Sec.420 and 406 I.P.C . - Charge sheet against the accused - High court quashed the case as the ingredients attracts sec.379 of I.P.C - Apex court held that We do not propose to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the High Court in an enquiry that there was no entrustment of money.The High Court, in our opinion, grossly erred in quashing the proceedings against the respondents with a certificate that it is one of the rarest cases where the court is required to quash the proceedings. Whether the respondents are guilty under Section 379 IPC or not is a matter of evidence. The fact that the police chose to file a chargesheet under Section 406 and 420 IPC is not conclusive regarding the offences for which the respondents-accused are to be tried. The trial Court can always frame an appropriate charge if there is sufficient material from the report of the police available before it. In case where the material is insufficient to frame a charge, the trial Court may either discharge the accused or may direct further investigation in the matter. Before deciding as to which one of the three courses of action mentioned above is to be resorted to, the trial Court must examine the content of the complaint, the evidence gathered by the investigating agency and also scrutinize whether the investigating agency proceeded in the right direction. We, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order.= CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1838 OF 2014 [Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No.4540 of 2013] Ghanshyam Sharma …Appellant Versus Surendra Kumar Sharma & Ors. …Respondents = 2014 - Aug. Part - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41859

    Sec.420 and 406 I.P.C . - Charge sheet against the accused - High court quashed the case as the ingredients attracts sec.379 of I.P.C - Apex court held that We do not propose to examine the correctness of the findings  recorded by the High Court in an enquiry that there  was  no  entrustment  of  money.The High Court, in our opinion,  grossly  erred in quashing the proceedings against the respondents with a certificate  that it is one of the rarest cases where the  court  is  required  to  quash  the proceedings. Whether the respondents are guilty under Section 379 IPC or not  is  a matter of evidence.   The fact that the police chose to  file  a  chargesheet under Section 406 and 420 IPC is not conclusive regarding the  offences  for which the respondents-accused are to be tried.   The trial Court  can  always frame an appropriate charge if there is sufficient material from the  report of the  police  available  before  it.     In  case  where  the  material  is insufficient to frame a charge, the trial Court  may  either  discharge  the accused or may direct further investigation in the matter.  Before  deciding as to which one of the three courses of action  mentioned  above  is  to  be resorted to, the trial Court must examine the content of the complaint,  the evidence gathered by the investigating agency and  also  scrutinize  whether the investigating agency proceeded in the right direction. We, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order.=

 On 11.7.2009, the appellant complained to the police that  the  father
of the contesting respondents herein had  called  the  appellant  herein  on
telephone and asked the appellant to make the payment of the balance  amount
to  the  first  respondent  herein.   Accordingly,  the   first   respondent
approached the appellant.  Both of them went to the bank in a car  belonging
to the  first  respondent  wherein  the  appellant  withdrew  an  amount  of
Rs.16,68,000/-.  Both of them proceeded to the house of the  father  of  the
respondents.  When they were about to enter the house, the first  respondent
insisted that the  appellant  leave  the  money  in  the  car  itself.   The
appellant left the money  in  the  car  and  went  into  the  house  of  the
respondents.  While the appellant and the father  of  the  respondents  were
discussing, the first respondent went out of the house and returned after  a
while to inform the appellant that the glass of the vehicle, in which  money
was kept, was broken and the money was stolen.

6.    In the abovementioned background, the  appellant  lodged  a  complaint
with the police praying that action be taken against the respondents.

7.    The police  investigated  the  case  and  filed  a  chargesheet  under
Section 406 and 420 IPC.= 

The High Court opined that there was no entrustment of  the  money  in
the instant case and at best it was a case of theft  falling  under  Section
379 IPC.
      “What is being alleged in the present case is  that  the  money  which
was carried by the complainant for discharge of  his  liability  for  paying
remaining sale consideration which amount was kept in the vehicle  owned  by
the applicants.  There was no specific agreement between the  applicant  and
the accused persons for creation of dominion for  the  said  property  which
could constitute an entrustment.  Even the dominion over  the   property  is
not being reflected in the  statement  of  the  witnesses  as  also  of  the
complainant.  All that is said that the money was kept in the vehicle  which
was found missing after the complainant  and  applicants  came  out  of  the
house of one of the applicants.  By any stretch of imagination it cannot  be
said that the  property  was  entrusted  to  the  accused  persons.   It  is
admitted case of the persons that the  money  was  found  missing  from  the
vehicle.  The question of misappropriating of the  same  as  such  does  not
arise.  There is no evidence on record that the said money was taken by  the
accused.  The money was found missing from the vehicle.  This  at  best  can
be an offence under Section 379.  In view of this, I do not find any  reason
to allow the proceedings to continue. Since both the offences under  Section
420 and 406 are not made out, it is one of the rarest cases where the  court
is required to quash the proceedings.”

10.   We do not propose to examine the correctness of the findings  recorded
by the High Court in an enquiry that there  was  no  entrustment  of  money.
The fact remains that the appellant lost money which was kept in the car  of
the first respondent.  Even according to the  High  Court,  the  case  would
fall under Section 379 IPC.
The High Court, in our opinion,  grossly  erred
in quashing the proceedings against the respondents with a certificate  that
it is one of the rarest cases where the  court  is  required  to  quash  the
proceedings.

11.   Whether the respondents are guilty under Section 379 IPC or not  is  a
matter of evidence.  
The fact that the police chose to  file  a  chargesheet
under Section 406 and 420 IPC is not conclusive regarding the  offences  for
which the respondents-accused are to be tried.  
The trial Court  can  always
frame an appropriate charge if there is sufficient material from the  report
of the  police  available  before  it.   
 In  case  where  the  material  is
insufficient to frame a charge, the trial Court  may  either  discharge  the
accused or may direct further investigation in the matter.  
Before  deciding
as to which one of the three courses of action  mentioned  above  is  to  be
resorted to, the trial Court must examine the content of the complaint,  the
evidence gathered by the investigating agency and  also  scrutinize  whether
the investigating agency proceeded in the right direction.

12.   We, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order.
  
2014 - Aug. Part - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41859
                                                          REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COUR OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1838  OF 2014
                 [Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No.4540 of 2013]



Ghanshyam Sharma                             …Appellant

            Versus

Surendra Kumar Sharma & Ors.            …Respondents






                               J U D G M E N T


Chelameswar, J.

1.    Leave granted.

2.    Aggrieved by the judgment and order  dated  12th  September,  2012  in
Criminal Misc. Application No.34280 of  2011,  the  defacto  complainant  in
case No.1743/IX/2009, arising out of Case Crime No.246 of 2009 on  the  file
of the 1st Additional  Chief Judicial Magistrate,  Mathura,  preferred  this
appeal.

3.    The respondents are the accused in the abovementioned  case.   By  the
impugned  order,  the  High   Court   quashed   the   proceedings   in   the
abovementioned criminal case on the file of the trial Court.

4.    It is alleged that there was an agreement between  the  appellant  and
the contesting respondents (1 to 3) where under the said  respondents  agreed
to sell a plot of land admeasuring 400 sq. yards  to  the  appellant  herein
for an amount of Rs.44,00,000/-.  It is alleged that as per  the  agreement,
the appellant did, in fact, make some payment.

5.    On 11.7.2009, the appellant complained to the police that  the  father
of the contesting respondents herein had  called  the  appellant  herein  on
telephone and asked the appellant to make the payment of the balance  amount
to  the  first  respondent  herein.   Accordingly,  the   first   respondent
approached the appellant.  Both of them went to the bank in a car  belonging
to the  first  respondent  wherein  the  appellant  withdrew  an  amount  of
Rs.16,68,000/-.  Both of them proceeded to the house of the  father  of  the
respondents.  When they were about to enter the house, the first  respondent
insisted that the  appellant  leave  the  money  in  the  car  itself.   The
appellant left the money  in  the  car  and  went  into  the  house  of  the
respondents.  While the appellant and the father  of  the  respondents  were
discussing, the first respondent went out of the house and returned after  a
while to inform the appellant that the glass of the vehicle, in which  money
was kept, was broken and the money was stolen.

6.    In the abovementioned background, the  appellant  lodged  a  complaint
with the police praying that action be taken against the respondents.

7.    The police  investigated  the  case  and  filed  a  chargesheet  under
Section 406 and 420 IPC.  The trial Court summoned the accused  (respondents
herein).  The respondents  approached  the  High  Court  under  Section  482
Cr.P.C.  praying  that  the  criminal  proceedings  be  quashed.   The  said
application was allowed by the High Court and hence the instant appeal.

8.    The basic facts that the appellant withdrew money from the bank,  went
to the house of the respondents accompanied  by  the  first  respondent  and
left the money in the car of the first respondent do not  appear  to  be  in
dispute.  On the other hand, from the impugned judgment it appears that  the
argument before the High Court was that the offences under Section  406  and
420 IPC are not made out on the facts alleged in the FIR.   The  submissions
made before the High Court can be culled out from  the  impugned  order  and
are as follows:
“Two fold submissions  have  been  made  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the
applicants:-

1.    That the facts disclosed in the report as well as in the statement  of
the witnesses, do not constitute the substantive offence under  Section  406
as there is no entrustment of the property.

