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Thursday, April 11, 2013

whether the punishment imposed on the appellant is shockingly disproportionate to the misconduct.- “Mishra was immediately suspended from work for the crime of talking to the press and his suspension continues even today, five months after the event. While all those who displayed singular dereliction of duty continued merrily along, the one man who put the interest of the country above his own selfish interest has been made to suffer as an example to others that in the nuclear establishment the only ‘leaks’ that matter are leaks of authentic information.” = A “whistle blower” would be a person who possesses the qualities of a crusader. His honesty, integrity and motivation should leave little or no room for doubt. It is not enough that such person is from the same organization and privy to some information, not available to the general public. The primary motivation for the action of a person to be called a “whistle blower” should be to cleanse an organization. It should not be incidental or byproduct for an action taken for some ulterior or selfish motive. - In our opinion, the appellant had failed to maintain the standard of confidentiality and discretion which was required to be maintained. In the facts of this case, it is apparent that the appellant can take no advantage of the observations made by this Court in the case of Indirect Tax Practitioners’ Association (supra). This now brings us to the reliance placed by the appellant on the judgment in the case of Gujarat Steel Tubes Case (supra). In our opinion, the ratio in the aforesaid judgment would have no relevance in the case of the appellant. We are not satisfied that this is a case of ‘glaring injustice’. In our opinion, the punishment imposed on the appellant is not ‘so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience’ of this Court. The observations of this Court in Ranjit Thakur (supra) are also of no avail to the appellant. No injustice much less any grave injustice has been done to the appellant.


Page 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. ………………. OF 2013
[Arising out of SLP (C) NO.9126 OF 2010]
Manoj H. Mishra . ..Appellant
VERSUS
Union of India & Ors. ..Respondents
J U D G M E N T
SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR,J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order
dated 14th July, 2009 rendered in Letters Patent Appeal No.1041 of
2007 by the Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat at
Ahmedabad confirming the judgment of the learned Single Judge
dated 31st January, 2007 in Special Civil Application No.2115 of
1997. On 11th May, 2010, this Court issued notice limited to the
question of award of punishment. In the High Court, before the
learned Single Judge, the learned counsel for the appellant made
only one submission that looking to the allegations and the charges
proved against the appellant and the penalty of removal imposed
1Page 2
upon the appellant is disproportionate to the misconduct. However,
in the Letters Patent Appeal, a draft amendment was moved by the
appellant seeking to challenge the order of removal from service on
the ground that the acts committed by the appellant did not
constitute misconduct. The application for amendment was rejected.
3. We may very briefly notice the relevant facts for deciding the
limited issue as to whether the punishment imposed on the appellant
is shockingly disproportionate to the misconduct.
4. On 14th October, 1991, the appellant, who had studied
upto 12th standard, was appointed as Tradesman/B Class III post at
Kakarapar Atomic Power Project (KAPP) at Surat, Gujarat, a public
sector enterprises. He was placed on probation for two years in
accordance with the statutory rules. It is his case that on completion
of the probation period, he is deemed to be confirmed w.e.f.
14th October, 1993. Thereafter, on 17th December, 1993, he was
elected as General Secretary of the recognized Union of Class III
and Class IV of KAPP, called Kakarapar Anumathak Karamchari
Sangthan. It is the claim of the appellant that until his resignation
from the primary membership of the aforesaid Union
on 22nd September, 1995 at the instance of the Managing Director of
2Page 3
the Nuclear Power Corporation (respondent No.2), he acted as the
General Secretary of the Union. He was a popular Union leader who
always won elections with more than 3/4th majority. On 3rd May,
1994, he was declared a protected workman along with others. He
claims that as the General Secretary of the Union, he was very
active and always made extra efforts to see that the genuine
demands of the members of the Union are accepted by the
respondents. As a representative of the Union, he was regularly in
contact with the Station Director, KAPP (respondent No.4). As a
consequence of the Union activities, the relationship of the appellant
with respondent No.4 were sour. The appellant, however,
maintained working relationship with the respondents. It is also the
claim of the appellant that during the monsoon season, there was
heavy rain during the night of 15th June, 1994 and water at
Kakarapar Dam had risen beyond the danger level. As a result, the
Dam authorities had to open the flood gates. In normal
circumstances, Kakarapar lake would receive the Dam water
through a canal which is an interlink. The water of the lake is used
by the respondents’ authorities for power generation. However, on
the night of 15th July, 1994, it was the flood water, which entered in
the Kakarapar lake and within no time it had also entered into the
plant. Before the next morning, more than 25 feet of the turbine
3Page 4
which is adjacent to the Nuclear reactors was submerged under
water. In fact, the entire record room and computer room were
washed away. That apart, some of the barrels containing nuclear
wastes were also washed away by the flood water. On
16th July, 1994, the respondent authorities declared an emergency,
and started taking preventive measures.
5. It is the claim of the appellant that questions were being raised by
many people as to why and how the flood water could not be
prevented from entering into the turbines and other areas of the
plant. Therefore on 18th June, 1994, the appellant wrote a letter to
the Editor, Gujarat Samachar, Surat narrating in the Gujarati
language about the aforesaid incident. A translated copy of the
letter has been placed at Annexure: P1 to the Special Leave Petition
and reads as under :-
“Date: 18.06.1994
To,
The Editor,
Gujarat Samachar,
Surat.
In the Kankarapar on 16.06.94 there was water filled
in, due to this reason about 25 to 30 feet water was filled in
the Kankarapar, due to this reason the machines lying in the
Atomic Centre shut down Unit No.1 several machines have
moved back, and if this same unit No.1 was in the running
condition then the situation would have been very grave, the
Unit No.2 is not yet started. On 16.06.94 night there was
water filled in the Pali Mahi Scheme, but some engineers in
the department who were present at night in Pali they did not
4Page 5
find it important to take any action due to this reason the
water level went on rising slowly and the situation became
so worse that there was emergency declared and the
employees were sent away, the staff that was left behind
there was no proper facility for food and water made, the
employees leader Manojbhai Mishra says that all this is a
result of grave corruptions. The department has incurred
expenses worth lakhs of rupees and several big canals were
made, but the same were not managed properly therefore
due to ….illigible….field engineer section thousands of
rupees were expended and in the building the situation was
very grave and due to this reason although there were
thousand crores rupees expended on motor, pump, piping all
of which is drowned.
The employees leader Manojbhai Mishra has stated
that in the department there are no arrangements made for
meeting with the natural calamities, and as a result of which
this situation was created. Manojbhai Mishra has further
stated that this is not any cloth mill, sugar mill or any paper
mill but it is a valuable asset of the country of India and it is
an atomic reactor. Manojbhai Mishra says that a high level
committee inquiry should be immediately initiated in respect
to the Kakarapar Atomic Centre and take strict action against
the erring officer, so that in future no such accident may take
place.
Thanking you,
 Yours faithfully,
 Sd/-
 [Manojbhai Mishra]
 General Secretary Employee Union”
6. The appellant points out that he did not disclose any official
information which he could have received during his official duty.
He claims that the facts narrated in the letter were of public
knowledge and a matter of public concern. This is evident from the
fact that every newspapers, politicians, members of legislative
assembly and other citizens expressed their concern regarding the
5Page 6
safety of the nuclear project and as to how the said incident could
have happened. The appellant had narrated the facts relating to the
water logging so that in future this type of incident may not occur.
The appellant relies on a newspaper Anumukti dated
22nd June, 1994 entitled “Paying the Price for Honesty and Courage”.
This article points out that although mercifully no great disaster took
place the event did highlight the lax attitude towards safety of the
nuclear power plant authorities. The article points out some of the
glaring irregularities. After pointing out the irregularities, the article
concludes:-
“All this shows a criminal negligence on part of designers,
operations and regulators of nuclear power in the country.
And yet nobody is likely to suffer any adverse consequences
at all. Nobody except Shri Manoj Mishra – the man who
blew the whistle”.
xx xx xx
“Mishra was immediately suspended from work for the crime
of talking to the press and his suspension continues even
today, five months after the event. While all those who
displayed singular dereliction of duty continued merrily
along, the one man who put the interest of the country above
his own selfish interest has been made to suffer as an
example to others that in the nuclear establishment the only
‘leaks’ that matter are leaks of authentic information.”
7. The appellant claims that it was only after the news was
published on the 22nd June, 1994 that people outside and even the
nuclear establishment in Bombay took cognizance of the event. The
Station Superintendent made a “dash” to Surat and issued a
6Page 7
statement along with the District Collector of Surat assuring all and
sundry that all was well under control. The appellant claims that his
honest approach was, however, not appreciated by the Management
and in fact he was singled out for action, instead of taking action
against erring officials on account of negligence. He had only
performed his duty in alerting the authorities to the imminent danger
to KAPP.
8. As a ‘reward’, the respondent authorities placed him under
suspension by an order dated 5th July, 1994, in contemplation of
disciplinary proceedings for major penalty. On 4th August, 1994,
the appellant was served with the following charge sheet:-
“Article I: That Shri Manoj Mishra, while functioning as
Tradesman/B in the Kakrapar Atomic Power Project, vide his
letter on 18-6-1994 to the Editor, 'Gujarat Samachar'
newspaper, Surat, unauthorisedly communicated with the
Press.
Article II: That the said Shri Manoj Mishra, while functioning
as Tradesman/B in the aforesaid project, in the letter dated
18-6-1994 written by him to the Editor, Gujarat Samachar
made certain statement or expressed certain opinions, which
amounted to criticism of the Project management or casting
of aspersion on the integrity of its authorities.
Article III: That the said Shri Manoj Mishra, while functioning
as Tradesman/B in the aforesaid project, though his letter
dated 18-6-1994, he wrote to the Editor of the Gujarat
Samachar unauthorisedly communicated to the Press official
information concerning the Kakrapar Atomic Power Project.
Article IV: That the said Shri Manoj Mishra, while functioning
as Tradesman/B in the aforesaid project established contact
with a Press correspondent to feed information enabling the
7Page 8
press to create news story about the Project containing
inflammatory and misleading information causing
embarrassment to, and damaging the reputation of the
Project and the NPCIL.
