service matter - While the appellant was unwell and was undergoing treatment, a charge memo, being Rc. 4/PR/A2/93 was issued against him on July 5, 1993. An ex-parte enquiry was held and the enquiry report was submitted to the Director General of Fire Services on November 27, 1993 and finally by order dated January 12, 1994, the appellant was dismissed from service without being given a copy of the enquiry report or any opportunity to show cause against the proposed punishment.= The High Court has taken the view that the ex parte enquiry held against the appellant could not be faulted as his whereabouts were not known and has also justified the non-supply of a copy of the enquiry report to the appellant for the same reason. However, the High Court seems to have overlooked that the notice with regard to the departmental enquiry was sent at the address of house No.147 but the correct address of the appellant was house No.177 and not No.147. Thus, the ex parte enquiry and the order of dismissal passed on that basis were quite vulnerable and the Tribunal has rightly held that the order of dismissal was passed on the basis of an enquiry which is untenable in law.

Page 1
NON- REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.2768-2769 OF 2013
[ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) Nos.719-720 OF 2011]
Mohd. Yousuf … Appellant
Versus
Director General of Fire Services, A. P. & Ors. … Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Aftab Alam, J.
1. Delay condoned.
2. Leave granted.
3. One of these two appeals is directed against the main judgment and
order, dated March 23, 2005 passed by a division bench of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court in writ petition No.3478 of 2004. By this judgment, the
High Court, allowed the writ petition filed by the respondents, set aside the
order of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal and restored and
confirmed the order of the appellant’s dismissal from service. Against the
1Page 2
judgment passed in the writ petition, the appellant filed a review petition
(Miscellaneous Petition No.12798 of 2005) which was dismissed by order
dated April 13, 2010. The other appeal is filed against the order dismissing
the review petition.
4. The appellant was working as a driver at Fire Station Sanathnagar
under the Fire Service Department. He was dismissed from service
following an ex-parte enquiry on charges of unauthorized absence. The
order of dismissal was passed on January 12, 1994 but dismissal from
service was made retrospective, with effect from December 29, 1992.
5. The case of the appellant was that on account of ill health and family
issues, he had submitted an application for voluntary retirement from service
with effect from December 1, 1992 under rule 43(1) of the Andhra Pradesh
Revised Pension Rules, 1980. His application was neither accepted nor
rejected, but on November 19, 1992, he was informed that a charge memo
bearing No. 15/PR/89 was pending against him and, therefore, his request
for voluntary retirement would be considered only after its disposal. On
November 25, 1992, the appellant represented before the departmental
authority that the charge memo was disposed of in the year 1990 itself and
requested that action be taken on his application for voluntary retirement.
On November 26, 1992, the appellant was advised by the Divisional Fire
2Page 3
Officer to perform his duties till further orders were received from the
Regional Fire Officer. The matter stood at that stage when the appellant,
while on duty on December 29, 1992 became ill and was admitted to the
hospital where he was advised by the doctors complete bed rest for at least
two months. While the appellant was unwell and was undergoing treatment,
a charge memo, being Rc. 4/PR/A2/93 was issued against him on July 5,
1993. An ex-parte enquiry was held and the enquiry report was submitted to
the Director General of Fire Services on November 27, 1993 and finally by
order dated January 12, 1994, the appellant was dismissed from service
without being given a copy of the enquiry report or any opportunity to show
cause against the proposed punishment.
6. The appellant took recourse to departmental appeals. His appeals to
the departmental officers were unsuccessful, but at the end of the hierarchy,
the Home Minister passed the order on March 22, 1999 directing that the
appellant’s dismissal would be effective from the date of the order i.e.
January 12, 1994 and not from the earlier date, December 29, 1992.
7. His dismissal order was revised accordingly.
8. Failing to get the desired relief from the departmental authorities, the
appellant finally moved the Administrative Tribunal by O.A. No.4949/2000.
The Tribunal by its order, dated March 11, 2003 found and held that the
3Page 4
enquiry was not conducted in accordance with the A.P.C.S. (CC & A) Rules
1991, and no enquiry report was furnished to the appellant. Further that on
receipt of the Enquiry Officer’s report, the Regional Fire Officer
straightaway issued the order of punishment dismissing the applicant from
service and, hence, his order was not in accordance with the A.P.C.S. (CC &
A) Rules, 1991.
9. On a consideration of the material facts and circumstances, the
Tribunal came to the conclusion that the order of the appellant’s dismissal
from service was wrongly passed. However, the Tribunal observed that the
appellant had attained the age of 59 years in the year 2000 and had thus,
retired from service in that year itself. Accordingly, while allowing the OA
by order dated March 11, 2000, the Tribunal directed the respondents to pay
to the appellant his terminal dues, including pension.
10. The respondents challenged the order of the Tribunal by filing a writ
petition before the High Court and the High Court by its judgment and order
dated March 23, 2005 allowed the writ petition and set aside the judgment
and order passed by the Tribunal. The review petition filed by the appellant
was also dismissed by order dated April 13, 2010. The appellant has finally
brought the matter to this Court in appeal by special leave.
4Page 5
11. On hearing Mr. Devesh Singh, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant and Mr. G.N. Reddy, learned counsel appearing for the
respondents and on going through the materials on record, including the
judgments of the Tribunal and the High Court, we are of the view that the
Tribunal’s judgment is well founded on a proper consideration of all the
material facts and circumstances and we see no reason for the High Court to
interfere with that judgment, particularly on issues of facts.
12. The High Court has taken the view that the ex parte enquiry held
against the appellant could not be faulted as his whereabouts were not
known and has also justified the non-supply of a copy of the enquiry report
to the appellant for the same reason. However, the High Court seems to have
overlooked that the notice with regard to the departmental enquiry was sent
at the address of house No.147 but the correct address of the appellant was
house No.177 and not No.147. Thus, the ex parte enquiry and the order of
dismissal passed on that basis were quite vulnerable and the Tribunal has
rightly held that the order of dismissal was passed on the basis of an enquiry
which is untenable in law.
13. In the facts of the case, there was no occasion for the High Court to
exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. We,
5Page 6
accordingly, set aside the impugned orders of the High Court and restore the
order of the Tribunal.
14. In the result, the appeals are allowed but with no order as to costs.
……………………………...J.
(Aftab Alam)
……………………………...J.
(Ranjana Prakash Desai)
New Delhi
April 2, 2013.
