  of
Rates, South Central Railway” modified by the tender  percentage  and  where
such items are not contained in the latter at the rates agreed upon  between
the Engineer and the Contractor before the execution of such items  of  work
and the Contractor shall be bound to notify  the  Engineer  at  least  seven
days before the necessity arises for the execution of  such  items  of  work
that the accepted schedule of rates does not include a  rate  or  rates  for
the extra work involved.

    The rates payable for such items     shall be decided at the meeting  to
be held between the Engineer and the contractor in  as  short  a  period  as
possible after the need for the special item has come  to  the  notice.   In
case the contractor fails to attend the meeting after being notified  to  do
so or in the event of no settlement being arrived at the  Railway  shall  be
entitled to execute the extra works by other means and the contractor  shall
have no claim for loss or  damage  that  may  result  from  such  procedure.
Provided that if the Contractor commences work or incurs any expenditure  in
regard thereto before the rates are determined and  agreed  upon  as  lastly
mentioned, then and in such a case the Contractor shall only be entitled  to
be paid in respect of the work carried out or expenditure  incurred  by  him
prior to the date of the rates as aforesaid according to the rates as  shall
be fixed by the Engineer.  However, if the contractor is not satisfied  with
the decision of the Engineer in this respect he  may  appeal  to  the  Chief
Engineer within 30 days of getting the decision of  the  Engineer  supported
by the analysis of the rates claimed. The Chief  Engineer's  decision  after
hearing both the parties in the matter would be final  and  binding  on  the
contractor and the Railway.”

“Clause-63.  All disputes and differences of  any  kind  whatsoever  arising
out of or in connection with the contract whether  during  the  progress  of
the  work  or  after  its  completion  and  whether  before  or  after   the
determination of the contract shall be referred by  the  Contractor  to  the
Railway and the Railway shall within a reasonable time after receipt of  the
contractor's presentation make and notify decisions on all matters  referred
to by the contractor in writing provided that matters  for  which  provision
has been made in Clause  18,  22(5),  39,  45(a),  55,  55-A(5),  61(2)  and
62(1)(xiii)(B)(e)(b) of the General Conditions of contract or in any  Clause
of the Special conditions of the  contract  shall  be  deemed  as  'Excepted
matters'  and  decisions  thereon  shall  be  final  and  binding   on   the
contractor; provided further that excepted matters shall stand  specifically
excluded from the purview  of  the  arbitration  clause  and  shall  not  be
referred to arbitration.”






  Upon perusal of Clause 63 of the aforestated contract, it is  quite  clear
that the matters for which provision had been made  in  Clauses  18,  22(5),
39, 45(a), 55,  55-A(5),  61(2)  and  62(1)(xiii)(B)(e)(b)  of  the  General
Conditions of Contract were “excepted matters”  and  they  were  not  to  be
referred to the arbitrator.

  In the instant case, we are concerned with  a  dispute  which  had  arisen
with regard to the amount payable to the contractor  in  relation  to  extra
work done by the contractor.

  Upon perusal of Clause  39,  we  find  that  in  the  event  of  extra  or
additional work entrusted to the contractor, if  rates  at  which  the  said
work was to be done was not specified in the contract,  the  amount  payable
for the additional work done was to be discussed by the contractor with  the
concerned Engineer and  ultimately  the  rate  was  to  be  decided  by  the
Engineer. If the rate fixed by  the  Engineer  was  not  acceptable  to  the
contractor, the contractor had to file  an  appeal  to  the  Chief  Engineer
within 30 days of getting  the  decision  of  the  Engineer  and  the  Chief
Engineer’s decision about the amount payable was to be final.

   It is not in dispute that some work, which  was  not  covered  under  the
contract had been entrusted  to  the  contractor  and  for  determining  the
amount payable for the said work, certain meetings  had  been  held  by  the
contractor and the concerned Engineer but they could not agree to any  rate.
 Ultimately, some amount was paid in respect of the  additional  work  done,
which was not acceptable to the contractor but the contractor  accepted  the
same under protest.

  In addition to the aforestated dispute with  regard  to  determination  of
the rate at which the contractor was to be paid for the extra work  done  by
it, there were some other disputes also and in order to  resolve  all  those
disputes, Respondent No.5, a former  Judge  of  the  High  Court  of  Andhra
Pradesh, had been appointed as an Arbitrator.

 The learned Arbitrator decided all  the  disputes  under  his  Award  dated
21.9.2002 though  the  contractor  had  objected  to  arbitrability  of  the
disputes which were not referable to the Arbitrator as per Clause 39 of  the
Contract.   Being aggrieved by the Award, Union of India  had  preferred  an
appeal before the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad under Section  34
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter  referred  to  as
“the Act”) and the said appeal  was  allowed,  whereby  the  Award  was  set
aside.

Before the City Civil Court, in the appeal filed under  Section  34  of  the
Act, the following two issues had been framed :-

(a)   Whether the dispute was in relation to an “excepted  matter”  and  was
not arbitrable?

(b)  Whether the claimant  was  entitled  to  the  amounts  awarded  by  the
Arbitrator?




11.   The Court decided the appeal in favour of the respondent  and  against
the contractor.  Being aggrieved by the order dated 8.4.2005 passed  by  the
XIVth Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court,  Hyderabad,  CMA  No.476  of
2005 was filed by the contractor before the High Court and  the  High  Court
was pleased to dismiss the same by  virtue  of  the  impugned  judgment  and
therefore, the contractor has filed this appeal.

