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Tuesday, July 16, 2013

Service matter = (i) Whether two different age of superannuation of 58 and 60 years can be prescribed for the employees similarly situated, including members of the same service, solely on the basis of their source of entry in the service. (ii) Whether ‘the Uttar Pradesh Jal Nigam (Retirement on attaining age of Superannuation) Regulations, 2005’ fixing two different age of superannuation for similarly situated employees of Jal Nigam are discriminatory and ultra vires under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.= ‘no pay no work’ is not applicable to the employees who were guided by specific rules like Leave Rules etc. relating to absence from duty. Such principle can be applied to only those employees who were not guided by any specific rule relating to absence from duty. If an employee is prevented by the employer from performing his duties, the employee cannot be blamed for having not worked, and the principle of ‘no pay no work’ shall not be applicable to such employee. = Regulation 31 shall be applicable and the age of superannuation of employees of the Nigam shall be 60 years; we are of the view that following consequential and pecuniary benefits should be allowed to different sets of employees who were ordered to retire at the age of 58 years: (a) The employees including respondents who moved before a court of law irrespective of fact whether interim order was passed in their favour or not, shall be entitled for full salary up to the age of 60 years. The arrears of salary shall be paid to them after adjusting the amount if any paid. (b) The employees, who never moved before any court of law and had to retire on attaining the age of superannuation, they shall not be entitled for arrears of salary. However, in view of Regulation 31 they will deem to have continued in service up to the age of 60 years. In their case, the appellants shall treat the age of superannuation at 60 years, fix the pay accordingly and re-fix the retirement benefits like pension, gratuity etc. On such calculation, they shall be entitled for arrears of retirement benefits after adjusting the amount already paid. (c) The arrears of salary and arrears of retirement benefits should be paid to such employees within four months from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment. The judgment passed by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench dated 29th July, 2010 and other impugned judgments stand modified to the extent above.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40490
Page 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5527 OF 2012
(arising out of SLP (c) No. 31279 of 2010)
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH         … APPELLANT
Versus
DAYANAND CHAKRAWARTY & ORS.              … RESPONDENTS
With
C.A.No.5528   of   2012  (Arising   Out   of   SLP(C)   No.35579   of
2010)
C.A.No.5617­5659   of   2012  (Arising   Out   of   SLP(C)   No.5218­
5260 of 2011)
C.A.No.   5529   of   2012  (Arising   Out   of   SLP(C)   No.14880   of
2011)
C.A.No. 5530 of 2012  (Arising Out of SLP(C) No.19119 of
2011)
C.A.No.   5531   of   2012  (Arising   Out   of   SLP(C)   No.16519   of
2011)
C.A.No.   5532   of   2012(Arising   Out   of   SLP(C)   No.26336   of
2011)
C.A.No.   5533   of   2012(Arising   Out   of   SLP(C)   No.22838   of
2011)
C.A.No.   5534   of   2012(Arising   Out   of   SLP(C)   No.22839   of
2011)
C.A.No.   5535   of   2012(Arising   Out   of   SLP(C)   No.22840   of
2011)
J U D G M E N T
SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.
These appeals Nos. 5527 of 2012, 5528 of 2012 and 5617­
5659   of   2012   (arising   out   of   SLP(C)   Nos.31279   of   2010,
35579 of 2010, 5218­60 of 2011) have been preferred by the
State   of   Uttar   Pradesh   and   others   against   the   common
1Page 2
judgment dated 29th July, 2010 passed by the Division Bench
of   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   at   Allahabad,   Lucknow
Bench,   Lucknow   in   Writ   Petition   (C)   No.1595(S/B)   of   2009
etc.etc.  whereby the High Court declared Uttar Pradesh Jal
Nigam   Employees   (Retirement   on   attaining   age   of
superannuation) Rules, 2005 which have created two separate
age   of   retirement   amongst   same   classes   of   employees
discriminatory   and   unconstitutional   and   held   that   the
employees   of   the   Jal   Nigam   are   entitled   to   continue   in
service upto the age of 60 years with further directions to
pay 20%  of back wages to those writ petitioners who in the
meantime were forced to retire on attaining the age of 58
years in absence of any  interim order in their cases.
The benefit of enhancement of age was confined to the
persons   who   had   filed   the   writ   petitions   before   their
retirement and was not granted to those who in the meantime
retired at the age of 58 years and had not moved before the
High Court.
The   other   appeals   have   been   preferred   against   the
judgments   subsequently   passed   on   29th  April,   2010,   17th
August,  2010,  16th  September,  2010,  28th  October,  2010,  3rd
2Page 3
December,   2010   which   were   disposed   of   in   terms   of   the
aforesaid judgment dated 29th July, 2010.
Before   the   High   Court   Writ   Petition   No.1191(SB)   of
2009 was filed by the U.P. Engineers Association Jal Nigam,
praying   therein   to   declare   U.P.   Jal   Nigam   Karamchari
(Adhivarshita   Par   Seva   Nivarti)   Viniyamawali,   2005   [U.P.
Jal   Nigam   Employees   (Retirement     on   attaining   age   of
Superannuation) Regulations, 2005] (hereinafter referred to
as   the   “Regulations,   2005”)   unconstitutional   and   ultra
vires   to   the   provisions  of   the   Constitution  of   India   and
further   to   quash   the   orders   dated   3rd  July,   2009   and   29th
June, 2009 passed by the respondents 1 and 2 to the writ
petition, respectively.  The other prayers were to restrain
the respondents from causing retirement of the members of
the writ petitioners’ association at the age of 58 years as
well as to allow them to continue to work  till they attain
the age of 60 years.
Except the aforesaid writ petition, in all other writ
petitions,   writ   petitioners   have   challenged   their
respective order (s) whereby they had been asked to retire
3Page 4
on attaining the age of 58 years as per the provisions of
Regulations, 2005.
2. The questions involved in these appeals are:
(i) Whether two different age of superannuation of 58 and
60   years   can   be   prescribed   for   the   employees   similarly
situated, including members of the same service, solely on
the basis of their source of entry in the service.
(ii) Whether   ‘the   Uttar   Pradesh   Jal   Nigam   (Retirement   on
attaining age of Superannuation) Regulations, 2005’ fixing
two different age of superannuation for similarly situated
employees of Jal Nigam are discriminatory and ultra vires
under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
3. The factual matrix of the case are as follows:
  A   department,   known   as   Public   Health   Engineering
(hereinafter referred to as the 'PHED') was created during
the British period for performing all the works related to
public   health   engineering   including   sewerage   and   water
supply. Just before the independence, the State of United
Province   created   a   Local   Self   Government   Engineering
Department (hereinafter referred to as the 'LSGED') which
4Page 5
was   converted   from   PHED.     All   the   engineering   works   of
Local   Self   Government   were   entrusted   to   the   said   newly
created department.
4. By   Notification   dated   18th  June,   1975   issued   under
Section  3   of   the   Uttar   Pradesh   Water   Supply  and  Sewerage
Act, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act, 1975), the
State   Government   constituted   Uttar   Pradesh   Jal   Nigam
(hereinafter referred to as the “Nigam”). Section 37(1) of
the Act, 1975 provided that the services of the employees
and   engineers   of   the   Local   Self­Government   Engineering
Department (LSGED) will be transferred and merged into the
newly created Nigam on the same terms and conditions, which
were   governing   their   services   prior   to   such   absorption,
till the said service conditions are altered/changed by the
Rules or Regulations framed in accordance with law.
5. In its second meeting dated 4th April, 1977 vide Agenda
Item   No.2.21   the   Board   of     Nigam   resolved   that   all   the
provisions   of   Financial   Handbook,   Manual   of   Government
Order, Civil Services Regulations, Government Servant Rules
and   other   Government   orders   shall   be   applicable   to   the
5Page 6
employees of the Nigam, provided the Nigam has not passed
any other order.
Initially, in exercise of powers conferred under sub­
section (1) and clause (c) of sub­section (2) of Section 97
of Act, 1975 and with the previous approval of the State
Government, the Nigam made regulations for regulating the
recruitment to the posts and the conditions of service of
persons appointed to the Uttar Pradesh Jal Nigam Service of
Engineers (Public Health Branch) known as the Uttar Pradesh
Service   of   Engineers   (Public   Health   Branch)   Regulations,
1977.
6. Subsequently,   in   exercise   of   powers   conferred   under
sub­section   (1)   and   clause   (c)     of   sub­section   (2)   of
Section 97 of the Act, 1975, and with the previous approval
of the State Government, Nigam  made the “Uttar Pradesh Jal
Nigam   Services   of   Engineers   (Public   Health   Branch)
Regulations,   1978”   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the
“Regulations, 1978”) for regulating the recruitment to the
posts and the conditions of service of persons appointed to
the   Jal   Nigam   Engineers   (Public   Health   Branch).   The   said
Regulations,   1978   were   made   equally   applicable   to   the
6Page 7
employees transferred and merged from the erstwhile LSGED
and  the  employees   directly   recruited   by  the  Nigam   and   it
came   into   force   w.e.f.   27th  April,   1978.     Regulation   31
relates   to   pay,   allowance,   pension,   leave   and   other
conditions of service which reads as follows:
“Regulation   31.­   Except   as   provided   in
these   regulations   the   pay,   allowance,
pension, leave, imposition of penalties and
other conditions of service of the members
of the service shall be regulated by rules,
regulations or orders applicable generally
to   the   Government   Service   in   connection
with the affairs of the state.”
7. There   is   no   separate   provision   for   age   of
superannuation of employees of the Nigam prescribed under
Regulations,   1978.   As   per   Regulation,   31,   the   terms   and
conditions of service of the employees of the Nigam shall
be   governed   by   the   same   rules,   regulations   and   orders
generally   applicable   to   the   employees   of   the   State
Government  and hence the retirement and superannuation age
of   employees   of   the   Nigam   shall   stand   governed   by   the
provisions of Rule 56(a) of the Uttar Pradesh Fundamental
Rules contained in the Financial Handbook, Volume II, Part
II­IV, which reads as follows:
7Page 8
“Rule 56(a).Except as otherwise provided in
other clauses of this rule every Government
servant   shall   retire   from   service   on   the
afternoon of the last day of the month in
which   he   attains   the   age   of   fifty­eight
years. He may be retained in service after
the   date   of   retirement   on   superannuation
with   the   sanction   of   the   government   on
public   grounds   which   must   be   recorded   in
writing but he must not be retained after
the   age   of   sixty   years   except   in   very
special circumstances.”
The age of retirement of the State Government employees
as per Rule 56(a) of Uttar Pradesh Fundamental Rules was 58
years.     In   the   year   2001,   the   State   Government   vide   its
Official   Order   No.1098/A­1/2001   dated   28th  November,   2001
informed of its intention to amend clause (a) of Rule 56.
Consequently, Rule 56(a) was amended by “The Uttar Pradesh
Fundamental   (Amendment)   Rules,   2002”   vide   Notification
dated   27th  June,   2002,   which   came   into   force   on   28th
November, 2001.  As per the amended  clause (c) of Rule 56,
the age of superannuation of the State Government employees
was   enhanced   from   58   years   to   60   years,   which   reads   as
follows:
“Rule 56(a).Except as otherwise provided in
this   rule,   every   government   servant   shall
retire from service on the afternoon of the
last day of the month in which he attains
the age of sixty years.
8Page 9
Provided   that   a   Government   servant   whose
date of birth is the first day of a month
shall retire from service on the afternoon
of the last day of the preceding month on
attaining the age of sixty years.
Provided further that a Government servant
who   has   attained   the   age   of   fifty   eight
years   on   or   before   the   first   day   of
November,   2001   and   is   on   extension   in
service shall retire from service on expiry
of his extended period of service.”
8. In the meantime, after issuance of Government’s order
expressing its intention to amend clause (a) of Rule 56 by
Notification   dated   28th  November,   2001,   the   Nigam   by   its
letter   dated   31st  December,   2001   enquired   from   the   State
Government as to whether the benefit of enhancement in the
age of superannuation from 58 years to 60 years would be
applicable to the employees of the Nigam or not. In reply
thereto just before the Amendment Rules, 2002, the special
Secretary   to   the   State   Government   from   its   Department   of
Local   Self   Government   by   his   letter   dated   22nd  January,
2002, conveyed that the employees of the Nigam shall not be
entitled to the enhancement of age of superannuation from
58 years to 60 years as the same would be applicable only
to the State Government employees. On receipt of the said
letter,   on   11th  July,   2002   the     Nigam     resolved   that
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enhancement in the age of superannuation from 58 years to
60 years would not be applicable to the employees of the
Nigam.