6

service matter - whether it is open to the management of the Bank to lay down a benchmark, besides the criteria fixed by the rules for grant of promotion on seniority-cum-merit basis. What should be the minimum necessary merit for promotion, is a matter that is decided by the management, having in mind the requirements of the post to which promotions are to be made. The employer has the discretion to fix different minimum merit, for different categories of posts, subject to the relevant rules. For example, for promotions at lower levels, it may fix lesser minimum qualifying marks and fix a comparatively higher minimum qualifying marks for higher posts.” 14. The decision of the High Court, thus, appears to be clearly contrary to the view taken by this Court in Rajendra Kumar Srivastava. 15. The decision of the High Court is, accordingly, set aside. The writ petitions filed by the respondents before the Orissa High Court are dismissed. The select list prepared by the appellant-bank is affirmed. The appeals are allowed but with no order as to costs.

Page 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2760 OF 2013
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.16961 OF 2008)
Chairman, Rushikulya Gramya Bank … Appellant
Versus
Bisawamber Patro & Others …Respondents
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2761 OF 2013
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.17546 OF 2008)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2762 OF 2013
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.17974 OF 2008)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2763 OF 2013
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.17977 OF 2008)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2764 OF 2013
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.18417 OF 2008)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2765 OF 2013 Page 2
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.18898 OF 2008)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2766 OF 2013
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.19292 OF 2008)
AND
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2767 OF 2013
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.19301 OF 2008)
J U D G M E N T
Aftab Alam,J.
1. Leave granted in all the special leave petitions.
2. All the appeals are at the instance of a Regional Rural Bank, namely,
Rushikulya Gramya Bank, and the matter relates to promotion from one scale to
another. Out of the eight appeals, six relate to promotion from Junior
Management Scale-I to Middle Management Scale-II and in the remaining two
appeals (arising from SLP (Civil) No.17974 of 2008 and SLP(civil) No.18898
of 2008), the matter relates to promotion from Clerk to Junior Management
Scale-I.
2Page 3
3. The short question that arises in these appeals is
whether it is open to
the management of the Bank to lay down a benchmark, besides the criteria fixed
by the rules for grant of promotion on seniority-cum-merit basis. 
4. The appellant - bank issued a circular No.024/2004-05, dated June 23,
2004 notifying the vacancies inter alia in the seventeen posts of Middle
Management Scale-II and eight posts of Junior Management Scale-I. The
circular stated that the process of promotion shall be conducted as per the
promotion rules of the Government of India. For promotion to the post of
Middle Management Scale-II, the zone of consideration was four times the
number of vacancies and for promotion to the post of Junior Management Scale
– I, all eligible candidates were permitted to take the exam.
5. The rules governing promotion from Junior Management Scale-I to
Middle Management Scale-II, in so far as relevant for the present, are as under:-
*2 (a) to (c) xxxxxxxx
(d) Whether promotion to be made on seniority basis or merit:
Promotion shall be made on the basis of seniority-cum-merit.
(e) Eligibility: xxxxxxx
(f) Mode of Selection: The Selection of the
candidates shall be made by the
committee on the basis of written
test, interview and assessment of
Performance Appraisal Reports for
3Page 4
the preceding five years as an
officer in Sealed/Field Supervisor.
(g) Composition of
Committee: xxxxxxxxx
(h) Reckoning of the
minimum eligibility: xxxxxxxxx
(i) Number of candidates
to be considered for
promotion: xxxxxxxxx
(j) Selection process for
promotion: The selection shall be on the
basis of performance in the written
test, interview and performance
Appraisal Report for preceding
five years as per the division of
marks given below.
(A) Written Test: 60 marks
(B) Interview: 20 marks
(C) Performance Appraisal
Reports: 20 marks
TOTAL marks: 100 marks
(A) Written test (60 marks)
The candidates shall be required to appear for written test
comprising of two parts viz. Part (A) covering Banking Law
and practice of Banking and Part (B) covering Credit Policy,
Credit Management including Priority Sector, Economics and
Management.
:60 marks allotted written test shall be further divided as under:
Part “A” 30 marks
Part “B” 30 marks
4Page 5
A list of only those candidates who
secure minimum 40% marks in each
part shall be prepared and such
candidates shall be called for interview.
(B) Interview (20 marks):
There shall be no minimum qualifying
marks for the interview.
(C) Performance appraisal
Reports (20) marks):
Performance Appraisal Reports for the preceding five years shall
be considered for the purpose of awarding marks for promotion.”
 In case of promotion from Clerk to Junior Management Class-I scale
the division of marks is as under:-
“(A) Written test : 70 marks
 (B) Interview marks : 20 marks
 (C) Performance Appraisal : 10 marks.
 Reports
Total Marks : 100 marks.”
70 marks allotted to written test are further divided as under:
“English : 35 marks
Bank Law Practice : 35 marks
Total Marks : 70”
5Page 6
6. A candidate in order to qualify must secure a minimum of 40 per cent
marks each in English and banking law practice.
7. The appellant – bank, in addition to the requirement of 40%
qualifying marks in the written test further fixed the qualifying mark of 60% for
general candidates and 55% marks for SC/ST candidates on the aggregate
marks comprising written test, performance appraisal reports and interview.
8. The names of all candidates who got 60% or above in the aggregate
were put in the list for promotion strictly as per their seniority. All candidates
were promoted in order of seniority, irrespective of anyone among them having
got marks in excess of 60% in the aggregate.
9. The respondents in each of the appeals who were unsuccessful in
getting promotions, challenged the select list of the promoted candidates by
filing writ petitions before the Orissa High Court. The High Court heard W.P.
(civil) No.14359/2003 (giving rise to civil appeal, arising from SLP(Civil)
No.19292/2008)) as the leading case. It allowed the Writ Petition holding that
prescription of the benchmark of 60% marks in the aggregate was in violation
of the promotion policy and the rules governing the field. It, accordingly,
allowed the Writ Petition and directed the appellant-bank to make fresh
selection in accordance with the Rules. (The other writ petitions giving rise to
the other appeals were disposed of following the judgment passed in W.P.
(Civil) No.14359/2004).
6Page 7
10. In taking the view that the prescription of the minimum qualifying
marks in the aggregate was in contravention of promotion based on senioritycum-merit, the High Court relied upon the decisions of this Court in State of
Kerala v. N.M. Thomas1
, Bhagwandas Tiwari v. Dewas Shajapur Kshetriya
Gramin Bank2
, , and B.V. Sivaiah v. K. Addanki Babu3
.
11. In a more recent decision in Rajendra Kumar Srivastava and others
v. Samyut Kshetriya Gramin Bank and others4
, this Court re-visited the issue of
fixing a high percentage as the minimum qualifying marks for promotion on
seniority-cum-merit basis. It examined all the three decisions (besides others)
relied upon by the High Court, namely, Bhagwandas Tiwari (supra), B.V.
