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Saturday, April 13, 2013

LAND ACQUISITION - FIXATION OF COMPENSATION FOR DIFFERENT LANDS UNDER ONE NOTIFICATION = the High Court almost on a uniform basis awarded compensation at the rate of Rs.235/- per sq. yard notwithstanding the type of land involved. Although a distinction had been made between "chahi" lands, "pahar gair mumkin" lands and "gair mumkin" lands while assessing compensation, ultimately, a uniform rate was awarded in respect of the different types of lands which had been acquired. Different reasons have been given by the High Court in arriving at the uniform figure of Rs.235/- per sq. yard, but what is important is that ultimately by applying different methods, the compensation worked out to be same. In the said cases, the High Court had assessed the compensation payable for the acquired lands at the rate of Rs.805/- per sq. yard along with the statutory sums available under Section 23(1A) of the Land Acquisition Act and solatium on the market value under Section 23(2) thereof. It was also indicated that the land owners would also be entitled to interest as provided under Section 28 of the Act. ; The general cut imposed is at a flat rate of 40%, which, in our view, is not warranted on account of the fact that the lands in question have lost their character and potentiality as agricultural lands and have more or less been converted into lands which were ready for use for the purpose of construction. Taking Ms. Agarwal's submissions regarding the factors which determine deduction towards development cost, such as location and potentiality, into account, we are of the view that a deduction of 331/3 per cent would be reasonable on account of the passage of time and the all round development in the area which has made it impossible for the lands to retain their original character. 47. Accordingly, we direct that except where we have provided otherwise, wherever a deduction of 40% had been made, the same should be altered to 331/3 per cent and the compensation awarded is to be modified accordingly.; the Collector had awarded compensation at a uniform rate of Rs. 1,81,200/- per acre along with statutory benefits. The Reference Court determined the compensation at the uniform rate of Rs. 206/- per sq. yard. The High Court modified the said award and awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 260/- per sq. yard for the land acquired up to the depth of 100 meters abutting National Highway No. 10. The value of the rest of the acquired land was maintained at Rs. 206/- per sq. yard. The area in question being already developed to some extent, a cut of 50% on the value is, in our view, excessive. We agree with Mr. Swarup that resorting to the belting system by the High Court was improper and that at best a standard cut of 1/3rd would have been sufficient to balance the smallness of the exhibits produced. It has been pointed out by Mr. Swarup that on a comparative basis, the price of lands in the area in 1991 was on an average of about Rs. 420/- per sq. yard. Given the sharp rise in land prices, the value, according to Mr. Swarup, would have doubled to about Rs. 800/- per sq. yard by 1993. Even if we have to apply the formula of 12% increase, the valuation of the lands in question in 1993 would be approximately Rs. 527/- per sq. yard. Imposing a deduction of 1/3rd, valuation comes to about Rs. 350/- per sq. yard, which, in our view, would be the proper compensation for the lands covered in the case of Mukesh (supra) and other connected matters.


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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.3279-3287 OF 2013
[Arising out of SLP(C)Nos.24704-24712 of 2007]
Ashrafi and Ors. ...Appellants
Vs.
State of Haryana and Ors. ...Respondents
WITH
C.A.Nos.3288-3299/2013@SLP(C)Nos.13415-13426/2008,
C.A.Nos.3300-3319/2013@SLP(C)Nos.12263-12282/2008,
C.A.No.3320/2013@SLP(C)No.15648/2008,
C.A.Nos.3321-3323/2013@SLP(C)Nos.5392-5394/2008,
C.A.Nos.3324-3325/2013@SLP(C)Nos.15485-15486/2009,
C.A.Nos.3326-3330/2013@SLP(C)Nos.8592-8596/2009,
C.A.Nos.3331-3333/2013@SLP(C)Nos.34118-34120/2010,
C.A.Nos.3334-3337/2013@SLP(C)Nos.4176-4179/2010,
C.A.Nos.3338-3340/2013@SLP(C)Nos.11156-11158/2009,
C.A.No.3341/2013@SLP(C)No.28895/2008,
C.A.Nos.3342-3344/2013@SLP(C)Nos.14409-14411/2013
(CC 863-865/2011),
C.A.No.3345/2013@SLP(C)No.33257/2010,
C.A.Nos.3346-3347/2013@SLP(C)Nos.11171-11172/2009,
C.A.Nos.3348-3349/2013@SLP(C)Nos.3125-3126/2011,
C.A.Nos.3350-3351/2013@SLP(C)Nos.29721-29722/2009,
C.A.No.3352/2013@SLP(C)No.31281/2009,
C.A. No.8719 of 2010,
C.A.Nos.3353-3433/2013@SLP(C)Nos.18744-18824/2008,
C.A.Nos.3434-3450/2013@SLP(C)Nos.1089-1105/2008,
C.A.Nos.3451-3452/2013@SLP(C)Nos.27923-27924/2008,
C.A.No.3453/2013@SLP(C)No.246/2009,
C.A.Nos.3454-3455/2013@SLP(C)Nos.3367-3368/2010, Page 2
2
C.A.Nos.3456-3458/2013@SLP(C)Nos.9268-9270/2011,
C.A.Nos.3459-3488/2013@SLP(C)Nos.28613-28642/2010,
C.A.Nos.3489-3495/2013@SLP(C)Nos.7233-7239/2011,
C.A.Nos.3496-3516/2013@SLP(C)Nos.35673-35693/2010,
C.A.Nos.3517-3521/2013@SLP(C)Nos.12083-12087/2011,
C.A.Nos.3522-3523/2013@SLP(C)Nos.14389-14390/2011,
C.A.No.3524/2013@SLP(C)No.13613/2011,
C.A.Nos.3525-3532/2013@SLP(C)Nos.674-681/2011
C.A.No.3533/2013@SLP(C)No.33749/2010,
C.A.No.3534/2013@SLP(C)No.3647/2011,
C.A.Nos.3535-3576/2013@SLP(C)Nos.28644-28685/2010,
C.A.No.3577/2013@SLP(C)No.31832/2010,
C.A.Nos.3578-3595/2013@SLP(C)Nos.27706-27723/2010,
C.A.No.3596/2013@SLP(C)No.14425/2011,
C.A.No.3597/2013@SLP(C)No.28686/2010,
C.A.Nos.3598-3602/2013@SLP(C)Nos.31772-31776/2011,
C.A.No.3603/2013@SLP(C)No.1512/2007,
C.A.Nos.3604-3610/2013@SLP(C)Nos.20144-20150/2007,
C.A.No.3611/2013@SLP(C)No.21597/2006,
C.A.No.3612/2013@SLP(C)No.19668/2007,
C.A.No.3613/2013@SLP(C)No.16005/2006,
C.A.No.3614/2013@SLP(C)No.16262/2006,
C.A.No.3615/2013@SLP(C)No.16271/2006,
C.A.No.3616/2013@SLP(C)No.16302/2006,
C.A.No.3617/2013@SLP(C)No.16303/2006,
C.A.No.3618/2013@SLP(C)No.16304/2006,
C.A.No.3619/2013@SLP(C)No.16378/2006,
C.A.No.3620/2013@SLP(C)No.16379/2006,
C.A.No.3621/2013@SLP(C)No.16407/2006,
C.A.No.3622/2013@SLP(C)No.16536/2006,
C.A.No.3623/2013@SLP(C)No.16537/2006,
C.A.No.3624/2013@SLP(C)No.16538/2006,
C.A.No.3625/2013@SLP(C)No.19384/2006,
C.A.No.3626/2013@SLP(C)No.16793/2006,
C.A.No.3627/2013@SLP(C)No.16794/2006,
C.A.No.3628/2013@SLP(C)No.18564/2006,
C.A.No.3629/2013@SLP(C)No.19381/2006,
C.A.No.3630/2013@SLP(C)No.19379/2006,
C.A.No.3631/2013@SLP(C)No.19382/2006, Page 3
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C.A.No.3632/2013@SLP(C)No.19380/2006,
C.A.No.3633/2013@SLP(C)No.19419/2006,
C.A.No.3634/2013@SLP(C)No.19489/2006,
C.A.No.3635/2013@SLP(C)No.19603/2006,
C.A.No.3636/2013@SLP(C)No.21851/2006,
C.A.No.3637/2013@SLP(C)No.21850/2006,
C.A.No.3638/2013@SLP(C)No.20188/2006,
C.A.No.3639/2013@SLP(C)No.5509/2007,
C.A.No.3640/2013@SLP(C)No.6175/2007,
C.A.No.3641/2013@SLP(C)No.8129/2007,
C.A.No.3642/2013@SLP(C)No.7001/2007,
C.A.No.3643/2013@SLP(C)No.5571/2007,
C.A.No.3644/2013@SLP(C)No.5895/2007,
C.A.No.3645/2013@SLP(C)No.5572/2007,
C.A.No.3646/2013@SLP(C)No.6167/2007,
C.A.No.3647/2013@SLP(C)No.7002/2007,
C.A.No.3648/2013@SLP(C)No.11527/2007,
C.A.No.3649/2013@SLP(C)No.29447/2008,
C.A.No.3650/2013@SLP(C)No.18448/2006,
C.A.No.3651/2013@SLP(C)No.18876/2006,
C.A.No.3652/2013@SLP(C)No.18877/2006,
C.A.No.3653/2013@SLP(C)No.19133/2006,
C.A.No.3654/2013@SLP(C)No.19231/2006,
C.A.No.3655/2013@SLP(C)No.5487/2007,
C.A.No.3656/2013@SLP(C)No.18588/2006,
C.A.No.3657/2013@SLP(C)No.7601/2007,
C.A.No.3658/2013@SLP(C)No.21848/2006,
C.A.No.3659/2013@SLP(C)No.21846/2006,
C.A.No.3660/2013@SLP(C)No.3416/2007,
C.A.No.3661/2013@SLP(C)No.3468/2007,
C.A.No.3662/2013@SLP(C)No.2420/2007,
C.A.Nos.3663-3677/2013@SLP(C)Nos.6866-6880/2008,
C.A.No.3678/2013@SLP(C)No.3356/2007,
C.A.No.3679/2013@SLP(C)No.3415/2007,
C.A.No.3680/2013@SLP(C)No.3411/2007,
C.A.No.3681/2013@SLP(C)No.17564/2006,
C.A.No.3682/2013@SLP(C)No.14642/2006,
C.A.No.3683/2013@SLP(C)No.14536/2006,
C.A.No.3684/2013@SLP(C)No.17361/2006, Page 4
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C.A.No.3685/2013@SLP(C)No.6326/2006,
C.A.No.3686/2013@SLP(C)No.7165/2006,
C.A.No.3687/2013@SLP(C)No.7106/2006,
C.A.No.3688/2013@SLP(C)No.14161/2006,
C.A.No.3689/2013@SLP(C)No.9990/2006,
C.A.No.3690/2013@SLP(C)No.18583/2006,
C.A.No.3691/2013@SLP(C)No.16272/2006,
C.A.No.3692/2013@SLP(C)No.17268/2006,
C.A.No.3693/2013@SLP(C)No.12661/2006,
C.A.No.3694/2013@SLP(C)No.16273/2006,
C.A.No.3695/2013@SLP(C)No.3646/2011,
C.A.No.3696/2013@SLP(C)No.3350/2007,
C.A.No.3697/2013@SLP(C)No.6899/2006,
C.A.No.3698/2013@SLP(C)No.7036/2006,
C.A.No.3699/2013@SLP(C)No.7247/2006,
C.A.No.3700/2013@SLP(C)No.19676/2007,
C.A.Nos.3701-3704/2013@SLP(C)Nos.19539-19542/2007,
C.A.No.3705/2013@SLP(C)No.20667/2007,
C.A.Nos.3706-3738/2013@SLP(C)Nos.16372-16404/2008,
C.A.Nos.3844-3852/2013@SLP(C)Nos.14459-14467/2013
(CC 2754),
C.A.No.3740/2013@SLP(C)No.14426/2013 (CC 9752),
C.A.No.3741/2013@SLP(C)No.6332/2007,
C.A.No.3742/2013@SLP(C)No.6335/2007,
C.A.Nos.3743-3762/2013@SLP(C)Nos.1678-1697/2010,
C.A.Nos.3763-3783/2013@SLP(C)Nos.13529-13549/2011,
C.A.Nos.3784-3787/2013@SLP(C)Nos.15508-15511/2011
C.A.No.3788/2013@SLP(C)No.6584/2012 (CC 2620 of
2011),
C.A.Nos.319-352/2011, C.A.Nos.8654-8661/2010,
C.A.Nos.8642-8645/2010, C.A.Nos.423-424/2011,
C.A.No.418/2011, C.A.No.419/2011,
C.A.No.8637/2010, C.A.No.8638/2010, C.A.Nos. 8646-
8653/2010, C.A.Nos.354-411/2011, C.A.Nos. 412-
417/2011,
C.A.Nos.3789-3792/2013@SLP(C)Nos.33337-33340/2010,
C.A.Nos.3793-3800/2013@SLP(C)Nos.26772-26779/2009,
C.A.Nos.3801-3804/2013@SLP(C)Nos.31842-31845/2009,
C.A.Nos.3805-3806/2013@SLP(C)Nos.33637-33638/2011,Page 5
5
C.A.Nos.3388-3389/2011, C.A.No.5206/2011,
C.A.No.5208/2011, C.A.No.5209/2011,
C.A.No.5210/2011, C.A No.5211/2011,
C.A.No.5212/2011, C.A.No.5213/2011,
C.A.No.5214/2011, C.A.No.5207/2011,
C.A.No.5215/2011, C.A.No.5216/2011,
C.A.Nos.7179-7182/2011,
C.A.Nos.3807-3808/2013@SLP(C)Nos.14427-14428/2013
(CC 14220-14221)
C.A.No.3853-3854/2013@SLP(C)No.14468-14469/2013
(CC 14164)
C.A.Nos.3810-3817/2013@SLP(C)Nos.21344-21351/2011,
C.A.Nos.3818-3819/2013@SLP(C)Nos.32764-32765/2011,
C.A.Nos.3820-3821/2013@SLP(C)Nos.32766-32767/2011,
C.A.Nos.3822-3823/2013@SLP(C)Nos.32770-32771/2011,
C.A.Nos.3824-3825/2013@SLP(C)Nos.32772-32773/2011,
C.A.Nos.3826-3827/2013@SLP(C)Nos.32790-32791/2011,
C.A.Nos.3828-3829/2013@SLP(C)Nos.32792-32793/2011,
C.A.Nos.3830-3831/2013@SLP(C)Nos.32796-32797/2011,
C.A.Nos.3832-3833/2013@SLP(C)Nos.32798-32799/2011,
C.A.Nos.3834-3835/2013@SLP(C)Nos.32801-32802/2011,
& C.A.Nos.3836-3837/2013@SLP(C)Nos.32806-
32807/2011.