Against the decision of the State Government dated 22nd
January,   2002   and   the   decision   of   the   Nigam   vide   Office
Memorandum   dated   11th   July,   2002     a   number   of   writ
petitions were preferred by the employees of the Nigam who
were   being   sought   to   retire   on   completing   the   age   of   58
years. Some of the employees directly filed writ petitions
before   this   Court   challenging   the   orders   issued   by   the
Nigam     against   them   to   the   effect   that   they   would
superannuate   upon   completion   of  58   years.     This  Court   by
its judgment in Harwindra Kumar vs. Chief Engineer, Karmik
and   others,   2005   (13)   SCC   300  directed   the   Nigam     to
continue   the   petitioners   of   those   cases   in   service   till
they attain the age of 60 years and the orders directing
their retirement at the age of 58 years were set aside with
the following observation:
“9. In the present case, as the Regulations have
been   framed   by   the   Nigam   specifically
enumerating   in   Regulation   31   thereof   that   the
Rules   governing   the   service   conditions   of
government   servants   shall   equally   apply   to   the
employees of the Nigam, it was not possible for
10Page 11
the   Nigam   to   take   an   administrative   decision
acting   under   Section   15(1)   of   the   Act   pursuant
to the direction of the State Government in the
matter of policy issued under Section 89 of the
Act   and   directing   that   the   enhanced   age   of
superannuation   of   60   years   applicable   to   the
government   servants   shall   not   apply   to   the
employees   of   the   Nigam.   In   our   view,   the   only
option   for   the   Nigam   was   to   make   suitable
amendment   in   Regulation   31   with   the   previous
approval   of   the   State   Government   providing
thereunder   the   age   of   superannuation   of   its
employees   to   be   58   years,   in   case   it   intended
that   60   years   which   was   the   enhanced   age   of
superannuation of the State Government employees
should   not   be   made   applicable   to   the   employees
of the Nigam. It was also not possible for the
State Government to give a direction purporting
to act under Section 89 of the Act to the effect
that the enhanced age of 60 years would not be
applicable   to   the   employees   of   the   Nigam
treating the same to be a matter of policy nor
was it permissible for the Nigam on the basis of
such a direction of the State Government in the
policy   matter   of   the   Nigam   to   take   an
administrative   decision   acting   under   Section
15(1)   of   the   Act   as   the   same   would   be
inconsistent with Regulation 31 which was framed
by the Nigam in the exercise of powers conferred
upon it under Section 97(2)(c) of the Act.
10.  For   the   foregoing   reasons,   we   are   of   the
view   that   so   long   as   Regulation   31   of   the
Regulations   is   not   amended,   60   years   which   is
the age of superannuation of government servants
employed under the State of Uttar Pradesh shall
be   applicable   to   the   employees   of   the   Nigam.
However, it would be open to the Nigam with the
previous   approval   of   the   State   Government   to
make   suitable   amendment   in   Regulation   31   and
alter the service conditions of employees of the
Nigam, including their age of superannuation. It
is  needless to  say  that if  it  is  so done,  the
same shall be prospective.
11Page 12
11.  For   the   foregoing   reasons,   the   appeals   as
well   as   writ   petitions   are   allowed,   orders
passed   by   the   High   Court   dismissing   the   writ
petitions   as   well   as   those   by   the   Nigam
directing   that   the   appellants   of   the   civil
appeals   and   the   petitioners   of   the   writ
petitions would superannuate upon completion of
the   age   of   58   years   are   set   aside   and   it   is
directed   that   in   case   the   employees   have   been
allowed to continue up to the age of 60 years by
virtue of some interim order, no recovery shall
be   made   from   them   but   in   case,   however,   they
have   not   been   allowed   to   continue   after
completing   the   age   of   58   years   by   virtue   of
erroneous   decision   taken   by   the   Nigam   for   no
fault   of   theirs,   they   would   be   entitled   to
payment of salary for the remaining period up to
the age of 60 years which must be paid to them
within a period of three months from the date of
receipt   of   copy   of   this   order   by   the   Nigam.
There shall be no order as to costs.”
9. After the decision in Harwindra Kumar(supra), the Nigam
in exercise of its powers conferred under sub­sections (1)
and   (2)   of   Section   97   of   the   Act,   1975,   framed   Uttar
Pradesh   Jal   Nigam   Employees   (Retirement   on   the   age   of
Superannuation) Regulations, 2005 (hereinafter referred to
as the ‘Regulations, 2005’). It was issued by Office Order
dated 8th December, 2005 and made effective from 30th August,
2005. By Regulation 3 the retirement age of 60 years was
provided but for employees and Engineers who were employed
in erstwhile LSGED and who were transferred and merged in
the   Nigam.   In   Regulation   4,   a   separate   age   of
12Page 13
superannuation   at   the   age   of   58  years   was   prescribed   for
all   other   employees   and   Engineers,   who   were   not   covered
under Regulation 3 i.e. those who were directly appointed
in the Nigam.   Regulation 3 and 4 reads as follows:
“  Retirement   on   attaining   age   of
superannuation:
3.   Age   of   superannuation   of   every
employee   who   was   employed   in   the
Engineering Department of the Local Self
Government   under   Section   37(1)   of   the
Act,   and   has   been   transferred   to   the
Corporation   and   is   employed   in   the
Corporation, will be 60 years.
4.   The   age   of   superannuation   of   the
employees different from those under Rule
3 above, will be 58 years. But the age of
superannuation of the Group ‘D’ employee
who   have   been   employed   prior   to
5.11.1985, will be 60 years.”
After framing the aforesaid Regulation, 2005, the Nigam
filed   a   review   petition   before   this   Court   being   Review
Petition   No.24   of   2006,   seeking   review   of   decision   in
Harwindra   Kumar(supra).  The   review   petition   was   dismissed
by this Court on 29th August, 2006.
10. A number of employees challenged Regulation 4 by filing
Writ   Petition   No.45800   of   2006,   etc.   The   Allahabad   High
13Page 14
Court by  its common judgment dated 21st  May, 2007 allowed
the writ petitions and held that Regulation 4 to the extent
it   provides   superannuation   age   of   58   years   for   those
employees directly recruited is arbitrary and   declared it
non­est. The writ petitioners were allowed to continue in
service till the age of 60 years.
11. As against the aforesaid judgment, the Nigam filed a
special appeal before the Division Bench of the Allahabad
High Court which by order dated 1st August, 2007 stayed the
declaration given by the learned Single Judge.  However, so
far   as   the   writ   petitioners   were   concerned,   no   interim
orders were passed in the said special appeal and as such,
they were allowed to discharge their duties upto the age of
60 years.
12. The Nigam being not satisfied with the order passed by
the Division  Bench  moved  before this  Court   in  Chairman,
Uttar Pradesh Jal Nigam  & another vs. Radhey Shyam Gautam
and another, 2007 (11) SCC 507.   In the said case, taking
into   consideration   the   earlier   decision   rendered   in
14Page 15
Harwindra Kumar(supra)  and  Jaswant Singh(supra)  this Court
dismissed the appeal with following observation:
“10.  After the amendment made in Rule 56(a) of
the   Rules   by   the   State   Government   and   thereby
enhancing   the   age   of   superannuation   of
government   servants   from   58   years   to   60   years,
the same would equally apply to the employees of
the   Nigam   and   in   case   the   State   Government   as
well as the Nigam intended that the same would
not be applicable, the only option with it was
to   make   suitable   amendment   in   Regulation   31   of
the   Regulations   after   taking   previous   approval
of   the   State   Government   and   by   simply   issuing
direction by the State Government purporting to
act   under   Section   89   of   the   Act   and   thereupon
taking   administrative   decision   by   the   Nigam
under Section 15 of the Act in relation to the
age   of   the   employees   would   not   tantamount   to
amending Regulation 31 of the Regulations.
11.  In  Harwindra   Kumar   case  the   Division   Bench
decision on which the appellant places reliance
was challenged. Orders passed by the High Court
dismissing   the   writ   petitions   as   well   as   those
by   the   Nigam   directing   that   the   appellants   of
the   civil   appeals   and   the   petitioners   of   the
writ   petitions   would   superannuate   upon
completion of the age of 58 years were set aside
and it was directed that in case the employees
have been allowed to continue up to the age of
60   years   by   virtue   of   some   interim   order,   no
recovery   shall   be   made   from   them   but   in   case,
however, they have not been allowed to continue
after completing the age of 58 years by virtue
of erroneous decision taken by the Nigam for no
fault   of   theirs.   They   would   be   entitled   to
payment of salary for the remaining period up to
the age of 60 years which was to be paid to them
within a period of three months from the date of
receipt   of   copy   of   this   Court's   order   by   the
Nigam.”
15Page 16
13. In   the   meantime,   a   large   number   of   employees   of   the
Nigam, who were forced to retire on attaining the age of 58
years, preferred writ petitions and sought benefit of the
directions given by this Court in  Harwindra Kumar(supra).
The   matter   ultimately,   moved   before   this   Court   in
Chairman,   Uttar   Pradesh   Jal   Nigam     vs.   Jaswant   Singh   &
others,   2006   (11)   SCC   464.    While   dismissing   the   appeal
this Court observed:
“16.  Therefore,   in   case   at   this   belated
stage   if   similar   relief   is   to   be   given   to
the   persons   who   have   not   approached   the
court that will unnecessarily overburden the
Nigam and the Nigam will completely collapse
with   the   liability   of   payment   to   these
persons   in   terms   of   two   years'   salary   and
increased   benefit   of   pension   and   other
consequential   benefits.   Therefore,   we   are
not   inclined   to   grant   any   relief   to   the
persons who have approached the court after
their   retirement.   Only   those   persons   who
have filed the writ petitions when they were
in   service   or   who   have   obtained   interim
order   for   their   retirement,   those   persons
should   be   allowed   to   stand   to   benefit   and
not   others.   We   have   been   given   a   chart   of
those nine persons, who filed writ petitions
and   obtained   stay   and   are   continuing   in
service. They are as follows:
1. Shri Bhawani Sewak Shukla
2. Shri Vijay Bahadur Rai
3. Shri Girija Shanker
4. Shri Yogendra Prakash Kulshresht
5. Shri Vinod Kumar Bansal
6. Shri Pradumn Prashad Mishra
16Page 17
7. Shri Banke Bihari Pandey
8. Shri Yashwant Singh
9. Shri Chandra Shekhar
And   the   following   persons   filed   writ
petitions   before   retirement   but   no   stay
order was granted:
1. Shri Gopal Singh Dangwal (WP   No.   35384
of 2005 vide order dated 5­5­2005)
2. Shri R.R. Gautam (WP   No.   45495   of   2005
vide order dated 15­6­2005)
17.  The   benefits   shall   only   be   confined   to
abovementioned   persons   who   have   filed   writ
petitions   before   their   retirement   or   they
have   obtained   interim   order   before   their
retirement. The appeals filed  against  these
persons by the Nigam shall fail and the same
are   dismissed.   Rest   of   the   appeals   are
allowed and orders passed by the High Court
are set aside. There would be no order as to
costs.”
14. In Harwindra Kumar(supra) this Court held that as long
as Regulation 31 is not amended,  60 years which is the age
of superannuation of government servants employed under the
State of Uttar Pradesh shall be applicable to the employees
of the Nigam.   However, liberty was given to the Nigam to
make suitable amendment in Regulation 31 with the previous
approval   of   the   State   Government   to   alter   the   service
conditions of employees of the Nigam, including their age
of superannuation.  It was also made clear that if the same
is done, it shall be prospective.  It appears that in view
17Page 18
of observation of this Court, the Nigam framed Regulations,
2005 but prescribed separate age of superannuation, one for
employees   and   engineers   who   were   employed   in   erstwhile
LSGED and another for those who were directly appointed in
the   Nigam.     Regulations   2005   were   so   framed   without
repealing or amending Regulation 31.
