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Wednesday, May 7, 2014

Electricity Act -payment of CSS to WESCO- SEZ - PPA - payment of CSS to WESCO -only for running it's unit but not for Muliti Unit SEZ - Benefits conferred under Notification whether applies - and whether CSS is to be payable to WESCO - The Notification dated 03.03.2010 providing for the “Developer” of SEZ being deemed as a “Distribution Licensee” was issued keeping in view the concept of Multi Unit SEZs and will apply only to such cases in which the Developer is supplying the power to multiple Units in the SEZ. The said Notification will not apply to a Developer like the Appellant who has established the SEZ only for itself. Apex court held that it is not possible for the Appellant to avoid payment of CSS to WESCO. = M/s. Sesa Sterlite Ltd. ….Appellant(s) Vs. Orissa Electricity Regulatory Comm. & Ors. …Respondent(s) = 2014 (April. Part)http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41475

Electricity Act -payment of CSS to WESCO-  SEZ - PPA - payment of CSS to WESCO -only for running it's unit but not for Muliti Unit SEZ - Benefits conferred under Notification whether applies - and whether CSS is to  be payable to WESCO - The Notification  dated  03.03.2010  providing  for  the “Developer” of SEZ being  deemed  as  a  “Distribution  Licensee”  was issued keeping in view the concept of Multi Unit SEZs and  will  apply  only to such cases in which the Developer is supplying  the  power  to multiple Units in the SEZ. The said Notification will not apply to  a Developer like the Appellant who has  established  the  SEZ  only  for itself. Apex court held that it is not  possible  for  the  Appellant  to avoid payment of CSS to WESCO.  =

To recapitulate  briefly,
      in the present case no doubt by virtue of the status of a developer in
      the SEZ area, the Appellant is also  treated  as  deemed  Distribution
      Licensee.  
However with this, it only gets exemption from specifically
      applying for licence under Section 14 of the Act.  
In order  to  avail
      further benefits under the Act, the Appellant is also required to show
      that it is in fact  having  distribution  system  and  has  number  of
      consumers to whom it is supplying the electricity.  
That  is  not  the case here.  
For its own plant only, it is getting the electricity from Sterlite Ltd. for which it has entered into PPA.  
We have to  keep  in
      mind the object and scheme of SEZ Act which  envisages  several  units
      being set up in a SEZ area.  This is evident from a collective reading
      of the various provisions of the SEZ Act viz. Section 2(g)(j)(za)(zc),
      Section 3, 4, 11, 12, 13 and 15.  
There can be a Sector  Specific  SEZ
      with Several Units i.e. for IT,  Mineral  Based  Industries  etc.  but
      instances of single unit SEZ like in the present case of the Appellant
      may be rare.  
The Notification  dated  03.03.2010  providing  for  the
      “Developer” of SEZ being  deemed  as  a  “Distribution  Licensee”  was
      issued keeping in view the concept of Multi Unit SEZs and  will  apply
      only to such cases in which the Developer is supplying  the  power  to
      multiple Units in the SEZ.  
The said Notification will not apply to  a
      Developer like the Appellant who has  established  the  SEZ  only  for
      itself.

      44.  Having regard to the aforesaid  factual  and  legal  aspects  and
      keeping in mind the purpose for which CSS is payable, as explained  in
      detail in the earlier part of this judgment, we are of the  view  that
      on the facts of this case it is not  possible  for  the  Appellant  to
      avoid payment of CSS to WESCO.  
We, therefore, do not find  any  merit
      in this Appeal which is accordingly dismissed.
2014 (April. Part)http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41475   
SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, A.K. SIKRI

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                       IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5479 of 2013




      M/s. Sesa Sterlite Ltd.                              ….Appellant(s)

                             Vs.

      Orissa Electricity Regulatory
      Comm. & Ors.                                            …Respondent(s)



                                   J U D G M E N T

      A.K. SIKRI, J.




   1. Instant is a statutory Appeal which is filed by the  Appellant  under
      Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 (hereinafter referred to  as
      ‘the Act’).  This Appeal arises out of the judgment and  order  dated
      3rd May, 2013 passed by Appellate Tribunal for Electricity.

   2. By the aforesaid judgment, the Appellate Tribunal  has  affirmed  the
      orders of the Odisha Electricity Regulatory  Commission  (hereinafter
      referred to as the ‘State Commission’).  The essence of these  orders
      is that even when the Appellant is a “Deemed  Distribution  Licensee”
      for the purpose of Electricity Act, it is still liable to  pay  Cross
      Subsidy Surcharge (CSS) to the Respondent No.8 viz. WESCO which is  a
      Distribution Licensee for the area in question.

   3. To put it in nutshell, the case of the Appellant is that it  has  its
      unit in Special Economic Zone (SEZ) and it is a Developer in the said
      SEZ area.  It is not drawing or utilizing any  electricity  from  the
      Distribution Licensee viz. WESCO for its unit  namely  VALE-SEZ.   In
      fact, the Appellant had entered into a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA)
      dated 18th August, 2011 with M/s. Sterlite Energy Ltd.  The Appellant
      had filed application for getting approval of the said PPA.   However
      the Odisha  State  Commission,  instead  of  granting  the  approval,
      rejected the said PPA and directed the Appellant to pay CSS to  WESCO
      holding the Appellant to be a ‘Consumer’.

   4. As per the Appellant, as it is a deemed distribution licensee for the
      purpose of Electricity Act  by  virtue  of  it  being  a  ‘Developer’
      because of the reason that its  unit  is  in  SEZ  area  and  such  a
      recognition  is  given  to  the  Appellant  statutorily   under   the
      provisions of Special Economic Zone Act, 2005  (hereinafter  referred
      to as SEZ Act).  Therefore, the question of payment  of  CSS  to  the
      Distribution Licensee does not arise.  It is also  the  case  of  the
      Appellant that, in any case, since no electricity is being drawn from
      the open access network of WESCO, there  is  no  question  of  making
      payment of cross subsidy surcharge.  This is the brief description of
      the dispute raised by the Appellant and in order  to  understand  the
      gravamen of this dispute, we take a tour of the factual roadmap.

      The Facts:

   5. These facts are in narrow compass and have been  narrated  succinctly
      by the Appellate Tribunal in its order.  As there is no dispute about
      the correctness of these  facts,  we  intend  to  traverse  the  same
      therefrom. The Appellant is engaged in the business of production and
      export of aluminium.  The Appellant has set up a 1.25  MTPA  capacity
      aluminium smelter project in a sector specific Special Economic Zone.
       After getting all necessary approvals for the development of SEZ for
      manufacture of export of aluminium the appellant set up the aforesaid
      plant.  These approvals include the approval with captive power plant
      as well.  It is also a matter of record that on 27th  February,  2009
      the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India  issued  a
      notification declaring the unit of the Appellant to be SEZ.   It  was
      followed by Notification dated 3rd March, 2010 under Section 49(1) of
      the SEZ Act.  By the said notification,  the  Central  Government  of
      promoting the objects of Special Economic Zone and in terms of powers
      delegated under the Special Economic Zone Act, introduced  a  proviso
      to the provisions of Section 14(b) of the Electricity Act, 2003.   By
      the said introduction, a developer of a  Special  Economic  Zone  was
      declared as a deemed licensee authorized  to  distribute  electricity
      within the Special Economic zone area.  The effect of  the  aforesaid
      Notification under section 14(b) of the Electricity Act is  that  the
      Appellant became a deemed Distribution Licensee.

   6. It would be pertinent to mention at this stage that the units of  the
      Appellant are divided into two broad areas.  One is  Domestic  Tariff
      Area (DTA) where it has established one of its unit.  Other  unit  is
      VAL-SEZ which is in SEZ (hereinafter referred to  as  VAL-SEZ  Unit).
      In so far as its unit in DTA is concerned, it draws power  from  open
      access and duly phased pays cross subsidy surcharge  for  this  area.
      There is no dispute to this extent.  In the present  Appeal,  we  are
      concerned with VAL-SEZ which is in SEZ Area where  the  Appellant  is
      stated as deemed Distribution Licensee for the purpose of Electricity
      Act by virtue of Notification under Section 14(b) of the  Electricity
      Act.

   7. For supply of energy to this unit in SEZ Area (VAL-2), the  Appellant
      entered into a PPA on 18th August, 2011  with  Sterlite  Energy  Ltd.
      which was arrayed as Respondent No.4 in the Appeal.   However  during
      the pendency of the Appeal under the scheme of merger approved by the
      High Court, Sterlite stood  merged  with  the  Appellant  itself  and
      because of this reason the Respondent No.4 (hereinafter  referred  to
      as ‘Sterlite’) has been deleted from the  array  of  parties  at  the
      instance of the Appellant.

   8. Since the supply of power by a  Generating  Company  to  Distribution
      Company is regulated under the provisions of Electricity  Act,  2003,
      the Appellant on 30th August, 2011 filed a petition before the  State
      Commission for approval of the said  PPA.   Subsequently,  the  State
      Commission at the preliminary hearing sought some clarifications with
      regard to the factual aspects.  The Appellant, thereafter  filed  two
      amendment petitions.  One was on 8th November, 2011 and  another  was
      on 27th March, 2012 seeking for the additional prayer requesting  the
      State Commission to grant deemed distribution licence  in  favour  of
      the Appellant on the strength of the Government of India notification
      issued dated 3rd March, 2010 with effect from the date  of  the  said
      notification.

   9. As already pointed out above,  the  State  Commission  rejected  this
      application  for  grant   of   deemed   Distribution   Licensee   and
      subsequently rejected the prayer of the Appellant for approval of PPA
      also.  The State Commission, while doing so held as under:

           “a.  Since the Application for grant of Distribution License was
           rejected, State Commission did not consider it necessary  to  go
           into the issues relating to the PPA.

           b.  Consequent upon the rejection of the Application  for  grant
           of Distribution License, State Commission held that VAL is to be
           treated as a consumer of WESCO.

           c.  As a result, VAL has to pay cross subsidy surcharge to WESCO
           for open access drawal of power from SEL.”




  10. This Order of the State Commission has been upheld by  the  Appellate
      Tribunal in Appeal filed by the Appellant.

      Question of Law:

  11. In the present Appeal, the Appellant has raised following question of
      law which the Appellant recall this Court to determine an answer:

                “Whether a developer of a notified Special  Economic  Zone,
           who has been deemed by law to be a licensee for distribution  of
           electricity, is required to, once again,  apply  to  Electricity
           Regulatory Commission under the Electricity Act for grant  of  a
           licence or the deeming fiction carved out in Section 14  of  the
           Electricity Act automatically dispenses  with  this  requirement
           and  ipso  facto  makes  such  SEZ  developer   a   distribution
           licensee.”




      The Arguments: Appellant



  12. Mr. Shyam Diwan, Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the  Appellant,
      with full of passion and vehemence argued that all the three findings
      of the State Commission, which are upheld by the Appellate  Tribunal,
      are ex facie untenable in law.  Questioning the first aspect  of  the
      order of the authorities below refusing to register the said PPA, his
      plea was that since the PPA is a contract between  the  two  parties,
      the State Commission could not have refused  to  consider  the  same.
      Such outright refusal amounts to failure to  discharge  the  function
      enjoined by the Parliament on  the  State  Commission  under  Section
      86(b) of the Act.  Under this provision, the State Commission has  to
      regulate electricity purchase and procurement process of distribution
      licensee including the price at which electricity shall  be  procured
      from the generating company.  Thus it was duty bound to approve a PPA
      subject to the terms and conditions which it deems  fit  in  law  and
      only when the parties fail to comply with those terms of the  license
      that such license can be revoked.  The failure to not look into a PPA
      altogether amounts to non exercise of jurisdiction.

  13.  In so far as  the  opinion  of  the  Appellate  Authority  that  the
      Appellant is to be treated as a consumer of WESCO is  concerned,  Mr.
      Diwan placed heavy reliance on the proviso to Section  14(b)  of  the
      Act as per which developer of the notified SEZ itself becomes  deemed
      Licensee from the date of such notification.   He  thus  argued  that
      when there was a specific notification under that  proviso  declaring
      the Appellant as a developer, the Appellant was a deemed Licensee and
      therefore there could not have any requirement for the  Appellant  to
      obtain the license under the Electricity Act.  As a fortiorari,  such
      a developer cannot  be  treated  as  a  ‘consumer’.   Therefore,  the
      authorities below could not, in law,  hold  the  Appellant  to  be  a
      consumer of WESCO.

           In the  alternative,  it  was  argued  that  in  any  case,  the
      Appellant was purchasing the electricity from Sterlite under the  PPA
      and, therefore, by no stretch of imagination, it could be treated  as
      consumer of WESCO.  To buttress this submission, Mr.  Diwan  referred
      to the provisions of Section  2(15)  of  the  Electricity  Act  which
      defines the term “consumer” and submitted that in order to treat  the
      Appellant as a consumer, it was necessary to  establish  that  it  is
      supplied with the electricity by such “Licensee” or the  “government”
      or “any other person engaged in the business of supplying electricity
      to the public”.

