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Thursday, April 18, 2013

VSNL had raised a preliminary objection that a writ petition would not be maintainable against it as it is neither a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India nor is it performing any public function.- In our opinion, the functions performed by VSNL/TCL examined on the touchstone of the aforesaid factors cannot be declared to be the performance of a public function. The State has divested its control by transferring the functions performed by OCS prior to 1986 on VSNL/TCL.


Page 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2147 OF 2010
Jatya Pal Singh & Ors.
...Appellants
VERSUS
Union of India & Ors.
...Respondents
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.3933 OF 2013
(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No. 4619 of 2011
M.P. Singh
...Appellant
VERSUS
Union of India & Ors.
...Respondents
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 425 OF 2012
Vijay Thakur ...Appellant
VERSUS
1Page 2
VSNL & Anr.
...Respondents
WITH
WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 689 OF 2007
Videsh Sanchar Nigam Scheduled Castes/Tribes
Employees Welfare
Samiti (Regd.) & Anr.
...Petitioners
VERSUS
Union of India & Ors.
...Respondents
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5740 OF 2012
Ram Prakash
...Appellant
VERSUS
Union of India & Ors.
...Respondents
J U D G M E N T
SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR,J.
1. Leave granted in SLP© No.4619 of 2011.
2Page 3
2. This judgment will dispose of a group of appeals,
details of which are given hereunder, as they raise only
one question of law :
Proceedings before the Bombay High Court :-
3. Writ Petition No.2139 of 2007 titled as Mahant Pal
Singh vs. Union of India dismissed in limine by the
Division Bench on 7th September, 2009. Civil Appeal
No.3933 of 2013 @ Special Leave Petition (C) No.4619 of
2011 titled as M.P.Singh vs. Union of India & Ors. has
been filed challenging the aforesaid order of the Division
Bench. Writ Petition No.2652 of 2007 titled as Jatya Pal
Singh & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors. was dismissed in
limine by the Division Bench on 8th September, 2009 in
view of the order dated 7th September, 2009 passed in
Writ Petition No.2139 of 2007. The aforesaid order has
been impugned by the appellants (writ petitioners in the
High Court) Jatya Pal Singh & Ors. vs. Union of India &
Ors. in C.A.No.2147 of 2010.
Proceedings in the Delhi High Court :-
3Page 4
4. Ten writ petitions were filed by the former employees
of the Videsh Sanchar Nigam Limited (VSNL). The
common question of law raised in all the appeals relates
to the very maintainability of the writ petitions. VSNL had
raised a preliminary objection that a writ petition would
not be maintainable against it as it is neither a State
within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of
India nor is it performing any public function. The learned
Single Judge accepted the aforesaid preliminary objection
and dismissed the writ petitions by judgment and order
dated 29th August, 2011. Letters Patent Appeal No.924 of
2011 challenging the aforesaid order was dismissed by
the Division Bench on 14th November, 2011. LPA Nos.
930 of 2011 and 931 of 2011 were dismissed by the
common order dated 15th November, 2011.
4A. Only two of the original writ appellants have
approached this Court in the civil appeals against the
judgment of the learned Single Judge and the Division
Bench of the Delhi High Court by way of civil appeals.
These are Ram Prakash vs. Union of India & Ors. in
4Page 5
C.A.No.5740 of 2012 and Vijay Thakur vs. V.S.N.L. and
Anr. in C.A.No.425 of 2012.
5. For the purpose of this order, we shall make a
reference to the facts as pleaded in C.A.No.2147 of 2010.
All the appellants in writ petitions had been working in the
Ministry of Communication, in particular, Department of
Overseas Communication Service (OCS) from 1st March,
1971 onwards. Their dates of appointment on various
posts are as under :
6. Appellant Nos. 1 and 2 were appointed as Assistant
Engineer on 16th May 1983 and 1st September, 1983,
respectively. Appellant Nos. 3 and 4 were appointed as
Junior Technical Assistant on 1st March, 1971 and 13th
January, 1976 and appellants 5 and 6 were appointed on
8
th January, 1980. During their continuous service with
respondent No.1, they had earned promotions at due time
on merit. They have a clean record of service. Till 31st
March, 1986, they were holding responsible posts in the
OCS.
5Page 6
Background of VSNL:
A) Origin of Overseas Communication Service (in
short OCS) -
7. On 1st of January, 1947 ‘Indian Radio and
Telecommunication company Ltd.’ a Private Company
operating India’s external telecommunication service was
taken over by the Govt. along with its employees on the
terms and conditions as they had with the private
company.
8. The Govt. created a department in ministry of
telecommunication known as Overseas Communication
Service (OCS) that dealt communication of India subjects
with the rest of the world.
9. The OCS department of Ministry of
telecommunication continued till 31st of March, 1986.
B) Conversion of OCS into VSNL -
10. Ministry of Communication took a decision to convert
its OCS Department into a Public Sector Corporation
6Page 7
(PSC). A notification to this effect was issued on 19th
March, 1986 and the Corporation was named as VSNL.
Accordingly, w.e.f. 1st April, 1986, all international
telecommunication services of the country handled by the
Govt. stood transferred to VSNL. All the employees were
deemed to have been transferred to the VSNL on the
existing terms and conditions till their case for absorption
or otherwise are decided upon by the VSNL in consultation
with the cadre controlling authority and other concerned
Govt. Departments. They were to be treated on
deputation on Foreign Service to VSNL without deputation
allowance. These employees also were to be treated as
though on the strength of OCS as on 31st March, 1986 till
their cases were finalized by the VSNL. Those who do not
opt for absorption will be treated as on deputation on
foreign service with the Corporation for a period of 2
years without deputation allowance. The Corporation
(VSNL) would finalise the terms and conditions for
employment in the Corporation within a period of 12
months or on any specified date as may be agreed upon
7Page 8
by the Government. It was provided that the employees
will be asked to exercise their option for being absorbed
in the company or otherwise within the stipulated period.
The date of induction of the employees in the Corporation
will be the date from which they have exercised the
option to be absorbed in the Company with the approval
of the competent authority. The notification also provided
that pensionary and other retirement benefits to the
employees on their absorption in the Corporation will be
determined in accordance with the Department of
Pensions and Pensioners Welfare O.M. No.4(8)-85-P & PW
dated 13th January, 1986 and as amended from time
to time.
11. Thereafter on 11th December, 1989, VSNL issued
STAFF NOTICE on the subject ‘Absorption of OCS
Employees in VSNL’. In this notice, it is mentioned that
date of absorption of OCS employees in the VSNL has
been approved by the Ministry of Communication on 1st
January, 1990. It is further mentioned that accordingly
from that date, the OCS employees transferred to VSNL
8Page 9
on deputation basis without deputation allowance on
foreign service terms will cease to be government
servants. The aforesaid notice of absorption including the
terms and conditions of absorption was also issued
individually to each employee. On 5th July, 1989, the
Government had issued Office Memorandum No.4/18/87-
P&PW (D) on the subject ‘Settlement of Pensionary terms
etc. in respect of Government employees transferred en
masse to Central Public Sector Undertakings/Central
Autonomous Bodies’. Under this, the employees were
given the option to retain the pensionary benefits
available to them under the Government rules or be
governed by the rules of the Public Sector
Undertaking/Autonomous Bodies. The Government also
assured that the employees of the OCS will not be
removed by the VSNL unless their case was placed before
the competent authority in the Government. Finally, the
VSNL absorbed en-masse the erstwhile employees of OCS
with effect from 1st January, 1990. The solemn promise of
not being removed was incorporated in the Conduct
9Page 10
Discipline and Appeal Rules framed by the VSNL in the
year 1992. It is pertinent to note here that all the
appellants had opted to join VSNL.
C. Disinvestment
12. Between 1992 and 2000, Government of India
divested a portion of its share holding in VSNL by sale of
equity to certain funds, banks and financial institutions
controlled by the Government in 1992 and to the general
public in 1999. Thereafter, the company was listed on
Indian Stock Exchange. In 1997, the Government of India
sold some of its equity holdings by issuing Global
Depository Receipts (GDRs) following which VSNL was
listed on the London Stock Exchange. On 15th August,
2000, VSNL became first Public Sector Undertaking of
India to be listed on the New York Stock Exchange
through conversion of underlying GDRs to American
Depository Receipts (ADRs). However on 13th February,
2002, Government of India which till then held 52.97% of
shares in VSNL, divested 25% shares in favour of
10Page 11
Panatone Finvest Limited, (comprising of 4 companies of
the Tata Group) and 1.85% in favour of its employees
after following due process in accordance with its
disinvestment policy. This brought the share holding of
the Government of India to 26.12 %. Tata Group also
made a public offer for acquiring a further 20% of the
share capital of the VSNL, from the public in terms of SEBI
(Substantial Acquisition of Share and Takeover)
Regulations 1997. Consequently, the total holding of the
Tata Group in VSNL increased to 44.99 % of the paid up
share capital in 2002. Presently, Tata Group holdings in
VSNL is about 50.11%.
13. As per the share holding agreement and share
purchase agreement, the Government of India mandated
the Tata Group to ensure that none of the employees
should be retrenched for a period of one year. Clause
5.13 of the aforesaid agreement was as under :-
“5.13 Employees.
(a) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in
this Agreement, the Strategic Partner shall not
11Page 12
cause the Company to retrench any of the
employees of the Company for a period of 1
(one) year from the closing other than any
dismissal or termination of employees of the
company from their employment in accordance
with the applicable staff regulations and
standing orders of the Company or applicable
law.”
14. It appears that the Tata Group by a letter dated 14th
April, 2002 to ensure that the morale of the present
employees of the VSNL is maintained at a high level and
that they continue to deliver their best performance,
decided that it shall cause VSNL not to retrench any of
the employees of VSNL for a period of two years from 13th
February, 2002.
15. On 5th February, 2004, VSNL was granted a non
exclusive licence by the Government of India pursuant to
the disinvestment. Clause (1) of the non exclusive licence
reads as under :-
“1. In view of the fact that the LICENSEE is the
INCUMBENT OPERATOR and in consideration of
the payments including LICENCE FEE and due
performance of all the terms and conditions
mentioned in the SCHEDULE on the part of the
LICENSEE, the Licensor does, hereby grant,
12Page 13
under Section 4 of the Indian Telegraph Act,
1885, on a non-exclusive basis, this Licence
to establish, install, operate and maintain
INTERNATIONAL LONG DISTANCE SERVICE on
the terms and conditions contained in the
SCHEDULE and ANNEXURES appended to this
LICENCE AGREEMENT.” (emphasis added)
16. Prior to disinvestment, VSNL enjoyed the monopoly
in respect of international long distance service (ILDS),
which ceased with effect from 5th February, 2004.
Thereafter other telecom licensees like Reliance, Airtel,
Idea, Aircel, HFCL and even Government companies like
MTNL and BSNL became competitors in respect of ILDS.
17. It appears that on 16th July, 2007 and 4th October,
2007, the services of 20 managerial employees were
terminated after paying them 3 months’ salary in lieu of
notice. The aforesaid termination was said to have been
effected in terms of Clause 1.6 of the appointment letter
which reads as under :
“1.6 After confirmation, your appointment may
be terminated by either side at any time by
giving three months notice in writing. VSNL
however, reserve the right of terminating your
services forthwith or before expiry of the
13Page 14
stipulated period of notice of 3 months by
making payment to you of a sum equivalent to
the pay and allowances for the period of notice
or unexpired portion thereof. The decision of the
management shall not be question.”
18. The orders of termination issued to the aforesaid 20
employees were identical. Meanwhile on 28th January,
2008, subsequent to the disinvestment in 2002, the name
of VSNL being a Tata Group Company was changed to
“Tata Communications Limited”. Ten writ petitions were
filed by the employees before the Delhi High Court and 2
writ petitions were filed before the Bombay High Court
challenging the orders of termination. On 29th August,
2011, learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court vide
common order dismissed the 10 writ petitions, as not
maintainable against TCL, the reconstituted entity of
VSNL after disinvestment. The aforesaid order was
challenged by four of the writ appellants in LPA which was
dismissed by separate orders on 14th November, 2011,
15th November, 2011 and 17th February, 2012. Out of the
said four persons Ram Prakash and Vijay Thakur have
14Page 15
filed Civil Appeal No.5740 of 2012 and Civil Appeal No.
425 of 2012 before this Court.
19. As noticed earlier, Division Bench of the Bombay
High Court also dismissed the writ petitions by order
dated 7th September, 2009 and 8th September, 2009
against which the appellant herein have filed Special
Leave Petition (C) No. 4619 of 2011 and Civil Appeal No.
2147 of 2010.
Submissions:
20. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.
21. Mr. T.N. Razdan, learned counsel for the appellants
has submitted that VSNL cannot be said to have become
an absolute private entity after Union of India sold its 25%
shares out of 52.97% to Panatone Finvest Ltd. Union of
India still holds 26.97% shares in VSNL. Other
Government Companies hold 17.35 % shares in VSNL.
Therefore, VSNL cannot be said to be not amenable to the
writ jurisdiction. Furthermore, VSNL is under the complete
control of Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI)
15Page 16
Act, 1997 and the Telegraph Act, 1948. Therefore, the
writ petition would lie in cases where the services of the
employees were terminated in breach of the rules
governing the service conditions of the employees.
Referring to the share holding pattern in VSNL, it is
claimed that Union of India is the single large shareholder
holding 26.12% shares in VSNL. It is further the case of
the appellant that Panatone Finvest Ltd. having stepped
into the shoes of erstwhile shareholder and is bound by
the commitments and obligations, rights and liabilities
arising from the sale/purchase of shares.
22. Dr. K.S. Chauhan, learned counsel, also reiterated
the aforesaid submissions. In addition, he submitted that
Central Government still has pervasive control over the
VSNL/TCL. The strategic partner i.e. Panatone Finvest
Limited/TATAs have been bound by the Government
agreement in relation to divestment of the 25% stakes,
and there is a further condition that if the strategic
partner wish to sell its stakes in the VSNL/TCL, it is not
free for the strategic partner to sell off the same in the
16Page 17
open market, but the shares can be sold off back to the
Government only. It clearly, according to learned counsel,
buttresses the fact that the Government consider the
function/activity so sacrosanct and of such public
importance that it does not wish to alter the nature of the
functions of VSNL/TCL. However, there is no such
condition precedent in the agreement with the other
telecommunication companies which are merely service
providers. Thus, both the learned counsel have reiterated
the submission that VSNL would be covered by the term
“other authority” within the scope and ambit of Article 12.
Nature of the Functions performed by the VSNL:-
23. According to Mr. Razdan, the right to communication
is a facet of freedom of speech and expression under
Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution of India. The
Government of India is duty bound to provide
uninterrupted Telecommunication Services to enable its
citizen to effectively exercise the aforesaid right. This
public duty was being provided through one of the
17Page 18
departments i.e. Department of Telecommunication, in
particular, the OCS. The same function was subsequently
performed by the VSNL, a wholly owned government
enterprises, till disinvestment. Even after disinvestment,
VSNL continues to perform the same functions by
connecting its subscribers to their receivers in India as
well as abroad. VSNL performs the aforesaid functions
under license in terms of Section 4 of Indian Telegraph
Act, 1948. Being the licensee, VSNL is under the control of
TRAI for all its activities of ILDS. After disinvestment, VSNL
has spread its ILDS activities to 52 locations and has
increased the strength of its employees from 3000 to
7000. It has been located in prime areas in all the cities
like Delhi, Pune, and Kolkata. The aforesaid land belongs
to Union of India and is in the possession of VSNL. Union
of India is the licensor of all the lands, assets, equipment
machine and tools under the license of VSNL. Land
belonging to Union of India is worth lakhs of crores of
rupees. In the face of this, the High Court would not have
18Page 19
concluded that Government of India has no control over
the activities of VSNL.
24. This submission was also reiterated by Dr. K.S.
Chauhan, learned counsel. Dr. Chauhan, in addition to the
aforesaid arguments, submitted that Respondents herein
have monopoly over the international communication, as
VSNL/TCL is the gateway of the world. VSNL can
communicate worldwide for India which facility is not
available to any other communication company.
Companies, such as Vodafone etc., are only transferring
speech whereas VSNL is providing value added service. It
provides EMER Set service to Defence Forces including
Merchant Navy. VSNL/TCL is specially catering to the
requirement of the President and Prime Minister of India
for preparation of hotline, etc. Further, learned counsel
submitted that even a private function which is performed
for public benefit would be a public function. He submitted
that in the case of Delhi Science Forum vs. Union
of India1
 that telecommunication has been
1
(1996 (2) SCC 405)
19Page 20
internationally recognized as a public utility of strategic
importance. Therefore, it cannot be said that VSNL is not
performing public functions.
25. The High Court, it was submitted, was unduly
influenced by the fact that the VSNL does not enjoy a
monopolistic character. Further more, it was wrongly held
that services provided by other telecom operators are no
different to the service provided by VSNL. Mr. Razdan
further submitted that the High Court has failed to
distinguish the expression ‘other authority’ as defined in
Article 12 of the Constitution of India from that of ‘any
person or authority’ in Article 226 of the Constitution. In
fact, the High Court totally ignored the submission that
the definition of other authority would now have to be
seen by taking into account the mixed economy of State
and the private enterprises. The High Court, however,
confined itself only to the issue as to whether VSNL after
disinvestment is State within Article 12 of the
Constitution. He submitted that it is important to have a
re-look at the definition of State/other authorities under
20Page 21
Article 12 of the Constitution. In view of the present set up
of mixed economy i.e. where the State is in partnership
with semi-government/private corporations that take over
the Government companies in part or full. In support of
his submission, he relies on the judgment of this Court in
the case of Air India Statutory Corporation vs.
United Labour Union & Ors. 2
26. Dr. Chauhan further submitted that when the
Government, in the exercise of its executive power by
way of a policy decision, creates an entity or divests its
functions, which may have a bearing upon the
Fundamental Rights, in favour of a private body or
transfer of public entity to a private body, in such an
eventuality, the functions earlier discharged by the
Government cannot be termed as purely a private
function. He submitted that realizing the necessity to
promote, protect and enjoyment of human rights,
including the right to freedom of expression, on the
internet and in other technologies, the U.N. Human Rights
2
 (1997 (9) SCC 377)
21Page 22
Council has passed a resolution with regard to the same.
Similarly, the right to telecommunication (Overseas), a
service exclusively provided by Government of India
before disinvestment has the public law element and,
therefore, nature of work performed by VSNL/TCL
continued to remain the same. He submits that the
functions performed by VSNL would satisfy all the tests for
determining whether a function is a public function
provided under the Human Rights Act, 1998. Learned
counsel has submitted that it is necessary to look at the
nature of the public functions which have been
transferred. He submits that the meaning of public
function would have to be determined by taking into
account the effect of transfer of the public function from a
public body to a private body. Learned counsel submitted
that in view of the above, it can be safely concluded that
VSNL is performing a public function. He relied on the
observations made by this Court in the case of Binny
Ltd. vs. Sadasivan.3
 Besides, he relied on the judgment
3
(2005) 6 SCC 657
22Page 23
of this Court in Federal Bank Ltd. vs. Sagar Thomas
and Ors.
4
 Learned counsel also relied on a judgment of
the Supreme Court of South Africa in Appeal of South
Africa in Mittal Steel South Africa Limited
(previously known as ISCOR Limited) vs. Mondli
Shadrack Hlatshwayo, rendered in case No.326 of 2005
on 31st August, 2006.
27. Another submission made by Mr. Razdan is that the
High Court has wrongly held that the functions performed
by VSNL are not sovereign functions and, therefore, it
cannot be said to be performing public functions. He
submitted that the so called dichotomy between
sovereign and non-sovereign functions of the State does
not really exist. The question that whether a particular
function of the State is a sovereign function depends on
the nature of the power and manner of its exercise.
Relying on the judgment of this Court in Secretary,
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting vs.
4
 (2003) 10 SCC 733).
23Page 24
Cricket Association of Bengal5
, he submitted that
airwaves or frequencies are public property. Their use has
to be controlled and regulated by a public authority in the
interest of the public and to prevent the invasion of their
rights. The right to impart and receive information is a
species of the right of freedom of speech and expression
guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
Therefore, it cannot be said that VSNL is not performing a
public function. Learned counsel also relied on the
judgment of this Court in Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree
Muktaji Vandas Swami Suverna Jayanti Mahotsav
Smarak Trust & Ors. vs. V.R.Rudani & Ors.
6
. Learned
counsel has also placed reliance on the judgment of this
Court in Unni Krishnan J.P. & Ors. vs. State of
Andhra Pradesh & Ors.
7
.
Employees Structure:
5
(1995) 2 SCC 122
6
(1989) 2 SCC 691
7
(1993) 1 SCC 645
24Page 25
28. It was also submitted by Mr. Razdan that the
Government had assured that the employees of the OCS
will not be removed by the VSNL unless their case was
placed before the competent authority in the
Government. The solemn promise of not being removed
was incorporated in the Conduct Discipline and Appeal
Rules framed by the VSNL in the year 1992.
29. According to the appellants, the employees of the
VSNL fall into three categories which are as under :
(a) The employees that were transferred to VSNL by
notification dated 19th March, 1986 i.e. erstwhile
employees of OCS.
(b) The employees who are recruited directly under the
VSNL Recruitment and Promotion Rules, 1983 dated 21st
May, 1993, subject to the rules of Conduct Discipline and
Appeal Rules of 1992 framed by VSNL.