It appears that in view of the subsequent decisions of
this Court, the Nigam vide its Resolution dated 13th April,
2008,  resolved to enhance the age of the superannuation of
the employees, irrespective of their source of entry, to 60
years   and   forwarded  the  same   to  the  State   Government   for
its approval.  The resolution aforesaid reads as follows:
Agenda Item No. Description of
Agenda
Decision taken by
the Board of
Directors
147.07 Regarding
enhancement   of   age
of   superannuation
from   58   years   to
60   years,   of   the
officers   and
officials   working
in   Uttar   Pradesh
Jal   Nigam   ,
similar   to   the
working   Government
employees.
Proposal   approved
by   the   Board   of
Directors   and   it
is   decided   to
refer   to   the
Government   for
obtaining   the
approval   of   the
Government.
18Page 19
15. But   the   State   Government   provided   a   uniform   age   for
superannuation   as   58   years   for   all   employees   working   in
Government   Companies   and   Government   Corporations   by   its
order dated 29th  June, 2009.   For the said reason, by its
order dated 3rd July, 2009, the State Government refused to
accord approval to the recommendations of the Nigam   dated
13th April, 2008.
16. On   being   aggrieved   by   the   said   action   of   the   State
Government   the   employees   of   the   Nigam   preferred   the   writ
petitions   in   question   before   the   Allahabad   High   Court.   A
number of writ petitions were heard together and disposed
of  by the common  impugned judgment dated 29th  July,  2010.
The   other   writ   petitions   which   were   taken   up   or   filed
subsequently   were   disposed   of   by   the   impugned   separate
orders in terms with common judgment dated 29th July, 2010.
17. By the impugned common judgment dated 29th  July, 2010
the   Division   Bench   of   the   Allahabad   High   Court,   Lucknow
Bench,   Lucknow   in   Writ   Petition   (C)   No.1595(S/B)   of   2009
etc.etc.   declared     “Uttar   Pradesh   Jal   Nigam   Employees
(Retirement   on   attaining   age   of   Superannuation)
Regulations”,   2005   unconstitutional   as   it   created   two
19Page 20
classes of employees in determining two separate retirement
age with observation as noticed above.
18. Learned counsel for the appellant­State and the Nigam
assailed the judgment mainly on the following grounds:
(i) The High Court cannot equate the employees of the public
undertakings/corporations with the employees of the State Government for
determination of age of superannuation.
(ii) The High Court was not justified in declaring that all the employees
of the Nigam shall retire on attaining the age of 60 years like State
Government employees, by pre-empting the Nigam from exercising its
power under Section 97 of the Act, 1975.
(iii) The classification between the employees of Local Self-Government
Engineering Department transferred to the Nigam and the employees
directly recruited by the Nigam, in prescribing different age of
superannuation is valid and reasonable.
(iv) The High Court was not justified in setting aside the Jal Nigam
Employees (Retirement on attaining age of Superannuation) Regulations,
2005 in absence of any challenge to the power of the Nigam to frame the
regulations particularly when the petitioners only challenged the Regulation
20Page 21
(v) The High Court committed an error of law in not considering
Section 37(1) of the Act, 1975, which protects the terms and conditions of
service of the employees of erstwhile Local Self-Government Engineering
Department who were transferred to the Nigam on its creation.
(vi) The question of determination of age of superannuation is a matter
of policy of the State Government or the competitive authority of a
Corporation, and the High Court under Article 226 cannot determine the
age of superannuation.
19. Thus, from a detailed analysis and close examination of
facts relating to condition of service of employees of the
Nigam   starting   from   its   constitution   till   today,   the
following facts emerges:
(a) The question relating to age of superannuation of employees of the Nigam
stood finally concluded on 18th November, 2005 when this Court rendered
decision in Harwindra Kumar (supra).
(b) After judgment in Harwindra Kumar (supra) based on liberty given by this
Court, the Nigam framed Regulations, 2005 prescribing two separate age of
superannuation for the employees of the Nigam, without amending Regulation 31.
The Nigam subsequently by Resolution dated 13th April, 2008 proposed to amend
Regulations 2005 prescribing common age of 60 years for superannuation for all
21Page 22
employees of the Nigam. The State Government by its order dated 29th June, 2009
prescribed uniform age of superannuation as 58 years for all the employees
working in the Government Undertakings i.e. Government Companies and
Government Corporations and then in view of such decision, the State
Government refused to accord approval to the recommendations of the Nigam
dated 13th April, 2008 by its letter dated 3rd July, 2009.
20. In   view   of   the   subsequent   development   after   decision
rendered   in  Harwindra   Kumar   (supra)  case,   again   the
question of age of superannuation of employees of the Nigam
has   been   reopened   keeping   in   view   of   such   fact,   the
question   required   to   be   determined   as   raised   in   these
cases.
21. This Court in Harwindra Kumar (supra) held that so long
as Regulation 31 is not amended, 60 years which is the age
of   superannuation   of   the   government   servants   shall   be
applicable   to   the   employees   of   the   Nigam.     However,   in
contravention   of   finding   of   this   Court   without   amending
Regulation 31, new Regulation 3 and 4 of Regulations, 2005
has been framed by the Nigam prescribing two separate age
of superannuation for similarly situated employees.
22Page 23
22. In Prem Chand Somchand Shah v. Union of India (1991) 2
SCC 48 this Court held:
“8. As regards the right to equality guaranteed under
Article 14 the position is well settled that the said
right ensures equality amongst equals and its aim is
to   protect   persons   similarly   placed   against
discriminatory   treatment.   It   means   that   all   persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike both in
privileges   conferred   and   liabilities   imposed.
Conversely   discrimination   may   result   if   persons
dissimilarly situate are treated equally. Even amongst
persons similarly situate differential treatment would
be   permissible   between   one   class   and   the   other.   In
that   event   it   is   necessary   that   the   differential
treatment   should   be   founded   on   an   intelligible
differentia which distinguishes persons or things that
are grouped together from others left out of the group
and that differentia must have a rational relation to
the   object   sought   to   be   achieved   by   the   statute   in
question.”
23. Since creation of the Nigam, irrespective of source of
recruitment, the employees of the Nigam were treated alike
for   the   purpose   of   superannuation   and   were   allowed   to
superannuate   at   the   age   of   58   years   as   is   evident   from
Regulation 31.  
24. As per decision of this Court in  Prem Chand Somchand
Shah   (supra)  even  amongst   persons   similarly   situated
differential   treatment   would   be   permissible   between   one
class and the other.   In that event it is necessary that
23Page 24
the   differential   treatment   should   be   founded   on   an
intelligible   differentia   which   distinguishes   persons   or
things   that  are  grouped  together   from   others   left   out   of
the   group   and   that   differentia   must   have   a   rational
relation   to   the   object   sought   to   be   achieved   by   the
statute.     The appellants, the Nigam as well as the State
of Uttar Pradesh failed to place on record the reasons for
differential   treatment   which   distinguishes   employees   of
erstwhile   LSGED   and   those   who   were   appointed   directly   in
the Nigam.
Further, as employees appointed from different source,
after their appointment were treated alike for the purpose
of superannuation under Regulation 31, subsequently solely
on the basis of source of recruitment no discrimination can
be made and differential treatment would not be permissible
in   the   matter   of   condition   of   service,   including   age   of
superannuation,   in   absence   of   an   intelligible   differentia
distinguishing them from each other. We therefore hold that
the   High   Court   by   impugned   judgment   rightly   declared
Regulations,   2005   unconstitutional   and   ultra   wires   of
Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
24Page 25
25. Regulation 31 of  the ‘Uttar Pradesh Jal Nigam Services
of   Engineers   (Public   Health   Branch)   Regulations,   1978’
Special   Regulation;   it   will   not   be   affected   by   later
Regulation 4 of  the Uttar Pradesh Jal Nigam (Retirement on
attaining   age   of   Superannuation)   Regulations,   2005,   in
absence   of   express   repeal   of   Special   Regulation.   By
implication   it   cannot   be   inferred   that   the   Regulation   31
stands repealed in view of subsequent Regulations, 2005.
26. Even if it is treated that both the General Regulation
4   of   Regulations,   2005   and   Special   Regulation   31   of
Regulations, 1978 co­exist, one which is advantageous i.e.
Regulation   31   shall   be   applicable   to   the   members   of   the
same service.
27. The   State   Government’s   order     dated   29th  June,   2009
prescribing     a  uniform   age   of   superannuation   at  58   years
for the employees working in the Government Companies and
Government   Corporations   cannot   prevail   over   statutory
Regulation 31 framed by the Nigam under Section 97 (2) (C)
of the Act, 1975 with the previous approval of the State
Government.     Therefore,   the   employees   of   the   Nigam   shall
not   be   guided   by   the   State   Government’s   order   dated   29th
25Page 26
June, 2009 but will continue in the services up to the age
of   60   years,   in   view   of   Regulation   31,   having   not   yet
amended or repealed.  
28. In Harwindra Kumar (supra) case this Court already held
that   it   is   not   possible   for   the   Nigam   to   take  an
administrative   decision   pursuant   to   the   direction   of   the
State   Government   in   the   matter   of   policy   issued   under
Section   89   of   the   Act   and   directing   that   the   age   of
superannuation   of   60   years   applicable   to   the   Government
servants   shall   not   be   applicable   to  the  employees   of   the
Nigam.   In view of such finding of this Court, the Nigam
cannot   act   on   the   basis   of   the   State   Government’s   order
dated   29th  June,   2009   providing   uniform   age   of
superannuation at 58 years.  
29. During   the   pendency   of   these   appeals   further
development   has   taken   place.   The   Government   of   Uttar
Pradesh   by   its   letter   No.3199/9­3­11­113C/2011   dated   23rd
December,   2011   informed   the   Chairman,   Uttar   Pradesh   Jal
Nigam its approval to increase the age of superannuation of
full time regular officers/employees of the Nigam from 58
years to 60 years.   The State Government directed to make
26Page 27
appropriate   amendments   in   the   Regulations   framed   by   the
Nigam, which reads as follows:
“No.3199/9­3­11­113C/2011
From: Vijay Bahadur Singh,
Special Secretary,
Government of Uttar Pradesh.
To: The Chairman,
Uttar Pradesh Jal Nigam ,
Lucknow.
Urban Developmetn Section 3 Lucknow dt.
23.12.2011
Sub: For increasing the age of retirement of full
time regular employees of Uttar Pradesh Jal
Nigam  from 58 years to 60 years.
Sir,
This   is   in   reference   to   your   letter   no.
86/P­1/2005­002/11   dated   23.12.2011   and
Government   order   no.160/44­1­20911­90/2008
dated   20.12.2011   of   the   Public   Enterprises
Bureau Section, on the above subject.
2. In this regard I have been directed to say
that a meeting of the Board of Directors of
Jal Nigam was held on 23.12.2011 and it was
decided   in   the   said   meeting   that   age   of
retirement   of   full   time   regular
officers/employees   of   Uttar   Pradesh   Jal
Nigam     be   increased   from   58   years   to   60
years.   The aforesaid decision of Board was
considered by the Government and Government
has   decided   that   age   of   full   time   regular
officers/employees   of   Uttar   Pradesh   Jal
Nigam     be   increased   from   58   years   to   60
years.
3. However,   the   aforesaid   increase   in   the   age
of   retirement   will   be   subject   to   the
27Page 28
condition that all the additional financial
burden   which   will   be   incurred   due   to
aforesaid increase in the age of retirement,
will   be   borne   by   Uttar   Pradesh   Jal   Nigam
from   its   own   resources   and   no   financial
assistance   whatsoever   will   be   given   by   the
Government in this regard.
4. I   have   been   further   directed   to   say   that
appropriate   amendments   in   the
rules/regulations/standing   orders   of   the
Uttar   Pradesh   Jal   Nigam     pertaining   to
fixation   of   the   age   of   retirement   of   the
personnel of the Jal Nigam will be made by
the Jal Nigam on its own.
Yours
SD/­ Illegible
Vijay Bahadu Singh
Special Secretary.”