Sivaiah (supra) and N.M. Thomas (supra).
12. In Rajendra Kumar Srivastava, the Court framed the following two
questions for consideration:
“8.On the contentions urged, the following two
questions arise for our consideration:
(i) Whether minimum qualifying marks could be
prescribed for assessment of past performance and
interview, where the promotions are to be made on the
principle of seniority-cum-merit?
1
(1976) 2 SCC 310
2
(2006) 12 SCC 574
3
(1998) 6 SCC 720
4
(2010) 1 SCC 335
7Page 8
(ii) Whether the first respondent Bank was justified in
fixing a high percentage (78%) as the minimum
qualifying marks (minimum merit) for promotion?
13. Answering both the questions in the affirmative, the Court on an
analysis of the earlier decisions observed and held that:
“13. Thus it is clear that a process whereby eligible
candidates possessing the minimum necessary merit in the
feeder posts is first ascertained and thereafter, promotions are
made strictly in accordance with seniority, from among those
who possess the minimum necessary merit is recognised and
accepted as complying with the principle of “seniority-cummerit”. What would offend the rule of seniority-cum-merit is a
process where after assessing the minimum necessary merit,
promotions are made on the basis of merit (instead of seniority)
from among the candidates possessing the minimum necessary
merit. If the criteria adopted for assessment of minimum
necessary merit is bona fide and not unreasonable, it is not open
to challenge, as being opposed to the principle of senioritycum-merit. We accordingly hold that prescribing minimum
qualifying marks to ascertain the minimum merit necessary for
discharging the functions of the higher post, is not violative of
the concept of promotion by seniority-cum-merit.
14. The next question is whether fixing of 78% as minimum
qualifying marks (that is, as the minimum necessary merit) is
unreasonable and arbitrary. The Rules in this case provide that
the mode of selection is by interview and assessment of
performance reports for the preceding three years as officer
Scale I. The seniority list of officers in Scale I was published on
4-12-1996. Thereafter, the promotion process was held by
earmarking 60 marks for assessment of performance reports (at
the rate of 20 marks per year) and 40 marks were allotted for
interview. The officers possessing the minimum qualifying
marks of 78%, were then promoted on the basis of seniority.
What should be the minimum necessary merit for promotion, is
a matter that is decided by the management, having in mind the
requirements of the post to which promotions are to be made.
8Page 9
The employer has the discretion to fix different minimum merit,
for different categories of posts, subject to the relevant rules.
For example, for promotions at lower levels, it may fix lesser
minimum qualifying marks and fix a comparatively higher
minimum qualifying marks for higher posts.”
14. The decision of the High Court, thus, appears to be clearly contrary
to the view taken by this Court in Rajendra Kumar Srivastava. 
15. The decision of the High Court is, accordingly, set aside. The writ
petitions filed by the respondents before the Orissa High Court are dismissed.
The select list prepared by the appellant-bank is affirmed. The appeals are
allowed but with no order as to costs. 
................................................J.
(Aftab Alam)
................................................J.
(Ranjana Prakash Desai)
New Delhi,
April 2, 2013.
9

a notification dated July 7, 2005 issued by the Central Government under section 10(1) of the Act. The notification was issued after due consultation with the Central Advisory Central Labour Board with regard to the conditions of work and benefits provided for the contract labour and other relevant factors enumerated in sub-section 2 of section 10 and it prohibited the employment of contract labour “in the works of sleeper renewal of railway Tracks, repairing, restoration and laying and linkage of tracks in the establishment of Kolkata Port Trust, Kolkata” with effect from the date of publication of the notification in the official gazette.= the division bench has carved out an exception in favour of the respondent, Port Trust of Calcutta (hereinafter, “Port Trust”) from a notification issued by the Central Government under section 10(1) of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (hereinafter “the Act”) and held that the notification “would not in any way affect the right of the Port Trust to assign the work of laying and linkage of railway tracks as one time measure of (sic. to) RITES, another Central Government Organization”. Whether the work of laying and linking of tracks is of perennial nature and whether workers engaged through contractors are employed by the Port trust for that work are pure questions of fact that were investigated by the statutory committee constituted under section 5 of the Act and are covered by the recommendations made both by the Committee and by the Advisory Board. It was, therefore, quite wrong for the division bench of the High Court to completely nullify that part of the notification in a highly casual and off- hand manner and simply on the ipse dixit of the respondent; more so as the division bench did not otherwise find any illegality in the notification in question. In light of the discussion made above, we see no justification for the division bench of the High Court to carve out the exception and to rationalize the assignment of the contract to RITES merely on the ground that it is another Central Government organization. The High Court clearly exceeded its jurisdiction in passing the impugned order. 19. We are, therefore, unable to sustain the impugned order passed by the division bench. The order of the division bench of the High Court is set aside and the order of the learned single Judge is restored.

Page 1
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2771 OF 2013
 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.3104 OF 2011)
BALESHWAR RAJBANSHI & ORS. … APPELLANTS
VERSUS
BD. OF TRUSTEES FOR PORT TRUST OF
CALCUTTA & ORS. …RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
Aftab Alam, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated January
29, 2010 passed by a division bench of the Calcutta High court in an intracourt appeal against the judgment of a learned single Judge of that court. By
the impugned judgment, the division bench has carved out an exception in
favour of the respondent, Port Trust of Calcutta (hereinafter, “Port Trust”)
from a notification issued by the Central Government under section 10(1) of
the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (hereinafter “the
Act”) and held that the notification “would not in any way affect the right of
the Port Trust to assign the work of laying and linkage of railway tracks as
1Page 2
one time measure of (sic. to) RITES, another Central Government
Organization”. 
3. The controversy in this case centres around
a notification dated July 7,
2005 issued by the Central Government under section 10(1) of the Act. The
notification was issued after due consultation with the Central Advisory
Central Labour Board with regard to the conditions of work and benefits
provided for the contract labour and other relevant factors enumerated in
sub-section 2 of section 10 and it prohibited the employment of contract
labour “in the works of sleeper renewal of railway Tracks, repairing,
restoration and laying and linkage of tracks in the establishment of Kolkata
Port Trust, Kolkata” with effect from the date of publication of the
notification in the official gazette.
