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Wednesday, April 3, 2013

environmental clearance= the appellant company applied and obtained ‘No Objection Certificate’ on 01.08.1994 from the Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board (forPage 2 short ‘the TNPCB’) for setting up a copper smelter plant (for short ‘the plant’) in Melavittan village, Tuticorin. On 16.01.1995, the Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India, granted environmental clearance to the setting up of the plant of the appellants at Tuticorin subject to certain conditions including those laid down by the TNPCB and the Government of Tamil Nadu. On 17.05.1995, the Government of Tamil Nadu granted clearance subject to certain conditions and requested the TNPCB to issue consent to the proposed plant of the appellants. Accordingly, on 22.05.1995, the TNPCB granted its consent under Section 21 of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 (for short ‘the Air Act’) and under Section 25 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (for short ‘the Water Act’) to the appellants to establish the plant in the SIPCOT Industrial Complex, Melavittan village, Tuticorin Taluk.- The environmental clearance granted by the Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India, and the consent orders under the Air Act and the Water Act granted by the TNPCB were challenged before the Madras High Court in W.P. Nos.15501, 15502 and 15503 of 1996 by the National Trust for Clean Environment. = There is no doubt that there has been misrepresentation and suppression of material facts made in the special leave petition but to decline relief to the appellants in this case would mean closure of the plant of the appellants. The plant of the appellants contributes substantially to the copper production in India and copper is used in defence, electricity, automobile, construction and infrastructure etc. The plant of the appellants has about 1300 employees and it also provides employment to large number of people through contractors. A number of ancillary industries are also dependent on the plant. Through its various transactions, the plant generates a huge revenue to Central and State Governments in terms of excise, custom duties, income tax and VAT. It also contributes to 10% of the total cargo volume of Tuticorin port. For these considerations of public interest, we do not think it will be a proper exercise of our discretion under Article 136 of the Constitution to refuse relief on the grounds of misrepresentation and suppression of material facts in the special leave petition. - In the result, the appeals are allowed and the impugned common judgment of the High Court is set aside. The appellants, however, are directed to deposit within three months from today a compensation of Rs.100 crores with the Collector of Thoothukudi District, which will be kept in a fixed deposit in a Nationalized Bank for a minimum of five years, renewable as and when it expires, and the interest therefrom will be spent on suitable measures for improvement of the environment, including water and soil, of the vicinity of the plant of the appellants after consultation with TNPCB and approval of the Secretary, Environment, Government of Tamil Nadu. In case the Collector of Thoothukudi District, after consultation with TNPCB, finds the interest amount inadequate, he may also utilize the principal amount or part thereof for the aforesaid purpose after approval from the Secretary, Environment, Government of Tamil Nadu. By this judgment, we have only set aside the directions of the High Court in the impugned common judgment and we make it clear that this judgment will not stand in the way of the TNPCB issuing directions to the appellant-company, including a direction for closure of the plant, for the protection of environment in accordance with law. We also make it clear that the award of damages of Rs. 100 Crores by this judgment against the appellant Company for the period from 1997 to 2012 will not stand in the way of any claim for damages for the aforesaid period or any other period in a civil court or any other forum in accordance with law.


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Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 2776-2783 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 28116-28123 of 2010)
Sterlite Industries (India) Ltd. Etc. Etc. … Appellants
Versus
Union of India & Ors. Etc. Etc. … Respondents
J U D G M E N T
A. K. PATNAIK, J.
Leave granted.
FACTS:
2. The relevant facts very briefly are that
  the appellant company applied and obtained ‘No Objection Certificate’ on 01.08.1994 from the Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board (forPage 2 short ‘the TNPCB’) for setting up a copper smelter plant (for short ‘the plant’) in Melavittan village, Tuticorin.
On
16.01.1995, the Ministry of Environment and Forests,
Government of India, granted environmental clearance to
the setting up of the plant of the appellants at Tuticorin
subject to certain conditions including those laid down by the
TNPCB and the Government of Tamil Nadu.
On 17.05.1995,
the Government of Tamil Nadu granted clearance subject to
certain conditions and requested the TNPCB to issue consent
to the proposed plant of the appellants. Accordingly, on
22.05.1995, the TNPCB granted its consent under Section 21
of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 (for
short ‘the Air Act’) and under Section 25 of the Water
(Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (for short ‘the
Water Act’) to the appellants to establish the plant in the
SIPCOT Industrial Complex, Melavittan village, Tuticorin
Taluk.
3. The environmental clearance granted by the Ministry of
Environment and Forests, Government of India, and the
consent orders under the Air Act and the Water Act granted
2Page 3
by the TNPCB were challenged before the Madras High Court
in W.P. Nos.15501, 15502 and 15503 of 1996 by the National
Trust for Clean Environment.
While these writ petitions were
pending, the appellants set up the plant and commenced
production on 01.01.1997. Writ Petition No.5769 of 1997
was then filed by V. Gopalsamy, General Secretary, MDMK
Political Party, Thayagam, praying for inter alia a direction to
the appellants to stop forthwith the operation of the plant.
Writ Petition No. 16861 of 1991 was also filed by Shri K.
Kanagaraj, Secretary, CITU District Committee, District
Thoothukudi, for directions to the State of Tamil Nadu,
TNPCB and the Union of India to take suitable action against
the appellant-company for its failure to take safety measures
due to which there were pollution and industrial accidents in
the plant. A Division Bench of the High Court heard Writ
Petition Nos. 15501 to 15503 of 1996, Writ Petition No.5769
of 1997 and Writ Petition No.16861 of 1998 and by the
common judgment dated 28.09.2010, allowed and disposed
of the writ petitions with the direction to the appellantcompany to close down its plant at Tuticorin. By the
3Page 4
common judgment, the High Court also declared that the
employees of the appellant-company would be entitled to
compensation under Section 25FFF of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 and directed the District Collector, Tuticorin, to
take all necessary and immediate steps for the reemployment of the workforce of the appellant-company in
some other companies/factories/organizations so as to
protect their livelihood and to the extent possible take into
consideration their educational and technical qualifications
and also the experience in the field. Aggrieved, the
appellant has filed these appeals against the common
judgment dated 28.09.2010 of the Division Bench of Madras
High Court and on 01.10.2010, this Court passed an interim
order staying the impugned judgment of the High Court.
CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS:
4. Mr. C.A. Sundaram, learned senior counsel appearing
for the appellants, submitted that one of the grounds stated
in the impugned judgment of the High Court for directing
closure of the plant of the appellants was that the TNPCB
4Page 5
had stipulated in the Consent Order dated 22.05.1995 that
the appellant-company has to ensure that the location of the
unit should be 25 kms. away from the ecologically sensitive
area and as per the report of NEERI (National Environmental
Engineering and Research Institute) of 1998 submitted to the
High Court, the plant is situated within 25 kms. from four of
the twenty one islands in the Gulf of Munnar, namely,
Vanthivu, Kasuwar, Karaichalli and Villanguchalli, which are
at distances of 6 k.m., 7 k.m. and 15 k.m. respectively from
Tuticorin where the plant is located. He submitted that there
is no notification issued by the Central Government under
Rule 5(1) of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986
prohibiting or restricting the location of an industry in
Tuticorin area. He submitted that the Government of Tamil
Nadu, however, had issued a notification dated 10.09.1986
notifying its intention under Section 35(1) of the Wildlife
(Protection) Act, 1972 to declare the twenty one islands of
the Gulf of Munnar as a Marine National Park, but no
notification has yet been issued by the Government of Tamil
Nadu under Section 35(4) of the aforesaid Act declaring the
5Page 6
twenty one islands of the Gulf of Munnar as a National Park.
He explained that prior to the Environment (Protection) Act,
1986 and the Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986, some
environmental guidelines had been issued by the Ministry of
Environment and Forests, Department of Environment,
Government of India, in August, 1985 and one of the
guidelines therein was that industries must be located at
least 25 kms. away from the ecologically sensitive areas and
it is on account of these guidelines that the TNPCB in its
Consent Order dated 22.05.1995 under the Water Act had
stipulated that the plant of the appellants should be situated
25 kms. away from ecologically sensitive areas. He
submitted that this stipulation was made in the Consent
Order under the Water Act because the plant was likely to
discharge effluent which could directly or indirectly affect
the ecological sensitive areas within 25 kms. of the industry,
but in the Consent Order issued on 14.10.1996 to operate
the industry, this stipulation was removed and instead it was
stipulated in clause (20) that the unit shall re-use the entire
quantity of treated effluent in the process and ensure that
6Page 7
no treated effluent is discharged into inland surface water or
on land or sewer or sea as proposed by the unit. He
submitted that in any case the consent for establishment
issued under the Water Act by the TNPCB would show that
the appellant-company was given the consent to establish its
copper smelter project in SIPCOT Industrial Complex
irrespective of the distance at which the SIPCOT Industrial
Complex was located from any ecological sensitive area and
in the SIPCOT Industrial Complex, many other chemical
industries are located and the High Court appears to have
lost sight of this aspect of the consent given by the TNPCB to
establish the plant.
5. Mr. Sundaram submitted that the second ground given
by the High Court for directing closure of the plant of the
appellants was that this being a project exceeding Rs.50/-
crores, environmental clearance was required to be obtained
from the Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government
of India, after a public hearing which was a mandatory
requirement but no materials were produced before the High
Court to show that there was any such public hearing
7Page 8
conducted before the commencement of the plant of the
appellant-company. He submitted that when the
environmental clearance was granted to the appellantcompany the Environmental Impact Assessment (for short
‘EIA’) notification dated 27.01.1994 was in force and this
notification did not make public hearing mandatory and only
stated that comments of the public may be solicited if so
recommended by the Impact Assessment Agency within 30
days of the receipt of the proposal. He submitted that the
High Court, therefore, was not correct in taking a view that a
public hearing was mandatory during EIA before
environmental clearance was given by the Ministry of
Environment and Forests, Government of India. He clarified
that by a subsequent notification dated 10.04.1997, a public
hearing was made compulsory but by the time this
notification came into force environmental clearance had
already been granted to the plant of the appellants on
16.01.1995.
6. Mr. Sundaram submitted that the High Court also took
the view in the impugned judgment on the basis of the
8Page 9
report of the NEERI of 1998 that there was undue haste on
the part of the governmental authorities in granting
permissions and consents to the appellant-company. He
submitted that in an Explanatory Note to the EIA notification
dated 27.01.1994 the Central Government has clarified that
Rapid EIA could also be conducted for obtaining environment
clearance for any new project/activity and therefore the
State Government while granting No Objection Certificate by
its letter dated 01.08.1994 asked the appellants to conduct
Rapid EIA based on one season data and the appellants
carried out Rapid EIA study based on the data collected by
the M/s. Tata Consultancy Service (TCS). He relied on the
affidavit dated 01.12.1998 filed on behalf of the Ministry of
Environment and Forests, Government of India to submit
that Rapid EIA before granting clearance to the plant of the
appellant was conducted in accordance with the guidelines.
7. Mr. Sundaram submitted that the third ground on which
the High Court directed closure of the plant of the appellants
was that the TNPCB stipulated a condition in clause No.20 of
the No Objection Certificate that the appellants will develop
9Page 10
a green belt of 250 meters width around the battery limit of
the industry as contemplated under the Environmental
Management Plan but subsequently the appellant-company
submitted a representation to TNPCB requesting TNPCB to
reduce the requirement of green belt from 250 meters to the
width of 10-15 meters as development of the green belt of
250 meters width requires a land of around 150 acres and
TNPCB in its meeting held on 18.08.1994 relaxed this
condition and stipulated that the appellant-company will
develop a green belt of minimum width of 25 meters. He
submitted that the land allocated by SIPCOT to the
appellants was not sufficient to provide a green belt of 250
meters width around the plant and hence this was an
impossible condition laid down in the No Objection
Certificate and for this reason the appellants approached the
TNPCB to modify this condition and the TNPCB reduced the
width of the green belt to 25 meters. He further submitted
that generally, the TNPCB and the Ministry of Environment
and Forests, Government of India, have been insisting on a
green belt of 25% of the plant area and the appellants could
10Page 11
not be asked to provide a green belt of more than 25% of
the plant area.