J U D G M E N T
ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.
1. All these matters involve a common question
relating to claims for enhancement of compensation
in respect of lands acquired under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, hereinafter referred to as
"the 1894 Act", in several States, such as, Punjab,Page 6
6
Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh and the
Union Territory of Chandigarh. In some of the
Special Leave Petitions, leave has already been
granted and they have been listed as Civil Appeals.
Leave is also granted in all other Special Leave
Petitions which are being heard together in this
batch of matters.
2. For the sake of convenience, we have taken up
the batch matters State-wise. The major number of
cases are from the States of Punjab and Haryana
and, accordingly, it was decided to take up the
said matters first. We have, therefore, heard the
matters relating to the State of Haryana before the
other matters and for the said purpose, we have
also selected some specific matters, the decision
wherein would also govern the rest. Since in the
State of Haryana, the lands acquired were from
different districts, such as Faridabad, Ambala,
Fatehabad, Hisar, Sonepat and Kurukshetra and underPage 7
7
different Notifications published under Section 4
of the 1894 Act, we took up the individual cases of
Ashrafi and Others vs. State of Haryana & Ors.
Others, being SLP(C)Nos.24704-24712 of 2007,
relating to the Notification dated 2nd August,
2009, and Sailak Ram (D) Tr. LRs. & Ors. vs. State
of Haryana & Ors., being SLP(C)No.28686 of 2010,
relating to the Notification dated 7th September,
1992, in respect of the lands situated in
Faridabad. In addition, we also took up
SLP(C)No.18588 of 2006 filed by the State of
Haryana against Surinder Kumar and Others, in
respect of the Notification dated 26th May, 1981,
relating to the lands situated within the District
of Ambala. Another matter relating to the District
of Ambala, namely, State of Haryana vs. Manohar Lal
Khurana, being SLP(C)No.11527 of 2007, relating to
the Notification dated 2nd February, 1989, was also
taken up separately. As far as the lands relating
to the District of Hisar are concerned, the SpecialPage 8
8
Leave Petition filed by the State of Haryana
against Partap Singh and Another, being SLP(C)
No.21597 of 2006, relating to the Notification
dated 21st March, 1991, was taken up for separate
hearing as also some of the cases involving lands
in Sonepat, Kurukshetra Districts, in respect of
the Notifications published under Section 4 of the
1894 Act, dated 20th April, 1982 and 17th September,
1993, respectively.
3. Some of the Special Leave Petitions (now
Appeals) have been filed by the State of Haryana,
which is equally aggrieved by the enhancement of
the compensation assessed in reference under
Section 18 of the 1894 Act. As would be evident
shortly, the High Court almost on a uniform basis
awarded compensation at the rate of Rs.235/- per
sq. yard notwithstanding the type of land involved.
Although a distinction had been made between
"chahi" lands, "pahar gair mumkin" lands and "gair
Page 9
9
mumkin" lands while assessing compensation,
ultimately, a uniform rate was awarded in respect
of the different types of lands which had been
acquired. Different reasons have been given by the
High Court in arriving at the uniform figure of
Rs.235/- per sq. yard, but what is important is
that ultimately by applying different methods, the
compensation worked out to be same.
4. In the case of Smt. Ashrafi & Ors., arising out
of RFA No.99 of 1997 decided by the Punjab and
Haryana High Court on 21st May, 2007, along with
several other similar appeals, lands measuring
184.66 acres in village Mewla, Maharajpur, District
Faridabad, were acquired for the development of
Sector 45 in Faridabad. Notification was published
under Section 4 of the 1894 Act on 2nd August,
1989. The Land Acquisition Collector awarded
compensation at the rate of Rs.3,50,000/- per acre
for chahi lands and Rs.1,50,000/- per acre forPage 10
10
other lands. On a reference made by the land
owners to the learned District Judge, Faridabad,
under Section 18 of the 1894 Act, the Reference
Court fixed the compensation at Rs.45/- per sq.
yard against which the parties moved the High Court
in First Appeal.
5. One of the other cases which was taken up
separately was that of Smt. Kamlesh Kumari vs.
State of Haryana & Anr., being SLP(C)No.28613-28642
of 2010, wherein 486.61 acres of land in village
Mewla, Maharajpur, were also acquired.
6. Coming back to the decision in Ashrafi's case,
the High Court fixed the compensation at Rs.220/-
per sq. yard in respect of the lands situated in
village Mewla, Maharajpur, acquired for the purpose
of establishing Sector 45, Faridabad.
7. It was sought to be urged that the compensation
assessed was extremely low in comparison to thePage 11
11
compensation awarded in respect of the lands
acquired in the same area and under the same
Notification under Section 4 of the 1894 Act. It
was urged that the learned Single Judge in the High
Court had wrongly assessed compensation at Rs.220/-
per sq. yard, when in respect of the lands acquired
under the same Notification dated 28th August, 1989,
the learned District Judge had fixed the market
value at Rs.328.50 per sq. yard and also at
Rs.337/- per sq. yard, in respect of the lands
acquired under a Notification issued in July, 1987.
8. In Smt. Kamlesh Kumari's case, it was urged by
Mr. J.L. Gupta, learned Senior Advocate, that while
the Collector had awarded Rs.1,96,000/- per acre in
respect of the acquired lands, the Reference Court
enhanced the same to Rs.325/- per sq. yard, which
would be equivalent to Rs.15,73,000/- per acre.
The High Court, however, reduced the rate from
Rs.325/- per sq. yard to Rs.90/- per sq. yard,Page 12
12
which would be equivalent to approximately
Rs.4,35,000/- per acre. Letters Patent Appeals
filed against the said decision of the learned
Single Judge were dismissed and the matter
ultimately came up to this Court in Civil Appeal
No. 9808 of 2003, and the case was remanded to the
Reference Court for a fresh determination. After
remand, the Reference Court, by its Order dated 12th
January, 2008, assessed the compensation at
Rs.238/- per sq. yard. In appeal, after considering
the decision of a learned Single Judge of the same
Court in Sailak Ram's case, referred to
hereinabove, the learned Judge determined the
compensation at Rs.280/- per sq. yard. In fact, it
was pointed out by Mr. Gupta that in Sailak Ram's
case, different amounts were awarded as
compensation in respect of lands comprised in
village Mewla, Maharajpur, acquired under the
Notification dated 2nd August, 1989. It was
finally held that the market rate for the acquiredPage 13
13
properties would be Rs.280/- per sq. yard, along
with all statutory benefits, as per the provisions
of the 1894 Act.
9. Mr. Gupta urged that even the enhancement made
by the High Court was not adequate in view of the
compensation awarded in other cases, in respect of
the lands comprised in the same village. It was
highlighted that in Pritam Singh's case,
compensation had been awarded at the rate of
Rs.435/- per sq. yard. Even in the case of lands
situated in village Ajronda acquired under
Notification dated 5th June, 1992, for the
development of Sector 20-B, Faridabad, compensation
had been awarded at Rs.392.50 per sq. yard. Mr.
Gupta submitted that, in such circumstances, the
compensation should have been assessed, if not at
the said rate, at least at a figure near about the
said rate. Mr. Gupta submitted that in yet another
case regarding lands acquired from the same villagePage 14
14
by Notification dated 30th July, 1987, for
constructing a link road from Delhi-Mathura road to
Sector 46, Faridabad, compensation awarded was at
the rate of Rs.337.20 per sq. yard.
10. Mr. Gupta lastly referred to the decision of
this Court in State of Haryana vs. Gurbax Singh
(Dead) By LRs. & Anr. [(2008) 11 SCC 65], in which
the decision of this Court in another case, viz.,
Union of India vs. Harinder Pal Singh [(2005) 12
SCC 564] was referred to and quoted. In paragraph
15 thereof, it was indicated that the entire area
was in a stage of development and the different
villages were capable of being developed in the
same manner, as lands situated elsewhere. Mr.
Gupta submitted that in the said decision, an
enhancement of compensation by adding 12% per annum
for a period of two years, was duly accepted by
this Court. It was, therefore, submitted that the
compensation awarded by the High Court was requiredPage 15
15
to be revised in parity with the compensation
awarded in respect of the other lands comprised in
the same village, in line with the observations
made by this Court in Sailak Ram's case and also in
Smt. Kamlesh Kumari's case.
11. One of the other sets of cases, viz., Sucha
Singh & Ors. vs. Collector, Land Acquisition &
Ors., being SLP(C)Nos.1678-1697 of 2010, were taken
up separately, at the instance of Mr. R.K. Kapoor,
learned Advocate, appearing for the AppellantsClaimants. According to Mr. Kapoor, the submissions
made on behalf of the Appellant, Sucha Singh, would
also cover SLP(C)Nos.13529-13549 of 2011, Surjit
Kaur & Ors. vs. Collector, Land Acquisition and
Colonisation & Ors., SLP(C)Nos. 15508-15511 of
2011, Joginder Singh & Ors. vs. Land Acquisition
Collector & Ors., and SLP(C)..CC 2620 of 2011,
Mehar Singh (D) Tr. LRs. & Ors. vs. Collector, Land
Acquisition and Colonisation Department.Page 16
16
12. Mr. Kapoor contended that the Notification
under Section 4 was issued on 10th February, 1984,
for acquisition of 79 acres and 5 kanals of land in
village Talwandi Bhai, District Ferozepur, for the
purpose of construction of a new grain market. In
respect of such acquisition, the Land Acquisition
Collector awarded compensation to the land owners
at the rate of Rs.40,000/- per acre, which was
enhanced by the Reference Court to Rs.4,60,000/- up
to 1 killa and to Rs.4,00,000/- beyond one killa.
On appeal to the High Court, the amounts were
reduced. Special Leave Petitions were, thereafter,
filed against the said Order in this Court. While
issuing notice on 5th January, 2010, confined to the
question of deduction, this Court directed stay of
recovery of the amounts already paid by way of
compensation to the Petitioners therein.
13. Mr. Kapoor contended that having regard to
certain plots which were auctioned by the MunicipalPage 17
17
Committee before acquiring the lands in question,
the average rate in respect of various plots was
Rs.30,000/- per marla and Rs.6,00,000/- per kanal,
which would mean that the value of the land would
be Rs.48,00,000/- per acre. Mr. Kapoor submitted
that, since apart from the above, sale deeds are
also a reliable indicator of the land value in a
particular area, if the market value is not taken
at Rs.48,00,000/- per acre, the value of sale
transactions during the same period could also be
taken into consideration in determining the
compensation. According to Mr. Kapoor, the High
Court took the average value of such transactions
for the period 19th September, 1980 up to 3rd June,
1983. The average sale price was found to be
Rs.6,23,997/- per acre, which would, therefore, be
the market value of the land during the period in
question. An added increase of 12% per annum would
give a figure of Rs.7,82,746/- per acre.
Accordingly, on the date of the Notification underPage 18
18
Section 4 of the 1894 Act, i.e., 10th February,
1984, the market value of the land would be
Rs.7,82,746/- per acre, even if the auction price
of Rs.48,00,000/- per acre is not taken into
consideration. Mr. Kapoor submitted that the lands
in question fell within the Municipal limits of
Talwandi Bhai and no development would be required
since the lands had been acquired for constructing
a new grain market only. Hence, a deduction of 40%
was unjustified in the circumstances. Mr. Kapoor,
therefore, prayed that even if the final figure of
the market value, as determined by the High Court,
i.e., Rs.6,23,997/-, is taken into consideration,
then also by adding 12% per annum to the said
figure, the compensation would amount to
Rs.7,82,746/- per acre.
