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Saturday, April 20, 2013

BELLARY MINING LEASES = M/s. Bellary Iron Ore Pvt. Ltd., M/s. Mahabaleswarapa & Sons, M/s. Ananthapur Mining Corporation and M/s. Obulapuram Mining Company Pvt. Ltd.= The “Category-A” comprises of (a) working leases wherein no illegality/marginal illegality have been found and (b) non working leases wherein no marginal/illegalities have been found. The number of such leases comes to 21 & 24 respectively. 29. “Category-B” comprises of (a) mining leases wherein illegal mining by way of (i) mining pits outside the sanctioned lease areas have been found to be up to 10% of the lease areas and/ or (ii) over burden/waste dumps outside the sanctioned lease areas have been found to be up to 15% of the lease areas and (b) leases falling on interstate boundary between Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh and for which survey sketches have not been finalized. For specific reasons as mentioned in the statement of “Category-B” leases, M/s. S.B. Minerals (ML No. 2515), M/s. Shantalaxmi Jayram (ML No. 2553), M/s. Gavisiddeshwar Enterprises (ML No. 80) and M/s. Vibhutigudda Mines (Pvt.) Ltd. (ML No. 2469) have been assigned in “Category-B”. The numbers of such leases in “Category-B” comes to 72. 30. The “Category-C” comprises of leases wherein (i) the illegal mining by way of (a) mining pits outside the sanctioned lease area have been found to be more than 10% of the lease area and/or (b) over burden/waste dumps outside the sanctioned lease areas have been found to be more than 15% of the lease areas and/or (ii) the leases found to be involved in flagrant violation of the Forest (Conservation) Act and/or found to be involved in illegal mining in other lease areas. The number of such leases comes to 49.= We, therefore, order for the complete closure of the Category ‘C’ mines and for necessary follow up action in terms of the recommendations of the CEC in this regard, details of which have already been extracted in an earlier part of this order. - The operation of the 7 leases placed in “B” category situated on or nearby the KarnatakaAndhra Pradesh inter-State boundary will remain suspended until finalisation of the inter-State boundary dispute whereupon the question of commencement of operations in respect of the aforesaid 7 leases will be examined afresh by the CEC. -(12) The recommendations made in paragraph XI (grant of fresh leases) and paragraph XII (in respect of pending applications for grant of mining leases) of the CEC’s Report dated 3.2.2012 (Pg. 59) are not accepted. In view of the discussions and conclusions in para 44 of the present order, this Court’s order dated 02.11.2012 placing an embargo on grant of fresh mining leases need not be continued any further. Grant of fresh mining leases and consideration of pending applications be dealt with in accordance with law, the directions contained in the present order as well as the spirit thereof. (13) . Determination of the inter-State boundary between Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh in so far as the same is relevant to the present proceedings, as agreed upon by the two States, be made through the intervention of the office of Surveyor General of India.We also direct that all consequential action in terms of the present order be completed with the utmost expedition. The writ application filed by Samaj Parivartan Samudaya and IAs shall stand disposed of in terms of our abovestated conclusions.


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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL /APPELLATE JURISDICTION
& CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 562 of 2009
Samaj Parivartana Samudaya & Ors. ... Petitioner (s)
Versus
State of Karanataka & Ors. ... Respondent(s)
WITH
SLP (C) Nos.7366-7367 of 2010, SLP (C) Nos.32690-
32691 of 2010, WP (Crl.) No.66 of 2010, SLP (C)
Nos.17064-17065 of 2010, SLP (C) No……(CC No.16829 of
2010), SLP (C) No……….(CC No. 16830 of 2010), WP (C)
No.411 of 2010, SLP (C) No.353 of 2011 and WP (C)
No.76 of 2012
J U D G M E N T
RANJAN GOGOI, J.
W.P. (C) No.562 of 2009
1. What should be the appropriate contours of this Court’s
jurisdiction while dealing with allegations of systematic
plunder of natural resources by a handful of opportunistsPage 2
2
seeking to achieve immediate gains?
This is the core
question that arises in the present proceeding in the context
of mining of Iron Ore and allied minerals in the State of
Karnataka.
2. Over exploitation, if not indiscriminate and rampant mining,
in the State of Karnataka, particularly in the District of
Bellary, had been purportedly engaging the attention of the
State Government from time to time.
In the year 2006,
Justice U.L. Bhat Committee was appointed to go into the
issues which exercise, however, did not yield any tangible
result.
Thereafter, the matter was referred to the Lokayukta
of the State and a Report dated 18.12.2008 was submitted
which, prima facie, indicated indiscriminate mining of
unbelievable proportions in the Bellary district of the State.

It is in these circumstances, that the petitioner- Samaj
Parivartana Samudaya had instituted the present writ
petition under Article 32 of the Constitution complaining of
little or no corrective action on the part of the State; seeking
this Court’s intervention in the matter and specifically
praying for the reliefs noted hereinbelow.
Page 3
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“(A) To issue a Writ of mandamus or any other
appropriate writ, order or direction, directing
immediate steps be initiated by both the
Respondent States and the Union of India to
stop all mining and other related activities in
forest areas of Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka
which are in violation of the orders of this
Hon’ble Court dated 12.12.1996 in W.P (C) No
202 of 1995 and the Forest (Conservation) Act,
1980.
(B) To issue a Writ of mandamus or any other
appropriate writ, order or direction, directing as
null and void retrospectively all ‘raising contracts’ /
sub leasing because which are in violation of the
Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation)
Act, 1957 and initiate penal action against the
violators.
(C) To issue a Writ of mandamus or any other
appropriate writ, order or direction, directing the
stoppage of all mining along the border and in
forest areas in the Bellary Reserve Forest till a
systematic survey of both the interstate border and
the mine lease areas along the entire border isPage 4
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completed by the Survey of India along with a
representative of the Lokayukta of Karnataka.
(D) To issue a Writ of mandamus or any other
appropriate writ, order or direction, directing action
against all the violators involved either directly or
indirectly in illegal mining including those named in
the Report of the Lokayukta of Karnataka (Part-I).
(E) To issue a Writ of mandamus or any other
appropriate writ, order or direction, directing the
recovery of the illegal wealth accumulated through
the illegal mining and related activities; and
(F) To issue a Writ of mandamus or any other
appropriate writ, order or direction, directing null
and void notification No. CI 33 MMM 1994 dated
15.3.2003 and other related notifications/orders
dereserving lands for mining operations.”
3. The writ petition was entertained and the Central
Empowered Committee (hereinafter for short “the CEC”) was
asked to submit a report on the allegations of illegal mining in
the Bellary region of the State of Karnataka.
The very initial
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order of this Court is dated 19.11.2010 and was restricted to
six mining leases granted in favour of M/s. Bellary Iron Ore Pvt.
Ltd., M/s. Mahabaleswarapa & Sons, M/s. Ananthapur Mining
Corporation and M/s. Obulapuram Mining Company Pvt. Ltd.
What followed thereafter is unprecedented in the history of
Indian environmental jurisprudence. It is neither necessary
nor feasible to set out the series of Reports of the CEC and the
various orders of the Court passed from time to time. Rather,
a brief indication of the core Reports of the CEC and the main
orders passed by the Court will suffice to understand what had
happened so to enable the Court to unravel the course of
action for the future.
4. The initial Reports submitted by the CEC in response to the
orders of the Court having indicated large scale illegal mining
at the cost and to the detriment of the environment, a stage
came when by order dated 29.7.2011 a complete ban on
mining in the district of Bellary was imposed. Extension of the
said ban was made in respect of the mining operations in the
districts of Tumkur and Chitradurga by order dated 26.8.2011.
As the materials placed before the Court (including the Report
Page 6
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of the Lokayukta dated 18.12.2008) indicated large scale
encroachment into forest areas by leaseholders and ongoing
mining operations in such areas without requisite statutory
approval and clearances, a Joint Team was constituted by this
Court by order dated 6.5.2011 to determine the boundaries of
initially 117 mining leases which number was subsequently
extended to 166 by inclusion of the mines in Tumkur and
Chitradurga districts. The result of the survey by the Joint
Team revealed a shocking state of depredation of nature’s
bounty by human greed. Objections of the lease holders to the
survey came early and were subjected to a re-examination by
the special team itself under orders of the Court dated
23.9.2011 in the course of which 122 cases were re-examined
and necessary corrections were effected in 33 cases.
Thereafter, the CEC submitted its Report termed as the “Final
Report” dated 3.2.2012 which is significant for two of its
recommendations. The first was for categorization of the mines
into three categories, i.e., ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ on the basis of the
extent of encroachment in respect of the mining pits and
over burden dumps determined in terms of percentage qua
the total lease area. The second set of recommendations
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pertained to the conditions subject to which reopening of the
mines and resumption of mining operations were to be
considered by the Court. A set of modified recommendations
along with a set of detailed guidelines for preparation and
implementation of Reclamation and Rehabilitation Plans (R &
R) were also submitted to the Court by the CEC on 13.3.2012.
Before the relevant extracts from the Reports of the CEC dated
3.2.2012 and 13.3.2012 are noticed, to make the discussion
on the Report of the Joint Team complete it will be necessary
to note that in terms of the order dated 10.2.2012 of the Court,
66 representations were considered by the CEC out of which
only 4 were found tenable. Accordingly, corrections were
made in respect of the said four leases which corrections,
however, did not involve any change of category. The CEC
placed the cases of two lease holders i.e. M/s. V.S. Lad & Sons
and M/s. Hothur Traders for consideration of the Court as to
whether the said two leases placed in Category “C” needed
upgradation to Category “B” in view of the minimal violation
committed by them and the circumstances surrounding such
violations.Page 8
8
5. We may now proceed to notice the relevant part of the two
Reports of the CEC dated 3.2.2012 and 13.3.2012, as referred
to hereinabove.
“IV. CLASSIFICATION OF LEASES IN DIFFERENT
CATEGORIES ON THE BASIS OF THE LEVEL OF
ILLEGALITIES FOUND.
27. The CEC, based on the extent of illegal mining
found by the Joint Team and as appropriately modified
by the CEC in its Proceeding dated 25th January, 2012
and after considering the other relevant information has
classified the mining leases into three categories
namely “Category-A”, “Category-B” and “Category-C”.
28. The “Category-A” comprises of (a) working leases
wherein no illegality/marginal illegality have been found
and (b) non working leases wherein no
marginal/illegalities have been found. The number of
such leases comes to 21 & 24 respectively.
29. “Category-B” comprises of (a) mining leases
wherein illegal mining by way of (i) mining pits outside
the sanctioned lease areas have been found to be up to
10% of the lease areas and/ or (ii) over burden/waste
dumps outside the sanctioned lease areas have been
found to be up to 15% of the lease areas and (b) leases
falling on interstate boundary between Karnataka and
Andhra Pradesh and for which survey sketches have not
been finalized. For specific reasons as mentioned in thePage 9
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statement of “Category-B” leases, M/s. S.B. Minerals
(ML No. 2515), M/s. Shantalaxmi Jayram (ML No. 2553),
M/s. Gavisiddeshwar Enterprises (ML No. 80) and M/s.
Vibhutigudda Mines (Pvt.) Ltd. (ML No. 2469) have been
assigned in “Category-B”. The numbers of such leases
in “Category-B” comes to 72.
30. The “Category-C” comprises of leases wherein (i)
the illegal mining by way of (a) mining pits outside the
sanctioned lease area have been found to be more than
10% of the lease area and/or (b) over burden/waste
dumps outside the sanctioned lease areas have been
found to be more than 15% of the lease areas and/or (ii)
the leases found to be involved in flagrant violation of
the Forest (Conservation) Act and/or found to be
involved in illegal mining in other lease areas. The
number of such leases comes to 49.
RECOMMENDATIONS (as modified by CEC by its
Report dated 13.3.2012. Items 1 to IV of the Report
dated 3.2.2012 stood replaced by Items A to I of the
Report dated 13.3.2012 which are reproduced below
along with Items V to XIV of the initial Report dated
3.2.2012).
(A) the findings of the Joint Team and as modified
after careful examination by the CEC may be
accepted and directed to be followed by the
concerned authorities and the respective
leases, notwithstanding anything to thePage 10
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contrary. The boundaries of the mining leases
should accordingly be fixed on the ground.
(B) a ceiling of 25 Million Metric Tonnes (MMT) for
total production of iron ore from all the mining
leases in District Bellary may be prescribed. A
ceiling of 5 MMT for production of iron ore
from all the mining leases in Districts
Chitradurga and Tumkur together may be
prescribed;
(C) the proposed “guidelines for the preparation
of the R&R Plans” may be approved by this
Hon’ble Court and the prescriptions/provisions
of the R&R Plans, prepared as per these
guidelines, may be directed to be followed by
the respective lessees and the concerned
authorities;
(D) the iron ore which becomes available should
be used for meeting the iron ore requirement
of the steel plants and associated industries
located in Karnataka and also of those plants
located in the adjoining States which have
been using the iron ore from the mining
leases located in these Districts. Exports,
outside the country, should be permissible
only in respect of the material which the steel
plants and associated industries are not
willing to purchase on or above the average
price realized by the Monitoring Committee
for the corresponding grades of fines/lumps
during the sale of about 25 MMT of the
existing stock of iron ore. Similarly, the iron
ore produced by the beneficiation plants afterPage 11
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processing should also not be permitted to be
exported outside the country;
(E) the sale of the iron ore should continue to be
through e-auction and the same should be
conducted by the Monitoring Committee
constituted by this Hon’ble Court. However,
the quantity to be put up for e-auction, its
grade, lot size, its base/floor price and the
period of delivery will be decided/provided by
the respective lease holders. The Monitoring
Committee may permit the lease holders to
put up for e-auction the quantities of the iron
ore planned to be produced in subsequent
months. The system of sale through the
Monitoring Committee may be reviewed after
say two year;
(F) 90% of the sale price (excluding the royalty
and the applicable taxes) received during the
e-auction may be paid by the buyer directly
to the respective lease holders and the
balance 10% may be deposited with the
Monitoring Committee alongwith the royalty,
FDT and other applicable taxes/charges;
(G) The responsibility of the Monitoring
Committee will be (a) to monitor the
implementation of the various
provisions/prescriptions of the R&R Plans, (b)
to ensure strict compliance of the conditions
on which the environment clearance, the
approval under the Forest (Conservation) Act,
1980 and the other statutory
approvals/clearances have been accorded, (c)
to ensure that the mining is undertaken as
per the approved Mining Plan, (d) to ensurePage 12
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that the ceiling on annual production fixed for
the lease does not exceed, (e) to ensure that
the safety zone is maintained around the
lease area and in respect of the clusters of
mining leases around the outer boundary of
such cluster of mining leases and (f) to ensure
compliance of the other applicable
condition/provisions. Any lease found to be
operating in violation of the stipulated
conditions/provisions should be liable for
closure and/or termination of the lease;
(H) the present Members of the Monitoring
Committee should continue for a period of
next two years; and
(I) in the larger public interest the mining
operations in the two leases of M/s. NMDC
may be permitted to be continued. However,
it will be liable to deposit
penalty/compensation as payable for the
mining leases falling in “Category-B”
(V) In respect of the mining leases falling in
“CATEGORY-B” (details given at Annexure-R-
10 to this Report) it is recommended that:
i) the R&R Plan, under preparation by the
ICFRE, after incorporating the appropriate
changes as per the directions of this Hon’ble
Court, should be implemented in a time
bound manner by the respective lessees at
his cost. In the event of his failure to do so orPage 13
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if the quality and/or the progress of the
implementation of the R&R Plan is found to be
unsatisfactory by the Monitoring Committee
or by the designated officer(s) of the State of
Karnataka, the same should be implemented
by the State of Karnataka through
appropriate agency(ies) and at the cost of the
lessee;
ii) for carrying out the illegal mining outside the
lease area, exemplary compensation/ penalty
may be imposed on the lessee. It is
recommended that:
a) For illegal mining by way of mining pits
outside the leases area, as found by the
Joint Team, the compensation/ penalty may
be imposed at the rate of Rs. 5.00 crore
(Rs. Five Crore only) for per ha. of the area
found by the Joint Team to be under illegal
mining pit; and
b) For illegal mining by way of over burden
dump(s) road, office, etc. outside the
sanctioned lease area, the compensation/
penalty may be imposed @ Rs. 1.00 crores
(Rs. One Crores only) for per ha. of the area
found to be under illegal over burden dump
etc.
iii) Mining operation may be allowed to be
undertaken after (a) the implementation of
the R& R Plan is physically undertaken and is
found to be satisfactory based on the predetermined parameters (b) penalty/
compensation as decided by this Hon’blePage 14
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Court is deposited and (c) the conditions as
applicable in respect of “Category-A” leases
are fulfilled/followed;
iv) In respect of the seven mining leases located
on/nearby the interstate boundary, the mining
operation should presently remain suspended.