8. Mr. Sundaram submitted that the last ground, on which
the High Court directed closure of the plant of the appellants
is that the plant of the appellants has caused severe
pollution in the area as has been recorded by NEERI in its
report of 2005 submitted to the High Court and the
groundwater samples taken from the area indicate that the
copper, chrome, lead cadmium and arsenic and the chloride
and fluoride content is too high when compared to Indian
drinking water standards. He referred to the reports of
NEERI of 1998, 1999, 2003 and 2005 submitted to the High
Court and the report of NEERI of 2011 and also the joint
inspection report of TNPCB and CPCB of September 2012
submitted to this Court, to show that the finding of the High
Court that the plant of the appellants had caused severe
pollution in the area was not correct. He vehemently
submitted that though there were no deficiencies in the
plant of the appellants, the TNPCB in its affidavit has
referred to its recommendations as if there were
11Page 12
deficiencies. He submitted that the recommendations made
by the TNPCB were only to provide the best of checks in the
plant against environmental pollution with a view to ensure
that the plant of the appellants becomes a model plant from
the point of view of the environment, but that does not mean
that the plant of the appellants had deficiencies which need
to be corrected. He submitted that the reports of NEERI of
2005 and 2011 referred to accumulation of gypsum and
phospho gypsum, which come out from the plant of the
appellants as part of the slag but the opinion of CPCB in its
letter dated 17.11.2003 to the TNPCB is that such slag is
non-hazardous and can be used in cement industries, for
filling up lower level area and as building/road construction
material, etc. and has no adverse environmental effects.
9. Mr. Sundaram finally submitted that since none of the
grounds given by the High Court in the impugned judgment
for directing closure of the plant of the appellants are wellfounded, it is a fit case in which this Court should set aside
the impugned judgment of the High Court and allow the
appeals. He submitted that the plant of the appellants
12Page 13
produces 2,02,000 metric tones of copper which constitute
39% of the total of 5,14,000 metric tones of copper produced
in India and that 50% of the copper produced by the plant of
the appellants is consumed in the domestic market and the
balance 50% is exported abroad. He also submitted that the
plant provides direct and indirect employment to about 3000
people and yields a huge revenue to both the Central and
State Governments. He submitted that closure of the plant
of the appellants, therefore, would also not be in the public
interest.
CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE WRIT PETITIONERSRESPONDENTS:
10. Mr. V. Gopalsamy, who was the writ petitioner in Writ
Petition No.5769 of 1997 before the High Court, appeared inperson and supported the impugned judgment of the High
Court. He submitted that the TNPCB in its No Objection
Certificate dated 01.08.1994 as well as in its Consent Order
dated 22.05.1995 under the Water Act clearly stipulated that
the appellant-company shall ensure that the location of its
unit should be 25 kms. away from ecological sensitive area
13Page 14
and the Government of Tamil Nadu in their affidavit dated
27.10.2012 have stated that all the 21 islands including the
four near Tuticorin in the Gulf of Munnar Marine National
Park are ecologically sensitive areas. He submitted that
NEERI in its report of 1998 has observed that four out of
twenty one islands, namely, Vanthivu, Kasuwar, Karaichalli
and Villanguchalli, are at distances of 6 kms., 7 kms. and 15
kms. respectively from Tuticorin. He further submitted that
merely because a condition has been subsequently imposed
on the appellant-company by TNPCB not to discharge any
effluent to the sea, the restriction of minimum 25 kms.
distance from ecological sensitive area from location of the
unit of the appellants cannot be lifted particularly when the
Government of Tamil Nadu as well as the Central
Government are treating the Gulf of Munnar as a Marine
National Park and extending financial assistance for the
development of its ecology. He submitted that the proposal
for issuance of a declaration under Section 35(4) of the
Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 is pending for concurrence of
the Central Government and, therefore, the ecological
14Page 15
balance in the area of Gulf of Munnar would be disturbed if
the plant of the appellants continues at Tuticorin and the
High Court was right in directing closure of the plant of the
appellants located at Tuticorin.
11. Mr. V. Gopalsamy submitted that the High Court was
similarly right in directing closure of the plant of the
appellants on the ground that the appellants did not develop
a green belt of 250 metres width around their plant as
stipulated in the No Objection Certificate dated 01.08.1994
of the TNPCB and instead represented to the TNPCB and got
the green belt reduced to only 25 metres width. He
submitted that considering the grave adverse impact on the
environment by the plant of the appellants, a 250 metres
width of green belt was absolutely a must but the TNPCB
very casually reduced the green belt from 250 metres width
to 25 metres. He submitted that it will be seen from the
joint report of TNPCB and CPCB filed pursuant to the order
dated 27.08.2012 of this Court that as a condition of the
renewal of the consent order, the appellant-company has
been asked to develop a green belt to an extent of 25% of
15Page 16
the total area of 172.17 hectares which works out to 43.04
hectares and yet the TNPCB has found development of green
belt of 26 hectares as sufficient compliance. He submitted
that the appellants would, therefore, be required to develop
a green belt of 17.04 hectares more for compliance of the
condition for renewal of consent stipulated by the TNPCB.
12. Mr. V. Gopalsamy submitted that for their plant, the
appellants have been importing copper concentrate from
Australian mines which are highly radioactive and
contaminated and contain high levels of arsenic, uranium,
bismuth, fluorine and experts of environment like Mark
Chernaik have given a report on the adverse impacts of the
plant of the appellants at Tuticorin on the environment. In
this context, he also submitted that an American company,
namely, the Asarco producing copper had to be closed down
on account of such adverse environmental effects. He
submitted that the claim of the appellants that their plant
has no deficiencies and that it does not have any impact on
the environment is not correct and different reports of the
NEERI would show that the plant of the appellants is
16Page 17
continuing to pollute the air and has also affected the ground
water of the area by discharging effluent and the High Court,
therefore, rightly directed the closure of the plant. He
submitted that the appellants had initially proposed to
establish the plant in Gujarat but this was opposed
vehemently and the appellants decided to shift the
establishment of the plant to Goa but because of opposition
the plant could not be established in Goa. He submitted that
the appellants thereafter intended to set up the plant at
Ratnagiri in Maharashtra and invested Rs.200 crores in
construction activities after obtaining environmental
clearance but because of the opposition of the farmers of
Ratnagiri, the Maharashtra Government had to revoke the
licence granted to the appellants. He submitted that the
appellants have been able to set up the plant at Tuticorin in
Tamil Nadu by somehow obtaining environmental clearance
from the Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government
of India, without a public hearing and the consents under the
Water Act and the Air Act from the TNPCB and the High
17Page 18
Court rightly allowed the writ petitions and directed closure
of the plant of the appellants.
13. Mr. V. Prakash, learned senior counsel appearing for the
writ petitioner, National Trust For Clean Environment, in Writ
Petition Nos. 15501 to 15503 of 1996 before the High Court,
submitted that the appellants had made a false statement in
the synopsis at page (B) of the Special Leave Petition that it
has been consistently operating for more than a decade with
all necessary consents and approvals from all the statutory
authorities without any complaint. He submitted that
similarly in ground no. IV at page 45 of the Special Leave
Petitions the appellants have falsely stated that the High
Court has erred in not appreciating that the appellants had
got all the statutory approvals/consent orders from the
authorities concerned as also the Central Government and
the State Government. He submitted that the report of
NEERI of 2011 would show that the appellants did not have
valid consent during various periods including the period
when it filed the Special Leave Petitions. He submitted that
the appellants did not also inform this Court that when they
18Page 19
moved this Court on 01.10.2010 to stay the operation of the
impugned order of the High Court, the plant of the
appellants had already stopped operation. He vehemently
argued that due to misrepresentation of the material facts
by the appellants in the Special Leave Petitions as well as
suppression of the material facts, this Court was persuaded
to pass the stay order dated 01.10.2010. He argued that on
this ground alone this Court should refuse to grant relief to
the appellants in exercise of its discretion under Article 136
of the Constitution. He relied on the decisions of this Court
in Hari Narain v. Badri Das [AIR 1963 SC 1558], G.
Narayanaswamy Reddy (dead) by LRs. & Anr. v. Government
of Karnataka & Anr. [(1991) 3 SCC 261] and Dalip Singh v.
State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. [(2010) 2 SCC 114] and
Abhyudya Sanstha v. Union of India [(2011) 6 SCC 145] for
the proposition that this Court can refuse relief under Article
136 of the Constitution where the appellants have not
approached this Court with clean hands and have made
patently false statements in the special leave petition.
19Page 20
14. Mr. Prakash next submitted that the main ground that
was taken in the writ petitions before the High Court by
National Trust For Clean Environment was that the Ministry
of Environment and Forests, Government of India, and the
TNPCB had not applied their mind to the nature of the
industry as well as the pollution fall out of the industry of the
appellants and the capacity of the unit of the appellants to
handle the waste without causing adverse impact on the
environment as well as on the people living in the vicinity of
the plant. He submitted that this Court has already held that
a right to clean environment is part of the right to life
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution and has
explained the precautionary principle and the principle of
sustainable development in Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum
v. Union of India & Ors. [(1996) 5 SCC 647], Tirupur Dyeing
Factory Owners’ Association v. Noyyal River Ayacutdars
Protection Association [(2009) 9 SCC 737] and M.C. Mehta v.
Union of India Ors. [(2009) 6 SCC 142]. He submitted that
these principles, therefore, have to be borne in mind by the
authorities while granting environmental clearance and
20Page 21
consent under the Water Act or the Air Act, but unfortunately
both the Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government
of India, and the TNPCB have ignored these principles and
have gone ahead and hastily granted environmental
clearance and the consent under the two Acts. He submitted
that, in the present case, the appellants have relied on the
Rapid EIA done by Tata Consultancy Service, but this Rapid
EIA was based on the data which is less than the month’s
particulars and is inadequate for making a proper EIA which
must address the issue of the nature of the manufacturing
process, the capacity of the manufacturing facility and the
quantum of production, the quantum and nature of
pollutants, air, liquid and solid and handling of the waste.
15. Mr. Prakash referred to the report of NEERI of 1998
submitted to the High Court to show that the inspection
team of NEERI collected waste water samples from the plant
of the appellants and an analysis of the waste water samples
indicate that the treatment plant of the appellants was
operating inefficiently as the levels of arsenic, selenium and
lead in the treated effluent as also the effluent stored in the
21Page 22
surge ponds were higher than the standards stipulated by
the TNPCB. He also referred to the report of NEERI of
February 1999 in which NEERI has stated that the treated
effluent quality did not conform to the standards stipulated
by the TNPCB.
16. Mr. Prakash further submitted that the counter affidavit
of the Union of India filed on 01.12.1998 before the High
Court also does not disclose whether, apart from the Rapid
EIA of Tata Consultancy Services, there was any independent
evaluation of the Rapid EIA by the environmental impact
assessment authority, namely, the Ministry of Environment
and Forests. He submitted that the TNPCB in its No
Objection Certificate dated 01.08.1994 has stipulated in
Clause 18 that the appellants have to carry out Rapid EIA
(for one season other than monsoon) as per the EIA
notification dated 27.01.1994 issued by the Ministry of
Environment and Forests, Government of India, and furnish a
copy to the TNPCB and this clause itself would show that
TNPCB had not applied its mind as to whether there was a
sufficient rational analysis of the nature of the industry,
22Page 23
nature of pollutants, quantum of fall out and the plan or
method for handling the waste. He submitted that since
there was no application of mind by either the Ministry of
Environment and Forests, Government of India, before
granting the environmental clearance or by the TNPCB
before granting the consents under the Water Act and the
Air Act, the environmental clearance and the consent orders
are liable to be quashed.
