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Monday, July 15, 2013

Section 302 read with 149, 307 read with 149, as well as for offences under Sections 452, 148 and 147 IPC.= whether there was any controversy relating to the place of occurrence in order to doubt the case of the prosecution,-The I.O. found blood in the ‘Verandah’ of the third storey. He also found some pellets there. He had prepared memo Ext.Ka-7. It is also said that the incient had taken place in the ‘Verandah’ of the third storey of the house. PW-2 Smt. Zabira has clearly stated in her cross-examination that at the time of the incident all the injured were sitting in the ‘Verandah’ of the third storey. Thus, the place of occurrence was not doubtful.” ; whether there was any doubt about the death of the deceased, as submitted on behalf of the appellants. Mr. Jaspal Singh, learned senior counsel in his submissions referred to the Criminal Appeal No.752 of 2008 27 of 30 evidence of P.W.4, Dr. Irfan Ahmad, who examined the injured including the deceased at 5:45 pm on 05.09.1997 and contended that according to the doctor all the injuries were caused by firearm, that such injuries might have been caused from the distance of 40 feet, that the injuries were on the front side, that there was no injury on the head as compared to the evidence of P.W.5, the postmortem doctor, who stated categorically that injury No.1 was on the right side of the head, which might have been caused by Lathicharge, which was also the version of P.W.3. The learned counsel made further reference to Ext.A-18 by which the death of the deceased was communicated by the doctor to the police station for conducting a postmortem and the postmortem held on 07.09.1997. By making further reference to Ext.Ka-5, the postmortem report, which was issued by U.H.M. Hospital, Kanpur by one Dr. B.S. Chauhan while the name of P.W.5 the postmortem doctor who gave evidence was mentioned as Dr. P.V.S. Chauhan of Ursala Hospital, Kanpur, the learned counsel submitted that there were serious doubts as to whether it related to the corpse of the deceased and the concerned postmortem report really related to the deceased Zahiruddin in this case. Though, in the first blush, the said contention made on behalf of the appellants appear to be of some substance, on a close reading of the evidence of P.Ws.4 and 5, we find that such instances pointed out by learned counsel were all of insignificant factors and based on such factors it cannot be held that there was any doubt at all as to the death of the deceased or the injuries sustained by him as noted by P.W.4 in Exts.Ka-2, Ka-3 and Ka-4. Ext.Ka-3 is related to the deceased. Ext.Ka-5 postmortem certificate was issued by P.W.5. We should also state that nothing was put to the above said witnesses with reference to those alleged doubts relating to the death of the deceased Zahiruddin. We are not, therefore, inclined to entertain the said submission at this stage in order to find fault with the case of the prosecution.; whether there was any scope to hold that the offence would fall under Section 304 Part I or II and not under Section 302 IPC and that no other offence was made out, we can straight away hold that having regard to the extent of the injuries sustained by the deceased, P.Ws.2 and 3 and the aggression with which the offence was committed as against the victims, which resulted in the loss of life of one person considered along with the motive, which was such a petty issue, we are of the firm view that there was absolutely no scope to reduce the gravity of the offence committed by the appellants. We are, therefore, not persuaded to accept the said feeble submission made on behalf of the appellants to modify the conviction and the sentence imposed. 28. For all the above stated reasons, we do not find any merit in this appeal. The appeal fails and the same is dismissed.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40475
Page 1
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.752 OF 2008
Rafique @ Rauf & others ….Appellants
VERSUS
State of U.P. ….Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.
1. This appeal by the eight accused who were proceeded against
in Crime No.397/97 in Sessions Case No.35/1998 in the Court
of Second Additional Sessions Judge, District Kannauj, were
charged and convicted for offences falling under Section 302
read with 149, 307 read with 149, as well as for offences under
Sections 452, 148 and 147 IPC. All the accused were convicted
and inflicted with the punishment of life imprisonment for the
offence under Section 302 read with 149 IPC, 5 year rigorous
imprisonment for the offence under Section 307 read with 149
IPC, 1 year rigorous imprisonment for the offence under
Section 452 IPC, 6 months rigorous imprisonment for the
offence under Section 148 IPC and 3 months rigorous
imprisonment for the offence under Section 147 IPC.
Criminal Appeal No.752 of 2008 1 of 30Page 2
2. The case of the prosecution as projected before the Court
below was that 7 days prior to the date of occurrence there
was some dispute between the children of the parties of the
victim and the accused. A goat belonging to the accused
persons stated to have gone into the maize field of the
deceased Zahiruddin and when the son of the said deceased
objected to that, he was caught by the father of the accused 1
to 6. When the deceased Zahiruddin came to know about the
said conduct of Masook, father of the accused 1 to 6, he went
and protested by questioning him as to how for the grazing of
the maize crop by the goat belonging to Masook, the son of
the deceased could be held in captivity. The said protest
raised by deceased Zahiruddin was not liked by Masook and
both stated to have abused each other. Pursuant to the said
incident, on 05.09.1997 at about 3.00 pm, all the appellantsaccused armed with country-made gun (Addhi) as well as
country-made pistols and the first accused holding his gun,
entered the house of the deceased where P.Ws.1 to 3 were
conversing with the deceased, Zahiruddin and made
indiscriminate firing towards the deceased and the other
persons. The deceased, P.Ws.2 and 3 stated to have sustained
firearm injuries and they raised alarm pursuant to which others
Criminal Appeal No.752 of 2008 2 of 30
rushed to the spot. The appellants stated to have escaped
from the scene of occurrence after giving further threats.
3. The deceased and other injured were stated to have been
brought to Kotwali Farrukhabad, where P.W.1 lodged the
written complaint Ext. Ka-1. The crime was registered as Crime
No.397/97, as was evident from the G.D. entry Ext.Ka-14. The
Investigating Officer P.W.6 stated to have recorded the
statement of the deceased Zahiruddin purportedly under
Section 161 Cr.P.C under Ext. Ka-9. The injured along with the
deceased stated to have been sent to the hospital where the
injured persons including the deceased were examined by the
doctor. The injury report of the deceased Zahiruddin was Ext.
Ka-3, the injury report of P.W.2 was Ext. Ka-4 and the injury
report of P.W.3 was Ext. Ka-2. The deceased Zahiruddin died
on the next day, i.e. on 06.09.1997 at 3:30 pm. The inquest
memo was Ext. Ka-15 and the postmortem report was Ext. Ka-
5. P.W.4 Dr. Irfan Ahmad was the doctor who conducted the
postmortem and issued the postmortem certificate. The
Investigation was initially carried out by P.W.6 and was later
on completed by P.W.8. The charge-sheet was Ext.Ka-12.
P.W.2, the wife of the deceased suffered two injuries, while
P.W.3, the niece of the deceased, suffered one injury. The
Criminal Appeal No.752 of 2008 3 of 30Page 4
deceased suffered as many as eight injuries. It was in evidence
that all the injuries were due to gun shots. The distance
between the place of occurrence and the police station was
stated to be 20 kilometers. All the injured were examined by
the doctor by 5:45 pm to 6.10 pm on 05.09.1997 itself. It is in
the evidence of P.W.5, postmortem doctor that based on the
injuries noted on the body of the deceased it could be stated
that he was capable of speaking in spite of the injuries
sustained by him. The prosecution examined P.Ws.1 to 9.
Based on the evidence before the trial Court and the
incriminating circumstances existed against the appellants,
they were questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C and all the
appellants denied their involvement and stated that due to
animosity the evidence had been adduced against them. It
was also stated that all of them belong to one and the same
family. They did not choose to let in any evidence in support of
their defence. It is in the above-stated background the
conviction and sentence came to be imposed by the trial
Court, which was also affirmed by the High Court in toto.
4. Assailing the judgment impugned, Mr. Jaspal Singh, learned
senior counsel for the appellants after taking us through the
relevant evidence on record, as well as the judgments
Criminal Appeal No.752 of 2008 4 of 30Page 5
impugned before us submitted that the presence of P.W.1 in
the place of occurrence was doubtful; that there were
prevaricating statements by the witnesses about the exact
place of occurrence; that there were grave doubts as to
whether all the accused opened fire or only few of them; that
having regard to the position in which P.Ws.2, 3 and deceased
were placed at the time of occurrence the occurrence could
not have been witnessed by the said so called eye-witnesses
as narrated by them and that though only fire shot injuries
were said to have been caused, not even a single pellet or an
empty cartridge was recovered from the scene of occurrence.
According to the learned senior counsel, there were serious
doubts as to whether the postmortem report related to the
body of the deceased. The learned senior counsel also
contended that the accused were not questioned with
reference to the so called dying declaration of the deceased in
the 313 questioning. The learned senior counsel, therefore,
contended that all the above factors created lot of doubts as to
the factum of the occurrence, as well as the crime and that in
any event the offence under Section 302 IPC cannot be said to
have been made out and at best it may fall under Section 304
Part I or II and that Section 148 will not apply. According to
Criminal Appeal No.752 of 2008 5 of 30Page 6
him, if at all the accused had any grievance it could have been
only against Shamshuddin, but certainly none had any object
to kill Zahiruddin, the deceased.
5. As against the above submissions, Mr. Aarohi Bhalla, learned
counsel for the State by referring to the judgment of the trial
Court contended that after a detailed consideration of the
stand of the appellants, the trial Court was able to conclude
with all certainty about the place of occurrence and, therefore,
the said submission made on behalf of the appellants do not
merit any consideration. According to the learned State
counsel, the family of P.W.1 and the deceased were only living
in two different portions of the same building and, therefore,
the submission raising doubts about the place of occurrence
does not merit any consideration. According to him the
medical evidence fully established the use of firearm in the
incident. The learned State counsel by making reference to
Ext.Ka-15, inquest report issued by Irshad Ahmad at 10:55,
contended that there was no doubt about the death of the
deceased and the postmortem report relating to his death was
also proved.
Criminal Appeal No.752 of 2008 6 of 30

6. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties and
having bestowed our serious consideration to the various
submissions made before us, we find that the submissions of
learned counsel for the appellants raise the following questions
for consideration, namely:-
I. Whether the reliance placed upon by the High Court
on Ext.Ka-9, the recorded statement of the deceased
Zahiruddin, which was relied upon by the High Court as a
dying declaration and the confirmation of the conviction on
that basis was justified?
II. Whether there was any controversy relating to the
place of occurrence in order to doubt the case of the
prosecution?
III. Whether there was any doubt about the death of the
deceased as submitted on behalf of the appellants?
IV. Whether there was any scope to hold that the offence
would fall under Section 304 Part I or II and not under
Section 302 and other offences for which they were
convicted?
Criminal Appeal No.752 of 2008 7 of 30Page 8
7. At the outset it will have to be noted that except mere denial
of the offence alleged against the accused in their 313
questioning no other specific stand was taken on behalf of the
appellants nor was any defence evidence, oral or
documentary, placed before the Court. The motive for the
offence was stated to be the grazing of maize crop by the goat
belonging to the father of the appellants-accused 1 to 6 and
the grand-father of appellant-accused 8 in the field of the
deceased seven days prior to the date of occurrence.
Admittedly, all the accused were closely related. Most of them
belong to one family, namely, Masook. P.W.2 Shamshuddin,
the complainant is the brother of the deceased. As far as the
grazing of the maize crop as alleged by the complainant party
was concerned not much argument was raised on behalf of the
appellants. Even in the evidence nothing was stated to have
been brought out in order to reject the said case pleaded by
the prosecution. There was also no dispute about the fact that
the occurrence took place in the premises of the deceased, as
well as the complainant and other injured witnesses, namely,
P.Ws.2 and 3. As regards the presence of the deceased and
the other injured witnesses, namely, P.Ws.2 and 3 in the police
station at the instance of P.W.1 who was also an eye-witness
Criminal Appeal No.752 of 2008 8 of 30Page 9
to the occurrence, was also not seriously disputed. We also
find that the occurrence, which was stated to have taken place
at 3.00 pm on 05.09.1997, was brought to the notice of the
police without further loss of time, which was located about 20
kilometers away from the place of occurrence. There was also
no serious argument raised as regards the registration of the
FIR relating to the occurrence. Both the Courts below,
therefore, held in one voice that there was no chance of any
manipulation at the instance of the police.