30. In view of the finding as recorded above and the State
Government’s   letter   dated   23rd  December,   2011   no
interference   is   called   for   in   the   impugned   judgment,
whereby   the   High   Court   held   Regulations,   2005
unconstitutional, violative of Article 14 and set aside the
orders of retirements.
31. An Interlocutory Application dated 20th March, 2013 has
been   filed   by   the   counsel   for   the   respondent   in   Civil
Appeal   No.5528   of   2012   intimating   that   1st  respondent­
Dayanand Chakrawarty expired on 17th  February, 2013, during
the pendency of the case, leaving behind their legal heirs,
28Page 29
Mrs.   Pramila   Chakrawarty   (widow),   Ms.   Manisha   Chakrawarty
(daughter),   Mr.   Vivekanand   Chakrawarty   (son),   Ms.   Utpana
Chakrawarty   (daughter)   and   Mr.   Sampurna   Nand   Chakrawarty
(son).
32. In   view   of   the   observation   made   in   the   preceding
paragraphs as the employees including the respondents are
entitled   to   get   consequential   benefits,   we   allow   the
petition for substitution to enable the heirs to derive the
benefit of the decision of this Court.
33. Now   the   question   arises   as   to   what   consequential
benefits to which the respondents and other employees who
have not moved before any court of law shall be entitled.
By impugned judgment the High Court observed:
“Similar   benefit   is   already   available   to   the
employees who are continuing in service by virtue
of   interim   order   passed   by   the   competent   court.
They should continue till the age of 60 years.
The   law   helps   those   who   are   vigilant   and   not   to
those who go to sleep as per maxim VIGILANTIBUS,
ET   NON   DORMINTIBUS,   JURA   SUB   VENIUNT.     So,   this
benefit   will   not   be   given   to   the   employees   who
peacefully   retired   on   attaining   the   age   of   58
years and never came before the Court.   But there
may   be   another   class   of   the   employees   who   came
before   this   Court   and   could   not   get   the   interim
order   but   writ   petitions   were   admitted.
29Page 30
Admittedly, these employees have not worked.   So,
on the basis of no pay no work, they will not be
entitled   for   arrears.     However,   their   back   wages
will be restricted @20% of the basic salary as per
the ratio laid down in the case of M/s Gvalli v.
Andhra   Education   Society   2010   AIR   1105   SC.
Lastly, it is clarified that the extended service
will be counted for all the purpose to the above
mentioned   employees.     The   petitions   are   allowed.
No cost.”
34. In  Harwindra   Kumar   vs.   Chief   Engineer,   Karmik   and
others (Supra),  this Court while allowing the employees of
Nigam   to   continue   till   the   age   of   60   years   in   view   of
Regulation 31, ordered that no  recovery shall be made from
those who continued up to the age of 60 years.  This Court
further   observed   that   the   employees   who   have   not   been
allowed to continue after completing the age of 58 years by
virtue   of   erroneous   decision   taken   by   the   Nigam   for   no
fault   of   theirs,   would   also   be   entitled   to   payment   of
salary for the remaining period up to the age of 60 years.
35. In  Chairman, U.P. Jal Nigam   vs. Radhey Shyam Gautam,
2007   (11)   SCC   507,  following   the   decision   in  Harwindra
Kumar (supra)  case,  this Court held that  the employees of
30Page 31
the   Nigam   shall   be   entitled   for   full   salary   for   the
remaining period up to the age of 60 years.
36. However, in    U.P. Jal Nigam   vs. Jaswant Singh, 2006
(11) SCC 464 this Court allowed the benefits of arrears of
salary only to those employees of the Nigam who had filed
writ petitions and denied the same to others who have not
moved before a court of law.
37. In view of the orders passed by this Court in Harwindra
Kumar(supra),   Radhey   Shyam   Gautam(supra)   and   Jaswant
Singh(supra), it was not open to the High Court to rely on
some other decision of this Court,   ratio of which is not
applicable in the present case for determining back wages
of   respondents     restricting   it   to   be   20%     of   the   basic
salary. We observe that the principle of 
‘no pay no work’
is   not   applicable   to   the   employees   who   were   guided   by
specific   rules   like   Leave   Rules   etc.   relating   to   absence
from   duty.     
Such   principle   can   be   applied   to   only   those
employees who were not guided by any specific rule relating
to absence from duty.   
If an employee is prevented by the
employer from performing his duties,   the employee cannot
31Page 32
be blamed for  having not worked, and the principle of  ‘no
pay no work’  shall not be applicable to such employee.  
38. In these cases as we have already held that 
Regulation
31   shall   be   applicable   and   the   age   of   superannuation   of
employees   of   the   Nigam   shall   be   60   years;   
we   are   of   the
view   that   following   consequential   and   pecuniary   benefits
should be allowed to different sets of employees who were
ordered to retire at the age of 58 years:
(a) The employees including respondents who moved before a court of law
irrespective of fact whether interim order was passed in their favour or not, shall
be entitled for full salary up to the age of 60 years. The arrears of salary shall be
paid to them after adjusting the amount if any paid.
(b) The employees, who never moved before any court of law and had to retire
on attaining the age of superannuation, they shall not be entitled for arrears of
salary. However, in view of Regulation 31 they will deem to have continued in
service up to the age of 60 years. In their case, the appellants shall treat the age of
superannuation at 60 years, fix the pay accordingly and re-fix the retirement
benefits like pension, gratuity etc. On such calculation, they shall be entitled for
arrears of retirement benefits after adjusting the amount already paid. 
32Page 33
(c) The arrears of salary and arrears of retirement benefits should be paid to
such employees within four months from the date of receipt of copy of this
judgment.
39. The   judgment   passed   by   the   Division   Bench   of   the
Allahabad   High   Court,   Lucknow   Bench   dated   29th  July,   2010
and other impugned judgments stand modified to the extent
above.   The   appeals   are   disposed   of   with   aforesaid
observation and directions.  There shall be no order as to
costs.
………..……………………………………………..J.
(G.S. SINGHVI)
........……………………………………………………….J.
(SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)
NEW DELHI,
JULY 2,  2013.
33

Monday, July 15, 2013

Section 498A and Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC.= where some part of evidence is not believable, it does not mean that entire case is false, court can take aid of sec.106 of Indian Evidence Act to do justice = “The maxim “falsus in uno falsus in omnibus” has no application in India and the witnesses cannot be branded as liars. This maxim has not received general acceptance nor has it come to occupy the status of a rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to is that in such cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called “a mandatory rule of evidence”. The doctrine is a dangerous one, especially in India for if a whole body of the testimony were to be rejected, because a witness was evidently speaking an untruth in some aspect, it is to be feared that administration of criminal justice would come to a dead stop. Witnesses just cannot help in giving embroidery to a story, however true in the main. Therefore, it has to be appraised in each case as to what extent the evidence is worthy of acceptance, and merely because in some respects the court considers the same to be insufficient for replacing reliance on the testimony of a witness, it does not necessarily follow as a matter of law that it must be disregarded in all respects as well. The evidence has to be sifted with care. Falsity of a particular material witness or a material particular would not ruin it from the beginning to end. The aforesaid dictum is not a sound rule for the reason that one hardly comes across a witness whose evidence 2 (2003) 7 SCC 643 does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggeration, embroideries or embellishment.” - while dealing with Section 106 of the Evidence Act, this Court observed as under: “A fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as to the most probable position. The above position is strengthened in view of Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872. It empowers the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process, the courts shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct, etc. in addition to the facts of the case. In these circumstances, the principles embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence Act can also be utilized. Section 106 however is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but it would apply to cases where the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts, unless the accused by virtue of his special knowledge regarding such facts, has offered an explanation which might drive the court to draw a different inference.” - PW-5 Dr. Rajabalan has stated that if poison had been consumed prior to the head injury, it would have reached the liver and kidney. He has added that if poison is administered to a person when he is in an unconscious state there is a possibility that it would reach the stomach and intestine. = A1-Babu first caused the head injury to the deceased and when she became unconscious in order to create evidence to suggest that the deceased committed suicide, he administered poison to her. It reached her stomach and intestine but before it could reach the kidney and liver she died. When she succumbed to the head injury, the poison did not pass on to the liver and kidney. The High Court has rightly observed that this is the reason why there is no evidence of any resistance being offered by the deceased and no bruises were found on her lips. The trial court has convicted A1-Babu for offence punishable under Section 304 Part I of the IPC and not for offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC on the ground that the deceased had suffered only one head injury. The High Court has concurred with the trial court. We see no reason to interfere with the impugned order. In the circumstances, we confirm the conviction of A1- Babu and A2-Pappathi for offence punishable under Section 498A of the IPC. We confirm the sentence imposed on A1- Babu for the offence under Section 498A of the IPC. We find from the letter dated 17/5/2013 sent by the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Coimbatore that A2-Pappathi has already undergone one year and four months sentence. In the peculiar facts of the case we direct that the sentence already undergone by A2-Pappathi be treated as sentence for the offence under Section 498A of the IPC. We confirm the conviction and sentence of A1-Babu for offence punishable under Section 304 Part I of the IPC. However, we quash and set aside the conviction and sentence of A2- Pappathi for offence punishable under Section 304 Part I read with Section 109 of the IPC. There is, therefore, no question of her surrendering to the Court. As per order passed by this Court on 8/10/2007, she is on bail. Her bail bond shall stand discharged. As per the order of this Court dated 8/10/2007, A1-Babu is also on bail. Since we have confirmed his conviction and sentence, we direct that he should surrender before the Principal Sessions Judge, Coimbatore to serve out the remaining sentence. His bail bond shall stand cancelled. Needless to say that A1-Babu’s sentence for offences punishable under Sections 498A and 304 Part I of the IPC shall run concurrently.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40478
Page 1
1
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1738 OF 2007
BABU @ BALASUBRAMANIAM AND ANR. …Appellants
Versus
THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU …Respondent
J U D G M E N T
(SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.
1. The appellants (A1-Babu and A2-Pappathi respectively,
for convenience) were tried by the Principal Sessions Court,
Coimbatore in Sessions Case No.141 of 2000 for offences
punishable under Section 498A and Section 302 read with
Section 34 of the IPC. A1-Babu was convicted under Section
498A of the IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs.500/-, in
default, to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for two
months. A1-Babu was also convicted for offence punishablePage 2
2
under Section 304 Part I of the IPC and sentenced to suffer
rigorous imprisonment for seven years for the same. A2-
Pappathi was convicted for offence punishable under Section
498A of the IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs.500/-, in
default, to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for two
months. A2-Pappathi was also convicted for offence
punishable under Section 304 Part I read with Section 109 of
the IPC and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for
seven years for the same. On appeal, the Madras High Court
confirmed the conviction and sentence. Hence, this appeal,
by special leave.
2. Gist of the prosecution case needs to be stated.
A1-Babu was married to deceased-Indirani (“the
deceased”) on 11/4/1994. The couple resided in the house
of A2-Pappathi, who is the younger sister of A1-Babu. At the
time of marriage, 25 gold sovereigns were demanded by A1-
Babu and his family, but the parents of the deceased could
only give 20 gold sovereigns. After six months of marriage,Page 3
3
they demanded dowry for which Panchayat meeting was
held by the elders in the house of the deceased. The
members of the panchayat went to the house of the accused
and requested them not to threaten the deceased. After one
year, the deceased gave birth to a male child. The accused
demanded 10 gold sovereigns and cash of Rs.10,000/-.
Parents of the deceased could give only 3 gold sovereigns.
