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Wednesday, August 13, 2014

Sec.80 Application of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 not barred - Secs.8 ,19, 24, 27A and 37 , and Rules 63,64 and 65 - all rules etc., are in support of central act and in addition to central act - in Rajesh kumar Gupta case it was wrongly decided that the prohibition contained in Rule 63[11] of the 1985 Rules is applicable only to those narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances which are mentioned in Schedule-I to the Rules and not to the psychotropic substances enumerated in the Schedule to the Act. and further held that In the light of our above conclusion the correctness of the orders impugned in all the Criminal Appeals is normally required to be considered by the Bench of appropriate strength. However, in view of the fact that most of these matters are old matters [pertaining to years 2006 to 2013], we deem it appropriate to remit all these matters to the concerned High Courts for passing of appropriate orders in the light of this judgment.=CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 660 OF 2007 Union of India & Another …Appellants Versus Sanjeev V. Deshpande …Respondent = 2014 - Aug.Part - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41821

   Sec.80 Application of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 not  barred- Secs.8 ,19,  24,  27A and  37 , and Rules 63,64 and 65 - all rules etc., are in support of central act and in addition to central act - in Rajesh kumar Gupta case it was wrongly decided that the prohibition contained in  Rule  63[11]  of  the  1985 Rules  is  applicable  only  to  those  narcotic  drugs   and   psychotropic substances which are mentioned in Schedule-I to the Rules  and  not  to  the psychotropic substances enumerated in the  Schedule  to  the  Act. and further held that In the light of our above conclusion the  correctness  of  the  orders impugned in all the Criminal Appeals is normally required to  be  considered by the Bench of appropriate strength.  However, in view  of  the  fact  that most of these matters are old matters [pertaining to years  2006  to  2013], we deem it appropriate to remit all these  matters  to  the  concerned  High Courts for passing of appropriate orders in the light of this judgment.=

    “Our attention has been invited by the learned counsel to two  decisions  of
this Court; namely, 
a decision of 3-Judge Bench  in  Collector  of  Customs,
New Delhi vs. Ahmadalieva Nodira (2004) 3 SCC 549  and  
subsequent  decision
of 2-Judge Bench in State of Uttaranchal vs. Rajesh  Kuamr  Gupta  (2007)  1
SCC 355.

Reference  was  also  made  of  Section  80  of  the  Narcotic   Drugs   and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 which reads as under:

“80.  Application of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 not  barred.   –
The
provisions of this Act or the rules made there under  shall  be  in  addition
to, and not in derogation of, the Drugs  and  Cosmetics  Act,  1940  (23  of
1940) or the rules made there under.

In our opinion, in view of the fact that the effect of Section  80  requires
to be considered, we grant leave  and  direct  the  Registry  to  place  the
papers before the Hon’ble  the  Chief  Justice  for   placing   the   matter
before  a 3-Judge Bench.
 whether  persons  accused  of  committing  an
offence under the Act could be enlarged on bail in view of the  stipulations
contained under Section 37 of the Act. 
Section 37[1] of the Act stipulates that all the  offences  punishable
under the Act shall be cognizable.
It further stipulates that:—
(1)   persons accused of an offence under Section 19,  24,  27A  or  persons
accused of offences  involved  in  “commercial  quantity”[2]  shall  not  be
released on bail, unless the public prosecutor is given  an  opportunity  to
oppose the application for bail; and

(2)   more importantly that unless “the Court is satisfied  that  there  are
reasonable grounds for believing” that the accused is not guilty of such  an
offence.
Further, the Court is also required to be satisfied that  such  a
person is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.

In other words, Section 37 departs from the long  established  principle  of
presumption of innocence  in  favour  of  an  accused  person  until  proved
otherwise.
6. As observed by this Court in Union of India v. Thamisharasi  clause  (b)
of sub-section (1) of Section 37 imposes limitations on granting of bail  in
addition to those provided under the Code.
The two limitations are:  (1)  an
opportunity to the Public Prosecutor to oppose  the  bail  application,  and
(2) satisfaction  of  the  court  that  there  are  reasonable  grounds  for
believing that the accused is not guilty of such offence and that he is  not
likely to commit any offence while on bail.
7. The limitations on granting of bail come in only  when  the  question  of
granting bail arises on merits.
Apart from the grant of opportunity  to  the
Public Prosecutor, the other twin conditions which really have relevance  so
far as the present accused-respondent is concerned,  are:  the  satisfaction
of the court that there  are  reasonable  grounds  for  believing  that  the
accused is not guilty of the alleged offence and that he is  not  likely  to
commit any offence while on bail.
The  conditions  are  cumulative  and  not
alternative.
The satisfaction contemplated regarding the accused  being  not
guilty has to be based on reasonable  grounds.
The  expression  “reasonable
grounds” means something more than  prima  facie  grounds. 
It  contemplates
substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty  of
the alleged offence…”=
Whereas Rule 65 stipulates that with  reference  to  the  psychotropic
substances other than those specified in Schedule-I to the  Rules  could  be
manufactured subject to the limitation specified under Rule  65.   In  other
words, notwithstanding the  prohibition  under  Section  8(c),  the  Central
Government in exercise of its power under Section  9(1)(a)(vi)  permits  the
manufacture  of  those  psychotropic  substances  other  than  specified  in
Schedule-I to the Rules.=
Therefore, we are of the opinion that the conclusion  reached  by  the
various High Courts that  prohibition  contained  under  Section  8  is  not
attracted in respect to all  those  psychotropic  substances  which  find  a
mention in the Schedule to the Act  but  not  in  Schedule-I  to  the  Rules
framed under the Act is untenable.=
We are unable to agree with the conclusion (reached  in  Rajesh  Kumar
Gupta’s case) that the prohibition contained in  Rule  63[11]  of  the  1985
Rules  is  applicable  only  to  those  narcotic  drugs   and   psychotropic
substances which are mentioned in Schedule-I to the Rules  and  not  to  the
psychotropic substances enumerated in the  Schedule  to  the  Act.  =
We  are  of  the  clear  opinion
that neither Rule 53 nor Rule 64 is a source of  authority  for  prohibiting
the DEALING IN narcotic drugs and psychotropic  substances,  the  source  is
Section 8.
Rajesh Kumar Gupta’s case in our view is wrongly decided.
In view of our conclusion, the complete analysis of  the  implications
of Section 80[15] of the Act is not really called for in the  instant  case.
It is only required to be stated that  essentially  the  Drugs  &  Cosmetics
Act, 1940 deals with various operations of manufacture, sale, purchase  etc.
of drugs generally whereas Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic  Substances  Act,
1985 deals with a more specific class of drugs  and,  therefore,  a  special
law on the subject. Further the provisions of the Act  operate  in  addition
to the provisions of 1940 Act.

36.   In the light of our above conclusion the  correctness  of  the  orders
impugned in all the Criminal Appeals is normally required to  be  considered
by the Bench of appropriate strength.
 However, in view  of  the  fact  that
most of these matters are old matters [pertaining to years  2006  to  2013],
we deem it appropriate to remit all these  matters  to  the  concerned  High
Courts for passing of appropriate orders in the light of this judgment.

37.   Ordered accordingly.  Appeals stand disposed of.
2014 - Aug.Part - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41821
CHIEF JUSTICE, J. CHELAMESWAR, A.K. SIKRI

                                                     REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COUR OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 660 OF 2007

Union of India & Another                           …Appellants

            Versus

Sanjeev V. Deshpande                         …Respondent

                                    WITH

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 848 OF 2011

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 855 OF 2011

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 876 OF 2011

                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1711  OF 2014
                (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2694 of 2006)

                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1713  OF 2014
                (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 5714 of 2006)

                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1710  OF 2014
                (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 4241 of 2009)

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1712 OF 2014
                (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 6743 of 2009)

                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1714  OF 2014
                (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 3000 of 2012)

                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1715  OF 2014
                (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 9114 of 2012)


                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1716  OF 2014
                 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 9374 of 2012)

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1717 OF 2014
                 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 3558 of 2013)



                               J U D G M E N T

Chelameswar, J.

1.    Leave granted in the special leave petitions.

2.    This batch of matters is listed pursuant to  various  orders  of  this
Court opining that these matters are required to be considered by  a  larger
Bench.