The survey sketches of these leases should be
finalized after the interstate boundary is
decided and thereafter the individual leases
should be dealt with depending upon the level
of the illegality found; and
v) Out of the sale proceeds of the existing stock
of the mining leases, after deducting :
a) The penalty/compensation payable;
b) Estimated cost of the implementation of
the R& R Plan; and
c) 10% of the sale proceeds to be retained by
the Monitoring Committee for being
transferred to the SPV
d) The balance amount, if any, may be
allowed to be disbursed to the respective
lessees.
(VI) In respect of the mining leases falling in
“CATEGORY-C” (details are given at
annexure-R-11 to this Report) it isPage 15
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recommended that (a) such leases should be
directed to be cancelled/determined on
account of these leases having been found to
be involved in substantial illegal mining
outside the sanctioned lease areas (b) the
entire sale proceeds of the existing stock of
the iron ore of these leases should be
retained by the Monitoring Committee and
(c) the implementation of the R&R Plan
should be at the cost of the lessee;
(VII) the area of the mining leases falling in the
“Category-C”, after cancellation of the mining
leases may be directed to be
allotted/assigned through a transparent
process of bidding to the highest bidder (s)
from amongst the end users. The floor price
for this purpose should be fixed on the basis
of the market value of the permissible annual
production of the iron ore during the period of
the agreements/lease period. The iron ore
produced from such mines should be used for
captive use only and no sale/export will be
permissible. The detailed schemes in this
regard should be prepared and implementedPage 16
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after obtaining the permission of this Hon’ble
Court;
(VIII) the mining leases owned by the M/s. MML
should be operated by it. Alternatively, the
agreements for mining operations and supply
of the iron ore should be entered into by it
through a transparent process and on the
basis of the market value of the mineral and
without any hidden subsidy. The detailed
scheme in this regard should be prepared and
implemented after obtaining permission of
this Hon’ble Court.
(IX) A Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) under the
Chairmanship of Chief Secretary, Government
Karnataka and with the senior officers of the
concerned Departments of the State
Government as Members may be directed to
be set up for the purpose of taking various
ameliorative and mitigative measures in
Districts Bellary, Chitradurga and Tumkur.
The additional resources mobilized by (a)
allotment/ assignment of the cancelled
mining leases as well as the mining leases
belonging to M/s. MML, (b) the amount of the
penalty/ compensation received/ receivablePage 17
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from the defaulting lessee, (c) the amount
received/ receivable by the Monitoring
Committee from the mining leases falling in
“Category-A” and “Category-B”, (d) amount
received/ receivable from the sale proceeds
of the confiscated material etc., may be
directed to be transferred to the SPV and
used exclusively for the socio-economic
development of the area/local population,
infrastructure development, conservation and
protection of forest, developing common
facilities for transportation of iron ore (such as
maintenance and widening of existing road,
construction of alternate road, conveyor belt,
railway siding and improving communication
system, etc.). A detailed scheme in this
regard may be directed to be prepared and
implemented after obtaining permission of
this Hon’ble Court;
(X) Out of the 20% of sale proceeds retained by
the Monitoring Committee in respect of the
cleared mining leases falling in “Category-A”,
10% of the sale proceeds may be transferred
to the SPV while the balance 10% of the sale
proceeds may be reimbursed to the
respective lessees. In respect of the miningPage 18
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leases falling in “Category-B”, after deducting
the penalty/compensation, the estimated cost
of the implementation of the R&R Plan, and
10% of the sale proceeds to be retained for
being transferred to the SPV, the balance
amount, if any, may be reimbursed to the
respective lessees;
(XI) no new mining leases, including for which
Notifications have already been issued, will be
granted without obtaining permission of this
Hon’ble Court;
(XII) the pending applications for grant of mining
leases in Ramgad and Swamimalai Block in
District Bellary and for which the NOC’s were
earlier issued will stand rejected;
(XIII) the confiscated iron ore pertaining to the
cancelled stock yards will be sold by the
Monitoring Committee and the sale proceeds
will be retained by the Monitoring Committee;
(XIII) the Monitoring Committee may be
authorized to sell low grade/sub grade ironPage 19
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ore to Cement Plants, Red Oxide and other
similarly placed industries. It may also be
authorized to supply iron ore required for
construction of nuclear plants at the rates
mutually agreed between the Monitoring
Committee and the concerned authorities
provided no middle man is involved; and
(XIV) the Monitoring Committee may be
authorized to utilize up to 25% of the interest
received by it for engaging reputed agencies
for the monitoring of the various parameters
relating to mining.”
6. As previously noticed, the CEC in its Report dated
13.3.2012 had set out in detail the objectives of the
Reclamation and Rehabilitation (R&R) plans and the guidelines
for preparation of detailed R & R plans in respect of each
mining lease. The origins of the idea (R & R plans) are to be
found in an earlier Report of the CEC dated 28.7.2011. As the
suggestions of the CEC with regard to preparations of R & R
plans for each mine is crucial to scientific and planned
exploitation of the mineral resources in question it will be
necessary for us to notice the said objectives and the detailedPage 20
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guidelines which are set out below. In this connection it would
be worthwhile to take note of the fact that the guidelines in
question have been prepared after detailed consultation with
different stakeholders including the Federation of Indian
Mineral Industries (FIMI) which claims to be the representative
body of the majority of the mining lessees of the present case.
“II. BROAD OBJECTIVES/PARAMETERS OF R&R PLANS
8. The broad objectives/parameters of the R&R Plans
would be:
(i) to carry out time bound reclamation and
rehabilitation of the areas found to be under
illegal mining by way of mining pits, over
burden/waste dumps etc. outside the sanctioned
areas;
(ii) to ensure scientific and sustainable mining after
taking into consideration the mining reserves
assessed to be available within the lease area;
(iii) to ensure environmental friendly mining and
related activities and complying with the
standards stipulated under the various
environmental/mining statutes e.g. air quality
(SPM, RPM), noise/vibration level, water quality
(surface as well as ground water), scientific overPage 21
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burden/waste dumping, stabilization of slopes
and benches, proper stacking and preservation
of top soil, sub grade mineral and saleable
minerals, proper quality of internal roads,
adequate protective measures such as dust
suppression/control measures for screening and
crushing plants, beneficiation plants, provision
for retention walls, garland drains, check dams,
siltation ponds, afforestation, safety zones,
proper covering of truck, exploring possibility of
back filling of part of over burden/waste dumps
in the mining pits, sale/beneficiation of sub grade
iron ore, water harvesting, etc.
(iv) for achieving (ii) and (iii) above, fixation of
permissible annual production; and
(v) regular and effective monitoring and evaluation.
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
VI. PROVISIONS/PRESCRIPTIONS OF THE LEASE
WISE R&R PLANS
14. The leasewise R&R Plans will provide for the
specific provisions/prescriptions as dealt with
hereunder:Page 22
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(A) REGARDING AREA FOUND BY THE JOINT
TEAM TO BE UNDER ILLEGAL MINING
15. The area under illegal mining pits should be filled
up with the existing over burden/waste dumps
preferably the illegal dumps. Appropriate soil and
moisture conservation measures will be provided and
such areas will be afforested with indigenous species.
16. The reclamation and rehabilitation works will be
carried out even if such areas are found to be having
mineral reserves.
17. In respect of area under illegal over burden/waste
dumps, wherever environmentally feasible the over
burden/waste dumps will be removed and disposed of
scientifically within the lease area of the encroacher.
18. In other cases, the illegal over burden/waste
dumps will be stabilized by:
(a) modifying the gradient of the lump
(b) construction of retaining walls,
(c) construction of gully plugsPage 23
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(d) construction of garland drains
(e) geo-metric/geo-matting of dumps
(f) afforestation, and
(g) other soil and moisture conservation measures,
19. However, in respect of the mining pits falling within
the area of the other sanctioned leases, specific leasewise prescription/provision will be made depending upon
the ground situation.
(B) REGARDING PERMISSIBLE ANNUAL
PRODUCTION
20. The permissible annual production for the mining
lease would be based on (a) the mineral reserves in the
lease area; (b) area available for over burden/waste
dumps, sub grade iron ore and other land uses (c)
existing transport facilities in relation to the traffic load of
the mining lease and (d) overall ceiling on the annual
production from all the mining leases in the district (as
dealt with earlier).Page 24
24
21. Presently the permissible annual production
would be decided for the next five years subject to
review/modification in any of the following situation:
(a) change in the assessed mineral
reserves/resources because of subsequent
exploration carried out and incorporated in the
modified mining plan/scheme and approved by
the IBM;
(b) identification of additional area for the
disposal of the over burden/waste dumps and
incorporated in the approved mining
plan/scheme (preferably by way of back filling of
mined out pits); and
(c) creation of additional physical
infrastructure such as railway sidings, conveyors,
wagon tipplers, wagon loaders (to
remove/reduce transportation bottlenecks).
(C) STABILIZATION OF THE EXISTING OVER
BURDEN/WASTE DUMPS AND SUB GRADE
IRON ORE DUMPS AND PLAN FOR ACTIVE
OVER BURDEN/WASTE DUMP
22. This will include the total area of the dump(s),
present gradient, planned gradient, provision for
retaining wall(s), benches, final gradient, volume of
over burden/waste dump that may be stored,Page 25
25
afforestation, use of geo-matting/geo-textile, garland
drains and other soil and moisture
conservation/protective measures;
23. The design will vary from mine to mine and
within the mine from dump to dump. The prescription
will also vary between old dumps and active dumps.
The slope of 27 degree provided in the environment
clearance may not be feasible for dumping on steep
hill slopes.
24. The ultimate objective of the dump
design/protective measure would be to ensure that
the slopes are stable, are not vulnerable to erosion
and to provide for adequate protective measures to
capture/control run off:
(D) MINING PITS
25. In respect of the mining leases where the shape
and design of the mining pits differ substantially from
those provided in the approved mining plan and /or
found to be in gross violation of the approved design,
mining will be permissible based on rectification as
required by the concerned statutory authority (viz.
DGMS). Similarly, gross violations under otherPage 26
26
Acts/Rules, if any, will need to be rectified (as required
by the relevant statutory authorities).
(E) SOIL AND MOISTURE CONSERVATIONS,
AFFORESTATION AND OTHER MEASURES
26. The R&R plan would inter alia provide for:
(i) broad design/specification for
(a) garland drains
(b) retaining walls
(c) check dams
(d) gully plugs and/or culverts (if required)
(e) geo textile/geo matting of dumps
(f) afforestation in the safety zones
(g) afforestation in peripheral area, road
side, over burden dumps and other areas
(ii) dust suppression measures at/for loading,
unloading and transfer points, internal roads,
mineral stacks etc.
(iii) covered conveyor belts (if feasible) – such as
down hill conveyor, pipe conveyor etc.Page 27
27
(iv) specification of internal roads,
(v) details of existing transport system and
proposed improvements
(vi) railways siding (if feasible)
(vii) capacity building of personnel involved in the
mining and environmental management
(viii) rain water harvesting
(F) TIME SCHEDULE
27. Time schedule for implementation of various
prescriptions will be provided.
(G) MONITORING MECHANISM
28. Monitoring mechanism, including
predetermined parameters to assess the successful
implementation of the various provision/prescriptions
of the R&R Plan will be provided. The Monitoring
Committee will be responsible for monitoring the
implementation of the prescription/provisions of the
R&R Plans.”Page 28
28
7. The recommendations of the CEC dated 13.3.2012 in
respect of Items A to I were accepted by the Court by its order
dated 13.4.2012.
8. The next significant event that had occurred in the
catalogue of relevant occurrences is the order of the Court
dated 3.9.2012 permitting reopening of 18 category ‘A’
mines subject to the conditions spelt out in the said order
which broadly were to the effect that mining shall be to the
extent of the annual production as applicable to each mine
determined by the CEC in its Report dated 29.8.2012 and
further subject to the following conditions:
“(I) compliance with all the statutory
requirements;
(II) the full satisfaction of the Monitoring
Committee, expressed in writing, that steps
for implementation of the R & R Plan in the
leasehold areas are proceeding effectively
and meaningfully, and
(III) a written undertaking by the
leaseholders that they would fully abide by
the Supplementary Environment
Management Plan (SEMP) as applicable to thePage 29
29
leasehold area and shall also abide by the
Comprehensive Environment Plan for Mining
Impact Zone (CEPMIZ) that may be
formulated later on and comply with any
liabilities, financial or otherwise, that may
arise against them under the CEPMIZ.
(IV) The CEC shall, upon inspection, submit a
report to this Court that any or all the stated
18 “Category A” mine owners have fully
satisfied the above-mentioned conditions.
Further, it shall be reported that the mining
activity is being carried on strictly within the
specified parameters and without any
violation.”
9. The order of the Court dated 28.9.2012, laying down certain
conditions “as the absolute first step before consideration of
any resumption of mining operations by Category–‘B’
leaseholders” would also be required to be specifically
noticed at this stage.
“I. Compensatory Payment
(a) Each of the leaseholders must pay
compensation for the areas under illegal mining
pits outside the sanctioned area, as found by the
Joint Team (and as finally held by the CEC) at the
rate of Rs.5 crores per hectare, and (b) for thePage 30
30
areas under illegal overburden dumps, roads,
offices, etc. outside the sanctioned lease area, as
found by the Joint Team (as might have been
finally held by the CEC) at the rate of Rs.1
crore per hectare.
It is made clear that the payment at the rates
aforesaid is the minimum payment and each
leaseholder may be liable to pay additional
amounts on the basis of the final determination of the
national loss caused by the illegal mining and the
illegal use of the land for overburden dumps,
roads, offices, etc. Each leaseholder, besides
making payment as directed above, must also give
an undertaking to the CEC for payment of the
additional amounts, if held liable on the basis of the
final determination.
At the same time, we direct for the constitution
of a Committee to determine the amount of
compensatory payment to be made by each of the
leaseholders having regard to the value of the ore
illegally extracted from forest/non-forest land falling
within or outside the sanctioned lease area and
the profit made from such illegal extraction and the
resultant damage caused to the environment and
the ecology of the area.Page 31
31
The Committee shall consist of experts/officers
nominated each by the Ministry of Mines and the
Ministry of Environment and Forests. The convener of
the Committee will be the Member Secretary of the
CEC. The two members nominated by the Ministry of
Mines and the Ministry of Environment and Forests
along with the Member Secretary, CEC shall co-opt
two or three officers from the State Government. The
Committee shall submit its report on the aforesaid
issue through the CEC to this Court within three
months from today.
The final determination so made, on being
approved by the Court, shall be payable by each of
the leaseholders.
II. Guarantee money for implementation of the R&R
plan in the respective sanctioned lease areas.
The CEC shall make an estimate of the expenses
required for the full implementation of the R&R plan
in each of the 63 'Category B' mines and each of
the leaseholders must pay the estimated amount as
guarantee for implementation of the R&R plans in
their respective sanctioned lease areas and in the
areas where they carried on illegal mining activities
or which were used for illegal overburden dumps,
roads, offices, etc. beyond the sanctioned lease area.
In case, any leaseholder defaults in implementationPage 32
32
of the R&R plan, it will be open to the CEC to carry
out the R&R plan for that leasehold through some
other proper agency from the guarantee money
deposited by the leaseholder. However, on the full
implementation of the R&R plan to the complete
satisfaction of the CEC and subject to the approval by
the Court, the guarantee money would be refundable
to the leaseholder.
III. In addition to the above, each leaseholder must
pay a sum equivalent to 15% of the sale proceeds of
its iron ore sold through the Monitoring Committee
as per the earlier orders of this Court. In this regard,
it may be stated that though the amicus suggests
the payment @ 10% of the sale proceeds, having
regard to the overall facts and circumstances of the
case, we have enhanced this payment to 15% of the
sale proceeds.
Here it needs to be clarified that the
CEC/Monitoring Committee is holding the sale
proceeds of the iron ores of the leaseholders,
including the 63 leaseholds being the subject of this
order. In case, the money held by the CEC/Monitoring
Committee on the account of any leaseholder is
sufficient to cover the payments under the aforesaid
three heads, the leaseholder may, in writing,
authorize the CEC to deduct from the sale proceedsPage 33
33
on its account the amounts under the aforesaid
three heads and an undertaking to make payment
of any additional amount as compensatory payment.
On submission of such authorization and
undertaking, the CEC shall retain the amounts
covering the aforesaid three heads and pay to
the concerned leaseholder the balance amount, if
any. It is expected that the balance amount, after
making the adjustments as indicated here, would be
paid to the concerned leaseholder within one month
from the date of submission of the authorization and
the undertaking.
In the case of any leaseholder, if the money
held on his account is not sufficient to cover the
aforesaid three heads, he must pay the deficit within
two months from today.