  14. In so far as the third finding holding the Appellant  liable  to  pay
      CSS to WESCO for open access drawal of power from SEZ  is  concerned,
      the submission of Mr. Diwan was that there was no  occasion  for  the
      State Commission (or for that matter Appellate Tribunal) to  go  into
      the aspect of CSS in an application filed by the Appellant  initially
      for approval of PPA only which was later amended on the directions of
      the State Commission to include a  prayer  to  the  extent  that  the
      Appellant should be  recognized  as  a  Distribution  Licensee  under
      Section 14(b) of the Electricity Act.  It was submitted that even  in
      the amended application there was no issue of CSS and the authorities
      below exceeded their jurisdiction in going into this issue and giving
      such a direction.

           Without prejudice to the aforesaid preliminary  submission,  Mr.
      Diwan argued that even on merits that such a  decision  was  palpably
      contrary to law.  In this behalf his submission was that since  under
      Section 42 of the Electricity Act, 2003, cross subsidy  surcharge  is
      payable to the Distribution Licensee of the area of supply only  when
      the “distribution system” of such Distribution Licensee is “used” for
      supply of electricity.  Therefore, without a clear finding of fact on
      appreciation  of  evidence,  that  the  supply-line  of  SEL-VAL   is
      connected to WESCO and that WESCO’s “distribution system”  is  “used”
      for supply of electricity, State Commission could not have held  that
      VAL has to pay cross subsidy  surcharge  to  WESCO  for  open  access
      drawal of power from SEL.

           In this context, the attention of the Court  was  drawn  to  the
      National Tariff Policy dated 6th January,  2014,  Clause  8.5,  Orissa
      Electricity Regulatory  Commission  (Terms  and  Conditions  for  Open
      access Charges) Regulations, 2005 (Clause  13(1)(ii)]  and  to  Orissa
      Electricity  Regulatory  Commission  (Determination  of  Open   access
      Charges) Regulations, 2006 [Clause 2(j).  It was submitted that from a
      bare perusal of the relevant Clauses of these Regulations, it is clear
      that CSS can be levied on “open access customers” i.e. “a consumer who
      has availed of or intends to avail of open access”.

           In  addition  to  the  aforesaid  submission,  questioning   the
      correctness of the each of the findings of the  State  Commission  and
      the Appellate Tribunal, Mr. Diwan emphasized that it is to be kept  in
      mind in deciding the issue that  VAL  SEZ  is  a  Deemed  Distribution
      Licensee by operation of  law  and  it  need  not  be  a  Distribution
      Licensee within the meaning of Section 2(17) of the  Electricity  Act,
      2003.  He admitted that a contention of the Respondents that  VAL  SEZ
      does not qualify as a Distribution  Licensee  within  the  meaning  of
      Section  2(17)  of  the  Electricity  Act,  2003  is  misplaced  since
      accepting such contention would defeat the very purpose of the deeming
      fiction created by the statute.  The deeming  fiction  would  have  no
      relevance if the reality which the statute creates by way  of  fiction
      already existed.  He argued that none of the five provisos to  Section
      14 of the  Electricity  Act,  2003  require  the  deemed  distribution
      licensees mentioned therein to obtain a license under the  Electricity
      Act.  The Developer of a notified SEZ is  a  special  entity  under  a
      special legislation and the definition of “consumer” or  “distribution
      licensee” etc. as defined under the Electricity Act,  2003  cannot  be
      made applicable.

           It is crucial point that  the  SEZ  Act  conceptually  envisages
      “Developer” of an SEZ distinct from the “Zone” itself as also distinct
      from “Unit”.  Developer is defined under Section 2(g) of the  SEZ  Act
      whereas Special Economic Zone is defined under Section (za) of the SEZ
      Act and Unit is defined under Section 2(zc) of the SEZ Act.  Thus  the
      Appellant in its capacity as the Developer of the SEZ has the duty  to
      develop, operate and maintain the Zone.   Failing  the  reconciliation
      between the provisions of the Electricity Act, 2003 and the  SEZ  Act,
      the provisions, objects and  purpose  of  the  SEZ  Act  will  prevail
      (Section 51 of the SEZ Act).  The object and purpose of the  SEZ  Act,
      inter alia, is to provide an internationally  for  export  production,
      expeditious and single window approval  mechanism  and  a  package  of
      incentives to attract foreign and domestic investments  for  promoting
      export-led growth.

      The Arguments: Respondents

  15. Mr. R.K. Mehta, Learned Counsel appearing on behalf  of  GRIDCO  Ltd.
      refuted the aforesaid submissions of Mr. Diwan.   His  main  argument
      was that even though the  Appellant  was  possessed  of  notification
      issued under Proviso to Section 14(b) of the Electricity  Act,  which
      treats the Appellant as of Deemed Distribution Licensee, the  concept
      of Distribution  Licensee  under  the  Electricity  Act  pre-supposes
      supply/distribution of power.  An entity which  utilizes  the  entire
      quantum of electricity for its own consumption and does not have  any
      other consumers cannot be deemed to be a Distribution Licensee,  even
      by a legal fiction.  In  support  of  this  submission,  the  Learned
      Counsel referred to the definitions of “consumer” in  Section  2(15),
      “Distribution Licensee” as contained in Section 2(17) and “supply” in
      relation to electricity to the consumers in Section 2(70).   He  also
      referred to Section 42 of the Act which  spells  out  the  duties  of
      Distribution Licensee and open access.   His  submission,  thus,  was
      that by virtue of the legal fiction created by the Notification dated
      3rd March, 2010, a person who distributes Electricity can  be  deemed
      to be a  distribution  licensee  even  though  he  does  not  have  a
      distribution license – But the legal fiction cannot  go  further  and
      make a person who does not distribute electricity as  a  distribution
      licensee.

  16. He also argued that if a  ‘Distribution  Licensee’  is  equated  with
      ‘Consumer’ the provisions of Section 2(15), 2(17), 42 and 43  of  the
      Electricity Act, 2003 would be rendered  otiose  and  nugatory.   The
      mandate of Section 42 and 43 of the Electricity Act, 2003  cannot  be
      negated by exercise of power under Section 49(1)(b) of the  SEZ  Act.
      It was further submitted that  only  a  proviso  has  been  added  to
      Section  14(b)  by  Notification  dated  3rd  March,  2010  qua   the
      Appellant. There is no stipulation in  the  Notification  that  other
      provisions of the Electricity Act will not apply to the Developer  of
      a SEZ.

  17. Mr. Mehta called for harmonious construction of the provisions of SEZ
      and the Electricity Act to support  his  submission  that  the  legal
      fiction of deemed Distribution Licensee cannot be taken to the  level
      of absurdity and made  applicable  even  when  it  does  not  involve
      distribution/supply of power at all.   He  further  pointed  out  the
      object and scheme of SEZ Act envisages several units being set up  in
      a SEZ.  This is evident from a  collective  reading  of  the  various
      provisions of the SEZ Act viz. Section 2(g)(j)(za)(zc), Section 3, 4,
      11, 12, 13 and 15.  There can be a Sector Specific SEZ  with  Several
      Units i.e. for IT, Mineral Based Industries  etc.  but  instances  of
      single unit SEZ like in the present case  of  the  appellant  may  be
      rare.  The Notification dated  3rd  March,  2010  providing  for  the
      “Developer” of an SEZ being deemed as a “Distribution  Licensee”  was
      issued keeping in view the concept of Multi Unit SEZs and will  apply
      only to such cases in which the Developer is supplying the  power  to
      multiple Units in the SEZ.  The said Notification will not apply to a
      Developer like the Appellant who has established  the  SEZ  only  for
      itself.

  18. Mr. Parag P. Tripathi, Learned Senior Counsel appeared with Mr.  Shiv
      Kumar Suri, Advocate on behalf of WESCO.  His submission was that  in
      the  facts  of  present  case  WESCO  was  entitled  to  CSS  on  the
      electricity  purchase  by  the  Appellant  from  Sterlite  which  was
      consumed wholly and completely  by  the  Appellant  itself.   It  was
      pointed out that surcharge was meant  to  compensate  a  Distribution
      Licensing  from  the  loss  of  cross  subsidy  surcharge  that  such
      distribution licensee would suffer by reason of the  consumer  taking
      supply from someone other than such Distribution Licensee, the moment
      it is found that the Appellant is covered  by  the  Definition  of  a
      consumer within the meaning of Section 2(15) of the Act.   He  argued
      that in such a situation the mere fact that the Appellants claims  to
      be a deemed Distribution Licensee is of no consequence at  all  since
      the entire power purchase by the Appellant is  for  its  own  use  or
      consumer and not for the purpose  of  Distribution.   The  Appellant,
      therefore, could be categorized as a  consumer  as  regards  its  own
      consumption even if it is a  deemed  Licensee.   On  merits,  it  was
      submitted that  Transmission  line  between  the  Generating  Company
      (Sterlite) and the Appellant is not a  Dedicated  Transmission  Line,
      with an attempt to justify it giving various reasons which  we  shall
      advert to all a later stage.

  19. It was also argued that as per Regulation 27 of the OERC  (Conditions
      of supply Code) Regulations 2004, the “service  line”  shall  be  the
      property of the  licensee  unless  otherwise  specified  in  writing.
      Hence the line between the grid sub-station and the  Appellant’s  SEZ
      qualify as the property of WESCO and therefore any use of  such  line
      could only be by Open Access under the EA and in any event CSS  would
      be payable.  Reference was also made to the Rule 4 of the Electricity
      Rules, 2005, as per which aforesaid line would be deemed as  part  of
      the Distribution System of WESCO.  On that basis  submission  of  Mr.
      Tripathi was that from any angle the matter is to be looked into  the
      orders of the Appellate Tribunal was perfectly justified.

      Our Analysis:

  20. From the aforesaid narration of events as well as  arguments  of  the
      counsel for the parties, it has become manifest the  primary  dispute
      relates to the CSS which the Appellant  is  called  upon  to  pay  to
      WESCO.  As per the Appellant no such CSS is payable and the PPA which
      was submitted by the Appellant to the State Commission for  approval,
      should have been accorded due approval by the State Commission.

      (1) Special Feature of the 2003 Act

  21. Before adverting to this central issue, it would be apt to understand
      conceptually the rationale of payment of such CSS to the Distribution
      Company,  under  the  scheme  of  the  Electricity  Act.   The  first
      enactment to govern electricity supply in India  was  passed  in  the
      year 1910 viz. the Electricity Act, 1910.  This Act envisaged  growth
      of electricity industry through private  licences.   It  created  the
      legal framework for laying down of wires and other works relating  to
      the supply of electricity.  Thereafter, the Electricity (Supply) Act,
      1948 mandated the creation of a State Electricity Board.   The  Board
      assigned the responsibility of arranging the supply of electricity in
      the State.  It was  experienced  that  over  a  period  of  time  the
      performance of State Electricity Boards had deteriorated  on  account
      of various factors.  Main failure on the part  of  these  Electricity
      Boards was to take decision on  tariffs  in  independent  manner  and
      cross subsidies had reached untenable levels.  To address this  issue
      and also to distance governance from determination  of  tariffs,  the
      Electricity Regulation Commission Act was enacted in the  year  1998.
      This Act created regulatory mechanism.  Within few years, it was felt
      that the three Acts of 1910, 1948 and 1998 which  were  operating  in
      the field needed to be brought in a new self contained  comprehensive
      legislation  with  the   policy   of   encouraging   private   sector
      participation in generation, transmission and distribution  and  also
      the objectives of distancing the regulatory responsibilities from the
      Government and giving it to the Regulatory Commissions.   With  these
      objectives in mind  the  Electricity  Act,  2003  has  been  enacted.
      Significant addition is the provisions for newer concepts like  power
      trading and open access. Various features of the 2003 Act  which  are
      outlined in the  statement  of  objects  and  reasons  to  this  Act.
      Notably, generation is being delicensed  and  captive  generation  is
      being  freely  permitted.   The  Act  makes  provision  for   private
      transmission licensees.  It now provides open access in  transmission
      from the outset.

      (2)  Open Access and CSS

  22. Open access implies freedom to procure power from any  source.   Open
      access in transmission means freedom  to  the  licensees  to  procure
      power from any source.  The expression “open access” has been defined
      in the Act to mean “the non-discriminatory provision for the  use  of
      transmission lines or distribution system  or  associated  facilities
      with such lines or system by any licensee or  consumer  or  a  person
      engaged in generation in accordance with the regulations specified by
      the Appropriate Commission”.  The Act mandates that it shall be  duty
      of the transmission utility/licensee  to  provide  non-discriminatory
      open  access  to  its  transmission  system  to  every  licensee  and
      generating company.  Open access in  transmission  thus  enables  the
      licensees  (distribution  licensees  and  traders)   and   generating
      companies the right to  use  the  transmission  systems  without  any
      discrimination.  This would facilitate sale of  electricity  directly
      to the  distribution  companies.   This  would  generate  competition
      amongst  the  sellers  and  help  reduce,  gradually,  the  cost   of
      generation/procurement.

  23. While open access in transmission implies freedom to the  licensee  to
      procure  power  from  any  source  of  his  choice,  open  access   in
      distribution with which we are concerned here, means  freedom  to  the
      consumer to get supply from any source of his choice.   The  provision
      of open access to consumers, ensures right  of  the  consumer  to  get
      supply from a person other than the distribution licensee of his  area
      of supply by  using  the  distribution  system  of  such  distribution
      licensee.  Unlike in transmission, open access in distribution has not
      been allowed from the outset primarily because  of  considerations  of
      cross-subsidies.  The law provides that open  access  in  distribution
      would be allowed  by  the  State  Commissions  in  phases.   For  this
      purpose, the State Commissions are required to specify the phases  and
      conditions of introduction of open access.