2.    That the amount of  Rs.16,68,000/- was required  to  be  paid  by  the
complainant in lieu of the sale consideration as such offence under  Section
420 is not made out as no inducement was made by the applicants  to  deliver
the property to the applicants.  Even  if  it  is  assumed  that  money  was
handed over this would be discharge of liability in respect of the  purchase
of the plot by the complainant.  It would not constitute entrustment as  the
complainant had transferred this money without  retaining  any  domain  over
the said property and the transferee had absolute right to  dispose  of  the
same.”

9.    The High Court opined that there was no entrustment of  the  money  in
the instant case and at best it was a case of theft  falling  under  Section
379 IPC.
      “What is being alleged in the present case is  that  the  money  which
was carried by the complainant for discharge of  his  liability  for  paying
remaining sale consideration which amount was kept in the vehicle  owned  by
the applicants.  There was no specific agreement between the  applicant  and
the accused persons for creation of dominion for  the  said  property  which
could constitute an entrustment.  Even the dominion over  the   property  is
not being reflected in the  statement  of  the  witnesses  as  also  of  the
complainant.  All that is said that the money was kept in the vehicle  which
was found missing after the complainant  and  applicants  came  out  of  the
house of one of the applicants.  By any stretch of imagination it cannot  be
said that the  property  was  entrusted  to  the  accused  persons.   It  is
admitted case of the persons that the  money  was  found  missing  from  the
vehicle.  The question of misappropriating of the  same  as  such  does  not
arise.  There is no evidence on record that the said money was taken by  the
accused.  The money was found missing from the vehicle.  This  at  best  can
be an offence under Section 379.  In view of this, I do not find any  reason
to allow the proceedings to continue. Since both the offences under  Section
420 and 406 are not made out, it is one of the rarest cases where the  court
is required to quash the proceedings.”

10.   We do not propose to examine the correctness of the findings  recorded
by the High Court in an enquiry that there  was  no  entrustment  of  money.
The fact remains that the appellant lost money which was kept in the car  of
the first respondent.  Even according to the  High  Court,  the  case  would
fall under Section 379 IPC.  The High Court, in our opinion,  grossly  erred
in quashing the proceedings against the respondents with a certificate  that
it is one of the rarest cases where the  court  is  required  to  quash  the
proceedings.

11.   Whether the respondents are guilty under Section 379 IPC or not  is  a
matter of evidence.  The fact that the police chose to  file  a  chargesheet
under Section 406 and 420 IPC is not conclusive regarding the  offences  for
which the respondents-accused are to be tried.  The trial Court  can  always
frame an appropriate charge if there is sufficient material from the  report
of the  police  available  before  it.    In  case  where  the  material  is
insufficient to frame a charge, the trial Court  may  either  discharge  the
accused or may direct further investigation in the matter.  Before  deciding
as to which one of the three courses of action  mentioned  above  is  to  be
resorted to, the trial Court must examine the content of the complaint,  the
evidence gathered by the investigating agency and  also  scrutinize  whether
the investigating agency proceeded in the right direction.

12.   We, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order.


                                                               ………………………….J.
                                                          (J. Chelameswar)


                                                              ……………………..….J.
                                                   (A.K. Sikri)
New Delhi;
August 26, 2014

-----------------------
7

SLAMBOB - Amusement park - agreement of partnership for 10 years - failed to pay the amount as per the terms of agreement after some time - The Arbitrator published his award allowing the claim to the tune of Rs.13,94,240/- with interest at the rate of 12% per annum, but disallowed the Minimum Guaranteed amount of Rs.69,416/- per month for the remaining 69 months, commencing from July, 2003.- single judge dismissed both suits -The Division Bench of the High Court affirmed the award of the Arbitrator. The High Court particularly held that the appellant having failed to make the payment of the dues, as agreed to between the parties, cannot deny the lawful claim of the respondent and accordingly the High Court upheld the reasoning of the Arbitrator and dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant. The Division Bench of the High Court also held that the award of interest at the rate of 12% per annum was also just and reasonable and accordingly affirmed the same. In these circumstances, the appeal filed by the first respondent, being OSA No.34 of 2009, was allowed and the appeal filed by the appellant, being OSA No.140 of 2009, was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court.- Apex court held that Where there is an error apparent on the face of the record or the Arbitrator has not followed the statutory legal position, then and then only it would be justified in interfering with the award published by the Arbitrator. Once the Arbitrator has applied his mind to the matter before him, the Court cannot reappraise the matter as if it were an appeal and even if two views are possible, the view taken by the Arbitrator would prevail. - dismissed the appeal = CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 7128-7129 OF 2011 M/s. Navodaya Mass Entertainment Ltd. .… Appellant :Versus: M/s. J.M. Combines ....Respondents = 2014 - Aug. Part - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41851

SLAMBOB - Amusement park - agreement of partnership for 10 years - failed to pay the amount as per the terms of agreement after some time - The   Arbitrator published his award allowing the claim to the tune  of  Rs.13,94,240/-  with interest  at  the  rate  of  12%  per  annum,  but  disallowed  the  Minimum Guaranteed amount of Rs.69,416/- per month  for  the  remaining  69  months, commencing from July, 2003.- single judge dismissed both suits -The Division Bench of the High Court affirmed the award of  the  Arbitrator. The High Court particularly held that the appellant having  failed  to  make the payment of the dues, as agreed to between the parties, cannot  deny  the lawful claim of the respondent and accordingly the  High  Court  upheld  the
reasoning  of  the  Arbitrator  and  dismissed  the  appeal  filed  by   the appellant. The Division Bench of the High Court also held that the award  of interest at the rate of 12% per annum  was  also  just  and  reasonable  and accordingly affirmed the same. In these circumstances, the appeal  filed  by the first respondent, being OSA No.34 of 2009, was allowed  and  the  appeal filed by the appellant, being OSA No.140  of  2009,  was  dismissed  by  the Division Bench of the High Court.- Apex court held that Where there  is an error apparent on the face of  the  record  or  the  Arbitrator  has  not followed the statutory legal position,  then  and  then  only  it  would  be
justified in interfering with the award published by  the  Arbitrator.  Once the Arbitrator has applied his mind to the  matter  before  him,  the  Court cannot reappraise the matter as if it were an appeal and even if  two  views are possible, the view taken by the Arbitrator would prevail. - dismissed the appeal =

by which the High Court while allowing O.S.A. No.34  of  2009  filed
by Respondent No.1, dismissed O.S.A. No.140 of 2009 filed by  the  appellant
herein.  =
“SLAMBOB”  in  the  amusement  park
“Kishkinta” which was  maintained  by  the  appellant.  The  Agreement  also
provided  that  the  first  respondent  shall  maintain  the  equipment   by
effecting necessary repairs etc. The Agreement  further  provided  that  the
collection from the ride would be shared in the ratio of 60:40 by the  first
Respondent and the appellant  in  the  first  year  of  its  operation,  and
thereafter in the ratio of 50:50 in the subsequent years. It  also  provided
for a guaranteed minimum gross collection of Rs.10 lakhs for the first  year
and Rs.8.33 lakhs for the subsequent 9 years. The  Agreement  was  in  force
for a period of 10 years and could be renewed/terminated as  per  the  terms
thereof. Pursuant to the  Agreement,  the  first  respondent  installed  the
equipment on 16.04.1999 and it started functioning from the said  date.  The
appellant defaulted in making the payments from the year 2000-2001  onwards.=

The first respondent filed a claim for  a  sum  of
Rs.13,94,240/-  together  with  interest  on  16.10.2006.   The   Arbitrator
published his award allowing the claim to the tune  of  Rs.13,94,240/-  with
interest  at  the  rate  of  12%  per  annum,  but  disallowed  the  Minimum
Guaranteed amount of Rs.69,416/- per month  for  the  remaining  69  months,
commencing from July, 2003. =

The Division Bench of the High Court affirmed the award of  the  Arbitrator.
The High Court particularly held that the appellant having  failed  to  make
the payment of the dues, as agreed to between the parties, cannot  deny  the
lawful claim of the respondent and accordingly the  High  Court  upheld  the
reasoning  of  the  Arbitrator  and  dismissed  the  appeal  filed  by   the
appellant. The Division Bench of the High Court also held that the award  of
interest at the rate of 12% per annum  was  also  just  and  reasonable  and
accordingly affirmed the same. In these circumstances, the appeal  filed  by
the first respondent, being OSA No.34 of 2009, was allowed  and  the  appeal
filed by the appellant, being OSA No.140  of  2009,  was  dismissed  by  the
Division Bench of the High Court.=
Where there  is
an error apparent on the face of  the  record  or  the  Arbitrator  has  not
followed the statutory legal position,  then  and  then  only  it  would  be
justified in interfering with the award published by  the  Arbitrator.  Once
the Arbitrator has applied his mind to the  matter  before  him,  the  Court
cannot reappraise the matter as if it were an appeal and even if  two  views
are possible, the view taken by the Arbitrator would prevail.  (See:  Bharat
Coking Coal Ltd. Vs. L.K. Ahuja, (2004) 5 SCC  109;  Ravindra  &  Associates
Vs. Union of India,  (2010)  1  SCC  80;  Madnani  Construction  Corporation
Private Limited Vs. Union of India & Ors.,  (2010)  1  SCC  549;  Associated
Construction Vs. Pawanhans Helicopters  Limited,  (2008)  16  SCC  128;  and
Satna Stone & Lime Company Ltd. Vs. Union of India &  Anr.,  (2008)  14  SCC
785.)
We have also perused the  clauses  of  the  said  Agreement,  in  particular
clauses 3 & 5 of the Agreement. We find that  the  reasoning  given  by  the
Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  cannot  be  said  to   be   perverse.
Furthermore, the appellant never terminated the Agreement or  requested  the
first respondent to take back the machinery. Now, at  this  stage  it  would
not be proper for us to express further  opinion  in  the  matter  when  the
matter/dispute has already been concluded by the Arbitrator  and  the  award
has been affirmed by the High Court. Under these circumstances, we do not find that there is any merit  in  these appeals. The same stand dismissed. However, the  parties  shall  bear  their
own costs.