IV. The R&R plans for the aforesaid 63 'Category B'
mines may be prepared as early as possible, as
directed by orders of this Court dated April 13,
April 20 and May 05, 2012, and in case where the
R&R plan is already prepared and ready, the
leaseholder may take steps for its comprehensive
implementation, both within and outside the
sanctioned lease area, without any delay.”Page 34
34
10. The number of “B” Category mines though mentioned as
72 in the CEC Report dated 3.2.2012, reference to the figure
of 63 in the above extracted part of the Court’s order dated
28.9.2012 is on account of placing of the 7 mines located on
the inter-State border (Karnataka-Andhra Pradesh) in a
special category (B1) and the cases of two leases i.e. M/s
S.B. Minerals (ML No.2515) and M/s. Shanthalakshmi
Jayaram (ML No.2553) [tentatively placed by CEC in
Category ‘B’] before the Court for orders as to their
appropriate categorization. The issue of the seven (7) mines
on the Karnataka – Andhra Pradesh border and the two (2)
mines in respect of which appropriate categorization which
is to be decided is being dealt with in another part of the
present order.
11. The latest Report of the CEC dated 15.2.2013 indicating
the present status of preparation and implementation of the
lease wise R& R plans and resumption of mining operations
by Category ‘A’ and Category ‘B’ mines and the compliance
of the preconditions for opening of Category ‘B’ mines will
also require specific notice, which recommendations are
extracted below.Page 35
35
“RECOMMENDATIONS
15. In the above background the following
recommendations are made for the consideration of this
Hon’ble Court :
(i) This Hon’ble Court may consider extending its
order dated 3rd September, 2012, by which
mining operations were permitted to be
resumed in 18 “Category-A” mining leases, to
all “Category-A” mining leases;
(ii) This Hon’ble Court may consider permitting
the resumption of the mining operations in
“Category-B” mining leases subject to the
conditions as applicable for the resumption of
the mining operations in the “Category-A”
mining leases and compliance of the following
additional conditions :
(a) In compliance of this Hon’ble
Court’s order dated 28th September, 2012
the lessees will be required to pay, if not
already so done, compensation for the area
under illegal mining pits, illegal over
burden dumps, roads, offices etc.
undertake to pay the additional
compensatory amounts, if held liable,
guarantee money for implementation of
the R&R Plans and deposit of 15% of the
sale proceeds of the existing iron ore sold
by the Monitoring Committee; and
(b) Before starting the mining
operations the implementation of the R& R
Plans for the areas found under illegal
mining pits, illegal over burden dumps, etc.Page 36
36
will be completed/nearing completion to
the satisfaction of the Monitoring
Committee; and
(iii) the CEC/Monitoring Committee may be
authorized to remove and sell through eauction the sub grade iron ore available in the
existing over burden dumps in and around
the lease areas subject to the condition that
such removal and sale is not likely to have
significant adverse impact on the existing
tree growth/vegetation and/or stability of the
over burden dumps. The Monitoring
Committee may be authorized to retain the
entire sale proceeds in respect of the dumps
located outside the sanctioned and presently
valid lease areas for the purpose of transfer
to the SPV for the implementation of the
Comprehensive Environment Plan for Mining
Impact Zone (CEPMIZ).”
Thus the CEC in its Report dated 15.2.2013 had
recommended resumption of mining operations in the
remaining category ‘A’ mines subject to the conditions already
imposed by this Court in its order dated 3.9.2012 and also for
reopening of Category ‘B’ mines subject to the same conditions
and additionally the preconditions recommended by the CEC
and approved by this Court by its order dated 28.9.2012. Page 37
37
12. The above main features contained in the various Reports
of the CEC and the orders of this Court apart, there are
certain incidental and supplementary matters which may be
conveniently noticed now.
13.The first is with regard to investigations in respect of alleged
criminal offences by lessees which have been ordered by this
Court to be investigated by the CBI. As investigations have
already been ordered by this Court and such investigations
would necessarily have to follow the procedure prescribed by
law we do not wish to delve upon the same save and except
to say that each of such investigation shall be brought to its
logical conclusion in accordance with law and any aggrieved
party would be entitled to avail of all legal remedies as may
be available.
14. The second supplementary issue that can be conveniently
dealt with at this stage is with regard to sale of the existing
stock of Iron Ore which is mainly the yield of illegal mining.
The Court had ordered disposal of such accumulated Iron
Ore by the process of e-auction through a Monitoring
Committee constituted by order of this Court datedPage 38
38
23.9.2011. From time to time this Court had directed certain
payments to be made to the Monitoring Committee e.g. by
way of 10% of sale proceeds; on account of compensatory
payments etc. By order dated 28.9.2012, this Court had
constituted a Special Purpose Vehicle (for short ‘SPV’) on the
suggestion of the learned Amicus Curiae. The purpose of
constitution of the SPV, it may be noticed, is for taking of
ameliorative and mitigative measures as per the
“Comprehensive Environment Plans for the Mining Impact
Zone” (CPEMIZ) around mining leases in Bellary, Chitradurga
and Tumkur. By the order dated 28.9.2012, the Monitoring
Committee was to make available the payments received by
it under different heads of receivables to the SPV.
[
15. The above facts would have relevance to the future of the
mining operations in the State as the continuance of this
Court’s orders for sale of the Iron Ore by the process of
e-auction by the Monitoring Committee after
recommencement of mining operations on the same terms
and conditions and also the continuance of the SPV would
be required to be considered by us. It would also bePage 39
39
convenient to take note of the fact that as per the CEC’s
Report dated 15.2.2013 sale of almost the entire quantity of
illegally extracted Iron Ore has been effected through the
Monitoring Committee and the sub-grade Iron Ore lying in
dumps in and around several lease areas may not have
adequate commercial potential. Besides removal thereof for
sale, in many cases, may also give rise to environmental
problems in as much as removal of such dumps may
constitute a hazard to the stability of the dumps which
have been in existence for many years. Permission for sale
of sub-grade iron ore, only when the same is commercially
viable and removal thereof from the dumps is an
environmentally safe exercise, has been sought by the CEC
in its last Report dated 15.2.2013. We do not find any
impediment in accepting the recommendations of the CEC
in the Report dated 15.2.2013 in respect of removal and
sale of sub-grade Iron Ore. Similarly, we do not find any
difficulty in continuing our previous orders permitting sale of
iron ore to be mined after resumption of operations through
the Monitoring Committee on the same terms and
conditions as presently in force.Page 40
40
16. The supplementary and the collateral issues, which we
must emphasize are not to be understood to be low either in
priority or importance because of the nomenclature used,
having been dealt with by us in the manner indicated above
we may now come to what can be conveniently referred to
as the central issues that confront the Court in the present
case. In this regard notice must be had to the large number
of interlocutory applications (IAs) filed basically questioning
the sanctity of the survey carried out by the Joint Team
constituted by this Court, the findings arrived at and the
categorization of the leaseholders into the three different
categories. Such objections in the main have come from
leaseholders who have been put in Category ‘C’ (except in
few isolated cases seeking a change from Category ‘B’ to
‘A’) for which Category of mines the recommendation of the
CEC is one of closure. The challenge is on twin grounds of
lack of procedural fairness and inherent defects in the
technical part of the exercise of survey besides apparent
legal fallacies in the process of determination of the
allegedly encroached mining area. Denial of adequatePage 41
41
opportunity to associate and coordinate with the survey
process, notwithstanding the possible adverse effects of the
findings of survey on the legal rights of the lease holders, is
the backbone of the challenge on ground of procedural
fairness. On the other hand, alteration of the lease area
either by shifting or reducing the same; ignoring concluded
judicial orders determining boundary disputes between
adjacent lease holders; taking of land use for dumps as
mining operations requiring a mining license for the land so
used or forest clearances under the Forest Conservation Act,
1980 (in case of such use of forest land) and above all the
change of boundaries demarcated decades back by
adoption of the Total Station Method instead of a repeat
survey by following the same Conventional Method (chain
method) are the common threads in the arguments
advanced to challenge the technical part of the survey.
17. The categorization of the allegedly offending leases on
the basis of percentage of the alleged encroachment qua
the total lease area is contended to be constitutionally
fragile and environmentally self-defeating. A leaseholderPage 42
42
with a more expansive lease area, inspite of committing a
larger encroachment, may still fall below the percentage
adopted as the parameter so as to place him in a more
favourable category, say Category ‘B’, as compared to a
small lease where the area encroached, though small, falls
in a less favourable category, say “C” because the
percentage of encroachment exceeds the prescribed
parameters. The recommendation of the CEC with regard to
categorization and the actions proposed on that basis as
well as the suggested parameters for drawing up the R& R
plans and the preconditions to be fulfilled by Category ‘A’
and ‘B’ leaseholders for recommencement of mining
operations has also been assailed by questioning the
credibility of the CEC as an institution and the prolonged
continuance of its members which, according to the
leaseholders, have the tendency of effectuating unbridled
powers.
18. Relying on the provisions of the Mines and Minerals
(Development & Regulation) Act, 1957; Forest
(Conservation) Act, 1980 and Environment (Protection) Act,Page 43
43
1986 (hereinafter referred to as “MMDR Act”, “FC Act” and
“EP Act” respectively) it is argued that each of the statutes
contemplate a distinct and definite statutory scheme to deal
with the situations that have allegedly arisen in the present
case. To resolve the said issues it is the statutory scheme
that should be directed to be followed and resort to the
powers of this Court under Article 32 read with Article 142 of
the Constitution, when a statutory scheme is in existence,
would be wholly uncalled for. Specifically, it has been
pointed out that none of the conditions that are required to
be fulfilled by Category ‘A’ leaseholders and none of the
compulsory payments contemplated for Category ‘B’
leaseholders for recommencement of operation are
visualized in any of the statutory schemes. Insofar as
Category ‘C’ leaseholders are concerned, it is contended
that cancellation, if any, has to be in accordance with the
statute which would provide the lease holder with different
tiers of remedial forums as compared to the finality that
would be attached if any order is to be passed by this Court.
In this regard, several earlier opinions of this Court, details
of which will be noticed in the discussions that follow, hadPage 44
44
been cited at the bar to persuade us to take the view that
we should desist from exercising our powers under the
Constitution and instead relegate the parties to the
remedies provided by the statute.
19. We may now proceed to deal with the issues arising in
proper sequential order.
ISSUE NO.1
Credibility of the CEC
20. A scathing attack has been made against the CEC on
behalf of one of the lessees represented by Shri Dushyant A.
Dave, learned senior counsel. It is contended that the said
authority has virtually become a law unto itself making
recommendations which is in defiance of both law and logic.
Assumption of unguided, unbridled and absolute powers has
been attributed to the CEC. The implicit trust of this Court
in the said body has been misutilised requiring a review by
this Court with regard to the continuance of the said body or
at least in respect of a change in its present composition, it
is argued.Page 45
45
21. The CEC was first constituted by the Court by its order
dated 9.5.2002 as an interim body until creation of the
statutory agency contemplated under the provisions of
Section 3 (3) of the EP Act. Thereafter by a Notification
dated 17.9.2002 published in the Gazette of India the
constitution of the Central Empowered Committee (CEC) for
a period of 5 years was notified indicating its composition
together with the extent of its powers and duties. It
transpires from the Court’s order dated 7.9.2007 that an
issue with regard to the correctness of the extent of
empowerment of the said body made by Notification dated
17.9.2002 was raised on behalf of the Union of India,
whereafter, on the suggestions of the Attorney General for
India, this Court by its order dated 14.12.2007 had
determined the extent of powers of the CEC in the following
terms :
 “1. In supersession of all the previous orders regarding
constitutions and functioning of the Central
Empowered Committee (hereinafter called the
"Empowered Committee") is constituted for the
purpose of monitoring and ensuring compliance with
the orders of this Court covering the subject
matter of forest and wild life and related issues
arising out of the said orders.Page 46
46
2. The Committee shall exercise the following powers
and perform the following functions:
(i) to monitor the implementation of this
Court's orders and place reports of noncompliance before the Court and Central
Government for appropriate action.
(ii) to examine pending Interlocutary
Applications in the said Writ petitions (as
may be referred to it by the Court) as
well as the reports and affidavits filed by
the States in response to the orders
passed by the Hon'ble Court and place
its recommendations before the Court
for orders
(iii) to deal with any applications made to it
by any aggrieved person and wherever
necessary, to make a report to this
Court in that behalf;
(iv) for the purposes of effective discharge of
powers conferred upon the Committee
under this order; the Committee can:-
(a) call for any documents from
any persons or the government of the
Union or the State or any other
official;
(b) undertake site inspection of
forest area involved;
(c) seek assistance or presence
of any person(s) or official(s) required
by it in relation to its work;
(d) co-opt one or more persons
as its members or as special invitees
for dealing with specific issues;Page 47
47
 (e) co-opt, wherever feasible,
the Chief Secretary or his
representative and Principal Chief
Conservator of Forests of the State as
special invitees while dealing with
issues pertaining to a particular state;
f) to suggest measures generally to
the State, as well as Central
Government, for the more effective
implementation of the Act and other
orders of this Court.
(v) to examine and advise/recommend on
any issue referred to the Committee.”
22. As the period of five years mentioned in the Notification
dated 17.9.2002 had expired and the terms of reference to
the body had been redetermined by this Court, perhaps, a
fresh notification should have been issued which was not
forthcoming. It is in such a situation that the CEC had
continued to function under orders of the Court submitting
its reports from time to time in various environmental issues
pending before this Court. It is on consideration of such
Reports that the Court has been passing its orders from time
to time.Page 48
48
23. In the circumstances enumerated above, questions
concerning the credibility of the CEC are absolutely
unfounded, particularly in the absence of any materials to
substantiate the apprehensions, if not allegations, that have
been leveled. The said body has been performing such tasks
as had been assigned by this Court by its orders passed
from time to time. The directions on the basis of which the
CEC had proceeded and had submitted its Reports are
within the framework of the terms of reference of the CEC
as determined by this Court by order dated 14.12.2007.
Needless to say, acceptance of the recommendations made
by the CEC on the basis of which orders of the Court are
formulated is upon the satisfaction of the Court. We,
therefore, close the issue by holding the contentions made
to be wholly untenable.
ISSUE NO.2
Exercise of jurisdiction under Article 32/142 of the
Constitution on the basis of the facts revealed by
Reports of the CEC i.e. large scale damage to the forest
wealth of the country due to illegal mining on an
unprecedented scale vis-à-vis resort to remedies under
the provisions of Mines and Minerals (Development and
Regulation) Act, 1957, Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980
and Environment (Protection) Act, 1986Page 49
49
24. On the above issue the short and precise argument on
behalf of the leaseholders is that the provisions of each of
the statutory enactments, i.e., the MMDR Act, FC Act and EP
Act prescribe a distinct statutory scheme for regulation of
mining activities and the corrective as well as punitive steps
that may be taken in the event mining activities are carried
out in a manner contrary to the terms of the lease or the
provisions of any of the statutes, as may be. The argument
advanced is that as the statutes in question contemplate a
particular scheme to deal with instances of illegal mining or
carrying on mining operations which is hazardous to the
environment, the CEC could not have recommended the
taking of any step or measure beyond what is contemplated
by the statutory scheme(s) in force. It is argued that it will
not be proper for this Court to act under Article 32 and to
accept any of the said recommendations which are beyond
the scheme(s) contemplated by the Statute(s). In other
words, what is sought to be advanced on behalf of the
leaseholders is that no step should be taken or direction
issued by this Court which will be contrary to or in conflict
with the provisions of the relevant statutes. SeveralPage 50
50
judgments of this Court, which are perceived to be
precedents in support of the proposition advanced, have
been cited in the course of the arguments made.
25. On the other hand, the learned Amicus Curiae, Shri
Shyam Divan, has submitted that the present is a case of
mass destruction of the forest wealth of this country
resulting not only in a plunder of scarce natural resources
but also causing irreparable ecological and environmental
damage and degradation. The learned Amicus Curiae has
submitted that the extent of illegal mining that had
happened in the three districts of the State of Karnataka is
unprecedented. The relevant data compiled by different
bodies has been placed by the learned Amicus Curiae to
indicate that in the Bellary-Hospet region the annual
production of Iron Ore had increased from 12.4 MMT in the
year 2001-02 to 44.39 MMT in the year 2008-09. The then
Chief Minister of the State had made a statement on the
floor of the legislative assembly on 9.7.2010 that 30.49 MMT
of illegal Iron Ore has been exported from the State of
Karnataka between 2003-04 to 2009-10 valued atPage 51
51
approximately Rs. 15,245 crores. In the year 2009-10 alone
the total quantity of illegal Iron Ore exported stood at 12.9
MMT. During the inspection carried out by the Indian
Bureau of Mines in December, 2009 it was found that not a
single mining lease was operating without violating the
provisions of the MMDR Act and the FC Act. In an affidavit
filed by the official Respondents in a writ petition registered
and numbered as W.P. No. 14551/2010 before the
Karnataka High Court it was stated that between November,
2009 and February, 2010 (i.e., within a period of four
months) 35.319 lakh MT of illegal Iron Ore was received at
Belekeri and Karwar ports, for movement of which for a
period of about 4 months 2986 trucks were required to
undertake the journey every day in both directions i.e., to
the ports and thereafter back.