(c) The employees recruited after the disinvestment on
13th February, 2002. The employees of TATA are guided
by TATA Conduct Rules. It is pointed out that VSNL was
25Page 26
granted a licence by the Ministry of Communication for
short distance service and long distance service.
International Long Distance Service (ILDS) was granted by
the Department of Telecommunication, Government of
India under Section 4 of the Indian Telegraph Act. The
licences of VSNL for ILDS which expired on 31st March,
2004 has been re-granted for another 20 years.
The brief factual matrix of case:
30. Civil Appeal No.2147 of 2010 pertains to the group
of employees detailed in category ‘a’ above. The
appellants in C.A.No.425 of 2012 are from category ‘b’. In
C.A.No.2647 of 2010, the VSNL terminated the services of
appellants 2, 3, and 4 on 13th July, 2007 and those of
appellants 1, 5, and 6 on 16th July, 2007. The termination
letter of appellant Nos. 2, 3, and 4 is issued by Vice
President while as those of appellant Nos. 1 and 5 is
issued by the Chief Officer Global operation. The
termination order of appellant No.6 is issued by the Chief
International Facilities Officer.
26Page 27
31. According to the appellants, none of these officers
were either competent or authorised officers to terminate
the services of appellants in terms of Conduct Discipline
and Appeal Rules of VSNL. Similarly, in C.A.No.421 of
2012, the services of the appellants were terminated by
the Vice President without any authority of law.
Challenging the order of the Division Bench in
C.A.No.2147 of 2010, it is submitted that the Division
Bench has erroneously held that the service rules
governing the appellants do not have any statutory force
and the status of the rules of a contract between the
employer and the employee. The High Court failed to
appreciate the issue raised in the writ petition that VSNL
has breached the fundamental rules and regulations
contained in its Conduct Discipline and Appeal Rules,
1992 which had the force of law. It was also pointed out
that the Corporation (VSNL) being in partnership with
Union of India is duty bound to uphold the rule of law.
Learned Counsel submitted that the aforesaid judgment is
27Page 28
liable to be set aside on the short ground that it is cryptic
and non-speaking.
32. This submission was also reiterated by Dr.K.S.
Chauhan, learned counsel. He submitted that the powers
of the High Court under Article 226 is much wider than
the powers of this Court under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India. He relied on the Constitution Bench
judgment of this Court in Zee Telefilms Ltd. vs. Union
of India8
. In this case, the activities of Board of Cricket
Control of India were held to be akin to public duties or
State functions. On the basis of the above, he submitted
that when a private body exercises public functions even
if it is not a State, the aggrieved person would have a
remedy by way of a writ petition under Article 226. Dr.
Chauhan relied on a judgment of this Court in Ramesh
Ahluwalia vs. State of Punjab & Ors. in C.A.No.6634
of 2012 decided on 13th September, 2012.
33. In response, Mr. C.U. Singh, learned senior counsel
appearing for the respondent has submitted that the tests
8 2005 (4) SCC 649.
28Page 29
for determining as to whether a particular body would fall
within the definition of State or other authority have been
well defined by this Court in a number of judgments.
Therefore, there is no scope for enlarging the time tested
definitions rendered by this Court. In support of the
submissions, he relied on All India ITDC Workers Union
& Ors. v. ITDC & Anr.9
; Pradeep Biswas v. Indian
Inst. of Chemical Biology10; G.Bassi Reddy vs.
International Corps Research Institute11; Balco
Employees Union vs. Union of India & Ors.12;
Agricultural Produce Market Committee vs. Ashok
Harikunj & Anr.13
34. On the basis of the tests laid down in the aforesaid
judgments, learned counsel submitted that VSNL is not a
State or other authority under Article 226 of the
Constitution. Therefore, both the High Courts have
9 2006 (10) SCC 66
10 2002 (5) SCC 111]
11 2003 (4) SCC 225
12 2002 (2) SCC 333
13 2000 (8) SCC 61.
29Page 30
correctly held that the writ petitions would not be
amenable against the VSNL.
35. Learned senior counsel then submitted that TCL
erstwhile VSNL is not performing a public function or a
mandatory public duty and, therefore, would not be
amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution. In support of the
submission, learned counsel relied on G. Bassi Reddy
(supra), and Binny Ltd. (supra).
36. He further submitted that without prejudice to the
aforesaid two submissions, so far as employment/service
contract is concerned, a writ petition would not be
maintainable. The appellants would have to first exhaust
the alternative remedies available. In support of this
submission, he relied on Radhakrishna Agarwal vs.
State of Bihar14; Binny Ltd. (supra), Kulchinder
14 1977 (3) SCC 457
30Page 31
Singh vs. Hardayal Singh Brar15 and Praga Tools
Corp. vs. C.A.Imanual & Ors.16
37. In view of the above, learned senior counsel
submitted that all these appeals deserve to be dismissed.
38. We have considered the submissions made by the
learned counsel for the parties. In essence, learned
counsel for the appellants have made only two
submissions –
(i) That inspite of the Government of India holding only
26.97 % shares in VSNL now TCL, it would still fall in the
definition of State or other authority within the ambit of
Article 12 of the Constitution.
(ii) Even if it is held that VSNL/TCL is a purely private
entity, it would be amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the
High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
as it is performing a public function/public duty.
15 [1976 (3) SCC 828]
16 [1969 (1) SCC 585].
31Page 32
39. We are unable to accept the aforesaid submissions.
We have earlier set out in detail the manner in which the
function which was earlier being performed by OCS which
were gradually transferred with effect from 1st April, 1986
to VSNL. Since 13th February, 2002, Government of India
holds only 26.12 % shares of TCL. Therefore, it can be
safely concluded that on the basis of the shareholding,
the Government of India would not be in control of the
affairs of TCL. In order for TCL to be declared as a State or
other authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the
Constitution of India, it would have to fall within the well
recognized parameters laid down in a number of
judgments of this Court. In the case of Pradip Kumar
Biswas (supra), a Seven Judge Bench of this Court
considered the question as to whether Indian Institute of
Chemical biology would fall within the definition of State
or other authority under Article 12. Ruma Pal, J. speaking
for the majority considered the manner in which the
aforesaid two expressions have been construed by this
Court in the earlier cases. The tests propounded for
32Page 33
determining as to when the Corporation will be said to be
an instrumentality or agency of the Government as
stated, Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs. International
Airport Authority of India17 were summarized as
follows :
“(1) One thing is clear that if the entire share
capital of the corporation is held by
Government, it would go a long way towards
indicating that the corporation is an
instrumentality or agency of Government.
(SCC p. 507, para 14)
(2) Where the financial assistance of the
State is so much as to meet almost entire
expenditure of the corporation, it would
afford some indication of the corporation
being impregnated with governmental
character. (SCC p. 508, para 15)
(3) It may also be a relevant factor …
whether the corporation enjoys monopoly
status which is State-conferred or Stateprotected. (SCC p. 508, para 15)
(4) Existence of deep and pervasive State
control may afford an indication that the
corporation is a State agency or
instrumentality. (SCC p. 508, para 15)
(5) If the functions of the corporation are of
public importance and closely related to
governmental functions, it would be a
relevant factor in classifying the corporation
as an instrumentality or agency of
Government. (SCC p. 509, para 16)
17 (1979) 3 SCC 489
33Page 34
(6) ‘Specifically, if a department of
Government is transferred to a corporation, it
would be a strong factor supportive of this
inference’ of the corporation being an
instrumentality or agency of Government.
(SCC p. 510, para 18)”
40. The aforesaid ratio in Ramana Dayaram Shetty
(supra) has been consistently followed by this Court, as is
evident from paragraph 31 of the judgment in Biswas
(supra). Para 31 reads as under :
“31. The tests to determine whether a
body falls within the definition of “State” in
Article 12 laid down in Ramana with the
Constitution Bench imprimatur in Ajay
Hasia form the keystone of the subsequent
jurisprudential superstructure judicially
crafted on the subject which is apparent
from a chronological consideration of the
authorities cited.”
41. The subsequent paragraphs of the judgment noticed
the efforts made to further define the contours within
which to determine; whether a particular entity falls
within the definition of other authority, as given in Article
12. The ultimate conclusion of the Constitution Bench are
recorded in paragraph 39 and 40 as under :-
34Page 35
“39. Fresh off the judicial anvil is the decision in
Mysore Paper Mills Ltd. v. Mysore Paper Mills
Officers' Assn. which fairly represents what we
have seen as a continuity of thought
commencing from the decision in Rajasthan
Electricity Board in 1967 up to the present time.
It held that a company substantially financed
and financially controlled by the Government,
managed by a Board of Directors nominated
and removable at the instance of the
Government and carrying on important
functions of public interest under the control of
the Government is “an authority” within the
meaning of Article 12.
40. The picture that ultimately emerges is
that the tests formulated in Ajay Hasia are not a
rigid set of principles so that if a body falls
within any one of them it must, ex hypothesi, be
considered to be a State within the meaning of
Article 12. The question in each case would be
— whether in the light of the cumulative facts
as established, the body is financially,
functionally and administratively dominated by
or under the control of the Government. Such
control must be particular to the body in
question and must be pervasive. If this is found
then the body is a State within Article 12. On
the other hand, when the control is merely
regulatory whether under statute or otherwise,
it would not serve to make the body a State.”
42. In view of the aforesaid authoritative decision of the
Constitution Bench (Seven Judges), it would be wholly
35Page 36
unnecessary for us to consider the other judgments cited
by the learned counsel for the parties.
43. If one examines the facts in the present case on the
basis of the aforesaid tests, the conclusion is inescapable
that TCL cannot be said to be other authority within
Article 12 of the Constitution of India. As noticed above,
the share holding of Union of India would not satisfy test
principles 1 and 2 in the case of Ramana Dayaram
Shetty (supra).
44. On perusal of the facts, it would be evident that test
No.3 would also not be satisfied as TCL does not enjoy a
monopoly status in ILDS. So far as domestic market is
concerned, there is open competition between the
numerous operators, some of which have been
enumerated earlier namely, MTNL, Airtel, Idea, Aircel, etc.
This brings us to the 4th test and again we are unable to
hold that the Government of India exercises deep and
pervasive control in either the management or policy
making of TCL which are purely private enterprises. We
36Page 37
may also notice that in fact even Government Companies
like MTNL and BSNL are competitors of TCL, in respect of
ILDS. We are, therefore, of the firm opinion that the High
Court of Delhi and the High Court of Bombay were fully
justified in rejecting the claim of the appellants that TCL
would be amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court
by virtue of the other authority within the purview of
Article 12 of the Constitution of India.
Is TCL performing a public function :-
45. It has been noticed earlier that ILDS functions, prior
to 1986, were being performed by OCS, a Department of
Ministry of Communications. VSNL was incorporated
under the Indian Companies Act, 1956 as a wholly owned
Government company to take over the activities of
erstwhile OCS with effect from 1st April, 1986. The
employees of erstwhile OCS continue to work for VSNL on
deputation till 1st January, 1990. However, as noticed
earlier, an option was given in 1989 to the pre 1986
employees for permanent absorption in VSNL. It was
37Page 38
made clear to all the employees that they would be
permanently absorbed in VSNL upon resigning from the
Government of India. It was also made clear that these
employees had the choice to remain as Government
employees but they would be transferred to surplus staff
cell of Government of India for re-deployment against the
vacancies in other government offices. It is an accepted
fact before us that all the appellants opted to be absorbed
in VSNL. They were, in fact, absorbed in VSNL with effect
from 1st January, 1990. In the staff notice issued on 11th
December, 1989, it was also made clear that OCS
employees transferred to VSNL on deputation basis
without deputation allowance on foreign service terms
will cease to be government servants. It is, therefore,
patent that the appellant accepted the absorption
voluntarily. Therefore, it would be difficult to accept the
submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that
even after absorption in VSNL, the appellants continued
to enjoy the protection available to them in the OCS as
government servants. The appellants have, however,
38Page 39
sought to rely on the memorandum No.4/18/87–P &PWD
dated 5th July, 1989 of the Department of Pension and
Pensioners’ Welfare, Government of India. In the said
letter, certain safeguards have been granted to ex-OCS
employees which are as under:
“Dismissal/removal from the service of a public
sector undertaking/autonomous body after
absorption for any subsequent misconduct shall
not amount to forfeiture of his retirement
benefits for the service rendered in the Central
Government. Also in the event of
Dismissal/removal of a transferred employee
from the public sector undertaking/autonomous
body the employee concerned will be allowed
protection to the extent that the administrative
Ministry/Department will review such order
before taking a final decision.”
46. In our opinion, the aforesaid condition would make
no difference to the legal status of the appellants within
VSNL. It was only an assurance that the rights to pension
which had already accrued to them on the basis of their
service in OCS shall be protected. Undoubtedly, this
assurance was accepted by VSNL on 1st May, 1992. It was,
in fact, incorporated in the rules governing the service
39Page 40
conditions of these employees in VSNL. It is a matter of
record that with effect from 13th February, 2002, the
shareholding of Government of India is 26.97 %. Soon
thereafter, the total shareholding of TATA Group in VSNL
increased to 44.99% of the paid up share capital in 2002.
It is also an accepted fact that shareholding of the TATA
Group in VSNL is 15.11%. It is also noteworthy that since
2002, VSNL was a TATA Group Company and accordingly
on 28th January, 2008 its name was changed to ‘TATA
Communication Limited”. In our opinion, the aforesaid
facts make it abundantly clear that the Government of
India did not have sufficient interest in the control of
either management or policy making functions of TATA
Communication Limited.
47. Merely because TATA Communication Limited is
performing the functions which were initially performed
by OCS would not be sufficient to hold that it is
performing a public function. It has been categorically
held in the case of Ramana Dayaram Shetty (supra) if
only the functions of the Corporation are of public
40Page 41
importance and closely related to Government functions,
it would be a relevant factor in classifying the Corporation
as an instrumentality or agency of the Government.
48. As noticed above, the functions performed by
VSNL/TCL are not of such nature which could be said to
be a public function. Undoubtedly, these operators
provide a service to the subscribers. The service is
available upon payment of commercial charges. Learned
counsel for the appellants had placed strong reliance on
the judgment of this Court in Air India Statutory
Corporation (supra). However, the aforesaid judgment is
of no assistance to the appellants as it was subsequently
overruled by a Constitution Bench in Steel Authority of
India Ltd. & Ors. vs. National Union Waterfront
Workers & Ors.
18. Dr. K.S. Chauhan had also relied on
the Human Rights Act, 1998 (Meaning of Public Function)
Bill which sets out the factors to be taken into account in
determining whether a particular function is a public
function for the purpose of sub-section (3)(b) of Section 6
18 (2001 (7) SCC 1)
41Page 42
of the aforesaid Act. Section (1) enumerates the following
factors which may be taken into account in determining
the question as to whether a function is a function of
public nature.
“(a) the extent to which the state has assumed
responsibility for the function in question ;
(b)the role and responsibility of the state in
relation to the subject matter in question ;
(c) the nature and extent of the public interest in
the function in question ;
(d) the nature and extent of any statutory power
or duty in relation to the function in question ;
(e) the extent to which the state, directly or
indirectly, regulates, supervises or inspects the
performance of the function in question ;
(f) the extent to which the state makes payment
for the function in question ;
42Page 43
(g) whether the function involves or may involve
the use of statutory coercive powers ;
(h) the extent of the risk that improper
performance of the function might violate an
individual’s Convention right.
Performance of public function by private provider –
49. For the avoidance of doubt, for the purposes of
Section 6(3)(b) of the Human Rights Act 1998, a function
of a public nature includes a function which is required or
enabled to be performed wholly or partially at public
expense, irrespective of –
(a) the legal status of the person who performs
the function, or
(b) whether the person performs the function by
reason of a contractual or other agreement or
arrangement”.
50. In our opinion, the functions performed by VSNL/TCL
examined on the touchstone of the aforesaid factors
43Page 44
cannot be declared to be the performance of a public
function. The State has divested its control by
transferring the functions performed by OCS prior to 1986
on VSNL/TCL. Dr. Chauhan had also relied on Binny Ltd.
(supra) wherein this Court reiterated the observations
made by this Court in Dwarkanath vs. Income-tax
Officer, Special Circle, D-ward, Kanpur & Anr. 19, it
was observed that :
“It is difficult to draw a line between the public
functions and private functions when it is being
discharged by a purely private authority. A body
is performing a “public function” when it seeks
to achieve some collective benefit for the public
or a section of the public and is accepted by the
public or that section of the public as having
authority to do so. Bodies therefore exercise
public functions when they intervene or
participate in social or economic affairs in the
public interest.”
51. This Court also quoted with approval the
Commentary on Judicial Review of Administrative Action
(Fifth Edn.) by de Smith, Woolf & Jowell in Chapter 3 para
0.24 therein it has been stated as follows :
19 (1965 (3) SCR 536)
44Page 45
“A body is performing a “public function” when
it seeks to achieve some collective benefit for
the public or a section of the public and is
accepted by the public or that section of the
public as having authority to do so. Bodies
therefore exercise public functions when they
intervene or participate in social or economic
affairs in the public interest.
Public functions need not be the exclusive
domain of the state. Charities, self-regulatory
organizations and other nominally private
institutions (such as universities, the Stock
Exchange, Lloyd’s of London, churches) may in
reality also perform some types of public
function. As Sir John Donaldson M.R. urged, it is
important for the courts to “recognize the
realities of executive power” and not allow
“their vision to be clouded by the subtlety and
sometimes complexity of the way in which it
can be exerted.” Non-governmental bodies such
as these are just as capable of abusing their
powers as is government.”
52. These observations make it abundantly clear that in
order for it to be held that the body is performing a public
function, the appellant would have to prove that the body
seeks to achieve some collective benefit for the public or
a section of public and accepted by the public as having
authority to do so. In the present case, as noticed earlier,
all telecom operators are providing commercial service
45Page 46
for commercial considerations. Such an activity in
substance is no different from the activities of a bookshop
selling books. It would be no different from any other
amenity which facilitates the dissemination of information
or DATA through any medium. We are unable to
appreciate the submission of the learned counsel for the
appellants that the activities of TCL are in aid of enforcing
the fundamental rights under Article 21(1)(a) of the
Constitution. The recipients of the service of the telecom
service voluntarily enter into a commercial agreement for
receipt and transmission of information. The function
performed by VSNL/TCL cannot be put on the same
pedestal as the function performed by private institution
in imparting education to children. It has been repeatedly
held by this Court that private education service is in the
nature of sovereign function which is required to be
performed by the Union of India. Right to education is a
fundamental right for children upto the age of 14 as
provided in Article 21A. Therefore, reliance placed by the
learned counsel for the appellants on the judgment of this
46Page 47
Court in Andi Mukta (supra) would be of no avail. In any
event, in the aforesaid case, this Court was concerned
with the non-payment of salary to the teachers by the
Andi Mukta Trust. In those circumstances, it was held that
the Trust is duty bound to make the payment and,
therefore, a writ in the nature of mandamus was issued.
Mr. C.U.Singh, senior counsel relied on Binny Ltd. (supra)
in support of the submissions that VSNL/TCL is not
performing a public function. In our opinion, the
observations made by this Court in the aforesaid
judgment are fully applicable in the facts and
circumstances of this case.
53. In these appeals, the claim of the appellants is that
their services have been wrongly terminated by VSNL/TCL
in breach of the assurances given by the Government of
India and VSNL in clause 5.13 of the share holding
agreement. If that be so, they would be at liberty to seek
redress by taking recourse to the normal remedies
available under law. 
47Page 48
54. A perusal of the aforesaid documents, however,
would show that VSNL had merely promised not to
retrench any employee who had come from OCS for a
period of two years from 13th February, 2002. Such a
condition, in our opinion, would not clothe the same with
the characteristic of a public duty which the employer was
bound to perform. The employees had individual contacts
with the employer. In case the employer is actually in
breach of the contract, the appellants are at liberty to
approach the appropriate forum to enforce their rights. 
55. We see no merit in the appeals and the same are
accordingly dismissed. 
Writ Petition No.689 of 2007 -
56. This writ petition has been moved by the VSNL
Scheduled Castes/Tribes employees Welfare Samiti
(Regd.) (Petitioner No.1) and Scheduled Castes and
Schedule Tribes Employees Welfare Association of VSNL
(Regd.)-Petitioner No.2.
48Page 49
57. The prayer in this writ petition is inter alia for the
issuing a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the
official respondents to safeguard the fundamental rights
of the members of the appellant as per the undertaking
given on 16th March, 2001, 9th October, 2001 and 30th
April, 2002. For the reasons already stated in the earlier
part of the judgment relating to the civil appeals, we are
unable to entertain the present writ petition. In our
opinion, it is not maintainable and accordingly dismissed.
………………………….J.
[Surinder Singh
Nijjar]
…..……………………….J.
[Anil R. Dave]
New Delhi;
April 17, 2013.
49