17. In support of his submissions, Mr. Prakash cited East
Coast Railway & Anr. v. Mahadev Appa Rao & Ors. [(2010) 7
SCC 678], for the proposition that for a valid order there has
to be application of mind by the authority, and in the
absence of such application of mind by the authority, the
order is arbitrary and is liable to be quashed. He cited the
decision of the Lords of the Judicial Committee of Privy
Council in Belize Alliance of Conservation Non-governmental
Organizations v. The Department of the Environment and
Belize Electric Company Limited [(2004) 64 WIR 68 para 69]
in which it has been observed that EIA is expected to be
comprehensive in treatment of the subject, objective in its
23Page 24
approach and must meet the requirement that it alerts the
decision maker to the effect of the activity on the
environment and the consequences to the community. He
also relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Judicature of Jamaica in The Northern Jamaica Conservation
Association v. The Natural Resources Conservation Authority
[Claim No. HCV 3022 of 2005] to argue that a public hearing
was a must for grant of environmental clearance and
submitted that as there was no public hearing in this case
and there was inadequate EIA before the grant of the
environmental clearance for the plant of the appellants, the
High Court has rightly directed closure of the plant of the
appellants.
18. Finally, Mr. Prakash submitted that the finding of the
High Court that the plant of the appellants continues to
pollute the environment has been substantiated by the
inspection report which has been filed in this Court by the
NEERI as well as the TNPCB from time to time. In particular,
he referred to the joint inspection report of the TNPCB and
CPCB to show that the directions issued by the TNPCB to
24Page 25
improve solid waste disposal has not been complied with.
He submitted that one of the conditions of the consent order
of the TNPCB was that no slag was to be stored in the
premises of the plant but huge quantity of slag has been
stored in the premises of the plant and the direction to
dispose at least 50% more than the monthly generation
quantities of both slag and gypsum has not been complied
with. He vehemently argued that unless the plant is shut
down, the appellants will not be able to clear the huge
quantity of slag and gypsum lying in the plant premises. He
submitted that it is not correct as has been submitted on
behalf of the appellants that the slag is not a hazardous
waste containing arsenic and will certainly jeopardize the
environment. He argued that there was therefore no other
option for the High Court but to direct closure of the plant of
the appellants to ensure clean environment in the area.
CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE AUTHORITIES:
19. Mr. S. Guru Krishna Kumar, learned counsel appearing
for the TNPCB as well as the State of Tamil Nadu, relying on
25Page 26
the affidavit filed on behalf of the State of Tamil Nadu on
29.10.2012 submitted that the Gulf of Munnar consisting of
21 islands in 4 groups was notified under Section 35(1) of
the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 on 10th September 1986
as this group of islands consisted of territorial waters
between them and the proposal to declare Gulf of Munnar as
a Marine National Park under Section 35(4) of the said Act
was sent by the Chief Wild Life Warden to the State
Government for approval on 30.04.2003 but the declaration
under Section 35(4) of the said Act has not been finally
made. He further submitted that all the 21 islands including
the 4 islands in the Gulf of Munnar are therefore ecological
sensitive areas. He submitted that notwithstanding the fact
that four of the islands were near Tuticorin, the TNPCB gave
the consent under the Water Act to the appellants to set up
the plant at Tuticorin because the plant has a zero effluent
discharge. He also referred to the compliance affidavit of
the TNPCB filed on 08.10.2012 to show that the TNPCB is
monitoring the emissions from the plant of the appellants to
26Page 27
ensure that the National Ambient Air Quality Standards are
maintained.
20. Mr. Vijay Panjwani, learned counsel appearing for CPCB,
made a reference to Sections 3, 16 and 18 of the Water Act
which relate to the CPCB and submitted that it was not for
the CPCB but for the TNPCB to issue No Objection Certificate
and consent in respect of the plant set up in the State of
Tamil Nadu. He submitted that under Rule 19 of the
Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemical
Rules, 1989, however, improvement notices can be issued
by the CPCB to any person to remedy the contravention of
the Rules.
CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE INTERVENER:
21. Mr. Raj Panjwani, learned counsel for the intervener,
submitted that a marine biosphere is an ecological sensitive
area and if in the consent order a condition was stipulated
that the plant of the appellants has to be situated beyond 25
kms. from ecological sensitive area, this condition has to be
complied with. He further submitted that in any case the
27Page 28
appellants are liable to compensate for having damaged the
environment.
FINDINGS OF THE COURT:
22. Writ Petition No.15501 of 1996, Writ Petition No.15503
of 1996 and Writ Petition No.5769 of 1997 had been filed for
quashing the environmental clearances dated 16.01.1995
and 17.05.1995 granted by the Ministry of Environment and
Forests, Government of India, to the appellants for setting up
the plant at Tuticorin and by the impugned judgment, the
High Court has not quashed the environmental clearance but
has allowed the three writ petitions. Hence, the first
question which we will have to decide is whether the High
Court could have interfered with the environmental
clearances granted by the Ministry of Environment and
Forests, Government of India, and the Government of Tamil
Nadu, Department of Environment.
23. The environmental clearance for setting up the plant
was granted to the appellants under the Environment
(Protection) Act, 1986. Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the
28Page 29
Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 provides that subject to
the provisions of the Act, the Central Government shall have
the power to take all such measures as it deems necessary
or expedient for the purpose of protecting and improving the
quality of the environment and preventing, controlling and
abating environmental pollution. Sub-section (2) of Section
3 further provides that in particular, and without prejudice to
the generality of the provisions of sub-section (1), such
measures may include measures with respect to all or any of
the matters specified therein. One such matter specified in
clause (v) of sub-section (2) is restriction of areas in which
any industries, operations or processes or class of industries,
operations or processes shall not be carried out or shall be
carried out subject to certain safeguards. Rule 5(3) of the
Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986 accordingly empowers
the Central Government to impose prohibitions or
restrictions on the location of an industry or the carrying on
processes and operations in an area, by notification in the
Official Gazette. In exercise of these powers under Section
3(2)(v) of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 and Rule
29Page 30
5(3) of the Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986, the Central
Government has issued a notification dated 27.01.1994
imposing restrictions and prohibitions on the expansion and
modernization of any activity or new projects being
undertaken in any part of India unless environmental
clearance has been accorded by the Central Government or
the State Government in accordance with the procedure
specified in the said notification.
24. Para 2 of the notification dated 27.01.1994 lays down
the requirements and procedure for seeking environmental
clearance of projects, and clause (c) of Para 2 provides that
the Impact Assessment Agency could solicit comments of the
public within thirty days of receipt of proposal, in public
hearings, arranged for the purpose, after giving thirty days
notice of such hearings in at least two newspapers, and after
completion of public hearing, where required, convey its
decision. The language of this notification did not lay down
that the public hearing was a must. The Impact Assessment
was done by Tata Consultancy Services as per the
requirements then existing and the Government of India has
30Page 31
granted the Environmental Clearance on 16.01.1995. The
notification dated 27.01.1994, however, was amended by
notification dated 10.04.1997 and it was provided in clause
(c) of Para 2 of the notification that the Impact Assessment
Agency shall conduct a public hearing and the procedure for
public hearing was detailed in Schedule IV to the notification
by the amendment notification dated 10.04.1997.
Admittedly, in this case, the environmental clearance was
granted by the Ministry of Environment, Government of
India, on 16.01.1995 in accordance with the procedure laid
down by notification dated 27.01.1994 well before the
notification dated 10.04.1997 providing for mandatory public
hearing in accordance with the procedure laid down in
Schedule IV. As there was no mandatory requirement in the
procedure laid down under the Environment (Protection) Act,
1986 and the Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986 and the
notifications dated 27.01.1994 as amended by notification
dated 04.05.1994 that a public hearing has to be conducted
before grant of environmental clearance, the High Court
could not have allowed the writ petitions challenging the
31Page 32
environmental clearances on the ground that no public
hearing was conducted before grant of the environmental
clearances.
25. An Explanatory Note regarding the EIA notification
dated 27.01.1994 was also issued by the Central
Government and Para 5 of the Explanatory Note clarified
that project proponents could furnish Rapid EIA report to the
Impact Assessment Agency based on one season data, for
examination of the project and Comprehensive EIA report
may be submitted later, if so asked for by the Impact
Assessment Agency and this was permitted where
Comprehensive EIA report would take at least one year for
its preparation. In Para 5 of the affidavit filed by the Union
of India before the High Court in Writ Petition Nos.15501 to
15503 of 1996, the allegation of the writ petitioner that the
Ministry of Environment and Forests have accorded
environmental clearance without applying its mind and
without making any analysis of the adverse impacts on the
marine ecological system has been denied and it has been
further stated that after detailed examination of Rapid
32Page 33
EIA/EMP, filled in Questionnaire for industrial projects, NOC
from State Pollution Control Board and Risk Analysis, the
project was examined as per the procedure laid down in the
EIA notification dated 27.01.1994 (as amended on
04.05.1994) and the project was accorded approval on
16.01.1995 subject to specific conditions. As the procedure
laid down under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 and
the Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986 and the
notifications dated 27.01.1994 as amended by notification
dated 04.05.1994 and as explained by the Explanatory Note
issued by the Government of India permitted Rapid EIA in
certain circumstances, the High Court could not have
allowed the writ petitions on the ground that environmental
clearance was issued to the appellant-company on the basis
of inadequate Rapid EIA, particularly when the Union of India
in its affidavit had clearly averred that the environmental
clearance was granted after detailed examination of Rapid
EIA/EMP, filled in Questionnaire for industrial projects, NOC
from State Pollution Control Board and Risk Analysis in
33Page 34
accordance with the procedure laid down in EIA notification
dated 27.01.1994 (as amended on 04.05.1994).
26. The High Court has noticed some decisions of this Court
on Sustainable Development, Precautionary and Polluter
Pays Principles and Public Trust Doctrine, but has failed to
appreciate that the decision of the Central Government to
grant environmental clearance to the plant of the appellants
could only be tested on the anvil of well recognized
principles of judicial review as has been held by a three
Judge Bench of this Court in Lafarge Umiam Mining (P) Ltd.
v. Union of India & Others [(2011) 7 SCC 338 at 380]. To
quote Environmental Law edited by David Woolley QC, John
Pugh-Smith, Richard Langham and William Upton, Oxford
University Press:
“The specific grounds upon which a public
authority can be challenged by way of judicial
review are the same for environmental law as for
any other branch of judicial review, namely on the
grounds of illegality, irrationality, and procedural
impropriety.”
Thus, if the environmental clearance granted by the
competent authority is clearly outside the powers given to it
34Page 35
by the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, the Environment
(Protection) Rules, 1986 or the notifications issued
thereunder, the High Court could quash the environmental
clearance on the ground of illegality. If the environmental
clearance is based on a conclusion so unreasonable that no
reasonable authority could ever have come to the decision,
the environmental clearance would suffer from Wednesbury
unreasonableness and the High Court could interfere on the
ground of irrationality. And, if the environmental clearance
is granted in breach of proper procedure, the High Court
could review the decision of the authority on the ground of
procedural impropriety.
27. Where, however, the challenge to the environmental
clearance is on the ground of procedural impropriety, the
High Court could quash the environmental clearance only if
it is satisfied that the breach was of a mandatory
requirement in the procedure. As stated in Environmental
Law edited by David Woolley QC, John Pugh-Smith, Richard
Langham and William Upton, Oxford University Press:
35Page 36
“It will often not be enough to show that there
has been a procedural breach. Most of the
procedural requirements are found in the
regulations made under primary legislation.
There has been much debate in the courts about
whether a breach of regulations is mandatory or
directory, but in the end the crucial point which
has to be considered in any given case is what
the particular provision was designed to
achieve.”