4. After the issuance of the notification, the appellants who claimed to
be engaged for the works covered by the notification for more than two
decades through different contractors approached the Calcutta High court in
W.P. No.20171 (W) of 2005 seeking a direction from the High Court to the
Port Trust to abolish the system of giving the works covered by the
notification to the contractors. On the other hand, the Port Trust also
approached the High Court in W.P. 22545 (W) of 2005, questioning the
validity of the notification. The two writ petitions were heard together by a
2Page 3
learned single Judge who decided to consider the writ petition filed by the
Port Trust first, as the decision on the legality of the notification would have
a direct bearing on the writ petition filed by the individual workmen.
5. The learned single Judge upheld the validity of the notification and
by judgment and order dated May 15, 2007 dismissed the writ petition filed
by the Calcutta Port Trust.
6. The Port Trust challenged the judgment, dated May 15, 2007 passed
by the learned single Judge before a division bench of the High Court in
intra-court appeal. The division bench by order dated March 31, 2008
directed the Port Trust to approach the Ministry of Labour through the
Ministry of Shipping for resolving the issue.
7. The order passed by the division bench was challenged by some
individual workmen before this court in civil appeal No.7394/2009 (arising
from SLP(C) No.22912/2008). The appeal was allowed by judgment and
order, dated November 6, 2009 passed by this Court1
. The order of the
division bench of the High Court dated March 31, 2008 was set aside and
the High Court was asked to rehear the Port Trust’s appeal against the
judgment of the single judge (MAT No.2363 of 2007 and FMA No. 430 of
2008) and to dispose it of in accordance with law.
1
 (2010) 1 SCC 116
3Page 4
8. After remand, the division bench of the High Court once again heard
the appeal and disposed it of by a brief order, modifying the order of the
learned single Judge and notwithstanding the notification under section 10 of
the Act, allowing the Port Trust to assign the work of laying and linkage of
railway tracks as one time measure to RITES, another Central Government
organization.
9. The division bench simply noted the submission of the counsel for the
Port Trust that laying and linking of the railway tracks did not come within
the daily affairs of the Port Trust; that it was required for the purpose of easy
movement of cargo; and further that such railway tracks were laid by the
railway. The railways were asked to replace the old tracks and the railways
perhaps got the work were done through contracts. That the Port Trust had
asked RITES, a Central Government undertaking under the Ministry of
Railways to lay and link railway tracks as one time job and such work is
nearing completion in the first phase. The High Court also noted the
submission of the counsel for the Port Trust that the laying and linkage of
railway tracks cannot be termed as a work of perennial nature and, therefore,
the assignment of the work of laying and linkage of railway tracks to RITES
who have the necessary expertise in the work cannot come within the
4Page 5
mischief of section 10 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act.
10. Accepting the submission made on behalf of the Board Trust, the
division bench held and directed as under:-
“We have considered the rival contentions. We have
perused the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge. We
are in full agreement when His Lordship deals with the issue of
maintenance of the railway tracks by way of repair or
otherwise. We are, however, of the opinion that laying and
linking as one time measure could not be said to be a
perennial duty. In any event, laying of railway tracks is no
part of the duty of the Port Trust. The duties and
responsibilities of the Port Trust do not include lying of railway
tracks. Railway tracks are laid only for the purpose of smooth
movement of the cargo discharged through the Port. In any
event, such laying can only be done by expert. The Railways
have that expertise and RITES is one such Corporation under
the Ministry of railways. Hence, we are of the view that the
Notification under challenge would not, in any way, affect
the right of the Port Trust to assign the work of laying and
linking of railway tracks as one time measure of RITES,
another Central Government Organisation.”
(emphasis added)
11. We are unable to appreciate or to even follow the view taken by the
High Court. The Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, is a
special Act that was framed to regulate the employment of contract labour in
certain establishments and to provide for its abolition in certain
circumstances and for matters connected therewith.
5Page 6
12. Section 3 of the Act provides for constitution of Central Advisory
Board and it is as under:-
“Central Advisory Board. – (1) The Central Government shall,
as soon as may be, constitute a board to be called the Central
Advisory Contract Labour Board (hereinafter referred to as the
Central Board) to advise the Central Government on such
matters arising out of the administration of this Act as may be
referred to it and to carry out other functions assigned to it
under this Act.
(2) The Central Board shall consist of –
(a) a chairman to be appointed by the Central Government;
(b) the Chief Labour Commissioner (Central), ex officio;
(c) such number of members, not exceeding seventeen but not
less than eleven, as the Central Government may nominate
to represent that Government, the Railways, the coal
industry, the mining industry, the contractors, the workmen
and any other interests which, in the opinion of the Central
Government, ought to be represented on the Central Board.
(3) The number of persons to be appointed as members from
each of the categories specified in sub-section(2), the term
of office and other conditions of service of, the procedure to
be followed in the discharge of their functions by, and the
manner of filling vacancies among, the members of the
Central Board shall be such as may be prescribed:
Provided that the number of members nominated to
represent the workmen shall not be less than the number of
members nominated to represent the principal employers
and the contractors.
6Page 7
13. Section 4 provides for the constitution of the State Advisory
Board.
14. Section 5 deals with the power of the Central Board or the State
Board to constitute committees and it is as under:-
“Power to constitute committees. – (1) The Central Board or
the State Board as the case may be, may constitute such
committees and for such purpose or purposes as it may think fit.
(2) The committee constituted under sub-section (1) shall
meet at such times and places and shall observe such
rules of procedure in regard to the transaction of
business at its meetings as may be prescribed.
(3) The members of a committee shall be paid such fees
and allowances for attending its meetings as may be
prescribed:
Provided that no fees shall be payable to a member who is
an officer of Government or of any corporation established
by any law for the time being in force.”
15. Section 10 deals with prohibition of employment of contract labour
and it is as under:-
“10. Prohibition of employment of contract labour. –
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the
appropriate Government may, after consultation with the
Central Board or, as the case may be, a State Board prohibit,
by notification in the Official Gazette, employment of
contract labour in any process, operation or other work in
any establishment.
7Page 8
(2) Before issuing any notification under sub-section
(1) in relation to an establishment, the appropriate
Government shall have regard to the conditions of work and
benefits provided for the contract labour in that
establishment and other relevant factors, such as-
(a) whether the process, operation or other work is
incidental to, or necessary for the industry, trade, business,
manufacture or occupation that is carried on in the
establishment;
(b) whether it is of perennial nature, that is to say, it is
of sufficient duration having regard to the nature of industry,
trade, business, manufacture or occupation carried on in that
establishment;
(c) whether it is done ordinarily through regular
workmen in that establishment or an establishment similar
thereto;
(d) whether it is sufficient to employ considerable
number of whole time workmen.
Explanation.- If a question arises whether any process or
operation or other work is of perennial nature, the decision
of the appropriate Government thereon shall be final.”