8. While the occurrence had taken place at 3.00 pm, the
deceased who was seriously injured along with the other
injured witnesses P.Ws.2 and 3, were rushed to the hospital
from the police station who were examined by P.W.4 between
5.45 pm to 6.10 pm on 05.09.1997. The injury reports Ext.Ka-
3, Ext.Ka-4 and Ext.Ka-2 of the deceased, P.W.2 and P.W.3,
read along with the evidence of P.W.4 Dr. Irfan Ahmad,
sufficiently establish the nature of injuries sustained by all the
three of them. Ext.Ka-9 the statement of the deceased
recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. by P.W.6 at the police
station when he was in the injured condition immediately after
the incident, disclose the specific overt act against the
appellants-accused as revealed by the deceased himself. It is
Criminal Appeal No.752 of 2008 9 of 30Page 10
true that the trial Court declined to rely upon the said
statement by treating it as a dying declaration, while the High
Court fully relied upon the said statement as a dying
declaration of the deceased. In that respect certain other
factors, which are relevant to be stated are that the deceased
was 45 years old at the time of his death, as noted by P.W.4
Dr. Irfan Ahmad. P.W.5, Dr. P.V.S. Chauhan, who conducted the
postmortem of the deceased, in the course of the crossexamination, categorically stated that because of the injury it
cannot be concluded that the injured was unconscious and was
not able to speak. He further stated that after getting the
injuries in the brain it is not necessary that the injured would
immediately go to coma stage and that it cannot be definitely
stated within which time a person would reach the state of
coma. It is also relevant to state that it has come in the
evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3 that the families of the deceased
Zahiruddin, as well as his brother P.W.1 were living in the
same premises in two different portions. The presence of
P.W.3, the niece of the deceased Zahiruddin, at the place and
time of occurrence has also been sufficiently stated and
corroborated by all the three witnesses.
Criminal Appeal No.752 of 2008 10 of 30
9. Keeping the above factors in mind when we examine the
submissions made on behalf of the appellants, as far as the
reliance placed upon by the High Court in the impugned
judgment on Ext.Ka-9 by treating it as a dying declaration, the
High Court has noted the details mentioned in the said exhibit
by extracting the same in the judgment impugned, which is to
the following effect:
“On the west side of my house, there is field of corn
crop wherein 7 days prior to today i.e. 5.9.97, the
goats of my co-villager Massok s/o Altaf had entered.
My younger son Ezaz, aged 7 years had caught goat
and was taking the same away on which Massok had
freed the goat and started to take away my son, on
which we came to know and I asked him not to do so
that you are making the goat to eat the crop and
simultaneously you are taking my son also away, it is
not the right thing, on which they hurled abuses.
Today on 5.9.97 I was sitting in the verandah of my
house that suddenly around 3 o’clock Rauf, Ishtiyaq,
Ataullah, Ayub, Pauva alias Pappu, Latif sons of
Massok, Nisar s/o Farukh and Karim s/o Rauf came
there out of them Latif was carrying Adhi and Rauf was
carrying desi gun and others were carrying tamancha,
and they came to my house climbing the stairs, my
brother Shamsuddin, my wife Zabira and Mushtaq’s
daughter Shehnaz also present there. All the accused
persons after arriving started firing indiscriminately on
myself and my family members with an intention to
kill us, on sustaining injuries I fell down on the ground
and my wife and Shehnaz d/o Mushtaq also sustained
pellet injuries. Then we raised alarm, hearing the
same Shamsuddin, who had gone out of the house and
Mushtaq s/o Defendar and Majeed s/o Panna came
there and challenged the accused persons on which
the accused persons went away towards their house.
The accused persons were threatening of dire
consequences. The accused persons had fired from
Criminal Appeal No.752 of 2008 11 of 30Page 12
close distance. I have sustained grievous injuries on
different part of my body. My voice is becoming
unclear, and my brother Shamsuddin has brought me
to Thana on jeep.”
10. The said statement refers to the incident, which took
place seven days prior to the date of occurrence, which formed
the motive for the occurrence. It also refers to the presence of
all the accused on 05.09.1997 at 3 O’clock in his house and
the arms, which were in their possession. It also mentions the
presence of P.Ws.1 to 3 at that time. It further states as to how
indiscriminate firing was made by the accused, which resulted
in the injuries sustained by him, as well as P.Ws.2 and 3. It also
refers to the alarm raised by P.W.2 and the rushing in of
Mushtaq s/o Defendar and Majeed s/o Panna pursuant to which
the appellants-accused went away after making further threats
against the victim. Finally, it was stated that he was taken to
the police station by his brother P.W.1 in a Jeep.
11. The important question for consideration, therefore, is
whether the said statement made by the deceased can be
taken as a dying declaration and reliance can be placed upon
the same. The High Court while relying upon the said
statement has noted certain circumstances, namely, the
Criminal Appeal No.752 of 2008 12 of 30Page 13
evidence of P.W.6, Investigating Officer, who deposed that the
deceased was fully conscious when he was brought to the
police station with injuries on his face, chest and other parts of
the body and that he recorded his statement. It was also noted
that after recording his statement the Investigating Officer
referred him to the hospital for medical examination and
treatment. The High Court, thereafter, noted the evidence of
P.W.5 the postmortem doctor who categorically stated in his
cross-examination that the injured was also in a position to
speak and that it was not necessary that in all cases after
sustaining injury in the brain a person cannot retain his
conscience or will not be in a position to speak. The High Court
noted the further statement of the doctor that it is not
necessary that in every such case the patient would
immediately go to a coma stage.
12. The High Court, therefore, reached a conclusion that
the deceased Zahiruddin, was in a position to speak and that
the statement under Ext.Ka-9 was given by him who expired
on the next day evening. It further stated that since it was the
last statement of the deceased to the Investigating Officer it
can very well be treated as a dying declaration. The High Court
was conscious of the fact that the trial Court did not place any
Criminal Appeal No.752 of 2008 13 of 30Page 14
reliance on the said statement which in the opinion of the High
Court was erroneous.
13. In this context when we make reference to the
statutory provisions concerning the extent of reliance that can
be placed upon the dying declaration and also the implication
of Section 162(2) Cr.P.C. vis-à-vis Section 32(1) of the
Evidence Act, 1872, we feel that it will be appropriate to make
a reference to the decision of this Court reported in Khushal
Rao vs. State of Bombay - AIR 1958 SC 22. Justice Sinha
speaking for the Bench after making further reference to a Full
Bench decision of the High Court of Madras headed by Sir
Lionel Leach, C.J., a decision of the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council and ‘Phipson on Evidence’ – 9th Ed., formulated
certain principles to be applied to place any reliance upon such
statements. We feel that the substance of the principles stated
in the Full Bench decision and the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council and the author Phipson’s view point on accepting
a statement as dying declaration can also be noted in order to
understand the principles ultimately laid down by this Court in
paragraph 16.
Criminal Appeal No.752 of 2008 14 of 30
14. The Full Bench of the Madras High Court reported in In
re, Guruswami Tevar - ILR 1940 Mad 158 at page 170 (AIR
1940 Mad 196 at p.200) in its unanimous opinion stated that
no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when a dying
declaration should be accepted, except stating that each case
must be decided in the light of its own facts and other
circumstances. What all the Court has to ultimately conclude is
whether the Court is convinced of the truthfulness of the
statement, notwithstanding that there was no corroboration in
the true sense. The thrust was to the position that the Court
must be fully convinced of the truth of the statement and that
it should not give any scope for suspicion as to its credibility.
This Court noted that the High Court of Patna and Nagpur also
expressed the same view in the decisions reported in
Mohamad Arif vs. Emperor – AIR 1941 Pat.409 (J) and
Gulabrao Krishnajee vs. Emperor – AIR 1945 Nag. 153 (K).
15. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council while
dealing with a case, which went from Ceylon, which was based
on an analogous provision to Section 32(1) of the Indian
Evidence Act, took the view that apart from the evidence of
the deceased the other evidence was not sufficient to warrant
a conviction. It was, however, held that in that case when the
Criminal Appeal No.752 of 2008 15 of 30Page 16
statement of the deceased was received and believed as it
evidently was by the jury it was clear and unmistakable in its
effect and thereby, the conviction was fully justified and was
inevitable. The Judicial Committee noted that the factum of a
murderous attack, though resulted in the cutting of the throat
and the victim was not in a position to speak but yet by mere
signs she was able to convey what she intended to speak out,
and the said evidence was brought within the four corners of
the concept of dying declaration, which formed the sole basis
ultimately for the Court to convict the accused, which was also
confirmed by the Supreme Court of Ceylon, as well as by the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.
16. The author Phipson in his 9th Ed., of the book on
Evidence made the following observations:
"......The deceased then signed a statement
implicating the prisoner, but which was not elicited by
question and answer, and died on March 20. It was
objected that being begun in that form, it was
inadmissible:- Held (1) the questions and answers as
to his state of mind were no part of the dying
declaration; (2) that even if they were, they only
affected its weight, not its admissibility; and (3) that
the declaration was sufficient, without other evidence,
for conviction R. v. Fitzpatrick, (1910) 46 Ir. L.T. 173
(M)."
Criminal Appeal No.752 of 2008 16 of 30Page 17
17. After considering the above legal principles, this Court
has set down the following six tests to be applied for relying
upon a material statement as a dying declaration:
“16. On a review of the relevant provisions of the
Evidence Act and of the decided cases in the different
High Courts in India and in this Court, we have come
to the conclusion, in agreement with the opinion of the
Full Bench of the Madras High Court, aforesaid, (1)
that it cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law
that a dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of
conviction unless it is corroborated; (2) that each case
must be determined on its own facts keeping in view
the circumstances in which the dying declaration was
made; (3) that it cannot be laid down as a general
proposition that a dying declaration is a weaker kind of
evidence than other pieces of evidence; (4) that a
dying declaration stands on the same footing as
another piece of evidence and has to be judged in the
light of surrounding circumstances and with reference
to the principles governing the weighing of evidence;
(5) that a dying declaration which has been recorded
by a competent magistrate in the proper manner, that
is to say, in the form of questions and answers, and,
as far as practicable, in the words of the maker of the
declaration, stands on a much higher footing than a
dying declaration which depends upon oral testimony
which may suffer from all the infirmities of human
memory and human character, and (6) that in order to
test the reliability of a dying declaration, the Court has
to keep in view the circumstances like the opportunity
of the dying man for observation, for example,
whether there was sufficient light if the crime was
committed at night; whether the capacity of the man
to remember the facts stated had not been impaired
at the time he was making the statement, by
circumstances beyond his control; that the statement
has been consistent throughout if he had several
opportunities of making a dying declaration apart from
the official record of it; and that the statement had
been made at the earliest opportunity and was not the
Criminal Appeal No.752 of 2008 17 of 30
result of tutoring by interested parties.” (Emphasis
added)
18. We also wish to add that as on date, there is no
statutory prescription as to in what manner or the procedure
to be followed for recording a dying declaration to fall within
the four corners of Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. The
presence of Magistrate; certification of the doctor as to the
mental or the physical status of the person making the
declaration, were all developed by judicial pronouncements. As
has been repeatedly stated in various decisions, it will have to
be found out whether in the facts and circumstances of any
case the reliance placed upon by the prosecution on a
statement alleged to have been made by the deceased prior to
his death can be accepted as a dying declaration, will depend
upon the facts and circumstances that existed at the time of
making the statement. In that case it would mainly depend
upon the date and time vis-à-vis the occurrence when the
statement was alleged to have been made, the place at which
it was made, the person to whom the said statement was
made, the sequence of events, which led the person
concerned to make the statement, the physical and mental
condition of the person who made the statement, the cogency
with which any such statement was made, the attending
Criminal Appeal No.752 of 2008 18 of 30Page 19
circumstances, whether throw any suspicion as to the factum
of the statement said to have been made or any other factor
existing in order to contradict the statement said to have been
made as claimed by the prosecution, the nexus of the person
who made the statement to the alleged crime and the parties
involved in the crime, the circumstance which made the
person to come forward with the statement and last but not
the least, whether the said statement fully support the case of
the prosecution.