As we have noticed, when the plant of the appellantcompany was granted environmental clearance, the
notification dated 27.01.1994 did not provide for mandatory
public hearing. The Explanatory Note issued by the Central
Government on the notification dated 27.01.1994 also made
it clear that the project proponents may furnish rapid EIA
report to the IAA based on one season data (other than
monsoon), for examination of the project Comprehensive EIA
report was not a must. In the absence of a mandatory
requirement in the procedure laid down under the scheme
under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 at the relevant
time requiring a mandatory public hearing and a mandatory
comprehensive EIA report, the High Court could not have
interfered with the decision of the Central Government
36Page 37
granting environmental clearance on the ground of
procedural impropriety.
28. Coming now to the ground of irrationality argued so
vehemently by Mr. V. Prakash, we find that no materials
have been produced before us to take a view that the
decision of the Central Government to grant the
environmental clearance to the plant of the appellants was
so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever
have taken the decision. As we have already noticed, in
Para 5 of the affidavit filed by the Union of India before the
High Court in Writ Petition Nos.15501 to 15503 of 1996, it
has been stated that the Ministry of Environment and Forests
have accorded environmental clearance after detailed
examination of rapid EIA/EMP, filled in Questionnaire for
industrial projects, NOC from State Pollution Control Board
and Risk Analysis, and that the project was examined as per
the procedure laid down in the EIA notification dated
27.01.1994 (as amended on 04.05.1994) and only thereafter
the project was accorded approval on 16.01.1995. No
material has been placed before us to show that the decision
37Page 38
of the Ministry of Environment and Forests to accord
environmental clearance to the plant of the appellants at
Tuticorin was wholly irrational and frustrated the very
purpose of EIA.
29. In Belize Alliance of Conservation Non-governmental
Organizations v. The Department of the Environment and
Belize Electric Company Limited (supra) cited by Mr.
Prakash, the Lords of the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council have quoted with approval the following words of
Linden JA with reference to the Canadian legislation in Bow
Valley Naturalists Society v. Minister of Canadian Heritage
[2001] 2 FC 461 at 494:
“The Court must ensure that the steps in the Act
are followed, but it must defer to the responsible
authorities in their substantive determinations as
to the scope of the project, the extent of the
screening and the assessment of the cumulative
effects in the light of the mitigating factors
proposed. It is not for the judges to decide what
projects are to be authorized but, as long as they
follow the statutory process, it is for the
responsible authorities.”
The aforesaid passage will make it clear that it is for the
authorities under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986,
38Page 39
the Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986 and the
notifications issued thereunder to determine the scope of the
project, the extent of the screening and the assessment of
the cumulative effects and so long as the statutory process
is followed and the EIA made by the authorities is not found
to be irrational so as to frustrate the very purpose of EIA, the
Court will not interfere with the decision of the authorities in
exercise of its powers of judicial review.
30. The next question that we have to decide is whether
the High Court was right in directing closure of the plant of
the appellants on the ground that the plant of the appellants
is located at Tuticorin within 25 kms. of four of the twenty
one islands in the Gulf of Munnar, namely, Vanthivu,
Kasuwar, Karaichalli and Villanguchalli. The reason given by
the High Court in coming to this conclusion is that the TNPCB
had stipulated in the Consent Order dated 22.05.1995 that
the appellant-company has to ensure that the location of the
unit should be 25 kms. away from ecologically sensitive area
and as per the report of NEERI, the plant of the appellants
was situated at a distance of 6 kms. of Vanthivu, 7 kms. of
39Page 40
Kasuwar and 15 kms. of Karaichalli and Villanguchalli and
these four villages are part of the twenty one islands in the
Gulf of Munnar. Hence, the High Court directed closure of
the plant because the appellant-company has violated the
condition of the Consent Order dated 22.05.1995 issued by
the TNPCB under the Water Act.
31. The Consent Order dated 22.05.1995 issued by the
TNPCB under Section 25 of the Water Act states as follows:
“Consent to establish or take steps to establish is
hereby granted under Section 25 of the Water
(Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 as
amended in 1988) (hereinafter referred to as ‘The
Act’) and the rules and orders made thereunder to
The Chief Project Manager,
M/s Sterlite Industries (India) Limited
(Copper Smelter Project)
SIPCOT Industrial Complex,
Meelavittam Village, Tuticorin Taluk,
V.O. Chidambaraner District
(hereinafter referred to as ‘The applicant’)
authorizing him/her/them to establish or take
steps to establish the industry in the site
mentioned below:
SIPCOT Industrial Complex,
Meelavittam Village, Tuticorin Taluk,
V.O. Chidambaraner District.”
40Page 41
The aforesaid extract from the Consent Order dated
22.05.1995 of the TNPCB issued under the Water Act makes
it clear that the appellant-company was given consent to
establish its plant in the SIPCOT Industrial Complex,
Melavittan Village, Tuticorin Taluk. Along with the Consent
Order under the Water Act, special conditions were annexed
and clause 20 of the special conditions reads as follows:
“20. (i) 1 km away from the water resources
specified in G.O.Ms. No.213 E&P Dept Dt.
30.3.89
(i) 25 km away from ecological/sensitive
areas.
(ii) 500 metres away from high tide line.”
32. On the one hand, therefore, the appellants were given
consent to establish their plant in the SIPCOT Industrial
Complex, which as per the NEERI report is within 25 kms. of
four of the twenty one islands in the Gulf of Munnar. On the
other hand, a condition was stipulated in the consent order
that the appellants have to ensure that the location of the
unit is 25 kms. away from ecological sensitive area. It thus
41Page 42
appears that the TNPCB while granting the consent under
the Water Act for establishment of the plant of the
appellants in the SIPCOT Industrial Complex added the
above requirement without noting that the SIPCOT Industrial
Complex was within 25 kms. from ecological sensitive area.
Since, however, the Consent Order was granted to the
appellant-company to establish its plant in the SIPCOT
Industrial Complex and the plant has in fact been established
in the SIPCOT Industrial Complex, the High Court could not
have come to the conclusion that the appellant-company
had violated the Consent Order and directed closure of the
plant on this ground.
33. This is not to say that in case it becomes necessary for
preservation of ecology of the aforesaid four islands which
form part of the Gulf of Munnar, the plant of the appellants
cannot be directed to be shifted in future. We find from the
affidavit filed on behalf of the State of Tamil Nadu on
29.10.2012 that the Gulf of Munnar consisting of 21 islands
including the aforesaid four islands have been notified under
Section 35(1) of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 on 10th
42Page 43
September 1986 and a declaration may also be made under
Section 35(4) of the said Act declaring the Gulf of Munnar as
a Marine National Park. We have, therefore, no doubt that
the Gulf of Munnar is an ecological sensitive area and the
Central Government may in exercise of its powers under
clause (v) of sub-section (1) of Rule 5 of the Environment
(Protection) Rules, 1986 prohibit or restrict the location of
industries and carrying on processes and operations to
preserve the biological diversity of the Gulf of Munnar. As
and when the Central Government issues an order under
Rule 5 of the Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986
prohibiting or restricting the location of industries within and
around the Gulf of Munnar Marine National Park, then
appropriate steps may have to be taken by all concerned for
shifting the industry of the appellants from the SIPCOT
Industrial Complex depending upon the content of the order
or notification issued by the Central Government under the
aforesaid Rule 5 of the Environment (Protection) Rules,
1986, subject to the legal challenge by the industries.
43Page 44
34. The next question with which we have to deal is
whether the High Court could have directed the closure of
the plant of the appellants on the ground that though
originally the TNPCB stipulated a condition in the ‘No
Objection Certificate’ that the appellant-company has to
develop a green belt of 250 meters width around the battery
limit of the plant, the appellants made representation to the
TNPCB for reducing the width of the green belt and the
TNPCB in its meeting held on 18.08.1994 relaxed this
condition and required the appellants to develop the green
belt with a minimum width of 25 meters. We find on a
reading of the No Objection Certificate issued by the TNPCB
that various conditions have been imposed on the industry
of the appellants to ensure that air pollution control
measures are installed for the control of emission generated
from the plant and that the emission from the plant satisfies
the ambient area quality standards prescribed by the TNPCB
and development of green belt contemplated under the
environmental management plan around the battery limit of
the industry of the appellants was an additional condition
44Page 45
that was imposed by the TNPCB in the No Objection
Certificate. If the TNPCB after considering the
representation of the appellants has reduced the width of
the green belt from a minimum of 250 meters to a minimum
of 25 meters around the battery limit of the industry of the
appellants and it is not shown that this power which has
been exercised was vitiated by procedural breach or
irrationality, the High Court in exercise of its powers of
judicial review could not have interfered with the exercise of
such power by the State Pollution Control Board. The High
Court in the impugned judgment has not recorded any
finding that there has been any breach of the mandatory
provisions of the Air Act or the Rules thereunder by the
TNPCB by reducing the green belt to 25 meters. Nor has
the High Court recorded any finding that by reducing the
width of the green belt around the battery limit of the
industry of the appellants from 250 meters to 25 meters, it
will not be possible to mitigate the effects of fugitive
emissions from the plant. The High Court has merely held
that the TNPCB should not have taken such a generous
45Page 46
attitude and should not have in a casual way dealt with the
issue permitting the appellant-company to reduce the green
belt particularly when there have been ugly repercussions in
the area on account of the incidents which took place on
05.07.1997 onwards. It was for the TNPCB to take the
decision in that behalf and considering that the appellant’s
plant was within a pre-existing industrial estate, the
appellant could not have been singled out to require such a
huge green belt.
35. This takes us to the argument of Mr. Prakash that had
the Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of
India, applied its mind fully before granting the environment
clearance and had the TNPCB applied its mind fully to the
consents under the Air Act and the Water Act and considered
all possible environmental repercussions that the plant
proposed to be set up by the appellants would have, the
environmental problems now created by the plant of the
appellants would have been prevented. As we have already
held, it is for the administrative and statutory authorities
empowered under the law to consider and grant
46Page 47
environmental clearance and the consents to the appellants
for setting up the plant and where no ground for interference
with the decisions of the authorities on well recognized
principles of judicial review is made out, the High Court could
not interfere with the decisions of the authorities to grant
the environmental clearance or the consents on the ground
that had the authorities made a proper environmental
assessment of the plant, the adverse environmental effects
of the industry could have been prevented. If, however,
after the environmental clearance under the Environment
(Protection) Act, 1986, and the Rules and the notifications
issued thereunder and after the consents granted under the
Air Act and the Water Act, the industry continues to pollute
the environment so as to effect the fundamental right to life
under Article 21 of the Constitution, the High Court could still
direct the closure of the industry by virtue of its powers
under Article 21 of the Constitution if it came to the
conclusion that there were no other remedial measures to
ensure that the industry maintains the standards of emission
and effluent as laid down by law for safe environment (see
47Page 48
M.C. Mehta v. Union of India and others [(1987) 4 SCC 463]
in which this Court directed closure of tanneries polluting the
waters of Ganga river).
36. We have, therefore, to examine whether there were
materials before the High Court to show that the plant of the
appellants did not maintain the standards of emission and
effluent as laid down by the TNPCB and whether there were
no remedial measures other than the closure of the industry
of the appellants to protect the environment. We find on a
reading of the impugned judgment of the High Court that it
has relied on the report of NEERI of 2005 to hold that the
plant site itself is severely polluted and the ground samples
level of arsenic justified classifying the whole site of the
plant of the appellant as hazardous waste. We extract
hereinbelow the relevant observations of NEERI in its report
of 2005 relating to air, water and soil environment in the
Executive Summary:
“Air Environment:
 The emission factors of SO2 from sulphuric acid
plant – I (SAP-I) and sulphuric acid plant – II
48Page 49
(SAP-II) were 0.55 kg/MT of H2SO4
manufactured which is well within the TNPCB
stipulated limit of 2kg/MT of H2SO4
manufactured.