2014 - Aug. Part - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41851

                                                     REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION





                    CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 7128-7129  OF  2011


M/s. Navodaya Mass Entertainment Ltd.                .… Appellant


                                  :Versus:


M/s. J.M. Combines
....Respondents




                               J U D G M E N T

Pinaki Chandra Ghose, J.


These appeals have been filed assailing the common judgment and order  dated
1.9.2009 passed by the Madras High Court in O.S.A. Nos.34 of  2009  and  140
of 2009 by which the High Court while allowing O.S.A. No.34  of  2009  filed
by Respondent No.1, dismissed O.S.A. No.140 of 2009 filed by  the  appellant
herein.  The facts of the case briefly stated are as follows:





The appellant offered a business proposal to  the  first  respondent  herein
and they entered into an agreement on July 30, 1998, whereby it  was  agreed
that the first respondent shall procure, install and  operate  an  amusement
ride for both adults and children called “SLAMBOB”  in  the  amusement  park
“Kishkinta” which was  maintained  by  the  appellant.  The  Agreement  also
provided  that  the  first  respondent  shall  maintain  the  equipment   by
effecting necessary repairs etc. The Agreement  further  provided  that  the
collection from the ride would be shared in the ratio of 60:40 by the  first
Respondent and the appellant  in  the  first  year  of  its  operation,  and
thereafter in the ratio of 50:50 in the subsequent years. It  also  provided
for a guaranteed minimum gross collection of Rs.10 lakhs for the first  year
and Rs.8.33 lakhs for the subsequent 9 years. The  Agreement  was  in  force
for a period of 10 years and could be renewed/terminated as  per  the  terms
thereof. Pursuant to the  Agreement,  the  first  respondent  installed  the
equipment on 16.04.1999 and it started functioning from the said  date.  The
appellant defaulted in making the payments from the year 2000-2001  onwards.
Despite repeated demands, the appellant failed to make the  payments,  hence
notice was served to the appellant calling upon the  appellant  to  pay  the
outstanding amount, along with interest at the rate of 24% per annum.


In these circumstances, dispute arose between the parties which was  covered
under  the  said  Agreement  by  arbitration  clause  and   accordingly   an
Arbitrator was appointed. The first respondent filed a claim for  a  sum  of
Rs.13,94,240/-  together  with  interest  on  16.10.2006.   The   Arbitrator
published his award allowing the claim to the tune  of  Rs.13,94,240/-  with
interest  at  the  rate  of  12%  per  annum,  but  disallowed  the  Minimum
Guaranteed amount of Rs.69,416/- per month  for  the  remaining  69  months,
commencing from July, 2003.  Aggrieved  by  the  award  in  respect  of  the
disallowed claim, the first  respondent  challenged  the  award  before  the
Madras High Court under by filing O.P. No.37 of 2007 and aggrieved over  the
entire award, the appellant challenged  the  same  before  the  Madras  High
Court by filing O.P. No.362 of 2007 under Section 34 of the Arbitration  and
Conciliation Act, 1996. The learned Single Judge of the  Madras  High  Court
dismissed both these applications. Aggrieved by  the  order  passed  by  the
learned Single Judge of the High Court,  appeals  were  filed  by  both  the
parties before the Division Bench of the High Court.  The High  Court  by  a
common judgment and order dated 1.9.2009 dismissed the appeal filed  by  the
appellant but allowed the appeal filed by the first respondent  herein.  The
High Court after scrutinizing all the materials placed  before  it  came  to
the conclusion that it is not in controversy that the Agreement was  entered
into between the parties on July 30, 1998. The parties also  agreed  to  the
ratio in which the collection of the amusement ride was  to  be  shared  and
the said Agreement was in force for a  period  of  10  years  and  was  also
renewable. The Agreement also stipulated  for  a  guaranteed  minimum  gross
collection of Rs.10 lakhs for the first  year  and  Rs.8.33  lakhs  for  the
subsequent 9 years.


The Division Bench of the High Court affirmed the award of  the  Arbitrator.
The High Court particularly held that the appellant having  failed  to  make
the payment of the dues, as agreed to between the parties, cannot  deny  the
lawful claim of the respondent and accordingly the  High  Court  upheld  the
reasoning  of  the  Arbitrator  and  dismissed  the  appeal  filed  by   the
appellant. The Division Bench of the High Court also held that the award  of
interest at the rate of 12% per annum  was  also  just  and  reasonable  and
accordingly affirmed the same. In these circumstances, the appeal  filed  by
the first respondent, being OSA No.34 of 2009, was allowed  and  the  appeal
filed by the appellant, being OSA No.140  of  2009,  was  dismissed  by  the
Division Bench of the High Court.


We have perused the order passed by the Division Bench of  the  High  Court.
We have also heard the learned counsel  for  the  parties.  Learned  counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that the Arbitrator  and  the
Courts have failed to appreciate the fact that the claim was not on  revenue
sharing basis i.e. the gross income but it  was  on  the  basis  of  minimum
guaranteed amount stated in the  petitions.  Learned  counsel  appearing  on
behalf of the appellant tried to argue before us that the alleged  Agreement
was not legal, valid and enforceable. He further  submitted  that  the  same
was one-sided Agreement. He also submitted that the Division  Bench  of  the
High Court ignored and overlooked clause 14 of  the  Agreement  which  deals
with the termination of the Agreement by the conduct of the parties. We  are
afraid that such points, as has been tried to be  contended  before  us,  it
appears, were never urged before the learned  Single  Judge  or  before  the
Division Bench of the High Court.  The dispute between the parties has  been
adjudicated upon by the Arbitrator and the award  has  been  published.  The
Division Bench of the High Court has found that the award cannot be said  to
be perverse or that there is any cogent reason to set aside the same.


In our opinion, the scope of interference of  the  Court  is  very  limited.
Court would not be justified in reappraising  the  material  on  record  and
substituting its own view in place of the Arbitrator’s view. Where there  is
an error apparent on the face of  the  record  or  the  Arbitrator  has  not
followed the statutory legal position,  then  and  then  only  it  would  be
justified in interfering with the award published by  the  Arbitrator.  Once
the Arbitrator has applied his mind to the  matter  before  him,  the  Court
cannot reappraise the matter as if it were an appeal and even if  two  views
are possible, the view taken by the Arbitrator would prevail.  (See:  Bharat
Coking Coal Ltd. Vs. L.K. Ahuja, (2004) 5 SCC  109;  Ravindra  &  Associates
Vs. Union of India,  (2010)  1  SCC  80;  Madnani  Construction  Corporation
Private Limited Vs. Union of India & Ors.,  (2010)  1  SCC  549;  Associated
Construction Vs. Pawanhans Helicopters  Limited,  (2008)  16  SCC  128;  and
Satna Stone & Lime Company Ltd. Vs. Union of India &  Anr.,  (2008)  14  SCC
785.)


We have also perused the  clauses  of  the  said  Agreement,  in  particular
clauses 3 & 5 of the Agreement. We find that  the  reasoning  given  by  the
Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  cannot  be  said  to   be   perverse.
Furthermore, the appellant never terminated the Agreement or  requested  the
first respondent to take back the machinery. Now, at  this  stage  it  would
not be proper for us to express further  opinion  in  the  matter  when  the
matter/dispute has already been concluded by the Arbitrator  and  the  award
has been affirmed by the High Court.


Under these circumstances, we do not find that there is any merit  in  these
appeals. The same stand dismissed. However, the  parties  shall  bear  their
own costs.