Article V: That the said Shri Manoj Mishra, while functioning
as Tradesman/B in the aforesaid project, established
contacts with the Press correspondent and fed him with vital
information which has come into his possession in the
course of his duty as Tradesman/B in the Project, enabling
the press to create a news story about the Project creating
embarrassment to the Project as swell as to the State
authorities. Shri Manoj Mishra has thus committed breach of
oath of secrecy which he took at the time of joining the
Project.”
9. The appellant appeared before the Enquiry Officer
on 20th December, 1995, when his Defence Assistant (for short ‘DA’)
made the following statement:-
“DA. Shri Manoj Mishra met M.D. on 18.12.95 regarding the
enquiry. He made appeal to M.D. on 22.9.95 and referring to
this Shri Mishra enquired with M.D. As to what was his
decision on his appeal. M.D. informed Shri Mishra that a
lenient view will be taken, if he accepts the charge. I also
met him today and he assured similarly to me also. In view
of the above facts, Shri Mishra admits all the charges
levelled against him and accordingly requests closure of the
proceedings. We now request the I.O. also to take a lenient
view of the case.”
10. The Enquiry Officer, however, declined to accept the
conditional admission with the following observations:-
“I.O. Such admissions in the inquiry are not valid. Your
meeting M.D. is an extraneous matter with which I am
Inquiry Officer is not concerned. Further I also would not like
you to admit the charges on reasons other than facts. I
therefore, request you to categorically tell me whether on
your own you admit the charges or not.”
8Page 9
11. In response to the aforesaid request of the Enquiry Officer, the
appellant, i.e., C.O. stated thus :-
“C.O. I admit the charges. I request the inquiry to be closed.”
12. In view of the aforesaid admission, the Enquiry Officer closed
the enquiry proceedings. The charges were held to be proved
against the appellant. Acting on the aforesaid enquiry report by
order dated 30th March, 1996, the Disciplinary Authority ordered the
removal of the appellant from service of KAPP w.e.f. afternoon of
30th March, 1996. The appellant was informed that an appeal lies
against the aforesaid order with the Station Director, KAPP within a
period of 45 days from the date of the issue of the order. The
appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed. The appellant
thereafter preferred a revision application before respondent No. 3,
which was also dismissed.
13. The appellant challenged the aforesaid order by way of a
Special Civil Application No. 2115 of 1997. The aforesaid writ
petition was dismissed by learned Single Judge. The appellant
preferred LPA No. 1041 of 2007 against the aforesaid judgment of
the learned Single Judge, which was dismissed by the Division
Bench on 14th July, 2009. All these orders have been challenged
before this Court in the present appeal.
9Page 10
14. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.
15. Mr. Prashant Bhushan, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant submitted that the appellant had only done his duty as an
enlightened citizen of this country in highlighting the serious lapses
on the part of the authorities that could have resulted in a
catastrophic accident. Learned counsel pointed out that seriousness
of the accident which took place at KAPP is evident from the fact
that it is mentioned in the Audit Report submitted by the department
of the Atomic Energy to the Government on the safety of Indian
Nuclear Installation. Learned counsel further pointed out that power
supply to the KAPP could be restored only at 1510 hrs. on 16th June,
1994. Some part of the plant could be restarted only on 17th June,
1994 at 10.25 am. The report clearly indicates that during the
incident Site Emergency was declared at 11.00 a.m. and terminated
at 5.00 p.m. on 16th June, 1994. The Audit Report clearly indicates
that the valuable feedback arising out from the three incidents which
were reviewed, which indicated the incident at KAPS led to
strengthening the design of the nuclear power stations in the
country. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, instead of
being punished, the appellant ought to have been rewarded for
10Page 11
doing his duty as an enlightened citizen of this country. Learned
counsel further pointed out that once the internal emergency had
been declared, respondent Nos. 2 to 4 were under obligation to alert
the Collector and District Magistrate, Surat, SDM of Vyara, Mandvi,
Olpad, DSP (rural), Surat about the emergency situation. However,
the KAPP authority did not alert the authorities of the district
administration on 16th June, 1994. In fact the District Authority
visited the site only on 23rd June, 1994 after the new stories were
published in the local dailies on 22nd June, 1994. Mr. Prashant
Bhushan has made a reference to the letter dated 2nd July, 1994, in
which the Disciplinary Authority has informed the appellant that:
“As a result of the appearing of the highly inflammatory news
stories in the press, the authorities of the District
Administration had to rush to the Plaint Site on 23.6.1994 to
ascertain the veracity of the story and to take corrective
measures for removing the apprehensions caused all around
on account of the news story. The project authorities too had
to rush to the District Headquarters on 23.6.1994 for taking
appropriate immediate action to issue clarificatory
information to the Press. All these could have been avoided
had Shri Manoj Mishra and his accomplices behaved
themselves in the responsible manner and desisted
themselves from interacting with the press and passed on
distorted information.
Since the action on the part of Shri Manoj Mishra and his
accomplices has caused serious difficulties to the various
authorities, apart from causing irreversible damage to the
reputation of the establishment and called in the question the
integrity of some of its own employees, the District
Administration Authorities have called upon the Project
Management to investigate into the entire episode and take
action to bring to book the culprits.”
11Page 12
16. Mr. Prashant Bhushan submitted that if the aim of the
appellant was to seek publicity, he could have gone to the press on
16th June, 1994 or the latest on 17th June, 1994. The appellant only
talked to the reporters when they were at plant site to cover the
situation. He had talked to the press in his capacity as the General
Secretary of KAKS. Learned counsel pointed out that the appellant
only wrote to the letter dated 18th June, 1994 to the Editor of Gujarat
Samachar, when he saw that the concerned authorities were acting
negligently. Mr. Bhushan further submitted that the appellant has
been misled into admitting the charges levelled against him as he
was verbally assured by respondent No. 4 that he would be dealt
with leniently, if he admits all the charges. Keeping in view the facts
that the appellant had acted in the best interest of nuclear facility
and to prevent a catastrophic accident having disastrous result like
Fukushima accident, the appellant could not be said to be guilty of
any misconduct. Mr. Bhushan further submitted that the information
given by the appellant was not, in any manner, confidential
information to invite any Disciplinary Proceedings or punishment.
The appellant was, in fact, in the position of a “whistle blower” and
he is to be given full protection by the Court. Learned counsel
pointed out that radio activity would continue for a long time even
after a nuclear reactor is shut down, therefore, the fuel rods have to
12Page 13
be kept cool for a very long time and sometimes even for years. The
incident which took place on the night of 15th June, 1994 was very
serious. The power failure could have had devastating effect.
Therefore, the civil authorities had to be alerted forthwith, as the
population in the entire area would have to be evacuated. Instead of
taking timely preventive measures, the atomic centre merely tried to
keep the incident concealed. Merely because the damage caused by
the flood was ultimately controlled is not a ground to conclude that it
would not have led to a major catastrophe. The appellant had only
alerted the Civil Authorities, which was required to be mandatorily
done by the respondents, under the rules. Mr. Bhushan reiterated
that the description of the incident given by the authorities
themselves clearly shows that ultimately action was taken on a war
footing to control the flood situation at the site. Various officers were
contacted and it was on their action the situation was brought under
control. Learned counsel also reiterated the Extracts from Manual on
Emergency Preparedness for KAPS Volume I Part II, Page 3 and
Action Plan for Site Emergency. He brought to our notice, in
particular, that on hearing the emergency signal and/or on getting
information of the same through telephone (or any other means), the
Director shall immediately proceed to the main control room. He is
required to alert Collector and District Magistrate, Surat, SDM of
13Page 14
Vyara, Mandvi, Olpad, DSP (rural), Surat. Under Clause 5 of the
aforesaid extracts from Manual. The authorities are required to
depute one Assistant Health Physicist to the assembly areas for
general contamination and radiation checks. Arrangements have to
be made for transportation of injured person/persons to the Hospital
after providing First Aid. Arrangements had to be made for
evacuation of the site personnel, if required. Since none of that was
being done, the appellant acted as a “whistle blower” and alerted the
Press.
17. Mr. Bhushan makes a reference to the letter dated 2nd July,
1994 of the Senior Manager (P & IR) to the appellant as President of
KAKS in which it was alleged that “the story which appeared in
Gujarat Samachar created panic among the people residing in areas
nearby the Project in particular and the State of Gujarat in general
as also the State Administration, thereby causing spread of
disinformation and bringing disrepute to the Project, which was
raised doubts about the safety of the Project and integrity of the
Project Authorities”.
18. Learned counsel, therefore, submitted that the learned Single
Judge as well as the Division Bench have committed a serious error
14Page 15
in not accepting the plea of the appellant that the punishment was
disproportionate to the misconduct. Learned counsel submitted that
when exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India, the High Court is not bound by any technicalities and is
required to do substantial justice where glaring injustice demands
affirmative action. He submitted that in the circumstances ends of
justice would be met in case the punishment of removal is
substituted by the punishment of stoppage of three increments
without cumulative effect. He relies on Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. &
Ors. Vs. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha & Ors.1
, in which
this Court held as under:-
“While the remedy under Article 226 is extraordinary and is
of Anglo-Saxon vintage, it is not a carbon copy of English
processes. Article 226 is a sparing surgery but the lancet
operates where injustice suppurates. While traditional
restraints like availability of alternative remedy hold back the
court, and judicial power should not ordinarily rush in where
the other two branches fear to tread, judicial daring is not
daunted where glaring injustice demands even affirmative
action. The wide words of Article 226 are designed for
service of the lowly numbers in their grievances if the subject
belongs to the court's province and the remedy is
appropriate to the judicial process”.
19. Relying on the aforesaid observations, he submits that the
High Court has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Singe Judge, even
having noticed the principle that the Court can interfere with the
1
 (1980) 2 SCC 593
15Page 16
decision of the Disciplinary Authority, if it seems to be illegal or
suffers from procedural impropriety or is shocking to the judicial
conscience of the Court, erroneously failed to apply the same to the
case of the appellant.