 The acid mist concentration of SAP-I was 85
mg/Nm3, which exceeds the TNPCB limit of 50
mg/Nm3. The acid mist concentration from
SAP-II was 42 mg/Nm3, which is well within the
TNPCB limit. In view of the exceedance of
TNPCB limit for acid mist, it is recommended
that the performance of acid mist eliminators
may be intermittently checked. It is further
recommended to install a tail gas treatment
plant to take care of occasional upsets.
 Out of the seven D.G. sets, one (6.3 MW) was
monitored for particulate matter (PM)
emissions. The level of PM was 115 mg/Nm3
(0.84 gm/kWh) which is within the TNPCB
stipulated limit of 150 mg/Nm3 for thermal
power plants of 200 MW and higher capacity
(165 mg/Nm3) but higher than that stipulated
for diesel engines / Gen sets up to 800 KW
capacity (0.3 gm/kWh). Therefore TNPCB may
decide whether the present PM emissions from
the DG sets of 6.3 MW capacity is within the
limit or otherwise.
 The fugitive emissions were monitored at four
sites to assess the status of air quality with
respect of SO2, NO2 and SPM. The results of
analysis at all fugitive emission monitoring
sites indicate that the levels of gaseous
pollutants SO2 and NO2, were below the
respective NIOSH/OSHA standards for work
place environment. The levels of SPM were
also within the stipulated TNPCB standards for
industrial areas.
49Page 50
 Impact of stack and fugitive emissions on
surrounding air quality was also assessed by
monitoring SO2, NO2 and SPM levels at five
monitoring locations. The levels of SPM, SO2
and NO2 at all the five sites were far below the
TNPCB standards of 120 μg/Nm3 for SO2 as
well as NO2 and 500 μg/Nm3 for SPM for
industrial zone.
Water Environment
 Surface water samples were collected and
analyzed for physico-chemical, nutrient
demand parameters. The physico-chemical
characteristics and nutrient demand
parameters, i.e. with special reference to pH
(7.9-8.0), TDS (120-160 mg/L), COD (11-18
mg/L) and levels of heavy metals viz. Cd, Cr,
Cu, Pb, Fe, Mn, Zn and As in surface water,
were found within the prescribed limits of
drinking water standards (IS: 10500-1995).
 Total eight groundwater samples were
collected (seven from hand pumps and one
from dug well) to assess the groundwater
quality in the study area. The analysis on
physico-chemical characteristics of
groundwater samples collected from various
locations showed high mineral contents in
terms of dissolved solids (395-3020mg/L),
alkalinity (63-210 mg/L), total hardness (225-
2434 mg/L), chloride (109-950 mg/L), sulphate
(29-1124 mg/L) and sodium (57-677 mg/L) as
compared to the drinking water standards
(IS:10500-1995). Thus, it could be concluded
that water in some of the wells investigated is
unfit for drinking. The concentrations of
nutrient demand parameters revealed that
phosphate was in the range 0.1-0.3 mg/L while
nitrate was in the range 1-7.5 mg/L at all
50Page 51
sampling locations which is within the limits
stipulated under drinking water standards
(IS:10500-1995). Levels of Chromium, Copper
and lead were found to be higher in
comparison to the parameters stipulated
under drinking water standards (IS:10500-
1995), other heady metal concentrations, viz.
iron, manganese, zinc and arsenic were found
in the range 0.01-0.05 mg/L, ND-0.01 mg/L
and ND-0.08 mg/L respectively which are
within the drinking water standards (IS:10500-
1995).
 To assess the impact on groundwater quality
due to secured and fill sites and other waste
disposal facilities, five samples were collected
from monitoring wells (shallow bore wells
located around the waste disposal sites). The
Physico-Chemical characteristics of well water
around secured land fill site and gypsum pond
showed mineral contents higher then the
levels stipulated in IS: 10500-1995 in terms of
dissolved solids (400-3245 mg/L), alkalinity
(57-137 mg/L), hardness (290-1280 mg/L),
chloride (46-1390 mg/L), sulphate (177-649
mg/L) and sodium (9-271 mg/L). The results of
nutrient demand parameters showed
phosphate in the range 0.1-0.5 mg/L while
nitrate was in the range 0.8-11.7 mg/L at all
sampling locations, which are within the levels
stipulated in IS:10500-1995, whereas level of
arsenic was found in the range of ND-0.08
mg/L as against the stipulated limit of 0.05
mg/L under drinking water standards
(IS:10500-1995). Levels of cadmium,
chromium, copper and lead were also found to
exceed the drinking water standards in some
of the wells.
51Page 52
 The hourly composite wastewater samples
were collected at six locations. During the
sample collection, flow monitoring was also
carried out at the inlet and final outlet of the
effluent treatment plant (ETP). The
concentrations of total dissolved solid (TDS)
and sulphate exceed the limit stipulated by the
TNPCB for treated effluent. All the other
parameters are within the consent conditions
prescribed by TNPCB. The treated effluent is
being recycled back in the process to achieve
zero discharge.
Soil Environment
 Soil samples were also analyzed for level of
heavy metals. The soil samples at the plant
site showed presence of As (132.5 to 163.0
mg/kg), Cu (8.6 to 163.5 mg/kg), Mn (283 to
521.0 mg/kg) and Fe (929.6 to 1764.6 mg/kg).
Though there is no prescribed limit for heavy
metal contents in soil, the occurrence of these
heavy metals in the soil may be attributed to
fugitive emission, solid waste dumps, etc.”
It will be clear from the extracts from the Executive
Summary of NEERI in its report of 2005, that while some of
the emissions from the plant of the appellants were within
the limits stipulated by the TNPCB, some of the emissions
did not conform to the standards stipulated by TNPCB. It will
also be clear from the extracts from the Executive Summary
52Page 53
relating to water environment that the surface water
samples were found to be within the prescribed limits of
drinking water (IS:10500-1995) whereas ground water
samples showed high mineral contents in terms of dissolved
solids as compared to the drinking water standards, but
concentrations of nutrient demand parameters revealed that
the phosphate and nitrate contents were within the limits
stipulated under drinking water standards and levels of
chromium, copper and lead were found to be higher in
comparison to the parameters stipulated under drinking
water standards, whereas the heavy metal concentrations,
namely, iron, manganese, zinc and arsenic were within the
drinking water standards. Soil samples also revealed heavy
metals. Regarding the solid waste out of slag in the plant
site, the CPCB has taken a view in its communication dated
17.11.2003 to TNPCB that the slag is non-hazardous. Thus,
the NEERI report of 2005 did show that the emission and
effluent discharge affected the environment but the report
read as whole does not warrant a conclusion that the plant
of the appellants could not possibly take remedial steps to
53Page 54
improve the environment and that the only remedy to
protect the environment was to direct closure of the plant of
the appellants.
37. In fact, this Court passed orders on 25.02.2011
directing a joint inspection by NEERI (National Engineering
and Research Institute) with the officials of the Central
Pollution Control Board (for short ‘the CPCB’) as well as the
TNPCB. Accordingly, an inspection was carried out during 6th
April to 8th April, 2011 and 19th April to 22nd April, 2011 and a
report was submitted by NEERI to this Court. On
18.07.2011, this Court directed the Tamil Nadu Government
and the TNPCB to submit their comments with reference to
the NEERI report. On 25.08.2011, this Court directed TNPCB
to file a synopsis specifying the deficiencies with reference
to the NEERI report and suggest control measures that
should be taken by the appellants so that this Court can
consider the direction to be issued for remedial measures
which can be monitored by the TNPCB. Accordingly, the
TNPCB filed an affidavit dated 30.08.2011 along with the
chart of deficiencies and measures to be implemented by
54Page 55
the appellants and on 11.10.2011, this Court directed the
TNPCB to issue directions, in exercise of its powers under the
Air Act and the Water Act to the appellants to carry out the
measures and remove the deficiencies indicated in the chart.
Pursuant to the order dated 11.10.2011, the TNPCB issued
directions to the appellants and on 17.01.2012, the
appellants claimed before the Court that they have removed
the deficiencies pointed out by the TNPCB and on
27.08.2012, this Court directed that a joint inspection be
carried out by TNPCB and CPCB and completed by 14th
September, 2012 and a joint report be submitted to this
Court.
38. The conclusion in the joint inspection report of CPCB and
TNPCB is extracted hereinbelow:
“Out of the 30 Directions issued by the Tamil
Nadu Pollution Control Board, the industry
has complied with 29 Directions. The
remaining Direction No.1(3) under the Air Act
on installation of bag filter to converter is at
the final stage of erection, which will require
further 15 working days to fully comply as
per the industry’s revised schedule.”
55Page 56
From the aforesaid conclusion of the joint inspection report,
it is clear that out of the 30 directions issued by the TNPCB,
the appellant-company has complied with 29 directions and
only one more direction under the Air Act was to be complied
with. As the deficiencies in the plant of the appellants which
affected the environment as pointed out by NEERI have now
been removed, the impugned order of the High Court
directing closure of the plant of the appellants is liable to be
set aside.
39. We may now consider the contention on behalf of the
interveners that the appellants were liable to pay
compensation for the damage caused by the plant to the
environment. The NEERI reports of 1998, 1999, 2003 and
2005 show that the plant of the appellant did pollute the
environment through emissions which did not conform to the
standards laid down by the TNPCB under the Air Act and
through discharge of effluent which did not conform to the
standards laid down by the TNPCB under the Water Act. As
pointed out by Mr. V. Gopalsamy and Mr. Prakash, on
account of some of these deficiencies, TNPCB also did not
56Page 57
renew the consent to operate for some periods and yet the
appellants continued to operate its plant without such
renewal. This is evident from the following extracts from the
NEERI report of 2011:
“Further, renewal of the Consent to Operate was
issued vide the following Proceedings Nos. and
validity period:
TNPCB Proceeding Validity
Upto
No.T7/TNPCB/F.22276/RL/TTN/W/2007
dated 07.05.2007
No.T7/TNPCB/F.22276/RL/TTN/A/2006
dated 07.05.2007
30-09-2007
No.T7/TNPCB/F.22276/URL/TTN/W/20
08 dated 19.01.2009
No.T7/TNPCB/F.22276/URL/TTN/A/200
8 dated 19.01.2009
31-03-2009
No.T7/TNPCB/F.22276/URL/TTN/W/20
09 dated 14.08.2009
No.T7/TNPCB/F.22276/URL/TTN/A/200
9 dated 14.08.2009
31-12-2009
Thereafter, the TNPCB did not renew the Consents
due to non-compliance of the following conditions:
Under Water Act, 1974
i. The unit shall take expedite action to achieve the
time bound target for disposal of slag, submitted
to the Board, including BIS clearance before
arriving at disposal to cement industries, marine
impact study before arriving at disposal for landfill
in abandoned quarries.
57Page 58
ii. The unit shall take expedite action to dispose the
entire stock of the solid waste of gypsum.
Under Air Act, 1981
i. The unit shall improve the fugitive control
measure to ensure that no secondary fugitive
emission is discharged at any stage, including at
the points of material handing and vehicle
movement area.”
For such damages caused to the environment from 1997 to
2012 and for operating the plant without a valid renewal for
a fairly long period, the appellant-company obviously is
liable to compensate by paying damages. In M.C. Mehta and
Another vs. Union of India and Others [(1987) 1 SCC 395], a
Constitution Bench of this Court held:
“The enterprise must be held to be
under an obligation to provide that the
hazardous or inherently dangerous
activity in which it is engaged must be
conducted with the highest standards of
safety and if any harm results on
account of such activity, the enterprise
must be absolutely liable to compensate
for such harm and it should be no
answer to the enterprise to say that it
had taken all reasonable care and that
58Page 59
the harm occurred without any
negligence on its part.”
The Constitution Bench in the aforesaid case further
observed that the quantum of compensation must be corelated to the magnitude and capacity of the enterprise
because such compensation must have a deterrent effect
and the larger and more prosperous the enterprise, the
greater must be the amount of compensation payable by it.