19. In this context, we can also make a reference to a
decision of this Court reported in Cherlopalli Cheliminabi
Saheb and another vs. State of Andhra Pradesh - (2003)
2 SCC 571, where it was held that it was not absolutely
mandatory that in every case a dying declaration should be
recorded only by a Magistrate. The said position was reiterated
in Dhan Singh vs. State of Haryana – (2010) 12 SCC 277
wherein, it was held that neither Section 32 of the Evidence
Act nor Section 162(2) of the Cr.P.C., mandate that the dying
declaration has to be recorded by a designated or particular
person and that it was only by virtue of the development of
law and the guidelines settled by the judicial pronouncements
that it is normally accepted that such declaration would be
Criminal Appeal No.752 of 2008 19 of 30Page 20
recorded by a Magistrate or by a doctor to eliminate the
chances of any doubt or false implication by the prosecution in
the course of investigation.
20. In a recent decision of this Court reported in Sri
Bhagwan vs. State of U.P. – 2012 (11) SCALE 734, to which
one of us was a party, dealt with more or less an identical
situation and held as under in paragraphs 21 and 22:
“21. As far as the implication of 162 (2) of
Cr.P.C. is concerned, as a proposition of law, unlike
the excepted circumstances under which 161
statement could be relied upon, as rightly
contended by learned senior counsel for the
respondent, once the said statement though
recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. assumes the
character of dying declaration falling within the four
corners of Section 32(1) of Evidence Act, then
whatever credence that would apply to a
declaration governed by Section 32 (1) should
automatically deemed to apply in all force to such a
statement though was once recorded under Section
161 Cr.P.C. The above statement of law would
result in a position that a purported recorded
statement under Section 161 of a victim having
regard to the subsequent event of the death of the
person making the statement who was a victim
would enable the prosecuting authority to rely upon
the said statement having regard to the nature and
content of the said statement as one of dying
declaration as deeming it and falling under Section
32(1) of Evidence Act and thereby commend all the
credence that would be applicable to a dying
declaration recorded and claimed as such.
Criminal Appeal No.752 of 2008 20 of 30Page 21
22. Keeping the above principle in mind, it can
be stated without any scope for contradiction that
when we examine the claim made on the statement
recorded by PW-4 of the deceased by applying
Section 162 (2), we have no hesitation in holding
that the said statement as relied upon by the trial
Court as an acceptable dying declaration in all force
was perfectly justified. We say so because no other
conflicting circumstance was either pointed out or
demonstrated before the trial Court or the High
Court or before us in order to exclude the said
document from being relied upon as a dying
declaration of the deceased. We reiterate that
having regard to the manner in which the said
statement was recorded at the time when the crime
was registered originally under Section 326 IPC
within the shortest time possible within which it
could be recorded by PW-4 in order to provide
proper medical treatment to the deceased by
sending him to the hospital, with no other intention
pointed out at the instance of the appellant to
discredit contents of the said statement, we hold
that the reliance placed upon the said statement as
the dying declaration of the deceased was perfectly
justified. Having regard to our above conclusion,
the said submission of the learned counsel for the
appellant also stands rejected.”
21. In the case on hand nothing was let in on the side of
the defence to contradict the presence of P.W.1 at the time of
occurrence, as well as subsequently when the deceased along
with the other injured persons, were taken to the police station
immediately after the occurrence. There was no reason to
doubt the presence of the deceased and the other injured
witnesses at the police station when the alleged statement
Ext.Ka-9 came to be recorded by P.W.6. A reference to the
Criminal Appeal No.752 of 2008 21 of 30
details contained in Ext.Ka-9 is in tune with what has been
narrated by the eye-witnesses P.Ws.1 to 3 before the Court.
There was nothing to contradict from the material available on
record in the form of evidence either documentary or oral in
order to hold that the deceased, could not have made the
statement before P.W.6. As has been noted by the courts
below, there was no delay involved in reporting the occurrence
to the police and the registration of the FIR. The further finding
of the courts below that there was no scope for any
manipulation at the instance of the police also strengthens the
reliance placed upon by the prosecution on Ext.Ka-9, by
treating the same as a dying declaration. When we apply
Section 162(2), the statute makes the position clear that the
statement as a dying declaration would squarely fall within the
said provision and has to only satisfy the stipulations
contained in Section 32(1).
22. Keeping the above factors in mind, when we apply
Section 32(1) to Ext.Ka-9 we find it, mentioned in every one of
the details of the case of the prosecution, which ultimately
resulted in the death of the deceased Zahiruddin, as well as
the injuries sustained by P.Ws.2 and 3, which fell for
consideration before the courts below. The very fact that the
Criminal Appeal No.752 of 2008 22 of 30Page 23
deceased who sustained such grievous injuries on the vital
parts of his body on 05.09.1997 at 3:00 pm, breathed his last
on 06.09.1997 at 3:30 pm, i.e. in a matter of 24 hours, was
sufficient to reach a conclusion that whether or not he was in
the expectation of his death, there could not have been any
scope to doubt the veracity of his statement as to the manner
in which the occurrence took place and the persons who were
responsible for the incident in question. Taking into account
the totality of the circumstances, namely, the motive behind
the incident, the mentioning of the names of the appellants
who were known to the deceased, as all of them belong to the
same village, the use of the weapons by the assailants, the
situation in which he was placed at the time when he made
the statement before P.W.6, where he could not have been
tutored to make the statement, having regard to the time
factor, the further statement of the doctor who issued the
postmortem certificate having come forward with an expert
opinion that in spite of the nature of injuries sustained the
deceased was fully capable of and was in a mind set to make a
statement, sufficiently demonstrated that Ext.Ka-9 was rightly
relied upon by the High Court as a dying declaration, squarely
falling within the statutory prescription of Section 32(1) of the
Criminal Appeal No.752 of 2008 23 of 30Page 24
Evidence Act, in order to rely upon the same for convicting the
appellants. We are, therefore, convinced that such reliance
placed upon by the High Court was perfectly justified and we
do not find any good grounds to differ from the same. We,
therefore, conclude and answer the said question in favour of
the prosecution.
23. When we come to the other question as to
whether
there was any controversy relating to the place of occurrence
in order to doubt the case of the prosecution, Mr. Jaspal Singh,
learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants contended
that in the FIR the complainant P.W.1 himself stated that he
came later and that the incident took place in his house; that
the staircase in the house was leading upto the first floor; that
the place where the incident took place was a narrow one; that
he was not certain as to whether all the accused opened fire or
one or two alone opened fire; that the firing took place only for
a minute; that when the accused entered the place P.Ws.2 and
3, as well as the deceased were facing north and that in
another place he stated that the deceased was present on the
roof and that no pellets were seen on the wall, nor any empty
cartridge was recovered. The learned counsel by referring to
the evidence of P.W.2 submitted that according to her she was
Criminal Appeal No.752 of 2008 24 of 30Page 25
in her house and that P.W.1 came later. It was pointed out that
the staircase inside the house led upto the second floor, while
P.Ws.2 and 3 and the deceased were in the Verandah of the
third floor, that the house of P.W.1 was on the eastern side of
the house of P.W.2, that the directions mentioned by her as to
how the parties were positioned at the time of occurrence,
were all circumstances, which go to show that there was no
cogency in the evidence of the so called eye-witnesses to
confirm that the occurrence took place at the place and in the
manner as narrated by them. 
24. While making reference to the above submissions, we
only state that all the above submissions were considered
threadbare by both the courts below. In the High Court the so
called contradictions referred to on behalf of the appellants
were considered in detail in the following paragraphs and
ultimately rejected by stating as under:
“Much emphasis was laid on the contradictions
regarding place of occurrence. According to the
prosecution case, the incident took place in the
verandah of the house. Some contradictory
statements have been given by the eyewitnesses
regarding the situation of verandah. The I.O. prepared
the site plan, Ext.Ka-6, in which he has marked the
place of occurrence by letter ‘X’. From letter ‘A’ the
accused persons had made fire, at place ‘P’ he got the
pellets and from place A-1, L, B, the witnesses had
Criminal Appeal No.752 of 2008 25 of 30
seen the occurrence. According to the site plan Ext.Ka-
6, the place of occurrence was the third floor of the
house. This house was three storied. The I.O. has
shown 1st floor, 2nd floor and 3rd floor in his site plan,
meaning thereby, technically speaking, the ground
floor has been shown as 1st floor and 1st floor as 2nd
floor and 2nd floor as 3rd floor. There was also
misunderstanding between eyewitnesses regarding
narration of the storeyes of the house. The witnesses
were the illiterate rustic villagers who did not know the
difference between storey and floor. The ground floor
is narrated as 1st storey or 1st floor. We are of the
opinion that the I.O. had made negligence in preparing
site plan and did not show important things in it. For
example, he has not shown the house of PW-1
Shamshuddin in the site plan. He has also not
described in the site plan that the 2nd and 3rd storey of
the house was in the level of agricultural field situate
towards west or the ground floor or 1st floor was
situate on the low level of the agricultural field situate
towards west or the ground floor or 1st floor was
situate on the low level of the agricultural field situate
towards west.
PW-1 Shamshuddin, the real brother of the deceased
has stated in his cross-examination that the house of
the deceased was three storeyed. There was a ‘Zeena’
in the second storey of the house but there was no
‘Zeena’ in the 2nd storey. Further he has stated that in
the 3rd storey there were three rooms and verandah
but later on he has stated that three rooms and
verandah were situated in the 2nd storey and in the 3rd
storey there were two rooms and one verandah, in
which the incident took place. Further, he has stated
that ‘Zeena’ was present on the second storey of the
house from where the accused persons entered the
Verandah.
PW-2 Smt. Zabira has stated in her cross-examination
that the third storey of the house was in the level of
agricultural field situate towards west. Further, she
has stated that the incident had taken place in the 3rd
storey of the house.
Criminal Appeal No.752 of 2008 26 of 30Page 27
PW-3 Smt. Shahnaz has stated in her crossexamination that in the second storey of the house
there was no room but it was in the shape of
verandah. Further, she has stated that the incident
had taken place in the 2nd storey of the house. Further,
she has stated that the ‘Zeena’ was situate in the 2nd
storey of the house, which was in the level of the
agricultural field situate towards west.
The learned Trial Court has made a detailed discussion
over the said contradictions and he has given a finding
that due to illiteracy and rustic background some
contradictions have come in their statements. The I.O.
found blood in the ‘Verandah’ of the third storey. He
also found some pellets there. He had prepared memo
Ext.Ka-7. It is also said that the incient had taken
place in the ‘Verandah’ of the third storey of the
house. PW-2 Smt. Zabira has clearly stated in her
cross-examination that at the time of the incident all
the injured were sitting in the ‘Verandah’ of the third
storey. Thus, the place of occurrence was not
doubtful.” 
25. Having considered the various facts noted by the Trial
Court and approved by the High Court in dealing with the
above submissions, we hold that the said submission does not
impress upon us in order to interfere with the judgment
impugned in this appeal. The said question is also, therefore,
answered against the appellants.
26. The next question that arises for consideration is as to
whether there was any doubt about the death of the deceased,
as submitted on behalf of the appellants. 
Mr. Jaspal Singh,
learned senior counsel in his submissions referred to the
Criminal Appeal No.752 of 2008 27 of 30
evidence of P.W.4, Dr. Irfan Ahmad, who examined the injured
including the deceased at 5:45 pm on 05.09.1997 and
contended that according to the doctor all the injuries were
caused by firearm, that such injuries might have been caused
from the distance of 40 feet, that the injuries were on the front
side, that there was no injury on the head as compared to the
evidence of P.W.5, the postmortem doctor, who stated
categorically that injury No.1 was on the right side of the head,
which might have been caused by Lathicharge, which was also
the version of P.W.3. The learned counsel made further
reference to Ext.A-18 by which the death of the deceased was
communicated by the doctor to the police station for
conducting a postmortem and the postmortem held on
07.09.1997. By making further reference to Ext.Ka-5, the
postmortem report, which was issued by U.H.M. Hospital,
Kanpur by one Dr. B.S. Chauhan while the name of P.W.5 the
postmortem doctor who gave evidence was mentioned as Dr.