….....…..…………………..J.
(M.Y. Eqbal)

New Delhi;                                          ...........…………………….J.
August 26, 2014.                        (Pinaki Chandra Ghose)

Labour laws - Notification for abolition of contract Labour engaged in DAP plant- cleaning Granulation, dry section, cleaing in combustion chmaber etc., - D.B. modified and held that those workersengaged in cleaning of Granulation, dry section, cleaning in combustion chamber, were directed to be regularized - the company raised a new plea that the state govt. has no authority to issue notification - Apex court held that We are of the view that since the decisions in the aforesaid writ petitions have reached finality, such question cannot be re-agitated in another writ petition between same parties as the question will be hit by the principles of res judicata. Now once the Notification dated 28th April, 2000 for abolition of contract labour in respect of the workers in DAP Plant –Cleaning of granulation dry section, cleaning in combustion chamber, etc. was issued, it was incumbent on the part of the Company to implement the same. Since it was not implemented, the High Court rightly directed to implement the same. In view of the fact as noticed above, while we are not inclined to answer the question about the appropriate government in the present case, keep the same open for determination in an appropriate case. We find no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and order by which the High Court directed the appellant to implement the notification abolishing the contract labour and to regularize the service of the workmen.= CIVIL APPEAL NO.8151 OF 2014 (arising out of SLP(C) No.822 of 2013) M/S PARADEEP PHOSPHATE LTD. … APPELLANT VERSUS PARADEEP PHOSPHATE MAZDOOR UNION & ORS. … RESPONDENTS = 2014 - Aug.Part - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41849

  Labour laws - Notification for abolition of contract Labour engaged in DAP plant- cleaning Granulation, dry section, cleaing in combustion chmaber etc., - D.B. modified and held that those workers engaged  in  cleaning  of   Granulation,  dry  section, cleaning in  combustion  chamber,  were  directed  to  be  regularized - the company raised a new plea that the state govt. has no authority to issue notification - Apex court held that  We are of the view that since the  decisions  in  the  aforesaid  writ petitions have reached finality, such  question  cannot  be  re-agitated  in
another writ petition between same parties as the question will  be  hit  by the principles of res judicata. Now once the Notification dated 28th  April,  2000  for  abolition  of contract labour in  respect  of  the  workers  in  DAP  Plant  –Cleaning  of granulation dry section, cleaning in combustion chamber,  etc.  was  issued, it was incumbent on the part of the  Company to implement the  same.   Since it was not implemented, the High Court rightly  directed  to  implement  the same. In view of the fact as noticed above, while we  are  not  inclined  to
answer the question about the appropriate government in  the  present  case, keep the same open for determination in an  appropriate  case.  We  find  no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and order by which  the  High Court directed the appellant to implement the  notification  abolishing  the contract labour and to regularize the service of the workmen.=

 The Division Bench of Orissa  High  Court,  Cuttack  by  its  impugned
judgment dated 17th September, 2012 in O.J.C. No.7464 of  2000  allowed  the
writ petition preferred  by  respondents  and  directing  the  appellant  to
enforce notification dated 28th April, 2000 issued by the  State  Government
for abolition of the Contract Labour in respect of workers  engaged  in  DAP
Plant-cleaning of Granulation, dry section, cleaning in combustion  chamber,
etc. The Division Bench further directed the  appellant  to  regularize  the
workers engaged in the DAP plant.
      The aforesaid judgment was challenged by the  appellant  by  filing  a
review petition.  The same was heard and disposed  of  vide  impugned  order
dated 20th December, 2012 by which the judgment  dated  17th  September,2012
was modified to the extent that not all the workers  engaged  in  DAP  Plant
but those who  were  engaged  in  cleaning  of   Granulation,  dry  section,
cleaning in  combustion  chamber,  were  directed  to  be  regularized.  The
aforesaid judgment and order passed in writ  petition  and  review  petition
are under challenge in these appeals.=

  we find that when earlier writ  application  OJC  No.
2751 of 2000  was disposed of by judgment dated 24th June,  2003,  the  High
Court directed the Company to  consider  the  recommendation  of  the  State
Advisory Contract Labour Board with regard to  abolition of Contract  Labour
in respect of 15 other areas  left out  by   it   and  to  take  appropriate
decision according to law,  though  the Company was a  party  to  the   said
writ application but no such plea was taken and the direction  of  the  High
Court reached  finality.
10.   Another Writ  Petition  being  W.P(c)  No.  13791  of  2005  was  also
disposed of by the High Court on 5th July, 2012. In the  said  case  similar
question  regarding  implementation  of  the  recommendation  of  the  State
Advisory Contract Labour Board was considered.  In the said case  also,  the
appellant-Company neither contended nor raised the question that  the  State
Government is not the appropriate government. The  said  writ  petition  was
disposed of by the High Court on 5th July, 2012.
11.   We are of the view that since the  decisions  in  the  aforesaid  writ
petitions have reached finality, such  question  cannot  be  re-agitated  in
another writ petition between same parties as the question will  be  hit  by
the principles of res judicata.
12.   Now once the Notification dated 28th  April,  2000  for  abolition  of
contract labour in  respect  of  the  workers  in  DAP  Plant  –Cleaning  of
granulation dry section, cleaning in combustion chamber,  etc.  was  issued,
it was incumbent on the part of the  Company to implement the  same.   Since
it was not implemented, the High Court rightly  directed  to  implement  the
same.
13.   In view of the fact as noticed above, while we  are  not  inclined  to
answer the question about the appropriate government in  the  present  case,
keep the same open for determination in an  appropriate  case.  We  find  no
reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and order by which  the  High
Court directed the appellant to implement the  notification  abolishing  the
contract labour and to regularize the service of the workmen.
14.   We find no merit in these appeals, they are accordingly dismissed.

2014 - Aug.Part - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41849
                                                              REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.8151 OF 2014
                   (arising out of SLP(C) No.822 of 2013)


M/S PARADEEP PHOSPHATE LTD.                        … APPELLANT

                                   VERSUS

PARADEEP PHOSPHATE MAZDOOR UNION & ORS.            … RESPONDENTS

With

Civil Appeal No.8152 of 2014
(@)S.L.P(C) No.23088 of 2014 @ SLP(C) CC No. 4627/2013)


                               J U D G M E N T


SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.


      Delay condoned. Leave granted.
2.    The Division Bench of Orissa  High  Court,  Cuttack  by  its  impugned
judgment dated 17th September, 2012 in O.J.C. No.7464 of  2000  allowed  the
writ petition preferred  by  respondents  and  directing  the  appellant  to
enforce notification dated 28th April, 2000 issued by the  State  Government
for abolition of the Contract Labour in respect of workers  engaged  in  DAP
Plant-cleaning of Granulation, dry section, cleaning in combustion  chamber,
etc. The Division Bench further directed the  appellant  to  regularize  the
workers engaged in the DAP plant.
      The aforesaid judgment was challenged by the  appellant  by  filing  a
review petition.  The same was heard and disposed  of  vide  impugned  order
dated 20th December, 2012 by which the judgment  dated  17th  September,2012
was modified to the extent that not all the workers  engaged  in  DAP  Plant
but those who  were  engaged  in  cleaning  of   Granulation,  dry  section,
cleaning in  combustion  chamber,  were  directed  to  be  regularized.  The
aforesaid judgment and order passed in writ  petition  and  review  petition
are under challenge in these appeals.
3.    The factual matrix of the case is as follows:
      A writ petition being O.J.C.  No.  7464  of  2000  was  filed  by  the
respondents-Paradeep  Phosphates  Mazdoor  Union  and  others   (hereinafter
referred to as the “Trade Union”)   seeking  enforcement   of   Notification
dated 28th April, 2000 issued by the State  Government  abolishing  contract
labour  in respect of workers in DAP  Plant-cleaning  of   Granulation,  dry
section,  cleaning in combustion chamber,  etc.  The  respondents  contended
that the workers named  therein  were  working  in  the  DAP  plant  of  the
appellant- M/s Paradeep Phosphate  Ltd.  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the
“Company”) for over 14 years uninterruptedly without any break  in  service.
They had been engaged through contractors appointed  for  the  purpose  from
time  to  time    The  contractors  were  changed  but  the  employees  were
continuing their  work  irrespective  of  change  of  contractors.   In  the
meantime,   those workers completed 15 years of service  in  the  particular
establishment. It was submitted that, the Trade Union  took  up  the  matter
considering the fate of such persons and several other  workers  engaged  in
different  establishments  of  the  Company  for  prohibition  of   contract
referring different establishments of the Company and for regularization  of
such employees in terms of Section 10(1) of the Contract Labour  (Regulation
and  Abolition)  Act,  1970.   After  much  deliberation   and   in   active
participation of  the  Company,   decision  has  been  taken  by  the  State
Advisory Contract Labour Board in its 21st meeting dated 3rd June, 1999  and
10th June, 1999 for  prohibiting  contract labour system  in   16  areas  of
the Company and the same was accordingly recommended  by the State  Advisory
Board.
4.    Meanwhile, the Government of Orissa through its Labour and  Employment
Department came out with a Notification dated 28th April,  2000  prohibiting
employment of contract labour in the  works in the Company  particularly  in
the  DAP  Plant-cleaning  of   Granulation,  dry   section,    cleaning   in
combustion chamber, etc.    It was submitted  that on  behalf of  the  Trade
Union that once  there  is  a   prohibition   of  competent  authority   for
engaging  contract  labourers  in  a  particular  work  in  the   particular
establishment, the only course left  with the establishment is  to  straight
away treat the persons concerned as the regular employees of the  particular
establishment and the relationship   between  contractor  and  the  contract
labourers ceases automatically  from the said moment when there is an  order
prohibiting  employment  of   contract  labour  in  particular   work  of  a
particular establishment. Thus, it was contended that the only  course  open
for the management is to regularize the employees  of the establishment  who
were working under the contractor.
5.    It was brought to the  notice  of  the  High  Court  that  on  earlier
occasions, another writ application was  filed  bearing  O.J.C.  No.2751  of
2000 which was disposed of on 24th  June,  2003  wherein  the  parties  were
common.  The said writ application was disposed of by the  High  Court  with
the following observation:
      “7.   There is no dispute that  the  State  Advisory  Contract  Labour
Board recommended to the State Government to abolish contract labour  system
in sixteen areas of  Paradeep  Phosphates  Limited  but  in  the  Government
notification dated 28.4.2000 only one area has been mentioned.   On  reading
of the note and order of the Minister extracted above, we  are  inclined  to
hold that the  Government  has  not  fully  considered  the  recommendation.
Therefore, in the interest of justice, the matter needs reconsideration.