26. According to Shri Divan, the present is a case of mass
tort resulting in the abridgment of the fundamental rights of
a large number of citizens for enforcement of which the writ
petition has been filed under Article 32. Shri Divan has
submitted, by relying on several decisions of this Court, thatPage 52
52
in a situation where the Court is called upon to enforce the
fundamental rights and that too of an indeterminate number
of citizens there can be no limitations on the power of Court.
It is the satisfaction of the Court that alone would be
material. Once such satisfaction is reached, the Court will be
free to devise its own procedure and issue whatever
directions are considered necessary to effectuate the
Fundamental Rights. The only restriction that the Court will
bear in mind is that its orders or directions will not be in
conflict with the provisions of any Statute. However, if the
statute does not forbid a particular course of action it will be
certainly open for the Court under Article 32 to issue
appropriate directions. According to the learned Amicus
Curiae in the present case none of the recommendations of
the CEC is inconsistent or contrary to any statutory
provision. They are at best supplemental to the existing
provisions seeking to achieve the same end through a
procedure which may be somewhat different. The
justification for this, according to the learned Amicus Curiae,
lies in the extraordinary situation that had occurred in the
present case.Page 53
53
27. At this stage, very briefly, the statutory scheme under the
three enactments in question may be taken note of. Under
the provisions of the MMDR Act the State Government has
been provided with the power of termination of licenses or
mining leases in the interest of regulation of mines and
minerals (Section 4A) whereas under Section 5, power has
been conferred not to grant mining leases in certain
specified situations. The Rule making power under Section
23C extends to framing of Rules by the State Government to
prevent illegal mining, transportation and storage of
minerals and to provide for checking and inspection of the
mining lease area. The Karnataka (Prevention of Illegal
Mining, Transportation and Storage of Minerals) Rules, 2011
has been notified on 5th February, 2011. Under the Mineral
Concession Rules, 1960, the expression “illegal mining” has
been explained in Rule 2(iia). The aforesaid Rules also
contemplate that while determining the extent of illegal
mining the area granted under the lease will be deemed to
have been held by the holder of the license under lawful
authority. Under the provisions of the EP Act, closure,
prohibition or regulation of industry, operation or process isPage 54
54
contemplated, whereas under the provisions of the FC Act
prior approval of the Central Government for use of forest
land for non forest purpose is mandatory. The question that
has been raised on behalf of the leaseholders is whether the
aforesaid provisions under the different statutes should be
resorted to and the recommendations made by the CEC
including closure of Category-“C” mines should not
commend for acceptance of this Court.
28.In Bandhua Mukti Morcha Vs. Union of India & Ors.
(1984) 3 SCC 161, this Court had the occasion to consider the
nature of a proceeding under Article 32 of the Constitution
which is in the following terms :-
“32. Remedies for enforcement of rights
conferred by this Part.
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by
appropriate proceedings for the enforcement
of the rights conferred by this Part is
guaranteed.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to
issue directions or orders or writs, including
writs in the nature of habeas corpus,
mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and
certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for
the enforcement of any of the rights conferred
by this Part.Page 55
55
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred
on the Supreme Court by clause ( 1 ) and
( 2 ), Parliament may by law empower any
other court to exercise within the local limits
of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers
exercisable by the Supreme Court under
clause (2).
(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall
not be suspended except as otherwise
provided for by this Constitution.”
29.The issue before the Court was one of release/freedom of an
indeterminate number of citizens from bonded labour and
was taken up by the Court by registering a letter addressed
to a Hon’ble Judge of this Court to the above effect as a writ
petition under Article 32. In the above context this Court in
para 13 of its order observed as follows :
“13. But the question then arises as to what is the
power which may be exercised by the Supreme
Court when it is moved by an “appropriate”
proceeding for enforcement of a fundamental
right. The only provision made by the Constitutionmakers in this behalf is to be found in clause (2) of
Article 32 which confers power on the Supreme
Court “to issue directions or orders or writs
including writs in the nature of habeas corpus,
mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and
certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for
enforcement of any of the fundamental rights”. It
will be seen that the power conferred by clause (2)
of Article 32 is in the widest terms. It is not
confined to issuing the high prerogative writs of
habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, certiorariPage 56
56
and quo warranto, which are hedged in by strict
conditions differing from one writ to another and
which to quote the words spoken by Lord Atkin in
United Australia Limited v. Barclays Bank Ltd.
[(1941) A.C. 1] in another context often “stand in
the path of justice clanking their mediaeval
chains”. But it is much wider and includes within
its matrix, power to issue any directions, orders or
writs which may be appropriate for enforcement of
the fundamental right in question and this is made
amply clear by the inclusive clause which refers to
in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus,
prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari. It is not
only the high prerogative writs of mandamus,
habeas corpus, prohibition, quo warranto and
certiorari which can be issued by the Supreme
Court but also writs in the nature of these high
prerogative writs and therefore even if the
conditions for issue of any of these high
prerogative writs are not fulfilled, the Supreme
Court would not be constrained to fold its hands in
despair and plead its inability to help the citizen
who has come before it for judicial redress, but
would have power to issue any direction, order or
writ including a writ in the nature of any high
prerogative writ. This provision conferring on the
Supreme Court power to enforce the fundamental
rights in the widest possible terms shows the
anxiety of the Constitution-makers not to allow any
procedural technicalities to stand in the way of
enforcement of fundamental rights. The
Constitution-makers clearly intended that the
Supreme Court should have the amplest power to
issue whatever direction, order or writ may be
appropriate in a given case for enforcement of a
fundamental right. But what procedure shall be
followed by the Supreme Court in exercising the
power to issue such direction, order or writ? That is
a matter on which the Constitution is silent and
advisedly so, because the Constitution-makers
never intended to fetter the discretion of thePage 57
57
Supreme Court to evolve a procedure appropriate
in the circumstances of a given case for the
purpose of enabling it to exercise its power of
enforcing a fundamental right. Neither clause (2)
of Article 32 nor any other provision of the
Constitution requires that any particular procedure
shall be followed by the Supreme Court in
exercising its power to issue an appropriate
direction, order or writ. The purpose for which the
power to issue an appropriate direction, order or
writ is conferred on the Supreme Court is to secure
enforcement of a fundamental right and obviously
therefore, whatever procedure is necessary for
fulfilment of that purpose must be permissible to
the Supreme Court.”
This Court also found that it would be justified to depart, in
a proceeding under Article 32, from the strict adversarial
procedure and the principles embodied in the Code of Civil
Procedure and the Indian Evidence Act and in this regard
observed as under:
“...We do not think we would be justified in imposing
any restriction on the power of the Supreme Court to
adopt such procedure as it thinks fit in exercise of its
jurisdiction, by engrafting adversarial procedure on it,
when the Constitution-makers have deliberately
chosen not to insist on any such requirement and
instead, left it open to the Supreme Court to follow
such procedure as it thinks appropriate for the
purpose of securing the end for which the power is
conferred, namely, enforcement of a fundamental
right.”Page 58
58
Insofar as the practice of appointing commissions for
collection of basic facts to enable the Court to adjudicate the
issues concerning violation of fundamental rights is concerned it
would be necessary to extract the following observations
recorded by this Court in para 14 in the case of Bandhua
Mukti Morcha (supra).
“14...It is for this reason that the Supreme Court has
evolved the practice of appointing commissions for
the purpose of gathering facts and data in regard to a
complaint of breach of a fundamental right made on
behalf of the weaker sections of the society. The
report of the Commissioner would furnish prima facie
evidence of the facts and data gathered by the
Commissioner and that is why the Supreme Court is
careful to appoint a responsible person as
Commissioner to make an enquiry or investigation
into the facts relating to the complaint. It is
interesting to note that in the past the Supreme Court
has appointed sometimes a District Magistrate,
sometimes a District Judge, sometimes a professor of
law, sometimes a journalist, sometimes an officer of
the Court and sometimes an advocate practising in
the Court, for the purpose of carrying out an enquiry
or investigation and making report to the Court
because the Commissioner appointed by the Court
must be a responsible person who enjoys the
confidence of the Court and who is expected to carry
out his assignment objectively and impartially without
any predilection or prejudice. Once the report of the
Commissioner is received, copies of it would be
supplied to the parties so that either party, if it wants
to dispute any of the facts or data stated in the
report, may do so by filing an affidavit and the court
then consider the report of the Commissioner and the
affidavits which may have been filed and proceed toPage 59
59
adjudicate upon the issue arising in the writ petition.
It would be entirely for the Court to consider what
weight to attach to the facts and data stated in the
report of the Commissioner and to what extent to act
upon such facts and data.”
30.In M.C. Mehta Vs. Union of India & Ors. (1987) 1 SCC
395, this Court not only reiterated the view adopted in
Bandhua Mukti Morcha (supra) but also held that the
power under Article 32 would be both injunctive as well as
remedial and the power to grant remedial relief, naturally,
would extend to a wide range of situations and cannot be put
in a straight jacket formula.
31.M.C. Mehta Vs. Union of India & Ors. (2009) 6 SCC 142
is a case which would disclose a very proximate connection
with the case in hand. In the aforesaid case this Court was
called upon to answer the question as to whether in view of
the provisions of Section 4A of the MMDR Act (noticed earlier)
it would be appropriate to exercise the power under Article
32 read with Article 142 in order to suspend mining
operations in the Aravali Hills. The said question was
required to be gone into by the Court in the context of the
specific materials placed before it to show that indiscriminatePage 60
60
mining resulting in large scale environmental degradation
had occurred. In the above context, the contents of the
paragraphs 41 to 45 of the judgment in the case of M.C.
Mehta (supra) would be relevant:-
“41. On the legal parameters, Shri Diwan and Shri
Venugopal, learned Senior Counsel and Shri S.K.
Dubey, learned counsel, submitted that where law
requires a particular thing to be done in a particular
manner, it must be done in that manner and other
methods are strictly forbidden. In this connection, it
was urged that when Section 4-A postulates
formation of an opinion by the Central Government,
after consultation of the State Government, in the
matter of cancellation of mining leases in cases of
environmental degradation, the power needs to be
exercised by the State Government upon receipt of
request from the Central Government. According to
the learned counsel, therefore, this Court cannot
cancel the mining leases if there is alleged
environmental degradation as submitted by the
learned amicus curiae.
42. It was further submitted that measures under
Section 3(2)(v) of the EP Act, 1986 to restrict areas in
which industries shall or shall not be carried out can
only be undertaken by the Central Government
where it deems expedient to protect and improve the
quality of environment. In fact, according to the
learned counsel, when Aravallis Notification was
issued on 7-5-1992 it was issued under Section 3(2)
(v) by the Central Government. At that time, the
Central Government thought it fit not to place a
complete ban but to permit the industries in the
mining sector to carry on its business/operations
subject to restrictions enumerated in the said
notification.Page 61
61
43. It was lastly submitted that the
recommendations of CEC to impose a complete ban
on mining, particularly in cases where environmental
clearances are obtained would amount to an exercise
of power outside the 1957 Act and the Rules framed
thereunder. That, this Court cannot exercise powers
under Article 142 of the Constitution when specific
provisions are made under various forest and
environmental laws dealing with the manner and
procedure for cancellation/termination of mining
leases.
44. We find no merit in the above arguments. As
stated above, in the past when mining leases were
granted, requisite clearances for carrying out mining
operations were not obtained which have resulted in
land and environmental degradation. Despite such
breaches, approvals had been granted for
subsequent slots because in the past the authorities
have not taken into account the macro effect of such
wide-scale land and environmental degradation
caused by the absence of remedial measures
(including rehabilitation plan). Time has now come,
therefore, to suspend mining in the above area till
statutory provisions for restoration and reclamation
are duly complied with, particularly in cases where
pits/quarries have been left abandoned.
45. Environment and ecology are national assets.
They are subject to intergenerational equity. Time
has now come to suspend all mining in the above
area on sustainable development principle which is
part of Articles 21, 48-A and 51-A(g) of the
Constitution of India. In fact, these articles have been
extensively discussed in the judgment in [M.C. Mehta
case (2004) 12 SCC 118] which keeps the option of
imposing a ban in future open.”Page 62
62
The issue is not one of application of the above principles
to a case of cancellation as distinguished from one of
suspension. The issue is more fundamental, namely, the
wisdom of the exercise of the powers under Article 32 read with
Article 142 to prevent environmental degradation and thereby
effectuate the Fundamental Rights under Article 21.
32. We may now take up the decisions cited on behalf of the
leaseholders to contend that the power under Articles 32
and 142 ought not to be exercised in the present case and
instead remedies should be sought within the relevant
statutes. The sheet anchor is the case of Supreme Court
Bar Association Vs. Union of India and Another
reported in (1998) 4 SCC 409. We do not see how or why we
should lie entrapped within the confines of any of the
relevant Statutes on the strength of the views expressed in
Supreme Court Bar Association (supra). The observations
made in para 48 of the judgment and the use of words
“ordinarily” and “are directly in conflict” as appearing in the
said paragraph (underlined by us) directly militates againstPage 63
63
the view that the lease holders would like us to adopt in the
present case.
“48. The Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction
under Article 142 has the power to make such order
as is necessary for doing complete justice “between
the parties in any cause or matter pending before it”.
The very nature of the power must lead the Court to
set limits for itself within which to exercise those
powers and ordinarily it cannot disregard a statutory
provision governing a subject, except perhaps to
balance the equities between the conflicting claims of
the litigating parties by “ironing out the creases” in a
cause or matter before it. Indeed this Court is not a
court of restricted jurisdiction of only dispute-settling.
It is well recognised and established that this Court
has always been a law-maker and its role travels
beyond merely dispute-settling. It is a “problemsolver in the nebulous areas” [see K. Veeraswami v.
Union of India (1991) 3 SCC 55)] but the substantive
statutory provisions dealing with the subject-matter
of a given case cannot be altogether ignored by this
Court, while making an order under Article 142.
Indeed, these constitutional powers cannot, in any
way, be controlled by any statutory provisions but at
the same time these powers are not meant to be
exercised when their exercise may come directly in
conflict with what has been expressly provided for in
a statute dealing expressly with the subject.”
33. Even if the above observations is understood to be laying
down a note of caution, the same would be a qualified one
and can have no application in a case of mass tort as has
been occasioned in the present case. The mechanism
provided by any of the Statutes in question would neither bePage 64
64
effective nor efficacious to deal with the extraordinary
situation that has arisen on account of the large scale
illegalities committed in the operation of the mines in
question resulting in grave and irreparable loss to the forest
wealth of the country besides the colossal loss caused to the
national exchequer. The situation being extraordinary the
remedy, indeed, must also be extraordinary. Considered
against the backdrop of the Statutory schemes in question,
we do not see how any of the recommendations of the CEC,
if accepted, would come into conflict with any law enacted
by the legislature. It is only in the above situation that the
Court may consider the necessity of placing the
recommendations made by the CEC on a finer balancing
scale before accepting the same. We, therefore, feel
uninhibited to proceed to exercise our constitutional
jurisdiction to remedy the enormous wrong that has
happened and to provide adequate protection for the future,
as may be required.
ISSUE NO.3
Sanctity of the process of survey undertaken by the
Joint Team constituted by this Court’s order dated 6thPage 65
65
May, 2011 and the determination of the boundaries of
the leases on the basis of the said survey.
34. The above issue will require examination from two
perspectives. The first is the fairness of the procedure adopted
in carrying out the survey and the second is with regard to
acceptability of the technical part of the survey process. In so
far as the fairness of the procedure adopted is concerned it is
on record that notice of the dates proposed for survey of a
particular lease was intimated to the lease holder well in
advance to enable the lease holder or his representative to be
present at the site while the survey is conducted. The field
survey was done by 7 teams consisting of one surveyor each
from the Karnataka Forest Department, Karnataka Mines and
Geological Department, Karnataka Revenue Department and a
representative of the National Institute of Technology,
Surathkal. The field survey undertaken by each team was
supervised by the Joint Team constituted by this Court. During
the field survey, the representative of the concerned lessees
were present and the Mahazars (Panchnamas) for each day’s
survey were prepared incorporating the details of the survey
carried out. The said Panchnamas were signed by, apart fromPage 66
66
the Government representatives and the representative of the
National Institute of Technology, Surathkal, also by the
concerned lessee or their representatives. The readings
recorded during the field survey were shared with the
concerned lessees or their representatives and before finalizing
the survey sketches the concerned lessees or their
representatives were given a personal hearing. After the field
survey was completed, in terms of the order of the Court dated
23.9.2011, the representations filed by the leaseholders against
the findings of the Joint Team were reconsidered by the Joint
Team and personal hearing was afforded to 122 lease holders.