Thereafter, the couple was blessed with a daughter. This
time also, the accused demanded 10 gold sovereigns and
cash of Rs.10,000/- to purchase manure, but the parents of
the deceased could not fulfill this demand due to their
financial difficulties. A1-Babu and A2-Pappathi started
harassing the deceased. On 15/11/1998 the deceased
informed PW-2 Nataraj, her brother about the dowry demand
made by her husband and the cruelty meted out to her. The
prosecution story further goes on to say that on 16/11/1998,
PW-3 Ponnusamy, the grandfather of the deceased, visited
the house of the accused. When he reached near the house
of the accused, he heard the voice of the accused asking the
deceased as to why sum of Rs.10,000/- was not brought byPage 4
4
her. PW-3 Ponnusamy peeped through the window and saw
A1-Babu, who had caught hold of the deceased, dashing the
back of her head against a pillar. At that time, A2-Pappathi
intervened and said that the deceased should not die like
this. She asked him to pour poison in her mouth. Upon this,
A1-Babu brought poison and gave it to A2-Pappathi. A1-
Babu caught hold of the deceased and A2-Pappathi poured
the poison in the mouth of the deceased. PW-3 Ponnusamy
went inside the house and questioned them. The accused
started pacifying him and told him that they would save her
life. They asked him to remain in the house and they took
the deceased in a van to Udumalpet Government Hospital.
PW-4 Dr. Shanmugham examined the deceased and
declared her dead. He sent a report to the Udumalpet Police
Station, pursuant to which PW-11 SI Lakshmanan came to
the hospital and recorded the statement of PW-1
Subramaniya, the father of the deceased, which is treated as
FIR. On the basis of the FIR, investigation was started. After
completion of investigation, the accused came to be charged
as aforesaid. In support of its case, the prosecutionPage 5
5
examined 14 witnesses. Out of them, PW-1 Subramaniya,
PW-2 Nataraj and PW-5 Dr. Rajabalan, who conducted the
post-mortem of the deceased are crucial to the prosecution.
The accused denied the prosecution case and contended
that they were falsely implicated. Learned Sessions Judge
convicted the accused as aforesaid.
3. We have heard Mr. Ratnakar Dash, senior advocate,
appearing for the appellants and Mr. M. Yogesh Khanna,
counsel appearing for the respondent-State. Mr. Ratnakar
Dash submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove its
case beyond reasonable doubt. He submitted that learned
Sessions Judge ought to have appreciated that the evidence
on record clearly establishes that the deceased had
committed suicide. The Forensic Science Laboratory Report
(Ex-P6) is a pointer to this. It is also clear that the deceased
had consumed poison first and had suffered head injury
because of the fall sustained by her due to consumption of
poison. Counsel pointed out that the suicide note (Ex-P1)
supports the case of the accused that the deceasedPage 6
6
committed suicide. Counsel submitted that the evidence of
PW-3 Ponnusamy has rightly been rejected by the trial court
and the High Court and that has made the prosecution case
suspect. Counsel submitted that it is the accused, who took
the deceased to the hospital. The conduct of the accused
belies the prosecution case. According to the counsel, since
the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond
reasonable doubt, the conviction of the accused deserves to
be set aside. Counsel submitted that in any case the
involvement of A2-Pappathi, the sister, who is a widow, is not
proved at all. Besides, she could not have been convicted
under Section 302 read with Section 109 of the IPC in the
absence of a charge being framed under Section 109 of the
IPC. In support of this submission, counsel relied on the
judgment of this Court in Wakil Yadav & Anr. v. State of
Bihar1
. Shri M. Yogesh Khanna, learned counsel for the
State submitted that the impugned judgment deserves no
interference.
1
 (2000) 10 SCC 500 Page 7
7
4. We shall first deal with charge under Section 498A of
the IPC. In our opinion, the trial court as well as the High
Court have rightly held that charge under Section 498A of
the IPC is proved. PW-1 Subramaniya, the father of the
deceased has stated how the deceased was ill-treated in her
matrimonial house. It appears from his evidence that the
accused constantly harassed the deceased and asked her to
bring gold sovereigns and money from her parents. On
account of his strained financial condition, he could not fulfill
those demands. He stated that at the time of marriage, a
demand of 25 gold sovereigns and a sum of Rs.50,000/- was
made. He could only give 20 gold sovereigns. He stated
that A1-Babu and the deceased lived in the house of A2-
Pappathi. He has described how A1-Babu used to threaten
and beat the deceased stating that what she had brought
was less as compared to his wealth and that she should
bring more from her parents. On several occasions, the
deceased had communicated this to him. He used to give
some money to the deceased as and when she came to his
house. Because of the persistence of the accused, aPage 8
8
meeting of the Panchayat was held. The members of the
Panchayat went to the house of the accused and told them
not to threaten the deceased. However, she was again
beaten up. When the first baby was born, A2-Pappathi came
to their house and demanded a gold chain for the baby.
They accordingly gifted a gold chain and anklet to the newly
born. When the second child was born, PW-2 Nataraj,
brother of the deceased went to the house of the accused
and informed them. After 2 to 3 days, the accused came to
the hospital and again demanded gold jewellery. He then
made a gold chain and anklet for the baby and took the
deceased to the house of the accused. According to him,
A1-Babu shouted at him and asked him as to why he had
brought her. The deceased stayed there for a month and
came back to his house. They consoled her and told her that
they would pay the money as and when they can arrange for
it. Thereafter, the deceased went to her matrimonial house
with the child. When PW-2 Nataraj went to see the
deceased, she told him that A1-Babu had demanded a sum
of Rs.10,000/- to buy fertilizers. She expressed a fear that hePage 9
9
would kill her if she failed to fulfill the demand. PW-1
Subramaniya then went to the matrimonial house of the
deceased and told her that he will arrange for the money at
any cost and she should bear with the situation for a while.
According to him, this talk took place just one week before
the incident in question. He has been cross-examined at
some length. In the cross-examination, he has not deviated
from the story narrated by him in the examination-in-chief.
This witness comes across as a very honest and reliable
witness. It may be stated here that he is a coolie.
Obviously, therefore, he could not have fulfilled the extraordinary demands of money and jewellery made by the
accused. His evidence is consistent with the FIR lodged by
him. There are no material omissions or contradictions in his
evidence. We, therefore, find no difficulty in placing reliance
on his evidence. PW-2 Nataraj has corroborated the
evidence of PW-1 Subramaniya in all respects.
5. It appears that while the inquest of the dead-body was
being conducted Ex-P2, a letter tied in the skirt (petticoat) of
the deceased was recovered by PW-6 Ganesan, the Revenue
Divisional Officer, who conducted the inquest. The accused
have placed heavy reliance on this letter which they
describe as a suicide note. It is contended that this note and
the poison found in the stomach and intestine of the
deceased suggest that the deceased had committed suicide.
We have carefully gone through the letter (Ex-P2). In our
opinion, Ex-P2 completely supports the prosecution case that
the deceased was harassed and ill-treated by the accused
for money and jewellery. This letter bears out the version of
the prosecution story given by PW-1 Subramaniya and PW-2
Nataraj. However, in this letter, the deceased has nowhere
expressed any desire to commit suicide. It is, therefore, not
possible to treat this letter as a suicide note. In view of the
above, we have no hesitation in concurring with the trial
court and the High Court that A1-Babu and A2-Pappathi
treated the deceased with cruelty and are guilty of offence
punishable under Section 498A of the IPC and their
conviction on that count is perfectly justified. Page 11
11
6. We must now turn to the conviction of the appellants
under Section 304 Part I of the IPC. We are of the confirmed
opinion that this charge is made out only against A1-Babu
and not against A2-Pappathi. A2-Pappathi’s involvement in
this offence could be held to be proved only if PW-3
Ponnusamy’s evidence is believed. PW-3 Ponnusamy has
been disbelieved by the trial court as well as the High Court
and, in our opinion, rightly so. This witness claimed that
when he visited the house of the accused, he heard the
accused asking the deceased as to why the sum of
Rs.10,000/- was not brought by her. He claimed that he
peeped through the window and saw A1-Babu catching hold
of the deceased and dashing her head against a pillar.
According to him, at that time, A2-Pappathi intervened and
asked A1-Babu to pour poison in her mouth. A1-Babu
accordingly brought poison. According to this witness,
further, A1-Babu gave poison to A2-Pappathi, who poured it
in the mouth of the deceased. It is at that time that he went
inside the house and questioned them. Thereupon, they
took the deceased to the hospital telling him that they would
save her life. This entire story is inherently improbable and
totally unbelievable. If this witness has seen A2-Pappathi
pouring poison in the mouth of the deceased, he should have
screamed and called people. He should have tried to
prevent A2-Pappathi from pouring poison in the mouth of the
deceased. He should have rushed to the police station
rather than waiting in the house. The exaggerated evidence
of this witness must, therefore, be kept out of consideration.
If this witness is disbelieved, A2-Pappathi cannot be said to
be involved in offence punishable under Section 304 Part I of
the IPC. In our opinion, her conviction for the said offence
must be set aside.
7. There is yet one other strong reason why we cannot
confirm the conviction of A2-Pappathi for offence punishable
under Section 304 Part I read with Section 109 of the IPC.
Though she has been convicted as aforesaid, she was
charged for offence punishable under Section 302 read with
Section 34 of the IPC. There was no charge under Section
109 of the IPC. Section 109 of the IPC by itself is anPage 13
13
independent offence though punishable in the context of
other offences. A2-Pappathi has faced trial for offence
punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC
i.e. for murdering the deceased by sharing common
intention with A1-Babu. She cannot therefore be convicted
for offence punishable under Section 304 Part I of the IPC
with the aid of Section 109 of the IPC in the absence of a
charge under Section 109 of the IPC. In this connection, we
may usefully refer to Wakil Yadav where the appellant
therein had faced trial for being a member of an unlawful
assembly which achieved the common object of killing the
deceased. No charge was framed for offence punishable
under Section 302 read with Section 109 of the IPC.
However, the appellant was convicted for offence punishable
under Section 302 read with Section 109 of the IPC and
sentenced to life imprisonment. This Court held that the
appellant therein having faced trial for being a member of an
unlawful assembly which achieved the common object of
killing the deceased, could in no event be substitutedly
convicted for offence under Section 302 of the IPC with thePage 14
14
aid of Section 109 of the IPC. This Court observed that there
was not only a legal flaw but also a great prejudice to the
appellant therein in projecting his defence. Drawing a
parallel from this decision, we hold that A2-Pappathi could
not have been convicted for offence punishable under
Section 304 Part I of the IPC read with Section 109 of the IPC
and sentenced for the same. On this count also, A2-
Pappathi’s conviction and sentence under Section 304 Part I
read with Section 109 of the IPC will have to be set aside.
8. Now the question is whether if PW-3 Ponnusamy is
disbelieved, the entire prosecution story becomes suspect
and deserves to be disbelieved. In our opinion, even if PW-3
Ponnusamy’s evidence is obliterated, the prosecution case
can be held proved on the basis of other evidence on record.
Witnesses do exaggerate. They have a tendency to improve
upon the prosecution case. If one of the witnesses is found
to be prone to exaggeration and, hence, not reliable, the
other evidence on record, if it is cogent and reliable, can be
relied upon. The entire prosecution evidence does notPage 15
15
necessarily become tainted thereby. In this connection we
may usefully refer to the observations of this Court in Sucha
Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab2
, which read thus:
“The maxim “falsus in uno falsus in omnibus” has
no application in India and the witnesses cannot
be branded as liars. This maxim has not received
general acceptance nor has it come to occupy the
status of a rule of law. It is merely a rule of
caution. All that it amounts to is that in such
cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that
it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely
involves the question of weight of evidence which
a court may apply in a given set of circumstances,
but it is not what may be called “a mandatory rule
of evidence”. The doctrine is a dangerous one,
especially in India for if a whole body of the
testimony were to be rejected, because a witness
was evidently speaking an untruth in some aspect,
it is to be feared that administration of criminal
justice would come to a dead stop. Witnesses just
cannot help in giving embroidery to a story,
however true in the main. Therefore, it has to be
appraised in each case as to what extent the
evidence is worthy of acceptance, and merely
because in some respects the court considers the
same to be insufficient for replacing reliance on
the testimony of a witness, it does not necessarily
follow as a matter of law that it must be
disregarded in all respects as well. The evidence
has to be sifted with care. Falsity of a particular
material witness or a material particular would not
ruin it from the beginning to end. The aforesaid
dictum is not a sound rule for the reason that one
hardly comes across a witness whose evidence
2
 (2003) 7 SCC 643
does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate
exaggeration, embroideries or embellishment.” 