In the Annual Report 2011 of the appellant-company, at
pages 20 and 21, the performance of its copper project is
given. We extract hereinbelow the paragraph titled Financial
Performance:
“PBDIT for the financial year 2010-11
was Rs.1,043 Crore, 40% higher than
the PBDIT of Rs.744 Crore for the
financial year 2009-10. This was
primarily due to higher LME prices and
lower unit costs at Copper India and with
the improved by-product realization.”
Considering the magnitude, capacity and prosperity of the
appellant-company, we are of the view that the appellant company should be held liable for a compensation of Rs. 100
crores for having polluted the environment in the vicinity of
59Page 60
its plant and for having operated the plant without a renewal
of the consents by the TNPCB for a fairly long period and
according to us, any less amount, would not have the
desired deterrent effect on the appellant-company. The
aforesaid amount will be deposited with the Collector of
Thoothukudi District, who will invest it in a Fixed Deposit
with a Nationalized Bank for a period of five years. The
interest therefrom will be spent for improving the
environment, including water and soil, of the vicinity of the
plant after consultation with TNPCB and approval of the
Secretary, Environment, Government of Tamil Nadu.
40. We now come to the submission of Mr. Prakash that
we
should not grant relief to the appellants because of
misrepresentation and suppression of material facts made in
the special leave petition that the appellants have always
been running their plant with statutory consents and
approvals and misrepresentation and suppression of
material facts made in the special leave petition that the
plant was closed at the time the special leave petition was
moved and a stay order was obtained from this Court on
60Page 61
01.10.2010.
There is no doubt that there has been
misrepresentation and suppression of material facts made in
the special leave petition but to decline relief to the
appellants in this case would mean closure of the plant of
the appellants. 
The plant of the appellants contributes
substantially to the copper production in India and copper is
used in defence, electricity, automobile, construction and
infrastructure etc. 
The plant of the appellants has about
1300 employees and it also provides employment to large
number of people through contractors. A number of
ancillary industries are also dependent on the plant.

Through its various transactions, the plant generates a huge
revenue to Central and State Governments in terms of
excise, custom duties, income tax and VAT.
 It also
contributes to 10% of the total cargo volume of Tuticorin
port. 
For these considerations of public interest, 
we do not
think it will be a proper exercise of our discretion under
Article 136 of the Constitution to refuse relief on the grounds
of misrepresentation and suppression of material facts in the
special leave petition. 
61Page 62
41. Before we part with this case, we would like to put on
record our appreciation for the writ petitioners before the
High Court and the intervener before this Court for having
taken up the cause of the environment both before the High
Court and this Court and for having assisted this Court on all
dates of hearing with utmost sincerity and hard work.
 In
Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action and Others vs. Union
of India and Others [(1996) 3 SCC 211],
 this Court observed
that voluntary bodies deserve encouragement wherever
their actions are found to be in furtherance of public interest.
Very few would venture to litigate for the cause of
environment, particularly against the mighty and the
resourceful, but the writ petitioners before the High Court
and the intervener before this Court not only ventured but
also put in their best for the cause of the general public. 
42. In the result, the appeals are allowed and the impugned
common judgment of the High Court is set aside. The
appellants, however, are directed to deposit within three
62Page 63
months from today a compensation of Rs.100 crores with the
Collector of Thoothukudi District, which will be kept in a fixed
deposit in a Nationalized Bank for a minimum of five years,
renewable as and when it expires, and the interest
therefrom will be spent on suitable measures for
improvement of the environment, including water and soil, of
the vicinity of the plant of the appellants after consultation
with TNPCB and approval of the Secretary, Environment,
Government of Tamil Nadu. 
In case the Collector of
Thoothukudi District, after consultation with TNPCB, finds the
interest amount inadequate, he may also utilize the principal
amount or part thereof for the aforesaid purpose after
approval from the Secretary, Environment, Government of
Tamil Nadu. 
By this judgment, we have only set aside the
directions of the High Court in the impugned common
judgment and we make it clear that this judgment will not
stand in the way of the TNPCB issuing directions to the
appellant-company, including a direction for closure of the
plant, for the protection of environment in accordance with
law.
63Page 64
43. We also make it clear that the award of damages
of Rs. 100 Crores by this judgment against the appellant Company for the period from 1997 to 2012 will not stand in the way of any claim for damages for the aforesaid period or any other period in a civil court or any other forum in accordance with law.
.……………………….J.
(A. K. Patnaik)
………………………..J.
(H. L. Gokhale)
New Delhi,
April 2, 2013.
64

Insurance policy claim - The appellant’s father lodged a claim for compensation by asserting that his son had suffered loss of vision due to accidental fall. After long correspondence, the respondents rejected the claim on the ground that the same was not covered by the policy. = Phthisis Bulbi is the endstage anatomic condition of the eye in response to severe ocular disease,infection, inflammation, or trauma. Clinically, it is categorized by a soft strophic eye with disorganization of intraocular structures. Phthisis Bulbi can be caused due to ocular injury, radiation, infection, or diffusion disease. Initial damage to intraocular structures either from penetrating trauma or inflammation can eventually lead to widespread atrophy and disorganization of the eye – Dictionary of Cell and Molecular Biology and Radiology of the Orbit and Visual Pathways, by Jonathan J. Dutton, Prof. of Ophthalmology, University of North Carolina at Chepal Hill, USA.= it is clear that the State Commission and the National Commission committed serious error by dismissing the complaint of the appellant by assuming that his right eye was afflicted with the disease of Phthisis Bulbi and the same was the cause of loss of vision. They completely ignored the report of the Medical Board which had opined that Phthisis Bulbi can be caused due to injury caused due to fall. Before the State Commission, sufficient evidence was produced by the appellant to prove that he had an accidental fall on 22.10.1999 and as a result of that, right side of his head and the right eye were injured. Therefore, there is no escape from the conclusion that the appellant’s case was covered by the policy issued by respondent No.1 and the State Commission and the National Commission committed serious error by rejecting his claim. - In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned order as also the one passed by the State Commission dismissing the complaint filed by the appellant are set aside and the respondents are directed to pay compensation of Rs.7,00,000/- to the appellant with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of filing the complaint. 16. The respondents are directed to pay the aforesaid amount to the appellant within a period of eight months from the date of receipt/production of copy of this judgment.


Page 1
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2759 OF 2013
(Arising out of SLP(C) No. 25991 of 2008)
Sandeep Kumar Chourasia …Appellant
versus
Divisional Manager, the New India
Insurance Company Ltd. and another …Respondents
J U D G M E N T
G. S. Singhvi, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against order dated 14.1.2008 of the National
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (for short, ‘the National
Commission’) whereby rejection of the appellant’s claim for compensation
by the Chhattisgarh State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (for
short, ‘the State Commission’) was upheld.
3. In July, 1997, Shri P.D. Chourasia (the appellant’s father) took
insurance cover under ‘Janta Gramin Vyaktigat Durghatna Policy’ for
Rs.7,00,000/- in the name of the appellant. The policy covered death,
permanent total disablement, loss of two limbs or two eyes, one limb and
- 1 -Page 2
one eye directly caused by accident.
4. While he was playing outside his house on 22.10.1999, the appellant
fell down and sustained injuries in the right portion of his head and the right
eye. He was initially treated in the Government hospital and then in the
private hospital. Dr. Jaishri Gopinath, Assistant Surgeon, Government
Hospital at Supela, Bhilai issued medical certificate dated 22.11.1999
mentioning therein that on account of injury caused to his right eye, the
appellant suffered total loss of vision in the right eye and severe loss of
hearing in both ears. 
Similar certificates were issued by Dr. K.K. Mishra and
Dr. A.K. Verma with little variation in the degree of disability. In October
and November, 2004, the appellant underwent further medical tests and a
surgery was performed to check further deterioration of his eyes.
The
District Medical Board, Durg issued certificate dated 27.10.2005, perusal of
which shows that the appellant had suffered 100% disability in the right eye.
5. The appellant’s father lodged a claim for compensation by asserting
that his son had suffered loss of vision due to accidental fall. After long
correspondence, the respondents rejected the claim on the ground that the
same was not covered by the policy. 
The appellant then filed a complaint
through his father for award of compensation of Rs.7,00,000/- with interest
at the rate of 18% to 25% and cost. In the complaint it was pleaded that the
appellant had suffered injury to the right eye and consequential loss of vision
- 2 -Page 3
and hearing in both ears on account of accidental fall.
6. The respondents filed separate written statements to contest the
complaint. They pleaded that the loss of vision and hearing was not caused
due to the accident. According to the respondents, the right eye of the
appellant was inflicted with Phthisis Bulbi and he was hard of hearing since
birth.
7. The appellant’s father Shri P.D. Chourasia filed his affidavit in
support of the claim. On behalf of respondent No.1, Shri Ajit Kumar
(Branch Manager) filed his affidavit. After considering the pleadings of the
parties and affidavits filed on their behalf, the State Commission decided to
call for an expert opinion. Accordingly, a request was sent to the
management of Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar Memorial Hospital, Raipur to
constitute a Medical Board to examine the appellant. The Medical Board
headed by Dr. A.K.Chandrakar, Professor and Head, Department of
Ophthalmology examined the appellant on 5.8.2005 and submitted a report,
the relevant portion of which is extracted below:
“After examining the complainant and pursing his document,
the opinion of the Medical Board is as follows-
1. Phthisis Bulbi RE is the course of loss vision.
2. The is total loss of vision in RE.
3. The patient had pathological myopia for which Radial
Kanatotomy surgery head been earlier. The loss of vision
- 3 -Page 4
could have been caused by fall while playing.
4. The loss of vision in RE is irreversible.”
8. After receiving the report of the Medical Board, the State Commission
passed order dated 18.5.2006 and dismissed the complaint. The findings
recorded by the State Commission are contained in paragraphs 14 to 16 of
that order, which are reproduced below:
“14. The Commission has referred the complainant to the
Medical Board, the report dated 5.8.05 of which has been
received. The said report discloses that there is no total loss of
vision in the right eye and it has further been stated that there
was Pahological Myopia for which Radial Keratoomy
Surgery had been done earlier and that the loss of vision could
have been caused by fall while playing. However, no definite
opinion regarding loss of vision has been given in the report
of the Medical Board.
15. As reported by Dr. Dani, Phthisis Bulbi is a progressive
disease and was found present on 28.10.99 i.e. almost after a
week of the accident. No material has been produced before
us as to whether the loss of vision was on account of, Phthisis
Bulbi or was a result of the fall. As noted earlier the
complainant has not produced any other documents to show
that the injury to the eye directly resulted due to fall.
16. In the circumstances it is not possible to record a finding
that the loss of vision in the right eye of the complainant was
direct result of fall as alleged by the complainant. Therefore
in our opinion the complainant is not entitled to the benefit
under the policy. Complaint is dismissed.”
9. Feeling aggrieved by the order of the State Commission, the appellant
filed an appeal under Section 21 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 but
could not convince the National Commission to entertain his plea for award
- 4 -Page 5
of compensation. The National Commission discarded the certificate of
Dr. Jaishri Gopinath by observing that she is neither an eye or ENT
specialist nor she had filed an affidavit to prove the contents of the
certificate. The National Commission also opined that the statement made
by the appellant about the loss of hearing was falsified by the record of the
maternity hospital, which revealed that the child was hard of hearing since
birth.
10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully perused
the record.
11. The State Commission heavily relied upon report dated 28.10.1999
prepared by Dani Hospital wherein it was mentioned that the loss of vision
could be attributed to Phthisis Bulbi in the right eye of the appellant. The
State Commission also referred to the report sent by the Medical Board,
which had examined the appellant in August, 2005 and concluded that the
loss of vision has not resulted due to the accidental fall. The National
Commission virtually copied the reasons recorded by the State Commission
and dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant.