Cancellation of Gift by third party= The plaintiff (appellant herein) filed a suit being Title Suit No. 80/1985 on 23.04.1985 for declaration that the gift deed dated 28.02.1985 registered on 22.03.1985 alleged to have been executed by defendant No.1 Sarup Singh (since deceased) in favour of defendant Nos. 2 and 3, Pritam Singh and Surjan Singh, in respect of the suit land is illegal, void, ineffective and is to be set aside. A decree for permanent injunction was also sought for restraining defendant No.1 Sarup Singh (now deceased) from alienating the land fully described in the schedule of the plaint. The plaintiff filed the said suit with the averments that he is the adopted son of Sarup Singh alias Sarupa (now deceased) (defendant No.1 in the original suit).= Without going into the question with regard to the custom prevalent amongst the Jats to take in adoption a married man having children, the evidence which has been brought on record goes against the plaintiff-appellant on the basis of which it cannot be held that there was a valid adoption. 17. The plaintiff-appellant impleaded his adoptive father Sarup Singh as defendant No.1 and alleged that he was adopted by defendant No.1. Curiously enough, defendant No.1, the so called adoptive father, contested the suit by filing written statement making an averment that he never adopted him as his son. If the adoptive father himself asserted that he never took the appellant in adoption, the court cannot come to the conclusion that appellant was taken in adoption by defendant No.1.- Apart from that, defendant No.1 adoptive father in his detailed written statement has denied each and every allegation and claimed to be in cultivating possession of the land and further denied that the appellant ever resided with him in his house or helped him in cultivating the land. The evidence, in our view, goes against the appellant and, therefore, it cannot be held that there is perversity in the judgment passed by the two appellate courts.