3.    The first of such orders is dated 20th April, 2007  made  in  Criminal
Appeal No.644 of 2007.   By the said order, leave was granted in SLP  (Crl.)
No.4976 of 2006.  The order reads as follows:-
“Our attention has been invited by the learned counsel to two  decisions  of
this Court; namely, a decision of 3-Judge Bench  in  Collector  of  Customs,
New Delhi vs. Ahmadalieva Nodira (2004) 3 SCC 549  and  subsequent  decision
of 2-Judge Bench in State of Uttaranchal vs. Rajesh  Kuamr  Gupta  (2007)  1
SCC 355.

Reference  was  also  made  of  Section  80  of  the  Narcotic   Drugs   and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 which reads as under:

“80.  Application of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 not  barred.   –  The
provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder  shall  be  in  addition
to, and not in derogation of, the Drugs  and  Cosmetics  Act,  1940  (23  of
1940) or the rules made thereunder.

In our opinion, in view of the fact that the effect of Section  80  requires
to be considered, we grant leave  and  direct  the  Registry  to  place  the
papers before the Hon’ble  the  Chief  Justice  for   placing   the   matter
before  a 3-Judge Bench.


4.    Each of the remaining matters came to be tagged on to Criminal  Appeal
No. 644 of 2007 on the ground that the  issue  involved  in  each  of  these
cases is identical with the issue involved in Criminal  Appeal  No.  644  of
2007.

5.    All these cases pertain to prosecution under  the  provisions  of  the
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985  (hereinafter  referred
to as “the Act”). Each one of the accused is alleged to be in possession  of
some  psychotropic  substance  mentioned  in  the  Schedule  to   the   Act.
Eventually, the  question  is  whether  persons  accused  of  committing  an
offence under the Act could be enlarged on bail in view of the  stipulations
contained under Section 37 of the Act.  In some of  these  cases,  bail  was
granted by the concerned High Court and in some cases,  bail  was  rejected.
Aggrieved by such orders, either the State or the  accused  preferred  these
appeals.

6.    Section 37[1] of the Act stipulates that all the  offences  punishable
under the Act shall be cognizable.   It further stipulates that:—
(1)   persons accused of an offence under Section 19,  24,  27A  or  persons
accused of offences  involved  in  “commercial  quantity”[2]  shall  not  be
released on bail, unless the public prosecutor is given  an  opportunity  to
oppose the application for bail; and

(2)   more importantly that unless “the Court is satisfied  that  there  are
reasonable grounds for believing” that the accused is not guilty of such  an
offence.   Further, the Court is also required to be satisfied that  such  a
person is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.

In other words, Section 37 departs from the long  established  principle  of
presumption of innocence  in  favour  of  an  accused  person  until  proved
otherwise.

7.    To understand the exact legal quandary involved in  these  matters,  a
brief  survey  of  the  relevant  provisions  of  the  Act   and   also   an
understanding  of  the  scheme  of  the  Drugs  and  Cosmetics   Act,   1940
(hereinafter referred to as “the 1940 Act”) is necessary.

8.    Prior to the Act, three colonial enactments to some extent dealt  with
the legislative subject matter of the Act.   They are Opium Act,  1857,  The
Opium Act, 1878 and the Dangerous Drugs Act,  1930.   Subsequently,  various
international treaties  and  protocols  etc.  dealing  with  the  menace  of
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances came into existence.   India  has
been a party to those treaties  and  protocols  etc.  and  incurred  several
legal  obligations  thereunder.  Parliament   opined   that   the   existing
enactments were inadequate to handle the hazard projected  by  the  narcotic
drugs  and  psychotropic  substances,  apart  from  the  inadequacy  of  the
existing law  to  enable  India  to  comply  with  its  international  legal
obligations.  Hence, the Act and all the three old Acts were repealed.

9.    The Act deals with narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.    Both
the  expressions  are  defined  under  the  Act.    Section  2(xiv)  defines
“narcotic drug” as follows:-
““narcotic drug” means coca leaf, cannabis (hemp), opium,  poppy  straw  and
includes all manufactured goods;”


10.    The  words  “coca  leaf”,  “cannabis”,  “opium”,  and  “poppy  straw”
occurring in the definition of narcotic drug are  themselves  defined  under
Sections 2 (vi), 2(iii), 2(xv) and 2(xviii) respectively.

11.   Section 8 prohibits the cultivation by any person of any  coca  plant,
opium poppy or cannabis plant  and  also  prohibits  the  gathering  of  any
portion of  coca  plant.   It  further  stipulates  that  “no  person  shall
produce, manufacture, possess, sell, purchase,  transport,  warehouse,  use,
consume” or indulge in either inter-state trade or international trade  (all
these  prohibited  activities  hereinafter  collectively  referred   to   as
“DEALING IN”) of any narcotic drug  or  psychotropic  substance.  Section  8
itself contains certain exceptions to the general prohibition  as  described
above.[3]  The details would be examined later.

12.   Sections 9 and 10 authorise the Central Government and  the  concerned
State Governments to  make  Rules  permitting  and  regulating  the  various
aspects of prohibition contained under Section 8.

13.   Chapter IV of the Act contains various offences  and  the  punishments
for the said offences.

14.   Since all the  cases  on  hand  are  cases  of  prosecution  for  some
contravention of the Act in relation to  psychotropic  substances,  Sections
22 to 24 are relevant for our enquiry.

15.   Section 22[4] prescribes the punishments for the violation of  various
activities prohibited under Section 8(c).  Depending upon  the  quantity  of
the psychotropic substance involved in the case, the  punishment  prescribed
also varies. If the  quantity  is  small,  the  punishment  extends  upto  6
months.   The  expression  “small  quantity”  is   defined   under   Section
2(xxiiia)[5].  If  the  quantity  is  less  than  “commercial  quantity”  as
defined under Section 2(viia), but greater  than  the  small  quantity,  the
punishment may extend upto 10 years  of  rigorous  imprisonment  apart  from
fine. When the quantity exceeds  the  commercial  quantity,  the  punishment
extends upto 20 years and carries a  fine  upto  2  lakhs  and  for  special
reasons even more.   Section 23[6] prescribes  the  punishment  for  illegal
import to India or export out of India of narcotic  drugs  and  psychotropic
substance. Once again, the punishment varies depending upon the quantity  of
the contraband involved in  the  offence.    Examination  of  the  scope  of
Section 24 is not necessary in the context of the  factual  setting  of  the
cases at hand.

16.   Section 35 stipulates that in any prosecution  for  an  offence  under
the Act which requires a culpable mental state of  the  accused,  the  court
trying offence is mandated to assume the existence  of  such  mental  state,
though it is open for the accused to  prove  that  he  had  no  such  mental
state.[7]

17.   The ambit and scope of section 37 was considered by this court in  two
earlier decisions in Union of India v. Thamisharasi, (1995) 4  SCC  190  and
Collector of Customs, New Delhi v. Ahmadalieva Nodira,  (2004)  3  SCC  549.
The latter of the two judgments after taking note of  the  earlier  decision
explained the context of section 37 as follows:
“6. As observed by this Court in Union of India v. Thamisharasi  clause  (b)
of sub-section (1) of Section 37 imposes limitations on granting of bail  in
addition to those provided under the Code. The two limitations are:  (1)  an
opportunity to the Public Prosecutor to oppose  the  bail  application,  and
(2) satisfaction  of  the  court  that  there  are  reasonable  grounds  for
believing that the accused is not guilty of such offence and that he is  not
likely to commit any offence while on bail.