In this case, the Central Board first constituted a Committee under section 5
of the Act to go into the question of abolition of contract labour in the
establishment of Calcutta Port Trust. The Committee examined the matter
in detail and made its recommendations as follows:-
 "From the above elaboration of work, the job in
question needs to be examined in the contract (sic.
context?) of provisions of section 10(2) of the Contract
Labour (R&A) Act, 1970.
8Page 9
 1. Whether the work is incidental to or necessary
for the industry of Calcutta Port Trust the Committee is
of the opinion that works of CPT involved loading and
unloading of cargo from or on the vessels as also the
stores of cargo. The railway track in Calcutta Dock
System has been laid to facilitate the movement of rail
bound caused to and from CPT so the work is very much
incidental to the main operation of CPT.
 2. The question whether work is of the provisional
nature and is of sufficient duration, the Committee
observes that renewal/cancellation of tracks and sleepers
have been going on almost continuously may be in some
or other part of the railway tracks and contract workers
are working for full 8 hours so the job deemed to be a
perennial nature.
 3. The question whether it is also done by the
regular workmen, it has already been explained the total
71 of regular employees are also involved on day- to- day
track maintenance job which includes the repairing of
tracks after derailment and in routine gauging, lubrication
of point and crossing, cleaning of check rail, dusking, etc.
which are also done by the contract workers after the
replacement, renewal of sleepers and tracks and also in
laying or linking of new railway lines.
The Committee also feels that it will be relevant to
mention about Notification No. U-23013/21/98 LW dated
20th June 2000 issued by the Ministry of Labour,
Government of India, by which the employment of
contract labour has been prohibited on the job of regular
track maintenance such as through packing, casual
renewal and maintenance work required for day-to-day
maintenance in the establishment of Eastern Railway.
 In the context of the above facts and observation, the
Committee is of the opinion that work/jobs of sleeper
renewal of railway tracks repairing/restoration laying and
9Page 10
linking of tracks in the establishment of Calcutta Port
Trust seem to be of regular nature and attracts the
provisions of Section 10(2) of the Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. Hence the
Committee recommended for prohibition of contract
labour on the above mentioned job."
The matter was then considered by the Central Board and it recommended to
the Central Government for prohibition of employment of contract labour in
the jobs of sleeper renewal for railway contracts repairing/restoration, laying
and linking of tracks in the establishment of Calcutta Port Trust. The
Advisory Board in its recommendation stated as under:-
 "......The Committee had recommended prohibition of
employment of Contract Labour on the ground that the work
seems to be of regular nature and since 1988 contracts have
been engaged for renewal/construction of tracks and sleepers in
some or other part of the railways tracks belonging to KOPT.
Secondly, the job performed by the regular employees were
almost identical to that of job performed by contract workers
and both types of maintenance jobs, i.e. day-to-day
maintenance and periodical maintenance are required to be
done on regular basis. The Committee has also observed that
since February 2000, miscellaneous work in connection with
strengthening of KOPT railway track, as and when required,
including supply of materials have been given on contract. This
is at variance with the statement of KOPT that there is no
contract in the said jobs since 1998.
 The management, on enquiry by the Board,
categorically stated that no contract labour system exists
now in the jobs under consideration and they would not be
adversely affected even if the contract labour system is
abolished. The management was also not able to
satisfactorily convince the Board, on the query whether the
10Page 11
renewal of track/sleepers would be done only once in 10-12
years at one go and not in parts on continuous basis. This gives
rise to an inference that the jobs under consideration are of
perennial type and are required to be done by regular
employees. In view of the recommendations of the Committee
and categorical statement of KOPT, and the fact that the
requirements under Section 10(2) of the Act are satisfied, the
Board recommends to the Government prohibition of
employment of contract labour in the jobs of sleeper renewal
of railways tracks, repairing/restoration, laying and
linking of tracks in the establishment of KOPT, Kolkata."
Based upon the aforesaid recommendations, the Central Government issued
the notification under section 10(1) of the Act which inter alia covers laying
and linking of tracks in the establishment of Calcutta Port Trust.
16. From the provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation and
Abolition) Act, as are noted above, it is quite clear that the notification is
issued after following a statutory scheme and it is based on a detailed
investigation of issues of facts followed by two tiers of recommendations,
first by the committee constituted under section 5 of the Act and the second
by the Advisory Board constituted under section 3 of the Act.
17. Whether the work of laying and linking of tracks is of perennial nature
and whether workers engaged through contractors are employed by the Port
trust for that work are pure questions of fact that were investigated by the
statutory committee constituted under section 5 of the Act and are covered
by the recommendations made both by the Committee and by the Advisory
11Page 12
Board. It was, therefore, quite wrong for the division bench of the High
Court to completely nullify that part of the notification in a highly casual
and off- hand manner and simply on the ipse dixit of the respondent; more
so as the division bench did not otherwise find any illegality in the
notification in question. 
18. In light of the discussion made above, we see no justification for the
division bench of the High Court to carve out the exception and to
rationalize the assignment of the contract to RITES merely on the ground
that it is another Central Government organization. The High Court clearly
exceeded its jurisdiction in passing the impugned order. 
19. We are, therefore, unable to sustain the impugned order passed by the
division bench. The order of the division bench of the High Court is set
aside and the order of the learned single Judge is restored. 
20. The appeal is allowed but with no order as to costs.
……………………….J.
(Aftab Alam)
……………………….J.
(Ranjana Prakash Desai)
New Delhi;
April 2, 2013.
12

The Public Service Commission Uttaranchal issued an advertisement dated February 26, 2006 for appointment to the posts of Veterinary Doctor in the department of Animal Husbandry. One of the conditions essential for making an application was that the applicant should be duly registered with Uttaranchal Veterinary Council.= “….This is in breach of constitutional mandate contained in Article 16 of the Constitution of India. In the event registration as a Veterinary Surgeon is considered to be the minimum eligible qualification, henceforth the State Government would ensure that persons registered as Veterinary Surgeons are entitled to respond to advertisements for recruitment of Veterinary Surgeons and shall not insist for the candidates to be registered as Veterinary Surgeons of the State of Uttarakhand.” 4. We are of the view that the issue before the High Court was quite serious and merited consideration in greater detail. We are unable to sustain the very brief order passed by the High Court on this serious issue. We, accordingly, set aside the order and remit the matter to the High Court to hear the parties afresh and to pass appropriate orders after taking into consideration not only the provisions of the Constitution but also the relevant statutory provisions. 5. Needless to say that since the order of the High Court is set aside, it will be open to the State Public Service Commission to adhere to the previous terms as long as the High Court does not take a contrary view in the matter. 6. In the result, the appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. No order as to costs.