Page 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3895-3896 OF 2013
(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 33612-33613 of 2009)
Harnek Singh ……Appellant(s)
Vs.
Pritam Singh & Ors. ….Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
M.Y.EQBAL,J.
Leave granted.
2. The plaintiff-appellant assailed the common judgment and
order dated 11.05.2009 passed in RSA Nos.122/2008 and 123/2008
whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed both the appeals and
affirmed the order passed by the lower appellate court.
3. The facts leading to these appeals may be summarized
thus:-
4. The plaintiff (appellant herein) filed a suit being Title Suit
No. 80/1985 on 23.04.1985 for declaration that the gift deed dated
28.02.1985 registered on 22.03.1985 alleged to have been executed
by defendant No.1 Sarup Singh (since deceased) in favour of
defendant Nos. 2 and 3, Pritam Singh and Surjan Singh, in respect of
1Page 2
the suit land is illegal, void, ineffective and is to be set aside. A
decree for permanent injunction was also sought for restraining
defendant No.1 Sarup Singh (now deceased) from alienating the land
fully described in the schedule of the plaint. The plaintiff filed the said
suit with the averments that he is the adopted son of Sarup Singh
alias Sarupa (now deceased) (defendant No.1 in the original suit).
The plaintiff’s case is that Sarup Singh and his wife Prem Kaur (now
both deceased) had no child and were issueless. They approached
the natural father of the plaintiff Kesar Singh and expressed their
desire to adopt the plaintiff as their son to which Kesar Singh agreed.
Consequently, the plaintiff was adopted as their own son by Sarup
Singh and his wife on 16.12.1982 at Village Khatoli, District Ambala.
There was actual giving and taking i.e. the plaintiff was allegedly put in
the lap of Sarup Singh and Prem Kaur by the natural father Kesar
Singh and declared that from 16.12.1982 the plaintiff became their
son. It was alleged that all necessary ceremonies including religious
and customary formalities were observed and sweets were distributed
and since then the plaintiff became the son of deceased defendant
No.1 Sarup Singh and his wife. Plaintiff’s further case is that since the
adoptive father and mother had become old, the plaintiff started
managing the entire property of the family including the land, houses
2Page 3
etc., and has been cultivating the suit land. The plaintiff’s further case
is that for a few days when he went out of the village, defendant Nos.2
and 3 who are very strong headed and clever fellows removed the
deceased Sarup Singh from his house and by misrepresentation and
putting pressure to him and by giving threat and undue coercion got
the alleged gift deed executed in their favour taking advantage of the
unsound and mental weakness of the deceased Sarup Singh. The
plaintiff, therefore, filed the suit being No. 80/1985 against Sarup
Singh (defendant No. 1) and defendant Nos. 2 and 3 challenging the
said alleged gift deed. The plaintiff also alleged that defendant Nos. 2
and 3 have obtained a decree against defendant No.1 regarding the
suit property. Plaintiff’s further case is that the plaintiff along with
defendant No.1 constituted a Joint Hindu family and was having title in
the ancestral property.
5. On being summoned, defendant Nos. 2 and 3 filed their
joint written statement taking preliminary objection that the plaintiff is
not the adopted son of Sarup Singh as Sarup Singh never adopted the
plaintiff and, therefore, the plaintiff has no locus standi to file the suit.
Defendants also denied that the plaintiff is in possession of the
disputed land. The entire story of giving and taking and celebration
was denied. It was also denied that any religious and customary
3Page 4
formalities were ever observed in respect of the alleged adoption.
Defendants’ further case is that defendant No.1 Sarup Singh executed
a gift deed in their favour out of love and affection and in view of the
services rendered by them. It was stated that defendant No.1 was the
absolute owner of the suit property and was fully competent to alienate
the same in favour of defendants.
6. It is pertinent to mention here that earlier defendant Nos. 2
and 3 had also filed a suit being Suit No. 784 of 1984 titled as Hari
Singh vs. Sarupa (defendant No. 1) for declaration that they are the
owners in possession of the suit land on the basis of Gift Deed dated
22.03.1985 which was decreed by the Civil Judge vide his judgment
and decree dated 15.04.1985. The plaintiff who was having no
knowledge of the decree dated 15.04.1985 could not challenge the
same in his aforementioned Suit No. 80 of 1985 filed on 23.04.1985
and had to file a second suit being Suit No. 46 of 1987 challenging the
decree dated 15.04.1985 alleging therein that the decree is a collusive
one and has been obtained by committing fraud upon the Court and
thus the same is invalid and ineffective. The pleadings of the parties
in Suit No. 46 of 1987 are alleged to be similar to the pleadings in Suit
No. 80 of 1985.
4Page 5
7. Both the suits were taken up together by the trial court and
the following consolidated issues were framed:-
1. Whether the plaintiff is adopted son of Sarup Singh as
alleged? OPP
2. Whether the judgment and decree dated 15.4.85 is
liable to be set aside as alleged? OPP
3. If issue No.1 is proved, whether the land was ancestral
in the hand of Sarupa Singh, if so to what effect? OPP
4. Whether the plaintiff was in possession of the suit land
as alleged? OPP
5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for possession of suit
land as alleged? OPP
6. Whether if the adoption deed if any is a result of forgery
as alleged? OPD
7. Whether gift deed dated 8.2.1985 is liable to be set
aside as alleged? OPP
8. Whether the present suit is not maintainable in the
present form? OPD
9. Whether the suit is bad for non joinder of necessary
parties? OPD
10. Whether the defendants are entitled for special costs?
OPD
11. Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action to file the
present suit? OPD
8. The trial court in its judgment dated 31.08.2007 after
analyzing the evidence and considering the facts of the case recorded
5Page 6
its findings and decided Issue Nos.1 and 6 in favour of the plaintiff
holding that the plaintiff is the legally adopted son of deceased
defendant No.1 Sarup Singh. However, the trial court decided Issue
Nos. 2 and 7 against the plaintiff and in favour of defendantrespondents. So far Issue No.3 is concerned, the trial court held that
the suit property was not the ancestral property; hence, Sarup Singh
was entitled to alienate the property. Consequently, the suit filed by
the plaintiff was dismissed.
9. Aggrieved by the judgment passed by the trial court, the
plaintiff-appellant filed appeals before the District Judge being Civil
Appeal Nos. 84 and 85 of 2007. The first appellate court while
narrating the facts in its judgment dated 13.12.2007, first of all noticed
that the suit was filed by the plaintiff during the lifetime of his adoptive
father Sarup Singh making him defendant No.1. The said Sarup Singh
contested the suit by filing written statement denying the averments
made in the plaint that he ever adopted the plaintiff-appellant as his
son. The said Sarup Singh also denied the allegations that the gift
deed was executed by him in favour of the defendant-respondents
under any pressure or coercion. After analysing the pleadings and the
evidence, the appellate court observed that although the plaintiff came
up with a definite plea that he was being treated as adopted son of
6Page 7
Sarup Singh since 1970 but the alleged actual giving and taking
ceremony took place in the year 1982; hence the plaintiff-appellant
was not sure as to whether the adoption had taken place in the year
1970 or in the year 1982. Strangely enough, no date or month has
been provided in the pleadings of the year 1970 when the alleged
adoption might have taken place. Admittedly, when the appellant was
taken in adoption, he was about 23 years old in the year 1982 and was
a married man having children. The appellate court held that since the
appellant was more than 15 years of age in 1982, it was incumbent
upon him to prove that there was valid customs amongst Jats under
which he could have been given in adoption. The appellate court after
noticing the fact that custom prevalent amongst the community has
not been pleaded or proved, relied upon the decision of Lahore High
Court in Kishan Singh and Others vs. Shanti and Others, AIR
1938 Lahore 299 for the proposition that if any party wants the Court
to rely on a custom, onus is on that party to plead the custom in the
precise terms and lead evidence to establish the said custom. The
first appellate court while dismissing the appeals discussed the other
decisions on the point of custom and finally recorded the following
findings:-
“ I have considered the respectful submissions of the
learned counsel for the appellant at length but before the
7Page 8
appellant could succeed in his claim it was incumbent
upon the appellant to at least plead that his adoption is in
consonance with the custom prevalent amongst his
community. This fact has no where been pleaded in the
plaint. This court is further of the view that it should have
been established beyond doubt that there existed such
custom in the area of district Ambala that jats can adopt a
child who may be more than fifteen years of age and may
be married. The cited ruling of Madhya Pradesh High
Court and of our own Hon’ble High Court pertains to the
area of M.P. and district Rohtak are of no avail to the case
of the appellant as custom differs from place to place and
from tribe to tribe. It cannot be laid down as a general rule
that simply because there was a custom in Rohtak
amongst Jat to adopt even a married person, the same will
hold good in District Ambala also. There was no dispute
about this proposition of law that once a custom is
recognized through judicial pronouncements, then it need
not be proved in subsequent cases but at the same time
this court is constrained to lay down that no judgment has
been produced by the learned counsel for the appellant
with respect to jats living in the area of District Ambala.
The custom amongst jats who are habitants of district
Ambala may be different then custom of jats who are
residents of district Rohtak. It reminds this court that our
own Hon’ble High Court has laid down in one of the
decided case reported in Hari Singh Vs. Bidhi Chand as
reported in 1997 MLJ 224 that jats of tehsil Naraingarh
district Ambala lack the capacity to adopt. From all this it
can be safely inferred that the custom differs from place to
place and from tribe to tribe and as such evidence should
have been led beyond shadow of doubt that there existed
custom amongst jats of Ambala under which a married
man and man beyond age of 15 years could have been
given in adoption. Strangely enough, the custom has not
been pleaded in the present case and thus findings cannot
be returned on issues no.1 and 6 in favour of the
appellant. Not only this, the suit was filed during the life
time of Sarup Singh, alleged adopted father of the
appellant and in pursuance to the notice given by the court
Sarup Singh duly put in appearance before the court and
filed a written statement wherein he denied the very
8Page 9
factum of adoption. Once the adoptive father himself is
alleging that he never took the appellant in adoption, this
court cannot substitute its own decision that the appellant
was taken in adoption by Sarup singh. Prima facie the
alleged adoption is violative of the provision of section 10
of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act 1956 and
accordingly the same cannot be held to be a valid
adoption. The findings of the learned trial court on issues
no.1 and 6 thus cannot be sustained and are accordingly
reversed.”
10. The plaintiff-appellant assailed the judgment of the first
appellate court by filing second appeals in the High Court being R.S.A.
Nos. 122 and 123 of 2008. The High Court after discussing the
judgments relied upon by the first appellate court and considering the
facts and evidence on record came to the conclusion vide judgment
dated 11.05.2009 that no fault could be found with the findings
recorded by the first appellate court holding that in absence of
pleading and proof of custom, no reliance could be placed on adoption
deed, specially when the stand of the plaintiff-appellant himself in the
suit was that he was governed by personal law, and the plea of
custom was in the alternative. The High Court, therefore, affirmed the
findings recorded by the first appellate court and dismissed the
appeals. Hence, the plaintiff-appellant has moved this Court by filing
the instant appeals by special leave.
9Page 10
11. Ms. Jyoti Mendiratta, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant assailed the judgment and order passed by the first
appellate court and that by the High Court as being contrary to law
settled by judicial pronouncements that there is a custom prevalent
amongst the Jats in Haryana to adopt even a married person.
Learned counsel submitted that in view of the judicial pronouncements
both the courts have misdirected itself by holding that neither the
custom has been pleaded nor the same has been proved. Learned
counsel submitted that it is well recognized that the Hindu Jats are
governed by their customs and, therefore, even in the absence of a
pleading, the appellate courts ought to have affirmed the judgment
passed by the trial court. Learned counsel drew our attention to
various decisions favoured and against on this issue which have been
fully discussed by the courts below.
12. Section 10 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act,
1956 needs to be quoted hereinbelow:-
“10. Persons who may be adopted - No person shall
be capable of being taken in adoption unless the
following conditions are fulfilled, namely:-
(i) he or she is a Hindu;
(ii) he or she has not already been adopted;
10Page 11
(iii) he or she has not been married, unless there is a
custom or usage applicable to the parties which permits
persons who are married being taken in adoption;
(iv) he or she has not completed the age of fifteen years,
unless there is a custom or usage applicable to the
parties which permits persons who have completed the
age of fifteen years being taken in adoption.”
13. Under clause (iv) of Section 10, one of the conditions inter
alia is that the person who may be adopted has not completed the age
of 15 years unless there is a custom and usage applicable to the
parties which permit persons who completed the age of 15 years
being taken in adoption. The other condition for a valid adoption has
been provided in Section 11 of the Act which reads as under:-
“11. Other conditions for a valid adoption - In every
adoption, the following conditions must be complied
with:-
(i) if the adoption is of a son, the adoptive father or
mother by whom the adoption is made must not have a
Hindu son, son's son or son's son's son (whether by
legitimate blood relationship or by adoption) living at the
time of adoption;
(ii) if the adoption is of a daughter, the adoptive father or
mother by whom the adoption is made must not have a
Hindu daughter or son's daughter (whether by legitimate
blood relationship or by adoption) living at the time of
adoption;
11Page 12
(iii) if the adoption is by a male and the person to be
adopted is a female, the adoptive father is at least
twenty-one years older than the person to be adopted;
(iv) if the adoption is by a female and the person to be
adopted is a male, the adoptive mother is at least
twenty-one years older than the person to be adopted;
(v) the same child may not be adopted simultaneously
by two or more persons;
(vi) the child to be adopted must be actually given and
taken in adoption by the parents or guardian concerned
or under their authority with intent to transfer the child
from the family of its birth or in the case of an
abandoned child or a child whose parentage is not
known, from the place or family where it has been
brought up to the family of its adoption:
Provided that the performance of datta homam
shall not be essential to the validity of adoption.”
14. Clause (vi) of Section 11 specifically provides that the child
to be adopted must be actually given and taken in adoption by the
parents or guardian concerned or under their authority with the intent
to transfer the child from the family of its birth. A child who is
abandoned or whose parentage is not known may also be taken in
adoption provided the given and taken ceremony is done from the
place of family where it has been brought up to the family of its
adoption.
12Page 13
15. Both the first appellate court and the High Court have
considered all the decisions relied upon by the parties and finally
came to the conclusion that neither the custom has been proved nor
the factum of adoption has been established by conclusive evidence.
Normally, the concurrent findings recorded by the two courts need not
be interfered with unless the findings appear to be perverse in law. 
16. Without going into the question with regard to the custom
prevalent amongst the Jats to take in adoption a married man having
children, the evidence which has been brought on record goes against
the plaintiff-appellant on the basis of which it cannot be held that there
was a valid adoption.
17. The plaintiff-appellant impleaded his adoptive father Sarup
Singh as defendant No.1 and alleged that he was adopted by
defendant No.1. Curiously enough, defendant No.1, the so called
adoptive father, contested the suit by filing written statement making
an averment that he never adopted him as his son. If the adoptive
father himself asserted that he never took the appellant in adoption,
the court cannot come to the conclusion that appellant was taken in
adoption by defendant No.1. It is strange enough that when during the
pendency of the case defendant No.1 adoptive father died the plaintiff-
13Page 14
appellant who claims himself to be the adopted son has not even
performed the last ritual and other ceremonies of the deceased. It has
also come in evidence that during the period when the alleged
adoption took place, the appellant’s natural father was Sarpanch of
the village and the register which was produced in court to show that
there was some entry with regard to adoption remained with the said
Sarpanch. Apart from that, defendant No.1 adoptive father in his
detailed written statement has denied each and every allegation and
claimed to be in cultivating possession of the land and further denied
that the appellant ever resided with him in his house or helped him in
cultivating the land. The evidence, in our view, goes against the
appellant and, therefore, it cannot be held that there is perversity in
the judgment passed by the two appellate courts.
18. In the light of the findings recorded by the two appellate
courts and the discussion made hereinbefore, we do not find any
reason to interfere with the judgments passed by the first appellate
court and the High Court.
14Page 15
19. For the reasons aforesaid, we do not find any merit in
these appeals which are accordingly dismissed.
..……………………………J
(Surinder Singh Nijjar )
…………………………….J.
(M.Y. Eqbal )
New Delhi
April 17, 2013
15