9. We can, therefore, analyze the other evidence and
circumstances on record and see whether they support the
conviction of A1-Babu for offence punishable under Section
304 Part I of the IPC. In this connection, the medical
evidence is of great importance. PW-5 Dr. Rajabalan
conducted the post-mortem on 16/11/1998 at 5.00 p.m. ExP5 is the post-mortem certificate. The external and internal
injuries are described in the certificate as under:
“External Injuries:- Contusion over the right
occipital area close to the midline 2 cm x 3 cm.
General appearances do tally with police report.
Eyelids closed. Frothy discharge from the mouth
and nostrils present. Tongue inside the mouth.
Jaws clenched. Teath 8/7-8/7. Hands empty. No
fracture ribs. Hart 200gm congested. Chambers
empty. Hyoid bone intact. Lungs left 400gm.
Right 450 gm congested. Stomach contain 200 ml
of white coloured fluid with irritant smell. Liver
1000 gm congested. Spleen 10 gm congested.
Kidney 100 gm each contested. Intestines
distended with gas. Uterus normal. Cavity empty.
Pelvis normal.
On opening the head: Extravasation of blood
from the contused area on the right parietal area
and occipital area close to the midline. Fracture
right parietal bone. Membranes torn on the
occipital and parietal area on the right side brain.
wt. of 1000 gms pale. 200 ml of fluid blood found
on the base of the skull”.
10. PW-5 Dr. Rajabalan opined that the death was due to
shock and hemorrhage due to the head injury sustained by
the deceased which could have occurred 10 to 12 hours prior
to post-mortem. As noted above, on opening the head,
extravasation of blood from the contused area on the right
parietal area and occipital area close to the midline was
found. There was also a fracture on the right parietal bone.
The membranes were torn on the occipital and parietal area
on the right side brain and 20 ml. of blood was found on the
base of the skull. This head injury, according to PW-5 Dr.
Rajabalan, was the cause of death. The nature of head
injury belies the defence case that the deceased suffered it
due to a fall on account of consumption of poison. In our
opinion, such injury cannot be caused by a mere fall. It can
be caused only if some external force is applied. This
conclusion of ours is supported by the evidence of PW-5 Dr.
Rajabalan, who stated that the injuries were caused beforePage 18
18
death and they could not be caused due to fall of the
deceased in a conscious state.
11. It is also pertinent to note that PW-5 Dr. Rajabalan
stated that the injuries sustained by the deceased could
have been caused 10 to 12 hours prior to the post-mortem.
We have already stated that the post-mortem was
conducted at 5.00 p.m. Thus, the death occurred around
6.00 a.m. The death occurred in the house where the
deceased resided with A1-Babu. Presence of the accused at
6.00 a.m. in the house is natural. Besides, it is not
contended by A1-Babu that he was not present in the house
when the incident occurred. To this fact situation, Section
106 of the Evidence Act is attracted. As to how the
deceased received injuries to her head and how she died
must be within the exclusive personal knowledge of A1-
Babu. It was for him to explain how the death occurred. He
has not given any plausible explanation for the death of the
deceased in such suspicious circumstances in the house in
which he resided with her and when he was admittedlyPage 19
19
present in the house at the material time. This circumstance
must be kept in mind while dealing with this case. We are
mindful of the fact that this would not relieve the
prosecution of its burden of proving its case. But, it would
apply to cases where the prosecution has succeeded in
proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be
drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts, unless
the accused by virtue of his special knowledge regarding
such facts, has offered an explanation which might drive the
court to draw a different inference. In this case, in our
opinion, the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from
which reasonable inference can be drawn that the death of
the deceased was homicidal and A1-Babu was responsible
for it. A1-Babu could have by virtue of his special knowledge
regarding the said facts offered an explanation from which a
different inference could have been drawn. Since he has not
done so, this circumstance adds up to other circumstances
which substantiate the prosecution case. In Tulshiram
Sahadu Suryawanshi & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra3
,
3
 (2012) 10 SCC 373
while dealing with Section 106 of the Evidence Act, this
Court observed as under:
“A fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from
certain other proved facts. When inferring the
existence of a fact from other set of proved facts,
the court exercises a process of reasoning and
reaches a logical conclusion as to the most
probable position. The above position is
strengthened in view of Section 114 of the
Evidence Act, 1872. It empowers the court to
presume the existence of any fact which it thinks
likely to have happened. In that process, the
courts shall have regard to the common course of
natural events, human conduct, etc. in addition to
the facts of the case. In these circumstances, the
principles embodied in Section 106 of the
Evidence Act can also be utilized. Section 106
however is not intended to relieve the prosecution
of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, but it would apply to
cases where the prosecution has succeeded in
proving facts from which a reasonable inference
can be drawn regarding the existence of certain
other facts, unless the accused by virtue of his
special knowledge regarding such facts, has
offered an explanation which might drive the court
to draw a different inference.” 
The above observation is attracted to this case.
12. We must now go to the FSL report (Ex-P-6). A perusal
of the same discloses that the stomach and intestine of thePage 21
21
deceased were found to contain the poisonous substance
viz. Metasystox but the liver and kidney did not contain the
said substance. 
PW-5 Dr. Rajabalan has stated that if poison
had been consumed prior to the head injury, it would have
reached the liver and kidney. He has added that if poison is
administered to a person when he is in an unconscious state
there is a possibility that it would reach the stomach and
intestine. Considering the medical evidence, particularly the
evidence of PW-5 Dr. Rajabalan that the head injury was
anti-mortem and must have been inflicted prior to the
consumption of poison and considering the other
circumstances of the case, we concur with the High Court
that
A1-Babu first caused the head injury to the deceased
and when she became unconscious in order to create
evidence to suggest that the deceased committed suicide,
he administered poison to her.
 It reached her stomach and
intestine but before it could reach the kidney and liver she
died. When she succumbed to the head injury, the poison
did not pass on to the liver and kidney.
The High Court has
rightly observed that this is the reason why there is no
Page 22
22
evidence of any resistance being offered by the deceased
and no bruises were found on her lips. 
13. The trial court has convicted A1-Babu for offence
punishable under Section 304 Part I of the IPC and not for
offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC on the
ground that the deceased had suffered only one head injury.
The High Court has concurred with the trial court. We see no
reason to interfere with the impugned order. 
14. In the circumstances, we confirm the conviction of A1-
Babu and A2-Pappathi for offence punishable under Section
498A of the IPC. 
We confirm the sentence imposed on A1-
Babu for the offence under Section 498A of the IPC. 
We find
from the letter dated 17/5/2013 sent by the Principal District
and Sessions Judge, Coimbatore that A2-Pappathi has
already undergone one year and four months sentence.
 In
the peculiar facts of the case we direct that the sentence
already undergone by A2-Pappathi be treated as sentence
for the offence under Section 498A of the IPC. 
We confirm
the conviction and sentence of A1-Babu for offence
Page 23
23
punishable under Section 304 Part I of the IPC. However, we
quash and set aside the conviction and sentence of A2-
Pappathi for offence punishable under Section 304 Part I
read with Section 109 of the IPC. There is, therefore, no
question of her surrendering to the Court. As per order
passed by this Court on 8/10/2007, she is on bail. Her bail
bond shall stand discharged. As per the order of this Court
dated 8/10/2007, A1-Babu is also on bail. Since we have
confirmed his conviction and sentence, we direct that he
should surrender before the Principal Sessions Judge,
Coimbatore to serve out the remaining sentence. His bail
bond shall stand cancelled. Needless to say that A1-Babu’s
sentence for offences punishable under Sections 498A and
304 Part I of the IPC shall run concurrently. 
15. The appeal is disposed of in the aforestated terms.
…..............................J.
(A.K. Patnaik)
……………………………J.Page 24
24
(Ranjana Prakash Desai)
New Delhi
July 02, 2013

suit for partition of joint family properties = even suit items 1 and 2 though were also purchased in the name of the first defendant yet they were joint family properties and therefore, the plaintiffs were entitled to claim a share in all the three items of the suit schedule properties.= The trial Court while granting the relief in favour of the appellants, considered the oral evidence of P.W.1, the mother and Ex.A-17 in particular. The High Court while reversing the judgment of the Trial Court placed reliance upon the release deed executed by the first respondent in the year 1959 viz., Ex.A-3 and partition deed of the year 1973, which was entered into between the four plaintiffs in which document the first respondent affixed his signature. the release deed of the year 1959 viz. Ex.A-3 and the partition deed of the year 1973 viz., Ex.A-28, it was established that the first and second items of the suit scheduled properties which were purchased in the name of the first respondent were the exclusive properties of the first respondent and therefore, the appellants were not entitled for partition in those properties. whether there was total misreading of evidence by the High Court by not considering or referring to Ex.A-17 while interfering with the judgment of the Trial Court and whether legal principles of gift were established in regard to the first item of the suit schedule property.”; Section 17 of the Evidence Act reads as under: “S.17. Admission defined:- An admission is a statement, oral or documentary or contained in electronic form, which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact, and which is made by any of the persons, and under the circumstances, hereinafter mentioned.” 24. As far as the principle to be applied in Section 17 is concerned, the Section as it reads is an admission, which constitutes a substantial piece of evidence, which can be relied upon for proving the veracity of the facts, incorporated therein. When once, the admission as noted in a statement either oral or documentary is found, then the whole onus would shift to the party who made such an admission and it will become an imperative duty on such party to explain it. In the absence of any satisfactory explanation, it will have to be presumed to be true. It is needless to state that an admission in order to be complete and to have the value and effect referred to therein, should be clear, certain and definite, without any ambiguity, vagueness or confusion. - "admissible evidence irrespective of whether the party making them appeared in the witness box or not and whether that party when appearing as witness was confronted with those statements in case it made a statement contrary to those admissions." - when we consider the contents of Ex.A-17, which is in Tamil, is a letter written by the first respondent himself on 24.06.1974. The said letter was addressed to the third plaintiff Mr.Manickavasagam. The contents of the said letter read as under: “The second plaintiff Saravanamurthi, came to my house the day before yesterday at around 09.30 p.m. He stated that something should be immediately arranged, as regards the house properties. He also asked what is the justification in all the three house properties in my name. I told him that you can be called and some arrangement can be made. I am not able to explain everything in this letter. He was in a very rash mood and was behaving in an unruly manner. At one stage, I was driven to the position that he can do whatever he likes. At 10.00 clocks in the night, I told him what arrangement could be made. But he was not in a sane mood. However much I told him that it was not my fault in purchasing all the three properties in my name and that I am not keen to have all the three properties. I was terribly upset by his behavior. At one stage, I asked him to get out. While going out, he expressed that the relationship cannot be continued thereafter. About this you need not inform mother or murthi himself.” While examining the contents of the said letter, the Trial Court concluded that the three house properties, referred to therein, only related to the suit scheduled properties. Going by the statements made by the first respondent himself in the said letter Ex.A-17, it was explicit and apparent that the first respondent was fully aware that even though the properties were in his name, he was not responsible for purchasing the same in his name and that he was not interested in having all the three properties for himself.; The ingredients of Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act relating to gifts were not shown to have been complied with in order to support the said claim. In fact, while considering the relevance of Ex.A-17 and its application to the case on hand, the Trial Court noted the contradictory statement of the first respondent made in his written statement, vis-à-vis the oral evidence. The Trial Court has specifically noted the funds, which were available with the first respondent pursuant to his father’s demise, which was to the tune of Rs.20,887.93/- and which was kept in deposit in two accounts in the name of the first respondent himself. One account was under Ex.A-25, which was a current account in which a sum of Rs.10,919.44/- was available and the other one was under Ex.A.26, which was a savings bank account, where a sum of Rs.9,968.49/- was available. Both put together a sum of Rs.20,887.93/- was available and therefore, even after the purchase of the third item of the suit schedule property, the first respondent had a further sum available with him. The trial Court has also noted that except the ipse dixit of D.W.2 and 3 that a sum of Rs.10,000/- was paid to the first respondent by way of gift at the time of marriage of the first respondent with his daughter, there was no other evidence to support and provide credence to the said version. Unfortunately, the Division Bench of the High Court completely omitted to examine the above material piece of evidence, which was considered in detail by the trial Court, while decreeing the suit. In the light of our above conclusions, the judgment of the Division Bench cannot be sustained. The appeal stands allowed and the judgment of the Division Bench is set aside and the judgment and decree of the Trial Court shall stand restored.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40476
Page 1
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1241 OF 2005
Vathsala Manickavasagam & Ors. ….