7. The limitations on granting of bail come in only  when  the  question  of
granting bail arises on merits. Apart from the grant of opportunity  to  the
Public Prosecutor, the other twin conditions which really have relevance  so
far as the present accused-respondent is concerned,  are:  the  satisfaction
of the court that there  are  reasonable  grounds  for  believing  that  the
accused is not guilty of the alleged offence and that he is  not  likely  to
commit any offence while on bail. The  conditions  are  cumulative  and  not
alternative. The satisfaction contemplated regarding the accused  being  not
guilty has to be based on reasonable  grounds.  The  expression  “reasonable
grounds” means something more than  prima  facie  grounds.  It  contemplates
substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty  of
the alleged offence…”


18.   Various sets of Rules were  framed  by  the  Government  of  India  in
exercise of the power  conferred  under  Sections  9  and  76  of  the  Act.
Relevant  for  the  purpose  of  our  enquiry  is  the  Narcotic  Drugs  and
Psychotropic Substances Rules, 1985 (hereinafter referred to  as  “the  1985
Rules”).  Various Chapters and Rules provide  for  various  aspects  of  the
control and  regulation  of  DEALING  IN  narcotic  drugs  and  psychotropic
substances.  The subject matter of Chapter III of the Rules is  opium  poppy
cultivation  and  production  of  opium  and   poppy   straw,   Chapter   IV
manufacture, sale and export of opium,   Chapter  V  manufactured  drugs[8],
Chapter  VI  import,  export  and  transshipment  of  narcotic   drugs   and
psychotropic substances into or out of India.   Rule  53  thereof  prohibits
both import  and  export  into  or  out  of  India  of  narcotic  drugs  and
psychotropic substances specified in Schedule I to  the  Rules,  subject  of
course to the provisions of Chapter VIIA.  Rule 53A prohibits export of  the
narcotic drug or psychotropic substance etc.  specified  in  Schedule-II  to
the Rules to certain countries or to the regions specified in the  Schedule.
 The further details of the chapter are not necessary for our purpose.

19.   The subject matter of Chapter VII is  psychotropic  substances.   Rule
64 prohibits each of the activities specified  under  Section  8(c)  of  the
Act, DEALING IN all the psychotropic substances specified in  Schedule-I  of
the Rules.
Rule 64 -
“No  person  shall  manufacture,  possess,  transport,  import  inter-State,
export inter-State, sell, purchase, consume or use any of  the  psychotropic
substances specified in Schedule-I.”

In other words, Rule 64 reiterates the prohibition contained  under  Section
8(c) of the Act, w.r.t. some of the  psychotropic  substances  mentioned  in
Schedule-I to the Act.

20.   Whereas Rule 65 stipulates that with  reference  to  the  psychotropic
substances other than those specified in Schedule-I to the  Rules  could  be
manufactured subject to the limitation specified under Rule  65.   In  other
words, notwithstanding the  prohibition  under  Section  8(c),  the  Central
Government in exercise of its power under Section  9(1)(a)(vi)  permits  the
manufacture  of  those  psychotropic  substances  other  than  specified  in
Schedule-I to the Rules.

Rule 65A stipulates that-
“No person shall possess sell, purchase, consume  or  use  any  psychotropic
substance except in accordance with the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945”.

Obviously,  the  said  Rule  has  application  only  to   the   psychotropic
substances other than those specified in Schedule-I of the Rules.

Rule 66 mandates that-
“no person shall possess any psychotropic substance for any of the  purposes
covered by the 1945 Rules, unless he is lawfully authorized to possess  such
substance for any of the said purposes under these rules.”

The reference to the 1945 Rules admittedly is to  the  Drugs  and  Cosmetics
Rules, 1945 (hereinafter referred to  as  “1945  Rules”)  framed  under  the
Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940.

21.   It is submitted by  Ms.  Pinky  Anand,  learned  Additional  Solicitor
General that the High Court of Bombay following two earlier decisions,  (one
of the Delhi High Court and another of the High Court of Punjab &  Haryana),
in its judgment, which is impugned in  Special  Leave  Petition  No.5714  of
2006, held thus:
“38.  So given, as far as psychotropic substances is the  present  case  are
concerned, operations pertaining to them are permitted  because  Schedule  I
to the Rules do  not  include  them  at  all.   That  these  substances  are
included in the schedule to the act is not of any relevance because one  has
to see everything viz.,  the  Act,  the  Rules  and  Order  made  there under
together  and  in  a  harmonious  manner.   It  is  well  settled  that  the
psychotropic substance is included in the Schedule to the Act but it is  not
included in the Schedule I to the Rules, then operations covered by  Section
8 cannot be said to be contravening provisions of the  Act  and,  therefore,
punishable.  That is how, these provisions have been  interpreted  by  Delhi
High Court and earlier by Punjab and Haryana High Court.  Their  views  have
my respectful concurrence.”

The learned ASG submitted that such a conclusion is  wholly  unwarranted  on
the face of clear language of Section 8(c) of the Act.

22.   Shri K.T.S. Tulsi, learned senior counsel appearing for  some  of  the
accused in this batch of matters submitted that possession  of  psychotropic
substance pursuant to some authorisation under the 1940 Act  or  Rules  made
thereunder coupled with the absence of mention of a particular  psychotropic
substance (found in the possession of  an  accused)  in  Schedule-I  to  the
Rules framed under the Act excludes the application of the Act.

23.   It is in the background of the above submissions, the legality of  the
conclusion recorded by the Bombay High Court that the absence of mention  of
a particular psychotropic substance in Schedule-I to the Rules excludes  the
application of Section 8, notwithstanding the  fact  that  such  a  drug  is
included in the Schedule to the Act, is required to be decided.

24.   Before we examine the correctness of various submissions, we  deem  it
appropriate to analyze and find out the true  scope  and  ambit  of  section
8(c).  Section 8(c) in no uncertain  terms  prohibits  the  DEALING  IN  any
manner  in  any  narcotic  drug  or  psychotropic  substance.   However,  an
exception to such prohibition is also contained in the said Section.
“Section 8.  Prohibition of certain operations – No person shall –
xxx                     xxx            xxx                  xxx

Except for medical or scientific purposes and  in  the  manner  and  to  the
extent provided by the provisions of this Act or the rules  or  orders  made
thereunder and in a case where any such provision, imposes  any  requirement
by way of licence, permit or  authorisation  also  in  accordance  with  the
terms and conditions of such licence, permit or authorisation;”


The exception being that  DEALING  IN  any  narcotic  drug  or  psychotropic
substance is permitted “in the manner and to  the  extent  provided  by  the
provisions of this Act or the rules or orders made thereunder”.

25.   In other words, DEALING IN narcotic drugs and psychotropic  substances
is permissible only when such DEALING is for medical purposes or  scientific
purposes.  Further, the mere fact that the DEALING  IN  narcotic  drugs  and
psychotropic substances is for a medical or scientific purpose does  not  by
itself lift the embargo created under section 8(c).  Such a dealing must  be
in the manner and extent provided by the provisions of  the  Act,  Rules  or
Orders made thereunder.  Sections 9[9] and 10[10]  enable  the  Central  and
the State Governments respectively to make rules permitting  and  regulating
various aspects (contemplated under Section 8(c),  of  DEALING  IN  narcotic
drugs and psychotropic substances.

26.   The Act does not contemplate framing  of  rules  for  prohibiting  the
various  activities  of  DEALING  IN   narcotic   drugs   and   psychotropic
substances. Such prohibition is already  contained  in  Section  8(c).    It
only contemplates of the framing of Rules for permitting and regulating  any
activity of DEALING IN narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances.

27.   Therefore, we are of the opinion that the conclusion  reached  by  the
various High Courts that  prohibition  contained  under  Section  8  is  not
attracted in respect to all  those  psychotropic  substances  which  find  a
mention in the Schedule to the Act  but  not  in  Schedule-I  to  the  Rules
framed under the Act is untenable.

28.   However, it is brought to our notice that conclusion such as  the  one
reached by the various  High  Courts  as  noted  above  is  supported  by  a
judgment of this Court in Rajesh Kumar Gupta (supra).  At para  19,  it  was
held;
“19. It has not been brought to our notice that the 1985  Act  provides  for
the manner and extent of possession of  the  contraband.  The  rules  framed
under Section 9 of the 1985 Act  read  with  Section  76  thereof,  however,
provide for both the manner and  the  extent,  inter  alia,  of  production,
manufacture, possession, sale, purchase, transport, etc. of the  contraband.
Chapter VI of the 1985 Rules provides for import, export and  trans-shipment
of narcotic drugs and psychotropic  substances.  Rule  53  contains  general
prohibition in terms whereof the import and  export  out  of  India  of  the
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances specified in Schedule I  appended
thereto is prohibited. Such prohibition, however, is subject  to  the  other
provisions of the said Chapter. Rule 63 to  which  our  attention  has  been
drawn specifically prohibits import and export  of  consignments  through  a
post [pic]office box but keeping in view the general  prohibition  contained
in Rule 53 the  same  must  be  held  to  apply  only  to  those  drugs  and
psychotropic substances which are mentioned in Schedule I of the  Rules  and
not under the 1985 Act. Similarly, Chapter  VII  provides  for  psychotropic
substances. Rule 64 provides for  general  prohibition.  Rules  53  and  64,
thus, contain a genus and other provisions  following  the  same  under  the
said Chapter are species thereof. This we say  in  view  of  the  fact  that
whereas Rule 64  provides  for  general  prohibition  in  respect  of  sale,
purchase, consumption or use of the  psychotropic  substances  specified  in
Schedule I,  Rule  65  prohibits  manufacture  of  psychotropic  substances,
whereas Rule 66 prohibits possession, etc. of  psychotropic  substances  and
Rule  67  prohibits  transport  thereof.  Rule  67-A  provides  for  special
provisions for medical and scientific purposes.”