P.V.S. Chauhan of Ursala Hospital, Kanpur, the learned counsel
submitted that there were serious doubts as to whether it
related to the corpse of the deceased and the concerned
postmortem report really related to the deceased Zahiruddin
in this case. Though, in the first blush, the said contention
Criminal Appeal No.752 of 2008 28 of 30Page 29
made on behalf of the appellants appear to be of some
substance, on a close reading of the evidence of P.Ws.4 and 5,
we find that such instances pointed out by learned counsel
were all of insignificant factors and based on such factors it
cannot be held that there was any doubt at all as to the death
of the deceased or the injuries sustained by him as noted by
P.W.4 in Exts.Ka-2, Ka-3 and Ka-4. Ext.Ka-3 is related to the
deceased. Ext.Ka-5 postmortem certificate was issued by
P.W.5. We should also state that nothing was put to the above
said witnesses with reference to those alleged doubts relating
to the death of the deceased Zahiruddin. We are not,
therefore, inclined to entertain the said submission at this
stage in order to find fault with the case of the prosecution.
27. With that when we come to the last of the submissions
made on behalf of the appellants, namely,
whether there was
any scope to hold that the offence would fall under Section
304 Part I or II and not under Section 302 IPC and that no other
offence was made out, 
we can straight away hold that having
regard to the extent of the injuries sustained by the deceased,
P.Ws.2 and 3 and the aggression with which the offence was
committed as against the victims, which resulted in the loss of
Criminal Appeal No.752 of 2008 29 of 30Page 30
life of one person considered along with the motive, which was
such a petty issue, we are of the firm view that there was
absolutely no scope to reduce the gravity of the offence
committed by the appellants. We are, therefore, not
persuaded to accept the said feeble submission made on
behalf of the appellants to modify the conviction and the
sentence imposed.
28. For all the above stated reasons, we do not find any
merit in this appeal. The appeal fails and the same is
dismissed. 
………….……….…………………………..J.
[Dr. B.S. Chauhan]
...……….…….………………………………J.
 [Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim
Kalifulla]
New Delhi;
July 02, 2013.
Criminal Appeal No.752 of 2008 30 of 30

Sunday, July 14, 2013

claimants are entitled to same compensation fixed already on relied judgement in the absence of negative grounds= in Balbir Singh’s case the value of the land was fixed to a sum of Rs.50,000/- per bigha. We are, therefore, of the view that while every other reasoning of the Division Bench in adopting the value, which was fixed in Balbir Singh’s case was justified, there is no need to deduct any amount from the said value, in as much as the exemplar relied upon by the Division Bench in Balbir Singh’s case, were all sale deeds pertaining to the period 18.01.1982 to 22.07.1983 i.e., prior to the very first notification issued in respect of the present acquisition of all the four villages viz., 01.08.1983, which notification pertains to the lands belonging to the appellants which were situated in Sahibabad Daulatpur village. = The appeals stand partly allowed by enhancing the compensation from Rs.42,000/- per bigha as determined by the Division Bench of the High Court to a sum of Rs.50,000/- per bigha, in respect of both categories of land. With the above modification in the rate of land value, the appeals stand partly allowed. Needless to add that appellants would be entitled for consequential benefits as per the law, if any.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40474
Page 1
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.949 OF 2005
Premwati …. Appellant
VERSUS
Union of India & Ors. ….Respondents
With
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2443 OF 2005
Rajinder Singh (D) by Lrs. …. Appellants
VERSUS
Delhi College of Engineering
….Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.
1. These two appeals arise out of a common judgment of the
Division Bench of Delhi High Court dated 07.02.2003, passed in
batch of first appeals commencing from RFA No.167 of 1991 etc.
We are concerned with the judgments passed in RFA No.132 of
1999, wherein the appellant in C.A.No.949 of 2005, was the
appellant before the High Court and RFA No.129 of 1999, wherein
Civil Appeal Nos.949 & 2443 of 2005 1 of 11Page 2
the appellant in C.A.No.2443 of 2005 was the appellant before
the High Court. The appellants were husband and wife. The
appellant in C.A.No.2443 of 2005, died during the pendency of
the appeal before the High Court and the appeal was pursued by
his LRs.
2. The question involved in these two appeals is about the value
of the land to be determined under the provisions of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). There
was a Notification under Section 4 of the Act, issued on
26.03.1983, followed by a Notification issued under Section 17(1)
of the Act, in respect of the lands situated in Shahibabad
Daulatpur, Khera Kalan, Siraspur and Samaipur villages. Under
Section 6 of the Act a declaration was also made on the same
date viz., 26.03.1983. The lands of the appellants before us were
all situated in the village Shahibabad Daulatpur. The extent of
land acquired from the appellants were 94 bighas and 2 biswas
bearing different Khasra Nos. covered by LAC case Nos.27 of 93
and 23 of 1993. The other extent of land was 4 biswas in Khasra
No.33/26, covered by LAC case Nos.28 of 1993 and 29 of 1993.
The concerned Awards were Award Nos.26/83-84 and 57/83-84
respectively. The Awards were dated 01.08.1983 and 26.09.1983
respectively. As per the Award, the value of the lands were fixed
Civil Appeal Nos.949 & 2443 of 2005 2 of 11Page 3
by the Acquisition Officer in a sum of Rs.13,000/- per bigha, in
respect of the lands falling under Block-A and Rs.6,000/- per
bigha, in respect of the lands falling under Block-B. The same
was the value fixed in Award No.57/83-84. Aggrieved by the
compensation fixed under the Award, the appellants preferred
LAC case Nos. 23, 27, 28 and 29 of 1993.
3. The reference Court by its judgment dated 07.01.1998,
determined the value in respect of both categories of land viz., A
and B in a sum of Rs.17,500/- per bigha and in respect of the
lands abutting the road in a sum of Rs.18,000/- per bigha. Before
the reference Court, the appellants initially claimed
compensation at the rate of Rs.50,000/- per bigha, but later on
they amended their petition and claimed the market value in a
sum of Rs.1,25,000/- per bigha. Aggrieved by the value fixed by
the reference Court, the appellants approached the High Court
and the High Court by the impugned judgment enhanced the
value to a sum of Rs.42,000/- per bigha. Aggrieved against the
same, the appellants have come forward with these appeals.
4. We have heard Mr.Sanjay Sharawat, learned counsel
appearing for the appellants and Ms.Rekha Pandey, learned
counsel for the respondent (s). We have also perused the Award,
Civil Appeal Nos.949 & 2443 of 2005 3 of 11Page 4
the judgment of the Reference Court, as well as that of the
Division Bench of the High Court and other material papers
placed before us.
5. Having considered the respective submissions and the
judgment impugned, along with the other material papers, we are
of the considered opinion that further enhancement to a marginal
extent can be justifiably granted in favour of the appellants.
6. When we perused the judgments of the Reference Court, we
find that on behalf of the appellants, four witnesses were
examined. P.W.1 Shri Jasbir Rana, is the son of the original
appellant Rajinder Singh, P.W.2 Shri Rehmat Ilahi, who was a
Reader in the Office of the Deputy Commissioner, Delhi at the
relevant time, P.W.3 Halqa Patwari Rajinder Singh, was examined
to show that Aks Sajra of village Shahibabad Daulatpur and P.W.4
Shri Jaswahar, was a witness from the Ministry of Urban
Development, Nirman Bhavan, New Delhi. On the side of the
respondents, no evidence was let in, while two documents were
tendered at the instance of the learned counsel for the
respondents. One of the documents was the judgment of the
Additional District Judge dated 30.03.1987, pertaining to the
same village, as well as the same notification dated 26.03.1983
Civil Appeal Nos.949 & 2443 of 2005 4 of 11Page 5
and the second document was a copy of the Award under
Reference being Award No.26/83-84 which were marked as Exs.
R1 and R2.
7. On behalf of the appellants reliance was placed upon an earlier
Division Bench decision of the Delhi High Court. While enhancing
the compensation to a sum of Rs.42,000/- per bigha, the High
Court relied upon its earlier judgment in Balbir Singh Vs. Union
of India dated 30.10.1991, in RFA No.810 of 1988, which was
reported in 50 (1993) DLT 40. In Balbir Singh’s case, the
question related to the value of the land in respect of the lands
acquired in Siraspur village for planned development of Delhi, in
particular for setting up an industrial estate. Notification under
Section 4 of the Act in that case was dated 27.07.1984 and the
total extent of land acquired was 2123 bighas and 5 biswas. The
land value fixed by the Acquisition Officer was Rs.17,000/- per
bigha for category A lands and Rs.13,000/- per bigha for category
B lands. The reference Court enhanced it to Rs.25,000/- per
bigha for A category and Rs.21,000/- per bigha for B category. In
respect of some of the lands in B category, it was fixed at
Rs.22,000/- per bigha. The High Court enhanced it to a sum of
Rs.50,000/- per bigha for leveled land and Rs.45,000/- per bigha
for the lands in depression.
Civil Appeal Nos.949 & 2443 of 2005 5 of 11Page 6
8. While fixing the land value at Rs.50,000/- per bigha in Balbir
Singh’s case, the High Court took into consideration the sale
deeds, which were executed between the periods 18.01.1982 to
22.07.1983, which was in the range of Rs.25,000/- to Rs.96,000/-
per bigha. Certain other considerations also weighed with the
High Court, while determining the land value in Balbir Singh’s
case, but we are not concerned with the same.
9. One other relevant factor which is required to be noted in the
case on hand was that though in Balbir Singh’s case, the lands
were actually situated in the revenue estate of Siraspur, the High
Court chose to rely on the same. In the case on hand, while
enhancing the value to Rs.42,000/-, the High Court applied the
rule of depreciated value, in as much as the acquisition in respect
of Siraspur village in Balbir Singh’s case was pursuant to
Section 4 Notification, dated 27.07.1984. It is relevant to note
that the present acquisition was made pursuant to Section 4
Notifications of August 1983 and September 1983. The Division
Bench therefore, deducted the value by 12% per annum on the
sum of Rs.50,000/- and arrived at Rs.42,000/- per bigha.
10. For applying the said rate, the Division Bench relied upon
another decision of the Delhi High Court in Bedi Ram Vs. Union
Civil Appeal Nos.949 & 2443 of 2005 6 of 11Page 7
of India and another, reported in 93 (2001) DLT 150, where the
lands situated in the estate of Samaipur, which was also one of
the villages governed by the present acquisition proceedings.
One other relevant factor which is required to be noted is that
P.W.3, who is Halqa Patwari, has deposed before the reference
Court and confirmed that the site plan marked as ‘E’ is the
correct consolidated site plan of village Samaipur and village
Shahibabad Daulatpur. He also further confirmed that the
boundaries of village Shahibabad Daulatpur and of village
Samaipur are adjoining and continuous. By relying upon the
testimony of P.W.1, the son of the appellant, as well as P.W.3 the
Halqa Patwari, it was contended that the lands of the two villages
viz., Shahhibabad Daulatpur and village Samaipur are adjoining
villages and, therefore, the market value of the lands of these
two villages cannot be different.
11. The High Court has in fact accepted the submission by
referring to village Siraspur with reference to the lands,
pertaining to the said village in Balbir Singh’s case, in which a
year later, the value of the land was fixed to a sum of Rs.50,000/-
per bigha.
Civil Appeal Nos.949 & 2443 of 2005 7 of 11Page 8
12. Keeping the above factors in mind, when we consider the
submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants, we find
that the reasoning of the Division Bench of the High Court in
having relied upon Balbir Singh’s case and Bedi Ram’s case
was perfectly justified. We would, however, hasten to add that
when once the Division Bench rightly felt that whatever was
decided in Balbir Singh’s case, so far as it related to the value
of the land fixed therein, can be applied even in respect of the
land situated in Shahibabad Daulatpur, which is an adjacent
village and the acquisition in respect of the lands in the said
village was made simultaneously along with the lands situated in
Samaipur and Siraspur villages, are of the considered opinion
that the same value, which was applied in Balbir Singh’s case
should have been applied even in respect of the lands belonging
to the appellants. We say so because, we find in Balbir Singh’s
case, while fixing the land value in a sum of Rs.50,000/- per
bigha, the High Court considered the various sale deeds of the
period between 18.01.1982 and 22.07.1983.