SEC. 64 OF N.I. ACT = The bill of exchange was accepted by M/s Lgee Enterprises (not made a party to the suit) and was further shown to be accepted by Punjab National Bank (respondent no. 1). It was then shown to be endorsed by respondent no. 2 in favour of the appellant-plaintiff and was delivered to it, who, thus, claims to have become the endorsee and the holder of the bill of exchange in question. The bill of exchange was presented for payment, but respondent no. 1 refused to make payment, thereby dishonoring the bill. 3. The appellant-plaintiff filed the suit, being Suit No. 780/1983, for recovery of the amount of the bill of exchange along with statutory interest.= it is clear that the bill of exchange is drawn by respondent nos. 3 & 4 (defendant nos. 3 & 4 in the suit) as partners of the firm, respondent no. 2 (defendant no. 2 in the suit). Admittedly, suit summons were not served on defendant nos. 2, 3 & 4 and they never contested the suit at any stage. The acceptor of the bill of exchange is M/s Lgee Enterprise which was not impleaded in the suit; the bill of exchange was never accepted by it; that A.B. Das, who was the Branch Manager of PNB’s Zakaria Street Branch, Calcutta and who was shown to have “accepted” the bill of exchange was not authorized to accept any bill of exchange on behalf of the Bank. In any event, the “co-acceptance” of the bill of exchange by A.B. Das in Bombay was not in discharge of his official duty as Branch Manager of a branch in Calcutta. The co-acceptance of the bill of exchange shown to have been made by A.B. Das was fraudulent and not binding on the Bank.; section 64 of the Negotiable Instruments Act= The Division Bench also held that the statutory requirement of presentment under section 64 of the Negotiable Instruments Act for payment is mandatory and the words “must be” clearly expressed the legislative intent. The consequence of failure to present was also made clear that the failure will absolve the liability of any of the “other parties thereto”. It was also made clear that in the case of a bill of exchange it must be presented for payment to the “acceptor”. In this case, admittedly the bill was not presented to M/s Lgee Enterprise, the named acceptor in the bill and as a consequence “other parties thereto” were totally absolved of their liability. 18. The Division Bench also rejected the contention made on behalf of the appellant-plaintiff that co-acceptance by the respondent-Bank should be treated as acceptance. The Division Bench pointed out that the case of the appellant-plaintiff in the plaint is that the respondent-Bank is the “acceptor”. After receiving the written statement filed by the respondent-Bank, the appellant-plaintiff wanted to introduce the case of co-acceptance by the Bank. The attempt to amend the plaint did not succeed right upto this Court. Hence, the case of the appellant-plaintiff was liable to fail, as on the face of the document the Bank was not the acceptor of the bill of exchange. 19. Each of the findings noted above, have been arrived at by the High Court with great care in regard to the facts of the case and the relevant provisions of the law. Each of the findings is unimpeachable and each of the finding on its own is fatal to the case of the appellant-plaintiff.