Page 1
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No.2772 OF 2013
[ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.17295 OF 2011]
State of Uttarakhand through Secretary … Appellant
Versus
Kumari Amita Singh & Ors. … Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Aftab Alam, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The Public Service Commission Uttaranchal issued an advertisement
dated February 26, 2006 for appointment to the posts of Veterinary Doctor
in the department of Animal Husbandry. One of the conditions essential for
making an application was that the applicant should be duly registered with
Uttaranchal Veterinary Council.
3. The aforesaid condition was challenged before the Uttarakhand High
Court in Writ Petition(S/B) No.98 of 2006. The High Court passed a veryPage 2
brief order on the case. It held without any deliberation or discussion that
the impugned condition offended Article 16 of the Constitution of India and,
though, declining to interfere with the 2006 advertisement on the ground that
it was issued four years ago, it directed the State Government by order dated
December 3, 2010 to ensure that in future anyone registered with the
Veterinary Council of any of the States in the country should be eligible for
appointment in Uttarakhand. The relevant portion of the High Court order is
as under:-
“….This is in breach of constitutional mandate
contained in Article 16 of the Constitution of
India. In the event registration as a Veterinary
Surgeon is considered to be the minimum eligible
qualification, henceforth the State Government
would ensure that persons registered as Veterinary
Surgeons are entitled to respond to advertisements
for recruitment of Veterinary Surgeons and shall
not insist for the candidates to be registered as
Veterinary Surgeons of the State of Uttarakhand.”
4. We are of the view that the issue before the High Court was quite
serious and merited consideration in greater detail. We are unable to sustain
the very brief order passed by the High Court on this serious issue. We,
accordingly, set aside the order and remit the matter to the High Court to
hear the parties afresh and to pass appropriate orders after taking into
2Page 3
consideration not only the provisions of the Constitution but also the
relevant statutory provisions. 
5. Needless to say that since the order of the High Court is set aside, it
will be open to the State Public Service Commission to adhere to the
previous terms as long as the High Court does not take a contrary view in
the matter. 
6. In the result, the appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. No
order as to costs. 
……………………………...J.
(Aftab Alam)
……………………………...J.
(H.L. Gokhale)
New Delhi
April 2, 2013
3

Rape of minor = whether the High Court erred in not taking into account the statement and testimony of H.L. that the respondent had raped her on several occasions and thereby acquitting him. In our opinion, the High Court committed an error of law in not considering the evidence put forward by the prosecutrix (who was less than 16 years when she was raped) and ignoring the settled position in law that if the sole testimony of the prosecutrix is credible, a conviction can Crl. Appeal No.352 of 2006 be based thereon without the need for any further corroboration. A reading of the judgment and order of the High Court indicates that it has not discussed the statement of H.L. under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate nor her testimony before the Trial Judge. On going through her statement recorded by the Magistrate, we find that it is rather detailed and the least that was expected of the High Court was to consider that statement. If it was found to be not credible, the High Court was entitled to reject it and also her testimony before the Trial Judge. But, to Crl. Appeal No.352 of 2006 completely ignore what the prosecutrix had said, merely on the basis of a handful of letters which she had written (even though she had explained the circumstances in which she had written those letters) is a rather unsatisfactory way of dealing with the entire case.- Under the circumstances, the more appropriate course of action would be to set aside the impugned Crl. Appeal No.352 of 2006 judgment and order passed by the High Court and remand the matter for reconsideration on merits after taking into account the entire evidence on record, including the statement and testimony of H.L. as well as the law on the subject. We do so accordingly. 33. Since the allegation of rape is of the year 1989- 1990, we request the High Court to accord high priority to the disposal of the case. 34. Appeal is disposed of.

Page 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 352 OF 2006
State of Haryana …..Appellant
Versus
Basti Ram …..Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Madan B. Lokur, J.
1. The question for our consideration is
whether the High
Court erred in not taking into account the statement and
testimony of H.L. that the respondent had raped her on
several occasions and thereby acquitting him. In our
opinion, the High Court committed an error of law in not
considering the evidence put forward by the prosecutrix
(who was less than 16 years when she was raped) and
ignoring the settled position in law that if the sole
testimony of the prosecutrix is credible, a conviction can
Crl. Appeal No.352 of 2006
Page 1 of 17Page 2
be based thereon without the need for any further
corroboration.
The facts:
2. On 12th March 1990, PW-3 Sardara Singh, a resident of
Village Farmana, lodged a complaint with PW-1 ASI Mehar
Singh of Police Station Kharkhoda to the effect that his
granddaughter H.L. aged about 14-15 years and staying
with him had been missing since 8.00 p.m. on 27th
February 1990. According to the complainant, H.L. had left
the house for answering the call of nature but did not
come back. Efforts were made to trace her out, including
at the residence of relatives and at her parental home in
Nainital but without success. The complaint of Sardara
Singh further stated that he suspected that Mohinder
Singh and Satte had enticed her away.
3. The complaint was registered as a First Information Report
and investigations commenced to trace out H.L.
Crl. Appeal No.352 of 2006 Page 2 of 17Page 3
4. On 20th March 1990 the investigating officer examined
Mohinder Singh and he stated that on 27th February 1990
he and Satte took H.L. from Village Farmana to the
Interstate Bus Terminal in Delhi. Their intention was to sell
her to somebody through Satte and then to equally divide
the proceeds. As a consequence of this, Satte took H.L. to
Bareilly and sold her to Jamaluddin.
5. It appears that Sardara Singh had wrongly (and perhaps
deliberately) accused Mohinder Singh of enticing away
H.L. and even Mohinder Singh had given a false
statement.
6. Be that as it may on 6th April 1990, PW-22 ASI Jaidev Singh
located H.L. and her father and on 7th April 1990 H.L. was
produced before the Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Sonepat
where her statement was recorded under Section 164 of
the Criminal Procedure Code (for short the Cr.P.C.).
7. In her statement given before the Judicial Magistrate, H.L.
stated that her father worked in Nainital. Her maternal
Crl. Appeal No.352 of 2006 Page 3 of 17Page 4
uncle Satish Prakash who got her admitted in a school at
Bhainswal sometime in June 1989 had brought her to
Village Farmana.