(emphasis supplied)


29.   We are unable to agree with the conclusion (reached  in  Rajesh  Kumar
Gupta’s case) that the prohibition contained in  Rule  63[11]  of  the  1985
Rules  is  applicable  only  to  those  narcotic  drugs   and   psychotropic
substances which are mentioned in Schedule-I to the Rules  and  not  to  the
psychotropic substances enumerated in the  Schedule  to  the  Act.   Such  a
conclusion was reached in Rajesh Kumar Gupta’s  case  on  the  understanding
that Rule 53 (prohibiting the import into and export out  of  India  of  the
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances specified in  Schedule-I  to  the
Rules) is the  source  of  the  authority  for  such  prohibition.   Such  a
conclusion was drawn from the fact that the other  Rules  contained  in  the
Chapter permit import into and export  out  of  India  of  certain  narcotic
drugs and psychotropic substances other than those specified  in  Schedule-I
to  the  Rules.  Unfortunately,  the  learned  Judges  in  reaching  such  a
conclusion ignored the mandate of Section 8(c) which  inter  alia  prohibits
in absolute terms import into and export out of India of any  narcotic  drug
and psychotropic substance. Rules framed under the Act cannot be  understood
to create rights and obligations contrary to those contained in  the  parent
Act.

30.   On examination of the scheme  of  Rules  53  to  63  which  appear  in
Chapter VI, we are of the opinion that Rule 53[12] reiterates an  aspect  of
the larger prohibition contained in Section 8(c) i.e.,  the  prohibition  of
import into and export out of India of the narcotic drugs  and  psychotropic
substances specified in  Schedule-I  to  the  Rules.   The  proviso  thereto
however enables the import into and export out of India on the basis  of  an
import certificate or export authorisation issued under  the  provisions  of
Chapter VI. The subsequent Rules stipulate the conditions subject  to  which
and the procedure to be followed by which some of  the  narcotic  drugs  and
psychotropic substances could be imported into  India  or  exported  out  of
India.  For example, opium is a narcotic drug by  definition  under  Section
2(xiv) of the Act whose export and import is prohibited under Section  8(c).
 But Rule  54[13]  authorizes  the  import  of  opium  by  Government  opium
factory.  The construction such as the one  placed  on  Rule  53  in  Rajesh
Kumar Gupta’s case would in  our  opinion  be  wholly  against  the  settled
canons of statutory interpretation that the subordinate  legislation  cannot
make stipulation contrary to the parent Act.

31.   Chapter VII deals with psychotropic substances. No doubt  Rule  64[14]
once again purports to prohibit various operations other  than  import  into
or export out of India in psychotropic substances  specified  in  Schedule-I
for the obvious  reason  that  import  and  export  operations  are  already
covered by Rule 53.  Rule 65  authorizes  the  manufacture  of  psychotropic
substances other than those specified in Schedule-I to the Rules subject  to
and in accordance with the conditions of a licence granted  under  the  1945
Rules.  The rule also provides for various other incidental  matters.   Rule
65A prohibits the sale, purchase, consumption or  use  of  any  psychotropic
substances except in accordance with the 1945 Rules.

32.    Rule  66  prohibits  any  person  from  having  in   possession   any
psychotropic substance even for any of the  purposes  authorized  under  the
1945 Rules unless the person in possession of such a psychotropic  substance
is lawfully authorized to possess such substance for  any  of  the  purposes
mentioned under the 1985 Rules.  Persons who are authorized under  the  1985
Rules, and the quantities of the material such  persons  are  authorized  to
possess, are specified under Rule 66(2).  They are-
any  research  institution  or  a  hospital  or  dispensary  maintained   or
supported by Government etc. – Rule 66(2).
individuals where  such  possession  is  needed  for  personal  medical  use
subject of course to the limits and conditions specified – the two  provisos
to Rule 66(2).
33.   Rule 66 reads as follows —
Rule 66. Possession, etc., of psychotropic substances.—(1) No  person  shall
possess any psychotropic substance for any of the purposes  covered  by  the
1945 Rules, unless he is lawfully authorized to possess such  substance  for
any of the said purposes under these rules.

(2)   Notwithstanding anything  contained  in  sub-rule  (1),  any  research
institution  or  a  hospital  or  dispensary  maintained  or  supported   by
Government or local body or by charity or voluntary subscription,  which  is
not authorized to possess any psychotropic substance under the  1945  Rules,
or any person who is not so authorized under the 1945 Rules, may  possess  a
reasonable quantity of such substance as may be necessary for their  genuine
scientific requirements, or both for such period as is deemed  necessary  by
the said research institution or, as the case may be, the said  hospital  or
dispensary or person:

Provided that where such psychotropic  substance  is  in  possession  of  an
individual for his personal medical  use  the  quantity  thereof  shall  not
exceed one hundred dosage units at a time:
Provided further than an individual may possess the  quantity  of  exceeding
one hundred dosage units at a time but not exceeding  three  hundred  dosage
units at a time for his personal  long  term  medical  use  if  specifically
prescribed by a Registered Medical Practitioner.

(3)   The research institution, hospital and dispensary referred to in  sub-
rule (2) shall maintain proper accounts  and  records  in  relation  to  the
purchase and consumption of the psychotropic substance in their possession.

34.   On the above analysis of the provisions of chapters VI and VII of  the
1985 Rules, we are  of  the  opinion,  both  these  Chapters  contain  Rules
permitting and regulating the  import  and  export  of  narcotic  drugs  and
psychotropic substances other than those specified in the Schedule-I to  the
1985 Rules  subject  to  various  conditions  and  procedure  stipulated  in
Chapter VI.  Whereas  Chapter  VII  deals  exclusively  with  various  other
aspects of DEALING IN psychotropic substances and the conditions subject  to
which such DEALING IN is permitted.  We are of the opinion that  both  Rules
53 and 64 are really in the nature of exception to  the  general  scheme  of
Chapters VI and VII respectively containing a list  of  narcotic  drugs  and
psychotropic substances which cannot be dealt in any manner  notwithstanding
the other provisions of these two chapters. We  are  of  the  clear  opinion
that neither Rule 53 nor Rule 64 is a source of  authority  for  prohibiting
the DEALING IN narcotic drugs and psychotropic  substances,  the  source  is
Section 8.  Rajesh Kumar Gupta’s case in our view is wrongly decided.

35.   In view of our conclusion, the complete analysis of  the  implications
of Section 80[15] of the Act is not really called for in the  instant  case.
It is only required to be stated that  essentially  the  Drugs  &  Cosmetics
Act, 1940 deals with various operations of manufacture, sale, purchase  etc.
of drugs generally whereas Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic  Substances  Act,
1985 deals with a more specific class of drugs  and,  therefore,  a  special
law on the subject. Further the provisions of the Act  operate  in  addition
to the provisions of 1940 Act.

36.   In the light of our above conclusion the  correctness  of  the  orders
impugned in all the Criminal Appeals is normally required to  be  considered
by the Bench of appropriate strength.  However, in view  of  the  fact  that
most of these matters are old matters [pertaining to years  2006  to  2013],
we deem it appropriate to remit all these  matters  to  the  concerned  High
Courts for passing of appropriate orders in the light of this judgment.

37.   Ordered accordingly.  Appeals stand disposed of.


                                                              ……………………….CJI.
                                                      (R.M. Lodha)


                                                               ………………………….J.
                                                          (J. Chelameswar)


                                                              ……………………..….J.
                                                   (A.K. Sikri)
New Delhi;
August 12, 2014
-----------------------
[1]     Section  37  -  Offences  to  be  cognizable  and  non-bailable.-(1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal  Procedure,  1973
(2 of 1974)
      (a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable;
      (b) no person accused of an  offence  punishable  for  offences  under
section 19 or section 24 or section 27 A and  also  for  offences  involving
commercial quantity shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless

      (i) the Public Prosecutor has been  given  an  opportunity  to  oppose
the application for such release, and
       (ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application,  the  court
is satisfied  that there are reasonable grounds for  believing  that  he  is
not guilty of such  offence and that he is not likely to commit any  offence
while on bail.