      8.    For the reasons aforesaid,   we   direct  the  State  Government
(opposite  party  no.1)  to  reconsider  the  recommendation  of  the  State
Advisory Contract Labour Board with regard to abolition of  contract  labour
in respect of 15 other  areas left out by it and take  appropriate  decision
according to law within four months of receipt of this order.”

6.    In spite of  the  aforesaid  direction,  no  action  has  been  taken.
Later the aforesaid  writ  petition  being  O.J.C.  No.  7464  of  2000  was
preferred with the prayer as noticed above. In the said  case,  the  Company
appeared  and  filed  a  counter  affidavit  taking  plea  that  the   State
Government is not appropriate government for the purpose of the Act and  the
notification issued by the State Government is not binding upon the  Company
and did not order for  abolition of contract labour.
7.     The  High  Court  while  observing  that  the   Company   failed   to
substantiate its stand that the undertaking is  controlled  by  the  Central
Government, referred to the decision of this Court  in  Steel  Authority  of
India Limited  and  Others  vs.  National  Union  Water  Front  Workers  and
Others, AIR 2001 SC 3527 and held that the Central  Government  is  not  the
appropriate Government in such cases. It was also  noticed  that  this  plea
was not taken when the earlier writ petition was heard.
8.    Similar pleas as were taken before the High Court have been  taken  by
the appellant and the contesting respondents before this Court.
9.    From the record, we find that when earlier writ  application  OJC  No.
2751 of 2000  was disposed of by judgment dated 24th June,  2003,  the  High
Court directed the Company to  consider  the  recommendation  of  the  State
Advisory Contract Labour Board with regard to  abolition of Contract  Labour
in respect of 15 other areas  left out  by   it   and  to  take  appropriate
decision according to law,  though  the Company was a  party  to  the   said
writ application but no such plea was taken and the direction  of  the  High
Court reached  finality.
10.   Another Writ  Petition  being  W.P(c)  No.  13791  of  2005  was  also
disposed of by the High Court on 5th July, 2012. In the  said  case  similar
question  regarding  implementation  of  the  recommendation  of  the  State
Advisory Contract Labour Board was considered.  In the said case  also,  the
appellant-Company neither contended nor raised the question that  the  State
Government is not the appropriate government. The  said  writ  petition  was
disposed of by the High Court on 5th July, 2012.
11.   We are of the view that since the  decisions  in  the  aforesaid  writ
petitions have reached finality, such  question  cannot  be  re-agitated  in
another writ petition between same parties as the question will  be  hit  by
the principles of res judicata.
12.   Now once the Notification dated 28th  April,  2000  for  abolition  of
contract labour in  respect  of  the  workers  in  DAP  Plant  –Cleaning  of
granulation dry section, cleaning in combustion chamber,  etc.  was  issued,
it was incumbent on the part of the  Company to implement the  same.   Since
it was not implemented, the High Court rightly  directed  to  implement  the
same.
13.   In view of the fact as noticed above, while we  are  not  inclined  to
answer the question about the appropriate government in  the  present  case,
keep the same open for determination in an  appropriate  case.  We  find  no
reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and order by which  the  High
Court directed the appellant to implement the  notification  abolishing  the
contract labour and to regularize the service of the workmen.
14.   We find no merit in these appeals, they are accordingly dismissed.

                                              ............................J.
                                  (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)


                                               ...........................J.
                                            (S.A. BOBDE)

NEW DELHI;
AUGUST 26, 2014.

Modification of sentence - Sec.420 I.P.C. - Public servant gave false certificate as landless poor for obtaining land from Govt. - trial court convicted both accused under sec.420, 465, 467, 468, 471 and 120B IPC - Appeal court convicted under sec.420 and sec.177 - High court confirm the same - Apex court held that The essential ingredients to attract Section 420 IPC are : (i) cheating; (ii) dishonest inducement to deliver property or to make, alter or destroy any valuable security or anything which is sealed or is capable of being converted into a valuable security and (iii) mens rea of the accused at the time of making the inducement. There is no evidence to show that there was such fraudulent dishonest intention on the part of the appellant in issuing certificate in favour of Lal Chand. Issuance of false certificate cannot be said to be with dishonest intention to make wrongful gain for himself. Since the ingredients of Section 420 IPC are not proved, the conviction of the appellant under Section 420 IPC, cannot be sustained and the same is set aside. For conviction under Section 177 IPC, the appellate court has awarded the sentence of imprisonment of six months which was confirmed by the High Court. It was submitted that allotment of land to Lal Chand was also cancelled, which, in our view has to be taken into consideration while considering the question of sentence imposed on the appellant. The appellant is said to have already undergone the sentence for a period of 51/2 months. For the conviction under Section 177 IPC, the sentence of imprisonment imposed on the appellant is modified to the period already undergone. = CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1837 OF 2014 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 2331/2014) BISHAN DAS .. Appellant Versus STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANR. ..Respondents = 2014 Aug. Part - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41848

Modification of sentence - Sec.420 I.P.C. - Public servant gave false certificate as landless poor for obtaining land from Govt. - trial court convicted both accused under sec.420, 465, 467, 468, 471 and 120B IPC - Appeal court convicted under sec.420 and sec.177 - High court confirm the same - Apex court held that The essential ingredients to  attract  Section  420   IPC  are  : 
 (i) cheating; (ii) dishonest inducement to deliver property or  to  make,  alter or destroy any valuable security or anything which is sealed or  is  capable of being converted into a valuable  security  and  (iii)  mens  rea  of  the accused at the time of making the inducement.       
There is no evidence  to show that there was such fraudulent dishonest intention on the part  of  the appellant in issuing certificate in favour of Lal Chand.   Issuance of  false certificate cannot be said to be with dishonest intention to  make  wrongful gain for himself.    Since the  ingredients  of  Section  420  IPC  are  not proved, the conviction of the appellant  under Section 420  IPC,  cannot  be sustained and the same is set aside. For conviction under Section 177  IPC, the appellate  court  has awarded the sentence of imprisonment of six months  which was  confirmed  by the High Court.  It was submitted that allotment of land to  Lal  Chand   was
also cancelled, which, in our  view  has  to  be  taken  into  consideration while considering the question of  sentence imposed on the  appellant.   The appellant is said to have  already undergone  the sentence  for a period  of 51/2 months.   For the conviction under Section 177  IPC,  the  sentence  of imprisonment  imposed on the appellant  is modified to  the  period  already
undergone.   =

The charge against the  appellant   is
that the appellant  had knowingly  issued a false certificate  in favour  of
Lal Chand  that he did not own  any property except the land  which  he  had
made fit for cultivation,  though Lal Chand  had owned  13   kanals  and  13
marlas of land  situated in village Baruhi  and his wife   owned  70  kanals
of land in village Baruhi.   Based on the said false certificate  pretending
to be the landless person, Lal Chand   sought allotment of land  and on  the
basis of the certificate, land was allotted to  Lal  Chand.   The  appellant
along with the co-accused  Lal Chand was  charged  for  the  offences  under
Sections 420, 465, 467, 468, 471 and 120B IPC and the trial court  convicted
the appellant  for the aforesaid  offences  and  imposed  various  sentences
inter alia two years rigorous imprisonment for  the  offence  under  Section
420 IPC.=
In the appeal,  the Addl. Sessions Judge, Hoshiarpur,  set  aside  the
conviction  of the appellant  under Sections 465, 467,  468,  471  and  120B
IPC  but convicted the appellant for the offences  under  Sections  420  and
177 IPC and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment of one  year  and
six months respectively and  ordered  them  to  run  concurrently.  =
In so far as the conviction of the appellant under  Section  420
IPC,  is concerned,  the appellate  court  convicted  the  appellant   under
Section  420  IPC, on the finding that the appellant issued the  certificate
in favour of  Lal Chand  with dishonest  intention of getting  allotment  of
land  for the said  Lal Chand and by getting  the allotment,  the  same  was
also  achieved.
9.    The essential ingredients to  attract  Section  420   IPC  are  :
 (i) cheating; 
(ii) dishonest inducement to deliver property or  to  make,  alter
or destroy any valuable security or anything which is sealed or  is  capable
of being converted into a valuable  security  and  
(iii)  mens  rea  of  the
accused at the time of making the inducement.      
There is no evidence  to
show that there was such fraudulent dishonest intention on the part  of  the
appellant in issuing certificate in favour of Lal Chand.  
Issuance of  false
certificate cannot be said to be with dishonest intention to  make  wrongful
gain for himself.    
Since the  ingredients  of  Section  420  IPC  are  not
proved, the conviction of the appellant  under Section 420  IPC,  cannot  be
sustained and the same is set aside.
10.         For conviction under Section 177  IPC, the appellate  court  has
awarded the sentence of imprisonment of six months  which was  confirmed  by
the High Court.
It was submitted that allotment of land to  Lal  Chand   was
also cancelled, which, in our  view  has  to  be  taken  into  consideration
while considering the question of  sentence imposed on the  appellant.   The
appellant is said to have  already undergone  the sentence  for a period  of
51/2 months.  
For the conviction under Section 177  IPC,  the  sentence  of
imprisonment  imposed on the appellant  is modified to  the  period  already
undergone.  
The  appellant  is  on  bail,  his  bail  bonds   shall   stand
discharged.   The appeal stands disposed of accordingly.