14. In one of the other matters, Surinder Kumar vs.
State of Haryana, being SLP(C) Nos.16372-16404 of
2008, 250.51 acres of land situated in villagePage 19
19
Patti Mehar, Saunda and Jandli in Ambala District,
covered by Notification dated 26th May, 1981, were
intended to be acquired for development and
utilisation of residential areas for an Urban
Estate in Ambala. Three Awards were made by the
Land Acquisition Collector. When Award No. 4 was
pronounced on 27th June, 1984, the market value of
the acquired lands was assessed at Rs.52,000/- per
acre, thereafter, two further awards were
pronounced wherein some other chahi lands were
assessed at Rs.34,500/- per acre, barani land was
assessed at Rs.27,520/- per acre and banjar and
gair mumkin land was assessed at Rs.13,760/- per
acre. On reference, the Reference Court enhanced
the market value of the acquired lands to
Rs.57,000/- per acre. Subsequently, however,
another Reference Court assessed the market value
of the acquired lands at Rs.3,38,800/- per acre.
Being dissatisfied with the orders of the Reference
Courts, the parties approached the High Court. ThePage 20
20
State of Haryana also filed appeals relating to the
judgment of 6th May, 1992. In the appeals filed by
the claimants, they claimed that the acquired land
was liable to be assessed at Rs.300/- per sq. yard.
The Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High
Court accepted the contention of the land owners
and directed that they would be entitled to the
market rate at Rs.110/- per sq. yard for the
acquired land, together with all statutory
benefits, as per the amended provisions of the Act.
The appeals filed by the State of Haryana were
dismissed.
15. Appearing for the Appellants, Ms. Indu
Malhotra, learned Senior Advocate, submitted that
though the compensation was enhanced by the
Division Bench from Rs.70/- per sq. yard to
Rs.110/- per sq. yard, there was no basis for
fixing the value at the said rate. Ms. Malhotra
urged that the said rate was fixed despite the factPage 21
21
that a Conveyance of the year 1973 i.e. earlier
than the date of acquisition (26.5.1981), had been
produced by the Appellants. Apart from the above,
Sale Deeds of 1981 were also produced which showed
the value of the lands to be Rs.209-213/- per sq.
yard. Ms. Malhotra urged that it would be evident
from the above that the High Court has erred in
fixing the rate of compensation at Rs.110/- per sq.
yard, without any basis whatsoever, when Sale Deeds
of even previous years and years contemporaneous to
the acquisition, indicated a much higher valuation
in respect of the acquired lands. Ms. Malhotra
submitted that the valuation of the acquired lands
was liable to be enhanced in a manner which was
commensurate with the value of the lands, as would
be evident from the various Sale Deeds produced on
behalf of the Appellants.
16. Mr. Manoj Swarup, learned Advocate, appeared in
several of the matters relating to acquisition ofPage 22
22
the lands in Hisar, covered by various
Notifications issued under Section 4 of the 1894
Act. Mr. Swarup, firstly, referred to the case of
Atam Singh & Anr. vs. State of Haryana & Ors.,
being SLP(C)Nos.33337-33340 of 2010, involving
lands measuring 112 kanals and 12 marlas situated
in village Basti Bhiwan, Tehsil Fatehabad, District
Hisar, notified for acquisition for establishing
new fruit, vegetable and fodder market, under
Section 4 of the aforesaid Act. Mr. Swarup also
referred to the case of Sarwan Singh vs. State of
Haryana & Anr., being SLP(C)Nos.20144-20150 of
2007, involving lands measuring 429.75 acres of
land, which is the subject matter of a Notification
dated 21.03.1991, under Section 4 of the above Act
for the development of a part of Sectors 11, 13,
15, 16 and 17, Hisar, Haryana. Reference was also
made to the case of Mukesh Kumar vs. State of
Haryana & Ors., being SLP(C)No.19668 of 2006,
involving lands measuring 227.44 acres in Hisar,Page 23
23
which was the subject matter of Notification dated
20.08.1992, under Section 4 of the above Act for
use as a residential sector by Haryana Urban
Development Authority (HUDA). Mr. Swarup, lastly,
referred to the case of Mukesh vs. State of Haryana
& Anr., being Civil Appeal Nos. 319-352 of 2011,
involving lands measuring 157.20 acres situated in
Fatehabad, District Hisar, under Notification dated
21.07.1993, also for residential and commercial
purposes in Sector 3, Fatehabad.
17. In Atam Singh's case, Mr. Swarup, pointed out
that the lands had been notified on 15.10.1987 for
establishing a new fruit, vegetable and fodder
market and that initially compensation was awarded
at the rate of Rs.54.75 per sq. yard. Mr. Swarup
pointed out that the land acquired in 1987 is
adjacent to the land acquired subsequently in 1993.
It was urged that the Reference Court had in its
judgment found the potentiality of the suit land toPage 24
24
be high having regard to the various developments,
which had occurred in the said area and also for
future development relating to a proposal for a
truck union and auto market. Certain
contemporaneous private sales, for the purpose of
comparison, had been filed, which were accepted by
the High Court, which had been held to be genuine,
from which it would appear that there has been a
steady increase in the valuation of the lands and
the chart indicates that the price of land in the
year 1989 was about Rs.200/- per sq. yard. The
chart also demonstrates that two years later, the
prices had doubled to about Rs.400/- per sq. yard.
Taking the same to be a yardstick, Mr. Swarup
submitted that the value of the land acquired in
1987 should be taken as the comparative unit and
that the value of the land acquired in 1987 should,
therefore, be assessed at Rs.100/- per sq. yard.Page 25
25
18. Mr. Swarup pointed out that the decision in
Atam Singh's case was thereafter followed by the
High Court in the case of Sarwan Singh & Anr.,
being SLP(C)Nos.20144-20150 of 2007. As indicated
hereinbefore, the said matter involved acquisition
of 429.75 acres of lands similar to the lands
acquired in Atam Singh's case. However, for the
purpose of assessing the value of the land, the
methodology followed was to add 12% annually
towards the value of the lands for a period of six
years, which is also one of the methods for
arriving at a valuation taking a base year and,
thereafter, computing the annual increase of the
value at the accepted rate of 12% per annum.
19. The question which was raised was whether the
same should be on the basis of a flat rate annually
or by adding to the value at the rate of 12% per
annum at a flat rate from the date of notification
till the award. In these matters, a connectedPage 26
26
question arose as to whether instead of flat rate
the interest should be added cumulatively, which,
according to Mr. Swarup, had been considered and
decided in the affirmative by this Court in General
Manager, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited
vs. Rameshbhai Jivanbhai Patel & Anr. [(2008) 14
SCC 745]. Mr. Swarup, therefore, urged that the
compensation assessed at Rs.235/- per sq. yard on
the basis of an annual increase of 12% was
inadequate and the yearly escalation is required to
be calculated on a cumulative basis.
20. In the case filed by Mukesh Kumar, being
SLP(C)No.19668 of 2007, relating to acquisition of
227.44 acres under Notification dated 20.08.1992,
Mr. Swarup pointed out that the decision had been
arrived at on the reasoning in Sarwan Singh's case
(supra) and Atam Singh's case, referred to
hereinabove. Mr. Swarup urged that in Sarwan
Singh's case, the High Court considered thePage 27
27
location of the acquired lands and upon observing
that they were situated next to prominent
localities to the north of the acquired lands, it
had no hesitation in arriving at the conclusion
that the entire acquired land fell within the
municipal limits of the District of Hisar with
substantial potential for its development for
residential and commercial purposes. Even the
Division Bench in appeal, while rejecting the
submissions made on behalf of the State, observed
that having regard to the nature of the development
of the surrounding areas, it would be improper to
resort to the belting system and to award one set
of compensation for the entire land.
21. Mr. Swarup then urged that in the case of Udho
Dass Vs. State of Haryana & Ors. [(2010) 12 SCC
51], this Court had the occasion to observe that
although, in the 1894 Act provision has been made
for the payment of solatium, interest and anPage 28
28
additional amount, the same had not kept pace with
the astronomical rise in land prices in many parts
of India, and most certainly in North India, and
the compensation awarded could not fully compensate
for the acquisition of the land. This Court
further observed that the 12% per annum increase
which had often been found to be adequate in
matters relating to compensation, hardly did
justice to those land owners whose lands had been
taken away and the increase was even at times up to
100% a year for land which had the potential of
being urbanised and commercialised, such as in the
present case.
22. Mr. Swarup pointed out that similar
observations had been made by this Court in General
Manager, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. Vs.
Rameshbhai Jivanbhai Patel [(2008) 14 SCC 745],
wherein similar views were expressed in a similar
vein as in the earlier case that primarily thePage 29
29
increase in land prices depends on four factors :
(i) situation of the land, (ii) nature of
development in surrounding area, (iii) availability
of land for development in the area, and (iv) the
demand for land in the area. It was observed that
in rural areas, unless there was any prospect of
development in the vicinity, increase in prices
would be slow, steady and gradual. On the other
hand, in urban or semi-urban areas, where the
development is faster and the demand for land is
high and where there is construction activity all
around, the escalation in market price is at a
much higher rate, as compared to rural areas and in
some pockets in big cities, due to rapid
development and high demand for land, the
escalation in prices have touched even 30% to 50%
or more per year during the nineties.
23. In the light of his aforesaid submissions, Mr.
Swarup submitted that although, the High Court hadPage 30
30
allowed yearly increase of 12%, taking 1983 as the
base year, such increase was not commensurate with
the yearly escalation of prices and the same was
required to be calculated on a cumulative basis, as
indicated in Rameshbhai Jivanbhai Patel's case
(supra).
24. In regard to the 157.20 acres of land situated
in Fatehabad, District Hisar, Haryana, acquired for
utilisation and development of residential and
commercial purposes in Sector-3, Fatehabad, by the
Haryana Urban Development Authority (HUDA), the
Collector had awarded compensation at a uniform
rate of Rs.1,81,200/- per acre along with statutory
benefits. As against the claim of the land owners
that the market value was Rs.1000/- per square
yard, the Reference Court determined the
compensation at the uniform rate of Rs.206/- per
square yard. The High Court modified the said
award and awarded compensation at the rate ofPage 31
31
Rs.260/- per square yard for the land acquired up
to the depth of 100 meters abutting National High
Way No.10. The value of the rest of the acquired
land was maintained at Rs.206/- per square yard.
Mr. Swarup submitted that having regard to the sale
instances for the years 1989 and 1991, wherein the
prices had doubled, by the same equation the price
of the land in 1993 should have been Rs.800/- per
square yard. Urging that the High Court had erred
in imposing a cut of 50% on the value, it was
submitted that no cut was required to be imposed
since the lands forming the subject matter of the
sale instances formed part of the acquired land and
was comprised in identically situated lands to the
rest of the acquired land. Mr. Swarup submitted
that at best the standard cut of 1/3rd would have
been sufficient to balance the smallness of the
exhibits and, in any event, the belting system
resorted to by the High Court was erroneous in the
light of the observations made by the High CourtPage 32
32
itself in Udho Dass and Rameshbhai Jivanbhai Patel
(supra).
25. In regard to the lands forming the subject
matter of C.A.Nos.3381-89 of 2011 and other
connected matters (Smt. Jamna Bai & Ors. Vs. State
of Haryana), Mr. Anoop G. Choudhary, learned Senior
Advocate, appearing for the Appellants, submitted
that the price of the plots to be sold by auction
by the municipality required an average of four
sale transactions to be taken as a sale indice
price of the lands in question. Mr. Choudhary
urged that out of the four sale transactions taken
into consideration the High Court erroneously chose
the value of Rs.200/- per square yard, which ought
not to have been taken for the purpose of
determining the value of the lands acquired.
26. Mr. S.B. Upadhyay, learned Senior Advocate, who
appeared for the Petitioners in four of the matters
relating to the lands in question, submitted thatPage 33
33
if all the valuation available were taken together
and an average was drawn, the valuation of the land
would come to Rs.4572/- per square yard.
Furthermore, deduction of 40% from the market value
towards development charges was excessive and where
the acquired land falls in the midst of already
developed land, the reasonable deduction would be
not more than 1/3rd of the assessed value of the
land.
27. In this regard, reference was firstly made to
the decision of this Court in Charan Dass Vs.
Himachal Pradesh Housing and Urban Development
Authority [(2010) 13 SCC 398], wherein quoting from
the decision of this Court in Triveni Devi's case,
this Court had observed that it had to be noted
that in the Building Regulations, setting apart
lands for development of roads, drainage and other
amenities like electricity, etc., are condition
precedent for approval of a layout for buildingPage 34
34
colonies. Therefore, any deduction made should be
based upon the situation of the land and the need
for development. Where acquired land is in the
midst of already developed land with amenities of
roads, drainage, electricity, etc. then deduction
of 1/3rd would not be justified. Reference was
also made to the decision of this Court in Haridwar
Development Authority Vs. Raghubir Singh & Ors.
[(2010) 11 SCC 581], wherein also, taking into
consideration the various stages of development,
this Court observed that appropriate deduction
towards development costs could vary between 20% to
75% depending upon various factors, but that in the
said case the deduction of 25% towards development
cost was appropriate. Mr. Upadhyay also referred
to the decision of this Court in Kasturi & Ors. Vs.