 The learned counsel  appearing  for  the  appellant-contractor  had  mainly
submitted that as per Clause  39  of  the  contract,  the  Engineer  of  the
respondent authorities was duty bound to decide the rate  at  which  payment
was to  be  made  for  the  extra  work  done  by  the  contractor,  through
negotiations between the parties.  A final decision on the said subject  was
taken by the respondent authorities without the  contractor's  approval  and
therefore,  there  was  a  dispute  between  the  parties.  He  had  further
submitted  that  no  specific  decision  was  taken  by  the  Engineer   and
therefore, there was no question of  filing  any  appeal  before  the  Chief
Engineer  and  as  the  Chief  Engineer  did  not  take  any  decision,  the
aforestated clauses, viz. Clauses 39 and 64 would not apply  because  clause
64 would “except” a decision  of  the  Chief  Engineer,  but  as  the  Chief
Engineer had not taken any decision, there was no question  with  regard  to
“referring to” clause 39.  He had, therefore, submitted that  the  Award  in
toto was correct and the High Court had wrongly upheld the dismissal of  the
Award by the trial Court.

13.   The  learned  counsel  had,  thereafter,  referred  to  the  judgments
delivered by this Court in General Manager, Northern Railway and another  v.
Sarvesh Chopra [(2002) 4 SCC 45] and Madnani  Construction  Corporation  (P)
Limited v. Union of India & ors.[(2010)  1  SCC  549]  to  substantiate  his
case.

14.   The  learned  counsel  had,  thereafter,  submitted  that  the  appeal
deserved to be  allowed  and  the  judgment  delivered  by  the  High  Court
confirming the order passed by the City Civil Court deserved to  be  quashed
and set aside.

15.    There was no representation on behalf  of  the  Union  of  India  and
therefore, we are constrained to consider the submissions  made  by  learned
counsel for the appellant only.

16.   Upon perusal of both the clauses included in the contract, which  have
been referred to hereinabove, it is crystal  clear  that  all  the  disputes
were not arbitrable.  Some of the disputes which had  been  referred  to  in
Clause 39 were specifically not arbitrable  and  in  relation  to  the  said
disputes the contractor had to negotiate with the concerned Engineer of  the
respondent and if the contractor was not satisfied with the rate  determined
by the Engineer, it was open to the contractor to  file  an  appeal  against
the decision of the Engineer before the Chief Engineer within 30  days  from
the date of communication of the decision to the contractor.

17.  In the instant case, there  was  no  finality  so  far  as  the  amount
payable to the contractor in relation to  the  extra  work  done  by  it  is
concerned,  because  the  said  dispute  was  never  decided  by  the  Chief
Engineer. In the aforestated  circumstances,  when  the  disputes  had  been
referred to the Arbitrator, the disputes  which  had  been  among  “excepted
matters” had also been referred to the learned Arbitrator.

18.  Upon perusal of the  case  papers  we  find  that  before  the  learned
Arbitrator, the contractor  did object to the arbitrability of the  disputes
covered under Clause 39, but the Arbitrator had decided the said  issues  by
holding that the same were not “excepted matters” but arbitrable.

19.  The question before this Court is whether  the  Arbitrator  could  have
decided the issues which were not arbitrable.

20.  Arbitration arises from a contract  and  unless  there  is  a  specific
written contract, a contract with regard to arbitration cannot be  presumed.
Section 7(3) of the Act clearly specifies that the contract with  regard  to
arbitration must be in writing.  Thus, so far as  the  disputes  which  have
been referred to in Clause 39 of the contract  are  concerned,  it  was  not
open to the Arbitrator to arbitrate upon the said disputes as  there  was  a
specific clause whereby the said disputes  had  been  “excepted”.  Moreover,
when the law specifically makes a provision with regard to  formation  of  a
contract in a particular  manner,  there  cannot  be  any  presumption  with
regard to a contract if the  contract  is  not  entered  into  by  the  mode
prescribed under the Act.

21.  If a non-arbitrable dispute is referred to an Arbitrator  and  even  if
an issue is framed by the Arbitrator in relation to such a dispute,  in  our
opinion, there cannot be a presumption or a conclusion to  the  effect  that
the parties had agreed to  refer  the  issue  to  the  Arbitrator.   In  the
instant case, the respondent authorities had raised  an  objection  relating
to the arbitrability of the aforestated issue before the Arbitrator and  yet
the Arbitrator had rendered his decision on  the  said  “excepted”  dispute.
In our opinion, the Arbitrator could not have decided  the  said  “excepted”
dispute.

22.  We, therefore, hold that it was not open to the  Arbitrator  to  decide
the issues which were not arbitrable and the award, so far as it relates  to
disputes regarding non-arbitrable disputes is concerned, is bad in  law  and
is hereby quashed.

23.   We also take note of the fact that the contract had been entered  into
by the parties on 24.4.1995 and the contractual work had been  finalised  on
31.3.1997.  The Award was made on 21.9.2002 and  therefore,  we  uphold  the
portion of the award so far as  it  pertains  to  the  disputes  which  were
arbitrable,  but  so  far  as  the  portion  of  the  arbitral  award  which
determines the rate for extra work done by the contractor is  concerned,  we
quash and set aside the same.

24.   Needless to say that it would  be  open  to  the  contractor  to  take
appropriate legal action for recovery of payment for work  done,  which  was
not forming part of the contract because  the  said  issue  decided  by  the
Arbitrator is now set aside.

25.   For the reasons recorded hereinabove, the  appeal  is  partly  allowed
with no order as to costs.


                                   …………...........................J.
                                           (ANIL R. DAVE)


                              …..........................................J.
                                                      (VIKRAMAJIT SEN)
New Delhi
September 05, 2014.