On the basis of the said hearings, necessary corrections were
made in respect of 33 number of leases. Thereafter, the final
Report of the CEC dated 3.2.2012 was submitted to the Court.
In terms of the Court’s order dated 10.2.2012, the CEC again
considered the representations filed by as many as 66 lease
holders. The findings of the Joint Team in respect of 4 leases
were modified by the CEC though the said modification did not
result into any change of categorization. Two representations,
one filed by M/s. V.S. Lad & Sons and another by M/s. Hothur
Traders have been placed before the Court for appropriatePage 67
67
orders [issue is being dealt with separately] whereas the rest of
the representations were rejected by the CEC. In the above
facts, procedural fairness in the process of survey carried out by
the Joint Team is writ large and there can be no room for any
doubt so as to question the sanctity of the survey process on
the above stated ground.
35. This will require the Court to go into the details of the
technical aspect of the survey which was conducted by the Joint
Team. The consideration of the details of the survey
undertaken, naturally, has to be in the backdrop of the multifold
complaints that have been raised on behalf of the leaseholders
in the several IAs filed. As already noted, on a very broad
plane, the complaints in this regard are that the Joint Team has
ignored judicial orders passed in respect of boundaries between
neighbouring/adjacent leases; reduction of the area of the lease
provided in the lease deed/lease sketch; shifting of the lease
area to a new location as a result of the survey. Specifically,
objections have been raised to the effect that overburden
dumps in different areas have been taken into account to come
to the finding that mining had been carried out in such areasPage 68
68
without necessary clearances under the FC Act (in case of forest
areas) or in the absence of mining leases in respect of such
areas (non forest areas) though the activity in question i.e.
dumping does not amount to mining operations under the
MMDR Act.
36. A consideration of the documents submitted by the
learned Amicus Curiae and those submitted on behalf of the
State of Karnataka would go to show that in carrying out the
survey, the Joint Team had encountered some serious
difficulties. The same may be enumerated below:-
i) the sanctioned lease sketch did not have
any reference point(s) and with reference
to which the location of the lease can be
decided;
ii) there is mis-match between the location(s)
of the reference point(s) on the ground
vis-à-vis the details of such reference
points(s) provided in the lease sketches;
iii) the reference point(s) have been
destroyed/altered on the ground;
iv) the Survey and Demarcation sketch does not
tally with the lease sketch; and
v) there is inherent defect in the lease
sketch.”Page 69
69
37. To overcome the said difficulties, before the
commencement of the actual survey, a pre-survey examination
was undertaken to identify the boundary pillars, rock marks,
revenue points etc. as shown in the lease sketch. This was
done with the help of the government staff as well as the
representative of the concerned lessee. Instead of measuring
the length of each arm of the lease sketch by using the
conventional engineering scale and instead of measuring the
angle by using a protractor, the original lease sketch was
scanned and the digitized so that the length of each arm and
the angles could be precisely measured. Thereafter survey was
undertaken by use of the Total Station Method, which,
undoubtedly, is the state of the art technology with room for
negligible error. A temporary control point was identified
keeping in view the visibility of the maximum number of
boundary points from the identified control point. Thereafter,
the distance between the control point and the visible boundary
points were measured and recorded in the instrument which
uses an infra-red ray. The instrument was shifted to another
temporary control point and in a similar manner the distance
between the said control point and remaining boundary pointsPage 70
70
were measured. After completing the reading of all the points
the margin of error for the instrument was determined (which
was virtually negligible). Thereafter the data from the total
station was downloaded on a computer using the autocadd
software for preparation of the survey sketch. The survey
sketch so prepared was superimposed on the digitized lease
sketch to ascertain the encroachment if any. Also, the details of
the survey sketch was superimposed on the satellite imageries
to further verify the correctness of the process of survey
undertaken. A manual calculation of the lease areas was also
undertaken to compare with the calculation of the lease areas
as per the digitized lease sketch. The difference between the
two measurements in case of 34 number of ‘C’ category leases
is less than +/- 05ha. The relevant details in this regard which
are available in the compilation of documents submitted by the
State of Karnataka would be illuminating and are, therefore,
indicated below:
S.No. Name of the Lessee M.L.
No.
Sanctione
d area in
Ha
Area as per
manual
calculation
in Ha
Areas as
per
digitized
sketch in
Ha
Difference
between
Manually
calculated
area &
Digitised
area
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 J.M.
VRISHVENDRAYYA
2173 3.36 3.348 3.54 0.19Page 71
71
2 VEEYAM PVT. LTD 2615 20.23 20.196 20.04 -0.16
3 AMBIKA GHORPADE 2354 4.95 4.495 4.84 0.35
4 MYSORE
MANGANESE
COMPANY
2603 3.24 3.07 3.16 0.10
5 HOTHUR TRADERS 2313 21.11 22.117 21.61 -0.51
6 M. DASHARATHA
RAMI REDDY
2560 19.95 19.59 19.46 -0.13
7 BHARAT MINES AND
MINERALS
2245 26.20 23.3 24.47 1.17
8 ASSOCIATED
MINING COMPANY
2434 10.12 10.03 10.14 0.11
9 B.R.
YOGENDRANATH
SINGH
2186 13.00 16.592 15.89 -0.70
10 LATHA MINING CO.
(D. NARAYANA)
958 4.05 4 3.93 -0.07
11 CANARA MINERALS 2635 11.34 12.12 11.52 -0.60
12 THANGA VELU &
OTHERS
2585 60.70 62.28 60.92 -1.36
13 TRADING MINING
COMPANY
1732 5.26 5.31 5.45 0.14
14 SRI. N. MANZOOR
AHMED
1324/
2616
15.97 15.65 15.71 0.06
15 SMT KAMALA BAI 1442 13.45 13.02 13.44 0.42
16 SUDARSHAN SINGH
(MAHALAKSHMI
MINERALS)
2579 8.09 8.37 8.11 -0.26
17 RAMGAD MINERALS
AND MINING PVT
LTD
2451 24.28 24.23 24.04 -0.19
18 TRIDENT MINERALS 2315 32.27 31.606 32.43 0.82
19 ALLUM
VEERABHADRAPPA
2436 28.07 23.553 24.53 0.98
20 KANHAYALAL
DUDHERIA
2563 30.76 28.73 30.09 1.36
21 ADARSHA
ENTERPRISES
2369 3.03 2.91 2.98 0.07
22 MATHA MINERALS 1975/
2600
129.5 125.5 129.16 3.66
23 S.B. MINERALS 2393 40.47 40.67 40.38 -0.29
24 KARNATAKA LIMPO 2650 6.07 6.94 6.47 -0.47
25 ANJANA MINERALS 2519 4.55 4.5 4.53 0.03
26 DECCAN MINING
SYNDICATE (P) LTD
2525 19.02 17.015 17.43 0.41
27 P. ABUBAKAR 2183 14.00 13.756 13.85 0.09
28 LAKSHMI
NARAYANA MINING
COMPANY
2487 105.22 103.06 86.18 -16.88
29 KAMALA BAI 2187 23.47 23.43 23.71 0.28
30 MYSORE
STONEWARE PIPES
AND POLTERIES
(P)LTD.
2521 122.72 118.3 122.65 4.35Page 72
72
31 TEJA WORK 2353 4.85 4.74 4.83 0.09
32 RAJAPURA MINES 2190 93.74 89.62 91.7 2.13
33 H.G.
RANGANGOWDA
2148 60.70 60.3 60.66 0.36
34 NIDHI MINING PVT.
LTD.
2433 31.84 29.195 29.49 1.30
35 S.B. MINERALS 2550 44.52 38.819 39.40 0.58
36 MILANA MINERALS
(LAKSHMI & CO.)
1842 99.56 95.556 99.55 3.99
37 DEEP CHAND
KISHANLAL
2348 125.45 128.546 124.92 -3.63
38 THUNGABHADRA
MINERALS LTD.
2365 125.58 135.04
163.74 -4.46
39 THUNGABHADRA
MINERALS LTD.
2366 33.97 33.16
40 M SRINIVASULU 2631 74.86 78.565 75.14 -3.43
41 M.
CHANNAKESHAVA
REDDY (SRI
LAKSHMI
NARASHIMHA
MINING CO.
2566 7.85 8 7.57 -0.43
42 SPARK LINE MINING
CORPORATION
2567 4.86 4.93 4.86 -0.07
43 MINERAL MINERS
AND TRADERS
2185
A
46.13 44.11 44.42 0.31
44 MYSORE MINERALS
LTD.
995 33.60 82.2 32.89 -49.31
45 V.S. LAD & SONS 2290 105.06 98.12 100.54 2.42
46 KARTHIKEYAS
MANGANESE
2559 27.23 27.236 26.71 -0.53
47 G RAJSHEKAR 2229 129.49 127.83 127.42 -0.41
48 RAMA RAO PAOL 2621 28.34 26.33 33.80 7.47
49 SMT RAZIA
KHANUM
2557/
1575
12.58 12.0578 12.54 0.48
38. The participation of the lessee or his representative
through out the process of survey by the Joint Team; the details
of the manner of conduct of the actual process of survey
delineated above; the use of the state of the art technology; the
composition of the Joint Team entrusted with the responsibility
of the survey and the constitution of the 7 teams that
conducted the field survey under the supervision of the JointPage 73
73
Team; the two stages of re-verification of the findings of the
survey in the light of the objections raised by the lease holders
under orders of this Court dated 26.9.2011 and 10.2.2012 and
the corrections made on the basis thereof can leave no doubt
as to the credibility of the findings of the survey conducted
under the orders of the Court. True it is that we cannot claim to
be experts; but we need not be to see what is ex facie evident.
Therefore, notwithstanding the protracted arguments advanced
on behalf of lease holders and the large scale reference to
sketches, maps and drawings filed before this Court by the said
lease holders, we are satisfied that all complaints and
grievances must fade away in the light of the survey
undertaken by the Joint Team and the events subsequent
thereto. It would also be significant to take note of the fact that
in the written submission on behalf of the Federation of Indian
Mineral Industries (FIMI), in the opening paragraph it has been
stated as under.
“The applicant submits that FIMI has full faith in
the integrity and fairness of the survey done by
the Joint Team and recommended by CEC. FIMI is
in full agreement with the recommendations made
by CEC with regard to Categories A and B and thePage 74
74
directions issued by this Hon’ble Court. FIMI is
simultaneously of the view that instead of
cancellation of Category ‘C’ mining leases, these
may be directed to make appropriate
compensatory afforestation payment, undertake
R&R work as per R& R Plan prepared by ICFRE and
approved by CEC and after successful completion
and implementation of R&R Plan, they should be
allowed to recommence mining operations in such
leases.”
39. We make it clear that we have not understood the above
statement as an admission on the part of the Federation and it
is on a consideration of the totality of the facts placed before us
that we accept the findings of the survey conducted by the
Joint Team constituted by the orders of this Court and the
boundaries of each of the leases determined on that basis. We
further direct that in supersession of all orders either of the
authorities of the State or Courts, as may be, the boundaries of
leases fixed by the Joint Team will henceforth be the boundaries
of each of the leases who will have the benefit of the lease area
as determined by the Joint Team. All proceedings pending in
any court with regard to boundaries of the leases involved in
the present proceeding shall stand adjudicated by means ofPage 75
75
present order and no such question would be open for reexamination by any body or authority.
40. Before proceeding to the next issue we would like to
observe that the contention urged on behalf of some of the
lessees that dumping of mining waste (overburden dumps) do
not constitute operations under Section 2(d) of the MMDR Act is
too naive for acceptance. The wide terms of the definition
contained in Section 2(d) of the MMDR Act encompasses all
such activity within the meaning of expression “mining
operations”. Use of forest land for such activity would require
clearance under the FC Act. In case the land used for such
purpose is not forest land the mining lease must cover the land
used for any such activity.
ISSUE NO.4
Acceptability of the Recommendations of the CEC with
regard to (i) categorization, (ii) Reclamation and
Rehabilitation (R&R) Plans, (iii) Reopening of Category
‘A’ and ‘B’ mines subject to conditions, (iv)
Closure/reopening of Category ‘C’ mines and (v) future
course of action in respect of Category ‘C’ mines if
closure thereof is to be ordered by the Court
41. In the light of the discussions that have preceded sanctity
of the procedure of laying information and materials before thePage 76
76
Court with regard to the extent of illegal mining and other
specific details in this regard by means of the Reports of the
CEC cannot be in doubt. Inter-generational equity and
sustainable development have come to be firmly embedded in
our constitutional jurisprudence as an integral part of the
fundamental rights conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution.
In enforcing such rights of a large number of citizens who are
bound to be adversely affected by environmental degradation,
this Court cannot be constrained by the restraints of procedure.
The CEC which has been assisting the Court in various
environment related matters for over a decade now was
assigned certain specified tasks which have been performed by
the said body giving sufficient justification for the decisions
arrived and the recommendations made. If the said
recommendations can withstand the test of logic and reason
which issue is being examined hereinafter we will have no
reason not to accept the said recommendations and embody
the same as a part of the order that we will be required to
make in the present case.
(i) CategorizationPage 77
77
42. The issue is whether categorization on the basis of
percentage of the encroached area qua the total lease area is
an arbitrary decision. Arbitrariness in the adoption of a criteria
for classification has to be tested on the anvil of Article 14 and
not on the subjective notions of availability of a better basis of
classification. The basis suggested i.e. total encroached area
has the potential of raising questions similar to the ones now
raised on behalf of the lease holders. This is on account of the
lack of uniformity in the areas covered by the different leases in
question. The test, therefore, ought not to be what would be a
‘better’ basis for the categorization for that would introduce
subjectivity in the process; the test is whether categorization on
the basis adopted results in hostile discrimination and adoption
of the criteria of percentage has no reasonable nexus with the
object sought to be achieved, namely, to identify the lessees
who have committed the maximum violations and damage to
environment. Viewed from the aforesaid perspective, the
categorization made does not fail the test of reasonableness
and would commend for our acceptance.Page 78
78
In this regard, we may take note of two IAs (IA.No.74 of
2012 and I.A.No.4 of 2012) filed by Federation of Indian Mineral
Industries which body claims membership of a vast number of
the lessees involved in the present proceedings. In the
aforesaid IAs, as already noticed in a different context, the
Federation has unequivocally accepted the findings of the
survey conducted by the Joint Team and the recommendation
of the CEC in so far as categorization of the leases and the
actions suggested for reopening of Category ‘A’ and ‘B’ mines
along with other pre-conditions stipulated including the
preparation of the R & R plans. The only caveat in this regard is
in respect of category ‘C’ mines. The Federation had suggested
that the said mines be also allowed to reopen subject to similar
or even more stringent conditions and, alternatively, for
reopening of 39 total out of the total of 49 category ‘C’ mines by
adoption of certain more liberal criteria than those
recommended by the CEC. In the totality of the circumstances,
we are of the view that the categorization suggested by the
CEC in its Report dated 3.2.2012 should be accepted by us.
(ii) Conditions which have been suggested for
opening of Category ‘A’ mines and additionally
the R& R Plans for Category ‘B’ minesPage 79
79
43. The conditions subject to which Category ‘A’ and ‘B’ mines
are to be reopened and the R&R Plans that have been
recommended as a precondition for reopening of Category ‘B’
mines are essentially steps to ensure scientific and planned
exploitation of the scarce mineral resources of the country. The
details of the preconditions and the R&R plans have already
been noticed and would not require a repetition. Suffice it
would be to say that such recommendations are wholesome
and in the interest not only of the environment and ecology but
the mining industry as a whole so as to enable the industry to
run in a more organized, planned and disciplined manner. FIMI
was actively associated in the framing of the guidelines and the
preparation of the R&R Plans. There is nothing in the
preconditions or in the details of the R&R plans suggested
which are contrary to or in conflict or inconsistent with any of
the statutory provisions of the MMDR Act, EP Act and FC Act. In
such a situation, while accepting the preconditions subject to
which the Category ‘A’ and ‘B’ mines are to be reopened and
the R&R plans that must be put in place for Category ‘B’ mines,
we are of the view that the suggestions made by the CEC forPage 80
80
reopening of Category ‘A’ and ‘B’ mines as well as the details of
the R&R plans should be accepted by us, which we accordingly
do. This will bring us to the most vital issue of the case, i.e., the
future of the Category ‘C’ mines.
44. The precise extent of illegal mining that took place in the
three districts of Karnataka have been noted in detail in an
earlier part of this order (para 23). The same, therefore, will not
require any repetition. Illegal mining apart from playing havoc
on the national economy had, in fact, cast an ominous cloud on
the credibility of the system of governance by laws in force. It
has had a chilling and crippling effect on ecology and
environment. It is evident from the compilation submitted to
the Court by the CEC that several of the Category ‘C’ mines
were operating without requisite clearances under FC Act or
even in the absence of a mining lease for a part of the area
used for mining operations. The satellite imageries placed
before the Court with regard to environmental damage and
destruction has shocked judicial conscience. It is in the light of
the above facts and circumstances that the future course of
action in respect of the maximum violators/polluters, i.e.,Page 81
81
Category ‘C’ mines has to be judged. While doing so, the Court
also has to keep in mind the requirement of Iron Ore to ensure
adequate supply of manufactured steel and other allied
products.