  24. However open access can be allowed on payment of a  surcharge,  to  be
      determined by the State Commission, to take care of  the  requirements
      of current level of cross-subsidy and the fixed cost  arising  out  of
      the licensee’s obligation to supply.  Consequent to the  enactment  of
      the Electricity (Amendment) Act, 2003, it has been mandated  that  the
      State Commission shall within five years necessarily allow open access
      to consumers having demand exceeding one megawatt.

      (3)  CSS: Its Rationale

  25. The issue of open access surcharge is very crucial and  implementation
      of the provision of open access depends on judicious determination  of
      surcharge by the State Commissions.  There  are  two  aspects  to  the
      concept of surcharge –  one,  the  cross-subsidy  surcharge  i.e.  the
      surcharge meant to take care of the requirements of current levels  of
      cross-subsidy, and the other, the additional  surcharge  to  meet  the
      fixed cost of the distribution licensee arising out of his  obligation
      to supply.  The presumption,  normally  is  that  generally  the  bulk
      consumers would avail of open  access,  who  also  pay  at  relatively
      higher rates.  As such, their  exit  would  necessarily  have  adverse
      effect on the finances of the  existing  licensee,  primarily  on  two
      counts –  one,  on  its  ability  to  cross-subsidise  the  vulnerable
      sections of society and the other, in terms of recovery of  the  fixed
      cost such licensee might have incurred as part of  his  obligation  to
      supply electricity to that consumer on demand (stranded  costs).   The
      mechanism of surcharge is meant to compensate the  licensee  for  both
      these aspects.

  26. Through this provision of open access, the law thus balances the right
      of the consumers to procure power from a source of his choice and  the
      legitimate claims/interests of  the  existing  licensees.  Apart  from
      ensuring freedom to the consumers, the provision  of  open  access  is
      expected to encourage competition amongst the suppliers  and  also  to
      put pressure on the existing utilities to improve their performance in
      terms of quality and  price  of  supply  so  as  to  ensure  that  the
      consumers do not go out of their fold to get supply  from  some  other
      source.

  27. With this open access policy, the consumer is given a choice to  take
      electricity from any Distribution Licensee.   However,  at  the  same
      time the Act makes provision of surcharge for taking care of  current
      level of cross  subsidy.   Thus,  the  State  Electricity  Regulatory
      Commissions are authorized to frame open access  in  distribution  in
      phases with surcharge for:

           (a)  Current level of cross subsidy to be gradually  phased  out
           along with cross subsidies; and

           (b)  obligation to supply.

  28. Therefore, in the aforesaid circumstances though CSS  is  payable  by
      the Consumer to the Distribution Licensee of  the  area  in  question
      when it decides not to take supply from that company but to avail  it
      from  another  distribution  licensee.   In  nutshell,   CSS   is   a
      compensation to the distribution licensee irrespective  of  the  fact
      whether its line is used or not, in view of the fact  that,  but  for
      the open access the consumer would pay tariff applicable  for  supply
      which would include an element of cross subsidy surcharge on  certain
      other categories of consumers.  What is important is that a  consumer
      situated in an area is bound to contribute to subsidizing a  low  and
      consumer if he falls in the category of subsidizing consumer.  Once a
      cross subsidy surcharge is fixed for an area it is liable to be  paid
      and such payment will be used for meeting the current levels of cross
      subsidy within  the  area.   A  fortiorari,  even  a  licensee  which
      purchases electricity  for  its  own  consumption  either  through  a
      “dedicated transmission line”  or  through  “open  access”  would  be
      liable to pay Cross Subsidy Surcharge under  the  Act.   Thus,  Cross
      Subsidy Surcharge, broadly speaking,  is  the  charge  payable  by  a
      consumer who opt to avail  power  supply  through  open  access  from
      someone other than such Distribution licensee in  whose  area  it  is
      situated.  Such surcharge is meant to  compensate  such  Distribution
      licensee from the  loss  of  cross  subsidy  that  such  Distribution
      licensee would suffer by reason of the consumer  taking  supply  from
      someone other than such Distribution licensee.

      (4)  Application of the CSS Principle

  29. In the present case, admittedly, the Appellant (which happens  to  be
      the operator of an SEZ) is situate  within  the  area  of  supply  of
      WESCO.   It  is  seeking  to  procure  its  entire   requirement   of
      electricity from Sterlite  (an  Independent  Power  Producer  (“IPP”)
      (which at the relevant time was  a  sister  concern  under  the  same
      management) and thereby is seeking  to  denude  WESCO  of  the  Cross
      Subsidy that WESCO would otherwise have got from it if WESCO were  to
      supply electricity to the Appellant.  In order to be  liable  to  pay
      cross subsidy surcharge to a distribution licensee, it  is  necessary
      that such distribution licensee must be a  distribution  licensee  in
      respect of the area where the consumer is  situated  and  it  is  not
      necessary that  such  consumer  should  be  connected  only  to  such
      distribution licensee but it would suffice  if  it  is  a  “consumer”
      within the aforesaid definition.

  30. Having regard to the aforesaid scheme,  in  normal  course  when  the
      Appellant has entered  to  PPA  with  Sterlite,  another  Electricity
      Generating Company  and  is  purchasing  electricity  from  the  said
      Company it is liable to pay CSS to the WESCO.  Admittedly  under  the
      PPA, the Appellant  is  purchasing  his  electricity  from  the  said
      generating station and it is consumed by the single  integrated  unit
      of the  Appellant.   The  Appellant  therefore,  qualifies  to  be  a
      “consumer” under Section 2(15) of the Electricity Act.   It  is  also
      not in dispute that the unit of the Appellant is in the area which is
      covered by the licenses granted to WESCO as distribution licenses.

  31. Notwithstanding the above, because of the reason that the area  where
      the unit of Val-SEZ unit of the Appellant is situate is  a  SEZ  area
      and the Appellant is declared as developer for that  area  under  the
      SEZ Act, it is the  contention  of  the  Appellant  that  in  such  a
      scenario it is not  liable  to  pay  any  CSS  to  the  WESCO.   This
      submission flows from the fact that there is a notification issued in
      this behalf under proviso to Section  49  of  the  SEZ  Act  and  the
      Appellant itself is treated as a deemed Distribution Licensee as  per
      the provisions of Section 14 of the Electricity Act.  On that  basis,
      detailed submissions are made by the Appellant  with  an  attempt  to
      show that it cannot be treated as a “consumer” under the  Electricity
      Act when the Appellant itself is deemed to  be  a  licensee.   It  is
      further argued that since the supply line of VAL-SEZ is not connected
      to WESCO and it is getting the  electricity  directly  from  Sterlite
      under the PPA, there is no question of payment of  CSS  to  WESCO  at
      all.  Argument of the WESCO that the lines owned by the  VAL-SEZ  are
      only “Transmission Lines” under Section 2 of the Electricity Act  and
      not “dedicated Transmission Lines” because of  the  reason  that  the
      duty  of  the  Generator  to   establish   and   maintain   dedicated
      transmission lines, is sought to be refuted by arguing that  even  as
      per Section 2(72) of the Act  Transmission  Lines  are  part  of  the
      Distribution System of Licensing”.  It is argued that it is not  even
      the case of WESCO that the supply line of SEL-VAL is a part of  WESCO
      Distribution System.

      (5)  Factual Aspect of the Electricity Supply to the Appellant:




  32. In order to appreciate these arguments, it would appropriate to first
      advert to the factual aspect of the supply of electricity by Sterlite
      to the Appellant under the PPA.  No doubt the  Appellant  is  getting
      direct supply of electricity from Sterlite.  However, question is  as
      to whether, in the process, it is using dedicated transmission  lines
      of WESCO.  We may point out at the outset that such an  argument  was
      not even raised before the two authorities below.  Primarily  it  was
      argued  that  having  acquired  the  status  of  deemed  distribution
      licensee under the  Electricity  Act,  it  cannot  be  treated  as  a
      “consumer” of other distribution licensee, viz. the WESCO.  Even  the
      question of law which is proposed and framed in the grounds of appeal
      and is already reproduced, does not raise this issue, which  is  even
      otherwise factual.  Notwithstanding,  the  Learned  Counsel  for  the
      WESCO has argued that the transmission line between the Sterlite  and
      the Appellant is not a dedicated transmission line for the  following
      reasons:

      (a)  Under Section 2(16) of the Electricity Act, 2003,  a  “Dedicated
      Transmission Line” is an electric supply line for  “point  to  point”
      transmission, which  are  required  for  the  purpose  of  connecting
      electric line or electric  plan  of  a  generating  station  to  “any
      transmission line”, or “sub-station” or “generating station”  or  the
      “load centre”, “as the case may be”.

      (b)  The Transmission Line in question commences from  the  Generator
      (Sterlite) and connects to the 400 KV Sub-Station at Sterlite end  at
      Jharsuguda.  It does not connect directly to the “Load Centre”  which
      is the Appellant.

      (c)  The 400 KV Busbar at the Generator (Sterlite) end  is  connected
      to a 200 KV Busbnar at VAL-CGP caters to the VAL -  Smelter 1 in  the
      Domestic Tariff Area.

      (d)  The said 400/200 KV sub-station is also connected to  the  OPTCL
      Grid (State Transmission Utility) at Budhipadar through 220 KV Bus at
      VAL – CGP end for the purpose of  evacuation  of  Sterlite  power  to
      GRIDCO as well as drawal of power by VAL – Smelter – 1.

      (e)  The said 400/220 kv sub-station is also connected to Power  Grid
      Corporation of India (PGCIL) line from which 2 nos of  400  KV  Lines
      emanate for Interstate sale of its Sterlite power through PGCIL Grid.

      (f)  The said 400/220 kv sub-station which is connected through 5  Km
      of 220 KV line to the 220 KV Bus of switching station at  VAL  –  CGP
      end.  There are 4 no’s of 200 KV  transmission  lines  branching  out
      from the said 220 KV switching station to carry power to VAL Smelter-
      1 Unit of the Appellant which is within the area of the  Distribution
      Licensee (WESCO).

      (g)  The said 400/220 kv sub-station also has 2 nos of 33 KV Tertiary
      transmission  lines  from   100/220/33   KV   Transformer   supplying
      electricity to Vedanta Township.

      (h)  Three such 400 KV Transmission lines emanating from the  400  KV
      Busbar at the Sterlite-IPP (Generator end)  also  happens  to  Supply
      power from the sub-station  to  the  Appellant’s  load  centre  (VAL-
      Smelter-2) in the SEZ area.

      (i)  Hence, the only part of the “dedicated” transmission line, if at
      all, is from the Generating Station 9Sterlite – IPP) to such  400  KV
      Busbar of the 400/220 KV Grid Sub-station.

      (j)  The transmission line that connects the sub-station to the  load
      centre of the Appellant is only a “transmission line”  under  Section
      2(72) of the EP 2003.



















  33. Following diagram is placed by WESCO to demonstrate this:

      [pic]

      34. Though the Appellant endeavoured to counter this position and has
      given its own diagram that  does  not  lodge  the  aforesaid  factual
      aspect.  Therefore, prima facie we accept the position  as  explained
      by the WESCO. Thus we feel that notwithstanding that supply  line  of
      SEL-VAL is transmission line, but not “dedicated transmission  line”.
      The Appellant cannot run away from the fact that under Section  2(10)
      of the Electricity Act, it is the  duty  of  the  Generating  Company
      (i.e.  WESCO)  in  this  case  to  establish,  operate  and  maintain
      dedicated transmission lines.  Since it is duty bound  to  establish,
      operate and maintain these dedicated lines by making huge investment,
      in order to get into the consumption in the area in question the very
      necessity of payment of CSS arises by  the  consumer  of  Electricity
      covered by the definition of “consumer” under Section  2(15)  of  the
      Act but is not getting supply of that Generator and someone else.  We
      have also to keep in mind the provision  of  Regulation  27  of  OERC
      (Conditions of Supply Code) Regulation 2004.  As per this  Regulation
      the “service line” shall be  the  property  of  the  licensee  unless
      otherwise specified in writing.  This clause reads as under:

           “27.  The entire service line,  notwithstanding  that  whole  or
           portion thereof has been paid for by the consumer, shall be  the
           property of the licensee and shall be maintained by the licensee
           who shall always have the right to use  it  for  the  supply  of
           energy to any other person unless the line has been provided for
           the exclusive use of the consumer through any arrangement agreed
           to in writing.”




      35.  Further as per Rule 4 of the Electricity Rule, 2005 the aforesaid
      line would be deemed to be part of Distribution System of WESCO:

           “4.   Distribution  System  –  The  distribution  system  of   a
           distribution licensee in terms of sub-section (19) of section  2
           of the Act shall also include  electric  line,  sub-station  and
           electrical plant that are primarily maintained for  the  purpose
           of distributing electricity  in  the  area  of  supply  of  such
           distribution  licensee  notwithstanding  that  such  line,  sub-
           station or electrical plant are high pressure cables or overhead
           lines or associated with such high pressure cables  or  overhead
           lines; or used incidentally for  the  purposes  of  transmitting
           electricity for others.”