12. Unfortunately, both the consumer fora did not bother to carefully go
through the report of the Medical Board constituted in furtherance of the
direction given by the State Commission. In that report, the concerned
doctors opined that the loss of vision could have been caused by fall while
- 5 -Page 6
playing. In their pleadings, respondents had not contested the statement
contained in the complaint, which was duly supported by the affidavit of
Shri P.D. Chourasia, that while playing outside the residence his child had
an accidental fall and the consequential injury to the right eye led to the loss
of vision.
13. The available medical literature shows that Phthisis Bulbi is the endstage anatomic condition of the eye in response to severe ocular disease,infection, inflammation, or trauma. Clinically, it is categorized by a soft strophic eye with disorganization of intraocular structures. Phthisis Bulbi can be caused due to ocular injury, radiation, infection, or diffusion disease.
Initial damage to intraocular structures either from penetrating trauma or inflammation can eventually lead to widespread atrophy and disorganization of the eye – Dictionary of Cell and Molecular Biology and Radiology of the Orbit and Visual Pathways, by Jonathan J. Dutton, Prof. of Ophthalmology,
University of North Carolina at Chepal Hill, USA.
14. From what has been mentioned above, 
it is clear that the State
Commission and the National Commission committed serious error by dismissing the complaint of the appellant by assuming that his right eye was afflicted with the disease of Phthisis Bulbi and the same was the cause of loss of vision. 
They completely ignored the report of the Medical Board
which had opined that Phthisis Bulbi can be caused due to injury caused due
- 6 -Page 7
to fall. Before the State Commission, sufficient evidence was produced by the appellant to prove that he had an accidental fall on 22.10.1999 and as a result of that, right side of his head and the right eye were injured. 
Therefore, there is no escape from the conclusion that the appellant’s case was covered by the policy issued by respondent No.1 and the State Commission and the National Commission committed serious error by rejecting his claim. 
15. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned order as also the one
passed by the State Commission dismissing the complaint filed by the
appellant are set aside and the respondents are directed to pay compensation
of Rs.7,00,000/- to the appellant with interest at the rate of 6% per annum
from the date of filing the complaint. 
16. The respondents are directed to pay the aforesaid amount to the
appellant within a period of eight months from the date of receipt/production
of copy of this judgment.
....….………………….…J.
 [G.S. SINGHVI]
....….………………….…J.
 [H.L. GOKHALE]
New Delhi,
April 02, 2013.
- 7 -

LAND ACQUISITION - SEC. 4, 5 A, 6 - Whether the acquisition of the appellants’ land is vitiated due to violation of Sections 5-A and 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, ‘the Act’) and whether the State Government resorted to discrimination in the matter of release of the acquired land = plea of discrimination is legally correct. It is not in dispute that the lands owned by the appellants and M/s. Rani Shaver Poultry Farm Ltd. and four others were acquired for one and the same purpose i.e. the development of Sectors 21, 22, 23 and 23A of Gurgaon. Therefore, once the State Government took a conscious decision to release the lands of M/s. Rani Shaver Poultry Farm Ltd. and four others, albeit by executing agreements with them, there could be no justification whatsoever for not according similar treatment to the appellants. As will be seen hereafter, the solitary reason put forward by the respondents for not releasing the appellants’ land, namely, that most of it was lying vacant was ex-facie erroneous. Be that as it may, the direction given by the Chief Minister for the issue of notification under Section 6(1) without considering the objections of the appellants and other relevant factors must be held as vitiated due to non application of mind. - arbitrary acquisition by pointing out to the authority concerned, inter alia, that the important ingredient, namely, “public purpose” is absent in the proposed acquisition or the acquisition is mala fide. - Section 5-A(2), which represents statutory embodiment of the rule of audi alteram partem, gives an opportunity to the objector to make an endeavour to convince the Collector that his land is not required for the public purpose specified in the notification issued under Section 4(1) or that there are other valid reasons for not acquiring the same. That section also makes it obligatory for the Collector to submit report(s) to the appropriate Government containing his recommendations on the objections, together with the record of the proceedings held by him so that the Government may take appropriate decision on the objections. Section 6(1) provides that if the appropriate Government is satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made by the Collector under Section 5-A(2) that particular land is needed for the specified public purpose then a declaration should be made. This necessarily implies that the State Government is required to apply mind to the report of the Collector and take final decision on the objections filed by the landowners and other interested persons. Then and then only, a declaration can be made under Section 6(1). As a sequel to the above discussion, we hold that the decision taken at the level of the Chief Minister was not in consonance with the scheme of Section 5-A(2) read with Section 6(1). We further hold that the State Government’s refusal to release the appellants’ land resulted in violation of their right to equality granted under Article 14 of the Constitution. 35. In the result, the appeals are allowed, the impugned order is set aside and the declaration issued by the State Government under Section 6(1) is quashed. However, it is made clear that this judgment shall not preclude the State Government from taking fresh decision after objectively considering the objections filed by the appellants under Section 5-A(1). 36. If the final decision of the State Government is adverse to the appellants, then they shall be free to challenge the same before an appropriate judicial forum and urge all legally permissible contentions in support of their cause.


Page 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2557 OF 2013
M/s. Usha Stud and Agricultural Farms
Private Limited and others …Appellants
versus
State of Haryana and others …Respondents
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2576 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2577 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2578 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2580 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2582 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2583 OF 2013
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2584 OF 2013
J U D G M E N T
G. S. Singhvi, J.
1. Whether the acquisition of the appellants’ land is vitiated due to
violation of Sections 5-A and 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for
short, ‘the Act’) and
whether the State Government resorted to
1Page 2
discrimination in the matter of release of the acquired land 
are the questions
which arise for consideration in these appeals filed against order dated
27.1.2012 passed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court.
2. By notification dated 13.11.1981 issued under Section 4(1), the State
Government proposed the acquisition of 1005.30 acres land of three
villages, namely, Mullahera, Dundahera and Daulatpur Nasirabad
(Carterpur) for the development of Sectors 21, 22, 23 and 23A of Gurgaon.
The appellants, whose land measuring 52.74 acres situated in village
Daulatpur Nasirabad (Carterpur) was included in the notification, filed
objections under Section 5-A(1). 
The Land Acquisition Collector
submitted report under Section 5-A(2) and recommended the acquisition of
702.37 acres land.
As regards the appellants’ land, the Land Acquisition
Collector opined that Stud Farm cannot be allowed to remain in the
residential zone and, therefore, the entire land may be acquired except the
portion on which residential building had been constructed.
The State
Government accepted the recommendations of the Land Acquisition
Collector and issued five separate declarations under Section 6(1). 
For
91.98 acres land of village Daulatpur Nasirabad (Carterpur), the declaration
was published in the Official Gazette dated 15.11.1984.
3. The appellants challenged the acquisition of their land in Writ
Petition No.5623/1984 which was dismissed by the High Court along with
other similar petitions.
2Page 3
4. The appellants then filed Special Leave Petition (C) No.2302/1986.
During the pendency of the matter before this Court, the State Government released the land belonging to 
M/s. Jawala Textiles Ltd., 
M/s. Rani Shaver Poultry Farm Ltd., 
M/s. Enfilco Ltd., 
M/s. Indo Swiss Time Limited and
M/s. Omega Commercial (Pvt.) Ltd.
5. On 13.7.1986, the Chief Town Planner, Haryana submitted a note for
release of the appellants’ land subject to the condition that they should
withdraw the Special Leave Petition.
The appellants did the needful.
Thereafter, the Commissioner and Secretary, Town and Country Planning
Department sent communication dated 21.8.1986 to the appellants
incorporating therein the terms on which the land was released. 
As a
sequel to this, agreement dated 8.6.1987 was executed between the
appellants and Haryana Urban Development Authority (HUDA) for release
of 47.74 acres land.
6. In furtherance of the agreement, the appellants deposited
Rs.1,00,000/- which, according to them, were towards the first instalment
of the development charges.
However, before the other terms of agreement
could be acted upon, the State Government issued fresh notification dated
7.12.1988 under Section 4(1) for the acquisition of 55.10 acres land
including the land owned by the appellants. 
They filed detailed objections
dated 4.1.1989, the salient features of which were:
(i) they had established Stud Farm on the acquired land by spending
3Page 4
substantial amount for breeding, rearing and exporting horses and were
doing other activities like animal husbandry, agriculture, horticulture,
nursery and dairy farming;
(ii) they had grown 5,000 trees on the land and also constructed ‘A’
class buildings worth several crores of rupees;
(iii) the purpose of acquisition was vague;
(iv) the notification issued under Section 4(1) was not published in two
newspapers and was not affixed in the vicinity of the acquired land, and 
(v) the decision of the State Government to acquire their land was
discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
7. Land Acquisition Collector, Urban Estate, Gurgaon submitted report
dated 17.11.1989 with the recommendation that the land of the appellants
may not be notified because the same had already been released from
acquisition. 
Similar recommendation was made by the Chief Town and
Country Planner. 
However, the State Government did not accept their
recommendations and issued a declaration under Section 6(1), which was
published in the Official Gazette dated 6.12.1989. 
8. The appellants challenged notifications dated 7.12.1988 and
6.12.1989 in Writ Petition Nos. 3820-3823/1991. 
During the pendency of
those petitions, the Land Acquisition Collector passed award dated
5.12.1991, which was followed by supplementary award dated 25.8.1993.
4Page 5
Thereupon, the appellants filed Writ Petition Nos. 1152-1155/1994 and
prayed for quashing of the awards.
9. While the writ petitions filed by them were pending, the appellants
made an application to the competent authority for permission to use the
acquired land for group housing. The Additional Director, Urban Estates
recommended the release of 37.906 acres land in favour of the appellants
but no final decision was taken in the matter apparently because the writ
petitions filed by them were pending.
10. M/s. Rani Shaver Poultry Farm Ltd., M/s. Indo Swiss Time Ltd., and
M/s. Kanodia Petro Products Ltd., successor of M/s. Jawala Textile Mills,
whose lands were acquired in 1981 but were released by the State
Government and were re-acquired vide notification dated 11.9.1990 filed
Writ Petition Nos. 11679/1993, 10456/1993 and 3942/1992 for quashing
the same. After receiving the notices issued by the High Court, the State
Government/HUDA executed separate agreements with them and released
substantial portion of their land. As a sequel to this, the writ petitions were
dismissed as withdrawn. However, the writ petition filed by M/s. Enfilco
Ltd. was dismissed by the High Court. When the matter was carried to this
Court (Civil Appeal No.4359/1994) an agreement was executed between
HUDA and M/s. Enfilco Ltd. and major portion of its land was released.
11. In the writ petitions filed by them, the appellants highlighted the
discrimination practiced against them. They pleaded that the Stud Farm
5Page 6
established by them is covered by the term ‘agriculture’ defined in Section
2(1) of the Punjab Scheduled Roads and Controlled Areas (Restriction of
Unregulated Development) Act, 1963 (for short, ‘the 1963 Act’) and they
had raised constructions in consonance with the provisions of that Act.
The appellants further pleaded that even though the Land Acquisition
Officer and the Chief Town Planner had recommended the release of their
land, the State Government arbitrarily issued the declaration under Section
6(1) by wrongly assuming that the entire land was lying vacant.
12. In the counter affidavits filed on behalf of the respondents, it was averred that the objections filed by the appellants were duly considered and final decision to acquire their land was taken by the highest political functionary of the State, i.e., the Chief Minister.
 It was further averred that
the construction made by the appellants was contrary to the provisions of
the 1963 Act because they had not obtained permission from the competent
authority. 
The respondents also pleaded that rearing and breeding of
horses is a commercial activity, which could not have been undertaken by
the appellants without obtaining sanction from the competent authority for
change of land use.
13. The Division Bench of the High Court rejected the contentions raised
on behalf of the appellants and dismissed the writ petitions.