45. Once the result of the survey undertaken and the
boundaries of the leases determined by the Joint Team has
been accepted by the Court and the basis of categorization of
the mines has been found to be rational and constitutionally
permissible it will be difficult for this Court to visualize as to how
the Category ‘C’ mines can be allowed to reopen. There is no
room for compassion; fervent pleas for clemency cannot have
even a persuasive value. As against the individual interest of
the 49 Category ‘C’ leaseholders, public interest at large would
require the Court to lean in favour of demonstrating the efficacy
and effectiveness of the long arm of the law. We, therefore,
order for the complete closure of the Category ‘C’ mines and for
necessary follow up action in terms of the recommendations of
the CEC in this regard, details of which have already been
extracted in an earlier part of this order. 
ISSUE NO.5Page 82
82
Other Miscellaneous/Connected Issues
46. We have noticed that by an order dated 2.11.2012 passed
by this Court an embargo has been placed on grant of fresh
mining licenses. In view of the developments that have taken
place in the meantime and in view of the fact that we are
inclined to accept the recommendations at Sl. Nos. VI and VII of
the CEC’s Report dated 3.2.2012 (Pg.56 of the Report), we do
not consider it necessary to continue with the order dated
2.11.2012 in so far as grant of fresh leases are concerned.
47. In so far as settlement of the inter-state boundaries
between the States of Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka is
concerned, both the States have agreed to have the boundaries
fixed under the supervision of the Geological Survey of India. In
view of the agreement between the States on the said issue we
permit the States to finalize the issue in the above terms. The
operation of the 7 leases (Category B1) located on or near the
inter-State boundary is presently suspended. Until the
boundary issue between the two States is resolved resumption
of mining operations in the 7 leases cannot be allowed.Page 83
83
48. The CEC has provisionally categorised M/s. S.B. Minerals
(ML No.2515) and Shanthalakshmi Jayaram (ML No.2553) in
Category “B” though the encroached area under illegal mining
pits has been found to be 24.44% and 23.62% respectively.
According to the CEC, it is on account of “the complexities
involved in finalizing the survey sketches and in the absence of
inter-village boundary” that the said leases have been placed in
Category “B” instead of Category “C”. We cannot agree with
the tentative decision of the CEC. On the basis of the findings
of the survey and the categorization made, both of which have
been accepted by the Court by the present order, we direct that
the aforesaid two leases, namely, M/s. S.B. Minerals and
M/s. Shanthalakshmi Jayaram be placed in Category “C”.
Necessary consequential action will naturally follow.
49. The CEC in its Report dated 28.3.2012 has placed the
cases of M/s. V.S. Lad & Sons and M/s. Hothur Traders (placed in
Category “C”) for final determination by the Court. The CEC has
reported that the encroachment by M/s. V.S. Lad & Sons is only
in respect of the overburden dumps and exceeds the
percentage (15%) marginally, i.e., by 0.17% which could veryPage 84
84
well be due to the least count error used by the Joint Team. In
so far as M/s. Hothur Traders is concerned the CEC in its Report
dated 28.3.2012 has recorded that according to the lessee it
has carried on its mining operation for the last 50 years in the
lease area allotted to it which may have been wrongly identified
in the earlier surveys and demarcations by taking into account
a wrong reference point.
Having considered the facts on which the two lessees have
sought upgradation from “C” to “B” Category we are afraid that
such upgradation cannot be allowed. Both the lessees, in fact,
accept the results of the survey by the Joint Team which
findings have already been accepted by us.
50. In the result, we summarize our conclusions in the matter
as follows:-
(1) The findings of the survey conducted by the
Joint Team constituted by this Court by order dated
6.5.2011 and boundaries of the leases in question as
determined on the basis of the said survey is hereby
approved and accepted.
Page 85
85
(2) The categorization of the mines (“A”, “B” and
“C”) on the basis of the parameters adopted by the
CEC as indicated in its Report dated 3.2.2012 is
approved and accepted.
(3) The order of the Court dated 13.4.2012
accepting the recommendations dated 13.3.2012 of
the CEC (in modification of the recommendations of
the CEC dated 3.2.2012) in respect of the items (A) to
(I) is reiterated. Specifically, the earmarked role of
the Monitoring Committee in the said order dated
13.4.2012 is also reiterated.
(4) The order of the Court dated 3.9.2012 in respect
of reopening of 18 Category “A” mines subject to the
conditions mentioned in the said order is reiterated.
(5) The order of the Court dated 28.9.2012 in all
respects is reiterated.
(6) The recommendations of the CEC contained in
the Report dated 15.2.2013 for reopening of
remaining Category “A” mines and Category “B”
mines (63 in number) and sale of sub-grade iron ore
subject to the conditions mentioned in the said
Report are approved. 
(7) The recommendations contained in paragraphs
VI and VII (Pg. 56 to 57) of the CEC Report dated
Page 86
86
3.2.2012 are accepted, meaning thereby, the leases
in respect of “C” Category mines will stand cancelled
and the recommendations of the CEC (para VII
Pg. 56) of Report dated 3.2.2012 with regard to the
grant of fresh leases are accepted. 
(8) The proceeds of the sales of the Iron Ore of the
‘C’ Category mines made through the Monitoring
Committee will stand forfeited to the State. The
Monitoring Committee will remit the amounts held by
it on this account to the SPV for utilization in
connection with the purposes for which it had been
constituted.
(9) M/s. V.S. Lad & Sons, M/s. Hothur Traders, M/s.
S.B. Minerals (ML No. 2515) and M/s. Shanthalakshmi
Jayaram (ML No. 2553) will be treated as “C”
Category mines and resultant consequences in
respect of the said leases will follow. 
(10) The operation of the 7 leases placed in “B”
category situated on or nearby the KarnatakaAndhra Pradesh inter-State boundary will remain
suspended until finalisation of the inter-State
boundary dispute whereupon the question of
commencement of operations in respect of the
aforesaid 7 leases will be examined afresh by the
CEC.
Page 87
87
(11) The recommendations made in the paragraph
VIII of the Report of the CEC dated 3.2.2012
(pertaining to M/s. MML, Pg.57) is accepted. The
recommendations made in paragraphs IX, X, XII (in
respect of confiscated iron-ore) XIII and XIV of the
said Report dated 3.2.2012 (Pg. 57-60) will not
require any specific direction as the same have
already been dealt with or the same have otherwise
become redundant, as may be.
(12) The recommendations made in paragraph XI
(grant of fresh leases) and paragraph XII (in respect
of pending applications for grant of mining leases) of
the CEC’s Report dated 3.2.2012 (Pg. 59) are not
accepted. 
In view of the discussions and conclusions
in para 44 of the present order, this Court’s order
dated 02.11.2012 placing an embargo on grant of
fresh mining leases need not be continued any
further. Grant of fresh mining leases and
consideration of pending applications be dealt with in
accordance with law, the directions contained in the
present order as well as the spirit thereof.
(13) Determination of the inter-State boundary
between Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh in so far
as the same is relevant to the present proceedings,
as agreed upon by the two States, be made through
the intervention of the office of Surveyor General of
India.
Page 88
88
51. We also direct that all consequential action in terms of the
present order be completed with the utmost expedition. The
writ application filed by Samaj Parivartan Samudaya and IAs
shall stand disposed of in terms of our abovestated conclusions.
SLP (C) Nos.7366-7367 of 2010, SLP (C) Nos.32690-
32691 of 2010, WP (Crl.) No.66 of 2010, SLP (C)
Nos.17064-17065 of 2010, SLP (C) No…….(CC No. 16829
of 2010), SLP (C) No......(CC No. 16830 of 2010), WP (C)
No.411 of 2010, SLP (C) No.353 of 2011 and WP (C)
No.76 of 2012
52. All these matters are de-tagged and directed to be listed
separately.
……………………………….J.
(Aftab Alam)
……………………………….J.
(K.S. Radhakrishnan)
……………………………….J.
(Ranjan Gogoi)
New Delhi;
April 18, 2013.

the Maharashtra Ownership of Flats (Regulation of Promotion of Construction, Sale, Management and Transfer) Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’)= According to the provisions of Section 4 (1) of the Act, the agreement, if any, executed between the plaintiffs on one hand and the developer on the another, ought to have been registered with the sub-Registrar. 24. In absence of such a registered document, the plaintiffs would not get any right in respect of the flats, which they intended to purchase. Moreover, in absence of the registration, the Subsequent Buyers could not have got an opportunity to inspect the agreement and there could not be any presumption that the Subsequent Buyers knew about the agreement.; The letter of intent=The letter of intent cannot be said to be an agreement to sell for the simple reason that according to the contents of the letter of intent, only upon payment of the entire purchase price, the Developer and the plaintiffs were to enter into an agreement with regard to sale of the flats. This fact clearly denotes that no agreement to sell had been entered into between the plaintiffs and the Developer and in absence of such agreements, in our opinion, there cannot be any right in favour of the plaintiffs with regard to specific performance of any contract. Thus, in our opinion, the High Court did not commit any error while coming to the conclusion that there was no binding contract or agreement in existence between the plaintiffs and the Developer and therefore, the trial court could not have decreed the suit for specific performance.; subsequent buyers - whether bonafide or not = As no averment was made by the plaintiffs in their plaints that the Subsequent Buyers were not bonafide purchasers for consideration, the Subsequent Buyers could not have adduced any evidence to show that they were bonafide purchasers for consideration. Had such a plea been raised by the plaintiffs in their pleadings, the Subsequent Buyers could have adduced necessary evidence to prove their cases. In such cases, normally the burden of proof would lie on the plaintiffs unless there is a registered document so as to raise a presumption that the Subsequent Buyers had knowledge with regard to the earlier transaction. Such a burden of proof was not discharged by the plaintiffs and therefore, we are also of the view that the Subsequent Buyers were bonafide buyers for consideration.; amount refunded with interest = In view of the above circumstances, in our opinion, the High Court was right in allowing the appeals and directing the Developer to return the amount of the purchase price received by it from the plaintiffs with interest at the rate of 9% p.a. from the date when the letter of cancellation was written by the Developer to the plaintiffs. In our opinion, the said direction is just and proper however, looking to the rising price and inflationary trend in the country, we partly modify the judgment by increasing the rate of interest from 9% p.a. to 12% p.a. The said amount shall be paid to the plaintiffs by the Developer within two months from today.


Page 1
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4509 OF 2007
HANSA V. GANDHI …APPELLANT
 VERSUS
DEEP SHANKAR ROY & ORS. ....RESPONDENTS
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4510 OF 2007
AND
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4511 OF 2007
J U D G M E N T
ANIL R. DAVE, J.
1. Being aggrieved by a common judgment delivered in First Appeal
Nos.492, 493 and 499 of 2002, dated 24th August, 2005 by the High Court of
Judicature at Bombay, these appeals have been filed by the original
plaintiffs, who had filed the suits for specific performance.
1Page 2
2. As the facts involved in all these three appeals are similar in nature,
all these appeals are being decided by this common judgment. For the
purpose of clarity, we are referring to all the parties by their description as it
was before the trial court. The Developer of the property, original
Defendant No.1 is now respondent No. 2 in all the appeals whereas
respondent no.1 is a subsequent buyer of the property in question. M/s.
O.P. Co-operative Housing Society (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Society’)
was the owner of the land which was being developed by the Developer.
3. The Developer had entered into an agreement to develop the property
i.e. land owned by the Society and thereafter to sell the flats constructed on
the land in question to the intending purchasers in accordance with the terms
and conditions of the agreement dated 17th April, 1992.
4. Each plaintiff wanted to purchase one flat to be constructed by the
Developer on the land belonging to the Society, so they had negotiated deals
with the Developer. As per the understanding arrived at between each
plaintiff and the Developer, the plaintiffs had to pay a total consideration of
Rs.4,40,000/- in respect of each flat in certain installments. Accordingly,
2Page 3
each plaintiff had started making payment to the Developer as per the
amount of installments determined by the Developer. The Developer had
executed a letter of intent dated 29th September, 1992, whereby the
Developer had agreed to reserve a flat for each plaintiff . Reservation of the
flat was subject to bye-laws of the Society. Moreover, the reservation made
by the Developer for the flats was also subject to the terms and conditions
which had been incorporated in the letter of intent. Initially each plaintiff
had given a sum of Rs. 88,000/- to the Developer and a receipt had been
executed by the Developer in respect of the said amount. Clause No. 3 of
the said letter of intent dated 29.9.1992, written by the Developer and
addressed to the plaintiffs is as under :
 “Clause 3 : We acknowledge and admit the receipt of
Rs.88,000/- (Rupees Eighty Eight Thousand only) from you,
which amount you have paid to us in view of our reserving
the above mentioned flat in our proposed building on the
basis of the plans shown to you, with a view to securing that
on compliance of all the terms and conditions of Agreement
to Lease executed between the Society and the Corporation,
you shall purchase the said flat and enter into ‘Agreement to
Sale’ with us.”
3Page 4
Thus, upon compliance of certain terms and conditions referred to in the
aforestated clause and in the letter of intent, the Developer had agreed to sell
the flats to the plaintiffs.
5. It was also provided in the letter of intent that the plaintiffs had to bear
expenses in relation to registration of the document, stamp duty and certain
other expenditure to be incurred for getting motor and electric connection
etc. and it was also provided in the letter of intent that delayed payment of
the installment would attract interest at the rate of 21% p.a. and if two or
more installments remained unpaid, the reservation made in respect of the
flat would stand cancelled.
6. In pursuance of the execution of the aforestated letter of intent, the
plaintiffs had started paying installments to the Developer. It may also be
noted here that due to some litigation which had taken place between some
persons and the Society before the High Court, the High Court had ordered
an enquiry. The said litigation went on till the end of 1996, due to which the
Developer could not continue his construction activity and that resulted into
delay in the construction work. According to the Developer, the said delay
4Page 5
had resulted into increase in the cost of construction and therefore, it was
constrained to increase the price of the flats and as a result thereof, the
amount of installment was also increased from Rs.22,000/- to Rs. 38,500/-.
The increase in the price of the flats and the amount of installments had been
opposed by the plaintiffs and they had refused to pay the installments on the
ground that the increase in the price as well as installments was not justified.
The plaintiffs had paid about ten installments till 10th January, 1997. In view
of the fact that the entire amount payable as per the letter of intent and the
understanding arrived at among the plaintiffs and the Developer had not
been paid, the Developer did not allot or sell any flat to the plaintiffs and
therefore, a Civil Suit No. 149 of 1998 had been filed by Mrs. Hansa V.
Gandhi (who has filed Civil Appeal No. 4509 of 2007 herein) with a prayer
for specific performance of the agreement for sale of the flat or in the
alternative, to refund the price already paid to the Developer along with
damages, which according to the plaintiff was Rs.10,00,000/-. Similarly,
other plaintiffs had also filed suits for specific performance/damages.
7. It is important to note that when the plaintiffs had stopped paying
installments to the Developer, the Developer had entered into another
agreement with the present respondent No.1 in each appeal for sale of the
5Page 6
flats with increased price, which were to be constructed and allotted to the
plaintiffs. All these buyers are described hereinafter as ‘Subsequent
Buyers’, who were defendant No.3 in the suits.
8. The Developer had filed written statements before the trial court
denying its liability on the ground that by virtue of letter dated 19th
December, 1997, it had cancelled the reservation of flats in question made
for the plaintiffs. Thus, the understanding arrived at among the Developer
and the plaintiffs in pursuance of the letter of intent had come to an end and
as there was no subsisting agreement with regard to sale of the flats in
question with any of the plaintiffs, there was no question of either specific
performance of the contract or about breach of the contract resulting into
payment of damages by the Developer.
9. It was contended on behalf of the Subsequent Buyers, who had
purchased the flats from the Developer that they were bonafide purchasers
for consideration without notice. It was specifically stated by them that they
had no notice with regard to the earlier transactions which the plaintiffs had
entered into with the Developer. It was also submitted that the agreement
6Page 7
between each plaintiff and the Developer, if any, had never been registered
as required under the provisions of the Maharashtra Ownership of Flats
(Regulation of Promotion of Construction, Sale, Management and Transfer)
Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) and therefore, it cannot be
presumed that the Subsequent Buyers had any notice with regard to the
earlier transactions, especially when they were never informed about the
earlier transactions either by the Developer or by the original plaintiffs. It
was further submitted on behalf of the Subsequent Buyers that they had paid
the entire amount of consideration of Rs. 6,37,000/- and they were also put
in possession of their respective flats and therefore, they were bonafide
purchasers for consideration. Thus, the agreement with regard to sale of the
flats, by the Developer to the Subsequent Buyers could not have been
questioned and they had legal and legitimate right to have occupation of
their respective flats.