Page 1
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.7552 OF 2002
Britannia Industries Limited … Appellant
Versus
Punjab National Bank & Ors. … Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Aftab Alam,J.
1. This appeal, by special leave, is directed against the judgment and
decree dated April 3, 2001 passed by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High
Court in Appeal No.114/1991. By the impugned judgment, the Division
Bench allowed the appeal preferred by Punjab National Bank (respondent
no. 1 before this Court), set aside the judgment and decree dated December
12, 1990, passed by a learned single judge of the High Court in Suit No.
780/1983 filed by the appellant-plaintiff under Order XXXVII of the Code
of Civil Procedure.
2. The claim of the appellant-plaintiff is based on a purported bill of
exchange dated February 15, 1983 for a sum of Rs. 1 crore only.
The bill of
1Page 2
exchange was drawn by two persons namely, Raghunath Dutta and Amit
Dutta (respondent nos. 3 & 4 respectively) as partners in the firm
Metropolitan Construction (respondent no. 2). 
The bill of exchange was
accepted by M/s Lgee Enterprises (not made a party to the suit) and was
further shown to be accepted by Punjab National Bank (respondent no. 1).
It
was then shown to be endorsed by respondent no. 2 in favour of the
appellant-plaintiff and was delivered to it, who, thus, claims to have become
the endorsee and the holder of the bill of exchange in question. 
The bill of
exchange was presented for payment, but respondent no. 1 refused to make
payment, thereby dishonoring the bill.
3. The appellant-plaintiff filed the suit, being Suit No. 780/1983, for
recovery of the amount of the bill of exchange along with statutory interest.
4. From the averments made in the plaint
it is clear that the bill of
exchange is drawn by respondent nos. 3 & 4 (defendant nos. 3 & 4 in the
suit) as partners of the firm, respondent no. 2 (defendant no. 2 in the suit).
Admittedly, 
suit summons were not served on defendant nos. 2, 3 & 4 and
they never contested the suit at any stage. 
The acceptor of the bill of
exchange is M/s Lgee Enterprise which was not impleaded in the suit on the facile plea that, based in Mumbai, it was beyond the jurisdiction of the
2Page 3
Calcutta High Court. 
The contest was, therefore, directly with PNB which
was described in the plaint as the “acceptor” of the bill.
5. PNB (respondent no.1) completely denied the case of the appellant plaintiff made out in the plaint and was granted leave to defend the suit in
terms of rule 3(5) of Order XXXVII.
6. In the written statement it was stated on behalf of PNB that the bill of exchange was never accepted by it; 
that A.B. Das, who was the Branch
Manager of PNB’s Zakaria Street Branch, Calcutta and who was shown to have “accepted” the bill of exchange was not authorized to accept any bill of exchange on behalf of the Bank.
 In any event, the “co-acceptance” of the bill
of exchange by A.B. Das in Bombay was not in discharge of his official duty as Branch Manager of a branch in Calcutta. 
The co-acceptance of the bill of exchange shown to have been made by A.B. Das was fraudulent and not binding on the Bank.
7. It was also stated in paragraph 10(f) of the written statement that A.B.
Das was arrested by the West Bengal Bureau of Investigation relating to his
involvement in connection with M/s Sanchita Investment and then on
November 8, 1983, A.B. Das was again arrested by C.B.I. and various
investigations were pending against A.B. Das.
3Page 4
8. It was also stated in the written statement that the Metropolitan
Construction was a non-existent firm and never had any place of business at
A-18 Kings Acres Plot No. 75, Saraswati Road, Santacruz (West) at
Bombay – 400054 or at 29, Creek Lane, Calcutta – 700014 (the addresses
given in the bill of exchange). The telephone number given in the said
purported bill was in the name of M/s Jayadas and Co., whose proprietress is
Mrs. Jayashree Das, the wife of A.B. Das’s brother. The acceptor, Lgee
Enterprise, is also a non-existing firm and has no office at Plot No. 154,
Juhu Tara Road, Bombay 400049, which is the address of one Sunlight
Firm, an associate of Sanchita Investments.
9. The allegation of fraud, directly against Britannia, was made in subparagraph (h) of paragraph 11 of the written statement which is set out
below:
“The said purported Bill of Exchange was not drawn on Punjab
National Bank, this defendant and the said Mr. A.B. Das
fraudulently in collusion and conspiracy with the plaintiff
and/or its Authorized Officer and/or officers purportedly put a
remark thereon as “Co-accepted”. The purported remark “coaccepted” was put on the said Bill of Exchange in collusion and
conspiracy with the plaintiff and/or its duly authorized officers
and is illegal, invalid and not binding on this defendant. There
was no acceptances of the said purported bill by this
defendant.”
4Page 5
10. Here it needs to be stated that after the filing of the written statement
of the respondent-Bank the appellant-plaintiff sought to amend the plaint
and to describe the respondent Bank as the “co-acceptor” of the bill of
exchange which, in the plaint, as noted above, was described as the
“acceptor” of the bill. The amendment petition was rejected by the trial court
and the order rejecting the amendment petition was upheld right upto this
Court.
11. On the basis of the pleadings, the parties went to trial and the trial
court by judgment and order dated December 12, 1990, decreed the suit.
12. Against the judgment and decree passed by the trial court, the
respondent-Bank preferred an intra-court appeal before the Division Bench
of the High Court and the Division Bench, as noted above, allowed the
appeal, set aside the judgment and decree passed by the single judge and
dismissed the plaintiff’s suit.
13. The Division Bench has rendered a long and learned judgment that
deals with practically the entire gamut of the law on bill of exchange.
14. On a careful consideration of the materials on record, the Division
Bench found that there was no material to hold that the alleged bill of
exchange was a validly executed instrument as the appellant-plaintiff failed
5Page 6
to adduce any evidence in regard to its execution. The Division Bench
further held that it was incumbent upon the appellant-plaintiff to prove the
execution of the bill of exchange and its validity as it was repeatedly
asserted in the written statement filed by the respondent-Bank that the
alleged bill of exchange was brought into existence by practicing fraud and
collusion and it was not a valid instrument and binding on the respondent.
15. The Division Bench further found that by allegedly giving the
guarantee for payment under the guise of “co-acceptance” of the bill, A.B.
Das acted in excess of his authority and the so called co-acceptance
endorsed by him could not and did not bind the respondent-Bank.
16. The Division Bench also found that the circumstances in which the
alleged bill of exchange was said to have been drawn up and accepted by
M/s Lgee Enterprise and “co-accepted” by the respondent-Bank appeared to
be highly curious and unusual and lent credence to the case of the
respondent-Bank that the bill of exchange was fraudulent.
17. The Division Bench also held that the statutory requirement of
presentment under section 64 of the Negotiable Instruments Act for payment
is mandatory and the words “must be” clearly expressed the legislative
intent. The consequence of failure to present was also made clear that the
6Page 7
failure will absolve the liability of any of the “other parties thereto”. 
It was
also made clear that in the case of a bill of exchange it must be presented for
payment to the “acceptor”. 
In this case, admittedly the bill was not presented
to M/s Lgee Enterprise, the named acceptor in the bill and as a consequence
“other parties thereto” were totally absolved of their liability.
18. The Division Bench also rejected the contention made on behalf of the
appellant-plaintiff that co-acceptance by the respondent-Bank should be
treated as acceptance. 
The Division Bench pointed out that the case of the
appellant-plaintiff in the plaint is that the respondent-Bank is the “acceptor”.
After receiving the written statement filed by the respondent-Bank, the
appellant-plaintiff wanted to introduce the case of co-acceptance by the
Bank. 
The attempt to amend the plaint did not succeed right upto this Court.
Hence, the case of the appellant-plaintiff was liable to fail, as on the face of
the document the Bank was not the acceptor of the bill of exchange.
19. Each of the findings noted above, have been arrived at by the High
Court with great care in regard to the facts of the case and the relevant
provisions of the law. Each of the findings is unimpeachable and each of the
finding on its own is fatal to the case of the appellant-plaintiff.
7Page 8
20. On hearing Mr. Shyam Divan, senior advocate counsel for the
appellant-plaintiff and Mr. Dhruv Mehta, learned senior advocate appearing
for the Bank, we find ourselves in complete agreement with the view taken
by the Division Bench of the High Court.
21. We find no merit in this appeal and is, accordingly, dismissed with
costs.
…..……………………….J.
(Aftab Alam)
…..……………………….J.
(Ranjana Prakash Desai)
New Delhi;
April 17, 2013.
8