20. The punishment imposed on the appellant suffer from all the
vices of irrationality, perversity and being shockingly
disproportionate and ought to have been set aside and substituted
by a lesser punishment. In support of the submissions, he relies on
Ranjit Thakur Vs. Union of India & Ors.2
, in which this Court held
as under:-
“25. Judicial review generally speaking, is not directed
against a decision, but is directed against the “decisionmaking process”. The question of the choice and quantum of
punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the
court-martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and
the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It
should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock
the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence
of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept
of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect
which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the
court-martial, if the decision of the court even as to sentence
is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would
not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity
are recognised grounds of judicial review. In Council of Civil
Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service9 Lord Diplock
said:
“Judicial review has I think developed to a
stage today when, without reiterating any
analysis of the steps by which the development
has come about, one can conveniently classify
under three heads the grounds on which
2
 (1987) 4 SCC 611
16Page 17
administrative action is subject to control by
judicial review. The first ground I would call
‘illegality’, the second ‘irrationality’ and the third
‘procedural impropriety’. That is not to say that
further development on a case by case basis
may not in course of time add further grounds.
I have in mind particularly the possible
adoption in the future of the principle of
‘proportionality’ which is recognised in the
administrative law of several of our fellow
members of the European Economic
Community;. . .”
21. On the same proposition, the learned counsel has relied on a
number of judgments, but it is not necessary to make a reference to
them as the ratio of law laid down in the aforesaid cases have only
been reiterated. Learned counsel submitted that on 21st April, 2004,
Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pension issued a
Notification for the protection of “whistle blowers” in terms of the
order of this Court in Parivartan & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors.,
Writ Petition (C) No. 93 of 2004 along with Writ Petition (C) No. 539
of 2003 recording the murder of Shri Satyendra Dubey. He also
relied on judgment of this Court in Indirect Tax Practitioners’
Association Vs. R.K. Jain3
 in support of his submission, that the
appellant had acted as “whistle blower” ought not to have been
punished.
3
 (2010) 8 SCC 281
17Page 18
22. Mr. Parekh seriously disputes the version of events as
narrated by the learned counsel for the appellant. He submits that
on 16th June, 1994, as a result of the overflow, the flood water
entered into parts of the plants and, therefore, precautionary actions
were to be taken. Therefore, follow up exercises were being
diligently carried out when everyone was busy in tackling the
situation to save Atomic Power Plant, the appellant, using the official
telephone contacted the following members of the media:-
(i) 623375-The Editor, Gujarat Samachar, Surat
(ii) 20760- Shri Vilasbhai Soni, Press Reporter,
Sandesh, Vyare
(iii) 30225-Hasmuklal and Company, Sardar
Chowk, Bardoli.
23. On 18th June, 1994, at about 11.30 a.m., the appellant
telephoned the pass section of CISF and told Mr. A. Srikrishna,
CISF Constable, that a person asking for him will come to pass
section. The Constable was told to tell the person to wait for the
appellant. After the press reporter arrived, the appellant met him in
his official quarters. Thereafter, the appellant wrote the letter to the
Daily Gujarat Newspaper having the largest circulation in Gujarat.
Relying on the aforesaid, the newspaper published the news. Soon
thereafter on 22nd June, 1994, another news story appeared in
Gujarat Samachar with the title that “Half of Gujarat would have
exploded on June 15”. In this news story, it was stated that “at the
18Page 19
same time chances of an accident damaging not only Surat district
but, the whole of Gujarat and being totally demolished within
seconds have been saved”. According to Mr. Parekh, the aforesaid
story contained false and defamatory allegations of “blatant
corruption going on in the organization”. It gave false and distorted
and inflammatory information about the Project, raising serious
doubts about the safety and security of the Nuclear Power Plant.
The aforesaid news story was capable of creating extreme panic
among the public of Gujarat. After satisfying himself with the safety
situations, the District Collector in his capacity as Director of Site
Emergency Plan of KAPS gave a press release to that effect.
Similarly, the Station Director also issued a press release to diffuse
the panic situation created by the news item released by the
appellant in his own name and signature. These clarifications were
published in the Gujarat Samachar on 23rd June, 1994.
On 5th July, 1994, respondent No. 2 appointed a Committee to
investigate the role of the appellant behind the aforesaid media
reports. Based on the preliminary reports, the Disciplinary Authority
placed the appellant under suspension, in contemplation of
disciplinary proceedings to be initiated against him for major penalty.
The statement of imputation of misconduct of misbehaviour in
support of charges were served on the appellant on
19Page 20
4
th August, 1994. An Inquiry Officer was appointed on
26th December, 1994. At the primary hearing in the enquiry, the
appellant denied all the charges. His choice of Mr. P.B. Sharma as
Defense Assistant was accepted. He was given inspection of all the
documents, he was also asked to submit his list of witnesses. The
appellant had stated that the list of witnesses would be submitted
after consulting his Defense Assistant. On 9th October, 1995, the
hearing of the inquiry was adjourned on the ground that the
appellant had submitted an appeal to NPCIL. On 20th December,
1995, the appellant admitted all the charges leveled against him in
toto and accordingly the inquiry was closed on such admission of the
charges.
24. Mr. Parekh further submitted that the appellant having
admitted all the charges levelled against him can not be permitted to
resile from the same on the ground that any assurance of leniency
were made to him by the respondents. He further submitted that the
appellant has been non-suited at every stage. Even this Court had
only issued notice with regard to the question of punishment. He
points out that the appellant is correct in saying that he is not an
employee of a cloth mill or sugar mill, he was an employee of the
highly sensitive Atomic Centre. He was required to maintain highest
20Page 21
degree of confidentiality at the time of the incident. The appellant,
instead of assisting the control of flood situation, was busy giving
disinformation to the press. He submitted that under the rules and
regulations applicable at the Atomic Centre, press can not be
contacted by any employee other than the Specified Officer. This is
so as the workers in the nuclear power facility are a special category
of employees. They are required to maintain a very high standard
with regard to confidentiality to prevent the leakage of very sensitive
information. Mr. Parekh emphatically denied the claim of the
appellant that he is a “whistle blower”. At the time when the water
was entering into the nuclear plant the appellant made three
telephone calls to the Media divulging the information which he was
not permitted to give. The appellant had even informed the
constable on duty to keep one of the news reporters outside
on 18th June, 1994 when the emergency was at its highest.
Mr. Parekh further pointed out that a mere perusal of the charges
which have been admitted by the appellant would clearly show that
the punishment is not only justified but in fact rather lenient. The
respondents in fact had the option to prosecute the appellant but he
has only been proceeded against the departmentally. Mr. Parekh
also submitted that most of the submissions made by Mr. Bhushan
and the documents relied upon in support of the submissions were
21Page 22
never a part of the record before the High Court. According to the
learned senior counsel, the appellant does not deserve any leniency
and the appeal deserves to be dismissed.
25. We have considered the submissions made by the learned
counsel very anxiously.
26. We have noted in detail the submissions made by
Mr. Bhushan, though strictly speaking, it was not necessary in view
of the categorical admission made by the appellant before the
Enquiry Officer. Having admitted the charges understandably, the
appellant only pleaded for reduction in punishment before the High
Court. The learned Single Judge has clearly noticed that the
counsel for the appellant has only submitted that the punishment is
disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct admitted by the
appellant. The prayer made by the appellant before the Division
Bench in the LPA for amendment of the grounds of appeal to
incorporate the challenge to the findings of guilt was rejected.
27. In our opinion, the learned Single Judge and the Division
Bench have not committed any error in rejecting the submissions
made by the learned counsel for the appellant. We are not inclined
22Page 23
to examine the issue that the actions of the appellant would not
constitute a misconduct under the Rules. In view of the admissions
made by the appellant, no evidence was adduced before the Enquiry
Officer by either of the parties. Once the Enquiry Officer had
declined to accept the conditional admissions made by the
appellant, it was open to him to deny the charges. But he chose to
make an unequivocal admission, instead of reiterating his earlier
denial as recorded in preliminary hearing held on 26th December,
1994. The appellant cannot now be permitted to resile from the
admission made before the Enquiry Officer. The plea to re-open the
enquiry has been rejected by the Appellate as well as the Revisional
Authority. Thereafter, it was not even argued before the learned
Single Judge. Learned counsel had confined the submission to the
quantum of punishment. In LPA, the Division Bench declined to
reopen the issue. In such circumstances, we are not inclined to
exercise our extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 for
reopening the entire issue at this stage. Such power is reserved to
enable this Court to prevent grave miscarriage of justice. It is
normally not exercised when the High Court has taken a view that is
reasonably possible. The appellant has failed to demonstrate any
perversity in the decisions rendered by the Single Judge or the
Division Bench of the High Court.
23Page 24
28. Having examined the entire fact situation, we are unable to
accept the submission of Mr. Bhushan that the appellant was acting
as a “whistle blower”. This Court in the case of Indirect Tax
Practitioners’ Association (supra) has observed as follows:-
“At this juncture, it will be apposite to notice the growing
acceptance of the phenomenon of whistleblower. A
whistleblower is a person who raises a concern about the
wrongdoing occurring in an organisation or body of people.
Usually this person would be from that same organisation.
The revealed misconduct may be classified in many ways;
for example, a violation of a law, rule, regulation and/or a
direct threat to public interest, such as fraud, health/safety
violations and corruption. Whistleblowers may make their
allegations internally (for example, to other people within the
accused organisation) or externally (to regulators, law
enforcement agencies, to the media or to groups concerned
with the issues).”