2014 Aug. Part - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41848

                                                        Non-Reportable


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.     1837       OF 2014
                (Arising  out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 2331/2014)



BISHAN DAS                                            .. Appellant

                                   Versus

STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANR.                          ..Respondents




                                  O R D E R



R. BANUMATHI, J.



            Leave granted.
2.          This appeal is preferred against  the  judgment  of  Punjab  and
Haryana High  Court   dated  18.12.2013  passed  in  Criminal  Revision  No.
3982/2013  confirming the conviction of the  appellant  under  Sections  420
and 177  IPC  as ordered by the Appellate Court.
3.          The case of the prosecution in brief is that the  appellant  was
Sarpanch of  Gram Panchayat, Baurhi.  The charge against the  appellant   is
that the appellant  had knowingly  issued a false certificate  in favour  of
Lal Chand  that he did not own  any property except the land  which  he  had
made fit for cultivation,  though Lal Chand  had owned  13   kanals  and  13
marlas of land  situated in village Baruhi  and his wife   owned  70  kanals
of land in village Baruhi.   Based on the said false certificate  pretending
to be the landless person, Lal Chand   sought allotment of land  and on  the
basis of the certificate, land was allotted to  Lal  Chand.   The  appellant
along with the co-accused  Lal Chand was  charged  for  the  offences  under
Sections 420, 465, 467, 468, 471 and 120B IPC and the trial court  convicted
the appellant  for the aforesaid  offences  and  imposed  various  sentences
inter alia two years rigorous imprisonment for  the  offence  under  Section
420 IPC.
4.    In the appeal,  the Addl. Sessions Judge, Hoshiarpur,  set  aside  the
conviction  of the appellant  under Sections 465, 467,  468,  471  and  120B
IPC  but convicted the appellant for the offences  under  Sections  420  and
177 IPC and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment of one  year  and
six months respectively and  ordered  them  to  run  concurrently.   In  the
revision preferred before the High Court, the High Court   has   upheld  the
conviction and sentence of the appellant as aforesaid.
5.          We have heard the learned counsel for the  parties.   The  point
falling for consideration is whether the  conviction  and  sentence  of  the
appellant  under Sections 420 and 177 IPC    is sustainable.
6.          Section 177 IPC deals with giving  of  false  information.   The
ingredients of Section 177 IPC are :-

(i)   That a person must be  legally  bound  to  furnish  information  on  a
particular subject  to a public  servant.

(ii)  That he must furnish, as true, information on that  subject  which  he
knows or has reason to believe to be false.


7.          The appellant being a Sarpanch of  Gram  Panchayat  was  legally
bound  to  give  correct   information   and  bound  to  issue   a   correct
certificate. Though Lal Chand  owned 13 kanals 13 marlas and his wife   also
owned lands in village Baruhi, the appellant  issued  false  certificate  in
favour of Lal Chand  that  he  does  not  own  any  land   except  the  land
which he has made fit for cultivation and  thus  furnished  the  information
which he knew to be false.   Based on the revenue records, the  trial  court
recorded factual findings that Lal Chand and  his  wife   totally  owned  83
kanals 14 marlas  of  land.   The  appellant   knowingly  issued  the  false
certificate in favour of Lal Chand  containing false  information   and  the
ingredients of Section 177  IPC  are  proved   and  we  find  no  reason  to
interfere with the conviction of the appellant under Section 177 IPC.
8.          In so far as the conviction of the appellant under  Section  420
IPC,  is concerned,  the appellate  court  convicted  the  appellant   under
Section  420  IPC, on the finding that the appellant issued the  certificate
in favour of  Lal Chand  with dishonest  intention of getting  allotment  of
land  for the said  Lal Chand and by getting  the allotment,  the  same  was
also  achieved.
9.    The essential ingredients to  attract  Section  420   IPC  are  :  (i)
cheating; (ii) dishonest inducement to deliver property or  to  make,  alter
or destroy any valuable security or anything which is sealed or  is  capable
of being converted into a valuable  security  and  (iii)  mens  rea  of  the
accused at the time of making the inducement.       There is no evidence  to
show that there was such fraudulent dishonest intention on the part  of  the
appellant in issuing certificate in favour of Lal Chand.  Issuance of  false
certificate cannot be said to be with dishonest intention to  make  wrongful
gain for himself.    Since the  ingredients  of  Section  420  IPC  are  not
proved, the conviction of the appellant  under Section 420  IPC,  cannot  be
sustained and the same is set aside.
10.         For conviction under Section 177  IPC, the appellate  court  has
awarded the sentence of imprisonment of six months  which was  confirmed  by
the High Court. It was submitted that allotment of land to  Lal  Chand   was
also cancelled, which, in our  view  has  to  be  taken  into  consideration
while considering the question of  sentence imposed on the  appellant.   The
appellant is said to have  already undergone  the sentence  for a period  of
51/2 months.   For the conviction under Section 177  IPC,  the  sentence  of
imprisonment  imposed on the appellant  is modified to  the  period  already
undergone.   The  appellant  is  on  bail,  his  bail  bonds   shall   stand
discharged.   The appeal stands disposed of accordingly.

                                                               ……………………………J.
                                                               (T.S. Thakur)



                                                               ……………………………J.
                                                              (R. Banumathi)


New Delhi,
August 26, 2014



-----------------------
6

Acquittal - one of the accused - Apex court held that While considering the involvement of Satbir Singh in the occurrence, we find some difficulty. The eye witnesses PW4 Rekha and PW5 Sudha have testified Satish @ Shakti gave a gandasa blow on the neck of Bani Singh and thereafter Satbir Singh gave a gandasa blow on the neck of Bani Singh. PW14 Dr. N.K. Chaudhary who conducted autopsy on the body of Bani Singh found a single injury on the neck of Bani Singh. Hence the overt act attributed to Satbir Singh, namely, attack on neck of Bani Singh with gandasa, becomes doubtful and his presence cannot be said to be established and the benefit of doubt has to be given to him. But so far as the other appellants are concerned, the prosecution version is consistent, namely, that they were armed with the lethal weapons and attacked the deceased and others and the conviction and sentences recorded by the Courts below are correct and does not call for any interference. In the result the appeal preferred by the appellant Satbir Singh in Special Leave Petition (Criminal) no.6674 of 2012 is allowed and the conviction and sentences imposed on him is set aside and he is acquitted of the charges. = CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1842 OF 2014 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.6673 of 2012] Balwan & Ors. … Appellant(s) versus State of Haryana … Respondent(s) = 2014 - Aug.Part - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41844

  Acquittal - one of the accused - Apex court held that  While considering the involvement of Satbir Singh in  the  occurrence, we find some difficulty.  -The eye witnesses PW4 Rekha  and  PW5  Sudha  have testified  Satish @ Shakti gave a gandasa blow on the  neck  of  Bani  Singh
and thereafter Satbir Singh gave a gandasa blow on the neck of  Bani  Singh. PW14 Dr. N.K. Chaudhary who conducted autopsy on  the  body  of  Bani  Singh found a single injury on the  neck  of  Bani  Singh.  Hence  the  overt  act attributed to Satbir Singh, namely,  attack  on  neck  of  Bani  Singh  with gandasa, becomes doubtful and his presence cannot be said to be  established and the benefit of doubt has to be given to him.  But so far  as  the  other appellants are concerned, the prosecution  version  is  consistent,  namely, that they were armed with the lethal weapons and attacked the  deceased  and others and the conviction and sentences recorded by  the  Courts  below  are correct and does not call for any interference. In the result the appeal preferred by the  appellant  Satbir  Singh in Special Leave Petition (Criminal) no.6674 of  2012  is  allowed  and  the conviction and sentences imposed on him is set aside and he is acquitted  of
the charges.  =

 It is trite law that the  evidence  of  injured  witness,  being  a  stamped
witness, is accorded a special status in law.
This is as a  consequence  of
the fact that injury to the witness is an inbuilt guarantee of his  presence
at the scene of the crime and because the witness  would  not  want  to  let
actual assailant go unpunished.

17.   The contradictions and variations in the testimonies of the  aforesaid
witnesses, in our considered view do not go to the root of the case and  the
substratum of the prosecution version remains  undisturbed.  
It  is  to  be
borne in mind that both of them are rustic women and not tutored witnesses.

18.   The occurrence had taken place in the midnight at  1.30  a.m.  leaving
one person dead on the spot and four others injured.
Two of the  grievously
injured persons were immediately taken to hospital  and  the  remaining  two
remained near the body in the house.
The distance  between  the  occurrence
place and the police station is about  10  kilometers.  
PW18  Sub-Inspector
Balwan Singh recorded the statement  of  PW4  Rekha  at  9.00  a.m.  in  the
occurrence place and the FIR came to be registered at  10.10  a.m.  and  the
special report was delivered in the Court at about 11.30 a.m.
In the  facts
of the case, we are unable to appreciate the contention  of  the  appellants
that FIR came into being after deliberation and there is nothing to  suspect
in the prosecution  case.  
The  Investigation  Officer  PW18  Sub-Inspector
Balwan Singh has seized blood stained earth from the  occurrence  place  and
that clinches the situs of the crime.  
The  contention  of  the  appellants
that the occurrence had not taken place  in  the  house  of  Bani  Singh  is
devoid of merit.  In fact, Bani Singh immediately succumbed to the  injuries
and the homicidal death is established by the medical evidence.