      (2) The limitations on granting of bail specified  in  clause  (b)  of
sub-section (1) are in  addition  to  the  limitations  under  the  Code  of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being  in
force, on granting of bail.]

[2]    Section 2(viia):  “ Commercial quantity”,  in  relation  to  narcotic
drugs and psychotropic  substances,  means  any  quantity  grater  than  the
quantity  specified  by  the  Central  Government  by  notification  in  the
Official Gazette.
[3]    Section 8. Prohibition of certain operations. -No person shall –
      (a) cultivate any coca plant or gather any portion of coca plant; or
      (b) cultivate the opium poppy or any cannabis plant; or
       (c)  produce,  manufacture,  possess,  sell,   purchase,   transport,
warehouse, use, consume,  import  inter-State,  export  inter-State,  import
into India, export from India or tranship any narcotic drug or  psychotropic
substance,
      except for medical or scientific purposes and in  the  manner  and  to
the extent provided by the provisions of this Act or  the  rules  or  orders
made thereunder and  in  a  case  where  any  such  provision,  imposes  any
requirement by way of licence, permit or authorization also   in  accordance
with the terms and conditions of such licence, permit or authorization:

      Provided that, and subject to the other provisions  of  this  Act  and
the rules made thereunder, the prohibition against the  cultivation  of  the
cannabis plant for the production of ganja or  the  production,  possession,
use, consumption, purchase,  sale,  transport,  warehousing,  import  inter-
State and export inter-State of ganja for any purpose  other  than   medical
and scientific purpose shall take  effect  only  from  the  date  which  the
Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify  in
this behalf:

[4]     22.   Punishment  for  contravention  in  relation  to  psychotropic
substances.  -Whoever, in contravention of any provision of this Act or  any
rule  or  order  made  or   condition   of   licence   granted   thereunder,
manufactures,  possesses,  sells,  purchases,  transports,  imports   inter-
State, exports inter-State, or uses  any  psychotropic  substance  shall  be
punishable, -

       where  the  contravention  involves  small  quantity,  with  rigorous
imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with  fine  which
may extend to ten thousand rupees or with both;
      where the  contravention  involves  quantity  lesser  than  commercial
quantity but greater than small quantity, with rigorous imprisonment  for  a
term which may extend to ten years and with fine which  may  extend  to  one
lakh rupees;
      where the contravention involves commercial  quantity,  with  rigorous
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than  ten  years  but  which
may extend to twenty years and shall also be liable to fine which shall  not
be less than one lakh rupees but which may extend to two lakh rupees:

      Provided that the court  may,  for  reasons  to  be  recorded  in  the
judgment, impose a fine exceeding two lakh rupees.

[5]    Section 2 (xxiiia): “small quantity”, in relation to  narcotic  drugs
and psychotropic substances, means any quantity  lesser  than  the  quantity
specified  by  the  Central  Government  by  notification  in  the  Official
Gazette.
[6]    Section 23. Punishment for illegal import in to  India,  export  from
India   or   transshipment    of    narcotic    drugs    and    psychotropic
substances.—Whoever, in contravention of any provision of this  Act  or  any
rule or order made or condition of licence or permit granted or  certificate
or authorization issued thereunder,  imports  into  India  or  exports  from
India or tranships any narcotic drug  or  psychotropic  substance  shall  be
punishment,—
      (a)   where the contravention involves small quantity, with rigorous
imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, which
may extend to ten thousand rupees or with both;

       (b)    where  the  contravention  involves   quantity   lesser   than
commercial  quantity  but  greater  than  small  quantity,   with   rigorous
imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and with fine;  which
may extend to one lakh rupees;

      (c)   where  the  contravention  involves  commercial  quantity,  with
rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years  but
which may extend to twenty years and shall also  be  liable  to  fine  which
shall not be less than one lakh rupees but which  may  extend  to  two  lakh
rupees:

      Provided that the court  may,  for  reasons  to  be  recorded  in  the
judgment, impose a fine exceeding two lakh rupees.

[7]     Section  35.  Presumption  of  culpable  mental  state.-(1)  In  any
prosecution for an offence under this Act which requires a  culpable  mental
state of the accused, the Court shall presume the existence of  such  mental
state but it shall be a defence for the accused to prove the  fact  that  he
had no such mental state with respect to the act charged as  an  offence  in
that prosecution.

        Explanation.-In  this  section  "culpable  mental  state"   includes
intention, motive knowledge of a fact and belief in, or reason  to  believe,
a fact.

      (2) For the purpose of this section, a fact is said to be proved  only
when the court believes it to  exist  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  and  not
merely when its existence is established by a preponderance of probability.

[8]    2(xi): “manufactured drug” means—
      all coca derivatives medicinal cannabis, opium derivatives  and  poppy
straw concentrate;
       any  other  narcotic  substance  or  preparation  which  the  Central
Government may, having regard to the available information as to its  nature
or  to  a  decision,  if  any,  under  any  International   Convention,   by
notification in the Official Gazette, declare to be a manufactured drug;
      but does not include any narcotic substance or preparation  which  the
Central Government  may, having regard to the available  information  as  to
its nature or to a decision, if any, under any International Convention,  by
notification in the Official Gazette,  declare  not  to  be  a  manufactured
drug.
[9]     Section 9. Power of Central Government to permit, control and
regulate.—(1) Subject to the provisions of section 8, the Central
Government may, by rules—
      (a)   permit and regulate—
      (i) to (v)       x     x    x     x
      the manufacture,  possession,  transport  import  inter-State,  export
inter-State, sale, purchase, consumption or use of psychotropic substances;

      x     x    x     x

[10]    Section 10. Power of State Government to permit, control and
regulate.—(1) Subject to the provisions of section 8, the State Government
may, by rules—
      permit and regulate—

      x     x    x     x



[11]   63.  Prohibition of import and export of consignments through a  post
office box, etc.  – The import or export of  consignments  of  any  narcotic
drug or psychotropic substance through a post office box or through  a  bank
is prohibited.
[12]   53.  General prohibition – Subject to the other  provisions  of  this
Chapter, the import into and export out of India of the narcotic  drugs  and
psychotropic substances specified in Schedule I is prohibited.
      Provided that nothing in this  rule  shall  apply  in  case  the  drug
substance in imported into or exported out of India  subject  to  an  import
certificate or export authorisation  issued  under  the  provision  of  this
Chapter and for the purpose mentioned in Chapter VIIA.

[13]   54.  Import of opium, etc. – The import of –
          (i) opium, concentrate of poppy straw, and
          (ii) morphine, codeine, thebaine, and their salts is prohibited
save by the Government Opium Factory;

           Provided that nothing in this  rule  shall  apply  to  import  of
morphine, codeine, thebaine and their salts  by  manufacturers  notified  by
the Government, for use in manufacture of products  to  be  exported  or  to
imports of small quantities of morphine,  codeine  and  thebaine  and  their
salts not exceeding a total  of  1  kilogram  during  a  calendar  year  for
analytical purposes by an importer,  after  following  the  procedure  under
rule 55 and subject to such conditions as may be  specified  in  the  import
certificate issued in Form No. 4A.

[14]    Rule 64. General Prohibition.—No person shall manufacture,  possess,
transport, import inter-State, export inter-State, sell,  purchase,  consume
or use any of the psychotropic substances specified in Schedule-I.
[15]   Section 80. Application of the Drugs  and  Cosmetics  Act,  1940  not
barred.—The provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder shall be  in
addition to, and not in derogation of, the Drugs  and  Cosmetics  Act,  1940
(23 of 1940) or the rules made thereunder.