29.Before making the aforesaid observations, this Court examined in
detail various events which had taken place over a long period of
time in which, the respondent, Editor of the Law Journal, Excise Law
Times had participated. A Contempt Petition was filed by the
appellant association against the respondent on the ground that he
wrote an editorial in the issue dated 1st June, 2009 of the Journal,
which amounted to criminal contempt under Section 2(c) of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. In the editorial, the respondent
appreciated the steps taken by the new President of CESTAT to
cleanse the administration. However, at the same time, he
24Page 25
highlighted the irregularities in transfer and posting of some
members of the Tribunal. He had pointed out that one particular
member, Mr. T.K. Jayaraman had been accommodated at
Bangalore by transferring another member from Bangalore to Delhi
in less than one year of his posting. Apart from this, he had also
criticized some of the orders passed by the bench comprising of
Mr. T.K. Jayaraman, which were adversely commented upon by the
High Court of Karnataka and Kerala. In spite of this, the appellant
contended that, by highlighting the irregularities and blatant
favoritism shown to Mr. T. K. Jayaraman, Mr. R.K. Jain was trying to
scandalize the functioning of CESTAT and lower its esteem in the
eyes of the public. It was pointed out that the article in which the
aforesaid statements have been made, was in breach of the
undertaking filed in this Court in Contempt Petition (Crl.) No. 15 of
1997. In these proceedings, the respondent had given an
undertaking on 25th August, 1998, to abide by the advise given by
his senior counsel that in future whenever there are any serious
complaints regarding the functioning of CEGAT, the proper course
would be to first bring those matters to the notice of the Chief Justice
of India, and/or the Ministry of Finance and await a response or
corrective action for a reasonable time before taking any other
action. During the pendency of the aforesaid contempt case, the
25Page 26
respondent had written a number of detailed letters to the Finance
Minister and other higher authorities in the Government of India
highlighting the specific cases of irregularities, malfunctioning and
corruption in CESTAT. After the notice of contempt was discharged,
the respondent wrote two more letters to the Finance Minister on the
same subject and also pointed out how the appointment and posting
of Mr. T.K. Jayaraman, Member CESTAT was irregular. He wrote
similar letters to the Revenue Secretary; President, CESTAT;
Registrar, CESTAT and the Central Board of Excise and Customs.
Since no cognizance of the aforesaid letters were taken by any of
the five authorities, the respondent wrote the editorial in which he
made the comments, which led to the filing of the Contempt Petition
by the appellant.
30.This Court took notice of the conduct and the credentials of the
respondent. It is noticed that the respondent is not a novice in the
field of Journalism. For decades, he had been fearlessly using his
pen to highlight malfunctioning of CEGAT and its successor
CESTAT. In his letter dated 26th December, 1991 written to the then
Chief Justice of India, he complained that CEGAT is without a
president for last over six months, which has adversely affected the
functioning of the Tribunal. After an in depth analysis of the relevant
26Page 27
constitutional provisions, this Court gave certain suggestions for
improving the functioning of CEGAT and other Tribunals constituted
under Articles 323A and 323B. [See R.K. Jain Vs. Union of India,
(1993) 4 SCC 119]. It was pointed out that the allegations made by
Mr. R.K. Jain having regard to the working of CEGAT are grave and
the authorities can ill afford to turn a “Nelson’s eye” to those
allegations made by a person who is fairly well conversant with the
internal working of the Tribunal.
31. After noticing the aforesaid observations in the earlier case,
this Court in the case of Indirect Tax Practitioners’ Association
(supra), pointed out that respondent was very conscious of the
undertaking filed in the earlier Contempt Petition and this is the
reason why before writing the editorial, he sent several
communications to the functionaries concerned, to bring to their
notice the irregularities in the functioning of CESTAT. The Court
notices that “The sole purpose of writing those letters was to enable
the authorities concerned to take corrective measures but nothing
appears to have been done by them to stem the rot. It is neither the
pleaded case of the appellant nor any material has been placed
before this Court to show that the Finance Minister or the Revenue
Secretary, Government of India had taken any remedial action in the
27Page 28
context of the issues raised by the respondent. Therefore, it is not
possible to hold the respondent guilty of violating the undertaking
given to this Court.”
32. This Court upon meticulously taking note of the entire fact
situation observed that the editorial written by the respondent was
not intended to demean CESTAT as an institution or to scandalize
its functioning. Rather, the object of the editorial was to highlight the
irregularities in appointment, posting and transfer of members of
CESTAT and instances of abuse of the quasi judicial powers. It was
further observed that the editorial highlighted the unsatisfactory
nature of the orders passed by the particular bench of
Mr. T.K. Jayaraman was a member. The orders had been set aside
by the High Courts of Karnataka and Kerala as well as by this Court.
In these circumstances, this Court observed:-
“38. It is not the appellant's case that the facts narrated in
the editorial regarding transfer and posting of the members
of CESTAT are incorrect or that the respondent had
highlighted the same with an oblique motive or that the
orders passed by the Karnataka and Kerala High Courts to
which reference has been made in the editorial were
reversed by this Court. Therefore, it is not possible to record
a finding that by writing the editorial in question, the
respondent has tried to scandalise the functioning of
CESTAT or made an attempt to interfere with the
administration of justice.
41. One of the most interesting questions with respect to
internal whistleblowers is why and under what circumstances
people will either act on the spot to stop illegal and otherwise
28Page 29
unacceptable behaviour or report it. There is some reason to
believe that people are more likely to take action with
respect to unacceptable behaviour, within an organisation, if
there are complaint systems that offer not just options
dictated by the planning and controlling organisation, but a
choice of options for individuals, including an option that
offers near absolute confidentiality. However, external
whistleblowers report misconduct on outside persons or
entities. In these cases, depending on the information's
severity and nature, whistleblowers may report the
misconduct to lawyers, the media, law enforcement or
watchdog agencies, or other local, State, or federal
agencies.
42. In our view, a person like the respondent can
appropriately be described as a whistle blower for the system
who has tried to highlight the malfunctioning of an important
institution established for dealing with cases involving
revenue of the State and there is no reason to silence such a
person by invoking Articles 129 or 215 of the Constitution or
the provisions of the Act.”
33. In our opinion, the aforesaid observations are of no avail to the
appellant. It is a matter of record that the appellant is educated only
upto 12th standard. He is neither an engineer, nor an expert on the
functioning of the Atomic Energy Plants. Apart from being an insider,
the appellant did not fulfill the criteria for being granted the status of
a “whistle blower”. One of the basic requirements of a person being
accepted as a “whistle blower” is that his primary motive for the
activity should be in furtherance of public good. In other words, the
activity has to be undertaken in public interest, exposing illegal
activities of a public organization or authority.
The conduct of the
appellant, in our opinion, does not fall within the high moral and
29Page 30
ethical standard that would be required of a bona fide “whistle
blower”.
34. In our opinion, the appellant without any justification assumed
the role of vigilante. We do not find that the submissions made on
behalf of the respondents to the effect that the appellant was merely
seeking publicity are without any substance.
The newspaper reports
as well as the other publicity undoubtedly created a great deal of
panic among the local population as well as throughout the State of
Gujarat. Every informer can not automatically be said to be a
bonafide “whistle blower”.
A “whistle blower” would be a person who
possesses the qualities of a crusader. His honesty, integrity and
motivation should leave little or no room for doubt. It is not enough
that such person is from the same organization and privy to some
information, not available to the general public. The primary
motivation for the action of a person to be called a “whistle blower”
should be to cleanse an organization. It should not be incidental or
byproduct for an action taken for some ulterior or selfish motive. 
35. We are of the considered opinion that the action of the
appellant herein was not merely to highlight the shortcomings in the
organization.
The appellant had indulged in making scandalous
30Page 31
remarks by alleging that there was widespread corruption within the
organization. Such allegations would clearly have a deleterious
effect throughout the organization apart from casting shadows of
doubts on the integrity of the entire project.
 It is for this reason that
employees working within the highly sensitive atomic organization
are sworn to secrecy and have to enter into a confidentiality
agreement. 
In our opinion, the appellant had failed to maintain the
standard of confidentiality and discretion which was required to be
maintained. 
In the facts of this case, it is apparent that the appellant
can take no advantage of the observations made by this Court in the
case of Indirect Tax Practitioners’ Association (supra). This now
brings us to the reliance placed by the appellant on the judgment in
the case of Gujarat Steel Tubes Case (supra). In our opinion, the
ratio in the aforesaid judgment would have no relevance in the case
of the appellant. We are not satisfied that this is a case of ‘glaring
injustice’. 
36. In our opinion, the punishment imposed on the appellant is not
‘so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience’ of
this Court. The observations of this Court in Ranjit Thakur (supra)
are also of no avail to the appellant. No injustice much less any
grave injustice has been done to the appellant. 
31Page 32
37. We see no merit in the appeal and the same is hereby
dismissed.
…..…….…………………J.
[Surinder Singh Nijjar]
 …..……………………….J.
[M.Y.Eqbal]
New Delhi;
April 09, 2013.
32

SLP is not maintainable, since the main order was not challenged but only the order passed in the review petition alone was challenged in this SLP. Hence, the SLP is, therefore, not maintainable and the same is dismissed.


Page 1
1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Special Leave Petition (Civil) NO.4616 of 2010
Municipal Corporation of Delhi .. Petitioner
Versus
Yashwant Singh Negi .. Respondent
J U D G M E N T
K. S. Radhakrishnan, J
1. This special leave petition has been preferred against the
order dated 11.09.2009 passed by the High Court of Delhi in
Review Petition No.79 of 2009 in LPA No.1233 of 2006. Mr.
Nidhesh Gupta, learned senior counsel appearing for the
respondent raised a preliminary objection that the special leave
petition is not maintainable since the main judgment rendered by
the High Court on 5.11.2008 in LPA No.1233 of 2006 was not
challenged.Page 2
2
2. Mr. Sanjiv Sen, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner
placed considerable reliance on the judgment of this Court in
Eastern Coalfields Limited v. Dugal Kumar (2008) 14 SCC 295
and submitted that the said judgment would apply to the facts of
this case and the SLP is perfectly maintainable, even though the
petitioner had not challenged the original order passed by the
High Court on 5.11.2008. Learned counsel submitted that on
dismissal of the review petition, the earlier order stood merged, in
the order passed in the review petition, consequently, the SLP is
perfectly maintainable. Considerable reliance was placed on
paragraphs 21 and 22 of the above Judgment, which read as
under:
“21. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties,
in our opinion, the appeal deserves to be partly allowed.