19.   There was also motive for the occurrence.
The appellants  nurtured  a
grudge against the victims on account of murder of  Yudhvir,  son  of  Gugan
Singh, belonging to their party  and  one  of  the  family  members  of  the
complainant side was involved in the said murder and that has culminated  in
the occurrence.

20.   While considering the involvement of Satbir Singh in  the  occurrence,
we find some difficulty.  
The eye witnesses PW4 Rekha  and  PW5  Sudha  have
testified  Satish @ Shakti gave a gandasa blow on the  neck  of  Bani  Singh
and thereafter Satbir Singh gave a gandasa blow on the neck of  Bani  Singh.
PW14 Dr. N.K. Chaudhary who conducted autopsy on  the  body  of  Bani  Singh
found a single injury on the  neck  of  Bani  Singh.  
Hence  the  overt  act
attributed to Satbir Singh, namely,  attack  on  neck  of  Bani  Singh  with
gandasa, becomes doubtful and his presence cannot be said to be  established
and the benefit of doubt has to be given to him.  
But so far  as  the  other
appellants are concerned, the prosecution  version  is  consistent,  namely,
that they were armed with the lethal weapons and attacked the  deceased  and
others and the conviction and sentences recorded by  the  Courts  below  are
correct and does not call for any interference.

21.      In the result the appeal preferred by the  appellant  Satbir  Singh
in Special Leave Petition (Criminal) no.6674 of  2012  is  allowed  and  the
conviction and sentences imposed on him is set aside and he is acquitted  of
the charges.  
The other two appeals in  Special  Leave  Petition  (Criminal)
no.6673 of 2012 and Special Leave Petition (Criminal) no.6384 of  2012,  are
dismissed.
  
2014 - Aug.Part - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41844

                                                           REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.   1842         OF 2014
       [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.6673 of 2012]


Balwan & Ors.                                      …     Appellant(s)

                                   versus

State of Haryana                                        …    Respondent(s)

                                    With

                  CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  1844         OF 2014
       (Arising out of  Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.6384 of 2012)
                                     And

                   CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  1843       OF 2014
       (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.6674 of 2012)


                               J U D G M E N T

C. NAGAPPAN, J.

1.    Leave granted.


2.    These three appeals are preferred against the  common  judgment  dated
27.01.2012 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at  Chandigarh  in
Criminal Appeal no.486-DB of 2004 and Criminal Appeal no.547-DB of 2004.

3.    The appellants herein are six in numbers and  were  tried  along  with
others for the charges under Sections 148, 149, 302, 307, 449, 323  and  216
of Indian Penal Code and in addition under Section 25 of the Arms Act,  1959
against appellant Naresh and the  Trial  Court  found  them  guilty  of  the
offence under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC and sentenced them  each
to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay fine of  Rs.10,000/-  each  with
default sentence; further found them guilty for the  offence  under  Section
307 read with Section 149 IPC and sentenced them each  to  undergo  rigorous
imprisonment for 8 years and to pay fine  of  Rs.5000/-  each  with  default
sentence; further found them guilty for the offence under Section  449  read
with  Section  149  IPC  and  sentenced   them  each  to  undergo   rigorous
imprisonment for 5 years and to pay fine  of  Rs.3000/-  each  with  default
sentence; further found them guilty for the offence under  Section  148  IPC
and sentenced them each to undergo rigorous imprisonment for  2  years  each
and found them guilty for the offence under Section 323  read  with  Section
149 IPC and sentenced them each  to  undergo  rigorous  imprisonment  for  9
months.  In addition appellant Naresh  was  found  guilty  for  the  offence
under Section 25 of the Arms Act  and  was  sentenced  to  undergo  rigorous
imprisonment for  2  years  and  to  pay  fine  of  Rs.2000/-  with  default
sentence.  The  Trial  Court  directed  the  substantive  sentences  to  run
concurrently.   Challenging  the  conviction  and   sentence   the   accused
preferred appeals in Criminal Appeal no.486-DB of 2004 and  Criminal  Appeal
no.547-DB of 2004 and  the  High  Court  allowed  the  appeal  preferred  by
accused Subhash and acquitted him of the charges.  The appeals preferred  by
the other accused were dismissed.  Aggrieved by the  confirmation  of  their
conviction and sentence six accused have preferred the present appeals.

4.    The prosecution case in brief is stated thus :  PW4 Smt. Rekha is  the
daughter-in-law of deceased Bani Singh.   PW5  Smt.  Sudha  is  the  married
daughter of the deceased.  Accused Naresh and Naseeb  are  sons  of  accused
Dharambir.  Accused Satish @ Shakti and accused Satbir  are  real  brothers.
On 26.5.2001 at about 1.30 a.m. PW4 Smt. Rekha  and  her  husband  Rishikesh
were sleeping in the upstairs room of their house.  Her  father-in-law  Bani
Singh, her mother-in-law Smt. Phulla and her sister-in-law  PW5  Smt.  Sudha
were sleeping in the ground floor  of  the  house.   At  that  time  accused
persons Dharambir carrying gandasa, Naresh armed with country  made  pistol,
Satbir, Satish @ Shakti and Dhillu all armed with gandasa,  Balwan  carrying
jelly, Ram Mehar armed with  gandasa  and  Dhaula  armed  with  darant,  all
entered   their   house   after   scaling   the    boundary    wall.     The
appellants/accused went upstairs and brought PW4 Smt. Rekha and her  husband
Rishikesh to the ground floor and exhorted that they  should  be  killed  to
take revenge for  the  murder  of  Yudhvir.   Thereafter,  Satish  @  Shakti
inflicted a gandasa blow on the neck of Bani Singh,  Satbir  caused  gandasa
blow at the very same place on the neck  of  Bani  Singh,  as  a  result  of
which, Bani Singh fell down and Dharambir  inflicted  gandasa  blow  on  his
right wrist and Dhillu gave gandasa  blow  which  hit  him  in  between  his
little and ring finger of the right hand.  Dhaula inflicted  a  darant  blow
on the right leg of Rishikesh.  Ram Mehar gave  two  gandasa  blows  on  the
left side of PW4 Smt. Rekha’s back and one gandasa blow on the head  of  PW5
Smt. Sudha.  Naresh fired shots from  the  pistol  which  he  was  carrying.
Balwan gave a jelly blow causing  an  injury  on  the  right  hand  of  Smt.
Phulla.  Hearing the cries raised by the injured  persons,  Umed  Singh  and
Ram Kumar rushed to the spot and the appellants/accused ran away with  their
weapons.  Bani Singh succumbed to the injuries on  the  spot.   The  injured
Rishikesh and PW5 Smt. Sudha were taken to  the  General  Hospital,  Bhiwani
for treatment.

5.    At 9.00 a.m. on the same day, PW18 Sub-Inspector Balwan Singh  reached
the occurrence place and recorded Ex.PE the statement of PW4 Smt. Rekha  and
the Ex.PR, FIR was registered at 10.10 a.m. on the same day.  PW  18  Balwan
Singh conducted inquest and prepared Ex.PCC inquest report.  Ex.PHH  is  the
rough site plan prepared by him.  He sent the body of Bani Singh to  General
Hospital, Bhiwani for conducting post-mortem.

6.    PW14 Dr. N.K. Chaudhary conducted autopsy on the body  of  Bani  Singh
on 26.5.2001 and found the following injuries :

1.    An eleptical wound left side of neck starting  from  midline  reaching
up to  mastoid  process  measuring  5.5”  x  4”  involving  the  left  pinna
partially amputated.  The lower lateral lobule of  pinna,  muscles,  carotid
vessels were exposed and there was subcutaneous echymosis present under  the
skin, carotid vessels ruptured.  Clotted blood present.

2.    Incised wound 1 x .5 inch  on  the  right  hand  at  lower  one  third
laterally placed.  Muscle exposed.

3.    Incised wound cutting through the centre of  little  finger  and  ring
finger at right hand reaching up to middle of palm, Muscle deep fracture  of
second metacarpal present.

He expressed opinion that  death  has  occurred  on  account  of  shock  and
haemorrhage due to injuries to major vessels and nerves.

7.    PW8 Dr. Vasundhara Gupta examined  Rishikesh  on  26.5.2001  at  03.25
a.m. and found following injuries :

1.    Lacerated wound of 8 cm x 6 cm over the anterior surface of right  leg
middle 1/3rd region.  Fresh bleeding was present.  Advised x-ray  and  ortho
surgeon’s opinion.

2.    A lacerated wound of 12 x 4 cm over the left side  of  face  extending
from the cheek  to  left  frontal  region  of  scalp.   Fresh  bleeding  was
present.  Advised x-ray band surgeon’s opinion.

8.    On the same day PW8 Dr. Vasundhara Gupta examined PW5 Smt.  Sudha  and
found the following injury :

Lacerated wound of 8 cm x 4 cm x 1 cm over the left side of  frontal  region
of scalp.  Swelling was present.  Profuse bleeding was present.  Advised  x-
ray and surgeon’s opinion.  The  patient  was  kept  under  observation  and
subjected to x-ray and opinion for nature of injuries.  Duration  of  injury
was within 24 hours.  Kind of weapon was to be  given  after  x-ray  report.
Copy of MLR is Ex.PM which bears my signature.