8. Satish Prakash used to take H.L. to her school every
morning on his scooter. From sometime in August 1989
he started misbehaving with her. She complained about
the misbehaviour to her grandmother and to her aunt
(wife of Satish Prakash) but to no effect. In her statement
H.L. stated that from September 1989 onwards Satish
Prakash began to rape her and did so several times. He
was subsequently transferred to Panipat but in the
meanwhile Basti Ram (the Respondent before us) came to
Bhainswal and joined a Veterinary Hospital. H.L. further
stated that apart from Satish Prakash, she was also raped
by Basti Ram and fed up with this unpleasant situation,
she expressed a desire to go back to her parental home at
Nainital.
9. H.L. then stated that on 27th February 1990 Satish Prakash
and Basti Ram confined her in a quarter near the
Crl. Appeal No.352 of 2006 Page 4 of 17Page 5
Veterinary hospital where they were working and they
raped her several times. Eventually on 8th March 1990
she was taken by them to Delhi and handed over to two
persons who were going to Nainital with the instructions
that she should be dropped off at her parental home.
10. In her statement H.L. stated that when she went to
her parental home she found that it was locked and
therefore from 9th March 1990 to 20th March 1990 she
lived with a neighbor, PW-19 Ram Singh who informed her
father in Pant Nagar of her arrival in Nainital. On 21st
March 1990 the lock of her parental home was broken and
she lived there till 4th April 1990 and came to Delhi along
with her father on 6th April 1990.
11. Upon completion of investigations, the police
authorities filed a charge sheet and on 3rd August 1990
the case was committed to the Sessions Court and
registered as Sessions Case No. 22 of 6.11.1990/Sessions
Trial No. 30 of 1990 before the Additional Sessions Judge,
Sonepat (Haryana).
Crl. Appeal No.352 of 2006 Page 5 of 17Page 6
Proceedings in the Trial Court:
12. The Additional Sessions Judge charged Satish
Prakash and Basti Ram for offences punishable under
Sections 366, 376, 363, 506 and 342 of the Indian Penal
Code (for short the IPC) on 7th November 1990 to which
they pleaded not guilty. It appears that the charge of
raping H.L. prior to 27th February 1990 was inadvertently
left out and therefore additional charges were framed
against Satish Prakash and Basti Ram to include the
commission of rape of H.L. prior to 27th February 1990.
The two accused pleaded not guilty to the additional
charges also.
The charges framed read as follows:
1. That you both on 27.2.90 in the area of Vill.
Bhainswal Kalan kidnapped Kumari H.L. aged
15/16 years, a minor by taking her out of legal
guardianship of her maternal grandfather Sh.
Sardara Ram S/o Jai Pal R/o Farmana with intent
that she may be forced or seduced to illicit
intercourse and thereby committed an offence
punishable u/s 366 IPC and within cognizance of
this Court.
2. Secondly, you both, between 27.2.90 to 08.3.90, in
the aforesaid area committed rape on the above
Crl. Appeal No.352 of 2006 Page 6 of 17Page 7
named H.L. by committing sexual intercourse
against her will or consent and thereby committed
an offence punishable u/s 376 IPC and within
cognizance of this Court.
3. Thirdly, you both on the aforesaid date kidnapped
Kumari H.L. a minor under the age of 18 years
from the lawful guardianship of her maternal
grandfather Sardara Ram and thereby committed
an offence punishable u/s 363 IPC and within
cognizance of this Court.
4. Fourthly, you both on same date and place
committed criminal intimidation by threatening
H.L. to cause death and thereby committed
offence punishable u/s 506 IPC and within
cognizance of this Court.
5. Fifthly, you both on the same date and place
wrongly confined H.L. in Govt. Quarter of
Veterinary Hospital Bhainswal Kalan from 27.2.90
to 08.3.90 and thereby committed an offence
punishable u/s 342 IPC and within cognizance of
this Court.
6. Sixthly that you accused Satish Kumar committed
rape on aforesaid H.L. by committing sexual
intercourse against her will or consent several
times from September, 1989 to February, 1990 at
your house in the area of village Farmana and
thereby committed an offence punishable under
Section 376 I.P.C. and within cognizance of this
Court.
7. Seventhly, that you accused Basti Ram committed
rape on aforesaid H.L. against her consent or will
several times between October, 1989 and
February, 1990 in Veterinary Hospital quarter
Bhainswal and thereby you committed an offence
punishable under Section 376 I.P.C. and within
cognizance of this Court.
Crl. Appeal No.352 of 2006 Page 7 of 17Page 8
13. The prosecution examined as many as 24
witnesses while the defence examined one witness.
14. The Trial Court first of all considered the issue
regarding the age of H.L. It was noted that her birth
certificate Exhibit PF gave her date of birth as 10th June
1974 but the school record as well as the evidence of one
of the teachers in the school in Bhainswal indicated that
her date of birth was 27th June 1975. The father of the
prosecutrix gave her date of birth as 10th June 1974 while
her mother gave the date of birth as 27th June 1975.
However, on an appreciation of the evidence and relying
upon the birth certificate Exhibit PF the Trial Court
concluded that the date of birth of H.L. was 10th June
1974. Therefore, when she was raped between
September 1989 and March 1990 she was below 16 years
of age.
15. The Trial Court then considered the issue of the
improbability of H.L. having been raped by Satish Prakash
Crl. Appeal No.352 of 2006 Page 8 of 17Page 9
and Basti Ram. The Trial Court was of the view that the
statement of the prosecutrix was credible. She had
complained to her grandmother and to her aunt about
being raped by Satish Prakash and Basti Ram, but it had
no effect on them. As such, she had little or no option but
to submit to the demands of Satish Prakash and Basti
Ram. The Trial Judge held that in any case since H.L. was
below 16 years of age her consent to have sexual
intercourse with Satish Prakash and Basti Ram was
meaningless.
16. On the basis of these findings the Trial Judge
concluded that Satish Prakash and Basti Ram had
subjected H.L. to rape and gang rape.
17. On the issue whether Satish Prakash had
kidnapped H.L., the Trial Judge concluded that H.L. was
under the guardianship of her grandfather Sardara Singh
and since Satish Prakash had taken her away from the
lawful guardianship of her grandfather, he was guilty of
kidnapping her. As such, it was held that Satish Prakash
Crl. Appeal No.352 of 2006 Page 9 of 17Page 10
was guilty of an offence punishable under Sections 363
and 366 of the I.P.C. Basti Ram was, however, found not
guilty of the charge of kidnapping H.L.
18. The Trial Judge considered the statement of PW-3
Sardara Singh and found that he was related to both
Satish Prakash and Basti Ram. In fact Satish Prakash is
his nephew (brother’s son) while Basti Ram is the cousin
of Satish Prakash. Under these circumstances, Sardara
Singh tried to save Satish Prakash and Basti Ram from
being involved in the kidnapping and rape of H.L. and he
also went to the extent of cooking up a story to implicate
Mohinder Singh and Satte. In these circumstances, the
Trial Judge did not give weightage to the evidence of
Sardara Singh and relied primarily on the testimony of
H.L. as well as the statement that she gave before the
Magistrate under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C.