So far as the technical objection raised by the Company
with regard to territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of
Calcutta is concerned, in our opinion, it would not be
appropriate to set aside the order passed in favour of
the writ petitioner on that ground. It is clear from the
record that the writ petition came up for admission
hearing on 6-9-1999 and the counsel for the appellant
Company was present. Not only that he did not raise
any objection as to territorial jurisdiction of the court, he
expressly made a statement before the court to pass
“usual order”. Accordingly, an order was passed
directing the Company to allot “balance quantity of
1008 MT” of coal to the writ petitioner. We are,
therefore, unable to uphold the contention of thePage 3
3
learned counsel for the appellant Company that the
High Court of Calcutta had no territorial jurisdiction to
entertain the writ petition.
22. But we are also unable to uphold the contention of
the writ petitioner that the appeal is not maintainable
since the Company had challenged the order passed in
review petition dated 28-1-2002 and not the main order
dated 17-2-2000 dismissing intra-court appeal.”
3. We find ourselves unable to agree with the views expressed
by this Court in Eastern Coalfields Limited (supra). In our view,
once the High Court has refused to entertain the review petition
and the same was dismissed confirming the main order, there is
no question of any merger and the aggrieved person has to
challenge the main order and not the order dismissing the review
petition because on the dismissal of the review petition the
principle of merger does not apply. In this connection reference
may be made to the Judgment of this Court in Manohar S/o
Shankar Nale and others v. Jaipalsing S/o Shivlalsing
Rajput and others (2008) 1 SCC 520 wherein this Court has
taken the view that once the review petition is dismissed the
doctrine of merger will have no application whatsoever. This
Court in DSR Steel (Private) Limited v. State of Rajasthan
and others (2012) 6 SCC 782 also examined the variousPage 4
4
situations which might arise in relation to the orders passed in
review petitions. Reference to paragraphs 25, 25.1, 25.2 and 25.3
is made, which are extracted below for ready reference:
“25. Different situations may arise in relation to review
petitions filed before a court or tribunal.
25.1. One of the situations could be where the review
application is allowed, the decree or order passed by the
court or tribunal is vacated and the
appeal/proceedings in which the same is made are
reheard and a fresh decree or order passed in the same.
It is manifest that in such a situation the subsequent
decree alone is appealable not because it is an order in
review but because it is a decree that is passed in a
proceeding after the earlier decree passed in the very
same proceedings has been vacated by the court
hearing the review petition.
25.2. The second situation that one can conceive of is
where a court or tribunal makes an order in a review
petition by which the review petition is allowed and the
decree/order under review is reversed or modified. Such
an order shall then be a composite order whereby the
court not only vacates the earlier decree or order but
simultaneous with such vacation of the earlier decree or
order, passes another decree or order or modifies the
one made earlier. The decree so vacated reversed or
modified is then the decree that is effective for the
purposes of a further appeal, if any, maintainable under
law.
25.3. The third situation with which we are concerned in
the instant case is where the revision petition is filed
before the Tribunal but the Tribunal refuses to interfere
with the decree or order earlier made. It simply dismisses
the review petition. The decree in such a case suffersPage 5
5
neither any reversal nor an alteration or modification. It
is an order by which the review petition is dismissed
thereby affirming the decree or order. In such a
contingency there is no question of any merger and
anyone aggrieved by the decree or order of the Tribunal
or court shall have to challenge within the time
stipulated by law, the original decree and not the order
dismissing the review petition. Time taken by a party in
diligently pursing the remedy by way of review may in
appropriate cases be excluded from consideration while
condoning the delay in the filing of the appeal, but such
exclusion or condonation would not imply that there is a
merger of the original decree and the order dismissing
the review petition.”
4. We are in complete agreement with the principle laid down
by this Court in DSR Steel (Private) Limited (supra) and
applying the 3rd situation referred to therein in paragraph 25.3, we
are inclined to dismiss this special leave petition. We find force in
the contention made by the learned senior counsel appearing for
the respondent that this SLP is not maintainable, since the main
order was not challenged but only the order passed in the review
petition alone was challenged in this SLP. Hence, the SLP is,
therefore, not maintainable and the same is dismissed. 
……………………………..J.
(K.S. Radhakrishnan)
……………………………..J.Page 6
6
(Dipak Misra)
New Delhi,
April 08, 2013

murder case = Ali Mohammad Lone who was a neighbour of the deceased and the accused unequivocally stated that he saw the appellant carrying a gun and as the deceased arrived at the spot, he took aim at him and opened fire. Gani Shah, hit by the shots, fell down. He also stated that the motive behind the killing was the refusal by the deceased to give his daughter Lovely in marriage to the appellant. 19. We have carefully examined the testimonies of the eye-witnesses and we find that those are intrinsically sound and reliable. There is no reason for this Court not to accept the evidences of those ocular witnesses. The evidences of each of the six witnesses are sound internally and corroborate the testimonies of the other witnesses. 20. On a careful consideration of all the materials on record and on hearing counsel for the parties, we are of the view that both the trial court and the High Court rightly held the appellant guilty of the charge of murder. We see no merit in the appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed.


Page 1
1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.700 OF 2006
SHABIR AHMED TELI … APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF JAMMU & KASHMIR … RESPONDENT
J U D GM E N T
Aftab Alam,J.
1. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order dated
October 16, 2003 passed by the Jammu & Kashmir High Court in Criminal Appeal
No.4 of 2002 with criminal reference No.27 of 2002. By the impugned judgment,
the High Court dismissed the appellant’s appeal and affirmed the judgment and
Page 2
2
order passed by the trial court by which the appellant was convicted under section
302 of the Ranbir Penal Code and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment.
2. According to the prosecution case, on August 6, 1997, at about 8:30 P.M.
one Gani Shah (the deceased) was returning to his house after offering the ‘Isha’
(late evening) prayers at the local mosque in village Magray-pora of tehsil
Anantnag. The appellant intercepted him in the lane, at a spot just outside the
kitchen of the house of the deceased and taking aim at him fired several shots from
the gun, which he was carrying. Gani Shah, hit by the gunshots fell down dead on
the spot. His wife and son and some neighbours who gathered at the place of
occurrence lifted him physically and took him inside the house. It is further the
case of the prosecution that the appellant wanted to marry the younger daughter of
Gani Shah, namely, Lovely. But the proposal for marriage sent by him was
rejected both by Gani Shah and Lovely and it was in retribution of the rejection of
his marriage proposal that he killed Gani Shah.
3. Apparently, no one from the victim’s family went to the police to report the
matter. On the following morning, i.e., on August 7, 1997, the village Chowkidar,
Ghulam Rasool Shah learnt that Gani Shah had been killed. Then, he along with
the village Numberdar, Mohd. Ahsan Dar went to the police station at Achabal and
reported the matter there at 8:15 A.M. In the report, he simply stated that onPage 3
3
August 6, 1997, at 8:30 P.M. one Gani Shah, son of Gh. Mohd. Shah, while he was
coming to his house from the mosque after offering the ‘Isha namaz’, was attacked
with gunfire by unknown gunmen outside his own kitchen and he died on the spot.
He also made it clear that neither he nor the Numberdar had witnessed the
occurrence; that they had only heard that one Gani Shah was killed by unidentified
gunmen by gunshots fired from an automatic weapon, the previous evening after
the ‘Isha Namaz’. The information given by the Chowkidar was reduced to
writing by the SHO and was registered as FIR No.21/1997 of Police Station
Achabal.
4. The police after investigation submitted charge-sheet against the appellant
following which the case was committed to the court of sessions where the
appellant was charged for commission of offences under sections 302/341/201
RPC read with sections 7/25 of the Arms Act. The appellant pleaded not guilty and
the case was set for prosecution evidence. At that stage, the public prosecutor filed
an application for further investigation of the case under section 170(8) of the Code
of Criminal Procedure. The court allowed the prayer and on further investigation
the police submitted a supplementary report, this time naming three others
Mansoor Ahmad Wagey, Nasir Ahmad Hajam and Shabir Ahmad Hajam, also as
accused. The newly added accused were charged for commission of offences under
sections 302/341/201/109 RPC and 7/25 of the Arms Act. Page 4
4
5. At the conclusion of the trial, however, the trial court acquitted the three
other accused who were named in the supplementary charge-sheet but held and
found the appellant guilty of committing murder of Gani Shah. It, accordingly,
convicted and sentenced the accused, as noted above, by judgment and order dated
August 23, 2002/September 21, 2002. As the sentence awarded to the appellant
was life imprisonment, the trial court made a reference to the High Court for
confirmation under section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which was
registered as Reference No.27 of 2002. The appellant in turn preferred an appeal
against the judgment and order passed by the trial court which was registered in the
High Court as Criminal Appeal No.4 of 2002. The High Court upheld the criminal
reference and dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant by the judgment and
order dated October 16, 2003.
6. The appellant has now come to this Court in appeal by special leave.
7. There are certain features of this case that stand out and that need to be dealt
with at the outset.
(I). According to the prosecution, the occurrence took
place on August 6, 1997 at 8:30 P.M. Achabal Police
Station is at a distance of 3 kilometers from village
Magray-pora where the occurrence took place.
Nonetheless, no one from the victim’s family went toPage 5
5
report the matter to the police. It was only the following
morning that the Chowkidar and the Numberdar of the
village went to the police station and there they reported
that Gani Shah was killed by “unknown gunmen”. They
also made it clear that they were not the witnesses of the
occurrence and they had only heard that Gani Shah was
killed by “unidentified gunmen”.
(II). On getting information about the occurrence, the
police came to the place of occurrence at Magrey-Pora at
about 8:30 or 8:45 a.m. and went back after about half an
hour, leaving behind the body of the deceased with the
family members for burial.
(III). On that date (August 7, 1997) the police recorded
the statements only of the informant Rasool Shah and Dr.