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Monday, August 11, 2014

Sec.138 and sec.142 (b) of N.I.Act- Delay of 25 days in filing complaint after issuing a hand note - High court quashed the complaint as barred by limitation - Apex court held that since there is no opportunity for explaining delay as the complaint strongly believed that he filed complaint from statutory notice and since the accused not raised this plea during the trial of case and for the fist time raised before High court for quashing, the apex court granted time to file a separate application for condone the delay in the special circumstances of the case but not as precedent authorizing every one from not filing delay condone application = CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1684 OF 2014 ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL) NO. 8924 OF 2013 PAWAN KUMAR RALLI … APPELLANT VERSUS MANINDER SINGH NARULA … RESPONDENT = 2014 -Aug. Part- http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41820

Sec.138 and sec.142 (b) of N.I.Act- Delay of 25 days in filing complaint after issuing a hand note - High court quashed the complaint as barred by limitation - Apex court held that since there is no opportunity for explaining delay as the complaint strongly believed that he filed complaint from statutory notice and since the accused not raised this plea during the trial of case and for the fist time raised before High court for quashing, the apex court granted time to file a separate application for condone the delay in the special circumstances of the case but not as precedent authorizing every one from not filing delay condone application =  

he
had given a loan of Rs.60 lakhs to the respondent in the month of  November,
2011. In discharge of his obligation to the appellant, on 25th April,  2012,
the respondent issued (i) Cheque No. 889953, drawn on  Allahabad  Bank,  for
Rs.30 lakhs; (ii) Cheque No. 545420, drawn on ICICI Bank, for  Rs.20  lakhs;
and (iii) Cheque No. 545409, drawn on ICICI Bank, for  Rs.  10  lakhs.  When
the appellant presented the said cheques in his Bank for  realization,  they
were dishonoured by the respondent’s banker with remarks ‘Stop Payment’.
 The  High
Court expressed the view that the complaint was not filed  within  a  period
of one month after the expiry of 15 days of  receipt  of  the  notice  dated
27th April, 2012 and hence it was barred by limitation under Section  142(b)
of the Act and by the impugned judgment  quashed  the  criminal  proceedings
against the respondent.
(a)   Whether the handwritten note sent by  the  appellant  on  27th  April,
2012 to the respondent could be treated as ‘notice’ or the notice issued  by
the advocate on 24th May, 2012 could only be treated as ‘notice’ within  the
meaning of Section 138 of the Act?

(b)   If there was any delay in filing the Complaint in  the  present  case,
whether such delay could have been condoned by the High Court in  accordance
with the provisions of the Act?

(c)   Whether the High Court was right in quashing the criminal  proceedings
on the ground of limitation or instead of quashing the criminal  proceedings
it ought to have remitted the matter back to the Trial  Court  for  deciding
the issue of limitation?

 It  appears  that
the respondent contested the matter before the Trial Court  and  also  filed
an application  under  Section  91,  Cr.P.C.  warranting  the  appellant  to
produce various documents. He has also moved an  application  under  Section
410, Cr.P.C. seeking transfer of the Complaint to a different Court.  It  is
noteworthy that all through out  the  pendency  of  proceedings  before  the
Trial Court, the respondent did not raise the  issue  of  ‘limitation’.  The
issue was raised for the first time before the High Court  in  Section  482,
Cr.P.C. proceedings.
Apex court held that
Thus,  in  our  opinion,  the  handwritten
note dated 27th April,  2012  fulfilled  the  mandatory  requirements  under
clause (b) of proviso to Section 138  and  could  be  said  to  be  a  valid
‘notice’ in the light of this Court’s Judgment in Central Bank  of  India  &
Anr. (supra). Moreover, this document (Annexure P4) stands admitted  by  the
appellant in his cross examination also.  Therefore,  in  our  opinion,  the
High Court has committed no error in considering the handwritten note  dated
27th April, 2012 as ‘notice’ under Section 138 of the Act.
 In view of the settled principles of law in  Rakesh  Kumar  Jain,  MSR
Leathers.  Subodh  S.  Salaskar  (supra)  and  in  the  peculiar  facts  and
circumstances of the case, we are of the considered opinion  that  the  High
Court was not right in quashing the complaint  merely  on  the  ground  that
complaint is barred by limitation, that too a plea which was taken  for  the
first time before the High Court. On the other hand, the  High  Court  ought
to have remanded the matter to the Trial Court for  deciding  the  issue  of
limitation.
24.   At the same time,  we  want  to  make  it  very  clear  that  by  this
observation we are not laying down a legal  proposition  that  without  even
filing an application seeking condonation of  delay  at  an  initial  stage,
complainant can be given opportunity at any stage  of  the  proceeding.   As
already discussed by us in the foregoing paragraphs, we  have  come  to  the
irresistible conclusion, to afford an opportunity  for  the  complainant  to
move an application seeking condonation of delay, under the  peculiar  facts
and circumstances of the case.
25.   For all the aforesaid reasons, in order to meet the ends  of  justice,
we exercise our discretion under Article 142 of  the  Constitution  and  set
aside the  impugned  judgment  of  the  High  Court  quashing  the  criminal
proceedings and restore the criminal proceedings  before  the  Trial  Court.
The appellant is permitted to file an application for condonation  of  delay
before the Trial Court and if such an application is filed, the Trial  Court
shall be at liberty to consider the same on its own  merits,  without  being
impressed  upon  by  any  of  the  observations  by  this  Court,  and  pass
appropriate orders.
      2014 -Aug. Part- http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41820

                                                            REPORTABLE



                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION



                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1684  OF 2014
                               ARISING OUT OF
                SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL) NO. 8924 OF 2013



PAWAN KUMAR RALLI                       …    APPELLANT

VERSUS

MANINDER SINGH NARULA             …     RESPONDENT




                                  JUDGMENT


N.V. RAMANA, J.


      Leave granted.
2.    This appeal arises out of the judgment and order dated  15th  January,
2013 of the High Court of Delhi passed in Criminal  Miscellaneous  Case  No.
2961 of 2012 filed by  the  respondent  herein  under  Section  482  of  the
Criminal Procedure Code. By the said judgment, the High  Court  quashed  the
criminal proceedings initiated by the appellant under  Section  138  of  the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter  referred  to  as  ‘the  Act’)
against the respondent.
3.    The brief history of the case, according to the appellant, is that  he
had given a loan of Rs.60 lakhs to the respondent in the month of  November,
2011. In discharge of his obligation to the appellant, on 25th April,  2012,
the respondent issued (i) Cheque No. 889953, drawn on  Allahabad  Bank,  for
Rs.30 lakhs; (ii) Cheque No. 545420, drawn on ICICI Bank, for  Rs.20  lakhs;
and (iii) Cheque No. 545409, drawn on ICICI Bank, for  Rs.  10  lakhs.  When
the appellant presented the said cheques in his Bank for  realization,  they
were dishonoured by the respondent’s banker with remarks ‘Stop Payment’.
4.    The appellant, after  receiving  the  communication  from  his  banker
about the dishonour of Cheques, issued a handwritten  notice  (Annexure  P4)
to the respondent on 27th April, 2012 calling upon him to make the  payment.
Upon non-compliance by the respondent, a  formal  legal  notice  dated  24th
May, 2012 (Annexpure P5)  was  issued  under  Section  138/142  of  the  Act
requiring the respondent to pay the cheques amount along with  interest  and
costs. In his reply to the legal notice, the  respondent  totally  disagreed
with the allegation of taking loan from  the  appellant.  Subsequently,  the
appellant filed a Complaint Case against the  respondent  invoking  Sections
138, 141 and 142 of the Act and Section 420, of the Indian Penal  Code.  The
Metropolitan Magistrate took cognizance  and  summoned  the  respondent  who
pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
5.     During  the  pendency  of  trial,  the  respondent   filed   Criminal
Miscellaneous Case before the High Court  under  Section  482,  Cr.P.C.  for
quashing of criminal proceedings pending before the Trial  Court.  The  High
Court expressed the view that the complaint was not filed  within  a  period
of one month after the expiry of 15 days of  receipt  of  the  notice  dated
27th April, 2012 and hence it was barred by limitation under Section  142(b)
of the Act and by the impugned judgment  quashed  the  criminal  proceedings
against the respondent. Aggrieved by  the  order  of  the  High  Court,  the
appellant-complainant  approached  this  Court  by  way  of  Special   Leave
Petition.
6.    Before us, the case of the appellant is that the High  Court  was  not
justified in exercising  extra  ordinary  jurisdiction  under  Section  482,
Cr.P.C.  The High Court  incorrectly  considered  the  handwritten  note  as
legal notice and calculated the limitation period accordingly. Whereas,  the
handwritten note was only an intimation to the accused and according to  the
provisions of law, the actual  notice  within  30  days  from  the  date  of
dishonour of the cheques, was issued  on  24th  May,  2012  and  accordingly
criminal proceedings were initiated well within the limitation period.  But,
the High Court failed to take into  consideration  this  material  fact  and
merely on the  ground  of  25  days  delay  from  the  date  of  service  of
handwritten note, quashed the criminal proceedings. The High  Court  ignored
the fact that the Act clearly enables the Court to  condone  the  delay,  if
any, beyond 30 days of limitation period under proviso to Section 142(b)  of
the Act.
7.    During  the  course  of  hearing,  we  felt  it  justifiable  to  have
assistance of a senior counsel and  we  accordingly  appointed           Mr.
Huzefa Ahmadi, learned senior counsel as Amicus Curiae.
8.    Learned Amicus submitted that the handwritten note dated  27th  April,
2012 whereby the appellant called  upon  the  respondent  to  make  payment,
would fall within the four corners of ‘notice’ under Section 138(b)  of  the
Act and there was a delay of 25 days  in  filing  the  Complaint  under  the
provisions of the Act.  He further submitted that  the  proviso  to  Section
142(b) of the Act confers power on the Court to condone the  delay,  if  the
complainant satisfies the Court on the part of delay. As it was believed  by
the Trial Court that since the legal notice was issued  on  24th  May,  2012
the limitation period would come into force from that date only,  there  was
no occasion for the appellant to plead for sufficient cause for  condonation
of delay as the question of delay did not  arise  before  the  Trial  Court.
While issuing process, the Trial Court was clearly  of  the  view  that  the
Complaint was within limitation on  the  basis  of  averments  made  in  the
Complaint. Therefore, the occasion did not arise for the appellant to  raise
the plea of ‘sufficient cause’ for the delay. Moreover, the  respondent  had
also not raised the question of limitation before the Trial  Court  and  the
issue of limitation was raised for the first time before the High Court.
9.    Even otherwise,  before  quashing  the  criminal  proceedings  on  the
ground of limitation, the High Court could have decided  whether  sufficient
cause was made out by the appellant under the proviso to Section  142(b)  of
the Act, and if satisfied, it could have condoned the delay.  Alternatively,
the High Court could  have  remanded  the  matter  to  the  Trial  Court  to
determine the issue. In support of his submissions, he placed reliance on  a
judgment of this Court in Rakesh Kumar Jain Vs. State (Through  CBI)  (2000)
7 SCC 656, in  which  while  considering  the  provisions  of  Section  473,
Cr.P.C. and deciding the question whether on the ground of  limitation,  the
accused is entitled to seek his discharge, this Court held:
“The mere fact that the complaint was filed 25 days after the expiry of  the
period of limitation did not entitle  the  accused  to  seek  his  discharge
under Section 245, Cr.P.C because the complainant has, under  law,  a  right
to seek for extension of time under  Section  473  Cr.P.C.  The  complainant
could satisfy the Magistrate on the facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case
that the delay was explainable which was  occasioned  on  account  of  their
bona fide belief to obtain the  sanction  for  the  purpose  of  filing  the
complaint”.