State of Haryana [(2003) 1 SCC 354], wherein also,
as against the normal cut of 1/3rd from the amount
of compensation, it was held that a cut of 20%
towards development charges was justified.Page 35
35
28. Appearing for the State of Haryana in
SLP(C)Nos.32764-32765 of 2011, Ms. Anubha Agarwal,
learned Advocate, submitted that the disparity in
the sale price of the different sale transactions
was mainly on account of the different areas where
the said lands were located. Furthermore, the sale
transactions relied upon by the Petitioners/
Appellants related to only plots measuring about 60
square yards or so. On account of the above, the
sale price of such transactions could not be taken
to be an accurate assessment of the valuation of
the lands which were acquired in bulk. What was
also important was the level of development of the
lands acquired. According to Ms. Agarwal, most of
the lands forming the subject matter of the
acquisition proceedings under different
Notifications published under Section 4 of the 1894
Act, at different points of time, were agricultural
in nature and comprised the interior portion of
lands acquired which were not developed at all.Page 36
36
The valuation of the said lands could not, in any
way, be compared with the lands which were closer
to the main roads and the developed zones and as
such the High Court had wrongly relied upon the
same in assessing the value of the extent of
compensation for the lands forming the subject
matter of the present proceedings.
29. Referring to the decision of the Reference
Court, Ms. Agarwal pointed out that development
work and/or construction had taken place alongside
the roads, such as the National Highway, Tosham
Road and Bhiwani Road and it was more or less
established that the development in the acquired
land was along the roads only and the entire
acquired land was not a developed block. Even
alongside the roads the development was not
symmetrical or systematic, but at the same time, it
also had to be recognised that the acquired land
had potential for being developed for residential,Page 37
37
commercial and/or industrial purposes as on the
date of the Notification.
30. Referring to the decision of this Court in Subh
Ram & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana & Ors. [(2010) 1
SCC 444], Ms. Agarwal pointed out that the factors
determining percentage of deduction had nothing to
do with the purpose for which the land was
acquired, nor could the purpose of acquisition be
used to increase the compensation awardable with
reference to expected profits from future user. In
the said judgment it was pointed out that Section
24 of the 1984 Act prohibits Courts from taking
into consideration any increase in value of land
acquired, or likely to accrue from use to which it
is put when required. Ms. Agarwal submitted that
it had also been indicated in the judgment that
deduction of "development cost" is a concept used
to derive the "wholesale price" of a large
undeveloped plot. The difference between the valuePage 38
38
of a small developed plot and the value of a large
undeveloped land is the "development cost".
Reference was also made to the decision in Kanta
Devi & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana & Anr. [(2008) 15
SCC 201], where it had been held that to determine
the market value for purposes of compensation,
deduction of development charges was normally 1/3rd
of the market value which also required the nature
of land to be acquired to be taken into
consideration. In the said case, relying upon the
sale price of a small plot, the High Court had
fixed the market value of the acquired land, but
deducted 70% therefrom towards development charges
to make the land suitable for the purpose for which
the land had been acquired. This Court held that
since the land was adjacent to the village Abadi
which was already developed, the deduction at the
rate of 70% was on the high side and a deduction of
60% of the market value would be reasonable.
Various other decisions were also cited on the samePage 39
39
lines and referring to the same would only amount
to repetition.
31. Ms. Agarwal submitted that the deduction
towards development cost depended mainly on the
area in which the land was located and their
potentiality for development and in the instant
case, the deduction of 40%, as suggested, was quite
apposite and did not require any interference.
32. Mr. R.S. Badharan, learned Advocate for HUDA,
in Civil Appeal Nos.3388-89 of 2011, urged that the
lands in question could not be compared with the
lands under consideration in a review. While
referring to other decisions, Mr. Badharan also
referred to the decision of this Court in Kasturi &
Ors. Vs. State of Haryana [(2003) 1 SCC 354],
wherein a question had arisen as to whether the
deduction of development charges at the rate of 70%
in regard to the acquired lands was justified or
not. Ultimately, after taking the various factorsPage 40
40
into consideration, the said Court agreed that a
cut of 20% towards the development charges, which
was lower than the normal 1/3rd, was understandable
and could be justified. However, the same
principle as has been relied upon in all the abovementioned decisions, has also been dealt with in
Kasturi's case (supra) and Courts have relied
basically on the normal deduction of 1/3rd of the
value.
33. Responding to the submissions made on behalf of
the respective parties, the learned Additional
Solicitor General, Mr. A.S. Chandhiok, referred to
the decision of this Court in Saibanna (Dead) by
Lrs. Vs. Assistant Commissioner and Land
Acquisition Officer [(2009) 9 SCC 409], wherein the
same question, as was considered earlier, once
again fell for examination. Relying on the earlier
judgments of this Court, the learned Judges
reiterated the factors which led to higher rates ofPage 41
41
deduction in respect of lands within the municipal
limits of a city. Their Lordships held that the
deduction of 53% as imposed was on the higher side
and should not have been more than 1/3rd. Their
Lordships observed that though no hard and fast or
rigid rule can be laid down, and each case had to
be decided on its individual facts, in the case
before Their Lordships the deduction of 331/3 per
cent towards development charges, was justifiable.
Mr. Chandhiok urged that the quantum of
compensation, as decided by the High Court in the
various cases under consideration, was based on the
above-mentioned principles and did not warrant the
interference of this Court.
34. As indicated hereinbefore, a common question is
involved in all these matters in respect of the
lands acquired in the States of Punjab, Haryana,
Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh and the Union
Territory of Chandigarh. Since the acquired landsPage 42
42
are situated in different areas even within the
different States, different quantums of
compensation have been awarded for the lands so
acquired. The general principles which have been
followed in assessing the compensation payable in
all these matters are the location of the lands
sought to be acquired, their potential for
development, their proximity to areas which are
already developed and the exorbitant rise in the
value of the lands over the years. In some of the
cases, the authorities have taken recourse to the
comparison method in regard to sale transactions
effected in respect of similar plots of land in the
area under notifications close to the date of
notification by which the lands of the Appellants
were acquired. The Courts have also taken recourse
to assessing the value of the lands for the
purposes of compensation on a uniform rate in
respect of the lands acquired, making a special
concession in respect of the lands which are closePage 43
43
to the roads and National Highways where a certain
amount of development had already taken place.
35. Having resorted to the aforesaid methods, the
Collectors of the different areas arrived at
different valuations in respect of the lands
situated within their respective jurisdictions. In
most of the cases, the High Court almost on a
uniform basis awarded compensation at the rate of
Rs.235/- per sq. yard on a flat rate
notwithstanding the type of land involved. In Smt.
Ashrafi's case arising out of RFA No.99 of 1997
decided by the Punjab & Haryana High Court on 21st
May, 2007, along with several other similar
appeals, the Land Acquisition Collector awarded
compensation at the rate of Rs.3,50,000/- per acre
for "chahi" lands and Rs.1,50,000/- per acre for
other lands. The Reference Court fixed the
compensation at Rs.45/- per sq. yard as against the
rate of compensation awarded by the LandPage 44
44
Acquisition Collector. In respect of similar
lands, the High Court fixed the compensation at
Rs.220/- per sq. yard in respect of the lands
situated in village Mewla and Maharajpur for
establishing Sector 34, Faridabad. It has been
agitated on behalf of the Appellants that the said
assessment of compensation fixed by the High Court
was on the lower side in view of the fact that in
respect of lands acquired under the same
Notification dated 20th August, 1989, the District
Court had fixed the market value at Rs.328.50 per
sq. yard and also at Rs.337/- per sq. yard, in
respect of the lands acquired under a Notification
issued in July, 1987. In Smt. Kamlesh Kumari's
case, in which the facts were the same, as that in
Smt. Ashrafi's case, the Collector had awarded
Rs.1,96,000/- per acre in respect of the acquired
lands which figure had been enhanced by the
Reference Court to Rs.325/- per sq. yard, which
would be equivalent to Rs.15,73,000/- per acre.Page 45
45
The High Court reduced the rate from Rs.325/- per
sq. yard to Rs.90/- per sq. yard, but ultimately
the compensation was assessed at Rs.238/- per sq.
yard. In appeal, the said amount was increased to
Rs.280/- per sq. yard.
36. Even the aforesaid enhancement does not appear
to have reflected the proper valuation of the lands
acquired since soon, thereafter, in Pritam Singh's
case (supra), compensation was awarded at Rs.435/-
per sq. yard and also at the rate of Rs.392.50 per
sq. yard in respect of the lands acquired under
Notification dated 5th June, 1992, in village
Ajronda.
37. In our view, the enhancement of the
compensation from Rs.280/- per sq. yard to Rs.435/-
per sq. yard and Rs.392.50 per sq. yard was
probably occasioned by the fact that while the
lands were acquired under the Notification issued
in July, 1987, the comparative rate relating to thePage 46
46
same property was Rs.392.50 per sq. yard. In view
of the passage of time between the different
acquisitions, in our view, a just compensation
would be at the rate of Rs.325/- per sq. yard
instead of Rs.280/- per sq. yard. Similar is the
case of Smt. Kamlesh Kumari, where the facts were
similar to those in Ashrafi's case. In Smt.
Kamlesh Kumari's case, initially the amount of
compensation assessed by the Reference Court at the
rate of Rs.325/- per sq. yard was reduced to
Rs.90/- per sq. yard by the High Court and,
ultimately, the amount of compensation was
increased to Rs.280/- per sq. yard, in appeal. In
our view, the just compensation in the lands in
Smt. Kamlesh Kumari's case also deserves to be
increased to Rs.325/- per sq. yard, which had been
the amount awarded by the Reference Court.
38. In Sailak Ram's case, different amounts were
assessed as compensation in respect of the landsPage 47
47
comprised in village Mewla, Maharajpur, acquired
under the Notification dated 2nd August, 1989.
There too the market rate was assessed at Rs.280/-
per sq. yard along with all statutory benefits
under the 1894 Act. In our view, the compensation
in respect of the lands involved has also to be
assessed at Rs.325/- per sq. yard.
39. In Sucha Singh's case, Mr. Kapoor had submitted
that the Land Acquisition Collector had awarded the
compensation at the rate of Rs.40,000/- per acre,
which was enhanced by the Reference Court to
Rs.4,60,000/- up to one killa and to Rs.4,00,000/-
beyond one killa. On appeal to the High Court, the
amounts were reduced to Rs.3,74,400/- per acre up
to one acre and Rs.2,24,640/- per acre beyond one
acre. According to Mr. Kapoor, while the average
sale price had been found to be Rs.6,23,997/- per
acre, together with increase of 12% per annum, the
figure would amount to Rs.7,82,746/- per acre.Page 48
48
However, although the land belonging to Mr.
Kapoor's clients fell within the municipal limits
of Talwandi Bhai, a deduction of 40% was
unjustified. On the other hand, a cut of 331/3 per
cent would be more realistic. Accordingly, the
compensation for the said lands, after taking into
consideration the deduction of 331/3 per cent is
assessed at Rs.7,25,000/- per acre.
40. As far as the lands within the District of
Ambala are concerned, in respect of one set of
lands, the Reference Court assessed the market
value of the acquired lands to be Rs.57,000/- per
acre. However, another Reference Court assessed
the market value of the acquired lands at
Rs.3,38,800/- per acre. In our view, the claim of
the land owners, assessed at Rs.300/- per sq. yard
is on the high side but Rs.110/- per sq. yard, as
had been held by the Division Bench of the Punjab
and Haryana High Court, is on the low side. On aPage 49
49
comparison of the price of lands sold during 1981,
or by adding 12% per annum on Rs.70/- per sq. yard
on annual compounded basis, the value of the lands
is assessed at Rs.180/- per sq. yard on a uniform
basis for all lands, as also submitted by Ms.
Malhotra.
41. In the lands covered in Atam Singh's case, the
Collector had initially assessed the compensation
at the rate of Rs.54.75 per sq. yard. Having
regard to Mr. Manoj Swarup's submissions that the
lands acquired in 1987 were adjacent to the lands
acquired subsequently in 1993, the value of the
lands in 1989 would be about Rs.200/- per sq. yard,
the prices had, in fact, doubled to about Rs.400/-
per sq. yard within the next two years. Mr.
Swarup's submission that by such standards, the
value of the lands acquired in 1987 should be
Rs.100/- per sq. yard, is, in our view,
justifiable. Page 50
50
42. In Mukesh Kumar's case (Supra), Mr. Manoj
Swarup had pointed out that having regard to the
potentiality of the acquired lands, the belting
system should not have been resorted to. We are
inclined to accept Mr. Swarup's contention on this
score. We are also inclined to accept Mr. Swarup's
other submissions that, although, the High Court
had allowed a yearly increase of 12%, taking 1983
as a base-year, such increase was not commensurate
with the yearly escalation of prices and that was
required to be calculated on a cumulative basis, as
was held in Rameshbhai Jivanbhai Patel's case
(supra). Accordingly, in Mukesh Kumar's case and
the other cases heard along with the said case, we
are of the view that while adding 12% annual
increase to the value of the lands acquired, the
same should be done on a cumulative basis. In
Mukesh Kumar's case, the compensation awarded was
at the rate of Rs.235/- per sq. yard along with all
statutory benefits, as provided under Sections
Page 51
51
23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 of the Land Acquisition Act.