Shabbir Ahmad, Medical Officer, PHC, Achabal, whom
they had brought with them to examine the deceased. The
informant Rasool Shah stated that he was a chowkidar of
village Kanganhal and resided there. On August 6, 1997
at about 8:30 in the evening he heard a gunshot but
fearing terrorist fire he did not come out from his house.
On the next morning he came to village Magrey-Pora and
came to learn that Abdul Gani Shah, while he was
returning to his house after offering Isha prayer in the
mosque, was killed by an unknown gunman. He once
again made it clear that he was not a witness to the
occurrence nor did he have any information as to whoPage 6
6
killed Abdul Gani Shah, the previous night. Dr. Shabir
Ahmad in his statement recorded under section 161
Cr.P.C. said that on medical examination it was apparent
that the death (of Gani Shah) was caused due to bullet
shots and loss of blood; further, that the cause of death
being apparent, there was no need for any post-mortem.
(IV). No post-mortem was held on the body of the
deceased Gani Shah. Dr. Basheer Ahmad Paddar,
Assistant Surgeon, Achabal, who was examined as one of
the prosecution witness stated that on August 7, 1997 the
police had taken him to Magrey-pora where he was
shown the dead body of Gani Shah. On examination he
found three gunshot injuries on the body of the deceased.
He identified the death certificate dated August 7, 1997
given by him which was marked as Ex.PWM1. He
further said that no detailed post-mortem was conducted
because the cause of death was apparent. He added that
the cause of death was due to multiple gunshot wounds
resulting in hemorrhage and shock with cardiorespiratory arrest. He also said that he could not tell the
time of death as it was not recorded in certificate given
by him. He was also unable to state the distance from
which the shots might have been fired.
(V). Zakir Hussain Shah and Abdul Rehman Shah who
are the son and the son-in-law respectively of the
deceased and who are among the six eye witnesses laterPage 7
7
examined before the trial court, were first examined by
the police on August 9, 1997. Fatah, the widow of the
deceased and Zubaida, one of the daughters of the
deceased who too are eye-witnesses of the occurrence
were first examined by the police under Section 161 of
the RPC and on August 13, 1997 and August 15, 1997
respectively. The remaining two eye-witnesses namely,
Mohd. Aslam Shah and Ali Mohd. Lone, who are not the
family members of the deceased, and who are also the
eye witnesses of the occurrence were examined by the
police on October 7, 1997. The statements of all these
witnesses were also recorded before a Magistrate under
section 164 of the RPC on May 5, 2000.
(VI). The appellant was arrested on May 15, 2000 that is
to say after about three years of the occurrence.
(VII). No gun was recovered from the appellant or from
any other accused in the case and it was for that reason
that the trial court acquitted the appellant of the charge
under section 7/25 of the Arms Act.
(VIII). The charge-sheet was finally submitted after
almost three years of the occurrence.
8. Applying the normal standards for judging the soundness and correctness of
a criminal charge, the aforesaid facts and circumstances would tend to
considerably weaken the case of the prosecution. But the question is why thePage 8
8
police investigation was so painfully slow, reluctant and shoddy? We have seen the
village Chowkidar saying that he heard the gun shot at 8.30 in the evening of
August 6, 1997 but he did not venture out of his house for fear of terrorist fire.
Next morning when he went to report the matter to the police he seems to be at
pains to make it clear that he had not witnessed the occurrence and as far as he was
concerned the killer was some unknown gunman. On getting the report, the police
come to the village but do not stay for more than half an hour. There is no
investigation at the site of the killing. No statement is taken of any witness. No
need is felt to have the post-mortem of the body of the deceased. The empty
cartridges fallen at the site of the killing that were collected by the witnesses are
handed over to the police but those are either thrown away or put away somewhere
as never again to see the light of the day. No attempt is made to look for the
accused, much less to arrest him even though he lived in village Magray-pora
itself. No attempt is made to search for or recover the weapon of crime which,
according to the charge-sheet submitted by the police almost three years after the
occurrence, was an AK-47 rifle.
9. In order to understand the highly unusual way in which the police
investigation took place, it is necessary to probe further and to see the personality
of the appellant. The appellant is described by the prosecution witnesses as a
member of “Ikhwan”. The “Ikhwan” is supposed to be a loose organization thatPage 9
9
was made of surrendered militants in Kashmir who worked or purported to work as
informers for the security forces and were also used for liquidating the secessionist
militants. The members of the “Ikhwan1” were mostly unruly, violent elements
generally believed to enjoy the patronage and protection of the security forces.
Common people feared them and as it would appear from this case even the state
police was wary of laying a hand on them.
Zakir Husain Shah (PW.2) stated:
“Accused Shabbir Ahmad Teli had relationship with Ikhwan
Tanjeem.”
He further said:
“I used to see the accused persons with army men, however, at
the time of occurrence, army men were not with him.”
Abdul Rehman Shah (PW.3) stated before the court:
“Accused Shabbir Teli was concerned with Ikhwan and the said
Tanjeem gave rifle to him.”
Zubaida Zakir Husain Shah (PW.4) stated before the court:
“Shabbir Ahmad Teli had gun and was working with Ikhwan.
Other accused persons have no concern with Tanjeem.
However, the above-named accused persons were friend of
Shabbir Ahmad.”
1 The full name of the group was “Ikhwan-ul-Muslemin” which literally means the Brotherhood of Muslims.Page 10
10
Mohammad Afzal Shah (PW.7) stated before the court:
“Accused Shabbir Tali was not wearing Maran but he was in
police uniform and was having rifle in his hands.”
10. From the statements of the prosecution witnesses, it is also clear that the
family members of the deceased were full of fears of the appellant. The appellant
was a neighbour of the deceased; he would come to the house of the deceased as he
wished and give to his family members open threats of dire consequences for not
giving Lovely to him in marriage. The family members of the deceased had the
apprehension that to give effect to his threats he might do something dreadful.
Lovely was sent away to live with some relatives in some other place for fear that
she might be kidnapped by the appellant.
11. Mohammad Afzal Shah who was examined as PW.7 stated before the court
that he was a marriage broker and about three years ago he had fixed the marriage
of Lovely, the daughter of the deceased in some family at Palipura. This greatly
displease the appellant who came to his house carrying a rifle and asked him to
break the marriage fixed by him and giving the threat that otherwise he would kill
him. He also said that the appellant was connected with Ikhwan.
12. In this background, we propose to test the truthfulness of the prosecution
case on the intrinsic worth of the prosecution evidence leaving aside the failings of
the police investigation.Page 11
11
13. In support of its case, the prosecution examined six eye witnesses. Four of
the eye-witnesses are the family members of the deceased, being his son (Zakir
Husain Shah), widow (Fatah), daughter (Zubaida) and son-in-law (Abdul Rehman
Shah). The other two, namely Mohammad Aslam Shah and Ali Mohammad Lone
are residents of the same village, unrelated both to the deceased and the appellant.
14. From the deposition of PW.2 Zakir Husain Shah, it appears that after doing
the ‘Isha Namaz’ on August 6, 1997, he returned to his house leaving behind his
father in the mosque. As he came to the house, there was a gunshot outside in the
lane. On hearing the shot, he and his mother Fatima came out of the house carrying
a lantern. He saw the appellant standing in the lane carrying an automatic rifle.
The appellant threatened them and asked them to go back inside the house. They
came back to the house and watched from the open window. He saw his father
coming out of the mosque and Manzoor Ahmad (one of the three accused acquitted
by the trial court) who was standing near the mosque signaling to the appellant that
his father was returning to the house. As his father came near the house, the
appellant, taking aim at him, fired several shots from his gun, as a result of which
his father fell down at the spot and died. He also stated that on hearing the first
gunshot (that was perhaps meant to announce the arrival of the appellant at the spot
or to scare away any people from there), his sister Zubaida too had come out of the
house and she and her husband Abdul Rehman Shah were also present at the spotPage 12
12
when the appellant killed his father by firing at him from his gun. Zakir Husain
Shah was subjected to long and searching cross-examination but there is nothing
that can be said to create any doubt about the veracity of his narrative. His
deposition is truthful, clear and definite.
15. The other three family members, namely, Fatah, the wife of the deceased,
Abdul Rehman Shah, son-in-law of the deceased and Zubaida, the daughter of the
deceased also narrated the same facts. Their evidences are quite consistent and
fully corroborative of each other. Zubaida also said that as her father fell down hit
by the shots fired by the appellant, she rushed to him and took her head in her lap
and he took his last breath in her arms.
16. Apart from the four family members, the prosecution case is also supported
by Mohammad Aslam Shah and Ali Mohammad Lone.
17. Mohammad Aslam Shah testified that he saw the appellant with the gun
standing near the kitchen of the house of the deceased. As the deceased arrived
there, on his way back from the mosque, the appellant fired four shots from his gun
hitting the deceased in his chest and killing him on the spot. Mohammad Aslam
Shah also stated that the occurrence was witnessed, besides him, by Zakir Husain,
Zubaida, Fatah and Rehman Shah and some other witnesses including Ali
Mohammad Lone.
Page 13
13
18. Ali Mohammad Lone who was a neighbour of the deceased and the accused
unequivocally stated that he saw the appellant carrying a gun and as the deceased
arrived at the spot, he took aim at him and opened fire. Gani Shah, hit by the
shots, fell down. He also stated that the motive behind the killing was the refusal
by the deceased to give his daughter Lovely in marriage to the appellant. 
19. We have carefully examined the testimonies of the eye-witnesses and we
find that those are intrinsically sound and reliable. There is no reason for this Court
not to accept the evidences of those ocular witnesses. The evidences of each of the
six witnesses are sound internally and corroborate the testimonies of the other
witnesses. 
20. On a careful consideration of all the materials on record and on hearing
counsel for the parties, we are of the view that both the trial court and the High
Court rightly held the appellant guilty of the charge of murder. We see no merit in
the appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed.
21. The bail bonds of the appellant are cancelled. The appellant is directed to
surrender within one month from today failing which the trial court should take
coercive steps for taking him in custody to make him serve out the remaining
period of his sentence.Page 14
14
……….…………………..J.
(Aftab Alam)
…………………..