Wednesday, April 17, 2013

Section 15(1)(a) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 (for short, 'the Act').- Amrik Singh (brother of respondent No.2) executed sale deed dated 21.5.1979 in favour of the petitioners and respondent No.1 in respect of 27 kanals 4 marlas land for a consideration of Rs.37,500/-. The sale deed was registered on 23.5.1979. Respondent No.2 challenged the sale deed in Civil Suit No.353/1981 and claimed pre-emption under Section 15(1)(a) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 (for short, 'the Act'). "Whether suit land is not pre-emptible in view of Section 17A of the Punjab Security of Land Tenure Act."= On the doctrine of relation back, which generally governs amendment of pleadings unless for reasons the court excludes the applicability of the doctrine in a given case, the petition for eviction as amended could be deemed to have been filed originally as such and the evidence shall have to be appreciated in the light of the averments made in the amended petition."; The plaintiff by asking for amendment sought to introduce an additional ground on the plea that besides being the brother, he is also a co-sharer in the suit land. As observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, and is evident from the judgment impugned as also the report of the trial Court dated 7.3.2006, there is sufficient material/evidence already on record i.e. prior to the introduction of the amendment to establish that the plaintiff is the co-sharer with the defendant-vendor. Through the amendment only, a new ground has been incorporated and not the new relief. Since the suit seeking the relief of pre-emption was instituted with the time, by introduction of a new ground to support the relief, the suit cannot become time barred.' It is settled law as is evident from the ratio of the judgment in the case of Siddalingamma (supra), that the court in appropriate case while allowing the amendment, may restrict the application of doctrine of relation back and permit the amendment from the date of the amendment. In the present case, the order of the Apex Court dated 10.11.1994 is clear and unambiguous in its terms. No such restriction has been imposed. To the contrary, the amendment rejected by this Court has been allowed primarily on the ground that the amendment is based upon admitted facts on record. I am of the considered view that the intention of the Apex Court in allowing the amendment was/is to apply the amendment without excluding the doctrine or relation back which normally and generally governs the amendment of pleadings."; A reading of the order passed by this Court shows that the application for amendment filed by respondent No.2 was allowed without any rider/condition. Therefore, it is reasonable to presume that this Court was of the view that the amendment in the plaint would relate back to the date of filing the suit. That apart, the learned Single Judge has independently considered the issue of limitation and rightly concluded that the amended suit was not barred by time. The argument of the learned counsel that the suit could not be decreed in view of the Haryana Amendment Act No.10 of 1995 does not require consideration because no such plea was argued before the High Court and we do not find any valid ground to allow the petitioners to raise such plea for the first time.


ITEM NO.4 COURT NO.3 SECTION IVB


S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No(s).15272/2008

(From the judgement and order dated 25/02/2008 in RSA No.1469/1983 of The
HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH)

PRITHI PAL SINGH & ANR. Petitioner(s)

VERSUS

AMRIK SINGH & ORS. Respondent(s)


(With appln(s) for permission to file additional affidavit and prayer for
interim relief and office report )
(for final disposal)

Date: 13/02/2013 This Petition was called on for hearing today.


CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.S. SINGHVI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.L. GOKHALE


For Petitioner(s) Mr. P.S.Patwalia,Sr.Adv.
Mr. Jagjit Singh Chhabra,Adv.
Mr. Tushar Bakshi,Adv.
Mr. Ajay Singh,Adv.
Mr. Rajat Singh,Adv.

For Respondent(s) Mr. Narender Hooda,Sr.Adv.
Mr. Ankit Swarup,Adv.
Ms. Neha Kedia,Adv.
Mr. Ajay Kumar,Adv.


UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R


This petition is directed against judgment dated 25.2.2008
of the learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court
whereby he dismissed the second appeal filed by the petitioners
and upheld the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate
Court, which had approved the decree passed by the trial Court in
favour of respondent No.2 - Bakshish Singh, who is now
represented by his legal representatives.

Amrik Singh (brother of respondent No.2) executed sale deed
dated 21.5.1979 in favour of the petitioners and respondent No.1
in respect of 27 kanals 4 marlas land for a consideration of
Rs.37,500/-. The sale deed was registered on 23.5.1979.

Respondent No.2 challenged the sale deed in Civil Suit
No.353/1981 and claimed pre-emption under Section 15(1)(a) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 (for short, 'the Act').


The petitioners and respondent No.1 contested the suit on
various grounds. 
They pleaded that the suit for pre-emption is
not maintainable and, in any case, the same is barred by time.

On the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the
following issues:

"1. Whether the plaintiff has got a superior right of
pre-emption over the suit land? OPP

2. Whether the sale consideration was fixed in good
faith and was actually paid by the defendants? OPD

3. If issue. No. 2 is not proved, what was the market
value of the suit land at the time of the impugned
sale? OPP

4. Whether the plaintiff has got no locus standi to
file and maintain the present suit? OPD

5. Whether the zare-panjam has been deposited within
time? OPP

6. Whether the suit is bad for partial pre-emption? OPD

7. Whether the suit property is co-parcenery and joint
Hindu family property qua the plaintiff and vendor?
OPD

8. Whether the plaintiff is estopped by his own act and
conduct to file and maintain the present suit? OPD

9. Whether the present suit is benami and for the
benefit of vendor? OPD

10. Whether the suit is within time? OPP

11. Whether the suit is not properly valued for the
purposes of court fee and jurisdiction? OPD

12. Whether the defendants have effected any improvement
over the suit land. If so to what amount? OPD

13. Whether the defendants are entitled to recover
stamps and registration charges in the eventuality of
the suit being decreed. If so to what amount? OPD.

14. Relief."

Subsequently, the petitioners and respondent No.1 sought and
were granted leave to amend the written statement leading to the
framing of the following additional issue:

"Whether suit land is not pre-emptible in view of Section
17A of the Punjab Security of Land Tenure Act."


After considering the pleadings and evidence of the parties
the trial Court decided issue Nos. 1, 4 to 13 in favour of
respondent No.2. The additional issue was also decided in his
favour. As a sequel to this, the trial Court decreed the suit in
favour of respondent No.2.


The appeal filed by the petitioners and respondent No.1 was
dismissed by the lower appellate Court vide judgment dated
30.5.1983, a reading whereof reveals that the petitioners and
respondent No.1 had filed another application for amendment of
the written statement, which was rejected by the lower appellate
Court. On merits, no serious argument appears to have been
advanced on behalf of the petitioners and this is the reason why
the lower appellate Court did not independently deal with the
findings recorded by the trial Court on various issues including
the one relating to limitation.