Having discarded the belting system which has been
resorted to, we are of the view that the
compensation as awarded at the rate of Rs.235/- per
sq. yard, has to be reassessed by applying the
cumulative rate of increase at the rate of 12% per
annum with the base year being the date of the
Notification under Section 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act, together with the statutory
benefits, as indicated hereinabove. The stand
taken on behalf of the State of Haryana, regarding
the amount of escalation fixed at 12% being
improper, does not appeal to us having regard to
the potentiality of the lands acquired and the
sharp increase in the value of the lands in recent
times. The valuation of the compensation of the
acquired land at the rate of Rs.235/- per sq. yard
by the High Court, appears to have been influenced
by the compensation already assessed in Atam
Prakash's case, where the market value of the land
Page 52
52
acquired in Sectors 9 and 11 was assessed at
Rs.235/- per sq. yard. According to Mr. Swarup,
the said lands were far away from the lands
involved in the present set of cases and,
accordingly, the rate of compensation for the lands
under consideration should be definitely higher
than awarded in respect of the lands covered in
Atam Prakash's case. Accordingly, we re-assess the
compensation assessed in respect of the lands
covered by these cases by applying the cumulative
rate of interest, taking the date of Notification
under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act as the
base year for such calculation at Rs.325/- per sq.
yard. The said valuation will also be applicable
in Mahabir & Anr. vs. State of Haryana & Anr.
[SLP(C)No.1512 of 2007], Sarwan Singh & Anr. vs.
State of Haryana & Anr. [SLP(C)Nos.20144-20150 of
2007] and State of Haryana & Anr. vs. Partap Singh
& Anr. [SLP(C)No.21597 of 2006]. As far as the
lands in village Patti Mehar, Saunda and Jandli inPage 53
53
Ambala District and forming the subject matter in
Surinder Kumar's case [SLP(C)Nos.16372-16404 of
2008], in Manohar Lal Khurana's case and in other
cases falling in the same category are concerned,
the compensation will be at the above rate on a
uniform basis.
43. There is yet another set of lands forming the
subject matter of the appeals arising out of
Special Leave Petition (C) Nos.33637-33638 of 2011,
filed by Manohar Singh and others, which are
situated in Hansi, District Hisar. The said lands
also form the subject matter of several other
Special Leave Petitions, which will be covered by
the decision in the above-mentioned Special Leave
Petitions (now appeals). In the said cases, the
High Court had assessed the compensation payable
for the acquired lands at the rate of Rs.805/- per
sq. yard along with the statutory sums available
under Section 23(1A) of the Land Acquisition Act
Page 54
54
and solatium on the market value under Section
23(2) thereof. It was also indicated that the land
owners would also be entitled to interest as
provided under Section 28 of the Act. 
44. While deciding the valuation of the lands, the
High Court applied a cut of 60% and also took into
consideration that the lands in question were small
plots, the value whereof was definitely higher than
the lands which had been acquired which were much
larger in area.
45. In our view, the High Court was justified in
taking into consideration the size of the plots,
which were exhibited for the purposes of comparison
with the size of the plots acquired, but we are
unable to uphold the cut of 60%, which has been
imposed by the High Court, since the acquired lands
are already within developed municipal limits. In
these cases also, a cut of one-third the value
would be appropriate as in the other cases.Page 55
55
Accordingly, we modify the valuation arrived at by
the High Court upon imposing a cut of 60% and
direct that the amount of compensation be reassessed upon imposing a cut of 331/3 per cent while
re-assessing the value of the land.
46. This brings us to the last part of the
submissions made with regard to the amount of
deduction effected in respect of the various
properties.
The general cut imposed is at a flat
rate of 40%, which, in our view, is not warranted
on account of the fact that the lands in question
have lost their character and potentiality as
agricultural lands and have more or less been
converted into lands which were ready for use for
the purpose of construction. Taking Ms. Agarwal's
submissions regarding the factors which determine
deduction towards development cost, such as
location and potentiality, into account, we are of
the view that a deduction of 331/3 per cent would be
Page 56
56
reasonable on account of the passage of time and
the all round development in the area which has
made it impossible for the lands to retain their
original character. 
47. Accordingly, we direct that except where we
have provided otherwise, wherever a deduction of
40% had been made, the same should be altered to
331/3 per cent and the compensation awarded is to be
modified accordingly.
48. In regard to the 157.20 acres of land situated
in Fatehabad, District Hisar, Haryana, acquired for
utilisation and development of residential and
commercial purposes in Sector-3, Fatehabad, the
compensation in respect thereof has been questioned
in Civil Appeal Nos. 319-352 of 2011 by one Mukesh
and a number of appeals have been tagged with the
said matter, including the one filed by the Haryana
Urban Development Authority, being SLP(C) Nos.
26772-26779 of 2009 (now appeals). As indicated
Page 57
57
hereinbefore, in paragraph 24,
the Collector had
awarded compensation at a uniform rate of Rs.
1,81,200/- per acre along with statutory benefits.
The Reference Court determined the compensation at
the uniform rate of Rs. 206/- per sq. yard. The
High Court modified the said award and awarded
compensation at the rate of Rs. 260/- per sq. yard
for the land acquired up to the depth of 100 meters
abutting National Highway No. 10. The value of the
rest of the acquired land was maintained at Rs.
206/- per sq. yard. The area in question being
already developed to some extent, a cut of 50% on
the value is, in our view, excessive. 
We agree
with Mr. Swarup that resorting to the belting
system by the High Court was improper and that at
best a standard cut of 1/3rd would have been
sufficient to balance the smallness of the exhibits
produced. It has been pointed out by Mr. Swarup
that on a comparative basis, the price of lands in
the area in 1991 was on an average of about Rs.
Page 58
58
420/- per sq. yard. Given the sharp rise in land
prices, the value, according to Mr. Swarup, would
have doubled to about Rs. 800/- per sq. yard by
1993. Even if we have to apply the formula of 12%
increase, the valuation of the lands in question in
1993 would be approximately Rs. 527/- per sq.
yard. Imposing a deduction of 1/3rd, valuation
comes to about Rs. 350/- per sq. yard, which, in
our view, would be the proper compensation for the
lands covered in the case of Mukesh (supra) and
other connected matters. 
49. This disposes of all the various matters which
were heard along with lead matters, a table of
which has been supplied by Mr. Swarup. 
50. The decision rendered in the appeals arising
out of SLP(C)Nos.24704-24712 of 2007 (Ashrafi &
Ors. vs. State of Haryana & Ors.) will govern
SLP(C)Nos.13415-13426 of 2008, SLP(C)Nos.12263-
12282 of 2008, SLP(C)No.15648 of 2008, SLP(C)Nos.Page 59
59
5392-5394 of 2008, SLP(C)Nos. 15485-15486 of 2009,
SLP(C)Nos.8592-8596 of 2009, SLP(C)Nos.34118-34120
of 2010, SLP(C)Nos.4176-4179 of 2010, SLP(C)Nos.
11156-11158 of 2009, SLP(C)No. 28895 of 2008,
SLP(C)....CC 863-865 of 2011, SLP(C)No.33257 of
2010, SLP(C)Nos.11171-11172 of 2009, SLP(C)Nos.
3125-3126 of 2011, SLP(C)Nos.29721-29722 of 2009,
SLP(C)No.31281 of 2009, C.A. No.8719 of 2010,
SLP(C)Nos.18744-18824 of 2008, SLP(C)Nos. 1089-1105
of 2008, SLP(C)Nos.27923-27924 of 2008, SLP(C)No.
246 of 2009, SLP(C)Nos.3367-3368 of 2010 and SLP(C)
Nos.9268-9270 of 2011. The decision rendered in
appeals arising out of SLP(C)Nos.28613-28642 of
2010 (Kamlesh Kumari Etc. Etc. vs. State of Haryana
and Anr.) and SLP(C)No.28686 of 2010 (Sailak Ram
Vs. State of Haryana) will govern the appeals
arising out of SLP(C)Nos.7233-7239 of 2011,
SLP(C)Nos.35673-35693 of 2010, SLP(C)Nos.12083-
12087 of 2011, SLP(C)Nos. 14389-14390 of 2011,
SLP(C)No.13613 of 2011, SLP(C)Nos.674-681 of 2011,Page 60
60
SLP(C)No.33749 of 2010, SLP(C)No.3647 of 2011,
SLP(C)Nos.28644-28685 of 2010, SLP(C)No.31832 of
2010, SLP(C)Nos.27706-27723 of 2010, SLP(C)No.14425
of 2011 and SLP(C)Nos. 31772-31776 of 2011. The
decision rendered in the appeal arising out of
SLP(C)No.19668 of 2007 (Mukesh Kumar Vs. State of
Haryana) will govern the appeals arising out of
SLP(C)No.16005 of 2006, SLP(C)No.16262 of 2006,
SLP(C)No.16271 of 2006, SLP(C)No.16302 of 2006,
SLP(C)No.16303 of 2006, SLP(C)No.16304 of 2006,
SLP(C)No.16378 of 2006, SLP(C)No.16379 of 2006,
SLP(C)No.16407 of 2006, SLP(C)No.16536 of 2006,
SLP(C)No.16537 of 2006, SLP(C)No.16538 of 2006,
SLP(C)No.19384 of 2006, SLP(C)No.16793 of 2006,
SLP(C)No.16794 of 2006, SLP(C)No.18564 of 2006,
SLP(C)No.19381 of 2006, SLP(C)No.19379 of 2006,
SLP(C)No.19382 of 2006, SLP(C)No.19380 of 2006,
SLP(C)No.19419 of 2006, SLP(C)No.19489 of 2006,
SLP(C)No.19603 of 2006, SLP(C)No.21851 of 2006,
SLP(C)No.21850 of 2006, SLP(C)No.20188 of 2006,Page 61
61
SLP(C)No.5509 of 2007, SLP(C)No.6175 of 2007,
SLP(C)No.8129 of 2007, SLP(C)No.7001 of 2007,
SLP(C)No.5571 of 2007, SLP(C)No.5895 of 2007,
SLP(C)No.5572 of 2007, SLP(C)No.6167 of 2007,
SLP(C)No.7002 of 2007, SLP(C)No.11527 of 2007,
SLP(C)No.29447 of 2008, SLP(C)No.18448 of 2006,
SLP(C)No.18876 of 2006, SLP(C)No.18877 of 2006,
SLP(C)No.19133 of 2006, SLP(C)No.19231 of 2006,
SLP(C)No.5487 of 2007, SLP(C)No.18588 of 2006,
SLP(C)No.7601 of 2007, SLP(C)No.21848 of 2006,
SLP(C)No.21846 of 2006, SLP(C)No.3416 of 2007,
SLP(C)No.3468 of 2007, SLP(C)No.2420 of 2007,
SLP(C)Nos.6866-6880 of 2008, SLP(C)No.3356 of 2007,
SLP(C)No.3415 of 2007, SLP(C)No.3411 of 2007,
SLP(C)No.17564 of 2006, SLP(C)No.14642 of 2006,
SLP(C)No.14536 of 2006, SLP(C)No.17361 of 2006,
SLP(C)No.6326 of 2006, SLP(C)No.7165 of 2006,
SLP(C)No.7106 of 2006, SLP(C)No.14161 of 2006,
SLP(C)No.9990 of 2006, SLP(C)No.18583 of 2006,
SLP(C)No.16272 of 2006, SLP(C)No.17268 of 2006,Page 62
62
SLP(C)No.12661 of 2006, SLP(C)No.16273 of 2006,
SLP(C)No.3646 of 2011, SLP(C)No.3350 of 2007,
SLP(C)No.6899 of 2006, SLP(C)No.7036 of 2006,
SLP(C)No.7247 of 2006, SLP(C)No.19676 of 2007,
SLP(C)Nos.19539-19542 of 2007, SLP(C)No.20667 of
2007, SLP(C)Nos.16372-16404 of 2008, SLP(C)No......
(CC 2754 of 2007), SLP(C)No...... (CC 9752 of
2007), SLP(C)No.6332 of 2007 and SLP(C)No.6335 of
2007. The decision rendered in the appeals
arising out of SLP(C)Nos.1678-1697 of 2010 (Sucha
Singh Vs. Collector) will govern the appeals
arising out of SLP(C)Nos.13529-13549 of 2011,
SLP(C)Nos.15508-15511 of 2011 and SLP(C).......(CC
2620 of 2011). The decision rendered in
C.A.Nos.319-352 of 2011 (Mukesh etc. etc. Vs. State
of Haryana and Another) will govern C.A.Nos.8654-
8661 of 2010, C.A.Nos.8642-8645 of 2010,
C.A.Nos.423-424 of 2011, C.A.No.418 of 2011,
C.A.No.419 of 2011, C.A.No.8637 of 2010,
C.A.No.8638 of 2010, C.A.Nos.8646-8653 of 2010,Page 63
63
C.A.Nos.354-411 of 2011, C.A.Nos.412-417 of 2011,
SLP(C)Nos. 26772-26779 of 2009 and SLP(C)Nos.31842-
31845 of 2009. The decision rendered in the
appeals arising out of SLP(C)Nos.33637-33638 of
2011 (Manohar Singh vs. State of Haryana & Anr.)
will govern Civil Appeal Nos.3388-3389 of 2011,
C.A.No.5206 of 2011, C.A.No.5208 of 2011,
C.A.No.5209 of 2011, C.A.No. 5210 of 2011,
C.A.No.5211 of 2011, C.A.No.5212 of 2011,
C.A.No.5213 of 2011, C.A.No.5214 of 2011,
C.A.No.5207 of 2011, C.A.No.5215 of 2011, C.A.No.
5216 of 2011, C.A.Nos.7179-7182 of 2011, SLP(C)Nos.