           “Distribution system” is defined in Section 2(19) of the Act  to
           mean:-

           “(19) “distribution  system”  means  the  system  of  wires  and
           associated  facilities  between  the  delivery  points  on   the
           transmission lines or the generating station connection and  the
           point of connection to the installation of the consumers:”

           “Transmission Line” is defined in Section 2(72) to mean:-

           (72) “transmission lines” means all  high  pressure  cables  and
           overhead lines (not being an essential part of the  distribution
           system of a licensee) transmitting electricity from a generating
           station to another generating station or a sub-station, together
           with any step-up and  step-down  transformers,  switch-gear  and
           other works….”



      (6)  Appellant deemed distribution Licensee: Its effect



      36.   It is now to be seen as to whether the fact that  the  Appellant
      is a Developer in SEZ, armed with Notification dated 3rd  March,  2010
      issued under Proviso to Section 49  of  the  SEZ  Act  and  it  deemed
      distribution licensee as per Section 14 of the Electricity  Act,  this
      would take away the Appellant from the clutches of CSS liability?

      37.   In order to appreciate this argument let us first refer  to  the
      certain statutory provisions:

                Section 49 of the Special Economic  Zone  Act  provides  as
           under:

                “Power to modify provisions of this Act or other enactments
           in relation to Special Economic Zones.

                (1)  the Central Government may,  by  notification,  direct
           that any of the provision of this Act (other than Section 54 and
           56) or any other Central Act or any rules  or  regulations  made
           thereunder or any notification  or  Order  issued  or  direction
           given thereunder (other than the provisions relating  to  making
           of the rules or regulations) specified in the notification-

                (a) shall not apply to a Special Economic Zone or  a  class
           of Special Economic Zones or all Special Economic Zones: or

                (b) shall apply to a Special Economic Zone or  a  class  of
           Special Economic Zones or all Specials Economic Zones only  with
           such  exceptions,  modifications  and  adaptation,  as  may   be
           specified in the notifications.”




      38. Likewise Section 14 of the Electricity Act reads as under:

           “14.  Grant of License

           The Appropriate Commission may, on application made to it  under
           section 15, grant any person licence to any person –

           (a)  To transmit electricity as a transmission licensee: or

           (b)  To distribute electricity as a distribution licensee: or

           (c)  To undertake  trading  in  electricity  as  an  electricity
           trader, in any area which may be specified in the licence:

           Provided that any person engaged in the business of transmission
           or supply or electricity under the provisions  of  the  repealed
           laws or any Act specified in  the  Schedule  on  or  before  the
           appointed date shall be deemed to be a licensee under  this  Act
           for such period as may be stipulated in the  licence,  clearance
           or approval granted to him under the repealed laws or  such  Act
           specified in the Schedule, and the provisions  of  the  repealed
           laws or such Act specified in the Schedule in  respect  of  such
           licence shall apply for a period of one year from  the  date  of
           commencement of this Act  or  such  earlier  period  as  may  be
           specified, at the request of the licensee,  by  the  Appropriate
           Commission and thereafter the provisions of this Act shall apply
           to such business:

           Provided further that the Central transmission  Utility  or  the
           State Transmission Utility shall be deemed to be a  transmission
           licensee under this Act:

           Provided also that in case an Appropriate  Government  transmits
           electricity or distributes electricity or undertakes trading  in
           electricity, whether before or after the  commencement  of  this
           Act, such Government shall be deemed to be a licensee under this
           Act, but shall not be required to obtain a  licence  under  this
           Act:

           Provided also that the Damodar Valley  Corporation,  established
           under  sub-section(1)  of  section  3  of  the  Damodar   Valley
           Corporation Act, 1948, shall be deemed to be  a  licensee  under
           this Act but shall not be required to  obtain  a  licence  under
           this Act and the provisions of the  Damodar  Valley  Corporation
           Act, 1948, in so far as  they  are  not  inconsistent  with  the
           provisions  of  this  Act,  shall  continue  to  apply  to  that
           Corporation:

           Provided  also  that  the  Government  Company  or  the  Company
           referred to in sub-section (2) of section 131 of  this  Act  and
           the company or  companies  created  in  pursuance  of  the  Acts
           specified in the Schedule, shall be  deemed  to  be  a  licensee
           under this Act.

           Provided also  that  the  Appropriate  Commission  may  grant  a
           licence to two or more persons for distribution  of  electricity
           through their own distribution  system  within  the  same  area,
           subject to the  conditions  that  the  applicant  for  grant  of
           licence within the same area, subject to the conditions that the
           applicant for grant of  licence  within  the  same  area  shall,
           without prejudice to the other conditions or requirements  under
           this Act, comply with the additional requirements (including the
           capital adequacy, credit worthiness, or code of conduct) as  may
           be prescribed by the Central Government, and no  such  applicant
           who complies with all the requirements  for  grant  of  licence,
           shall be refused grant of  licence  on  the  ground  that  there
           already exists a licensee in the same are for the same purpose:

           Provided also that in  a  case  where  a  distribution  licensee
           proposes  to  undertake  distribution  of  electricity   for   a
           specified area within his area of supply through another person,
           that person shall not be required to obtain any separate licence
           from  the  concerned  State  Commission  and  such  distribution
           licensee shall be responsible for distribution of electricity in
           his area of supply:

           Provided also that  where  a  person  intends  to  generate  and
           distribute electricity in a rural area to  be  notified  by  the
           State Government, such person shall not require any licence  for
           such generation and distribution of electricity,  but  he  shall
           comply with the measures which may be specified by the Authority
           under section 53:

           Provided also that a distribution licensee shall not  require  a
           licence to undertake trading in electricity.”

      39.  We would also like to take note of Notification dated 3rd March,
      2010 issued in  the  case  of  Appellant.   It  makes  the  following
      reading:

      “NOTIFICATION

      S.O. No.528(E). In exercise of the powers conferred by  clause(b)  of
      sub-section (1) of section 49 of the Special Economic zones Act, 2005
      (28 of  2005),  the  Central  Government  hereby  notifies  that  the
      provisions of clause (b) of section 14 of the Electricity  Act,  2003
      (36 of 2003), shall apply to  all  Special  Economic  Zones  notified
      under sub-section (1) of section 4 of the Special Economic Zones Act,
      2005, subject to the following modification, namely:-

           In clause (b) of section 14 of the Electricity Act, 2003 (36  of
      2003), the following proviso shall be inserted, namely:-

                “Provided that the Developer of  a  Special  Economic  Zone
           notified under sub section (1)  of  section  4  of  the  Special
           Economic Zones Act, 2005 shall be deemed to be  a  licensee  for
           the purpose of  this  clause,  with  effect  from  the  date  of
           notification of such Special Economic Zone.”




      40.   The reading of Section 49 of  SEZ  Act  would  reveal  that  the
      Central Government has got the authority to direct  that  any  of  the
      provisions of a Central Act and rules and regulations made  thereunder
      would not apply or to declare that  some  of  the  provisions  of  the
      Central Acts shall apply with exceptions, modifications and adaptation
      to the Special  Economic  Zone.   So,  under  the  scheme  of  Special
      Economic Zone Act, Central Government has to first notify as  to  what
      extent the provision of the other Acts are to be  made  applicable  or
      applicable  with  modification  or  not  applicable  for  the  Special
      Economic Zone area.  It is in furtherance thereto, the  Government  of
      India, Ministry of Commerce  and  Industry  through  its  notification
      dated 21st March, 2012, with regard to  power  generation  in  Special
      Economic Zone, has declared that all the provisions of the Electricity
      Act, 2003 and Electricity  Rule,  2005  shall  be  applicable  to  the
      generation, transmission and  distribution  of  power,  whether  stand
      alone or captive power.  This notification would clarify that there is
      no  inconsistency  between  Special  Economic  Zone  Act,   2005   and
      Electricity Act, 2003.

      41.   No  doubt  vide  Notification  dated  3rd  March,  2010  Central
      Government has added an additional proviso to Clause (b) of Section 14
      of the Electricity Act viz.  the  Appellant  shall  be  deemed  to  be
      licensee for the purpose  of  the  said  clause  w.e.f.  the  date  of
      notification of such SEZ.  It is on this basis, the  argument  of  the
      Appellant is that as it is already a deemed Distribution  Licensee  it
      need not apply for this license to the said Commission before entering
      into the PPA and the State Government is bound to grant  the  License.
      This contention is negated by the Appellate Tribunal  on  two  grounds
      which are as follows:

      (i)  There has to  be  a  harmonious  construction  of  SEZ  Act  and
      Electricity Act to give effect to the provisions of both the acts  so
      long as they are not consistent with each other in the opinion of the
      Tribunal.  The provisions of Section 51 of SEZ Act, 2005  are  to  be
      considered along with the provisions of Section 49 of the  said  Act.
      Accordingly, in view of the  provision  of  the  SEZ  Act,  2005  and
      consequent notification by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the
      deemed distribution licensee  status  as  claimed  by  the  Appellant
      should also be tested through other  provisions  of  the  Electricity
      Act, 2003 and Electricity Rules, 2005, for  certifying  its  validity
      and converting it into a formal distribution licensee.  In fact,  the
      Appellant has submitted to the jurisdiction of the State  Commission,
      by filing a petition before the State Commission seeking for approval
      of the PPA and also for grant of distribution licence. The  Appellate
      Tribunal, thus queried as to how could the Appellant now question the
      jurisdiction?

      (ii)  The Appellate Tribunal pointed out that there are none provisos
      to Section 14(b) of the Electricity  Act  and  another  is  added  in
      respect of the Appellant vide Notification dated 3rd March, 2010.   A
      reading of these provisos would indicate that  some  of  them  confer
      status of deemed distribution licensee on certain specified  entities
      who are  not  required  to  take  separate  licence  from  the  State
      Commission under this Act whereas some other provisos merely  declare
      the party as deemed licensee and nothing specified as to whether they
      are required to obtain the  licence  or  not.   However  when  it  is
      specially provided in proviso 4 and proviso 8 and 2 that the  Damodar
      Valley Corporation and State Government are not  required  to  obtain
      licence, and other provisos do not confer such privilege, they  would
      be required to obtain licence.

      42.   Further discussion on this aspect by the Appellate  Tribunal  is
      as under:

           “42.   Keeping  this  in  mind,  the  statute  makers   by   the
           notification  dated  3.03.2010  have  inserted  the   additional
           proviso to Section 14(b) of the  Electricity  Act.   Admittedly,
           the development and  operation  of  the  SEZ  are  two  distinct
           activities.  Thus, the jurisdiction of the State  Commission  to
           scruitinise the deemed distribution status of the  Appellant  is
           well established in view of the Section 49(1) of SEZ, Act,  2005
           and the notification of the Central Government dated 21.03.2012.
            Therefore, the contention  of  the  Appellant  that  the  State
           Commission dealt with  the  matter  relating  to  the  grant  of
           distribution  licence  by  going  beyond  its  jurisdiction   is
           misplaced.

           43.  It is noticed that the Ministry of  Commerce  and  Industry
           (Department of SEZ Section)  has  accorded  SEZ  status  to  the
           Appellant for  development  and  operation  and  maintenance  of
           sector specific Special Economic Zone for manufacture and export
           of  aluminium  on  the  condition  that  the  Appellant   should
           establish captive generating plant as stipulated in the approval
           letter of Ministry of Commerce and Industry but  it  is  pointed
           out the still the plant has not  been  established  for  various
           reasons.  If Captive  generating  plant  of  1215  MW  had  been
           established as per  the  condition  inside  the  SEZ  area,  the
           question of power purchase from Sterlite  Energy  Limited  under
           the pretext of  distribution  licensee  status  would  not  have
           arisen.  That apart, the  State  Commission  has  framed  Orissa
           Electricity  Regulatory   Commission   (conduct   of   business)
           Regulation, 2004 under the powers conferred under Section 181 of
           the Electricity Act,  2003.   The  distribution  of  electricity
           Licence (Additional  requirement  of  Capital  Adequacy,  Credit
           Worthiness and Code  of  Conduct)  Rules,  2005  framed  by  the
           Central  Government  also  would  apply  to  the  Appellant  for
           distribution licence in addition to the  requirements  of  State
           Commission’s Regulations.

           45.  Section 174  of  the  Electricity  Act  provides  that  the
           provisions of the  Electricity  Act  shall  have  to  overriding
           effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent with any other  law
           for the time being in force or in any instrument  having  effect
           by virtue of any law other than Electricity  Act.   That  apart,
           Section 175 also provides that the provisions of the Electricity
           Act are in addition to and not in derogation of  any  other  law
           for the time being in force.

           47.  The perusal of the notification dated 03.03.2010 would make
           it evident that the legislation’s intention  for  declaring  the
           developer  in  SEZ  area  as  deemed  distribution  licence,  is
           confined only to clause-b of  Section  14  of  Electricity  Act,
           which deals with the grant of license by the  appropriate  State
           Commission to any person for distribution of  electricity.   The
           said  notification  has  not  curtailed  the  power   of   State
           Commission so far as the applicability of  other  provisions  is
           concerned.  The interpretation of  various  relevant  terms  was
           necessary prior to grant of deemed distribution licence  by  the
           State Commission.  Therefore, the State Commission rightly acted
           upon those provisions.   As  a  matter  of  fact,  by  the  said
           amendment by inserting another proviso  to  Section  14(b),  the
           context has not been changed as claimed by the Appellant.