10.   Learned Amicus  finally  submitted  that  the  legislative  intent  in
inserting the proviso to Clause (b) of Section 142 of the Act  was  only  to
protect the Cheque holders from the defaulters who issued  the  Cheques  and
the Court should act reasonably in providing an opportunity  to  the  Cheque
holder to present his version on the issue of delay  if  any.  After  taking
into consideration the reasons advanced by  the  Cheque  holder,  the  Court
should consider the question of delay  and  then  only  it  should  pass  an
order. But in  the  present  case,  the  High  Court  adopted  an  unhealthy
approach by passing the impugned order quashing the criminal proceedings  on
the ground of limitation, that too for a delay  of  only  25  days,  without
considering the appellant’s reasons for  the  delay.  He  further  submitted
that the observation of the High Court in the impugned order that  “allowing
the appellant to pursue the Complaint against the  respondent  would  be  an
abuse of process” is also not in the interest of justice.
11.   Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, contended  that
there is no apparent error in the judgment of the  High  Court  in  quashing
the criminal proceedings on the ground of limitation.  The  High  Court  has
correctly treated the handwritten notice  sent  by  the  appellant  on  27th
April, 2012 as a valid notice in terms of Section 138  of  the  Act  as  the
appellant  had  given  the  notice  in  writing  within  fifteen   days   of
information of dishonour of the Cheuqes from his banker. In support of  this
contention learned counsel has cited the judgment of this Court  in  Central
Bank of India & Anr. Vs. Saxons Farms & Ors. (1999) 8 SCC 221  wherein  this
Court held that though no form of notice is  prescribed  in  Clause  (b)  of
Section 138 of the Act, the requirement is that notice  shall  be  given  in
writing within  fifteen  days  of  receipt  of  information  from  the  bank
regarding return of the Cheque as unpaid and in  the  notice  a  demand  for
payment of the amount of the Cheque has to  be  made.  So,  learned  counsel
argued that looking at this settled legal position, the first notice  issued
by the appellant on 27th April, 2012 had since fulfilled the  criteria  laid
down by this Court, the same has  to  be  treated  as  ‘notice’  within  the
meaning of Section 138(b) of the Act. Therefore, he submitted that the  High
Court was right in considering the handwritten  note  as  ‘notice’  for  the
purpose of  calculating  delay  in  filing  the  Complaint  and  it  rightly
declared that the Complaint was barred by limitation.
12.   Learned counsel for the respondent further contended that even  though
the proviso to Section 142(b) of the Act facilitates  condonation  of  delay
if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had cogent  reasons  for  not
making the complaint within the limitation period, in the present  case  the
complainant had made no request before the  High  Court  for  availing  such
benefit of condonation of  delay.  To  substantiate  his  argument,  learned
counsel relied upon the counter affidavit filed by the appellant before  the
High Court and submitted that there also the appellant, instead of  pleading
for condonation of delay, took the stand that the communication  dated  27th
April, 2012 shall not  be  treated  as  notice,  whereas  it  fulfilled  all
ingredients of a ‘notice’ under Section 138 of the Act. In  support  of  his
claim that the matter is barred by limitation and requires to  be  dismissed
at the threshold itself, he relied on this Court’s Judgment in Ramesh  Chand
Sharma Vs. Udham Singh Kamal & Ors. (1999) 8 SCC 304 and submitted  that  in
that  case  also  despite  the  objection  of  limitation  raised   by   the
appellants,  the  first  respondent  did  not  file  any   application   for
condonation of delay and this Court had dismissed  the  O.A.  filed  by  the
first respondent, on the ground of limitation.
13.   Learned counsel for the respondent therefore firmly opposed  the  plea
of the learned Amicus that the matter has to be remanded back to  the  Trial
Court for hearing the issue of limitation by  providing  an  opportunity  to
the appellant to avail the remedy envisaged under  the  proviso  to  Section
142(b) of the Act. He finally submitted that the High  Court  was  right  in
quashing the criminal proceedings and the impugned order does not  call  for
interference of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.
14.   We have heard learned counsel at length. In view  of  the  conflicting
approach adopted by the High Court in determining the  issue  of  limitation
which subsequently led to  the  quashing  of  criminal  proceedings  pending
before the Trial Court, the following issues emerge  for  our  consideration
for the disposal of this matter:
(a)   Whether the handwritten note sent by  the  appellant  on  27th  April,
2012 to the respondent could be treated as ‘notice’ or the notice issued  by
the advocate on 24th May, 2012 could only be treated as ‘notice’ within  the
meaning of Section 138 of the Act?

(b)   If there was any delay in filing the Complaint in  the  present  case,
whether such delay could have been condoned by the High Court in  accordance
with the provisions of the Act?

(c)   Whether the High Court was right in quashing the criminal  proceedings
on the ground of limitation or instead of quashing the criminal  proceedings
it ought to have remitted the matter back to the Trial  Court  for  deciding
the issue of limitation?

15.   Before embarking on the above issues, we may notice that  the  proviso
appended to Section 138 of the Act limits  the  applicability  of  the  main
provision stating:
138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc. of funds in  the  account.—

                                …     …     …

Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless—

(a)   the cheque has been presented to the  bank  within  a  period  of  six
months from the date on which it is  drawn  or  within  the  period  of  its
validity, whichever is earlier;

(b)   the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the  case  may
be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by  giving  a
notice in writing, to the drawer of the Cheque, within thirty  days  of  the
receipt of information by him from the bank  regarding  the  return  of  the
Cheque as unpaid; and

(c)   the drawer of such Cheque fails  to  make  the  payment  of  the  said
amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the  holder  in  due
course of the Cheque, within  fifteen  days  of  the  receipt  of  the  said
notice.”