......(CC 14220-14221 of 2011), SLP(C)No......(CC
14164 of 2011), SLP(C)Nos.21344-21351 of
2011,SLP(C)Nos.32764-32765 of 2011,
SLP(C)Nos.32766-32767 of 2011, SLP(C)Nos.32770-
32771 of 2011, SLP(C)Nos. 32772-32773 of 2011,
SLP(C)Nos.32790-32791 of 2011,
SLP(C)Nos.32792-32793 of 2011, SLP(C)Nos.32796-
32797 of 2011, SLP(C)Nos.32798-32799 of 2011,Page 64
64
SLP(C)Nos.32801-32802 of 2011 and SLP(C)Nos.32806-
32807 of 2011.
51. Having regard to the facts of the various cases
disposed of by this judgment, the parties will bear
their own costs. 
...................CJI.
(ALTAMAS KABIR)
.....................J.
(J. CHELAMESWAR)
New Delhi
Dated: April 11, 2013.

“Thus, in view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that if a Hindu female has been given only a “life interest”, through Will or gift or any other document referred to in Section 14 of the Act 1956, the said rights would not stand crystallised into the absolute ownership as interpreting the provisions to the effect that she would acquire absolute ownership/title into the property by virtue of the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Act 1956, the provisions of Sections 14(2) and 30 of the Act 1956 would become otios. Section 14(2) carves out an exception to rule provided in sub-section (1) thereof, which clearly provides that if a property has been acquired by a Hindu female by a Will or gift, giving her only a “life interest”, it would remain the same even after commencement of the Act 1956, and such a Hindu female cannot acquire absolute title.” ; so far as the court of first instance is concerned, and that the respondent was not the party before the said court. Permitting an application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC by a non-party, would amount to adding a party to the case, which is provided for under Order I Rule 10 CPC, or setting aside the ex-parte judgment and decree, i.e. seeking a declaration that the decree is null and void for any reason, which can be sought independently by such a party. In the instant case, as the fraud, if any, as alleged, has been committed upon a party, and not upon the court, the same is not a case where Section 151 CPC could be resorted to by the court, to rectify a mistake, if any was made.; See also: Kothamasu Kanakarathamma & Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors., AIR 1965 SC304) It is evident from the above, that a person who has not made an application before the Land Acquisition Collector, for making a reference under Section 18 or 30 of the Act, 1894, cannot get himself impleaded directly before the Reference Court.; In view of the above, the legal issues involved herein, can be summarised as under:- (i) An application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC cannot be filed by a person who was not initially a party to the proceedings; (ii) Inherent powers under Section 151 CPC can be exercised by the Court to redress only such a grievance, for which no remedy is provided for under the CPC; (iii) In the event that an order has been obtained from the Court by playing fraud upon it, it is always open to the Court to recall the said order on the application of the person aggrieved, and such power can also be exercised by the appellate court; (iv) Where the fraud has been committed upon a party, the court cannot investigate such a factual issue, and in such an eventuality, a 33Page 34 party has the right to get the said judgment or order set aside, by filing an independent suit. (v) A person aggrieved may maintain an application before the Land Acquisition Collector for reference under Section 18 or 30 of the Act, 1894, but cannot make an application for impleadment or apportionment before the Reference Court. 21. The instant case has been examined in light of the aforesaid legal propositions. We are of the considered opinion that the impugned judgment and order of the High Court cannot be sustained in the eyes of law, and is hence liable to be set aside. In view of the above, the appeals succeed and are allowed. The judgment and order impugned herein are set aside. The respondents are at liberty to seek appropriate remedy, by resorting to appropriate proceedings, as permissible in law.


Page 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.629 of 2004
Ramji Gupta & Anr. … Appellants
Versus
Gopi Krishan Agrawal (D) & Ors. … Respondents
With
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 630 of 2004
J U D G M E N T
Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J.
C.A. No.629 of 2004
1. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order
dated 6.9.2002, passed by the High Court of Allahabad in CMWP
No.25785 of 2002, by way of which, the High Court has dismissed the
writ petition of the appellants, affirming the judgment and decree of
the Small Causes Court dated 20.4.2001, which stood affirmed by the
Revisional Court, vide judgment and decree dated 13.5.2002. CivilPage 2
Appeal No.630 of 2004 has been filed against the judgment and order
dated 25.2.2003, in Review Application No.206905 of 2002 of the
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, dismissing the review petition.
In the aforesaid judgments, the courts below have held, that the
relationship of a landlord and tenant did not exist between respondent
nos.1 and 2 and the appellants.
2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are that:
A. The dispute pertains to the ownership of shop no.53/11 (old
number) corresponding to its new number, i.e. 53/8, Nayayaganj,
Kanpur Nagar. Janki Bibi (Ist) daughter of Har Dayal, was married to
one Durga Prasad, son of Dina Nath. Radhey Shyam was the adopted
son of Durga Prasad, whose son Shyam Sunder was married to Janki
Bibi (2nd). Shyam Sunder died in the year 1914. Thus, Radhey
Shyam created a life interest in the property in favour of Janki Bibi
(2nd), by way of an oral Will, which further provided that she would
have the right to adopt a son only with the consent of Mohan Lal, the
grand son of Har Dayal. Gopi Krishan, the great grand son of Mohan
Lal, claims to have been adopted by Janki Bibi (2nd), with the consent
of Mohan Lal, and as regards the same, a registered document was
also prepared.
2Page 3
B. Gopi Krishan filed a Regular Suit No.45 of 1956 against Smt.
Janki Bibi (2nd) in the Court of the Civil Judge, Mohanlal Ganj in
Lucknow, seeking the relief of declaration, stating that Janki Bibi was
only a life estate holder in respect of the properties shown in Schedule
‘A’, and that further, she was not entitled to receive any compensation
or rehabilitation grant bonds with respect to the village Nawai Perg,
Jhalotar Ajgain, Tehsil Hasangunj, District Unnao. He stated all this,
while claiming himself to be her adopted son.
C. Janki Bibi (2nd) contested the suit, denying the aforesaid
adoption. However, the suit was decreed vide judgment and decree
dated 23.4.1958, holding that while Smt. Janki Bibi (2nd) was in fact
the life estate holder of Radhey Shyam’s property, she was also
entitled to receive the said compensation, in respect of the property in
question herein.
D. The suit shop was under the tenancy of one Shri Badri Vishal.
However, Janki Bibi (2nd) transferred the same in favour of the
appellant’s mother Smt. Ram Kumari, wife of Shri Badri Vishal, vide
registered sale deed dated 7.5.1974. The said tenant, Shri Badri
Vishal died on 23.1.1986, and the tenancy was hence inherited by the
3Page 4
appellants. They thus, continued to pay rent to the vendee Smt. Ram
Kumari. Smt. Janki Bibi (2nd) died on 27.2.1996.
E. Respondent no.1 Gopi Krishan, filed SCC Suit No.77 of 1989
on 21.2.1989, alleging that the appellants had defaulted in making the
payment of rent, and that a sum of Rs.2,768.62 was outstanding
against them, as rent payable between the time period 17.2.1986 to
13.8.1988, and also damages for the period 14.8.1988 to 21.2.1989,
amongst other amounts due. During the pendency of the suit, Shri
Gopi Krishan respondent no.1, sold the said suit property to Smt.
Vidyawati Rathaur respondent no.2, vide registered sale deed dated
3.8.1989. In view thereof, respondent no.2 got herself impleaded as
plaintiff no.2 in Suit No.77 of 1989.
F. The appellants contested the suit on various grounds, claiming
themselves to be the owners of the property on the basis of a sale
deed. Smt. Vidyawati Rathaur respondent no.2, also filed Suit No.792
of 1995 before the Civil Court, Kanpur, seeking permanent injunction,
restraining the appellants from causing any addition(s) or alteration(s)
in the shop in dispute. The said suit is still pending.
4Page 5
G. The Small Causes Court, Kanpur, dismissed Suit No.77 of 1989
vide judgment and decree dated 10.5.1999, holding that no
relationship of landlord and tenant existed between respondent nos.1
and 2 and the appellants. However, the said judgment and decree was
set aside by the Revisional Court, vide judgment and decree dated
8.3.2000, and the case was remanded to the Judge, Small Causes
Court for deciding the same afresh.
H. After such remand, the suit was decreed vide judgment and
decree dated 20.4.2001, holding that the suit property had been
acquired by Gopi Krishan Agrawal, plaintiff/respondent, by virtue of
the judgment in Suit No.45 of 1956, which was decided on 23.4.1958,
and that the relationship of a landlord and tenant, could in fact be
deemed to have been created between the parties. The
appellants/defendants had hence, been in default of payment of rent.
I. Aggrieved, the appellants filed Revision No.57 of 2001 before
the learned District Judge, Kanpur, which was dismissed vide
judgment and order dated 13.5.2002. The said judgment and order
has been affirmed by the High Court, dismissing the writ petition vide
judgment and order dated 6.9.2002.
5Page 6
J. Aggrieved, the appellants preferred a review petition, which has
also been dismissed by the impugned judgment and order dated
25.2.2003.
 Hence, this appeal.
3. Shri D.K. Garg, learned counsel appearing for the appellants,
has submitted that the Small Causes Court has no jurisdiction/
competence, to determine the issue of title over the property, and that
all the courts below have erred, as they have adjudicated upon the
issue of title. Such a course is not permissible in collateral
proceedings, as the issue of title can be adjudicated upon, only by the
Civil Court. Moreover, the judgment and order dated 23.4.1958 could
not be given effect, in view of the provisions of Section 14(2) of the
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act,
1956’). Therefore, the appeal deserves to be allowed.
4. Per contra, Shri Rakesh Dwivedi, learned senior counsel and
Shri Arvind Kumar, learned counsel, appearing for the respondents,
have opposed the appeals, contending that the courts below have not
touched upon or determined the issue of title. It was necessary for the
courts below, to rely upon the said judgment and decree dated
6Page 7
23.4.1958, wherein it was categorically held that Smt. Janki Bibi (2nd)
was a life estate holder, and that as she had not acquired absolute title
over the property, the sale deed executed by her in favour of Smt.
Ram Kumari, was null and void. The said judgment and decree dated
23.4.1958, was also relied upon in collateral proceedings, wherein
Smt. Ram Kumari, mother of the appellants and vendee in the sale
deed dated 7.5.1974, had taken several pleas, all of which were
rejected, and such findings have been affirmed by the High Court.
Thus, the appeal has no merit, and is hence, liable to be dismissed.
5. We have considered the rival submissions made by learned
counsel for the parties, and perused the record.
6. In Shivdev Kaur (D) by L.Rs. & Ors. v. R.S. Grewal (Civil
Appeal Nos.5063-5065 of 2005, decided on 20.3.2013), this Court
dealt with the issue of Section 14(2) of the Act 1956 and held :- 
“Thus, in view of the above, the law on the issue
can be summarised to the effect that if a Hindu
female has been given only a “life interest”,
through Will or gift or any other document
referred to in Section 14 of the Act 1956, the said
rights would not stand crystallised into the
absolute ownership as interpreting the provisions
to the effect that she would acquire absolute
ownership/title into the property by virtue of the
provisions of Section 14(1) of the Act 1956, the
7Page 8
provisions of Sections 14(2) and 30 of the Act
1956 would become otios. 
Section 14(2) carves out an exception to
rule provided in sub-section (1) thereof, which
clearly provides that if a property has been
acquired by a Hindu female by a Will or gift,
giving her only a “life interest”, it would remain
the same even after commencement of the Act
1956, and such a Hindu female cannot acquire
absolute title.” 
 While deciding the said issue, this Court has placed reliance
upon various previous judgments of this Court, including Mst. Karmi
v. Amru & Ors., AIR 1971 SC 745; Navneet Lal @ Rangi v. Gokul
& Ors., AIR 1976 SC 794; Sadhu Singh v. Gurdwara Sahib Narike
& Ors., AIR 2006 SC 3282; and Jagan Singh (Dead) Through LRs.
v. Dhanwanti & Anr., (2012) 2 SCC 628.
(See also: Muniananjappa & Ors. v. R. Manual & Anr., AIR 2001
SC 1754; Sharad Subramanyan v. Soumi Mazumdar & Ors., AIR
2006 SC 1993; and Gaddam Ramakrishnareddy & Ors. v.
Gaddam Ramireddy & Anr., (2010) 9 SCC 602).
7. In order to operate as res judicata, the finding must be such,
that it disposes of a matter that is directly and substantially in issue in
the former suit, and that the said issue must have been heard and
8Page 9
finally decided by the court trying such suit. A matter which is
collaterally or incidentally in issue for the purpose of deciding a
matter which is directly in issue in the case, cannot be made the basis
for a plea of res judicata. A question regarding title in a small cause
suit, may be regarded as incidental only to the substantial issue in the
suit, and therefore, when a finding as regards title to immovable
property is rendered by a Small Causes Court, res judicata cannot be
pleaded as a bar in the subsequent regular suit, for the determination
or enforcement of any right or interest in the immovable property.
(Vide: Dhulabai etc. v. State of M.P. & Anr., AIR 1969 SC 78; Smt.
Gangabai w/o Rambilas Gilda v. Smt. Chhabubai w/o Pukharajji
Gandhi, (1982) 1 SCC 4; Life Insurance Corporation of India v.
M/s. India Automobiles & Co. & Ors., AIR 1991 SC 884; and
Rameshwar Dayal v. Banda (Dead) through His L.Rs. & Anr.
(1993) 1 SCC 531).