10. After framing necessary issues and upon considering the evidence led
before the trial court, the trial court decreed the suits whereby the Developer
was directed to specifically perform the contract with regard to sale of the
flats in favour of the plaintiffs upon payment of unpaid amount of
consideration by them.
7Page 8
11. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial court, the
Subsequent Buyers filed the First Appeals, referred to hereinabove, before
the High Court. As the facts in respect of each First appeal were quite
similar, the High Court thought it proper to decide all the three First Appeals
by a common judgment, which was delivered on 24th August, 2005 and
validity of the said judgment is challenged in these civil appeals filed before
this Court.
12. After hearing the concerned parties and looking at the facts of the case
and after considering the judgment delivered by the trial court, the High
Court allowed the appeals. The judgments and decrees which had been
passed in favour of the plaintiffs by the trial court had been set aside and it
was directed by the High Court that the plaintiffs would be entitled to get
refund of the amount paid by them to the Developer with interest at the rate
of 9% per annum from the date on which the letter of termination of the
agreement was sent by the Developer to the plaintiffs till the date of payment
of the said amount.
8Page 9
13. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants i.e. the original
plaintiffs mainly submitted that the Subsequent Buyers were not bonafide
purchasers without notice because they did not make sufficient enquiry with
regard to the earlier transactions which had been entered into by the
Developer with the plaintiffs. According to the learned counsel, had the
Subsequent Buyers made detailed enquiry with regard to the records of the
Developer, they would have surely ascertained the facts with regard to the
letters of intent sent to the plaintiffs by the Developer but by not doing so,
the Subsequent Buyers had shown gross negligence and therefore, it cannot
be said that the Subsequent Buyers were bonafide purchasers without any
notice with regard to earlier transactions entered into between the Developer
and the plaintiffs. The counsel further submitted that the burden of
establishing the bonafides of the Subsequent Buyers was on them and the
said burden had not been discharged by them and therefore, the High Court
was in error while observing that the Subsequent Buyers were bonafide
purchasers without any notice.
14. It was also submitted by the learned counsel that the Subsequent
Buyers had not adduced any evidence with regard to payment of purchase
9Page 10
price to the Developer and therefore, it could not have been said that the
Subsequent Buyers were buyers in good faith for valuable consideration.
15. On the other hand, it had been submitted on behalf of the Subsequent
Buyers i.e. respondent no. 1 in each appeal that the plaintiffs never averred
in their respective plaints that the Subsequent Buyers were not bonafide
purchasers having no notice with regard to the earlier transactions. In
absence of such pleadings before the trial court, the plaintiffs could not have
advanced any argument with regard to bonafides of the Subsequent Buyers.
To substantiate the aforestated submission, the learned counsel had relied
upon a judgment delivered in the case of Ram Swarup Gupta (dead)
through LRs. Vs. Bishun Narain Inter College and Ors. [(1987) 2 SCC
555] to the effect that in absence of pleadings, the court would not deal with
the matter not pleaded or the concerned party would not be permitted to
make out a case beyond its pleadings. Some other judgments were also cited
to substantiate the aforestated submissions.
16. It was mainly submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the
Subsequent Buyers that in absence of any registration of the agreement,
1Page 11
entered into between the plaintiffs and the Developer, the Subsequent
Buyers could not have got any opportunity to find out existence of the letter
of intent or an agreement, if any, entered into between the plaintiffs and the
Developer. According to the learned counsel, registration of a document is a
notice to all concerned persons and in absence of registration of the so called
agreement, it cannot be presumed that the Subsequent Buyers had any
knowledge with regard to the earlier transactions. The burden of proof
would be on the plaintiffs to establish that the Subsequent Buyers had
knowledge about the earlier transactions entered into by the Developer with
the plaintiffs.
17. The counsel appearing for the Subsequent Buyers further submitted
that Section 4(1) of the Act makes it mandatory to get the agreement,
between the purchaser of the flat and the Developer, registered but in the
instant case there was no registration as required under Section 4(1) of the
Act, the plaintiffs could not have acquired any right in the flats.
18. Thus, the sum and substance of the submissions made on behalf of the
Subsequent Buyers was that being bonafide purchasers for consideration,
1Page 12
they had a better right in respect of the flats in question, especially when the
plaintiffs had stopped paying installments which were due and payable by
them to the Developer and in view of the letter of cancellation written by the
Developer to the plaintiffs. If there was any agreement or if the plaintiffs had
any right to purchase the flats in question, by virtue of the letter dated 19th
December, 1997, cancelling the allotment, the so called right had come to an
end and thereafter the plaintiffs did not have any enforceable right in respect
of the flats in question.
19. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and have
perused the judgments of the courts below and the judgments referred to by
the learned counsel.
20. Upon thoughtful consideration, we are of the view that the High Court
was not in error while allowing the First Appeals filed by the Subsequent
Buyers for the reasons stated by it in the impugned judgment.
21. It is not in dispute that the letter of intent was issued by the Developer
to the plaintiffs wherein certain conditions had been incorporated and upon
1Page 13
fulfillment of those conditions, agreements for sale of the flats were to be
executed. Upon perusal of the letter of intent closely, one would find that
certain conditions had been incorporated in the letter of intent. The said
conditions clearly imposed a duty on the part of the intended purchasers to
make payment of all the installments payable in respect of the purchase price
of the flat. It is also not in dispute that it was open to the Developer to vary
the price or the area to be covered by a flat in certain cases. It is not in
dispute that the Developer had raised the price because of the delay caused
on account of the litigation faced by the Society. On account of the delay
caused in construction of the flats, the cost had gone up and therefore, the
Developer had asked for a rise in the price which was approved by the
majority of the intended purchasers of the flats. Accordingly, all the other
purchasers had started paying the increased price of installments but the
plaintiffs had refused to the same and in fact they had stopped paying the
installments which were becoming due and payable after the price had been
increased. It is also worth noticing that the plaintiffs did not make payment
even as per the rate prescribed under the letter of intent and the terms and
conditions agreed upon by them with the Developer.
1Page 14
22. It is a fact that the plaintiffs had not entered into any formal
agreement with regard to the purchase of the flats with the Developer. The
mere letter of intent, which was subject to several conditions, would not give
any right to the plaintiffs for purchase of the flats in question till all the
conditions incorporated in the letter of intent were fulfilled by the plaintiffs
i.e. the proposed purchasers. It is also a fact that all the conditions, which
were to be fulfilled, had not been fulfilled by the plaintiffs.
23. According to the provisions of Section 4 (1) of the Act, the agreement,
if any, executed between the plaintiffs on one hand and the developer on the
another, ought to have been registered with the sub-Registrar.
24. In absence of such a registered document, the plaintiffs would not get
any right in respect of the flats, which they intended to purchase. Moreover,
in absence of the registration, the Subsequent Buyers could not have got an
opportunity to inspect the agreement and there could not be any presumption
that the Subsequent Buyers knew about the agreement.
1Page 15
25. The letter of intent cannot be said to be an agreement to sell for the
simple reason that according to the contents of the letter of intent, only upon
payment of the entire purchase price, the Developer and the plaintiffs were
to enter into an agreement with regard to sale of the flats. This fact clearly
denotes that no agreement to sell had been entered into between the
plaintiffs and the Developer and in absence of such agreements, in our
opinion, there cannot be any right in favour of the plaintiffs with regard to
specific performance of any contract. Thus, in our opinion, the High Court
did not commit any error while coming to the conclusion that there was no
binding contract or agreement in existence between the plaintiffs and the
Developer and therefore, the trial court could not have decreed the suit for
specific performance.
26. As no averment was made by the plaintiffs in their plaints that the
Subsequent Buyers were not bonafide purchasers for consideration, the
Subsequent Buyers could not have adduced any evidence to show that they
were bonafide purchasers for consideration. Had such a plea been raised by
the plaintiffs in their pleadings, the Subsequent Buyers could have adduced
necessary evidence to prove their cases. In such cases, normally the burden
of proof would lie on the plaintiffs unless there is a registered document so
1Page 16
as to raise a presumption that the Subsequent Buyers had knowledge with
regard to the earlier transaction. Such a burden of proof was not discharged
by the plaintiffs and therefore, we are also of the view that the Subsequent
Buyers were bonafide buyers for consideration.
27. The learned counsel for the Subsequent Buyers relied upon several
judgments and the propositions laid down in the said judgments are clear to
the effect that
  if the contention of the plaintiffs is that the Subsequent
Buyers are not bonafide purchasers, the plaintiffs must have pleading to that effect.
28. In view of the above circumstances, in our opinion, the High Court
was right in allowing the appeals and directing the Developer to return the
amount of the purchase price received by it from the plaintiffs with interest
at the rate of 9% p.a. from the date when the letter of cancellation was
written by the Developer to the plaintiffs. In our opinion, the said direction
is just and proper however, looking to the rising price and inflationary trend
in the country, we partly modify the judgment by increasing the rate of
1Page 17
interest from 9% p.a. to 12% p.a. The said amount shall be paid to the
plaintiffs by the Developer within two months from today.
29. Looking into the aforestated facts, we are of the view that the High
Court did not commit any error while allowing the appeals. Subject to
aforestated modification with regard to the rate of interest, the appeals are
dismissed with no order as to costs.
………..……………......................J.
(R.M. LODHA)
………...........................................J.
 (ANIL R. DAVE)
…….…..……………......................J.
 (RANJAN GOGOI)
New Delhi
April 18, 2013
1

sec.149 common intention = where general allegations are made against a large number of persons the court would categorically scrutinise the evidence and hesitate to convict the large number of persons if the evidence available on record is vague. It is obligatory on the part of the court to examine that if the offence committed is not in direct prosecution of the common object, it yet may fall under the second part of Section 149 IPC, if the offence was such as the members knew was likely to be committed. Further inference has to be drawn as to what was the number of persons; how many of them were merely passive witnesses; what were their arms and weapons. The number and nature of injuries is also relevant to be considered. “Common object” may also be developed at the time of incident.” ; Delay in sending F.I.R. not fatal = when there is delayed despatch of the FIR, it is necessary on the part of the prosecution to give an explanation for the delay. We may further state that the purpose behind sending a copy of the FIR to the concerned magistrate is to avoid any kind of suspicion being attached to the FIR. Such a suspicion may compel the court to record a finding that there was possibility of the FIR being ante-timed or ante-dated. The court may draw adverse inferences against the prosecution. However, if the court is convinced as regards to the truthfulness of the prosecution version and trustworthiness of the witnesses, the same may not be regarded as detrimental to the prosecution case. It would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case.


Page 1
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 223 OF 2008
Rattiram & Ors. ...
……..Appellants
Versus
State of M. P. Through
Inspector of Police ………Respondent
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 458 OF 2008
Satyanarayan & ors. …......Appellants
Versus
The State of Madhya Pradesh Through
Incharge, Police Station Cantt. ………Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Dipak Misra, J.
In these two appeals assail is to the judgment of
conviction and order of sentence passed by the Division
Bench of the High Court of Judicature, Madhya Pradesh atPage 2
Jabalpur, in Criminal Appeal No. 1568 of 1996 whereby the
High Court concurred with the judgment of conviction and
order of sentence passed by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Sagar, in Sessions Trial No. 97 of 1995,
except in respect of one Gorelal, Appellant No. 2 before
the High Court and Accused No. 2 before the trial court,
wherein the present appellants along with Gorelal stood
convicted for offences under Section 302 read with
Section 149 Indian Penal Code and other offences and
sentenced to imprisonment for life with fine of Rs.1000/-,
in default of payment of fine, to further undergo rigorous
imprisonment for three months.
2. The factual score, as depicted, is that on 29.9.1995,
deceased Dhruv @ Daulat along with Ashok Kumar,
PW-5, Dheeraj, PW-6, Naresh, PW-7, and Leeladhar,
PW-12, was returning home about 11.00 p.m. after
attending a wrestling event which was organised at
“Kher Mata” (temple) in Makronia, a village in the
district of Sagar. As Ashok Kumar, PW-5, complained
of pain in the stomach, all of them went to the shop
of Gorelal for purchasing medicine and when they
2Page 3
reached the shop, all the accused persons coming
from the house of Chhotelal surrounded deceased
Daulat and started assaulting him and despite the
beseeching and imploring by the companions the
accused persons continued the assault, as a result of
which the deceased fell unconscious. As the
prosecution story proceeds, he was taken to the
hospital and, eventually, succumbed to his injuries.
On an FIR being lodged, the criminal law was set in
motion and after investigation the appellants were
charge-sheeted under Section 3(1)(x) of the
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short “the
Act”), but, eventually, charges were framed under
Sections 147, 148 and 302 read with Section 149 IPC.
The accused persons pleaded innocence and false
implication and claimed to be tried.
3. The prosecution, in order to establish its case,
examined 13 witnesses and exhibited number of
documents. The defence chose not to adduce any
evidence.
3Page 4
4. The learned trial Judge, appreciating the evidence on
record, came to hold that the prosecution had
brought home the charges against accused, Mohan,
under Sections 148 and 302 IPC and against the
remaining accused persons under Sections 147 and
302 IPC read with Section 149 IPC and apart from
imposing separate sentences under Section 147 IPC
sentenced each of them to suffer imprisonment for
life as stated hereinbefore.
5. Being dissatisfied with the judgment of conviction,
the appellants along with others preferred a singular
criminal appeal. In appeal, apart from raising various
contentions on merits, it was submitted that the
entire trial was vitiated as it had commenced and
concluded without committal of the case to the Court
of Session by the competent court inasmuch as the
Sessions Court could not have directly taken
cognizance of the offence under the Act without the
case being committed for trial. To bolster the said
contention reliance was placed on Gangula Ashok
4Page 5
and Another v. State of Andhra Pradesh1
, Moly
and Another v. State of Kerala2
 and
Vidyadharan v. State of Kerala3
. The High Court
relied on decision in State of M. P. v. Bhooraji &
Ors.4
 and treated it to be a binding precedent and
declined to set aside the conviction or remit the
matter for de novo trial. The High Court proceeded
to deal with the appeals on merits and came to hold
that except accused Gorelal all other accused
persons were present on the scene of occurrence and
had participated in the assault and, accordingly,
maintained the conviction and sentence in respect of
other accused persons and acquitted appellant No. 2
before the High Court.
6. For the sake of completeness, it is necessary to state
that when the matter was listed before a two-Judge
Bench, it was noticed that there was a conflict
between two lines of judgment of this Court and,
accordingly, referred the matter to the larger Bench.
1 AIR 2000 SC 740
2 AIR 2004 SC 1890
3
(2004) 1 SCC 215
4 AIR 2001 SC 3372
5Page 6
The three-Judge Bench noticed that the real conflict
or discord was manifest between Moly and Another
(supra), Vidyadharan (supra) on one hand and
Bhooraji & Ors. (supra) on the other and after due
deliberation in Rattiram and others v. State of
Madhya Pradesh through Inspector of Police5
,
came to hold as follows: -
“66. Judged from these spectrums and
analyzed on the aforesaid premises, we
come to the irresistible conclusion that the
objection relating to non-compliance of
Section 193 of the Code, which eventually
has resulted in directly entertaining and
taking cognizance by the Special Judge
under the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)
Act, 1989, does not vitiate the trial and on
the said ground alone, the conviction
cannot be set aside or there cannot be a
direction of retrial and, therefore, the
decision rendered in Bhooraji (supra) lays
down the correct law inasmuch as there is
no failure of justice or no prejudice is
caused to the accused.
67. The decisions rendered in Moly
(supra) and Vidyadharan (supra) have
not noted the decision in Bhooraji (supra),
a binding precedent, and hence they are
per incuriam and further, the law laid down
therein, whereby the conviction is set
aside or matter is remanded after setting
aside the conviction for fresh trial, does
not expound the correct proposition of law
5
(2012) 4 SCC 516
6Page 7
and, accordingly, they are hereby, to that
extent, overruled.”
7. As the controversy on the said score has been put to
rest, we are presently required to advert to the
merits of the appeal. At this juncture, we may state
that Chhotelal died after pronouncement of the
decision in appeal by the High Court and Babulal has
expired during the pendency of the appeal before
this Court and, therefore, the appeal, as far as
Babulal is concerned, stands abated.
8. Mr. Fakhruddin, learned senior counsel for the
appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 223 of 2008, has
contended that the finding by the trial court which
has been accepted by the High Court that all the
accused persons had assaulted is founded on
absolutely non-appreciation of evidence inasmuch as
there is nothing to implicate them in any of the overt
acts. It is his alternative submission that all the
accused were not present at the scene of occurrence
and, therefore, the conviction in aid of Section 149
7Page 8
IPC of all the appellants herein is wholly
unsustainable.