…………………..J.
(R.M. Lodha)
New Delhi,
April 11, 2013.

the High Court allowed the Government Appeal, set aside the judgment of acquittal rendered by the trial court, and finding the appellant guilty of the offence of murder convicted him under section 302 of the Penal Code and gave him the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for life. = tried to conceal the relationship between him and the deceased.= “Bhabhi” is a common form of address for the wife of someone who is known from before.; Coming now to Ex.Ka-10, it needs to be noted that that was an application for leave of absence given where he was working. It is a common failing to try to justify the unsanctioned absence from work by making out excuses and by taking some liberty with actual facts. Therefore, in his application for condoning the absence for four days, if he said that his cousin had met with a tragic accident, it cannot be inferred that the deceased was actually his cousin and in court he was trying to conceal the relationship. ; The Investigating Officer (PW.11) stated that he arrested the appellant at 8.00 p.m. on July 28, 1988. In course of interrogation he volunteered to produce the scissors used for killing the deceased from his shop. He took the Investigating Officer to his shop, opened it with the keys kept in his pocket and recovered the blood stained scissors from under the shop counter and produced it before the Investigating Officer. 35. PW.6 stated that on July 28, 1988, while he was going to the house of the deceased, he met the police people in Indira colony (the place where the occurrence took place). The appellant was also with them. The police people brought the appellant to his shop and got it opened and on the asking of the Daroga, the appellant picked up a pair of scissors from the counter of his shop and handed it to the police. A recovery memo was prepared and the signatures of the witness and one Bhim Singh were taken on the recovery On a careful consideration of the materials on record and the submissions made on behalf of the appellant and the State, we are of the view that the High Court has rightly rejected the view taken by the trial court as wholly untenable and has rightly accepted the evidences of PW.2 and PW.3 in order to bring home the guilt of the appellant. 37. In the light of the discussion above, we find no merit in the appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed.


Page 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1702 OF 2008
Rajendra Singh … Appellant
Versus
State of Uttaranchal … Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Aftab Alam, J.
1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated April 30,
2008 passed by the Uttarakhand High Court in Government Appeal No.1174
of 2001 (Old No.303 of 1991). By the impugned judgment, the High Court
allowed the Government Appeal, set aside the judgment of acquittal
rendered by the trial court, and finding the appellant guilty of the offence of
murder convicted him under section 302 of the Penal Code and gave him the
sentence of rigorous imprisonment for life. 
2. The case of the prosecution is based on a written report dated July 26,
1988 submitted at Police Station Dehradun by one Vijay Singh s/o Puran
Singh Rana (hereinafter referred to as “the informant”). In the written report
Page 2
it was stated that the informant’s elder brother, namely, Kishan Singh Rana
(the deceased) was a peon in the Bank of India, Rajpur Road Branch,
Dehradun. He had given a pair of pants and some cloth for stitching to
Rajendra Singh tailor (the appellant), whose shop is on the road just near
their house. The appellant did not return the stitched clothes even after
several days and on the evening prior to the date of occurrence, there was a
quarrel between the informant’s brother and the appellant on that issue. On
July 26, 1988 (the date of occurrence) the informant’s brother had gone to
the bank as usual on his motor cycle. He returned from the bank at about
1.00 p.m. and as he reached in front of the appellant’s shop, he got down
from the motor cycle as the road was broken at that point. At that instant, the
appellant came out of his shop carrying a pair of scissors in his hands;
hurling abuses, he came down to the road and attacked the informant’s
brother with the scissors with the intent to kill him. In order to save his life,
Kishan Singh Rana ran down the road but the appellant chased him and
caught him after some distance in front of Chintamani’s house. At that spot
he gave the informant’s brother many blows by the scissors, one after the
other. Kishan Singh Rana fell down bleeding on the road. It was further
stated in the written report that besides the informant, Makhan Singh
(PW.2), Laxman (Motor) Auto Mechanic (not examined) and his sister-in-
2Page 3
law, Deepa (the wife of the deceased – PW.3) and many other persons and
women of the area witnessed the occurrence. After assaulting the deceased,
the appellant fled away from there. It was further stated in the written report
that Makhan Singh took the informant’s brother to Dun Hospital, where he
was declared brought dead. The written report concluded with the request to
take legal action against the appellant.
3. The written report submitted by Vijay Singh was incorporated in the
first information report (report No.230) giving rise to criminal case
No.483/88/-under section 302 IPC, P.S. Dehradun.
4. The police after investigation submitted charge-sheet and the
appellant was put on trial on the charge under section 302 of the Penal Code.
5. In support of the charge, the prosecution examined 11 witnesses.
PW.1, PW.2 and PW.3 are the eye witnesses of the occurrence, of whom
PW.1 is also the first informant. PW.4 is one of the witnesses of the recovery
of blood stained and plain earth and a chappal from the place of occurrence.
He also identified his signature on the site plan (Ex.Ka-3) of the place of
occurrence. PW.5 is another witness of the recovery of blood stained and
plain earth, two chappals and one sandle from the place of occurrence. He
identified his signature on the seizure memo (Ex.La-3). PW.6 and PW.7 are
3Page 4
witnesses of the recovery of the scissors from the appellant’s shop. PW.8 is
the doctor who had conducted post-mortem on the body of the deceased.
PW.9 is a formal witness, the scribe of the chik FIR. PW.10 is a SubInspector of Police who had examined the place of occurrence and had
seized the articles from there. PW.11 is the Investigating Officer of the case.
6. The trial court found that there were a number of discrepancies in the
depositions of the eye-witnesses and held that the prosecution was not able
to establish the charge against the appellant. It, accordingly, acquitted the
appellant by the judgment and order dated November 16, 1990.
7. The State Government filed an appeal against the judgment of the trial
court and the High Court took the view that the reasons given by the trial
court for not accepting the statements of PW.2 and PW.3 were specious and
quite untenable. The High Court found that both PW.2 and PW.3 are wholly
reliable witnesses and there was no reason not to accept their evidences. It,
accordingly, set aside the judgment passed by the trial court and convicted
and sentenced the appellant, as noted above.
8. The appellant is now in appeal before this Court.
4Page 5
9. Before proceeding to examine the ocular evidence adduced by the
prosecution in support of its case, we may first see the medical evidence. As
noted above, PW.8 conducted the post mortem on the body of Kishan Singh
Rana on July 27, 1987. He found as many as 16 injuries on the body of the
deceased which are as under:-
“1. Stab wound 2.5 cm x 1 cm x cavity deep on left side of
chest, 9 cm below left nipple midline direction backward and
medially.
2. Stab wound 1.5 cm x .5 cm x muscle deep on left side of
abdomen, 8 cm below injury No.1 and 11 cm away from the
umbilicus.
3. Stab wound 4 cm x 1.5 cm x cavity deep on left side of
abdomen direction medially backward and downward.
4. Contusion 6 cm x 4 cm on back of left elbow and arm.
5. Contusion 22 cm x 3 cm on right arm extending from right
shoulder up to elbow (front aspect).
6. Lacerated wound 2 cm x 1 cm on right side of forehead x
scalp deep, 6 cm above outer angle of right eye.
7. Stab wound 3 cm x 1 cm x cavity deep on right side of chest
lower part on ant axillary line 12 cm below right nipple going
upward medially and backward, 12 cm below right nipple.
8. Stab wound 2.5 cm x 1 cm x cavity deep on right side of
chest in post axillary line 6 cm behind injury No.7.
9. Stab wound 3 cm x 1.5 cm on back of right side x cavity
deep going downwards backwards 7 cm below injury No.8.
5Page 6
10. Stab wound 2 cm x 1 cm on right buttock x muscle deep 15
cm below injury No.9 and 5 cm away from vert. column.
11. Stab wound 1.5 cm x .5 cm x cavity deep on right side of
back, 5 cm away from injury No.9 direction medially and
forward.
12. Stab wound 2.5 cm x 1 cm on right side of back x cavity
deep, 6 cm above injury No.11 direction medially and forward.
13. Stab wound 3 cm x 1.5 cm on right side of chest x cavity
deep over right back, 10 cm away from injury No.12 over the
inferior angle of scapula direction forward, medially and
downwards, 10 cm above injury No.12.
14. Stab wound 2.5 cm x 1 cm on right side of back of chest 8
cm above injury No.13 and 15 cm away from midline over the
upper part of scapula. Direction backward, medially and
upward.
15. Stab wound 1.5 cm x .5 cm x cavity deep 5 cm away from
vert. column and 8 cm away from injury No.14.
16. Stab wound 3 cm x 1.5 cm x chest cavity deep on left side
of lower chest back going downward forward and medially 4
cms away from midline, at L2 level.”
10. Here, it may be noted that apart from injuries 4 and 5 which are
contusions that may have been caused due to fall, the rest 14 are stab
injuries. The medical evidence is, thus, quite consistent with the prosecution
case that the deceased was killed by inflicting injuries by a pair of scissors.
11. Let us now come to the ocular evidence.
6Page 7
12. The informant Vijay Singh who is the younger brother of the deceased
was examined as PW.1. In his examination-in-chief he fully supported the
prosecution case but in course of cross-examination in paragraph 12 of his
deposition he stated as under:-
“……….. On the day of occurrence I had gone to school. I had
come back from school at 2.30 P.M. when I came back then I
was informed that my brother was killed. People were weeping
in the house. Then I had gone to hospital. Scissor blow was not
given in my presence.”
13. It is for the reason of this statement that the trial court discarded the
evidence of PW.1. 
14. It is difficult to fault the trial court for rejecting the evidence of PW.1
but let us now see the evidences of PW.2 and PW.3. 
15. It is undeniable that both PW.2 and PW.3 fully supported the
prosecution case in regard to the assault by the appellant on the deceased
with a pair of scissors. 
PW.3, the wife of the deceased also deposed before
the court regarding the genesis of the occurrence i.e., the quarrel between the
deceased and the appellant that had taken place on the evening before the
date of occurrence over the appellant’s failure to return the clothes given by
the deceased for stitching even after a number of days. 