8. In Nirmal Jeet Singh Hoon v. Irtiza Hussain & Ors., (2010)
14 SCC 564, this Court has held, that the Small Causes Court has no
right to adjudicate upon the title of the property, as Section 23 of the
Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 (hereinafter referred to as
the Act, 1887) reads:
9Page 10
“Return of plaints in suits involving questions of
title-(1) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing
portion of this Act, when the right of a plaintiff and
the relief claimed by him in a Court of Small
Cause depend upon the proof or disproof of a title
to immovable property or other title which such a
Court cannot finally determine, the Court may at
any stage of the proceedings return the plaint to be
presented to a Court having jurisdiction to
determine the title.
(2) xx xx xx xx”
 (Emphasis added)
Thus, it is evident from the above, that the Small Causes Court
cannot adjudicate upon the issue of title. In the instant case therefore,
the trial court has rightly refused to go into such issue, and neither can
any fault be found with the findings recorded by the courts below in
this regard. Furthermore, as it is an admitted fact that defendant nos.1
and 2 were tenants of the original plaintiffs, the question of title could
not be adjudicated at the behest of the appellants under any
circumstance.
9. While dealing with the provisions of Section 23 of the Act,
1887, this Court in Budhu Mal v. Mahabir Prasad & Ors., AIR
1988 SC 1772 held, that a question of title could also be decided upon
incidentally, and that any finding recorded by a Judge, Small Causes
10Page 11
Court in this behalf, could not operate as res judicata in a suit based
on title.
Furthermore, the procedure adopted in the trial of a case before
the Small Causes Court is summary in nature. Clause (35) of Schedule
II to the Act 1887, has made the Small Causes Court a court of limited
jurisdiction. Certain suits are such, in which the dispute is incapable
of being decided in a summarily.
10. We have further examined the record of the case, and the Court
of Small Causes, while determining the issues involved therein, has
taken note of the result of the earlier Suit No.45 of 1956, decreed vide
judgment and decree dated 23.4.1958, and also of the Execution
Appeal No.64 of 1965, in the matter of Smt. Bibi Devi v. Janki Bibi,
wherein it was held, that Janki Devi (2nd), being a life estate holder
had no right to transfer the property. In Execution Appeal No.64 of
1965, Smt. Ram Kumari, mother of the appellants was made a party,
however, so far as the issue of title by the courts below is concerned,
the trial court held as under:
“This court cannot determine the question
relating to proprietary right/ownership of the
parties. On this point, this court has limited
jurisdiction to decide as to whether there exists
the relationship of house-owner and tenants in
11Page 12
between the parties or not. As per the judgment
passed by the competent court, Smt. Janakibibi
had the right in the disputed property during her
life time only. She had no right or authority to sale
or transfer the disputed property. This court is
bound to accept the aforesaid conclusion.
Therefore, if Smt. Janakibibi has transferred the
disputed property, contrary to her rights, to the
defendant no. 4 – Smt. Ramkumari on 7th of May,
1974, then because of that, no rights are
established to Smt. Ramkumari. Such document is
a nullity and no legal cognizance can be taken in
account.” (Emphasis added)
 The said finding has been upheld by all the courts.
11. We are not inclined to enter into the controversy regarding
Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, as it has been submitted
that the remedy of declaration envisaged by the said provisions is not
exhaustive, and that there can be a declaration even outside the scope
of the said Section 34. In support of the said contention, submissions
have been made on the basis of the judgments of this Court in Radha
Rani Bhargava v. Hanuman Prasad Bhargava (deceased) thr. L.Rs.
& Ors., AIR 1966 SC 216; and M/s. Supreme General Films
Exchange Ltd. v. His Highness Maharaja Sir Brijnath Singhji Deo
of Maihar & Ors., AIR 1975 SC 1810.
12Page 13
12. In view of the above, we do not see any cogent reason to
interfere with the impugned judgments. The appeal lacks merit and is
accordingly, dismissed.
C.A. No. 630 of 2004
In view of the judgment in C.A. No.629 of 2004, no specific
order is required in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed.
….……………………………...................................J.
 (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)
…..……………………………...................................J.
(FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA)
NEW DELHI;
April 11, 2013.
13Page 14
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2798 of 2013
Ram Prakash Agarwal & Anr. … Appellants
Versus
Gopi Krishan (Dead through L.Rs.) & Ors. … Respondents
And
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2799 of 2013
Hari Prakash Agarwal & Anr. … Appellants
Versus
Gopi Krishan (Dead through L.Rs.) & Ors. … Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J.
1. These appeals have been preferred against the impugned
judgment and order, dated 20.10.2011, passed by the High Court of
Allahabad, (Lucknow Bench) in Writ Petition No.764 of 2002 (MS),
14Page 15
by way of which, the High Court has set aside the order of the trial
court dated 20.2.2002 by which it had rejected the application under
Order IX Rule 13 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘CPC’), for setting
aside the judgment and decree dated 22.5.2000 in Misc. Case No. 66
of 1999.
2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals are that:
A. The dispute pertains to the ownership of shop no.53/11 (old
number) corresponding to its new number, i.e. 53/8, Nayayaganj,
Kanpur Nagar. Janki Bibi (Ist) daughter of Har Dayal, was married to
one Durga Prasad, son of Dina Nath. Radhey Shyam was the adopted
son of Durga Prasad, whose son Shyam Sunder was married to Janki
Bibi (2nd). Shyam Sunder died in the year 1914. Thus, Radhey
Shyam created a life interest in the property in favour of Janki Bibi
(2nd), by way of an oral Will, which further provided that she would
have the right to adopt a son only with the consent of Mohan Lal, the
grand son of Har Dayal. Gopi Krishan, the great grand son of Mohan
Lal, claims to have been adopted by Janki Bibi (2nd), with the consent
of Mohan Lal, and as regards the same, a registered document was
also prepared.
15Page 16
B. Gopi Krishan filed Regular Suit No.45 of 1956 against Smt.
Janki Bibi (2nd), in the Court of the Civil Judge Mohanlal Ganj,
Lucknow, seeking the relief of declaration, stating that Janki Bibi was
only a life estate holder in respect of the properties shown in Schedule
‘A’, and that further, she was not entitled to receive the compensation
or rehabilitation grant bonds with respect to the village Nawai Perg.,
Jhalotar Ajgain, Tehsil Hasangunj, District Unnao. He stated all this,
claiming himself to be her adopted son.
C. Janki Bibi (2nd) contested the suit, denying the aforesaid
adoption. However, the suit was decreed vide judgment and decree
dated 23.4.1958, holding that while Smt. Janki Bibi (2nd) was in fact
the life estate holder of Radhey Shyam’s property, she was also
entitled to receive the said compensation in respect of the property in
question herein.
D. That the property bearing no.264/1-53 admeasuring 17 bighas,
2 biswas, 2 biswansi and 19 kachwansi to the extent of half share
situated in village Suppa Rao, Pargana Tehsil, District Lucknow, was
owned by Radhey Shyam. The aforesaid suit land was acquired by
the State Government for Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad
16Page 17
(hereinafter referred to as, the ‘Parishad’), for the development of the
Talkatora Road Scheme, Lucknow, vide notification under Section 4
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act,
1894’) dated 20.10.1962. The possession of the said land was taken
on 30.12.1971, after completion of certain formalities.
E. Gopi Krishan approached the Nagar Mahapalika Tribunal,
constituted under the Municipal Corporation Act, 1959, under
Sections 18/30 of the Act, 1894, by filing Misc. Case No.269 of 1983,
claiming compensation in respect of the properties acquired by the
State of U.P., on the ground that he possessed the legal right to do so,
as a vested remainder, under the judgment and decree dated
23.4.1958. In the said case, Smt. Janki Bibi (2nd) was a party and after
her death, Madhuri Saran and his legal heirs were also brought on
record, pursuant to the Will of Janki Bibi as a legatee.
F. In the meanwhile, Madhuri Saran, predecessor in interest of the
present appellants, filed a Reference under Section 18 of the Act,
1894 which was registered as Miscellaneous Case No.66 of 1999, for
enhancement of compensation in respect of half share in the aforesaid
suit land. During the pendency of the aforesaid proceedings, Madhuri
17Page 18
Saran died and his legal heirs were substituted. Gopi Krishan,
respondent no.1 was not impleaded as a party. The Tribunal vide
judgment and order dated 22.5.2000 held that the opposite parties
were entitled to receive compensation (including enhancement)
relating to the aforesaid property. In pursuance of the said Reference
award, the appellants applied for withdrawal of the enhanced
compensation. When respondent no.1 learnt about the order dated
22.5.2000, he filed an application under Order IX Rule 13 read with
Section 151 CPC, for the purpose of setting aside the said award dated
22.5.2000. The Tribunal, vide order dated 20.2.2002, rejected the said
application, on the ground that an application under Order IX Rule 13
can only be filed by a person who was a party to the proceedings in
which such an order was passed, and that such an application was not
maintainable at the behest of a stranger.
G. Aggrieved, the respondents preferred a writ petition before the
High Court, which has been allowed by the Court holding, that while
an application under Order IX Rule 13 was not maintainable, the said
award should have been set aside in exercise of its powers under
Section 151 CPC, as the same was required to be done, in order to do
substantial justice between the parties. Hence, these appeals.
18Page 19
3. We have heard Shri S. Naphade and Shri Pradip Kant, learned
counsel appearing for the appellants and Shri Rakesh Dwivedi,
learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents, as regards the
issues, particularly with respect to the extent that the provisions of the
CPC are applicable to these proceedings, and further, in relation to
whether an application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC can be
maintained by a person who was never a party to the suit, and lastly,
in the event that such an application is not maintainable, whether such
relief can be granted in exercise of the inherent powers under Section
151 CPC.
4. In Smt. Santosh Chopra v. Teja Singh & Anr., AIR 1977 Del
110, the Delhi High Court dealt with the issue with respect to whether
a non-party/stranger has any locus standi to move an application
under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, to get an ex-parte decree set aside, he
would be adversely affected by such decree. In the said case, the Rent
Controller had held, that it would be patently unjust to bar any remedy
for such a landlord, since the applicant was the assignee of the rights
of the previous landlord, therefore, he could apply for setting aside of
the decree as such. The Delhi High Court came to the conclusion that
the statutory provisions of Order IX Rule 13 CPC itself, refer to the
19Page 20
defendant in an action, who alone can move an application under
Order IX Rule 13 CPC. Therefore, a person who is not a party,
despite the fact that he might be interested in the suit, is not entitled to
move an application under the rule. In fact he had no locus standi to
have the order set aside. Such an order could not be passed even
under Section 151 CPC. In view thereof, the order passed by the Rent
Controller was reversed.
5. In Smt. Suraj Kumari v. District Judge, Mirzapur & Ors.,
AIR 1991 All 75, the Allahabad High Court dealt with a similar issue,
and rejected the contention that at the instance of a stranger, a decree
could be reopened in an application under Order IX Rule 13 read with
Section 151 CPC, even if such decree is based on a compromise, or
has been obtained by practising fraud upon the court, to the prejudice
of the said stranger.
6. However, in Dulhim Suga Kuer & Anr. v. Deorani Kuer &
Ors., AIR 1952 Pat 72, the Patna High Court dealt with the provisions
of Section 146 CPC, which contemplate a change of title after the
decree has been awarded and held that, the true test is whether the
transferee is affected by the order or decree in question. Where, the
20Page 21
transfer is subsequent to the ex parte decree, the transferee would
certainly be interested in setting aside the ex parte decree.
7. In Surajdeo v. Board of Revenue U.P. Allahabad & Ors.,
AIR 1982 All 23, the Allahabad High Court dealt with an issue where
an application was filed by a non-party, under Order IX Rule 13 CPC
to set aside the ex parte decree. The Court held:
“the petitioner was vitally interested in the decree
passed in favour of the contesting opposite parties
which he wants to be vacated. If the decrees in
favour of the contesting opposite parties remain
intact, the petitioner’s right of irrigating his fields
from the disputed land shall be vitally affected. In
such a circumstance even if the petitioner is
assumed to have no locus standi to move the
application for setting aside the ex parte decrees
in favour of the contesting opposite parties, it
cannot be said that the trial court had no
jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte decrees which
were against the provisions of law and were the
result of collusion and fraud practiced by the
plaintiff and the defendants in the suits in which
decrees recognizing the claim of the contesting
opposite parties in the disputed land as Sirdar
were passed.”
 (Emphasis added)
8. Section 151 CPC is not a substantive provision that confers the
right to get any relief of any kind. It is a mere procedural provision
which enables a party to have the proceedings of a pending suit
21Page 22
conducted in a manner that is consistent with justice and equity. The
court can do justice between the parties before it. Similarly,
inherent powers cannot be used to re-open settled matters. The
inherent powers of the Court must, to that extent, be regarded as
abrogated by the Legislature. A provision barring the exercise of
inherent power need not be express, it may even be implied. Inherent
power cannot be used to restrain the execution of a decree at the
instance of one who was not a party to suit. Such power is absolutely
essential for securing the ends of justice, and to overcome the failure
of justice. The Court under Section 151 CPC may adopt any
procedure to do justice, unless the same is expressly prohibited.