9.    PW15 Dr. Mahender Kumar examined  PW4  Smt.  Rekha  on  26.5.2001  and
found the following injuries :

1.    A lacerated wound triangular shape having 4 cm length of each  arm  on
left lower back, superficial, redish in colour at the level of  L4  and  L5.
Advised x-ray lumbar area AP and lateral also opined for  General  Surgeon’s
opinion.  Injury was kept under observation.

2.    A lacerated wound present at upper  back  on  the  left  lateral  side
measuring 6 cm x .5 cm x .5 cm and another just above it measuring  3  cm  x
.5 cm x .5 cm.  Advised  x-ray  thorasic  AP  and  lateral  and  opined  for
surgeon opinion.

10.   PW15 Dr. Mahender Kumar  also  examined  Smt.  Phulla  and  found  the
following injuries :

1.    Swelling, tenderness  the  right  forearm.   Advised  x-ray.   AP  and
lateral and opined for ortho surgeon opinion.

2.    Complaint of pain in the left foot.

11.   PW18 Sub-Inspector Balwan Singh seized blood stained earth,  one  khol
of cartridge and one sikka from the occurrence place  by  preparing  a  Memo
and recorded the statements of  witnesses.   He  arrested  the  accused  and
recovered the  weapons  on  the  information  furnished  by  them  in  their
disclosure statements.  On completion of investigation final report came  to
be filed in the case.

12.   During the trial the prosecution examined  PWs  1  to  27  and  marked
documents.  The accused persons were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C.  and
their statements were recorded.  Thereafter, two witnesses were examined  in
defence.  The Trial Court acquitted  accused  Balbir  Singh  and  found  the
remaining nine accused guilty.  Out of them accused Naseeb was  released  on
probation since he was found to be a juvenile.  The remaining eight  accused
were convicted and sentenced as stated earlier.

13.   On appeal to the High Court the appeal preferred  by  accused  Subhash
was allowed and he was acquitted of the charges and at the  same  time,  the
appeals  preferred  by  the   other   appellants/accused   were   dismissed.
Challenging their conviction and sentence six  accused  have  preferred  the
present appeals.

14.    Shri  Sushil  Kumar,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing   for   the
appellants, contended that there was inordinate  delay  in  registering  the
FIR and it has come  into  existence  after  due  deliberations  to  falsely
implicate the appellants and the prosecution case should be  discarded.   He
also contended that as per the testimonies  of  the  eye  witnesses  accused
Satish @ Shakti and Satbir Singh gave individual gandasa blows on  the  neck
of Bani Singh, whereas the post-mortem  doctor  has  noticed  single  injury
only on the neck of Bani Singh and hence the overt act attributed to  Satbir
Singh is doubtful and his presence itself is not  established.   It  is  his
further contention that out of four persons alleged  to  have  been  injured
during the occurrence, two alone were examined as  witnesses  and  the  non-
examination of other two injured witnesses affects the prosecution case  and
makes it doubtful.  Lastly, he contended that the occurrence had  not  taken
place inside the  house  of  Bani  Singh  and  the  appellants  are  falsely
implicated due to party faction in the village.

15.   Per contra, Shri Manjit Singh,  learned  Additional  Advocate  General
appearing  for  the  respondent-State,  contended  that   it   is   midnight
occurrence and the parties are known to each other, being residents  of  the
same village and PW4 Rekha  and  PW5  Sudha  have  not  only  witnessed  the
occurrence but sustained injuries in the attack made by  the  assailants  on
them and their testimonies have rightly  been  relied  upon  and  after  the
occurrence immediate  attention  was  given  to  take  the  injured  to  the
hospital and thereafter the police were informed and it cannot be said  that
there was undue delay in  this  regard  and  the  conviction  and  sentences
imposed on the appellants are sustainable.

16.   The prosecution case is based on the ocular  testimony  of  PW4  Rekha
and PW5 Sudha.  They are the daughter-in-law and daughter, respectively,  of
deceased Bani Singh.  They have categorically  testified  about  the  brutal
attack made by the appellants on victims  by  describing  their  overt  acts
during the occurrence.  Both of them in  their  statements  recorded  during
the investigation, as  well  as,  in  their  testimonies  have  stated  that
electricity lights were on in the house, at the time of  occurrence.   Their
presence in the house cannot be  doubted  and  they  had  no  difficulty  in
identifying the  assailants.   Both  of  them  sustained  injuries  and  the
grievously injured PW5 Sudha was admitted  in  the  hospital  at  3.25  a.m.
itself.  The medical evidence is available on record.   Rishikesh  and  Smt.
Phulla were also injured during the occurrence but were not  examined.   The
testimonies of injured witnesses  PW4  Rekha  and  PW5  Sudha  are  natural,
cogent  and  trustworthy  and  non-examination  of  the  other  two  injured
witnesses does not, in any way, affect the prosecution case.  In  a  similar
fact situation this Court in the decision in Mano Dutt  vs.  State  of  U.P.
(2012) 4 SCC 79, held thus :

“29.  As per PW5, Dr. Surya Bhan Singh, he had examined Salik Ram  Yadav  as
well as Nankoo on 22.10.1977 itself and noticed as many as five injuries  on
Salik Ram and four injuries upon the person of Nankoo.  He stated  that  the
deceased was the son of Nankoo, while Salik  Ram  was  his  brother.   These
injuries were suffered by them from a blunt object.

30.   Salik Ram was examined as PW2 and his statement is  cogent,  coherent,
reliable and fully supports the  case  of  the  prosecution.   However,  the
other  injured  witness,  Nankoo,  was  not  examined.   In  our  view  non-
examination of Nankoo, to which the accused raised the objection, would  not
materially affect  the  case  of  the  prosecution.   Normally,  an  injured
witness would enjoy greater credibility because he is the  sufferer  himself
and thus, there will be no occasion for such a person to state an  incorrect
version of the occurrence, or to involve anybody falsely and in the  bargain
protect the real culprit.”……………….



It is trite law that the  evidence  of  injured  witness,  being  a  stamped
witness, is accorded a special status in law.  This is as a  consequence  of
the fact that injury to the witness is an inbuilt guarantee of his  presence
at the scene of the crime and because the witness  would  not  want  to  let
actual assailant go unpunished.

17.   The contradictions and variations in the testimonies of the  aforesaid
witnesses, in our considered view do not go to the root of the case and  the
substratum of the prosecution version remains  undisturbed.   It  is  to  be
borne in mind that both of them are rustic women and not tutored witnesses.

18.   The occurrence had taken place in the midnight at  1.30  a.m.  leaving
one person dead on the spot and four others injured.  Two of the  grievously
injured persons were immediately taken to hospital  and  the  remaining  two
remained near the body in the house.  The distance  between  the  occurrence
place and the police station is about  10  kilometers.   PW18  Sub-Inspector
Balwan Singh recorded the statement  of  PW4  Rekha  at  9.00  a.m.  in  the
occurrence place and the FIR came to be registered at  10.10  a.m.  and  the
special report was delivered in the Court at about 11.30 a.m.  In the  facts
of the case, we are unable to appreciate the contention  of  the  appellants
that FIR came into being after deliberation and there is nothing to  suspect
in the prosecution  case.   The  Investigation  Officer  PW18  Sub-Inspector
Balwan Singh has seized blood stained earth from the  occurrence  place  and
that clinches the situs of the crime.   The  contention  of  the  appellants
that the occurrence had not taken place  in  the  house  of  Bani  Singh  is
devoid of merit.  In fact, Bani Singh immediately succumbed to the  injuries
and the homicidal death is established by the medical evidence.

19.   There was also motive for the occurrence.  The appellants  nurtured  a
grudge against the victims on account of murder of  Yudhvir,  son  of  Gugan
Singh, belonging to their party  and  one  of  the  family  members  of  the
complainant side was involved in the said murder and that has culminated  in
the occurrence.

20.   While considering the involvement of Satbir Singh in  the  occurrence,
we find some difficulty.  The eye witnesses PW4 Rekha  and  PW5  Sudha  have
testified  Satish @ Shakti gave a gandasa blow on the  neck  of  Bani  Singh
and thereafter Satbir Singh gave a gandasa blow on the neck of  Bani  Singh.
PW14 Dr. N.K. Chaudhary who conducted autopsy on  the  body  of  Bani  Singh
found a single injury on the  neck  of  Bani  Singh.  Hence  the  overt  act
attributed to Satbir Singh, namely,  attack  on  neck  of  Bani  Singh  with
gandasa, becomes doubtful and his presence cannot be said to be  established
and the benefit of doubt has to be given to him.  But so far  as  the  other
appellants are concerned, the prosecution  version  is  consistent,  namely,
that they were armed with the lethal weapons and attacked the  deceased  and
others and the conviction and sentences recorded by  the  Courts  below  are
correct and does not call for any interference.

21.      In the result the appeal preferred by the  appellant  Satbir  Singh
in Special Leave Petition (Criminal) no.6674 of  2012  is  allowed  and  the
conviction and sentences imposed on him is set aside and he is acquitted  of
the charges.  The other two appeals in  Special  Leave  Petition  (Criminal)
no.6673 of 2012 and Special Leave Petition (Criminal) no.6384 of  2012,  are
dismissed.

                                                             …….…………………...J.
(T.S. Thakur)


                                                               .…………………………J.
(C. Nagappan)


                                                            ……..…………………...J.
(Adarsh Kumar Goel)


New Delhi;
August   26, 2014.