Further, the
7Page 8
deposition of PW.3 in regard to the assault by the appellant on the deceased
is quite graphic. 
16. The trial court, however, highlighted certain discrepancies between
the statements of PW.2 and PW.3 and for that reason found them to be
unreliable. 
Those very discrepancies were emphasized by the counsel for the
appellant to urge before this Court that the judgment of the trial court was
quite sound and the High Court was in error in reversing that judgment and
holding the appellant guilty of the charge.
17. In order to appreciate the view taken by the trial court and the
submissions made on behalf of the appellant in its support we may advert to
the depositions of PW.2 and PW.3.
18. PW.2 Makhan Singh stated before the court that at the time of the
occurrence he was not a tenant of the deceased. He further said that he had
not said to Darogaji that he was a tenant in the house of Kishan Singh and
he did not know how he (Darogaji) had so written in his statement. He
further stated that in those days he was not working in any factory and he
had not said that he was working in a factory. He had given (the No.) 119/3
as his address. That house belonged to the deceased. He was a resident of
Tehri Garhwal and the deceased too was a resident of Tehri Garhwal. They
thus, belonged to the same place. They also belonged to the same caste. He
8Page 9
knew Kishan Singh and Rajendra Singh from before. He also said that he
had no relationship with Kishan Singh.
19. PW.2 was recalled for further evidence. On recall he reiterated that he
had no relationship with the deceased Kishan Singh. He was then shown an
application that was marked as Exhibit Ka-10 and he admitted that it was
written in his hand and it was given at the Drona Hotel. In that application it
was stated that his “Chachera Bhai” (paternal cousin), Kishan Singh had
met with a tragic accident and for that reason he was unable to report for
duty from July 26 to July 30, 1988. He further stated that he had given the
number of the house of Kishan Singh because the place where he stayed had
no number.
20. PW.3, the wife of the deceased denied before the court that Makhan
Singh lived in their house as a tenant. She further said that Makhan Singh
lived in Indra Colony and she did not know Makhan Singh before the
occurrence. She further said that she had seen him first when the occurrence
took place and she came to know his name when it was said to her by the
police. The police had come to her house at 5.00 to 6.00 P.M. She did not
remember whether or not Makhan Singh was with them at that time.
21. The Investigating Officer was examined as PW.11. No question was
asked to him with reference to any statement of Makhan Singh recorded
9Page 10
under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He, too, was recalled
for further evidence and on recall he said that Makhan Singh addressed
Deepa-PW.3 as “Bhabhi”.
22. In the statement of the appellant recorded under section 313 of the
Code of Criminal procedure, the court put to him the following question:-
“It has come in the statement of Shri Naresh Pal Yadav,
SI PW.11 that Makhan Singh had called Deepa as “Bhabhi”.
What do you have to say in this regard?
Ans.: She is real Bhabhi (sister-in-law). Witness Makhan
Singh lives with his Bhabhi.”
23. The depositions of PW.2 and PW.3 are discussed by the trial court in
paragraph 13 of its judgment where it made the following observations:
“Now, there remains the testimony of Makhan Singh Rana
(PW.2) and Smt. Deepa PW.3. Makhan Singh Rana (PW.2)
tried to conceal the relationship between him and the deceased.
Makhan Singh PW.2 stated that he had no relationship with
Kishan Singh, deceased. He further stated that he was not the
tenant of Kishan Singh. He further stated that he had not told
the Investigating Officer that he was the tenant of Kishan Singh
in that house, but the Investigation Officer stated in his
statement that Makhan Singh told that he was the tenant and he
gave the address of his house 119/3 Nai Basti. Naresh Pal
Yadav, SHO PW.11 stated that Makhan Singh told Deepa as his
Bhabhi. Makhan PW.2 stated in his re-examination that he had
written in the application Ex. KA-10 Kishan Singh as cousin
brother. He stated that this fact was written in the application
wrongly, but he has not stated the reasons why this fact was
written in the application wrongly. Moreover, Ghanshyam Das
DW.2 stated that the application for Ration-Card of Makhan
Singh was on the address of 119/3 Nai Basti, Chukhuwala.
10Page 11
Smt. Deepa PW3 also stated in his (sic. her) cross-examination
that Makhan Singh was not the cousin of her husband. She
stated in her cross-examination that she did not know Makhan
Singh before the incident. When this accident took place she
knew the name of Makhan Singh. The police personnel told the
name of Makhan Singh, then she knew the name of Makhan
Singh. Thus both the witnesses Makhan Singh PW2 and Smt.
Deepa PW3 are intentionally concealing their relationship. It is
highly strange that Smt. Deepa does not know the name of her
husband's cousin.”
24. The above quoted passage from the trial court judgment suffers from
some errors of fact.
We have perused the evidence of PW.11 more than
once but we failed to notice any statement in his deposition that Makhan
Singh had given his address as house No.119/3, Nai Basti and had told him
that he was a tenant of the deceased.
As a matter of fact, it was PW.2,
Makhan Singh himself who truthfully accepted that in his statement before
the Investigating Officer he had given his address as No. 119/3 which was
the house of Kishan Singh, the deceased. 
In his statement on recall he had
also explained that he had given the address of the house of the deceased
because the place where he lived had no clearly ascertainable address.
Moreover, both he and the deceased came from the same place and belonged
to the same caste and he knew the deceased from before.
He repeatedly
denied that he lived in the house of the deceased as a tenant and there is no
reason not to accept his statement.
11Page 12
25. Further, calling Deepa as “Bhabhi” does not at all mean that Makhan
Singh was a blood relation of Kishan Singh Rana.
“Bhabhi” is a common
form of address for the wife of someone who is known from before.
Moreover, Makhan Singh had clearly said that both he and Kishan Singh
Rana belonged to Tehri Garhwal and they were also of the same caste and
further that he knew Kishan Singh Rana from before.
In those
circumstances, to call the wife of the deceased as “Bhabhi” was quite natural
for him but at the same time it did not, by any means, show that he had any
blood relationship with the deceased.
26. Coming now to Ex.Ka-10, it needs to be noted that that was an
application for leave of absence given where he was working. It is a
common failing to try to justify the unsanctioned absence from work by
making out excuses and by taking some liberty with actual facts. Therefore,
in his application for condoning the absence for four days, if he said that his cousin had met with a tragic accident, it cannot be inferred that the deceased was actually his cousin and in court he was trying to conceal the relationship. 
27. We see no reason for the trial court to come to the conclusion that
PW.2 and PW.3 were speaking falsely and were trying to hide the
12Page 13
relationship between PW.2 and the deceased or that he lived in the house of
the deceased as a tenant.
28. In the first place no such inference is possible on the basis of the
depositions of PW.2 and PW.3 and secondly and more importantly even if it
is assumed for the sake of argument that the depositions of PW.2 and PW.3
were incorrect in regard to the relationship between PW.2 and the deceased
and in regard to PW.2 living in the house of the deceased as a tenant at the
time of occurrence, we fail to see how that can be the ground to reject their
deposition entirely even though it is perfectly sound in respect of the main
prosecution case. In our system of law, the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in
omnibus is not followed.
29. Here, it is to be stated that the learned counsel appearing for the
appellant submitted that the deposition of PW.3 was quite unreliable as it
contained certain statements that were either incorrect or quite
inconceivable. He referred to paragraph 20 of the deposition of PW.3 where
she said that the first fight (between her husband and the appellant) took
place on the verandah of the shop; that blood also spilled on the verandah of
the shop and further that the first fight on the verandah of the shop went on
for about 10-15 minutes. He also referred to paragraph 21 of the deposition
of PW.3 where she said that the accused held the scissors with both hands
13Page 14
and opened both the handles of the scissors and then attacked with one hand
at her husband.
30. Learned counsel submitted that there was no verandah in front of the
shop of the appellant and the manner of assault as described by PW.3 was
quite inconceivable.
31. We are unable to accept the submission that on the basis of the
statements pointed out by the counsel the deposition of PW.3 is liable to be
rejected.
The statements relied upon by the counsel were made by PW.3
under the stress of cross-examination. She is a housewife and apparently not
highly educated. 
She has a limited vocabulary and an imperfect capacity to
describe the manner of assault on her husband. 
Her statement especially in
paragraph 21 is obviously in answer to some convoluted question by the
cross-examiner, to which she replied as best as she could. 
32. We find the testimonies of PW.2 and PW.3 wholly reliable and see no
reason not to accept the same.
33. Apart from the evidences of PW.2 and PW.3, there are other
circumstances that lend credence to the prosecution case.
34. The Investigating Officer (PW.11) stated that he arrested the appellant
at 8.00 p.m. on July 28, 1988. 
In course of interrogation he volunteered to
produce the scissors used for killing the deceased from his shop. 
He took
14Page 15
the Investigating Officer to his shop, opened it with the keys kept in his
pocket and recovered the blood stained scissors from under the shop counter
and produced it before the Investigating Officer.
35. PW.6 stated that on July 28, 1988, while he was going to the house of
the deceased, he met the police people in Indira colony (the place where the
occurrence took place).  
The appellant was also with them. 
The police
people brought the appellant to his shop and got it opened and on the asking
of the Daroga, the appellant picked up a pair of scissors from the counter of
his shop and handed it to the police. 
A recovery memo was prepared and the
signatures of the witness and one Bhim Singh were taken on the recovery
memo.
36. On a careful consideration of the materials on record and the
submissions made on behalf of the appellant and the State, we are of the
view that the High Court has rightly rejected the view taken by the trial court
as wholly untenable and has rightly accepted the evidences of PW.2 and
PW.3 in order to bring home the guilt of the appellant. 
37. In the light of the discussion above, we find no merit in the appeal. It
is, accordingly, dismissed. 
38. The bail bonds of the appellant are cancelled and he is directed to
surrender within four weeks from today, failing which the trial court is
15Page 16
directed to take all possible measures to apprehend him to make him
undergo the remaining sentence.
…..………………………J.
(Aftab Alam)
…..………………………J.
(Ranjana Prakash Desai)
New Delhi
April 11, 2013.
16