The consolidation of suits has not been provided for under any
of the provisions of the Code, unless there is a State amendment in
this regard. Thus, the same can be done in exercise of the powers
under Section 151 CPC, where a common question of fact and law
arise therein, and the same must also not be a case of misjoinder of
parties. The non-consolidation of two or more suits is likely to lead to
a multiplicity of suits being filed, leaving the door open for conflicting
decisions on the same issue, which may be common to the two or
more suits that are sought to be consolidated. Non-consolidation may,
22Page 23
therefore, prejudice a party, or result in the failure of justice. Inherent
powers may be exercised ex debito justitiae in those cases, where
there is no express provision in CPC. The said powers cannot be
exercised in contravention of, or in conflict with, or upon ignoring
express and specific provisions of the law. (See: B.V. Patankar &
Ors. v. C.G. Sastry, AIR 1961 SC 272; Ram Chandra Singh v.
Savitri Devi & Ors., AIR 2004 SC 4096; Jet Plywood Pvt. Ltd. v.
Madhukar Nowlakha, AIR 2006 SC 1260; State Bank of India v.
Ranjan Chemicals Ltd. & Anr., (2007) 1 SCC 97; State of
Haryana & Ors. v. Babu Singh, (2008) 2 SCC 85; Durgesh Sharma
v. Jayshree, AIR 2009 SC 285; Nahar Industrial Enterprises Ltd.
v. H.S.B.C. etc. etc., (2009) 8 SCC 646; and Rajendra Prasad
Gupta v. Prakash Chandra Mishra & Ors., AIR 2011 SC 1137).
9. In exceptional circumstances, the Court may exercise its
inherent powers, apart from Order IX CPC to set aside an ex parte
decree.
An ex-parte decree passed due to the non appearance of the
counsel of a party, owing to the fact that the party was not at fault, can
be set aside in an appeal preferred against it. So is the case, where the
absence of a defendant is caused on account of a mistake of the Court.
23Page 24
An application under Section 151 CPC will be maintainable, in the
event that an ex parte order has been obtained by fraud upon the court
or by collusion. The provisions of Order IX CPC may not be attracted,
and in such a case the Court may either restore the case, or set aside
the ex parte order in the exercise of its inherent powers.
There may be an order of dismissal of a suit for default of
appearance of the plaintiff, who was in fact dead at the time that the
order was passed. Thus, where a Court employs a procedure to do
something that it never intended to do, and there is miscarriage of
justice, or an abuse of the process of Court, the injustice so done must
be remedied, in accordance with the principle of actus curia neminem
gravabit - an act of the Court shall prejudice no person.
10. In Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth
Hiralal, AIR 1962 SC 527, this Court examined the issue with respect
to whether, the court is competent to grant interim relief under Section
151 CPC, when the same cannot be granted under Order XXXIX
Rules 1 & 2 CPC, and held :
“There is difference of opinion between the High
Courts on this point. One view is that a Court
cannot issue an order of temporary injunction if
the circumstances do not fall within the provisions
of Order 39 of the Code…… the other view is that
24Page 25
a Court can issue an interim injunction under
circumstances which are not covered by Order 39
of the Code, if the Court is of opinion that the
interests of justice require the issue of such interim
injunction;……We are of opinion that the latter
view is correct and that the Court have inherent
jurisdiction to issue temporary injunction in
circumstances which are not covered by the
provisions of Order 39, C.P.C., there is no
expression in Section 94 which expressly prohibits
the issue of temporary injunction in circumstances
not covered by Order 39 or by any rule made
under the Code. It is well-settled that the
provisions of the Code are not exhaustive, for the
simple reason that the Legislature is incapable of
contemplating all the possible circumstances
which may arise in future litigation and
consequently for providing the procedure for them.
The effect of the expression ‘ if it is so prescribed’
is only this that when the rule prescribes the
circumstances in which the temporary injunction
can be issued, ordinarily the Court is not to use its
inherent powers to make the necessary orders in
the interests of justice, but is merely to see
whether the circumstances of the case bring it
within the prescribed rule. If the provisions of
Section 94 were not there in the Code, the Court
could still issue temporary injunction, but it could
do that in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction.
No party has a right to inherent jurisdiction only
when it considers it absolutely necessary for the
ends of justice to do so. It is in the incidence of the
exercise of the power of the Court to issue
temporary injunction that the provisions of Section
94 of the Code have their effect and not in taking
away the right of the Court to exercise the inherent
power.”
(Emphasis added)
11. In Indian Bank v. M/s. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd., AIR
1996 SC 2592, this Court dealt with a similar case and observed, that
fraud not only affects the solemnity, regularity and orderliness of the
25Page 26
proceedings of the court, but that it also amounts to abuse of the
process of court. The Court further held, that “the judiciary in India
also possesses inherent powers, specially under Section 151 CPC, to
recall its judgment or order if the same has been obtained by fraud
upon the court. In the case of fraud upon a party to the suit or
proceedings, the court may direct the affected party to file a separate
suit for setting aside the decree obtained by fraud.”
12. Similarly, in Dadu Dayal Mahasabha v. Sukhdev Arya &
Anr., (1990) 1 SCC 189, this Court examined a issue as to whether
the trial court has the jurisdiction to cancel an order permitting the
withdrawal of the suit under its inherent powers, if it is ultimately
satisfied that the suit has been withdrawn by a person who is not
entitled to withdraw the same. The court held that “the position is well
established that a court has the inherent power to correct its own
proceedings when it is satisfied that in passing a particular order it
was misled by one of the parties”. However, the Court pointed out that
there is a distinction between cases where fraud has been practised
upon the court and where fraud has been practised upon a party, while
observing as under:
26Page 27
“If a party makes an application before the court
for setting aside the decree on the ground that he
did not give his consent, the court has the power
and duty to investigate the matter and to set aside
the decree if it is satisfied that the consent as a fact
was lacking and the court was induced to pass the
decree on a fraudulent representation made to it
that the party had actually consented to it.
However, if the case of the party challenging the
decree is that he was in fact a party to the
compromise petition filed in the case but his
consent has been procured by fraud, the court
cannot investigate the matter in the exercise of its
inherent power, and the only remedy to the party
is to institute a suit”. (Emphasis
added)
13. In view of the above, the law on this issue stands crystalised to
the effect that the inherent powers enshrined under Section 151 CPC
can be exercised only where no remedy has been provided for in any
other provision of the CPC. In the event that a party has obtained a
decree or order by playing a fraud upon the court, or where an order
has been passed by a mistake of the court, the court may be justified
in rectifying such mistake, either by recalling the said order, or by
passing any other appropriate order. However, inherent powers cannot
be used in conflict of any other existing provision, or in case a remedy
has been provided for by any other provision of the CPC.
27Page 28
Moreoveer, in the event that a fraud has been played upon a party, the
same may not be a case where inherent powers can be exercised.
14. Be that as it may, the Tribunal decided the case of
compensation filed by the appellants on 22.5.2000, and the application
filed by the respondents under Order IX Rule 13 CPC was dismissed
vide order dated 20.2.2002. The respondents challenged the said order
dated 20.2.2002, by filing Writ Petition No. 764 of 2002 in the High
Court, and the same stood dismissed in default. The same was
restored, heard and disposed of vide order dated 12.12.2005, by way
of which the said Writ Petition was dismissed, in view of the
alternative remedy of appeal. Such an order was passed in view of the
fact that the order passed by the Tribunal was appealable under
Section 381 of the U.P. Nagar MahaPalika Adhiniyam, 1959, to the
High Court. The respondents filed an appeal to recall the said order,
the court heard such appeal on merits. However, the said application
for recall was dismissed in default vide order dated 12.1.2009. A
second application for recall was then filed, which was also dismissed
in default vide order dated 15.3.2010. A third application was finally
filed, and has been allowed vide impugned order.
28Page 29
15. In fact, while passing its final order, the High Court was
convinced that the appellants had committed a fraud upon the court by
not disclosing before the Tribunal, that at a prior stage, the matter had
been adjudicated upon, with respect to the entitlement of the
respondents, and also in respect of some other properties therein, the
High Court had made certain observations against the respondents,
and that the matter had ultimately come before this Court in Civil
Appeal No. 3871 of 1990, wherein this Court had passed the
following order:
“Having considered the entire matter, we are of the view
that special leave petition is fit to be dismissed.
However, there may be some mis-apprehension with
respect to certain observations made in the impugned
judgment as having finally decided the adjudicated issues
between the parties and we, therefore make it clear that
those observations shall not be treated to have finally
adjudicated upon any of the disputed points. The appeal
is disposed of accordingly.”
16. In the instant case, we have to bear in mind that the proceedings
stood concluded so far as the court of first instance is concerned, and
that the respondent was not the party before the said court. Permitting
an application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC by a non-party, would
amount to adding a party to the case, which is provided for under
29Page 30
Order I Rule 10 CPC, or setting aside the ex-parte judgment and
decree, i.e. seeking a declaration that the decree is null and void for
any reason, which can be sought independently by such a party. In the
instant case, as the fraud, if any, as alleged, has been committed upon
a party, and not upon the court, the same is not a case where Section
151 CPC could be resorted to by the court, to rectify a mistake, if any
was made.
17. The matter basically relates to the apportionment of the amount
of compensation received for the land acquired. This Court, in May
George v. Special Tahsildar & Ors., (2010) 13 SCC 98, has held,
that a notice under Section 9 of the Act, 1894, is not mandatory, and
that it would not by any means vitiate the land acquisition
proceedings, for the reason that ultimately, the person interested can
claim compensation for the acquired land. In the event that any other
person has withdrawn the amount of compensation, the “person
interested”, if so aggrieved, has a right either to resort to the
proceedings under the provision of Act 1894, or he may file a suit for
the recovery of his share. While deciding the said case, reliance has
been placed upon a large number of judgments of this Court,
including Dr. G.H. Grant v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 237.
30Page 31
18. The said case is required to be examined from another angle.
Undoubtedly, the respondents did not make any application either
under Section 18 or Section 30 of the Act, 1894 to the Land
Acquisition Collector. The jurisdiction of the Reference Court, vis-à-
vis “persons interested” has been explained by this Court in Shyamali
Das v. Illa Chowdhry & Ors., AIR 2007 SC 215, holding that the
Reference Court does not have the jurisdiction to entertain any
application of pro interesse suo, or in the nature thereof. The Court
held as under:
“The Act is a complete code by itself. It provides for
remedies not only to those whose lands have been
acquired but also to those who claim the awarded
amount or any apportionment thereof. A Land
Acquisition Judge derives its jurisdiction from the order
of reference. It is bound thereby. His jurisdiction is to
determine adequacy and otherwise of the amount of
compensation paid under the award made by the
Collector”. Thus holding that, “It is not within his
domain to entertain any application of pro interesse suo
or in the nature thereof.”
The plea of the appellant therein, stating that the title dispute be
directed to be decided by the Reference Court itself, since the
appellant was not a person interested in the award, was rejected by
31Page 32
this Court, observing that the Reference Court does not have the
power to enter into an application under Order I Rule 10 CPC.
19. In Ajjam Linganna & Ors. v. Land Acquisition Officer,
RDO, Nizamabad & Ors., (2002) 9 SCC 426, this court made
observations to the effect that it is not open to the parties to apply
directly to the Reference Court for impleadment, and to seek
enhancement under Section 18 for compensation.
In Prayag Upnivesh Awas Evam Nirman Sahkari Samiti
Ltd. v. Allahabad Vikas Pradhikaran & Anr., (2003) 5 SCC 561,
this Court held as under:
“It is well established that the Reference Court gets
jurisdiction only if the matter is referred to it under
Section 18 or Section 30 of the Act by the Land
Acquisition Officer and if the Civil Court has got the
jurisdiction and authority only to decide the objections
referred to it. The Reference Court cannot widen the
scope of its jurisdiction or decide matters which are not
referred to it.” 
While deciding the said case, the Court placed
reliance on the judgments in Parmatha Nath Malik Bahadur v.
Secretary of State, AIR 1930 PC 64; and Mohammed Hasnuddin v.
The State of Maharashtra, AIR 1979 SC 404.
32Page 33
(See also: Kothamasu Kanakarathamma & Ors. v. State of
Andhra Pradesh & Ors., AIR 1965 SC304)
It is evident from the above, that a person who has not made an
application before the Land Acquisition Collector, for making a
reference under Section 18 or 30 of the Act, 1894, cannot get himself
impleaded directly before the Reference Court.
20. In view of the above, the legal issues involved herein, can be
summarised as under:-
(i) An application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC cannot be filed by
a person who was not initially a party to the proceedings;
(ii) Inherent powers under Section 151 CPC can be exercised by
the Court to redress only such a grievance, for which no remedy is
provided for under the CPC;
(iii) In the event that an order has been obtained from the Court by
playing fraud upon it, it is always open to the Court to recall the said
order on the application of the person aggrieved, and such power can
also be exercised by the appellate court;
(iv) Where the fraud has been committed upon a party, the court
cannot investigate such a factual issue, and in such an eventuality, a
33Page 34
party has the right to get the said judgment or order set aside, by filing
an independent suit. 
(v) A person aggrieved may maintain an application before the
Land Acquisition Collector for reference under Section 18 or 30 of the
Act, 1894, but cannot make an application for impleadment or
apportionment before the Reference Court.
21. The instant case has been examined in light of the aforesaid
legal propositions. We are of the considered opinion that the
impugned judgment and order of the High Court cannot be sustained
in the eyes of law, and is hence liable to be set aside.
In view of the above, the appeals succeed and are allowed. The
judgment and order impugned herein are set aside. The respondents
are at liberty to seek appropriate remedy, by resorting to appropriate
proceedings, as permissible in law.
….……………………………...................................J.
 (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)
…..……………………………...................................J.
(FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA)
NEW DELHI;
April 11, 2013.
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