During the pendency of the second appeal filed by the
petitioners, respondent No.2 applied for amendment of the plaint
and claimed that he was entitled to relief as co-sharer of the
suit property. The learned Single Judge vide his judgment dated
22.5.1986 allowed the second appeal and rejected the application
made by respondent No.2 for amendment of the plaint.

This Court reversed the judgment of the learned Single
Judge, granted leave to respondent No.2 to amend the plaint and
remanded the matter to the High Court for fresh disposal of the
second appeal - Bakshish Singh v. Prithi Pal Singh 1995 Supp. (3)
SCC 577.


After remand the learned Single Judge reconsidered the
second appeal and dismissed the same. The learned Single Judge
extensively dealt with the question whether the amendment made in
the plaint would relate back to the date of institution of the
suit or the same will be treated as effective from the date of
this Court's order and held:

"The admitted facts now stand that the plaintiff
and vendor are the co-sharers. The fate of the present
appeal hinges upon the question "whether the amendment
allowed by the Apex Court vide its judgment dated
10.11.1994 will operate from the date of the order or is
deemed to have been incorporated as a part of the plaint
from the date of the institution of the suit. If the
amendment is considered to be part of the plaint from the
date of institution of the suit, the plaintiff is bound to
succeed, otherwise the suit shall fail if the amendment is
found to become operative from the date of the order of the
Apex Court allowing amendment. It is settled principle of
law that at that time of consideration of the plea of
amendment, the court is not required to go into the
question of merits of the amendment sought. A party seeking
the amendment may ultimately succeed or fail on the basis
of the amendment is not the relevant consideration at the
time the plea of amendment is to be considered. Only
consideration at the time is whether such an amendment is
necessary, relevant and relate to the controversy involved
in the lis. Hon'ble Supreme Court by allowing the amendment
of the plaint vide its order dated 10.11.1994 observed that
the amendment should have been allowed, on the basis of the
admitted facts. Whether the suit is barred by limitation or
is within limitation, all depends upon the effective date
of amendment. Mr. Goel, learned Counsel for the appellants
has referred to the judgment passed in the case of Tarlok
Singh vs Vijay Kumar Sabharwal 1996 PLJ 237. In this case,
the parties had entered into an agreement to sell. A suit
for perpetual injunction was instituted on 23.12.1987.
During the pendency of the suit, an application under Order
6 Rule 17 CPC came to be filed on 17.7.1989 for converting
the suit for injunction into the one for specific
performance of agreement dated 18.8.1984. The amendment was
allowed on 25.8.1989. A plea was raised that the suit for
specific performance is barred by limitation. This plea was
considered by the Apex Court wherein following observations
have been made:

"6. Shri Prem Malhotra, learned Counsel for the
respondents contended that since the respondent had
refused performance the suit must be deemed to have been
filed on December 23, 1987 and, therefore, when the
amendment was allowed, it would relate back to the date
of filing the suit which was filed within three years
from the date of the refusal. Accordingly, the suit is
not barred by limitation. Shri U.R. Lalit, learned
senior counsel for the appellant, contended that in view
of the liberty given by the High Court the appellant is
entitled to raise the plea of limitation. The suit filed
after expiry of 3 years from 1986 is barred by
limitation. The question is as to when the limitation
began to run? In view of the admitted position that the
contract was to be performed within 15 days after the
injunction was vacated, the limitation began to run on
April 6, 1986. In view of the position that the suit for
perpetual injunction was converted into one for specific
performance by order dated August 25, 1989, the suit
must be deemed to have been instituted on August 25,
1989 and the suit was clearly barred by limitation. We
find force in the stand of the appellant. We think that
parties had, by agreement, determined the date for
performance of the contract. Thereby limitation began to
run from April 6, 1986. Suit merely for injunction laid
on December 23, 1987 would not be of any avail nor the
limitation began to run from that date. Suit for
perpetual injunction is different from suit for specific
performance. The suit for specific performance in fact
was claimed by way of amendment application filed under
Order 6 Rule 17 CPC on September 12, 1979. It will
operate only on the application being ordered. Since the
amendment was ordered on August 25, 1989 the crucial
date would be the date on which the amendment was
ordered, by which date, admittedly, the suit is barred
by limitation. The courts below, therefore, were not
right in decreeing the suit."

In the case of Sampath Kumar vs Ayyakannu and Anr.,
2002 (3) Civil Court Cases 364 (S.C.) initially, a suit for
prohibitory injunction was filed in the year 1988 claiming
possession of the suit property. Later in the year 1989, an
application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC was made for
conversion of the suit into one for declaration of title of
the suit property and consequential relief of delivery of
possession alleging that during the pendency of the suit,
defendant dispossessed the plaintiff in January 1989. The
amendment was refused. However, in appeal before the
Hon'ble Apex Court, the conditional amendment was allowed.
The Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:

"11. In the present case, the amendment is being sought
for almost 11 years after the date of the institution of
the suit. The plaintiff is not debarred from instituting
a new suit seeking relief of declaration of title and
recovery of possession on the same basic facts as are
pleaded in the plaint seeking relief of issuance of
permanent prohibitory injunction and which is pending.
In order to avoid multiplicity of suits it would be a
sound exercise of discretion to permit the relief of
declaration of title and recovery of possession being
sought for in the pending suit. The plaintiff has
alleged the cause of action for the reliefs now sought
to be added as having arisen to him during the pendency
of the suit. The merits of the averments sought to be
incorporated by way of amendment are not to be judged at
the stage of allowing prayer for amendment. However,
defendant is right in submitting that if he has already
perfected his title by way of adverse possession then
the right so accrued should not be. allowed to be
defeated by permitting an amendment and seeking a new
relief which would relate back to the date of the suit
and thereby depriving the defendant of the advantage
accrued to him by lapse of time, by excluding a period
of about 11 years in calculating the period of
prescriptive title claimed to have been earned by the
defendant. The interest of the defendant can be
protected by directing that so far as the reliefs of
declaration of title and recovery of possession, now
sought for, are concerned the prayer in that regard
shall be deemed to have been made on the date on which
the application for amendment has been filed.

xxx xxx xxx xxx

13. The prayer for declaration of title and recovery of
possession shall be deemed to have been made on the date
on which the application for amendment was filed."

From the ratio of the aforesaid judgments, following points
emerge:

(a) Merits of the averments sought to be incorporated
by way of amendment are not to be judged at the
stage of allowing prayer for amendment;

(b) The dominant purpose of the amendment is to
minimize the litigation;

(c) The amendment once allowed and incorporated relates
back to the date of the initial institution of the
suit;

(d) The Court, however, in appropriate case may
restrict the application of doctrine of relation
back and permit the application of the amendment
from the date the amendment is allowed.

This principle has been enunciated by the Hon'ble
Apex Court in the case of Siddalingamma and another Vs
Mamtha Shenoy (2001) 8 Supreme Court Cases 561, wherein the
Court observed:

"10. On the doctrine of relation back, which generally
governs amendment of pleadings unless for reasons the
court excludes the applicability of the doctrine in a
given case, the petition for eviction as amended could
be deemed to have been filed originally as such and the
evidence shall have to be appreciated in the light of
the averments made in the amended petition." (Emphasis
supplied)

Mr. C.B. Goel, learned Counsel has strenuously
argued that the amendment in the present case should be
treated to have effected only from 10.11.1994 and the suit
for pre-emption is deemed to have been instituted on the
said date on the ground of the plaintiff being co-sharer.
His precise contention is that the suit for pre-emption
filed in the year 1994 under Clause "fourthly" Section
15(1)(b) is barred by time having been filed beyond one
year from the date of the sale in question. The appreciate
this contention, the sole question is whether a new relief
has been introduced way of amendment. In the case of Tarlok
Singh (supra), initially, the suit was for permanent
prohibitory injunction. However, by way of amendment, a new
relief of specific performance was introduced which was
held to be barred by time as the cause of action for the
relief of specific performance had accrued to the plaintiff
in the said case from the date of the execution of the
agreement to sell dated 21.12.1984. Relief of specific
performance was introduced in the year 1989 which was
admittedly beyond three years from the date cause of action
accrued. I have already extracted the relevant observations
of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in regard to the amendment.
Applying the test to the fact of the present case, the plea
of Mr. Goel is not sustainable. In the instant case, it was
a suit for pre-emption from the initial day. Initially, the
ground for seeking relief was that the plaintiff is the
brother of the vendor-defendant. This was one of the
grounds available under law by virtue of Clause "secondly"
of Section 15(1) of the Act. This provision has, however,
come to be struck down by the Supreme Court in the case of
Atam Parkash (supra). The plaintiff by asking for amendment
sought to introduce an additional ground on the plea that
besides being the brother, he is also a co-sharer in the
suit land. As observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, and is
evident from the judgment impugned as also the report of
the trial Court dated 7.3.2006, there is sufficient
material/evidence already on record i.e. prior to the
introduction of the amendment to establish that the
plaintiff is the co-sharer with the defendant-vendor.
Through the amendment only, a new ground has been
incorporated and not the new relief. Since the suit seeking
the relief of pre-emption was instituted with the time, by
introduction of a new ground to support the relief, the
suit cannot become time barred. In the present case, the
doctrine of relation back of the amendment has to apply as
no new or fresh relief has been incorporated. Apart from
above, there is another reason to decline the prayer of the
appellants. 
It is settled law as is evident from the ratio
of the judgment in the case of Siddalingamma (supra), that
the court in appropriate case while allowing the amendment,
may restrict the application of doctrine of relation back
and permit the amendment from the date of the amendment. In
the present case, the order of the Apex Court dated
10.11.1994 is clear and unambiguous in its terms. No such
restriction has been imposed. To the contrary, the
amendment rejected by this Court has been allowed primarily
on the ground that the amendment is based upon admitted
facts on record. I am of the considered view that the
intention of the Apex Court in allowing the amendment
was/is to apply the amendment without excluding the
doctrine or relation back which normally and generally
governs the amendment of pleadings."


(underlining is ours)
(reproduced from the SLP paper book)



Shri P.S. Patwalia, learned senior counsel appearing for thepetitioners argued that even though this Court granted leave to
respondents No.2 to amend the plaint, the learned Single Judge
should have dismissed the second appeal as barred by time because
the amendment was filed much after expiry of the limitation. He
further argued that while dismissing the second appeal, the
learned Single Judge did not consider the amendment made in
Section 15 of the Act by Haryana Amendment Act No.10 of 1995 and
on this ground alone the impugned judgment is liable to be set
aside.

In our opinion, there is no merit in the submissions of thelearned counsel. A reading of the order passed by this Court
shows that the application for amendment filed by respondent No.2
was allowed without any rider/condition. Therefore, it is
reasonable to presume that this Court was of the view that the
amendment in the plaint would relate back to the date of filing
the suit. That apart, the learned Single Judge has independently
considered the issue of limitation and rightly concluded that the
amended suit was not barred by time.


The argument of the learned counsel that the suit could not
be decreed in view of the Haryana Amendment Act No.10 of 1995
does not require consideration because no such plea was argued
before the High Court and we do not find any valid ground to
allow the petitioners to raise such plea for the first time.

With the above observations, the special leave petition is
dismissed.


[SUMAN WADHWA] [PHOOLAN WATI ARORA]
COURT MASTER COURT MASTER