           49.   As  correctly  indicated  by  the  State  Commission,  the
           definition of term “distribution licensee” as  enumerated  under
           Section 2(17) of Electricity  Act,  2003,  emphasizes  upon  the
           distribution licensee to operate  and  maintain  a  distribution
           system and supply of power to the  consumers.   Considering  the
           definition of ‘supply’ in Section 2(70), the supply  here  means
           sale of electricity to consumers.  By merely being authorized to
           operate and maintain a distribution system as a deemed licensee,
           would not confer the status  of  distribution  licensee  to  any
           person.  The purpose of such  establishment  is  for  supply  of
           power to consumers.  Mere fact that the Appellant claims to be a
           deemed distribution licensee is of no consequence at  all  since
           admittedly, the entire power purchased by the Appellant  is  for
           its  own  use  and  consumption  and  not  for  the  purpose  of
           distribution and supply/sale to consumers.

           50.  An entity which utilizes the entire quantum of  electricity
           for its own consumption and does not have any  other  consumers,
           cannot, by such a notification, be  deemed  to  be  distribution
           licensee, even by a legal  fiction.   By  virtue  of  the  legal
           fiction  created  by  the  notification  dated  3.03.2010,   the
           Developer of SEZ notified under the  SEZ  Act,  who  distributes
           electricity can be deemed to be a distribution licensee.   Thus,
           this legal fiction cannot go further and make a person who  does
           not distribute electricity to the consumers as  to  distribution
           licensee.  Therefore there is no merit in the contention of  the
           Appellant.

      43.   We are in agreement with the aforesaid rationale in the impugned
      order of the Appellate Tribunal as that is the only  manner  in  which
      the two Acts can be harmoniously construed.  To recapitulate  briefly,
      in the present case no doubt by virtue of the status of a developer in
      the SEZ area, the Appellant is also  treated  as  deemed  Distribution
      Licensee.  However with this, it only gets exemption from specifically
      applying for licence under Section 14 of the Act.  In order  to  avail
      further benefits under the Act, the Appellant is also required to show
      that it is in fact  having  distribution  system  and  has  number  of
      consumers to whom it is supplying the electricity.  That  is  not  the
      case here.  For its own plant only, it is getting the electricity from
      Sterlite Ltd. for which it has entered into PPA.  We have to  keep  in
      mind the object and scheme of SEZ Act which  envisages  several  units
      being set up in a SEZ area.  This is evident from a collective reading
      of the various provisions of the SEZ Act viz. Section 2(g)(j)(za)(zc),
      Section 3, 4, 11, 12, 13 and 15.  There can be a Sector  Specific  SEZ
      with Several Units i.e. for IT,  Mineral  Based  Industries  etc.  but
      instances of single unit SEZ like in the present case of the Appellant
      may be rare.  The Notification  dated  03.03.2010  providing  for  the
      “Developer” of SEZ being  deemed  as  a  “Distribution  Licensee”  was
      issued keeping in view the concept of Multi Unit SEZs and  will  apply
      only to such cases in which the Developer is supplying  the  power  to
      multiple Units in the SEZ.  The said Notification will not apply to  a
      Developer like the Appellant who has  established  the  SEZ  only  for
      itself.

      44.  Having regard to the aforesaid  factual  and  legal  aspects  and
      keeping in mind the purpose for which CSS is payable, as explained  in
      detail in the earlier part of this judgment, we are of the  view  that
      on the facts of this case it is not  possible  for  the  Appellant  to
      avoid payment of CSS to WESCO.  We, therefore, do not find  any  merit
      in this Appeal which is accordingly dismissed.


                                                           …………………………….………J.
                         [Surinder Singh Nijjar]







                                                           …………………………………….J.
                                         [A.K. Sikri]





      New Delhi
      April 25, 2014

SEBI - Regulations 11,16, 18, & 27 - Takeover Regulations- ejusdem generis principle- Acquired excess shares - breached the creeping limits of acquisition - against the rule 11 - made a voluntary open offer through a Public Announcement in major National Newspapers, under Regulation 11 of the Takeover Regulations - sought permission by letter to SEBI - Sebi delayed in giving it's comments - in the meanwhile - the company withdraw it's open offer as it is unviable - SEBI not accepted - challenged in SAT - SAT allowed - Apex court held that The plain reading of the regulation makes it clear that no public offer whether it is voluntary or triggered by Regulation 11 can be withdrawn, unless it satisfies the circumstances set out in Regulation 27(1)(b), (c) and (d). There can be no distinction between a triggered public offer and a voluntary public offer. Both have to be considered on an equal footing. and held that In our opinion, the ejusdem generis principle is fully applicable for the interpretation of Regulation 27(1)(b)(c) and (d) as there is a common genus of impossibility. This impossibility envisioned under the aforesaid regulation would not include a contingency where voluntary open offer once made can be permitted to be withdrawn on the ground that it has now become economically unviable. and allowed the appeal filed By SEBI set aside the SAT order and restored the directions of SEBI = Securities and Exchange Board of India …Appellant VERSUS M/s. Akshya Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. ..Respondent=2014 (April. Part)http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41474

SEBI - Regulations 11,16, 18, & 27 - Takeover Regulations- ejusdem  generis  principle- Acquired excess shares - breached the creeping limits of acquisition - against the rule 11 - made  a  voluntary  open offer  through  a  Public   Announcement   in   major   National Newspapers, under Regulation  11  of  the  Takeover  Regulations - sought permission by letter to SEBI - Sebi delayed in giving it's comments - in the meanwhile - the company withdraw it's open offer as it is unviable -  SEBI not accepted - challenged in SAT - SAT allowed - Apex court held that The  plain  reading  of  the regulation makes it clear that no public  offer  whether  it  is voluntary or triggered by Regulation 11 can be withdrawn, unless it satisfies the circumstances set out  in Regulation 27(1)(b), (c) and (d). There can be  no  distinction  between  a triggered public offer and a voluntary public offer.  Both  have to be considered on an equal footing. and held that In our opinion, the ejusdem  generis  principle is  fully  applicable  for  the  interpretation  of   Regulation 27(1)(b)(c) and (d) as there is a common genus of impossibility. This impossibility envisioned  under  the  aforesaid  regulation would not include a contingency where voluntary open offer  once made can be permitted to be withdrawn on the ground that it  has now become economically unviable. and allowed the appeal filed By SEBI set aside the SAT order and restored the directions of SEBI =


whether  an
      open offer voluntarily made through a  Public  Announcement  for
      purchase of shares of the target company can be permitted to  be
      withdrawn at a time when the voluntary  open  offer  has  become
      uneconomical to be performed.=

The appellant by letter dated 30th November, 2012  conveyed  its
      comments in terms of the proviso  to  Regulation  16(4)  of  the
      Takeover Regulations on  the  draft  letter  of  offer.  Certain
      information was sought  in  the  aforesaid  letter.           
No
      reference was made in this letter with  regard  to  the  request
      made by the respondent  for  permission  to  withdraw  the  open
      offer. 
Rather it was stated as under :
           “Please note that failure to carry out the suggested changes  in
           the letter of offer as well as violation of  provisions  of  the
           Regulations will attract appropriate action. Please also  ensure
           and confirm that apart from above, no other changes are  carried
           out in the letter of offer submitted to us.”=

Regulation 27(1)(a) before its deletion  on  September  9,  2002
      permitted the public offer to be withdrawn, consequent upon  any
      competitive bid. =
We see no reason to differ from the view  taken
      in Nirma Industries Ltd. (supra) wherein  we  have  observed  as
      follows:


           “62. A bare perusal of  the  aforesaid  Regulations  shows  that
           Regulation 27(1) states the general rule in negative  terms.  
It
           provides that no public offer, once made,  shall  be  withdrawn.
           
Since clause (a) has been omitted, we are required to  interpret
           only the scope and ambit of clauses (b), (c) and (d). 
The  three
           sub-clauses are exceptions to the general rule  and,  therefore,
           have to be construed very strictly.  
The  exceptions  cannot  be
           construed in such a manner that would destroy the  general  rule
           that no public offer shall be permitted to  be  withdrawn  after
           the public announcement has been made. 
Clause (b) would permit a
           public offer to be withdrawn in case of legal impossibility when
           the statutory approval required has  been  refused.  
Clause  (c)
           again provides for impossibility when the sole acquirer, being a
           natural  person,  has  died.  
Clause  (b)  deals  with  a  legal impossibility 
whereas clause (c) deals with a natural  disaster.
           
Clearly clauses (b)  and  (c)  are  within  the  same  genus  of impossibility. 
Clause (d) also being an exception to the general rule would have to be naturally construed in  terms  of  clauses (b) and (c). 
Mr Divan has placed a great deal of emphasis on the
           expression “such circumstances” and “in the opinion” to indicate
           that the Board would have a wide discretion to permit withdrawal
           of an offer even though it is not impossible to perform. 
We  are
           unable to accept such an interpretation.” =

 Factually, it cannot be denied that in the years 2006-07,  2007-
      08 and 2010-11, the respondent had acquired shares in excess  of
      5% which breached the 5%  creeping  acquisition  limit.  
In  our
      opinion, the respondent was required to comply  with  Regulation
      11  and  make  a  Public  Announcement  to  acquire  shares   in
      accordance  with  law.  
The  respondent  admittedly  not  having
      complied with Regulation 11, in our opinion, the  appellant  was
      perfectly  justified   in   taking   the   non-compliance   into
      consideration whilst considering the feasibility of  the  public
      offer made on 20th October, 2011.=
It  is
      true that under Regulation 18(2), SEBI was required to  dispatch
      the necessary letters to the shareholders  within  a  reasonable
      period. 
It is a matter of record  that  the  comments  were  not
      offered for 13 months. 
Such kind of delay is wholly  inexcusable
      and needs to be avoided. It can lead  to  avoidable  controversy
      with regard to whether such belated action is bona fide exercise
      of statutory power by SEBI. 
By adopting such a lackadaisical, if
      not callous attitude, the very object for which the  regulations
      have been framed is diluted,  if  not  frustrated.  It  must  be
      remembered that SEBI is the watchdog of the  Securities  Market.
      It is the guardian of the interest of the  shareholders.  
It  is
      the protective shield  against  unscrupulous  practices  in  the
      Securities Market. 
Therefore, SEBI like any other body, which is
      established as a watchdog, ought not to act in  a  lackadaisical
      manner  in  the  performance  of  its  duties.  
The  time  frame
      stipulated  by  the  Act  and  the  Takeover   Regulations   for
      performing certain functions is required  to  be  maintained  to
      establish the transparency in the functioning of SEBI.=

Ultimately, SEBI is  charged
      with the duty of ensuring that every public offer made  is  bona
      fide for the benefit of the shareholders as well  as  acquirers.
      
In  the  present  case,  SEBI  has  found  that  permitting  the
      respondent to withdraw the public offer would be detrimental  to
      the overall interest of the shareholders. =
The  only  reason  put
      forward by the respondent for withdrawal of the offer is that it
      is no longer economically viable to continue with the offer. =
The  plain  reading  of  the  aforesaid
      regulation makes it clear that no public  offer  whether  it  is
      voluntary or triggered by Regulation 11 can be withdrawn, unless
      it satisfies the circumstances set out  in Regulation 27(1)(b), (c) and (d). 
There can be  no  distinction  between  a
      triggered public offer and a voluntary public offer.  Both  have
      to be considered on an equal footing.=
In our opinion, the ejusdem  generis  principle
      is  fully  applicable  for  the  interpretation  of   Regulation
      27(1)(b)(c) and (d) as there is a common genus of impossibility.
This impossibility envisioned  under  the  aforesaid  regulation
      would not include a contingency where voluntary open offer  once
      made can be permitted to be withdrawn on the ground that it  has
      now become economically unviable. 
Accepting such  a  submission,
      would  give  a  field  day  to  unscrupulous  elements  in   the
      securities market to  make  Public  Announcement  for  acquiring
      shares in the Target Company, knowing perfectly well  that  they
      can pull out when the prices of the shares have  been  inflated,
      due to the public offer. Such speculative practices  are  sought
      to be prevented by  Regulation  27(1)(b)(c)  and  (d),  that  is
      precisely the reason why Regulation 27(1)(a) was deleted. 
Merely
      because there has not been any substantial change in  the  price
      of shares in this particular case, would  not,  in  any  manner,
      invalidate the conclusion reached in Nirma  Industries  (supra).

37. Last but not least, we are not  able  to  approve  the  approach
      adopted by SAT in adopting the Issue of Capital  and  Disclosure
      Requirements   Regulations,   2009   (ICDR)    Regulation    for
      interpreting the provisions contained in Regulation  27  of  the
      Takeover Regulations. The regulations in Takeover Code  have  to
      be  interpreted  by  correlating  these   regulations   to   the
      provisions of the SEBI Act.

38. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed. The impugned  order
      passed by the SAT dated 19th June, 2013 in Appeal No.3  of  2013
      is set aside and the directions issued by the appellant  in  the
      letter dated 30th November, 2012 are restored.

2014 (April. Part)http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41474    
SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, A.K. SIKRI

REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6041  OF 2013




      Securities and Exchange Board of India         …Appellant


                                   VERSUS


      M/s. Akshya Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.           ..Respondent


                               J U D G M E N T


      SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.

   1. This appeal under Section 15Z of  the  Securities  and  Exchange
      Board of India Act, 1992 (the ‘SEBI Act’)  is  directed  against
      the  judgment  and  final  order  of  the  Securities  Appellate
      Tribunal, Mumbai (SAT) dated 19th June, 2013 rendered in  Appeal
      No.3  of  2013,  by  which  the  appeal  filed  by  M/s.  Akshya
      Infrastructure Private Limited – the respondent  herein  against
      the         directions          issued          by          SEBI
      on 30th November, 2012 has been allowed.


   2. The fundamental issue which arises in this appeal is whether  an
      open offer voluntarily made through a  Public  Announcement  for
      purchase of shares of the target company can be permitted to  be
      withdrawn at a time when the voluntary  open  offer  has  become
      uneconomical to be performed.


   3. In this case, the respondent herein, M/s  Akshya  Infrastructure
      Pvt. Ltd., is a part of the Promoter Group of MARG Limited (‘the
      Target Company’). For the years 2006-07,  2007-08  and  2010-11,
      the gross acquisition by the Promoter Group  of  shares  in  the
      Target Company was as under :
           “Financial Year          Percentage         Date  triggered
           on
               2006-07         14.34%                30.03.2007
               2007-08          5.64%                12.10.2007
               2010-11           7.11%                19.02.2011”


           As  a  consequence  of  the  foregoing  acquisitions,   the
      acquirers breached the 5% creeping acquisition  limit  and  were
      required to comply with the provisions of Regulation 11  of  the
      SEBI  (Substantial  Acquisition   of   Shares   and   Takeovers)
      Regulations, 1997 (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  “Takeover
      Regulations”).


   4. On 20th October, 2011, the  respondent  made  a  voluntary  open
      offer  through  a  Public   Announcement   in   major   National
      Newspapers, under Regulation  11  of  the  Takeover  Regulations
      wherein the public shareholders of the Target Company were given
      an opportunity to exit at an offer price of Rs.91/-  per  equity
      share.  This price  represents  a  premium  of  10.3%  over  the
      average market closing price for the  two  weeks  preceding  the
      Public Announcement.  The  tendering  period  was  scheduled  to
      commence on 1st December, 2011 and conclude  on  20th  December,
      2011.  The consideration for the tendered shares was to be  paid
      on or before 4th January, 2012. As  on  the  date  of  the  open
      offer, the list of  Promoters/Promoter  Group  Entities  was  as
      under:-
           Sl. No.     Name
            1.         Mr. G.RK. Reddy
            2.         Mr. G. Raghava Reddy
            3.         Ms. V.P. Rajini Reddy
            4.         Mr. G. Madhusudan Reddy
            5.         GRK Reddy & Cons (HUF)
            6.         M/s. Global Infoserve Ltd.
            7.         M/s. Marg Capital Markets Limited
            8.         M/s. Exemplarr Worldwide Limited
            9.         M/s. Marg Projects and Infrastructure Limited
                       (formerly Marg Holdings and Financial  Services
                       Limited)
            10.        M/s. Akshya Infrastructure Private Limited


   5. However, due to certain events, which have been  highlighted  by
      both the parties, the respondent by  letter  dated  29th  March,
      2012 through M/s. Motilal Oswal Investment  Advisors  (P)  Ltd.,
      the Managers to  the  Issue  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the
      “Merchant Banker”), addressed to SEBI, sought  to  contend  that
      the  open  offer  in  question  had  become  outdated,   thereby
      outliving its necessity and, therefore, the  same  ought  to  be
      permitted to be withdrawn.   It  was  also  contended  that  the
      amount of Rs.17.46 crores deposited  by  the  respondent  in  an
      escrow account towards the open offer ought to be allowed to  be
      withdrawn.  The letter emphasizes that the  public  announcement
      was in nature of a voluntary open offer under Regulation  11  of
      the Takeover Regulations for consolidation  of  shareholding  of
      the Promoter Group in the Target Company.  The  offer  price  of
      Rs.91/- per equity share of the  Target  Company  was  aimed  at
      presenting a commercially reasonable opportunity to  the  public
      shareholders to exit and at  the  same  time  it  was  meant  to
      consolidate the shareholding  of  the  promoter  in  the  Target
      Company.  It was further stated  that  due  to  the  unjustified
      delay by SEBI in taking a decision as to whether to approve  the
      draft letter  of  offer  has  rendered  the  entire  open  offer
      exercise academic and  meaningless.  It  was  claimed  that  the
      transaction envisaged by the respondent is no longer justifiable
      on any ground, including the grounds of economic  rationale  and
      commercial reasonableness.  The respondent sought the withdrawal
      of open offer made under the public  announcement  in  terms  of
      Regulation 27 of the Takeover Regulations. The exact prayer made
      by the respondent was as follows:-
           “Consequently, we hereby seek withdrawal of the open offer  made
           under the public announcement in terms of Regulation 27  of  the
           Takeover Regulations (the benefit of which continue to accrue to
           us in  terms  of  Regulation  35(2)  of  the  SEBI  (Substantial
           Acquisition of Shares  and  Takeovers)  Regulations,  2011  “New
           Takeover Regulations”).  Regulation 23(1)(d) of the New Takeover
           Regulations equally empowers withdrawal of an open offer.”


   6. The appellant by letter dated 30th November, 2012  conveyed  its
      comments in terms of the proviso  to  Regulation  16(4)  of  the
      Takeover Regulations on  the  draft  letter  of  offer.  Certain
      information was sought  in  the  aforesaid  letter.           No
      reference was made in this letter with  regard  to  the  request
      made by the respondent  for  permission  to  withdraw  the  open
      offer. Rather it was stated as under :
           “Please note that failure to carry out the suggested changes  in
           the letter of offer as well as violation of  provisions  of  the
           Regulations will attract appropriate action. Please also  ensure
           and confirm that apart from above, no other changes are  carried
           out in the letter of offer submitted to us.”


           The aforesaid comments  of  SEBI  were  challenged  by  the
      respondent before SAT in Appeal No.3 of 2013.


   7. The respondent claimed that the impugned directions,  ostensibly
      in the form of comments and observations on the draft letter  of
      offer, reject the plea of the petitioner that the  delay  caused
      by SEBI in clearance of the draft letter of offer,  now  renders
      the open offer unviable  and  academic.  Further,  the  impugned
      directions purport to bind the appellant and thereby  constitute
      an order by which the respondent was aggrieved; and necessitated
      the appeal before the SAT.


   8. In the appeal  before  SAT,  the  respondent  claimed  that  the
      directions contained in the impugned letter of SEBI  dated  30th
      November, 2012, incorrectly allege that prima facie  requirement
      to make an open offer was triggered by  the  promoters  and  the
      promoter group entities of the Target Company  (Promoter  Group)
      under Regulation 11(1) of the Takeover Regulations on three past
      occasions, viz. March 30, 2007, October 12,  2007  and  February
      19, 2011 (Alleged Triggers). It was  further  claimed  that  the
      directions  to  revise  the  offer  price,  on  account  of  the
      requirement to make open offers pursuant to the alleged triggers
      was illegal and without jurisdiction. It was also  claimed  that
      the directions contained  in  the  impugned  letter  has  caused
      severe civil consequences to the respondent. It was also claimed
      that the submissions on the issues presented by  the  respondent
      before  the  appellant  have   neither   been   considered   nor
      appreciated.


   9. The appeal was contested by the appellant by filing  a  detailed
      affidavit on 12th April, 2013. As noticed above,  the  aforesaid
      appeal has been allowed by SAT in terms of  prayer  clause  (a),
      (b) and (c) of Para 7 of the appeal  filed  by  the  respondent,
      which are as under:-
           “(a)  That this Hon’ble Tribunal be pleased  to  set  aside  the
                 Impugned Direction;
           (b)   That this Hon’ble Tribunal be pleased to order and  direct
                 the respondent to allow the appellant to withdraw the  open
                 offer without any adverse orders or directions against  the
                 appellants or the Promoter Group;
           (c)   That this Hon’ble Tribunal be pleased to order and  direct
                 the respondent to  allow  the  appellant  to  withdraw  the
                 amount of Rs.17.46 crores deposited in escrow  in  lieu  of
                 the Open Offer.”


  10.  It  was,  however,  made  clear  that  SAT  has  not  made  any
      observation on the merits  of  the  issue  regarding  the  three
      alleged triggers and the contentions  of  the  parties  in  this
      regard were kept open.   Aggrieved  by  the  aforesaid  impugned
      judgment, SEBI has filed the present Civil Appeal.


  11. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length.


  12. Mr.  C.U.  Singh,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the
      appellant, has submitted that the issues raised by the appellant
      herein are squarely covered against the respondent by an earlier
      judgment of this Court in  Nirma  Industries  Ltd.  &  Anr.  Vs.
      Securities and Exchange Board of India[1].


  13.  At  this  stage,  Mr.  R.F.  Nariman,  learned  senior  counsel
      appearing for the respondent,  has  raised  certain  preliminary
      objections with regard to the maintainability of the appeal.  He
      submits that the directions issued by the SEBI are  based  on  a
      misconception of the law applicable to  the  peculiar  facts  of
      this case.  He submits that firstly: this is a  case  where  the
      respondent had made voluntary open offer.  It was not a case  of
      an open offer made because of a triggered  mechanism  under  the
      Takeover Regulations; secondly: since the open offer was a  pure
      and simple voluntary offer, no prejudice has been caused to  any
      shareholder; thirdly: the present case does not fall within  the
      ambit of Regulation 27 of Takeover  Regulations.   According  to
      Mr. Nariman, Regulation 27 ought to be read in a manner that  it
      would only govern mandatory open offers and not  voluntary  open
      offers;   fourthly:   SEBI   has   without   any   justification
      intermingled acquisition of shares  by  the  respondent  on  the
      three  earlier  occasions  in  2006-07,  2008-09  and   2009-10;
      fifthly: SEBI unjustifiably and arbitrarily took  13  months  to
      offer comment(s) on the draft letter of offer.   Even  then  the
      clarification sought by the  appellant  pertained  to  the  past
      alleged triggers which had no connection with the voluntary open
      offer. It is submitted that even if the case of  the  respondent
      falls within the ambit  of  Regulation  27,  the  withdrawal  is
      permissible in such circumstances which in the opinion  of  SEBI
      (the Board) merit withdrawal; sixthly:  the  judgment  in  Nirma
      Industries (supra) is distinguishable; lastly: the  judgment  in
      Nirma Industries (supra) is incorrect and needs reconsideration.


  14. Mr.  C.U.  Singh,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the
      appellant,  has  submitted  that  the  correspondence  exchanged
      between the parties would show that the delay  in  consideration
      of the letter of offer was  caused  by  the  respondent  by  not
      giving the necessary information. He relies  on  the  voluminous
      correspondence between the parties in support of his  submission
      which, if necessary,  shall  be  considered  later.  His  second
      submission is that the request for withdrawal of open  offer  is
      to be considered strictly under the provision of  Regulation  27
      of the Takeover Regulations.


  15.   The   respondent    had    made    a    Public    Announcement
      on  20th  October,  2011  which  clearly  informed  the   public
      shareholders of the Target Company that they were being given an
      opportunity to exit at an offer  price  of  Rs.91/-  per  equity
      share, which represented a premium of  10.3%  over  the  average
      market closing price for the  two  weeks  preceding  the  Public
      Announcement. This Public Announcement and the Public Offer  was
      sought to be withdrawn on 29th March, 2012. He points  out  that
      in  the  aforesaid  letter;  the  request  for   withdrawal   is
      specifically  made  under  Regulation   27   of   the   Takeover
      Regulations. Therefore, Mr. Nariman cannot be permitted to, now,
      submit that Regulation 27 is not applicable to the open offer in
      the present case.


  16.  Mr.  C.U.  Singh  then  submits  that  the   respondents   have
      consciously proceeded with an open offer and they  have  rightly
      not been permitted to withdraw the same by  the  appellant.  The
      next submission of Mr. C.U. Singh is that  Regulation  27  deals
      with only withdrawal of ‘Public Offer’  and  not  withdrawal  of
      ‘Public Announcement’. In any event, according to learned senior
      counsel,  submission  with  regard  to  withdrawal   of   Public
      Announcement has been made,  only,  at  the  time  of  arguments
      before this Court. It was neither pleaded nor raised before  the
      SEBI/SAT, nor even in the counter affidavit before  this  Court.
      He next submitted that under the provisions  of  Regulation  27,
      public offer is a rule and withdrawal is an  exception.  Relying
      on the interpretation  of  Regulation  27  in  Nirma  Industries
      Ltd.(supra), he submits that an offer can  be  permitted  to  be
      withdrawn only if it becomes virtually  impermissible  to  carry
      out. Permitting public offers once made to be withdrawn  on  the
      ground that it has  become  uneconomical  would  compromise  the
      integrity of the Securities Market. This would  be  contrary  to
      the scheme of the  Takeover  Code.                     Mr.  C.U.
      Singh then submits that there is no distinction under Regulation
      27 between the voluntary open offer  and  mandatory  open  offer
      which is the result  of  a  triggered  acquisition.  Relying  on
      Regulations   11   to   14   of   the   Takeover    Regulations,
      he submits that all the different types of open offers  are  set
      out therein. Each one of the open offers has the same effect  on
      shareholders and the market. Therefore, the provisions contained
      in Regulation 27 have to be strictly adhered to  in  considering
      the request for withdrawal of the  open  offer.  It  is  further
      submitted that the appellant had fixed the offer price under the
      relevant regulations and in accordance with the law laid down by
      this Court in Clariant International Ltd. & Anr. Vs.  Securities
      & Exchange Board of India[2].