Appellants
VERSUS
N. Ganesan & Anr. …. Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.
1. This appeal is directed against the Division Bench judgment of
the Madras High Court dated 19.06.2003, in A.S.No.367 of 1985.
2. Originally the suit for partition was filed by one late
Mrs.Nagarathnam, along with her two sons late Manickavasagam
and Saravanamurthi as well as her daughter Sethulakshmi as
plaintiffs 3, 2 and 4.
The present first appellant is the wife of the
late Manickavasagam, the third plaintiff, along with her sons, the
second appellant and the third appellant. The fourth appellant is
the second plaintiff and the fifth appellant is the fourth plaintiff.
The first defendant who is the first respondent herein is also the
son of the first plaintiff. The second respondent was the second
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 1 of 24Page 2
defendant in the suit, who purchased the property from one
Barnabass Nadar, to whom the first defendant earlier sold the
suit property on 11.11.1978.
3. The suit was for partition. The plaintiffs claim 4/5th shares in
respect of three items of the suit properties, which was decreed
by the Trial Court, as against which, the first respondent/first
defendant, filed the first appeal before the High Court. The High
Court by the impugned judgment, modified the judgment and
decree of the Trial Court and held that the decree with reference
to item Nos.1 and 2 of the suit properties, cannot be sustained
and that the decree of the Trial Court for partition, was confirmed
only in respect of the third item of the suit property and that the
preliminary decree for partition in respect of the third item of the
suit property was alone granted.
It is against the said judgment
and decree of the Division Bench of the High Court, the
appellants have come forward with this appeal.
4. The simple case of the plaintiffs in the suit was that the
plaintiffs and the first defendant, are the descendants of the late
Nithyanandam, who died intestate on 22.09.1956.
They filed the
suit for partition for their 4/5th shares in respect of items 1 to 3.
The first item of the suit property was sold by the first defendant
to one Barnabass Nadar, on 11.11.1978, who in turn sold the
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 2 of 24Page 3
property to the second defendant/second respondent.
 It was the
common case that the deceased Nithyanandam had no ancestral
property and that his wife, sons and daughter have got equal
share in the property. 
Therefore, as regards the eligibility and
extent of share, there was no dispute. 
According to the first
defendant/first respondent herein, out of the three items of the
suit properties, the first and second items of properties were the
exclusive properties of the first defendant and therefore, others
were not entitled for any share in it.
5. So far as the first item of the property was concerned,
according to the first defendant, the said property was gifted to
him by his father and that the second item of the property was
purchased by him by selling the jewels of his wife, as well as from
the money advanced by his father-in-law to him.
6. The trial Court framed as many as 8 issues for consideration.
Issue Nos.1 to 3 related to the stand of the first respondent
herein that the first item of the suit property was gifted in his
favour by his father and that the second item of the property was
purchased from the proceeds of the jewels belonging to his wife,
as well as, from the money advanced by his father-in-law. The
third issue related to the question as to whether items 1 to 3 of
the suit schedule properties, were the joint family properties, as
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 3 of 24Page 4
claimed by the plaintiffs. The question relating to limitation, with
regard to the claim of items 1 and 2 of the suit properties, was
the 4th issue. The 5th issue related to the question whether,
proper Court Fee was mentioned in the plaint. The sixth issue
related to the entitlement of equity claimed by the second
defendant/second respondent herein, as regards the first item of
the suit schedule property. The last two issues related to the
entitlement of the plaintiff for partition and the relief to be
granted.
7. The first item of the suit property is a house property, in a site
measuring 10,000/- sq.ft. in T.S.No.2951/3, at Arulananda Nagar,
Thanjavur. The said house site was allotted by a Housing Society
called Little Flower Colony House Building Co-operative Society,
and the same was purchased by late Nithyanandam, in the name
of his eldest son viz., the first defendant/first respondent herein
8. The second item of the suit property is also a house site
bearing Door No.17/35, purchased in the name of the first
defendant on 21.10.1964, from one Visalakshmi Ammal, which is
located in Rajappa Nagar, Thanjavur. 
The third item of the suit
property is also a house and since there is no dispute about the
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 4 of 24Page 5
status of the property as a joint family property, we need not deal
with the same in detail. 
9. The trial Court while answering the issues, considered the
evidence both oral and documentary and reached a conclusion
that 
even suit items 1 and 2 though were also purchased in the
name of the first defendant yet they were joint family properties
and therefore, the plaintiffs were entitled to claim a share in all
the three items of the suit schedule properties. 
10. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellants, as well
as the respondents and having bestowed our serious
consideration to the judgments of the Division Bench of the High
Court, as well as that of the Trial Court and other material papers
placed before us, we feel that the controversy, which centers
around this appeal will have to be briefly stated to appreciate the
respective contentions of the parties.
11. The appellants and the first respondent are the descendants
of late Nithyanandham, who died intestate on 22.09.1956. His
wife, the first plaintiff, along with her deceased son
Manickavasagam, 4th and 5th appellants, filed a suit for partition,
as against the first respondent herein. During the pendency of
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 5 of 24Page 6
the litigation before the High Court, the first plaintiff viz., the wife
of the late Nithyanandham, as well as one of her sons, the third
plaintiff Manickavasagam also died. The wife and the children of
late Manickavasagam viz., appellants 1 to 3, therefore, came to
be impleaded along with appellants 4 and 5.
12. The suit was for partition in respect of three items of
properties. As far as the third item of the property is concerned,
the first respondent tacitly admitted the same to be a joint family
property and conceded for partition of 4/5th share of the
plaintiffs.
As far as the first item of the suit schedule property is
concerned, according to him, though funds were provided by the
late Nithyanandham for purchasing the same from a Co-operative Housing Society viz., Little Flower Colony House Building Cooperative Society,
 it was gifted to him by his father and therefore,
it was purchased in his name. 
The first respondent, therefore,
claimed that the suit property was his absolute property.
13. As far as the second item of the property is concerned, the
first respondent claims that the suit property was purchased from
out of the funds provided by his Father-in-law at the time of his
marriage, which he kept in a Fixed Deposit in a Co-operative
Bank, which got matured in 1964 and that the balance amount
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 6 of 24
was paid by disposing of his wife’s jewels.
The first respondent
therefore, claimed that the suit property was also his own
property and, therefore, the appellants were not entitled for any
share in the 1st and 2nd items of suit properties.
14. As already stated, the trial Court rejected the stand of the
first respondent and held that the appellants were entitled for
partition in respect of all the three properties, as they were joint
family properties. The High Court however, held that except the
suit third item of the property, the first and second items of
properties were exclusive properties of the first respondent
herein and therefore, the preliminary decree was restricted to the
third item of property and in other respects the judgment of the
trial Court was set aside.
15. The trial Court while granting the relief in favour of the
appellants, considered the oral evidence of P.W.1, the mother
and Ex.A-17 in particular. 
The High Court while reversing the
judgment of the Trial Court placed reliance upon the release deed
executed by the first respondent in the year 1959 viz., Ex.A-3 and
partition deed of the year 1973, which was entered into between
the four plaintiffs in which document the first respondent affixed
his signature. 
The High Court took the view that having regard to
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 7 of 24Page 8
the release deed of the year 1959 viz. Ex.A-3 and the partition
deed of the year 1973 viz., Ex.A-28, it was established that the
first and second items of the suit scheduled properties which
were purchased in the name of the first respondent were the
exclusive properties of the first respondent and therefore, the
appellants were not entitled for partition in those properties.
16. In light of the above factors, the question of law that arise for
consideration in this appeal is as to
“ whether there was total
misreading of evidence by the High Court by not considering or
referring to Ex.A-17 while interfering with the judgment of the
Trial Court and 
whether legal principles of gift were established in
regard to the first item of the suit schedule property.”
17. Mr.S.Nanda Kumar, learned counsel for the appellants
vehemently contended that at the time when the first item of the
suit scheduled property was purchased, the first respondent was
only a student, that the evidence of the mother P.W.1, discloses
that the property was purchased in his name after due
deliberations by the husband and wife and in order to avoid any
violation of service conditions of the late Nithyanandham, who
was then working as a Joint Registrar of Co-operative Society.
The learned counsel contended that the Trial Court considered
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 8 of 24Page 9
the documents relating to the said properties as per Ex.No.A-10
produced by the plaintiffs, which persuaded the Trial Court to
hold that the first item of the suit scheduled property was
purchased by the late Nithyanandham in the name of his son only
to avoid any violation of the rules relating to his service
conditions and that the first respondent failed to show that it was
gifted to him by his father as claimed by him.
The learned
counsel contended that none of the ingredients relating to gift
was neither pleaded nor proved by the first respondent.
18. As far as the second items of the suit scheduled property is
concerned, the learned counsel contended that in the first place,
the trial Court had specifically found that the terminal benefits,
which were settled pursuant to the demise of late
Nithyanandham, were sufficient enough for the purchase of the
second item of the suit scheduled property, as well as, the third
item of the suit scheduled property and that the claim of the first
respondent that the same was purchased from the funds
provided by his father-in-law and from the sale proceeds of the
jewels of his wife, were not conclusively proved. 
19. The learned counsel pointed out that while the first
respondent in his submission claimed that for purchasing the
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 9 of 24
second item of the suit schedule property, he utilized a sum of
Rs.10,000/- advanced by his father-in-law at the time of his
marriage and for the balance, he utilized the sale proceeds of his
wife’s jewels, in the oral evidence let in on his side was to the
effect that the balance sale consideration was paid by his fatherin-law and his brother-in-law in several installments, which was
contradictory to his earlier stand in the written statement.
20. The learned counsel further contended that having regard to
his prevaricating stand, one in the written statement and the
other in the oral evidence, the trial Court rightly rejected the
claim of the first respondent and chose to decree the suit. He
further pointed out that de hors the above glaring contradiction in
the written statement and the oral evidence let in by the first
respondent, there was a tacit admission in Ex.A-17, which was
relied upon by the Trial Court to conclude that all the three
properties of the suit schedule were the joint family properties in
which the plaintiffs and the first respondent were entitled for
equal share. The learned counsel further contended that the
High Court miserably failed to examine the above relevant
material piece of evidence namely Ex.A17, while reversing the
judgment of the trial Court.
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 10 of
24
21. As against the above submissions, Mr.A.T.M.Sampath,
learned counsel appearing for the respondents contended that
the Division Bench of the High Court was well justified in relying
upon Exs.A-3 and A-28 apart from Ex B-11 viz. the sale deed
which stood in the name of the first respondent, to hold that
items 1 and 2 of the suit scheduled properties exclusively
belonged to the first respondent. The learned counsel pointed
out that if really items 1 and 2 of the suit scheduled properties
were also part of the joint family properties, it was not known as
to why they were not part of the release deed executed by the
first respondent under Ex.A-3 and also part of Ex.A-28 the
partition deed, as between the four plaintiffs, in which document,
the first respondent also affixed his signature.
22. The learned counsel further contended that the parties were
well aware by 1959, as well as by 1973 that items 1 and 2 of the
suit schedule properties, were the exclusive properties of the first
respondent and, therefore, the parties never intended to include
those two properties, either for the purpose of the release to be
executed by the first respondent nor for the purpose of partition,
as between the plaintiffs and the first respondent in the year
1973.
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 11 of
24Page 12
23. Having heard the learned counsel for the respective parties,
we are of the considered opinion that at the forefront, it will be
necessary to consider the effect of Ex.A-17, in as much as, the
said document is fully controlled by Section 17 of the Evidence
Act.
Section 17 of the Evidence Act reads as under:
“S.17. Admission defined:- An admission is a
statement, oral or documentary or contained in
electronic form, which suggests any inference as to
any fact in issue or relevant fact, and which is made
by any of the persons, and under the circumstances,
hereinafter mentioned.”
24. As far as the principle to be applied in Section 17 is
concerned, the Section as it reads is an admission, which
constitutes a substantial piece of evidence, which can be relied
upon for proving the veracity of the facts, incorporated therein.