13. In the case on hand, we are concerned with the land situated
in Shahibabad Daulatpur village and the extent of land which
were acquired from the appellants was 94 bighas 2 biswas of
different Khasra Nos. covered by Award No.26/83-84 and 4
Civil Appeal Nos.949 & 2443 of 2005 8 of 11
Page 9
biswas in Khasra No.33/26, covered by Award No.57/83-84. Thus,
the extent of land acquired from the appellants were also
considerably large. The total extent of land thus, acquired in all
the four villages were around 785 bighas of continuous lands and
the acquisition was for the purpose of establishing the Delhi
Technological University.
14. We are, therefore, of the view that while every other
reasoning of the Division Bench in adopting the value, which was fixed in Balbir Singh’s case was justified, there is no need to
deduct any amount from the said value, in as much as the
exemplar relied upon by the Division Bench in Balbir Singh’s
case, were all sale deeds pertaining to the period 18.01.1982 to
22.07.1983 i.e., prior to the very first notification issued in
respect of the present acquisition of all the four villages viz.,
01.08.1983, which notification pertains to the lands belonging to
the appellants which were situated in Sahibabad Daulatpur
village. 
15. Therefore, even while confirming the reasoning of the
Division Bench in relying upon Balbir Singh’s case for
enhancing the value, we only modify the rate fixed by the
Division Bench to a sum of Rs.50,000/- per bigha instead of
Civil Appeal Nos.949 & 2443 of 2005 9 of 11
Page 10
Rs.42,000/- per bigha. With the modification only in respect to
the rate per bigha, in all other respects the Division Bench
decision deserves to be confirmed. We however, do not find any
merit in the claim of the appellants for claiming any further
enhancement beyond the sum of Rs.50,000/- per bigha, in as
much as there was absolutely no legally acceptable material in
support of any such claim.
16. The appeals stand partly allowed by enhancing the
compensation from Rs.42,000/- per bigha as determined by the
Division Bench of the High Court to a sum of Rs.50,000/- per
bigha, in respect of both categories of land. With the above
modification in the rate of land value, the appeals stand partly
allowed. Needless to add that appellants would be entitled for
consequential benefits as per the law, if any.
………….……….…………………………..J.
[Dr. B.S.Chauhan]
...……….…….………………………………J.
 [Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim
Kalifulla]
Civil Appeal Nos.949 & 2443 of 2005 10 of
11Page 11
New Delhi;
July 02, 2013.
Civil Appeal Nos.949 & 2443 of 2005 11 of
11

Mere Delay in sending FIR not fatal to the prosecution = where the FIR was actually recorded without delay and the investigation started on the basis of that FIR and there is no other infirmity brought to the notice of the Court then, however improper or objectionable the delay in receipt of the report by the Magistrate concerned be, in the absence of any prejudice to the accused it cannot by itself justify the conclusion that the investigation was tainted and the prosecution insupportable.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40473
Page 1
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1020 OF 2004
Sheo Shankar Singh …. Appellant
VERSUS
State of U.P. ….Respondent
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1021 OF 2004
Sarvajit Singh @ Sobhu …. Appellant
VERSUS
State of U.P. ….Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.
1. These appeals arise out of the common judgment dated
26.09.2003, by the High Court of Allahabad in Criminal Appeal
Nos.814 and 815 of 1981.
2. The appellant in Crl.A.No.814 of 1981 before the High Court is
the appellant before this Court in Crl.A.No.1021 of 2004. The
second appellant in Crl.A.No.815 of 1981 before the High Court is
the appellant before this Court in Crl.A.No.1020 of 2004. The
appellant in Crl.A.No.1020 of 2004, as well as one Harihar Singh
Criminal Appeal Nos.1020 & 1021 of 2004 1 of 21Page 2
were tried in Sessions Trial No.164 of 1979 and the appellant in
Crl.A.No.1021 of 2004, was tried in Sessions Trial No.228 of 1979.
All the accused were charged for an offence under Section 302
read with Section 34 of I.P.C. The present appellant in
Crl.A.No.1020 of 2004, as well as the appellant in Crl.A.No.1021 of
2004 were further charged for an offence under Section 379 of
I.P.C. All the three accused were awarded life imprisonment for
the charge under Section 302 read with Section 34 of I.P.C. and
the present appellants in these two appeals were further awarded
two years rigorous imprisonment for the charge under Section
379 of I.P.C. When Crl.A.No.815 of 1981 was pending before the
High Court, the first appellant Harihar Singh expired and his
appeal, therefore, stood abated as against him as per the order of
the High Court dated 11.02.2002.
3. It is in the above stated background, as on date, the appeal
relating to Sheo Shankar Singh, the appellant in Crl.A.No.1020 of
2004 and Sarvajit Singh @ Sobhu, appellant in Crl.A.No.1021 of
2004, only survive for consideration.
4. As the story of the prosecution goes, on 13.06.1979 at 3.30
p.m. at Badhwa Chau Muhanion Kachcha Road, by the side of the
godown of the Irrigation Department near the hovel of Vinod, the
deceased Lorik was travelling along with P.W.1 Rakesh Kumar his
Criminal Appeal Nos.1020 & 1021 of 2004 2 of 21Page 3
son, in a motorcycle bearing No.UTH 1287 as a pillion rider. The
accused Ranjit Singh along with his father Harihar Singh, his
brother Sarvajit Singh @ Sobhu and cousin Sheo Shankar Singh
alleged to have pounced upon P.W.1 Rakesh Kumar and the
deceased Lorik and stopped their motorcycle by catching hold of
its carrier. While P.W.1 attempted to drive fast, the accused
Harihar Singh exhorted his associates to kill the deceased,
whereupon, Ranjit Singh is stated to have fired a shot and the
same hit the deceased Lorik on his back. After receiving the
injuries, the deceased Lorik stated to have jumped from the
motorcycle and ran away shouting for help. As the deceased
Lorik jumped from the motorcycle, P.W.1 Rakesh Kumar lost his
balance, fell down and got his leg injured. Ranjit Singh armed
with a revolver and the remaining three accused with country
made pistols, stated to have attacked the deceased Lorik by firing
at him with their weapons and on receiving the injuries, Lorik fell
down a few paces ahead and when Ranjit Singh fired again, the
deceased is stated to have succumbed to the injuries
instantaneously. Thereafter, Ranjit Singh and the appellants
stated to have fled away from the scene of occurrence in the
motorcycle belonging to P.W.1 Rakesh Kumar while Harihar Singh
stated to have ran away from the scene of occurrence.
Criminal Appeal Nos.1020 & 1021 of 2004 3 of 21Page 4
5. On hearing the hue and cry, Ramjit (PW3) and Shyam Raj,
uncles of P.W.1 Rakesh Kumar and one Sheo Narain, who stated
to have witnessed the incident, reached the spot. P.W.1 lodged
the F.I.R. at Kotwali Police Station at 4.00 P.M., on the same day.
The police registered a case in the General Diary and the same is
marked as Exs.Ka12 and Ka13. The inquest report prepared by
the Investigating Officer (P.W.7) was marked as Ex.Ka14. The site
plan map was marked as Ex.Ka19. Dr.Virendra Srivastava at the
District Hospital, Ghazipur conducted the autopsy on the body of
the deceased on 14.06.1979 at 12.45 p.m. Blood stained clothes
and earth was sent for Serologist opinion and the blood group was
noted as ‘B’ as per Exs.Ka32 and Ka33.
6. P.Ws.1 and 3, Rakesh Kumar and Ramjit son and brother of the
deceased, were examined as eyewitnesses. Dr.P.N.Tandon,
Medical Officer at Ghazipur District Hospital, was examined as
P.W.2. P.W.2 examined P.W.1 at 4.30 p.m. and the injury report
was marked as Ex.Ka4. The postmortem report issued by P.W.4
Dr.Virendra Srivastava, was marked as Ex.Ka11. In the Section
313 questioning, while all the other accused pleaded not guilty
and claimed to be falsely implicated on account of enmity,
accused Sheo Shankar Singh contended that on the date of
occurrence, he had gone to attend a marriage in the house of
Criminal Appeal Nos.1020 & 1021 of 2004 4 of 21Page 5
D.W.1 Kanhaiya Singh at Singheri village, falling within the limits
of Madganj Police Station, Ghazipur district.
7. Based on the evidence placed before the Trial Court, the Trial
Court convicted the accused. Aggrieved over the same, they
preferred appeals before the High Court in Crl.A.Nos.814 and 815
of 1981 and the High Court having dismissed the appeals, the
appellants are before us.
8. We heard Mr.Mahavir Singh, learned senior counsel appearing
for the appellant in Crl.A.No.1020 of 2004 and Mr.Nagendra Rai
learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant in
Crl.A.No.1021 of 2004. The State was represented by Mr.Vivek
Vishnoi learned Standing Counsel for the State.
9. The sum and substance of the submissions made on behalf of
the appellants was that the non-recovery of the weapons and the
motorcycle disproves the case of the prosecution. The nonexamination of the so-called other eyewitnesses whose
statements were recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C., would
belie the case of the prosecution. The non-consideration of the
evidence of P.W.8 about the motorcycle, also vitiates the case of
the prosecution. The serious discrepancies, such as nonmentioning of the crime number and name in the vital
documents, as admitted by the Investigating Officer, create
Criminal Appeal Nos.1020 & 1021 of 2004 5 of 21
serious doubt about the case put-forth by the prosecution. Since,
admittedly the deceased Lorik was a history-sheeter and since no
independent eyewitnesses were examined who were stated to be
present at the time of occurrence, it will have to be held that the
prosecution roped in the appellants in a case of blind murder.
Therefore, it was contended for all the above discrepancies and
the evidence of the prosecution, not been properly appreciated
either by the Trial Court or by the High Court, the judgments
impugned are liable to be set aside.
10. As against the above submissions, the learned Counsel
appearing for the State would point out that none of the
submissions made on behalf of the appellants merit consideration,
inasmuch as, the Trial Court, as well as, the High Court have met
each one of the submissions effectively, while rejecting those
submissions.
11. The learned counsel appearing for the State also took us
through the evidence of eyewitnesses P.Ws.1 and 3, the evidence
of the Doctor P.W.2, the injuries sustained by P.W.1, as well as the
deceased and submitted that in the case on hand, the case of the
prosecution is supported by medical evidence as well and that,
the motive for the crime has been substantially established by the
prosecution. The learned State counsel, therefore, contended
Criminal Appeal Nos.1020 & 1021 of 2004 6 of 21Page 7
that none of the submissions made by the learned senior counsel
appearing for the appellants merited any consideration.
12. Having heard the learned senior counsel for the respective
appellants, the counsel for the State and having perused the
impugned judgments of the High Court, as well as that of the Trial
Court and all other material papers, before considering the
submissions made on behalf of the appellants, it will be necessary
to refer to the motive for the crime, as well as the injuries found
on the body of the deceased and P.W.1 for appreciating the
submissions.
13. As far as the motive is concerned, according to the
prosecution, one Raja of Ausanganj, a Zamindar, owned huge
properties with whom one Mukhchand, father of the deceased
Lorik, was employed as a gardener. On being satisfied with the
services of the said Mukhchand, the Zamindar gave him a land for
raising construction. Further as salary could not be paid to the
said Mukhchand by the Zamindar, the Zamindar allowed him to
segregate six bighas of land from the forest belonging to the
Zamindar for cultivation. The said Mukhchand cleared off six
bighas of land from the forest and stated to have started
cultivating the same and after his death, his son one Basu, started
working with the Zamindar. Since the price of the land increased
Criminal Appeal Nos.1020 & 1021 of 2004 7 of 21Page 8
by metes and bounds, the Zamindar wanted to reclaim the land,
which ended in a prolonged litigation and ultimately the deceased
and his brother stated to have succeeded in retaining the land.