  17. According to Mr. C.U. Singh, in normal circumstances, withdrawal
      can only be made under Regulation  27(1)(b),  (c)  and  (d).  He
      submits  that  in  the  letter  dated  29th  March,  2012,   the
      respondent claims that the offer has become “outdated due to the
      sheer efflux of time”. The second reason given is the  delay  in
      clearance of open offer from SEBI.  The  letter  also  indicates
      that the respondent does not agree with the views of the SEBI on
      the fact situation. Another reason given is that  “even  if  the
      SEBI were to approve the draft letter of offer today,  the  open
      offer exercise would  be  entirely  academic  and  meaningless.”
      Another reason given is that “the transaction then envisaged  by
      us is no longer justifiable on any ground including  grounds  of
      economic rationale and  commercial  reasonableness.”  All  these
      factors, according to Mr. C.U. Singh, will not be covered by any
      of the clauses in Regulation 27(1)(b)(c)(d). He  then  submitted
      that even if there is a delay by SEBI, the ordinary investor  in
      shares of the Target Company  should  not  be  made  to  suffer.
      According to Mr. C.U.  Singh,  the  controversy  raised  in  the
      appeal is squarely covered against the respondent by judgment of
      this Court in Nirma Industries Ltd. (supra).


  18. Mr. Nariman has rebutted the aforesaid submissions of  Mr.  C.U.
      Singh. He submits that the  single  most  important  distinction
      between Nirma and this case is that it pertains to  a  voluntary
      public offer.  This  Court  had  no  occasion  to  deal  with  a
      voluntary public offer in  Nirma  Industries  Ltd.  (supra).  In
      reply  to  the  other  submissions  made  by  Mr.  C.U.   Singh,
       Mr. Nariman has also relied on some correspondence. He has also
      relied upon a table to substantiate the submission that the  law
      laid down in Nirma Industries would not  be  applicable  in  the
      facts and circumstances of this case.  Dealing with the issue of
      delay, it  is  submitted  by  Mr.  Nariman  that  there  was  an
      unjustifiable and inexplicable delay  by  SEBI  in  issuing  its
      comments on the draft  letter  of  offer.  In  support  of  this
      submission, he has relied on some correspondence.


  19. He  relies  on  letter  dated  October  20,  2011,  whereby  the
      respondent made a voluntary open offer  by  Public  Announcement
      under Regulation 11 of the Takeover Regulations. He  points  out
      that Clause 11.4 of the Public Announcement clearly states  that
      voluntary open offer can be withdrawn by the respondent  at  any
      time. He then points out that on 25th October, 2011, SEBI called
      upon the respondent to provide information  on  the  changes  in
      shareholding and capital build up of the Target  Company,  along
      with compliance  of  the  SEBI  Regulations.   He  submits  that
      although  the  information  sought  pertains  to   the   earlier
      acquisition it  was  duly  provided  on  November  4,  2011  and
      November 8, 2011. Mr.  Nariman  submits  that  under  Regulation
      18(1) of the Takeover Regulations, the draft letter of offer  is
      required to be filed with SEBI well within 14 days from the date
      of the Public Announcement. Once the letter of offer  is  filed,
      SEBI was required to  dispatch  the  same  to  the  shareholders
      immediately after 21 days. During 21 days, SEBI is permitted  to
      stipulate the changes required to be made in the letter of offer
      which the Merchant Banker and the Acquirer shall incorporate  in
      the  letter  of  offer,  before  it   is   dispatched   to   the
      shareholders. In case, SEBI receives a complaint or it initiates
      an enquiry or investigation in respect of public offer,  it  can
      call for a revised letter of offer. In  this  case,  he  submits
      that the draft letter of offer was given  on  October  28,  2011
      well within 14 days period stipulated  under  Regulation  18(1).
      But SEBI did not issue its comments on the draft letter of offer
      within 21 days, as required. Not only there was a non-compliance
      of                Regulation 18(1) but there was no occasion  to
      invoke proviso to Regulation  18(2).  SEBI  did  not  inform  or
      advise the respondent to revise the draft  letter  of  offer  on
      account  of  any  inadequacy  in  the  disclosure  made  by  the
      respondent in the draft  letter  of  offer  in  respect  of  the
      voluntary offer. All  the  queries  were  related  to  the  past
      alleged triggers. These alleged triggers were  wholly  unrelated
      to the voluntary open offer for which the draft letter of  offer
      was filed with the appellant. He then pointed out that by letter
      dated 17th November, 2011, the appellant again sought  the  same
      clarification on the alleged triggers, as stated in  its  letter
      dated November 11, 2011.         He submitted that the  Merchant
      Banker and the respondent  provided  all  explanation  regarding
      these acquisitions  on  November  28,  2011.  The  letter  dated
      November 24,  2011  of  the  respondent  was  forwarded  to  the
      appellant by the Merchant Banker  on  November  28,  2011.  This
      letter gave date wise explanation on all the issues raised as to
      why no open offer was made pertaining to the  alleged  triggers,
      as there was no violation of Regulation 11(1) and 11(2)  of  the
      Takeover  Regulations.  This  explanation  was   reiterated   on
          December 14, 2011 by the respondent/Promoters but there  was
      no response from the appellant to any of the aforesaid  letters.
      This  led  the  respondent  to  a  reasonable  belief  that  the
      explanation  had  been  accepted.  Subsequently,  there  was   a
      telephonic  request  by  the  appellant  to  provide  the   same
      information on the alleged  triggers  in  various  formats.  The
      respondent duly                re-arranged the same  information
      in the desired format and provided the same to the appellant  on
      January 13, 2012, January 16, 2012 and February 3, 2012. Inspite
      of all this, still there were no comments  from  the  SEBI.  Mr.
      Nariman emphasized  that  the  unjustifiable,  inexplicable  and
      inordinate, delay on  the  part  of  the  appellant  in  issuing
      comments on the  draft  letter  of  offer  created  a  situation
      wherein it was impossible for the respondent  to  implement  the
      voluntary open offer. By that time, the underlying  decision  to
      consolidate shareholding had become infructuous by sheer  efflux
      of time. It was under these circumstances  that  the  respondent
      intimated its decision to withdraw its voluntary open offer  and
      sought withdrawal of the same in terms of the Regulation  27  of
      the Takeover Regulations.


  20.  It  was  pointed  out  by  Mr.  Nariman  that  the   respondent
      specifically and expressly  sought  opportunity  of  a  personal
      hearing on the aforesaid request for withdrawal,  the  appellant
      did not  revert  on  the  request.  The  respondent  once  again
      furnished the  same  information  on  the  alleged  triggers  in
      different  formats  as  required  by   the   appellant   through
      communications  dated  April   12,   2012;   April   20,   2012;
           May 10, 2012; May 21, 2012; June 6, 2012 and July 5,  2012.
      After a period of more than 13 months, from the date  of  filing
      of the draft letter of offer and after more than 8  months  from
      the date of request for withdrawal,  the  appellant  issued  the
      impugned letter dated November 30, 2012. Mr. Nariman points  out
      that the directions issued in the  impugned  letter  are  wholly
      unjustified. He points out to the following two directions :-
           (a) Go ahead with the voluntary open offer on  account  of  some
           alleged triggers (for creeping acquisitions under Regulation  11
           of the Takeover Code, 1997) in the past  i.e.  2006-07;  2007-08
           and 2010-11.
           (b) make an open offer with upward revision in price per  share.
           The share prices offered by the respondent in 2009 were RS.91.00
           per equity share and as on date  the  prices  is  RS.315.90  per
           equity share.


  21. Mr. Nariman submitted that SAT without going into the merits and
      demerits of the alleged earlier acquisitions, has left  it  open
      for SEBI to take appropriate action in accordance with law  with
      regard to the aforesaid three acquisitions.  Therefore,  clearly
      the aforesaid three acquisitions have no  connection  whatsoever
      with  the  voluntary  offer   under   consideration   in   these
      proceedings.


  22. The next submission of Mr. Nariman is the foundation of all  his
      other  submissions.  According  to  Mr.  Nariman,  there  is   a
      fundamental difference between a mandatory public  offer  and  a
      voluntary open offer. It cannot be placed on the same  pedestal.
      According to learned senior counsel, in a mandatory public offer
      there  exists  an  underlying  transaction  which  triggers  the
      Takeover Code under which the shareholders  obtain  a  right  to
      exit from the company. However, in a voluntary  open  offer,  no
      such right accrues to the  shareholders  to  exit  the  company,
      since the offer is not the result of a triggered acquisition. In
      the present case, the action of SEBI, according to Mr.  Nariman,
      is contrary to Regulation  18.  The  letter  of  offer  was  not
      dispatched  to  the  shareholders  as  per   Regulation   18(1).
      Regulation 15(4) deems that the offer is made  on  the  date  on
      which the Public Announcement has appeared in any newspaper. But
      according to Mr.  Nariman,  this  deeming  fiction  is  for  the
      purpose of price fixation for the offer. It has  nothing  to  do
      with Regulation 18 which is to dispatch the actual offer to  the
      shareholders. Therefore,  according  to  Mr.  Nariman,  reliance
      placed by Mr. C.U. Singh on the expression “offer once made”  in
      Regulation  27  is  misconceived.  This  expression  has  to  be
      understood in terms of Regulation 18. Since  Regulation  18  had
      not been complied with and there was no dispatch of  the  letter
      of offer to the shareholders,  there  was  no  question  of  any
      prejudice being caused to the interest of the shareholders.  Mr.
      Nariman then submits that because of the inaction on the part of
      SEBI, the respondent would be squarely covered under  Regulation
      27(1)(b). The approval of the letter of offer by  the  appellant
      is statutory in nature. Since it had not been granted within the
      stipulated period of time, the respondent was entitled to assume
      that it had been refused. According to Mr. Nariman, it has  been
      erroneously submitted by Mr. C.U. Singh that the  claim  of  the
      respondent is not covered under Regulation 27(1)(b). Mr. Nariman
      then submits that  the  judgment  in  Nirma  Industries  is  not
      applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case. Finally,
      he has submitted that the judgment in Nirma  Industries  (supra)
      requires reconsideration. In  support  of  this  submission,  he
      submits that Regulation 27 has to be interpreted by  keeping  in
      mind the earlier Regulation 27(1)(a). In Nirma Industries,  this
      Court has held that Regulation       27 (b), (c) and (d) are all
      in the nature of  impossibility.                    Mr.  Nariman
      made a mention about Regulation 27(1)(a) which  was  omitted  by
      the SEBI  (Substantial  Acquisition  of  Shares  and  Takeovers)
      (Second Amendment) Regulations, 2002 with effect from  September
      9, 2002. Prior to deletion, it read as under :
           “-(a) the withdrawal is consequent upon any competitive bid,”


           Based on this, he submits that economic viability of public
      offer was the genus of Regulation 27. The  facts  of  this  case
      would clearly place the request of the respondent for withdrawal
      of the public offer in  the  realm  of  impossibility.       Mr.
      Nariman has submitted that for the interpretation of  Regulation
      27, the ejusdem generis principle would not apply as there is no
      common genus between Clauses 27(1)(b)(c) and (d).


  23. Mr. C.U. Singh in rejoinder has submitted that in  view  of  the
      law laid down in Nirma Industries, the public offer made by  the
      respondent  cannot  be  permitted  to  be   withdrawn.   Earlier
      incidence of the alleged triggers can be relied upon.  According
      to him, the price has to be fixed on the  basis  of  the  public
      announcement/offer. He submits that Regulation 18(1) talks of 14
      days of  the  Public  Announcement.  Furthermore,  public  offer
      cannot be said to be made only on  dispatch  of  the  letter  of
      offer  to  the  individual  shareholders.   The  impact  on  the
      securities market  would  follow  the  public  announcement.  He
      reiterates that even the withdrawal letter seeks  permission  to
      withdraw the Public  Offer  under  Regulation  27.  Finally,  he
      submits that the interpretation of  Regulation  27  rendered  in
      Nirma Industries Ltd. (supra) is correct.  It fully  applies  to
      the facts of the present case. It is neither distinguishable nor
      does it require reconsideration.