When once, the admission as noted in a statement either oral or
documentary is found, then the whole onus would shift to the
party who made such an admission and it will become an
imperative duty on such party to explain it. In the absence of any
satisfactory explanation, it will have to be presumed to be true.
It is needless to state that an admission in order to be complete
and to have the value and effect referred to therein, should be
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 12 of
24Page 13
clear, certain and definite, without any ambiguity, vagueness or
confusion.
In this context, it will be worthwhile to refer to a
decision of this Court in Union of India Vs. Moksh Builders
and Financiers Ltd. and others - AIR 1977 SC 409 wherein it
is held as under:
“…It has been held by this Court in Bharat Singh
v. Bhagirath [1966] 1 SCR 606 = AIR 1966 SC 405 that
an admission is substantive evidence of the fact
admitted, and that admissions duly proved are
"admissible evidence irrespective of whether the party
making them appeared in the witness box or not and
whether that party when appearing as witness was
confronted with those statements in case it made a
statement contrary to those admissions." 
In taking this
view this Court has noticed the decision in Ajodhya
Prasad Bhargava v. Bhawani Shanker - AIR 1957 All 1
(FB) also.”
25. Keeping the said statutory provision in mind,
when we
consider the contents of Ex.A-17, which is in Tamil, is a letter
written by the first respondent himself on 24.06.1974. The said
letter was addressed to the third plaintiff Mr.Manickavasagam.
The contents of the said letter read as under:
“The second plaintiff Saravanamurthi, came to my house
the day before yesterday at around 09.30 p.m. He
stated that something should be immediately arranged,
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 13 of
24Page 14
as regards the house properties. He also asked what is
the justification in all the three house properties in my
name. I told him that you can be called and some
arrangement can be made. I am not able to explain
everything in this letter. He was in a very rash mood
and was behaving in an unruly manner. At one stage, I
was driven to the position that he can do whatever he
likes. At 10.00 clocks in the night, I told him what
arrangement could be made. But he was not in a sane
mood. However much I told him that it was not my fault
in purchasing all the three properties in my name and
that I am not keen to have all the three properties. I was
terribly upset by his behavior. At one stage, I asked him
to get out. While going out, he expressed that the
relationship cannot be continued thereafter. About this
you need not inform mother or murthi himself.”
26. While examining the contents of the said letter, the Trial
Court concluded that the three house properties, referred to
therein, only related to the suit scheduled properties. Going by
the statements made by the first respondent himself in the said
letter Ex.A-17, it was explicit and apparent that the first
respondent was fully aware that even though the properties were
in his name, he was not responsible for purchasing the same in
his name and that he was not interested in having all the three
properties for himself.
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 14 of
24Page 15
27. When we examine the said document, we find that the
conclusions arrived at by the trial Court based on the contents of
Ex.A-17, cannot be found fault with. In fact, Ex.A-17, came into
existence only on 24.06.1974. It is not as if the first respondent
disowned the said document. The contents of the said document
were also not disputed by the first respondent. It is not the case
of the first respondent that the three houses referred to in the
said document, related to any other properties other than the
suit-scheduled properties. It is also not his case that the name
and persons mentioned therein, related to somebody else other
than his own brother, the second plaintiff and his mother. The
first respondent had also not lead any evidence to disprove Ex.A-
17.
28. Keeping the above factors in mind, when we apply Section 17
of the Evidence Act, we find that Ex.A-17 is a statement and the
details contained therein, which pertains to the suit scheduled
properties, constituted a tacit admission at the instance of the
first respondent. If after Ex.A-3, release deed of 1959 and the
partition deed, Ex.A-28 of 1973, in 1974, the first respondent on
his own, came forward with the said letter to the third plaintiff
admitting in so many words as to the status of the suit scheduled
properties, vis-à-vis the concerned parties themselves, we fail to
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 15 of
24Page 16
understand as to what wrong was committed by the Trial Court in
placing reliance upon the same to decree the suit. If in reality,
the first respondent had his own reservations as to the ownership
of the suit scheduled properties, in particular items 1 and 2, no
one prevented him from stating so in uncontroverted terms, while
communicating the same in the form of writing, to one of his own
brothers. In fact, the grievance of the second plaintiff
Saravanamurthi, was that since the properties were purchased in
the name of the first respondent and he being the eldest son of
the family, was having an upper hand over all the others and was
trying to snatch away the properties. The tone and tenor of the
letter viz., Ex.A-17, authored by the first respondent, discloses
that he too was not very keen to grab all the three properties,
simply because those properties were purchased in his name. He
went to the extent of stating that he was not responsible for
purchasing all the three house properties in his name. He went
one step further and stated that he did not want to possess all
the three properties all time to come. If, such a clear-cut mindset
was expressed by the first respondent though Ex.A-17, it was
futile on his part to have come forward with any other story after
the suit came to be filed by the plaintiffs.
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 16 of
24Page 17
29. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the
appellants, the stand of the first respondent in his statement as
regards the second item of the suit schedule property, was that
the sale consideration of Rs.18,200/- was paid partly from a sum
of Rs.10,000/-, paid to him by his father-in-law and the remaining
sum by disposing of his wife’s jewels. The Trial Court has noted
that in support of the said stand, no piece of evidence was lead
before it. On the other hand, giving a go-by to the said stand
that the balance sale consideration was met by disposing of his
wife’s jewels, evidence was lead to show as though the remaining
sale consideration was paid by his father-in-law and brother-inlaw in installments. The above stand contained in the written
statement and lead by way of oral evidence, were fully
contradictory and, therefore, the one belied the other.
30. The specific case of the first respondent, as regards the
first item of the suit property was that his father gifted the said
property to him. Except for the said plea ipse dixit, there was
nothing on record to support the said stand. Reliance was
placed upon Exs.B1 to B6, which were the communications
between Nithyanandam and Little Flower Colony House
Building Society Ltd., Thanjavur in the year 1955-56. Ex.B4,
was a letter by the said Society dated 24.02.1955, which
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 17 of
24
informed Nithyanandam about the allotment of plot in his
favour and also asking him to deposit the sale value of
Rs.300/- and a sum of Rs.150 for reclamation and charges for
transfer of land in his favour. On the same day, under Ex.B5,
he wrote a letter expressing his acceptance. Under Ex.B6, he
deposited a sum of Rs.150/- towards charges for transfer of
the land in his favour.
31. P.W.1, the wife of Nithyanandam, the first plaintiff,
deposed that both of them discussed together and ultimately
decided to purchase the first item of the suit property in the
name of the first respondent. Through her, Exs.A1 and A2
were produced to show that the house tax were paid in the
year 1971-72, 1972-73 and 1973-74 by the family members, in
respect of the said property though it stood in the name of the
first respondent.
32. It has also come in evidence that at that point of time, the
first respondent was undergoing his graduation. There was no
gift deed by the late Nithyanandam in favour of the first
respondent. Till the lifetime of Nithyanandam, no evidence
was placed before the Court to demonstrate that
Nithyanandam gifted away the said property in favour of the
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 18 of
24Page 19
first respondent, absolutely and that the first respondent
expressed his acceptance of the said gift.
33. Keeping the above facts in mind, when we examine the
law relating to gift, under Section 122 of the Transfer of
Property Act, a “gift” is defined as ‘transfer of certain existing
movable or immovable property made voluntarily and without
consideration, by one person, called the donor, to another,
called the donee, and accepted by or on behalf of the donee”.
The section also mandates that “such acceptance must be
made during the lifetime of the donor and while he is still
capable of giving. If the donee dies before acceptance, the
gift is void.”
34. We are not concerned with the last part of the section.
Going by the facts placed before the Court as stated earlier,
except the ipse dixit statement made in the written statement,
that late Nithyanandam gifted away the first item of the suit
property in his favour, there was no other evidence lead in
support of the said claim of gift.
35. In fact, at that time, when the property was purchased, the
first respondent was a college going student. Merely because
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 19 of
24Page 20
the property was purchased in the name of the first
respondent, it cannot be held that there was a valid gift in his
favour, without any other evidence supporting the said claim.
36. Per contra, his own mother P.W.1, made it clear that since
her husband Nithyanandam, was in the service of the State
and was aware that a purchase of property would result in a
direct violation of the rules relating to his service, the husband
and wife viz., the father and mother of the first respondent,
discussed about it and after great deliberation, decided to
purchase it in the name of the first respondent. If the property
as contested by the first respondent had been gifted away to
him in the year 1955, then it was not known, as to why he was
not able to produce any other document connected with the
property, such as tax receipts or other revenue records to
show that he was enjoying the property absolutely, without
any hindrance from the other heirs of late Nithyanandam.
37. Per contra, Exs.A1 and A2, tax receipts, were produced by
the plaintiffs to show that the property was managed and
maintained by the family and not by the first respondent. That
apart, under Ex.A17, the first respondent himself admitted that
purchase of the said property, along with the other two
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 20 of
properties in his name, was not his fault. In the said document,
he also made it abundantly clear that he was not interested in
retaining the property, simply because the property stood in
his name. Therefore, the claim of gift relating to the first item
of the suit property was not proved to the satisfaction of the
Court, both on law as well as on facts. 
38. Having regard to such a prevaricating stand taken by the first
respondent, as compared to his tacit admission made in Ex.A-17,
we are of the considered view that the Trial Court was fully
justified in holding that all the three items of the suit scheduled
properties, were joint family properties, in which the plaintiffs and the first respondent were entitled for equal share.
39. Having regard to our above conclusions, when we examine
the judgment of the Division Bench impugned in this appeal, we
find that the Division Bench has completely omitted to examine
the implications of Ex.A-17 which has relevance in respect of all
the three suit schedule properties. As noted by the Trial Court,
Ex.A-17 was a very crucial piece of evidence, in as much as, it
contains the tacit admission voluntarily made by the first
respondent, while also establishing as to why the veracity of it’s
nature was never questioned by him. Since, there was no contra
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 21 of
24Page 22
evidence to disprove Ex.A-17, the first respondent was totally
bound by the said document. Since every ingredient of Section 17
of the Evidence Act, relating to the said document, Ex.A-17 was
fully complied with, the non-consideration of the same by the
Division Bench of the High Court, in our considered opinion,
would certainly amount to total misreading of the evidence, while
interfering with the judgment of the trial Court. Similarly, the
Division Bench miserably failed to examine the issue relating to
gift as regards the first item of the suit scheduled properties.
Though, such a claim was made by the first respondent, there
was no iota of evidence to support the said claim. 
The
ingredients of Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act relating
to gifts were not shown to have been complied with in order to
support the said claim.
40. In fact, while considering the relevance of Ex.A-17 and its
application to the case on hand, the Trial Court noted the
contradictory statement of the first respondent made in his
written statement, vis-à-vis the oral evidence. The Trial Court
has specifically noted the funds, which were available with the
first respondent pursuant to his father’s demise, which was to the
tune of Rs.20,887.93/- and which was kept in deposit in two
accounts in the name of the first respondent himself. One
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 22 of
24Page 23
account was under Ex.A-25, which was a current account in which
a sum of Rs.10,919.44/- was available and the other one was
under Ex.A.26, which was a savings bank account, where a sum
of Rs.9,968.49/- was available. Both put together a sum of
Rs.20,887.93/- was available and therefore, even after the
purchase of the third item of the suit schedule property, the first
respondent had a further sum available with him. The trial Court
has also noted that except the ipse dixit of D.W.2 and 3 that a
sum of Rs.10,000/- was paid to the first respondent by way of gift
at the time of marriage of the first respondent with his daughter,
there was no other evidence to support and provide credence to
the said version. Unfortunately, the Division Bench of the High
Court completely omitted to examine the above material piece of
evidence, which was considered in detail by the trial Court, while
decreeing the suit. 
41. In the light of our above conclusions, the judgment of the
Division Bench cannot be sustained. The appeal stands allowed
and the judgment of the Division Bench is set aside and the
judgment and decree of the Trial Court shall stand restored. 
………….……….…………………………..J.
[Dr. B.S. Chauhan]
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 23 of
24Page 24
...……….…….………………………………J.
 [Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim
Kalifulla]
New Delhi;
July 02, 2013.
Civil Appeal No.1241 of 2005 24 of