Irked by the above result, the Zamindar who was nurturing a
grievance stated to have set up the accused who were local
gundas to get rid of the deceased, his brother and his family
members from the lands. It is stated that the accused started
intimidating the family members of the deceased, which gave rise
to frequent confrontation among the accused party and the party
of the deceased, who wanted to protect their property.
14. On 13.08.1974, the deceased along with his associates is
stated to have assaulted the accused Harihar Singh and a criminal
case was also lodged against him. It was in the above stated
background, it is stated that the accused party headed by Harihar
Singh, who were nurturing a long-standing grievance against the
deceased, engineered a plot to eliminate him, which resulted in
the ultimate murder of the deceased. The above fact was brought
about in evidence through P.W.3 and the Courts below have noted
that while cross-examining him, the said narration of facts relating
to the motive could be ascertained.
15. Keeping the above factors in mind and the alleged crime
committed by the appellants, when we deal with the submissions
Criminal Appeal Nos.1020 & 1021 of 2004 8 of 21Page 9
of the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants,
according to the learned counsel, it was a case of blind murder
since the deceased Lorik himself was a history-sheeter, which has
come out in the evidence of P.W.7, the Investigating Officer
himself and, therefore, the appellants and the other accused were
conveniently roped in taking advantage of the earlier tussle as
between the appellants and the deceased. According to the
learned senior counsel, as per the evidence of the Investigating
Officer himself, at the time of inspection of the place of
occurrence, apart from P.Ws. 1 and 3, the statement of one
Somraj and Shiv Narayan were recorded, but both of them were
not produced before the Court. It was, therefore, contended that
by examining the close relatives of the deceased alone and by not
examining those independent witnesses, it will have to be held
that the case of the prosecution was manipulated and that the
reliance placed upon the so called eye witnesses viz., P.Ws. 1 and
3, should not have formed the basis for the ultimate conviction of
the appellants.
16. In fact, the Trial Court, as well as the High Court have
specifically dealt with this very contention. The Trial Court, while
considering the said submission, has noted that according to the
investigating officer, when he approached those other witnesses,
Criminal Appeal Nos.1020 & 1021 of 2004
9 of 21Page 10
none of them were prepared to come and give evidence in the
Court and that they were not even prepared to disclose their
names and that having regard to the background of the accused
party who were notorious criminals, none of them were prepared
to risk their life and give evidence in the Court. The Trial Court
has also noted that the crime committed by the appellants in
shooting the deceased to death in the broad day light was so
gruesome, there was a fear complex set in the minds of the
people around that place and, therefore, mere non-examination of
the other independent witnesses in the absence of any lacuna in
the evidences of P.Ws.1 and 3, cannot be held to be disastrous to
the case of the prosecution. The said view was fully approved by
the High Court and, in our considered opinion, there is no reason
to take a different view than what has been held by the Courts
below. The said submission of the learned senior counsel,
therefore, stands rejected.
17. It was then contended that the material evidence viz., the
motorcycle in which the deceased is stated to have travelled as a
pillion rider along with his son P.W.1, was not produced and that
in that context, the evidence of P.W.8 was not properly
appreciated by the Courts below.
Criminal Appeal Nos.1020 & 1021 of 2004 10 of 21Page 11
18. When we refer to the evidence of P.W.8, we find that
according to him, he was the original owner of the vehicle and
that he sold the said vehicle to the deceased, which was
supported by Exs.Ka29, Ka30 and Ka31. In the cross-examination,
he stated that the vehicle was in the possession of the deceased
for 10 to 12 days and that due to non-payment of the remaining
amount, he took possession from the deceased and that
ultimately he dismantled the vehicle and disposed it of in
Kabarkhana.
19. The evidence of P.W.8, in so far as it related to the sale of the
vehicle in favour of the deceased is concerned, the same is borne
out by Exs.Ka29, Ka30 and Ka31. Ex.Ka29 is a receipt for
Rs.6,000/-. Ex.Ka30 is delivery proof by way of information to the
Regional Transport Officer and Ex.Ka31 is the transfer document.
Therefore, going by the initial statements of P.W.8 and the above
referred three documents, the fact was brought forth without any
scope of contradiction that the vehicle was sold to the deceased
Lorik. Insofar as the statement of P.W.8 that due to non-payment,
he took back the vehicle is concerned, except his ipse dixit, there
is nothing on record to support the said version. So far as nonproduction of the vehicle is concerned, even according to the
prosecution, the vehicle was stealthily removed by the accused
Criminal Appeal Nos.1020 & 1021 of 2004 11 of 21
after committing the crime of killing of the deceased. P.W.8
stated that the vehicle was dismantled and disposed of in
Kabarkhana. Therefore, if the prosecution was not able to
produce the vehicle for the above stated reasons, no fault can be
found with the prosecution on that score. When it is brought out
in evidence through P.W.1, as well as P.W.3 and the injury found
on the body of P.W.1 as mentioned by the Doctor who examined
him viz., P.W.2 that the injuries sustained by P.W.1 were due to
his fall from a running motorcycle, we do not find any discrepancy
in the evidence placed before the Court in that respect.
Therefore, the said submission of the learned senior counsel also
does not impress upon us to take a different view than what has
been held by the Courts below.
20. As far as the plea made on behalf of the appellant in
Crl.A.No.1020 of 2004 that he was not present at the time of the
occurrence and that he was attending a wedding in the place of
D.W.1 is concerned, we find that it was a desperate attempt made
on behalf of the appellant by raising the plea of alibi, which was
rightly rejected by the Courts below.
21. We have perused the evidence of D.W.1. We find that his
evidence was not precise in its substance in order to rely upon the
same for accepting the plea of alibi. According to D.W.1, his
Criminal Appeal Nos.1020 & 1021 of 2004 12 of 21Page 13
daughter got married on 12.06.1979 and that the marriage party
had arrived on 12.06.1979 and left his house on 14.06.1979. As
far as the appellant in Crl.A.No.1020 of 2004 is concerned,
according to D.W.1, though he was not related to him, his
acquaintance was through his grandfather and his father and
because of the said long standing friendship, the appellant stayed
in his house at 12.30 hours on 13.06.1979 and left his house only
by 5.00 P.M. on the said date. D.W.1 was tendered for
examination on 03.03.1981 i.e., nearly 1½ years after the date of
occurrence. In the cross examination, he admitted that nearly
400 people attended the wedding and that he is not in a position
to state as to who came at what time and remained in the
premises, where the wedding was held. He would further admit
that from the village to which the appellant belonged viz.,
Ghazipur, except the appellant, nobody else were known to him.
He also claimed that the appellant gifted Rs.51/- to his daughter,
which was recorded in a sheet of paper. He is stated to have
mentioned about the said fact to many others in his village.
22. When we considered the above version of D.W.1 in the
absence of any proof of wedding taken place either by way of
production of invitation card or the proof of registration of the
marriage of his daughter with any statutory authority or any other
Criminal Appeal Nos.1020 & 1021 of 2004 13 of 21Page 14
supporting evidence, it will be highly risky to rely upon such a
feeble evidence in order to accept the plea of alibi to discharge
the appellant from the alleged crime. It will have to be borne in
mind that the eyewitnesses to the incident specifically made a
mention about the presence of the appellant in Crl.A.No.1020 of
2004 and the overt act alleged against him in the matter of killing
of the deceased. The appellant was closely related to the first
accused and was stated to have been hand in glove in the
elimination of the deceased. Having regard to the various missing
links and lack of sufficient materials to support the version of
D.W.1, the Trial Court rightly rejected the said defence plea on
behalf of the appellant in Crl.A.No.1020 of 2004, which was also
approved by the High Court in the impugned judgment. We are
also fully convinced of the above conclusion and we are not
inclined to disturb the same.
23. Submissions were made on behalf of the appellants that there
were serious lacunae in the registration of the F.I.R. and its
dispatch and, therefore, the Courts below should not have
accepted the case of the prosecution.
24. When we perused the F.I.R. placed before us in the additional
documents, we find that while the occurrence had taken place at
3.30 p.m. on 13.06.1979, the same was reported at 1600 hours on
Criminal Appeal Nos.1020 & 1021 of 2004 14 of 21Page 15
the same date. The police station is hardly a mile away in the
western direction of the place of occurrence. It is also noted in
the F.I.R that after registration, it was dispatched from the police
station on 14.06.1979.
25. The learned counsel appearing for the State brought to our
notice that as far as the dispatch is concerned, even as per the
column found in the F.I.R., only the date of dispatch is required to
be noted and not the time, as compared to the date and time to
be recorded as regards the reporting of the crime. Therefore, due
to non-mentioning of the time of dispatch, no fault can be found
as regards the registration of the F.I.R.
26. The trial Court has noted that while the prosecution claimed
that the occurrence took place at 3.30 P.M., the medical records
and the evidence of P.W.2 Dr.P.N.Tandon, discloses that P.W.1
was examined by him on the same day viz., 13.06.1979 at 4.30
P.M. The Doctor has noted that the injury was fresh and that it
could have occurred within six-hour duration. The Doctor also
specifically answered to a question put to him that the injury
could have happened at 3.30 p.m. on that day. In the course of
cross examination, when the Doctor was asked as to how he was
so very definite as to the freshness of the injury, the Doctor
explained by stating that the freshness of the swelling can be
Criminal Appeal Nos.1020 & 1021 of 2004
known by the difference in the temperature at the spot of the
swelling, as compared to the temperature in the rest of the
portion of the body. The Doctor who is an independent
witness/officer can have no inner reason to depose against the
appellants. In the said circumstances, there can be no reason to
doubt the registration of the F.I.R., as contended on behalf of the
appellants. The said contention of the appellants also, therefore,
do not merit any consideration.
27. On behalf of the appellants, it was also contended that going
by the evidence of P.W.1, the deceased and P.W.1 started from
their residence as directed by the deceased towards the place of
occurrence and that P.W.1 was not aware for what purpose the
deceased started from the house and was proceeding in that
direction. The learned senior counsel contended that if in the said
situation, the occurrence had taken place, there could have been
no scope at all to invoke Section 34, as against the accused in
Crl.A.No.1021 of 2004, against whom there was no specific overt
act. In that context, the learned senior counsel contended that
while it was specifically alleged that the first accused Harihar
Singh and the other accused opened fire towards the deceased,
there was no reference to the appellant in Crl.A.No.1021 of 2004
to state that he used the weapon to the effect that he fired at the
Criminal Appeal Nos.1020 & 1021 of 2004 16 of 21Page 17
deceased. The learned senior counsel referred to the evidence of
P.W.1, as well as P.W.3 and pointed out that while P.W.1 has
stated that in the F.I.R., all the accused fired towards the
deceased, P.W.3 made it clear that out of the four accused, two
alone indulged in firing and that the appellant in Crl.No.1021 of
2004 viz., Sarvajit Singh did not involve himself in any such firing
activity. The learned senior counsel, therefore, contended that
when out of several persons, only one person opened firing,
common intention cannot be held to have been made out. The
learned senior counsel relied upon a decision of this Court in Md.
Rustam alias Rustam vs. The State of Bihar reported in AIR
2003 SC 562 for that purpose.
28. Having perused the evidence of P.W.3, we find that he did not
state that all the accused, including Sarvajit Singh made his
brother Lorik to run, when Ranjit Singh was holding the revolver
and the remaining three were holding country made pistols in
their hands. He further stated that out of the four persons, two
were firing viz., Ranjit Singh and Shiv Shankar Singh and on
suffering the injuries the deceased fell down that while Ranjit
Singh continued to fire and that where after the deceased died.
After the above said firing and the death of the deceased, while
Harihar Singh is stated to have proceeded towards South by foot,
Criminal Appeal Nos.1020 & 1021 of 2004 17 of 21Page 18
the other three stated to have fled away in the motorcycle in
which the deceased and P.W.1 travelled. Accepting the said
version of P.W.3, we find that there was a specific statement
made to the effect that the deceased was made to run by all the
four accused who were holding weapons and all the four of them
were firing towards the deceased. He would further state that
while initially all the four were firing towards the deceased,
subsequently two of them viz., Ranjit Singh and Shiv Shankar
Singh, continued to fire towards the deceased and at the end,
Ranjit Singh alone fired indiscriminately in order to ensure that
the deceased succumbed to the injuries. Therefore, it is not as if
P.W.3 has merely stated that except two of the accused, the
others did not fire at the deceased. According to him, all the four
accused opened fire towards the deceased, who started to run
and after the initial firing, two of the accused continued to fire
pursuant to which the deceased fell down and finally, Ranjit Singh
ensured that the deceased lost his breath.