  24. We have considered the submission made by  the  learned  counsel
      for the parties.


  25. Factually, it cannot be denied that in the years 2006-07,  2007-
      08 and 2010-11, the respondent had acquired shares in excess  of
      5% which breached the 5%  creeping  acquisition  limit.  In  our
      opinion, the respondent was required to comply  with  Regulation
      11  and  make  a  Public  Announcement  to  acquire  shares   in
      accordance  with  law.  The  respondent  admittedly  not  having
      complied with Regulation 11, in our opinion, the  appellant  was
      perfectly  justified   in   taking   the   non-compliance   into
      consideration whilst considering the feasibility of  the  public
      offer made on 20th October, 2011.


  26. With regard to delay, we do  not  find  much  substance  in  the
      submission of Mr. C.U. Singh. Mr. Singh has  sought  to  explain
      the delay on the ground that information sought by the appellant
      was not given by the respondent. In our  opinion,  this  was  no
      ground for the appellant to delay the issuance  of  comments  on
      the letter of offer, especially not for a period of  13  months.
      In the event the information was not forthcoming, the  appellant
      had the power to refuse the approval of the public offer. It  is
      true that under Regulation 18(2), SEBI was required to  dispatch
      the necessary letters to the shareholders  within  a  reasonable
      period. It is a matter of record  that  the  comments  were  not
      offered for 13 months. Such kind of delay is wholly  inexcusable
      and needs to be avoided. It can lead  to  avoidable  controversy
      with regard to whether such belated action is bona fide exercise
      of statutory power by SEBI. By adopting such a lackadaisical, if
      not callous attitude, the very object for which the  regulations
      have been framed is diluted,  if  not  frustrated.  It  must  be
      remembered that SEBI is the watchdog of the  Securities  Market.
      It is the guardian of the interest of the  shareholders.  It  is
      the protective shield  against  unscrupulous  practices  in  the
      Securities Market. Therefore, SEBI like any other body, which is
      established as a watchdog, ought not to act in  a  lackadaisical
      manner  in  the  performance  of  its  duties.  The  time  frame
      stipulated  by  the  Act  and  the  Takeover   Regulations   for
      performing certain functions is required  to  be  maintained  to
      establish the transparency in the functioning of SEBI.


  27. Having said this, we are afraid such delay is of  no  assistance
      to the respondent. It will not result in nullifying  the  action
      taken by SEBI, even though belated. Ultimately, SEBI is  charged
      with the duty of ensuring that every public offer made  is  bona
      fide for the benefit of the shareholders as well  as  acquirers.
      In  the  present  case,  SEBI  has  found  that  permitting  the
      respondent to withdraw the public offer would be detrimental  to
      the overall interest of the shareholders. The  only  reason  put
      forward by the respondent for withdrawal of the offer is that it
      is no longer economically viable to continue with the offer. Mr.
      Nariman has referred to a tabular statement  and  data  to  show
      that there is no substantial variation in the share prices  that
      ensued making of the public offer. Having  seen  the  table,  we
      find substance in the submission of                 Mr.  Nariman
      that there is hardly any variation in the shares of  the  Target
      Company  from  20th  October,  2011  till                   30th
      November, 2011. The variation seems to  have  been  between  Rs.
      78.10  (on  24.11.2011)  and   Rs.   87.60                   (on
      20.10.2011). Such a variation cannot be said to be the result of
      the public offer. But this will not detract from the well  known
      phenomena  that  Public  Announcement  of  the  public  offering
      affects the securities market  and  the  shares  of  the  Target
      Company. The impact is immediate.


  28. We are unable to agree with the submission of                Mr.
      Nariman  that  Regulation  27  would  not  be  applicable  to  a
      voluntary public offer. A perusal of Regulation 27(1)  makes  it
      patently clear that Regulation 27(1)  reads  “no  public  offer,
      once made, shall not be withdrawn  except  under  the  following
      circumstances.” Accepting Mr. Nariman’s submission would  be  to
      reconstruct the aforesaid provision. This Court,  or  any  other
      court,  whilst  construing  the   statutory   provision   cannot
      reconstruct  the  same.  The  plain  reading  of  the  aforesaid
      regulation makes it clear that no public  offer  whether  it  is
      voluntary or triggered by Regulation 11 can be withdrawn, unless
      it satisfies the circumstances set out  in            Regulation
      27(1)(b), (c) and (d). There can be  no  distinction  between  a
      triggered public offer and a voluntary public offer.  Both  have
      to be considered on an equal footing. We find substance  in  the
      submission made by Mr. C.U. Singh that Regulation 18(2)  has  no
      relevance to  the  case  projected  by  the  respondents  having
      singularly failed to give the necessary information to SEBI with
      regard to the earlier three acquisitions.


  29.   We   also   do   not   agree    with    Mr.    Nariman    that
      Regulation 27 has to be read in the context of the Regulation as
      it existed when  it  was  first  enacted.  As  noticed  earlier,
      Regulation 27(1)(a) before its deletion  on  September  9,  2002
      permitted the public offer to be withdrawn, consequent upon  any
      competitive bid. We see no reason to differ from the view  taken
      in Nirma Industries Ltd. (supra) wherein  we  have  observed  as
      follows:


           “62. A bare perusal of  the  aforesaid  Regulations  shows  that
           Regulation 27(1) states the general rule in negative  terms.  It
           provides that no public offer, once made,  shall  be  withdrawn.
           Since clause (a) has been omitted, we are required to  interpret
           only the scope and ambit of clauses (b), (c) and (d). The  three
           sub-clauses are exceptions to the general rule  and,  therefore,
           have to be construed very strictly.  
The  exceptions  cannot  be
           construed in such a manner that would destroy the  general  rule
           that no public offer shall be permitted to  be  withdrawn  after
           the public announcement has been made. 
Clause (b) would permit a
           public offer to be withdrawn in case of legal impossibility when
           the statutory approval required has  been  refused.  
Clause  (c)
           again provides for impossibility when the sole acquirer, being a
           natural  person,  has  died.  
Clause  (b)  deals  with  a  legal
           impossibility 
whereas clause (c) deals with a natural  disaster.
           
Clearly clauses (b)  and  (c)  are  within  the  same  genus  of
           impossibility. 
Clause (d) also being an exception to the general
           rule would have to be naturally construed in  terms  of  clauses
           (b) and (c). 
Mr Divan has placed a great deal of emphasis on the
           expression “such circumstances” and “in the opinion” to indicate
           that the Board would have a wide discretion to permit withdrawal
           of an offer even though it is not impossible to perform. 
We  are
           unable to accept such an interpretation.”




  30. The submission with regard to the non-applicability  of  ejusdem
      generis for interpretation of the Takeover Regulations has  been
      considered  and  rejected  in  Nirma  Industries  Ltd.   (supra)
      (Paragraphs 63 to 71).


  31.   We   are   also   not   impressed   by   the   submission   of
      Mr. Nariman that it has now become  economically  impossible  to
      give effect to the public offer. This very submission  has  been
      rejected in Nirma Industries  Ltd.  (supra).  We  reiterate  our
      opinion  in   Nirma   Industries   Ltd.   (supra)   that   under
      Clause 27(1)(b)(c) and (d), a Public Offer, once made, can  only
      be permitted to be withdrawn  in  circumstances  which  make  it
      virtually impossible to perform the Public Offer.  In fact,  the
      very purpose for deleting Regulation 27(1)(a) was to remove  any
      misapprehension that an offer once made can be withdrawn  if  it
      becomes economically  not  viable.  We  are  of  the  considered
      opinion that the distinction sought to be made  by  Mr.  Nariman
      between a voluntary public offer and a triggered public offer is
      wholly misconceived. Accepting such a  submission  would  defeat
      the very purpose for which the Takeover Code has been enacted.


  32. We also do not find any merit in  the  submission  of        Mr.
      Nariman that the delay of 13  months  by  SEBI  in  issuing  the
      impugned directions would permit the respondent to withdraw  the
      Public Offer under Regulation  27(1)(b).  The  consideration  by
      SEBI is as to whether a Public Offer is in conformity  with  the
      provisions of the SEBI Act and the Takeover Regulations.   Delay
      in performance of its duties by  SEBI  can  not  be  equated  to
      refusal  of  the  statutory   approval   requires   from   other
      independent bodies, such as under the  RBI,  Taxation  Laws  and
      other   regulatory   statutes   including    Foreign    Exchange
      Regulations.  Delay by SEBI in taking a final decision in making
      its comments on  the  letter  of  offer  would  not  fall  under
      Regulation 27(1)(b).


  33. This now brings us to the submission of Mr. Nariman  that  there
      was a breach of Rules of Natural Justice. It is matter of record
      that the respondent had asked for an opportunity of hearing  but
      none was granted. But the question that arises is as to  whether
      this is sufficient to nullify  the  decision  of  SEBI.  In  our
      opinion, the respondent has failed to place on the record either
      before SAT or before this Court  the  prejudice  that  has  been
      caused by not observing Rules of Natural Justice. It is  by  now
      settled proposition of law that mere breach of Rules of  Natural
      Justice is not sufficient.  Such  breach  of  Rules  of  Natural
      Justice must also entail avoidable prejudice to the  respondent.
      This reasoning of ours is supported by a  number  of  cases.  We
      may, however, refer to the law laid down  in  Natwar  Singh  Vs.
      Director of Enforcement & Anr.,[3]  wherein  it  was  held  that
      “there must also have been caused some  real  prejudice  to  the
      complainant; there is  no  such  thing  as  a  merely  technical
      infringement of natural justice.”


  34. All the information sought by SEBI related to the three  earlier
      acquisitions when the creeping limit for  acquisition  has  been
      breached for triggering the mandatory Takeover  Regulations.  In
      appeal, SAT has left the question with  regard  to  the  earlier
      three acquisitions open and to be  decided  in  accordance  with
      law. Therefore, clearly no prejudice  has  been  caused  to  the
      respondent.




  35. Finally, we are unable to accept the  submission  of         Mr.
      Nariman that the ratio of law as declared  in  Nirma  Industries
      Ltd.  (supra)  would  not  be  applicable  to  the   facts   and
      circumstances of this case. As pointed out earlier,  we  do  not
      accept the distinction sought to be made  by  Mr.  Nariman  with
      regard to voluntary open offer and mandatory open offer which is
      the result of a triggered acquisition. The consequences of  both
      kinds of offers to acquire shares in the Target  Company,  at  a
      particular price, are the same. As soon as the  offer  price  is
      made public, the securities market  would  take  the  same  into
      account in all transactions. Therefore, the  withdrawal  of  the
      open offer will have to be considered by the Board in  terms  of
      Regulation  27(1)(b)(c)  and  (d).  Further,  the  deletion   of
      Regulation 27(1)(a) does not, in any manner, advance the case of
      the respondent. It rather reinforces the conclusion that an open
      offer  once  made  can  only  be  withdrawn   in   circumstances
      stipulated under Regulation 27(1)(b)(c) and (d). We also do  not
      agree with Mr. Nariman that voluntary open  offer  made  by  the
      respondent  ought  to  be  permitted  to  be   withdrawn   under
      Regulation 27(1)(b) for the  reasons  already  stated.  We  have
      already come to  the  conclusion  that  the  delay  in  offering
      comments by the Board on the letter  containing  voluntary  open
      offer,  though  undesirable,  is  not  fatal  to  the   decision
      ultimately taken by the  Board.  We,  therefore,  reiterate  our
      conclusion in Nirma Industries (supra).




  36. We also do not find substance  in  the  submission  of       Mr.
      Nariman that the judgment  in  Nirma  Industries  (supra)  needs
      reconsideration. In our opinion, the ejusdem  generis  principle
      is  fully  applicable  for  the  interpretation  of   Regulation
      27(1)(b)(c) and (d) as there is a common genus of impossibility.
      This impossibility envisioned  under  the  aforesaid  regulation
      would not include a contingency where voluntary open offer  once
      made can be permitted to be withdrawn on the ground that it  has
      now become economically unviable. Accepting such  a  submission,
      would  give  a  field  day  to  unscrupulous  elements  in   the
      securities market to  make  Public  Announcement  for  acquiring
      shares in the Target Company, knowing perfectly well  that  they
      can pull out when the prices of the shares have  been  inflated,
      due to the public offer. Such speculative practices  are  sought
      to be prevented by  Regulation  27(1)(b)(c)  and  (d),  that  is
      precisely the reason why Regulation 27(1)(a) was deleted. Merely
      because there has not been any substantial change in  the  price
      of shares in this particular case, would  not,  in  any  manner,
      invalidate the conclusion reached in Nirma  Industries  (supra).






  37. Last but not least, we are not  able  to  approve  the  approach
      adopted by SAT in adopting the Issue of Capital  and  Disclosure
      Requirements   Regulations,   2009   (ICDR)    Regulation    for
      interpreting the provisions contained in Regulation  27  of  the
      Takeover Regulations. The regulations in Takeover Code  have  to
      be  interpreted  by  correlating  these   regulations   to   the
      provisions of the SEBI Act.




  38. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed. The impugned  order
      passed by the SAT dated 19th June, 2013 in Appeal No.3  of  2013
      is set aside and the directions issued by the appellant  in  the
      letter dated 30th November, 2012 are restored.






                                                             ……………………………….J.
                                                     [Surinder Singh Nijjar]






                                                            ………………………………..J.
                                                [A.K.Sikri]
      New Delhi;
      April 25, 2014.















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[1] (2013) 8 SCC 20
[2] (2004) 8 SCC 524
[3] (2010) 13 SCC 255