19. The Trial Judge also considered some letters said
to have been written by H.L. to Mohinder Singh professing
intimacy with him but the prosecution version was
Crl. Appeal No.352 of 2006 Page 10 of 17Page 11
accepted that these letters were written at the instance of
Satish Prakash so as to put the blame on Mohinder Singh.
20. The defence witness DW-1 Dr. S.S. Wadhwa was
disbelieved by the Trial Judge on the question of the age
of the prosecutrix. According to this witness, H.L. was
between 16 and 17 years of age, but he did not have the
original medical report on the basis of which he had come
to this conclusion.
21. In their statement under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C.
the accused stated that H.L. was a girl of ‘bad character’
and that they had been falsely implicated at the instance
of the investigating agency.
22. After going through the evidence on record, the
Additional Sessions Judge, Sonepat by a judgment and
order dated 1st April 1992 convicted Satish Prakash and
Basti Ram of having committed gang rape on H.L. from
27th February 1990 to 8th March 1990. Satish Prakash was
also found guilty of having raped H.L. from September
Crl. Appeal No.352 of 2006 Page 11 of 17Page 12
1989 to February 1990. Basti Ram was found guilty of
having raped H.L. from October 1989 to February 1990.
Both the accused were also found guilty of offences
punishable under Sections 366, 342 and 506 of the IPC.
23. Subsequently by an order dated 3rd April 1992
Satish Prakash and Basti Ram were sentenced under
Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC to 10 years rigorous
imprisonment for the gang rape of H.L. They were also
asked to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- and in default thereof to
undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one year. For
the remaining offences, they were sentenced to various
terms of imprisonment, but all sentences were to run
concurrently and, therefore, we are not going into the
details of the punishment awarded.
Proceedings in the High Court:
24. Feeling aggrieved by the conviction and sentence,
both the convicts preferred an appeal in the High Court of
Crl. Appeal No.352 of 2006 Page 12 of 17Page 13
Punjab and Haryana, being Criminal Appeal No. 162-
SB/1992.
25. The High Court examined the evidence in a rather
cursory manner and after noting the contentions urged by
learned counsel for the parties, the High Court held as
follows:
“After going through the contention of learned
counsel for both the parties, I am of the opinion
that ASI Jai Dev PW 22 has admitted that he
recorded the statement of Mohinder who has
stated that he and Sat Narain had enticed away
H.L. and, thereafter, sent her to Bareli with
somebody else and that he can get H.L. recovered.
In Ex.D1 H.L. has clearly written to Mohinder that
she was absent from School for four days while
accompanying Mohinder to Delhi and she also
admitted that she has been questioned by Satish
Kumar appellant and her maternal grandfather
and grand-mother with regard to absence for four
days. Satish also reprimanded her that she had
been missing for four days without disclosing her
whereabouts and he would stop her from going to
School and send her to her father’s house after
performing betrothal to some boy. In letter Ex. D8
also she has named Dr. Satya asking help from
him for making a programme in the day time as it
is difficult to come out of the house at night.
Taking the totality of facts and the circumstances
of the case into consideration the above evidence
casts heavy doubt on the prosecution version and
Crl. Appeal No.352 of 2006 Page 13 of 17Page 14
does not inspire any confidence. Therefore, I have
no option but to accept this appeal and acquit
both the appellants of the charges framed against
them after setting aside the order of conviction
and sentence passed by the Trial Court. Bail
bonds tendered before the trial Court stand
discharged.”
26. On the above basis, the learned Single Judge
allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction of Satish
Prakash and Basti Ram.
27. The State of Haryana has challenged the judgment
and order passed by the learned Single Judge of the High
Court.
Discussion and conclusion:
28. During the pendency of the appeal before us,
Satish Prakash expired and the appeal only survives as
against Basti Ram.
29. The law on the issue whether a conviction can be
based entirely on the statement of a rape victim has been
settled by this Court in several decisions. A detailed
Crl. Appeal No.352 of 2006 Page 14 of 17Page 15
discussion on this subject is to be found in Vijay @
Chinee v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010) 8 SCC
191. After discussing the entire case law, this Court
concluded in paragraph 14 of the Report as follows:-
“Thus, the law that emerges on the issue is to the
effect that the statement of the prosecutrix if found to
be worthy of credence and reliable, requires no
corroboration. The Court may convict the accused on
the sole testimony of the prosecutrix.”
This decision was recently adverted to and followed in
State of Rajasthan v. Babu Meena, 2013 (2) SCALE
479.
30. A reading of the judgment and order of the High
Court indicates that it has not discussed the statement of
H.L. under Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate
nor her testimony before the Trial Judge. On going through
her statement recorded by the Magistrate, we find that it
is rather detailed and the least that was expected of the
High Court was to consider that statement. If it was found
to be not credible, the High Court was entitled to reject it
and also her testimony before the Trial Judge. But, to
Crl. Appeal No.352 of 2006 
Page 15 of 17Page 16
completely ignore what the prosecutrix had said, merely
on the basis of a handful of letters which she had written
(even though she had explained the circumstances in
which she had written those letters) is a rather
unsatisfactory way of dealing with the entire case.
31. Normally, we would have gone through the entire
evidence on record and decided whether the acquittal of
Basti Ram should be sustained or not. However, in the
absence of any discussion or analysis of the evidence by
the High Court in first appeal, we are of the opinion that a
right of appeal available to Basti Ram would be taken
away if we were to consider the case on its merits without
the opinion of the High Court. Additionally, for a proper
appreciation of the case, it is necessary for us to have the
views of the High Court on record. This is important since
the High Court has reversed a finding of conviction given
by the Trial Judge.
32. Under the circumstances, the more appropriate
course of action would be to set aside the impugned
Crl. Appeal No.352 of 2006 
Page 16 of 17
Page 17
judgment and order passed by the High Court and remand
the matter for reconsideration on merits after taking into
account the entire evidence on record, including the
statement and testimony of H.L. as well as the law on the
subject. We do so accordingly. 
33. Since the allegation of rape is of the year 1989-
1990, we request the High Court to accord high priority to
the disposal of the case. 
34. Appeal is disposed of.
..……………………..J.
(A.K. Patnaik)
..……………………..J.
(Madan B. Lokur)
New Delhi;
April 02, 2013
Crl. Appeal No.352 of 2006 Page 17 of 17