16.   Section 142 of the Act also puts a limitation on the power of the
Court to take cognizance of the offences, which reads as under:

142. Cognizance of offences—Notwithstanding anything contained in  the  Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),—

(a)  no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under  Section
138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as  the  case
may be, the holder in due course of the cheque;

(b)   such complaint is made within one month  of  the  date  on  which  the
cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138:

Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may be taken by the Court  after
the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the court  that  he  had
sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period.

(c)   no Court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or  a  Judicial
Magistrate of the  First  Class  shall  try  any  offence  punishable  under
Section 138.

17.   Admittedly, in the case on hand, the Cheques in question  were  issued
by the respondent  and  the  same  were  dishonoured  by  the  Bank  on  his
instructions of ‘stop payment’. Two communications, one a  handwritten  note
dated 27th April, 2012 by the appellant himself   and  the  other  a  formal
legal notice dated 24th May, 2012 issued by the  advocate,  were  served  on
the respondent calling upon him to pay the Cheque  amounts.  The  respondent
did not respond to the handwritten communication, but  has  replied  to  the
legal  notice  issued  through  advocate  on  24th  May,  2012  denying  the
allegation.  Upon  failure  of  the  respondent  to  obey  the   handwritten
communication as well as the legal notice, the appellant initiated  criminal
proceedings by filing Complaint Case on 5th July,  2012.   It  appears  that
the respondent contested the matter before the Trial Court  and  also  filed
an application  under  Section  91,  Cr.P.C.  warranting  the  appellant  to
produce various documents. He has also moved an  application  under  Section
410, Cr.P.C. seeking transfer of the Complaint to a different Court.  It  is
noteworthy that all through out  the  pendency  of  proceedings  before  the
Trial Court, the respondent did not raise the  issue  of  ‘limitation’.  The
issue was raised for the first time before the High Court  in  Section  482,
Cr.P.C. proceedings. The High Court, considering the handwritten  note  sent
by the appellant on 27th April, 2012 as ‘notice’ under Section  138  of  the
Act, came to the conclusion that the complaint is barred by limitation.
18.   This Court has already clarified in  Central  Bank  of  India  &  Anr.
(supra) that Section 138 of the Act does not prescribe any specific form  of
notice, but mandates that it should be issued in writing within thirty  days
(w.e.f. 6-2-2003) of receipt  of  information  from  the  banker  about  the
dishonour of Cheque, with a demand to the drawer for making payment  of  the
said amount.
19.   We have perused the handwritten note dated 27th April, 2012  (Annexure
P4) and found that it was issued within the mandatory period of thirty  days
of  dishonour  of  cheques  and  contained  (a)  the   subject   amount   of
Rs.60,00,000/- given by the  appellant  as  loan  to  the  respondent  under
promissory notes; (b) the details of Cheque numbers and dates of issue  with
amounts and particulars of Bank; (c) Returning  of  Cheques  by  the  banker
dishonouring them on the ground of ‘Stop Payment’ by the respondent;  (d)  a
demand for immediate repayment of the amount;  and  (d)  a  caution  to  the
respondent that in case of failure on the part of respondent, the  appellant
would initiate legal proceedings. Thus,  in  our  opinion,  the  handwritten
note dated 27th April,  2012  fulfilled  the  mandatory  requirements  under
clause (b) of proviso to Section 138  and  could  be  said  to  be  a  valid
‘notice’ in the light of this Court’s Judgment in Central Bank  of  India  &
Anr. (supra). Moreover, this document (Annexure P4) stands admitted  by  the
appellant in his cross examination also.  Therefore,  in  our  opinion,  the
High Court has committed no error in considering the handwritten note  dated
27th April, 2012 as ‘notice’ under Section 138 of the Act.
20.   However, when the issue of limitation has come up for the  first  time
before the High Court, it ought to have dealt with the  same  on  merits  as
per proviso to Section 142(b) of the  Act.  The  said  proviso  appended  to
clause (b) of Section  142  of  the  Act  was  inserted  by  the  Negotiable
Instruments (Amendment and  Miscellaneous  Provisions)  Act,  2002  and  the
legislative intent was, no doubt, in order to overcome the  technicality  of
limitation period.  The Statement of Objects and  Reasons  appended  to  the
Amendment Bill, 2002 suggests that the introduction of this proviso  was  to
provide discretion to the Court to take cognizance  of  offence  even  after
expiry of the period of limitation [See  MSR  Leathers  Vs.  S.  Palaniappan
(2013) 1 SCC 177].  Only with a view to  obviate  the  difficulties  on  the
part of the Complainant, Parliament inserted the proviso to  clause  (b)  of
Section 142 of the Act in the year 2002. It confers a jurisdiction upon  the
Court to condone the delay [See Subodh S. Salaskar Vs.  Jayprakash  M.  Shah
(2008) 13 SCC 689].
21.   It is no doubt true that at the time  of  filing  the  complaint,  the
Magistrate has to take  cognizance  of  the  complaint  when  it  is  within
limitation and in case of delay in filing the complaint, the  complaint  has
to come up with the application  seeking  condonation  of  delay.  But,  the
peculiar fact of the present case is that in the complaint, the  complainant
had only averred that he has sent the legal notice dated 24th May, 2012  but
not mentioned about the handwritten note dated 27th April, 2012.  Basing  on
the said averment, the learned Trial Judge was satisfied that the  complaint
is within the prescribed period of limitation. Hence, in this case,  raising
the plea of limitation and Court exercising the discretion  to  condone  the
delay did not arise at all.
22.    In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the  case,  while  keeping
in mind the legislative intent  and  the  specific  plea  of  the  appellant
raised in the grounds for the Special Leave Petition  that  he  should  have
been allowed to move an application for  condonation  of  delay  before  the
Trial Court as the respondent has not suffered any prejudice  by  reason  of
25 days delay, we strongly feel that the  appellant  should  not  have  been
deprived of the remedy provided by the Legislature. In fact, the  remedy  so
provided was to enable a genuine litigant  to  pursue  his  case  against  a
defaulter by overcoming the technical difficulty of limitation.  Hence,  the
High  Court  has  committed  an  error  by  not  considering  the  issue  of
limitation on merits.
23.   In view of the settled principles of law in  Rakesh  Kumar  Jain,  MSR
Leathers.  Subodh  S.  Salaskar  (supra)  and  in  the  peculiar  facts  and
circumstances of the case, we are of the considered opinion  that  the  High
Court was not right in quashing the complaint  merely  on  the  ground  that
complaint is barred by limitation, that too a plea which was taken  for  the
first time before the High Court. On the other hand, the  High  Court  ought
to have remanded the matter to the Trial Court for  deciding  the  issue  of
limitation.
24.   At the same time,  we  want  to  make  it  very  clear  that  by  this
observation we are not laying down a legal  proposition  that  without  even
filing an application seeking condonation of  delay  at  an  initial  stage,
complainant can be given opportunity at any stage  of  the  proceeding.   As
already discussed by us in the foregoing paragraphs, we  have  come  to  the
irresistible conclusion, to afford an opportunity  for  the  complainant  to
move an application seeking condonation of delay, under the  peculiar  facts
and circumstances of the case.
25.   For all the aforesaid reasons, in order to meet the ends  of  justice,
we exercise our discretion under Article 142 of  the  Constitution  and  set
aside the  impugned  judgment  of  the  High  Court  quashing  the  criminal
proceedings and restore the criminal proceedings  before  the  Trial  Court.
The appellant is permitted to file an application for condonation  of  delay
before the Trial Court and if such an application is filed, the Trial  Court
shall be at liberty to consider the same on its own  merits,  without  being
impressed  upon  by  any  of  the  observations  by  this  Court,  and  pass
appropriate orders.
26.   We are thankful to Mr. Huzefa Ahmadi, learned amicus curiae,  for  his
able assistance.
27.   The appeal stands allowed with the aforesaid observations.

                                                           ….……………………………….J.
                                                     (RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI)


                                                         .....………………………………J.
                                            (N.V. RAMANA)
NEW DELHI
AUGUST  11,  2014
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