29. Therefore, invoking of Section 34 was fully made out and the
submissions to the contrary cannot be countenanced. The
decision relied upon by the learned senior counsel, therefore,
does not in any way support the case of the appellants.
Criminal Appeal Nos.1020 & 1021 of 2004 18 of 21Page 19
30. One other submission made on behalf of the appellants was
that in the absence of any proof of forwarding the F.I.R. copy to
the jurisdiction Magistrate, violation of Section 157 of Cr.P.C. has
crept in and thereby, the very registration of the F.I.R. becomes
doubtful. The said submission will have to be rejected, in as much
as the F.I.R. placed before the Court discloses that the same was
reported at 4.00 p.m. on 13.06.1979 and was forwarded on the
very next day viz., 14.06.1979. Further, a perusal of the
impugned judgments of the High Court, as well as the Trial Court
discloses that no case of any prejudice was shown nor even raised
on behalf of the appellants based on alleged violation of Section
157 Cr.P.C. Time and again, this Court has held that unless
serious prejudice was demonstrated to have been suffered as
against the accused, mere delay in sending the F.I.R. to the
Magistrate by itself will not have any deteriorating effect on the
case of the prosecution. Therefore, the said submission made on
behalf of the appellants cannot be sustained. In this context, we
would like to refer to a recent decision of this Court in Sandeep
vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2012) 6 SCC 107
wherein the said position has been explained as under in
paragraph Nos.62 and 63 :
“62. It was also feebly contended on behalf of the
appellants that the express report was not
Criminal Appeal Nos.1020 & 1021 of 2004 19 of 21Page 20
forwarded to the Magistrate as stipulated under
Section 157, Cr.P.C. instantaneously. According to
learned counsel FIR which was initially registered
on 17.11.2004 was given a number on 19.11.2004
as FIR No.116 of 2004 and it was altered on
20.11.2004 and was forwarded only on 25.11.2004
to the Magistrate. As far as the said contention is
concerned, we only wish to refer to the reported
decision of this Court in Pala Singh and Another v.
State of Punjab wherein this Court has clearly held
that (SCC p.645, para 8)
where the FIR was
actually recorded without delay and the
investigation started on the basis of that FIR and
there is no other infirmity brought to the notice of
the Court then, however improper or objectionable
the delay in receipt of the report by the Magistrate
concerned be, in the absence of any prejudice to
the accused it cannot by itself justify the
conclusion that the investigation was tainted and
the prosecution insupportable. 
63. Applying the above ratio in Pala Singh to the
case on hand, while pointing out the delay in the
forwarding of the FIR to the Magistrate, no
prejudice was said to have been caused to the
appellants by virtue of the said delay. As far as
the commencement of the investigation is
concerned, our earlier detailed discussion
discloses that there was no dearth in that aspect.
In such circumstances we do not find any
infirmity in the case of the prosecution on that
score. In fact the above decision was
subsequently followed in Sarwan Singh & Ors. Vs.
State of Punjab, Anil Rai Vs. State of Bihar and
Aqeel Ahmad Vs. State of U.P.”
31. Having regard to our above conclusions, we do not find any
merit in these appeals. The appeals fail and the same are
dismissed.
Criminal Appeal Nos.1020 & 1021 of 2004

32. The appellants are on bail. The bail bonds stand cancelled and
they shall be taken into custody forthwith to serve out the
remaining part of sentence, if any.
………….……….…………………………..J.
[Dr. B.S. Chauhan]
...……….…….………………………………J.
 [Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim
Kalifulla]
New Delhi;
July 02, 2013.
Criminal Appeal Nos.1020 & 1021 of 2004 21 of 21

Enhancement of compensation - insurance claim = we find no ground shown by the Tribunal or the High Court in providing pecuniary and non­ pecuniary damages at a lower rate.= From the High Court's judgment and award passed by the Tribunal it is clear that the claimant placed evidence to suggest that the cost of prosthesis was Rs.75,000/­ . It was accepted at Bar that the cost of prosthesis was Rs.1,60,000/­. Inspite of the same the Tribunal did not chose to allow any amount towards prosthesis and the High Court allowed a petty amount of Rs.50,000/­ for the same. No separate amount has been allowed towards travelling to the Hospitals though the claimant was required to go to attend the Hospital every 10 days for treatment. We further find that a meager sum of Rs.25,000/­ has been allowed by the High Court towards pain and suffering. 18. Having regards to the fact that the Tribunal and the High Court have not allowed reasonable amount for different pecuniary and the non­pecuniary damages, we, therefore, with a view to do complete justice to the claimant re­ determined the amount of compensation on the following terms: Pecuniary damages (Special damages) (i) Expenses relating to treatment,hospitalisation, medicines,transportation, nourishing food, and miscellaneous expenditure. (medical expenses Rs.15,000 + Attendant Rs.15,000 + cost of prosthesis Rs.75,000) Rs.1,05,000 (ii) Loss of earnings (and other gains) which the injured would have made had he not been injured, comprising: 12Page 13 (a) Loss of earning during the period of treatment; (b) Loss of future earnings (on account of 70% permanent disability taking multiplier of 16) Rs.4,500 Rs.6,04,800 (iii) Future medical expenses. Rs.50,000 Non­pecuniary damages (General damages) (iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma as a consequence of the injuries. Rs.1,00,000 (v) Loss of amenities Rs.2,00,000 (vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of normal longevity) Rs.1,00,000 Total Rs.11,64,300 The respondent Insurance Company is directed to pay the claimant­appellant a sum of Rs.11,64,300/­ minus the amount already paid pursuant to the order passed by the Tribunal within three months from the date of judgment with interest @ 12%. The order passed by the High Court and Tribunal stands modified to the extent above. The appeal filed by the claimant is allowed with the above observation and direction. No separate order as to costs.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40489
Page 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.   4814         OF 2013
(arising out of SLP(C)No.6282 of 2011)
NEERUPAM  MOHAN MATHUR …. APPELLANT
VERSUS
NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO.                       ….RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.
Leave granted.
2. The present appeal is filed by the claimant­appellant
against  the  judgment   of  Punjab   and   Haryana   High  Court   at
Chandigarh   in   FAO   No.693   of  1989,   whereby   the   High   Court
granted a meager enhancement in the amount of compensation
awarded   to   him   by   the   Motor   Accident   Claims   Tribunal
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal').
3. The facts involved in the present case are as follows:
The   claimant   was   employed   as   a   'Product   Design
Engineer' in M/s. Utility Engineers (India) Ltd. Dharuhera,
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District Mohindergarh, Haryana.   The employer had arranged
for     a   Chartered   Bus   belonging   to   M/s.   National   Tours   &
Travels,   F­4,   East   of   Kailash,   New   Delhi,   2nd  respondent
before   the   Tribunal   for   carrying   the   employees   to   the
factory   at   Dharuhera     and   back;   one   Pritam   Singh,   1st
respondent before the Tribunal was the driver of the said
bus.   On   2nd  September,   1987,   the   claimant   along   with   his
colleagues   was   coming   back   from   Dharuhera   in   the   said
Chartered Bus bearing Registration No.DBP­805. At about 6
p.m.  when the said Bus reached near the turning of village
Shikohpur on Gurgaon­Jaipur Highway, it came across a truck
coming from opposite direction which was crossing  a camel
cart in front of it.  Pritam Singh, who was driving the bus
at   a   very   high   speed,   carelessly,   rashly   and   negligently
attempted to cross the above said truck without keeping the
Bus   to   the   extreme   left   hand   side.   This   resulted   in   a
collision   of   right   hand   side   of   the   bus   with   the   truck,
which resulted in severance of right hand of the claimant
who was sitting in the right side of the bus.   The said
accident   and   the   mishappenings   thereto   were   witnessed   by
the occupants of the bus.  One Anil Kumar,    PW­3, who was
also travelling in the said Chartered Bus at the time of
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the said accident, took the claimant to the Civil Hospital,
Gurgaon  from   where   he   was   given  medical  first­aid   and   he
was   referred   to   Safdarjang   Hospital,   New   Delhi.     The
claimant was later on transferred to ‘Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia
Hospital’, New Delhi and thereafter he was also treated in
different Hospitals at various stages.  The matter was also
reported to the Police by Anil Kumar, PW­3.
4. The cliamant filed a petition under Section 110­A of
the   Motor   Vehicles   Act,   1988   claiming   Rs.12   lacs   as   the
compensation   for   the   loss   of   the   right   hand   which   was
amputated near the shoulder, on various counts.
5. The   respondents   contested   the   claim   of   the   claimant.
The Tribunal after perusing oral and documentary evidence
held that the accident took place due to rash and negligent
driving   by   Driver,   Pritam   Singh   of   Bus   No.DBP­805.     The
Issue   No.1   was   thus   decided   in   favour   of   the   claimant.
While   assessing   the   compensation   under   Issue   No.2,   the
Tribunal   awarded   a   compensation   of   Rs.3,20,000/­   with
interest at the rate of 12%  per annum.
6. In the appeal preferred by the claimant the High Court
taken   a   loss   of   earning   capacity   to   70%   in   view   of
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permanent   disability   of   right   hand.   Based   on   salary   of
Rs.3,000/­ per month as claimed by the claimant adding 50%
on the same for future prospects of increase and applying
multiplier   of   16,   compensation   amount   was   raised   to
Rs.4,500/­ with interest at 6% from the date of petition.
The   High   Court   made   the   following   observation   while
granting compensation against different heads:
“4. In my view, the issue relating to death or injury
would   have   no   serious   difference   in   the   choice   of
multiplicand   or   the   multiplier.   If   at   all,   case   of
injury that completely disables a person for life is
more   poignant   than   a   case   of   death   and   that   is   why
Courts   do   not   always   provide   for   deductions   for
personal expenses in case claims for injuries. Indeed,
the deduction itself will be meaningless for unlike a
case of death, we need to make provision for his own
living   as   well   as   the   living   of   persons,   who   are
dependent   on   injured   person.   The   loss   in   case   of
injury   where   there   is   an   amputation   and   there   is   a
high   percentage   of   loss of   earning   capacity,   in   my
view, the principle laid down in Sarla Verma providing
for a prospect of future increase in salary cannot be
ruled out. I would, therefore, take the multiplicand
to be Rs.4,500/­ which is the salary of Rs.3,000/­ per
month   plus   50%   of   the   same   for   future   prospects   of
increase.   For   a   person,   who   was   aged   32   years,   the
appropriate multiplier ought to have been 16 and not
15 and I would, therefore, take the annual income to
be   Rs.54,000/­   and   adopting   a   multiplier   of   16,   I
would   take   the   income   to   be   Rs.8,64,000/­.   Having
regard   to   the   fact   that   I   have   taken   the   loss   of
earning capacity to be 70%, the amount that would bear
to   70%   of   Rs.8,64,000/­   is   the   amount   that   shall
become payable for loss of earning capacity. The loss
of   income   will   be   Rs.6,04,800/­.   I   shall   retain   the
medical   expenses   of   Rs.10,000/­,   Rs.15,000/­   for
attendant's   charges   and   Rs.25,000/­   as   provided   for
pain   and   suffering   by   the   Tribunal.  If   the   same  are
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retained, the amounts will add to Rs.6,54,800/­. The
learned counsel would contend that although there was
evidence placed before the Tribunal that the cost of
prosthesis was Rs.75,000/­, no amount had been granted
towards the same. The learned counsel would also state
across the bar that the present cost is Rs.1,60,000/­.