9. Mr. Anis Ahmed Khan, learned counsel appearing for
the appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 458 of 2008,
has submitted that there has been delay in lodging
the FIR and further copy of the report had not been
sent to the Magistrate as required under Section 157
of the Code and, therefore, the trial is vitiated. It is
also his submission that due to previous animosity
the informant has tried to rope in number of persons
though they had no role to play in the commission of
the crime in question and, hence, they deserve to be
acquitted.
10. Per contra, Ms. Vibha Dutta Makhija, learned counsel
for the State, would contend that there is evidence
implicating all the accused persons in the assault and
even assuming no overt act is attributed to them,
they were a part of the unlawful assembly being
aware of the common object of assault and, hence,
the conviction under Section 149 IPC does not
warrant any interference.
8Page 9
11. First, we shall advert to the issue whether all the
accused persons had participated in the assault or
not. Be it noted, the learned trial Judge as well as the
High Court has taken into consideration that Ext. P-7,
the FIR and relied on the testimony of PW-5, Ashok
Kumar and PW-12, Leeladhar, to record a finding that
all the accused persons had assaulted the deceased.
On a perusal of the FIR, it is seen that the allegation
against Ramesh, Kanchedi, Babulal, Ramcharan and
Rattiram is that they came with lathis to assault the
deceased. There is mention in the FIR that Kanchedi
Kurmi hit the deceased with a big piece of stone and
Ramcharan Kurmi hit with a stick. The accused
Babulal, Rattiram, Satyanarayan and Ramesh gave
blows with fists and kicks. In the FIR it has been
mentioned that Chhotelal exhorted to kill the
deceased and Dhaniram Kurmi, Govardhan Kurmi,
Badri Kurmi and Mohan Kurmi assaulted and specific
overt acts have been attributed to them. Ashok
Kumar, PW-5 in examination-in-chief has deposed
that Dhaniram hit Daulat on the head with a stick,
9Page 10
Mohan gave a blow on the head with a sword and
Badri and Govardhan hit him on the back and hand.
Thereafter, he has proceeded to depose that rest of
the accused gave fists and kick blows. In the crossexamination, this witness, who had lodged the FIR,
has stated that accused Chhotelal, Kanchedi,
Ramcharan, Ramesh and Gorelal did not possess
sticks. Thus, he has not stated that Kanchedi hit with
a big stone. Leeladhar, PW-12, has stated about the
exhortation made by Chhotelal and the blows given
by Dhaniram and Mohan. As far as Chhotelal,
Babulal, Satyanarayan, Rattiram and Gorelal are
concerned, he has stated that they hit the deceased
with their feet and clenched fists. In the crossexamination he has deposed that Babulal was not
present at the place of occurrence. He has also
stated that Daulat did not sustain any lathi blow on
his legs. He has admitted that some persons were
unarmed. Dheeraj, PW-6, and Naresh, PW-7, who
were cited as eye-witnesses, have turned hostile.
The learned trial Judge, as is evident from the
10Page 11
judgment, has not adverted to this facet and reached
the conclusion that all the accused persons were
armed and had assaulted the deceased. The High
Court in one line has stated that considering the
overall evidence on record it could be said that
barring Gorelal all the other accused persons were
present and jointly assaulted the deceased. The
concurrence of the High Court, we may respectfully
state, is bereft of any scrutiny of evidence. On a
studied evaluation of the evidence on record, we are
of the considered opinion that Chhotelal exhorted
and he along with Dhaniram, Mohan, Badri and
Govardhan assaulted the deceased. We are disposed
to think so because there is clear cut evidence of
their involvement and PW-5 and PW-12 have
categorically spoken about their overt acts whereas
as far as others are concerned, there are material
contradictions about their assaulting the deceased.
Thus, their involvement in any overt act is not proven
by the prosecution and, therefore, we are unable to
accept the view of the learned trial Judge which has
11Page 12
been concurred with by the High Court that all the
accused persons had assaulted the deceased.
12. The next limb of submission relates to justifiability of
conviction of all the accused persons in aid of Section
149 IPC. The learned trial Judge has held that all the
accused persons were present and had assaulted the
deceased. The High Court has opined that there is
no evidence against the appellant Gorelal. Ms.
Makhija, learned counsel for the State would contend
that there is ample material that the accusedappellants were present at the place of occurrence
and their common object is clear from the facts and
circumstances that they shared the common object
to assault the deceased and they were in know of the
act to be done. Elaborating the same, it is urged by
her that it is not a case where the accused persons
were just bystanders but, in fact, came with others
being aware that some of the accused persons were
carrying lathis amd Mohan was carrying a sword. Mr.
Fakhruddin and Mr. Anis Ahmed Khan, learned
counsel for the appellants, per contra, would
12Page 13
vehemently urge that the prosecution has really not
proven, barring the people who were involved in the
assault, that the other accused persons were really
present and further assuming that they were present,
their mere presence would not attract the concept of
common object as engrafted under Section 149 IPC.
13. Before we proceed to analyse the evidence on this
score, we think it appropriate to refer to certain
pronouncements pertaining to attractability of
Section 149 IPC. In Baladin and others v. State of
Uttar Pradesh6
, a three-Judge Bench has opined as
follows: -
“It is well settled that mere presence in an
assembly does not make such a person a
member of an unlawful assembly unless it
is shown that he had done something or
omitted to do something which would
make him a member of an unlawful
assembly, or unless the case falls under
section 142, Indian Penal Code.”
14. The dictum in the aforesaid case was considered by a
four-Judge Bench in Masalti v. The State of Uttar
Pradesh7
, wherein the Bench distinguished the
6 AIR 1956 SC 181
7 AIR 1965 SC 202
13Page 14
observations made in the case of Baladin (supra) on
the ground that the said decision must be read in the
context of special facts of that case and may not be
treated as laying down an unqualified proposition of
law. The four-Judge Bench, after explaining the said
decision, proceeded to lay down as follows: -
“It would not be correct to say that before
a person is held to be a member of an
unlawful assembly, it must be shown that
he had committed some illegal overt act or
had been guilty of some illegal omission in
pursuance of the common object of the
assembly. In fact, S. 149 make it clear
that if an offence is committed by any
member of an unlawful assembly in
prosecution of the common object of that
assembly, or such as the members of that
assembly knew to be likely to be
committed in prosecution of that object,
every person who, at the time of the
committing of that offence, is a member of
the same assembly, is guilty of that
offence; and that emphatically brings out
the principle that the punishment
prescribed by S. 149 is in a sense vicarious
and does not always proceed on the basis
that the offence has been actually
committed by every member of the
unlawful assembly.”
15. In Lalji v. State of U.P.8
 it has been observed that
common object of the unlawful assembly can be
8
(1989) 1 SCC 437
14Page 15
gathered from the nature of the assembly, arms used
by them and the behaviour of the assembly at or
before scene of occurrence. It is an inference to be
deduced from the facts and circumstances of each
case.
16. In Bhargavan and others v. State of kerala 9
it
has been held that it cannot be laid down as general
proposition of law that unless an overt act is proved
against a person who is alleged to be a member of an
unlawful assembly, it cannot be said that he is a
member of an assembly. The only thing required is
that he should have understood that the assembly
was unlawful and was likely to commit any of the
acts which fall within the purview of Section 141 IPC.
The Bench emphasised on the word “object” and
proceeded to state that it means the purpose or
design and, in order to make it “common”, it must be
shared by all. 
17. In Debashis Daw and others v. State of West
Bengal10, this Court, after referring to the decision in
9
(2004) 12 SCC 414
10 (2010) 9 SCC 111
15Page 16
Akbar Sheikh v. State of W.B.11
, observed that
the prosecution in a case of such nature is required
to establish whether the accused persons were
present and whether they shared a common object.
18. In Ramachandran and others v. State of
Kerala12, this Court has opined thus: -
“27. Thus, this Court has been very
cautious in a catena of judgments that
where general allegations are made
against a large number of persons the
court would categorically scrutinise the
evidence and hesitate to convict the large
number of persons if the evidence
available on record is vague. 
It is
obligatory on the part of the court to
examine that if the offence committed is
not in direct prosecution of the common
object, it yet may fall under the second
part of Section 149 IPC, if the offence was
such as the members knew was likely to
be committed. 
Further inference has to be
drawn as to what was the number of
persons; how many of them were merely
passive witnesses; what were their arms
and weapons. The number and nature of
injuries is also relevant to be considered.
“Common object” may also be developed
at the time of incident.”
19. Applying the aforesaid principles, we are required to
see whether all the appellants were present at the
11 (2009) 7 SCC 415
12 (2011) 9 SCC 257
16Page 17
time of occurrence. We have already opined that
Chhotelal exhorted and other accused persons,
namely, Dhaniram, Mohan, Badri and Govardhan had
assaulted the deceased and there is ample evidence
on record to safely conclude that they formed an
unlawful assembly and there was common object to
assault the deceased who, eventually, succumbed to
the injuries inflicted in the assault. As far as other
accused persons, namely, Babulal, Satyanarayan,
Rattiram, Kanchedi, Ramcharan and Ramesh are
concerned, there are really contradictory statements
with regard to the presence of the accused persons
because PW-12 has stated that Babulal was not
present at the place of occurrence. Ashok Kumar,
PW-5, has contradicted himself about the weapons
carried by Kanchedi, Ramcharan, Ramesh and
Gorelal. Leeladhar, PW-12, has not mentioned
anything about Ramesh and Govardhan. From the
apparent contradictions from the depositions of PW-5
and PW-12 it seems that they have implicated
Babulal, Satyanarayan, Rattiram, Ramesh and
17Page 18
Ramcharan in the crime. As far as Govardhan is
concerned, PW-5 has clearly stated that he and Badri
hit Daulat with sticks on the back and the neck. The
medical evidence corroborates the same. Nothing
has been elicited in the cross-examination of PW-5 to
discard his testimony. It has come out in the
evidence of PW-13 that PW-5 was going along with
Babulal, Kanchedi and his brother. We are referring
to the same only to highlight that there is an attempt
to implicate number of persons. It is borne out in the
evidence that the deceased was involved in many
criminal offences and there was some bad blood
between the accused persons and the deceased. In
such a situation it is not unusual to implicate some
more persons as accused along with the real
assailants.
20. Regard being had to the totality of the evidence on
record, filtering the evidence of PW-5 and PW-12 and
on studied evaluation we are of the considered
opinion that it is not safe to hold that the accusedappellants Ramesh, Kanchedi, Rattiram and
18Page 19
Satyanarayan were present at the spot and,
therefore, it will be inappropriate to record a
conviction in aid of Section 149 IPC and we are
inclined to think so as we entertain a reasonable
doubt about their presence at the scene of
occurrence.
21. We will be failing in our duty if we do not deal with
the contention of Mr. Khan that
when there has been
total non-compliance of Section 157 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, the trial is vitiated. On a perusal
of the judgment of the learned trial Judge we notice
that though such a stance had been feebly raised
before the learned trial Judge, no question was put to
the Investigating Officer in this regard in the crossexamination. 
The learned trial Judge has adverted to
the same and opined, regard being had to the
creditworthiness of the testimony on record that it
could not be said that the FIR, Ext. P-7, was antedated or embellished.
 It is worth noting that such a
contention was not raised before the High Court.
Considering the facts and circumstances of the case,
19Page 20
we are disposed to think that the finding recorded by
the learned trial Judge cannot be found fault with.
We may hasten to add that when there is delayed
despatch of the FIR, it is necessary on the part of the
prosecution to give an explanation for the delay. We
may further state that the purpose behind sending a
copy of the FIR to the concerned magistrate is to
avoid any kind of suspicion being attached to the FIR.
Such a suspicion may compel the court to record a
finding that there was possibility of the FIR being
ante-timed or ante-dated. 
The court may draw
adverse inferences against the prosecution.
However, if the court is convinced as regards to the
truthfulness of the prosecution version and
trustworthiness of the witnesses, the same may not
be regarded as detrimental to the prosecution case.
It would depend on the facts and circumstances of
the case. In the case at hand, on a detailed scrutiny
of the evidence upon bestowing our anxious
consideration, we find that the evidence cannot be
thrown overboard as the version of the witnesses
20Page 21
deserves credence as analysed before. Thus, this
colossal complaint made by Mr. Khan pales into
insignificance and the submission is repelled.
22. In the result, we allow the appeals in part and affirm
the judgment of conviction and order of sentence
recorded against the appellants, namely, Dhaniram,
Mohan, Badri and Govardhan. Accused Mohan has
been released after completing fourteen years of
imprisonment on getting the benefit of remission
under Section 433A of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. As far as Dhaniram is concerned, he is in
custody. The accused-appellants, namely, Badri and
Govardhan are on bail. Their bail bonds are
cancelled and they be taken into custody forthwith.
The accused-appellants, namely, Satyanarayan,
Ramesh, Kanchedi and Rattiram are acquitted and as
they are on bail, they be discharged from their bail
bonds.
……………………………….J.
[K. S. Radhakrishnan]
21Page 22
….………………………….J.
[Dipak Misra]
New Delhi;
April 18, 2013.
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Thursday, April 18, 2013

The High Court noticed the fact that the appellant - husband has filed two suits. In one suit, he is seeking divorce from the wife. In the other suit, he is seeking permanent injunction as well as temporary injunction, restraining the wife from entering the matrimonial home of the couple. It is also noticed by the High Court that in the second suit, ex parte ad interim order of injunction had been granted in favour of the husband. The aforesaid suit is still pending. Instead of deciding the issue on merits, the High Court admitted the appeal and stayed the operation of the ex parte ad interim order of injunction as well as hearing of both the suits until the appeal is heard and decided. In our opinion, the aforesaid order cannot be sustained. The High Court has granted a relief which was not even prayed for by the respondent, who was the appellant before the High Court. At best, the High Court could have directed that both the suits filed by the husband shall be consolidated and tried together. Mr. Dhruv Mehta, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellant, submits that the relations between husband and wife have deteriorated to such an extent that it would not be possible for the appellant to spend any time with the respondent – wife. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to order that wife be permitted entry into the matrimonial home. We are of the considered opinion that it would not be appropriate for the High Court or for this Court to make any observations on the merits of the controversy involved between the parties as the same shall have to be decided by the appropriate Court where the proceedings are pending. We, therefore, set aside the order passed by the High Court. We allow the appeal filed by the respondent before the High Court. Both the suits filed by the husband are consolidated and shall be tried together as prayed for by the respondent wife. We also direct the Court which is designated to decide the aforesaid two matters to decide the same as expeditiously as possible. The appeals are disposed of in the above terms. No costs.


Page 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.3884-3886 OF 2013
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.
33744-33746 of 2012]
ARVIND KUMAR SHARMA ...APPELLANT
VERSUS
VINEETA SHARMA & ANR. ...RESPONDENTS
ORDER
Leave granted.
The original prayer made by the respondent
No.1 before the Principal Judge, Family Court,
Dehradun was that the proceedings in Original Suit
No. 74 of 2009 and Original Suit No.263 of 2009
should be consolidated and tried together. This
prayer was rejected by the Family Court by its
judgment and order dated 27th January, 2012.
Consequently, respondent No.1 filed appeal before
the High Court. The High Court noticed the fact
that the appellant - husband has filed two suits.
In one suit, he is seeking divorce from the wife.
In the other suit, he is seeking permanent
injunction as well as temporary injunction,
restraining the wife from entering the matrimonial
home of the couple. It is also noticed by the High
Court that in the second suit, ex parte ad interim
...2/-Page 2
:2:
order of injunction had been granted in favour of
the husband. The aforesaid suit is still pending.
Instead of deciding the issue on merits, the High
Court admitted the appeal and stayed the operation
of the ex parte ad interim order of injunction as
well as hearing of both the suits until the appeal
is heard and decided. 
In our opinion, the aforesaid order cannot be
sustained. The High Court has granted a relief
which was not even prayed for by the respondent,
who was the appellant before the High Court. At
best, the High Court could have directed that both
the suits filed by the husband shall be
consolidated and tried together. 
Mr. Dhruv Mehta, learned Senior Advocate
appearing for the appellant, submits that the
relations between husband and wife have
deteriorated to such an extent that it would not be
possible for the appellant to spend any time with
the respondent – wife. Therefore, it would not be
appropriate to order that wife be permitted entry
into the matrimonial home. 
...3/-Page 3
:3:
We are of the considered opinion that it would
not be appropriate for the High Court or for this
Court to make any observations on the merits of the
controversy involved between the parties as the
same shall have to be decided by the appropriate
Court where the proceedings are pending. 
We,
therefore, set aside the order passed by the High
Court. We allow the appeal filed by the respondent
before the High Court. 
Both the suits filed by the
husband are consolidated and shall be tried
together as prayed for by the respondent wife. We
also direct the Court which is designated to decide
the aforesaid two matters to decide the same as
expeditiously as possible. 
The appeals are disposed of in the above
terms. No costs. 
....................,J.
(SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR)
....................,J.
(PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE)
NEW DELHI
APRIL 15, 2013