There is no definite evidence on the same and I would
take   the   cost   to   be   Rs.50,000/­   which   although   the
Tribunal   did   not   provide   for.   I   would   provide   as
necessary   equipment   that   he   may   require   for   fending
himself.   The   learned   counsel   states   that   if   the
prosthesis were to be fixed, the disability would even
be less. In my view, it will make a minimal difference
for   a   prosthesis   is   more   for   cosmetic   value   than   a
major functional adjunct. Sense of touch, ability to
pinch,   ability   to   push,  ability  to   pick  up,  are  all
factors which go into the making of disability, all of
which do not get improved by a prosthesis. All told,
the   amount   that   shall   become   payable   in   the   manner
worked   out   by   me   would   add   to   Rs.7,04,800/­.   The
Tribunal   has   already   awarded   Rs.3,20,000/­   and   the
amount   in   excess   of  what   is  awarded  by   the   Tribunal
shall be paid by the insurer with interest at 6% from
the   date   of   the   petition   till   the   date   of
realization.”
7. The   claimant   has   challenged   the   order   passed   by   the
High Court on three counts namely:
(i) The permanent disability has been wrongly assessed
at 70% which should have been 100% in the case of the
claimant.
(ii)   The   lower   amount   has   been   paid   towards   cost   of
prosthesis and
(iii)   Lesser   amounts   have   been   allowed   towards
pecuniary and non­pecuniary damages.
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8. Per   contra   according   to   the   learned   counsel   for   the
Insurer,   the   High   Court   allowed   higher   amount   than   the
amount of compensation to which claimant was entitled.
9. In the case of claimant, the High Court for determining
the   earning   capacity   adopted   the   percentage   of   loss   of
earning capacity as per the Workmen's Compensation Act and
has taken a loss of earning capacity to 70% for amputation
of arm above elbow.
10. Admittedly, claimant is a graduate in Science from Agra
University and Post Graduate Diploma holder in Mechanical
Engineering   with   specialization   in   Refrigeration   and   Air­
conditioning.   He was a young man of 32 years at the time
of accident.  Before the Tribunal, the claimant appeared as
PW­4 and stated that he had worked with many companies like
Blue Star, etc. and has extensive experience. Ultimately he
joined M/s. Utility Engineers (India) Ltd. on 1st September,
1986 as Product and Development Engineer and  was promoted
from Middle Management Group to Senior Management Group on
the   basic   pay   of   Rs.1400/­   to   Rs.1500/­   plus   other
incidental benefits like special increment of Rs.100.   At
the time of accident, he was drawing basic pay of Rs.1900/­
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plus   other   incidental   benefits   total   amounting   to   about
Rs.3,000/­   per   month.     His   job   was   designing   of   air­
conditioning project.
11. According to claimant the normal expectancy of life is
70 years and he was expected to earn up to the said age as
a   specialist   in   designing,   refrigeration   and   air
conditioning.   After loss of the right arm due to accident
he   has   become   100%   disabled   as   his   earning   capacity   has
gone   down   to   zero   in   doing   the   specialized   work   like
designing,   refrigeration   and   air   conditioning.     The
accident   has   completely   jeopardized   his   mastery   on   the
subject   and   his   chances   of   future   promotion   and
professional engagements have been virtually vanished.
12. The   question   regarding   “Assessment   of   future   loss   of
earnings   due   to   permanent   disability”   was   considered   by
this Court in Raj Kumar vs. Ajay Kumar and Another,  (2011)
1 SCC 343, wherein this Court held as follows:
“8.  Disability refers to any restriction or lack of
ability   to   perform   an   activity   in   the   manner
considered   normal   for   a   human   being.   Permanent
disability refers to the residuary incapacity or loss
of use of some part of the body, found existing at
the end of the period of treatment and recuperation,
after   achieving   the   maximum   bodily   improvement   or
recovery which is likely to remain for the remainder
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life of the injured. Temporary disability refers to
the   incapacity   or   loss   of   use   of   some   part   of   the
body  on  account  of  the   injury,  which  will  cease  to
exist   at   the   end   of   the   period   of   treatment   and
recuperation.   Permanent   disability   can   be   either
partial or total. Partial permanent disability refers
to a person's inability to perform all the duties and
bodily   functions   that   he   could   perform   before   the
accident, though he is able to perform some of them
and is still able to engage in some gainful activity.
Total   permanent   disability   refers   to   a   person's
inability   to   perform   any   avocation   or   employment
related activities as a result of the accident. The
permanent   disabilities   that   may   arise   from   motor
accident   injuries,   are   of   a   much   wider   range   when
compared   to   the   physical   disabilities   which   are
enumerated   in   the   Persons   with   Disabilities   (Equal
Opportunities,   Protection   of   Rights   and   Full
Participation) Act, 1995 (“the Disabilities Act”, for
short). But if any of the disabilities enumerated in
Section 2(i) of the Disabilities Act are the result
of injuries sustained in a motor accident, they can
be permanent disabilities for the purpose of claiming
compensation.
9.  The   percentage   of   permanent   disability   is
expressed by the doctors with reference to the whole
body,   or   more   often   than   not,   with   reference   to   a
particular limb. When a disability certificate states
that the injured has suffered permanent disability to
an extent of 45% of the left lower limb, it is not
the same as 45% permanent disability with reference
to the whole body. The extent of disability of a limb
(or   part   of   the   body)   expressed   in   terms   of   a
percentage   of   the   total   functions   of   that   limb,
obviously   cannot   be   assumed   to   be   the   extent   of
disability   of   the   whole   body.   If   there   is   60%
permanent   disability   of   the   right   hand   and   80%
permanent   disability   of   left   leg,   it   does   not   mean
that   the   extent   of   permanent   disability   with
reference to the whole body is 140% (that is 80% plus
60%).   If   different   parts   of   the   body   have   suffered
different percentages of disabilities, the sum total
thereof   expressed   in   terms   of   the   permanent
disability   with   reference   to   the   whole   body   cannot
obviously exceed 100%.
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10. Where the claimant suffers a permanent disability
as   a   result   of   injuries,   the   assessment   of
compensation   under   the   head   of   loss   of   future
earnings would depend upon the effect and impact of
such   permanent   disability   on   his   earning   capacity.
The   Tribunal   should   not   mechanically   apply   the
percentage of permanent disability as the percentage
of economic loss or loss of earning capacity. In most
of the cases, the percentage of economic loss, that
is,   the   percentage   of   loss   of   earning   capacity,
arising from a permanent disability will be different
from   the   percentage   of   permanent   disability.   Some
Tribunals   wrongly   assume   that   in   all   cases,   a
particular   extent   (percentage)   of   permanent
disability   would   result   in   a   corresponding   loss   of
earning   capacity,   and   consequently,   if   the   evidence
produced show 45% as the permanent disability, will
hold   that   there   is   45%   loss   of   future   earning
capacity. In most of the cases, equating the extent
(percentage)   of   loss   of   earning   capacity   to   the
extent   (percentage)   of   permanent   disability   will
result   in   award   of   either   too   low   or   too   high   a
compensation.
11.  What requires to be assessed by the Tribunal is
the effect of the permanent disability on the earning
capacity of the injured; and after assessing the loss
of earning capacity in terms of a percentage of the
income, it has to be quantified in terms of money, to
arrive   at   the   future   loss   of   earnings   (by   applying
the standard multiplier method used to determine loss
of   dependency).   We   may   however   note   that   in   some
cases,   on   appreciation   of   evidence   and   assessment,
the Tribunal may find that the percentage of loss of
earning   capacity   as   a   result   of   the   permanent
disability,   is   approximately   the   same   as   the
percentage of permanent disability in which case, of
course, the Tribunal will adopt the said percentage
for determination of compensation. (See for example,
the decisions of this Court in Arvind Kumar Mishra v.
New   India   Assurance   Co.   Ltd.  and  Yadava   Kumar  v.
National Insurance Co. Ltd.)”
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13. In   the   present   case,   the   percentage   of   permanent
disability   has   not   been   expressed   by   the   Doctors   with
reference   to   the   full   body   or   with   reference   to   a
particular limb.   However, it is not in dispute that the
claimant suffered such a permanent disability as a result
of   injuries   that   he   is   not   in   a   position   in   doing   the
specialized   job   of   designing,   refrigeration   and   air
conditioning.     For   the   said   reason,   claimant's   services
were terminated by his employer but that does not mean that
the claimant is not capable to do any other job including
the desk job.  Having qualification of B.SC degree and Post
Diploma   in   Mechanical   Engineering   he   can   perform   any   job
where   application   of   mind   is   required   than   any   physical
work.
14. In view of the forgoing discussion we find no grounds
made out to interfere with the finding of the High Court
which determined the percentage of loss of earning capacity
to 70% adopting the percentage of loss of earning capacity
as per the Workmen's Compensation Act.   The total loss of
income   thus   rightly   calculated   by   the   High   Court   at
Rs.6,04,800/­.
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15. However   from   the   award   passed   by   the   Tribunal   and
judgment   rendered   by   the   High   Court,   we   find   no   ground shown   by   the   Tribunal   or   the   High   Court   in   providing pecuniary   and   non­ pecuniary   damages   at   a   lower   rate.
Against some of the heads even no amount has been allowed.
16. The Tribunal in its award has noticed that the claimant
had to go to Hospital every 10 days for treatment. He was
admitted in different Hospitals and was under treatment as
indoor patient for about one and a half months.  Claimant's
hand was amputated and skin was grafted.   Inspite of the
same,   no   amount  has  been   allowed   towards   loss   of   earning
during   the   period   of   treatment   nor   any   amount   allowed
towards future medical expenses.  
17. From the High Court's judgment and award passed by the
Tribunal it is clear that the claimant placed evidence to
suggest  that   the   cost   of   prosthesis  was  Rs.75,000/­  .  
 It
was   accepted   at   Bar   that   the   cost   of   prosthesis   was
Rs.1,60,000/­.   
Inspite  of   the   same  the  Tribunal   did   not
chose to allow any amount towards prosthesis and the High
Court allowed a petty amount of Rs.50,000/­ for the same.
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No separate amount has been allowed towards travelling to
the   Hospitals   though   the   claimant   was   required   to   go   to
attend   the   Hospital   every   10   days   for   treatment.    
 We
further   find   that   a   meager   sum   of   Rs.25,000/­   has   been
allowed by the High Court towards pain and suffering.  
18. Having regards to the fact that the Tribunal and the
High Court have not allowed reasonable amount for different
pecuniary   and   the   non­pecuniary   damages,   we,   therefore,
with   a   view   to   do   complete   justice   to   the   claimant   re­
determined   the   amount   of   compensation   on   the   following
terms:
Pecuniary damages (Special damages)
(i) Expenses   relating   to
treatment,hospitalisation,
medicines,transportation,
nourishing   food,   and
miscellaneous expenditure.
(medical   expenses
Rs.15,000   +   Attendant
Rs.15,000   +   cost   of
prosthesis Rs.75,000)
Rs.1,05,000
(ii) Loss   of   earnings   (and
other   gains)   which   the
injured   would   have   made
had   he   not   been   injured,
comprising:
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(a) Loss of earning during
the period of treatment; 
(b)   Loss   of   future
earnings   (on   account   of
70%   permanent   disability
taking multiplier of 16)
Rs.4,500
Rs.6,04,800
(iii) Future   medical   expenses. Rs.50,000
Non­pecuniary damages (General damages)
(iv) Damages   for   pain,
suffering   and   trauma
as a consequence of the
injuries.
Rs.1,00,000
(v) Loss of amenities Rs.2,00,000
(vi) Loss of expectation of
life   (shortening   of
normal longevity)
Rs.1,00,000
Total            Rs.11,64,300
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19. The respondent Insurance Company is directed to pay the
claimant­appellant a sum of Rs.11,64,300/­ minus the amount
already paid pursuant to the order passed by the Tribunal
within three months from the date of judgment with interest
@   12%.   The   order   passed   by   the   High   Court   and   Tribunal
stands   modified  to   the   extent   above.   The   appeal  filed   by
the   claimant   is   allowed   with   the   above   observation   and
direction. No separate order as to costs.  
 ………..……………....…………………………..J.
(G.S. SINGHVI)
….......……………………………………………….J.
    (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)
NEW DELHI,
July 1,  2013.
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