While dealing
with the question whether the acquisition of the appellants’ land was
vitiated due to violation of Section 5-A(2), the Division Bench observed as
6Page 7
under:
“As regards the contention of the counsel for the petitioners that since the
Land Acquisition Collector has not made any recommendation in his report
while considering the objections filed by the petitioners under Section 5-A
of the Act, the same only requires to be noted and rejected for the simple
reason that the Collector is not the competent authority to decide the objections under Section 5-A of the Act raised by the land owners against the acquisition. 
He is required to submit his report as it existed on the spot as he
is required to enquire into the objections, record the statements of the
parties, inspect the sites and send his report to the State Government.
Along with his report he may make recommendation or may not do so because it has no bearing as the competent authority to take decision on the
objections is the State Government. 
Thus, for the failure to make any recommendation by the Collector, acquisition proceedings cannot be quashed on the ground that it violates the procedure or deny the rights conferred on
the land owners under Section 5-A of the Act.”
14. The Division Bench of the High Court also negatived the appellants’
plea of discrimination in the following words:
A ground of discrimination has been raised by the petitioners 
alleging that
in an earlier acquisition in the year 1981, 
petitioners and other similarly
placed Companies, namely, M/s Rani Shaver Poultry Farm, M/s Omega
Commercial Pvt. Ltd., Anand Purifier (now M/s Enfilco Ltd.), Indo Swiss
Time Ltd., M/s Jawala Textile Mills, had challenged the said acquisition by
filing independent writ petitions. 
These writ petitions were dismissed and during the pendency of the Special Leave Petitions before the Supreme Court, an agreement was entered into and the land of the petitioners as also
these Companies were released from acquisition. 
Thereafter, while notification for acquisition of the land of the petitioners was issued, land of other companies was not re-acquired. 
This objection was raised under Section 5-A of the Act, which led to the issuance of the notifications for acquiring the land of other companies also. As the petitioners challenged, similarly other companies also challenged the notifications. 
During the pendency of the
writ petitions, agreements were entered into between these companies and
respondents and on the basis of these agreements, writ petitions were withdrawn by these companies as their lands stood released from acquisition
except that in the case of M/s Enfilco. 
This contention of the petitioners can
also not be accepted as it is not in dispute that the acquisition, through
which the lands of these companies were acquired, was different from the
notifications issued for acquisition of the land of the petitioners. 
The judgments relied upon by the counsel for the petitioners in the case of Hari Ram
7Page 8
and another (supra), M/s Aggarwal Paper Board and Allied Industries
(supra), Chandu Singh (supra) and Anil Kakkar (supra) would not be applicable to the facts of the present case for the reason that in those cases,
the land, which was being acquired and discrimination qua which was
raised by the land owners, was the same whereas the notifications for acquisition are different in the present case.”
15. Shri Soli Sorabjee and Shri Pallav Shishodia, learned senior counsel
appearing for the appellants, argued that the impugned order is liable to be
set aside because the finding recorded by the High Court on the issue of
discrimination is ex-facie erroneous. 
Learned senior counsel emphasized
that the lands belonging to the appellants and those of M/s. Rani Shaver
Poultry Farm Ltd. and others were acquired for developing different sectors
of Gurgaon and, therefore, the State Government was not at all justified in
adopting different yardsticks in the matter of release of the acquired land.
Shri Sorabjee submitted that if the lands of M/s. Rani Shaver Poultry Farm
Ltd. and others were released on the ground that the same had already been
utilised for establishing industrial units, the same treatment should have
been accorded to the appellants because they had not only established Stud
Farm for rearing and breeding of horses but also started agricultural,
horticulture, animal husbandry, nursery and dairy farming and planted
5,000 trees. Learned senior counsel criticized the view expressed by the
High Court on the issue of compliance of Section 5-A and argued that the
same is contrary to the law laid down by this Court in Raghbir Singh
Sehrawat v. State of Haryana (2012) 1 SCC 792 and Kamal Trading (P)
Ltd. v. State of West Bengal (2012) 2 SCC 25.
8Page 9
16. Shri Neeraj Jain, learned senior counsel appearing for the
respondents, supported the impugned order and argued that the High Court
did not commit any error by dismissing the writ petitions. Shri Jain
submitted that the appellants cannot seek invalidation of the acquisition
proceedings on the ground of violation of Section 5-A because final
decision to acquire the land was taken by none other than the Chief
Minister. He submitted that the role of the Land Acquisition Collector
ended with the making of recommendations and it was for the State
Government to decide whether or not the particular piece of land should be
acquired for the specified public purpose. Shri Jain further argued that the
State Government cannot be accused of practicing discrimination because
while the lands belonging to M/s. Rani Shaver Poultry Farm Ltd. and others
had already been used for industrial, commercial and other purposes, those
owned by the appellants were lying vacant.
17. We have considered the respective arguments. We shall first
consider
whether the reason recorded by the High Court for rejecting the
appellants’ plea of discrimination is legally correct.
It is not in dispute that
the lands owned by the appellants and M/s. Rani Shaver Poultry Farm Ltd.
and four others were acquired for one and the same purpose i.e. the
development of Sectors 21, 22, 23 and 23A of Gurgaon. Therefore, once
the State Government took a conscious decision to release the lands of
M/s. Rani Shaver Poultry Farm Ltd. and four others, albeit by executing
agreements with them, there could be no justification whatsoever for not
9Page 10
according similar treatment to the appellants. As will be seen hereafter, the
solitary reason put forward by the respondents for not releasing the
appellants’ land, namely, that most of it was lying vacant was ex-facie
erroneous.
In this context, it will be apposite to take cognizance of the
notings recorded by the officers and the Special Secretary to the Chief
Minister of the State on the objections filed by the appellants:
(i) 09.10.1989
“For acquiring pie land of Usha stud farm and Agricultural farms, Gurgaon,
Sector-4 notification dated 7.12.88 was advertised in national newspaper
the Tribune on 14.12.88 and in The NAV BHARAT Times on 17.12.88. It
was issued in the vicinity on 9.12.88. Section 5-A objections were received
from four persons which are put in the file.
The report of the land acquisition collector is marked on page "K".
I have studied the objections. The details of the development on this land
before section 4 has been made which can be seen on page B . On the
shajra plan this development has also been marked which is at page " kh".
Out of the total land of 55 Acres A class construction is on 1K-11M, Class
B construction is on 18 Marias and class C and D construction is on 6 k. In
my view the class A construction of residential accommodation should not
be acquired while the rest of the land should be acquired.
One of the objections raised by the objectors is that earlier when the land of
the objectors was released land of other land owners like Rani Shaver
Farm, Jwala Textile Mills, and Indo-swiss Times ltd and others land was
also released. But now only the land of the objectors is being re acquired
while not of the others. In order to get to get a solution to this objection, it
is my suggestion that before we issue Section 6 notification in respect of
the land of the objectors, we should issue Section 4 notification to re acquire the land of the others so that the objectors do not have the ground of
discrimination available.
The objectors have also written that when their land was released
earlier they had deposited the development charges. My view on this may
be seen on page 65 whereby it is clear that the objectors had sent a cheque
of 1 lakh of Rupees to the Estate Officer, HUDA, Gurgaon without being
asked to do so. In my view, in case this cheque has already not been returned then the Estate Officer should be instructed to return the cheque immediately.
10Page 11
Sd/-
Additional Director Urban Estates
 9-10-1989”
(ii) 09.11.1989
“The objection of M/s Usha Stud and Agricultural Farm, Gurgaon whose
lands are now to be notified, u/s 6 of the LA. Act have clearly stated the aspect of discrimination since, lands in respect of M/s Rani Shaver, Jawala
Textile Mills Indian Swiss Time Ltd. notified for acquisition in Nov., 1981
along with Usha Stud simultaneously and subsequently all these were released.
However, now only lands of M/s Usha Stud and Agricultural Farms are
proposed to be acquired leaving the other lands.
The ADUE has therefore proposed that to remove any plea of discrimination the lands of M/s Rani Shaver, Jawala Textile Mills and Indo Swiss
time should also now be acquired and therefore notified simultaneously.
To my mind this would not a practicable proposition since all these are
functioning enterprises and to disturb and disrupt them through acquisition
would not be appropriate.
Therefore keeping into consideration the aspect of discrimination and the
report of ADUE the Government may take an appropriate view regarding
notifying this land u/s 6 which should have to be done prior to 6.12.89.
 Sd/-
 D. U. E.
 9-11-89”
C.T.C.P.
(iii) 17.11.1989
“In view of the position explained by the DUE, we need not issue the notification under Section 6 for this land. This land was earlier released from
acquisition on the grounds mentioned on Pages 13 to 17 (LFII) (Noting
portion), There is no change in the situation even now.
Dy. CM(I)/CM may kindly see for approval.
Sd/- C.T.C.P.
 17.11.89
Dy.C.M.(l)
Sd/-Dy. CM
11Page 12
27.11.89”
CM.
(iv) 05.12.1989
“Reg. Acquisition of land of M/S Usha Stud Agricultural Farm,
Gurgaon.
C.M. has ordered that the notification under section 6 for the acquisition of
land of M/S Usha Stud Agricultural Farm may be issued because it is
mostly lying vacant. He has further ordered that vacant lands belonging to
M/S Rani Showers Farm and Jawala Textiles may also be notified for acquisition.
Sd/-SSCM
 5.12.89.”
18. A reading of the above reproduced notings makes it clear that while
the Additional Director and the Director, Urban Estates Department had
treated the appellants’ case as similar to M/s. Rani Shaver Poultry Farm
Ltd. and others, the Chief Minister ordered the issue of notification under
Section 6(1) in respect of the land of appellant No.1 by assuming that
major portion of it was lying vacant. Of course, he also ordered that the
vacant lands belonging to M/s. Rani Shaver Poultry Farm Ltd. and Jawala
Textiles may also be notified for acquisition. It is a different thing that in
the second round also the lands owned by M/s. Rani Shaver Poultry Farm
Ltd. and four others were released during the pendency of the writ petitions
and the civil appeal filed by them. It is intriguing that while ordering the
issue of notification under Section 6(1), the Chief Minister did not even
advert to the objections filed by the appellants and the report made by the
12Page 13
Land Acquisition Collector under Section 5-A(2). He was totally oblivious
of the fact that the appellants had already utilised substantial portion of
their land for establishing Stud Farm and for other activities, like, animal
husbandry, agriculture, horticulture, nursery and dairy farming and had also
constructed a large number of buildings by spending crores of rupees and
planted 5,000 trees. Be that as it may, the direction given by the Chief
Minister for the issue of notification under Section 6(1) without considering
the objections of the appellants and other relevant factors must be held as
vitiated due to non application of mind.
19. What is most surprising is that not only the Chief Minister, but the
High Court also overlooked the fact that after the Chief Minister had
ordered acquisition of vacant land belonging to M/s. Rani Shaver Poultry
Farm Ltd. and others and notification dated 11.9.1990 was issued, the State
Government and/or HUDA executed agreement with them and released the
acquired land leaving out the appellants’ land and in this manner they were
subjected to hostile discrimination.
20. We also find merit in the argument of the learned senior counsel for
the appellants that the declaration issued by the State Government was
vitiated due to violation of Section 5-A (2) read with Section 6(1). For the
sake of reference,
Sections 4, 5-A and 6 of the Act are reproduced below: 
 “4. Publication of preliminary notification and powers of officers
thereupon.
(1) Whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that
land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public pur-
13Page 14
pose or for a company, a notification to that effect shall be published in the
Official Gazette and in two daily newspapers circulating in that locality of
which at least one shall be in the regional language and the Collector shall
cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said locality (the last of the dates of such publication
and the giving of such public notice, being hereinafter referred to as the
date of the publication of the notification).
(2) Thereupon it shall be lawful for any officer, either generally or specially
authorised by such Government in this behalf, and for his servants and
workmen,—
to enter upon and survey and take levels of any land in such locality;
to dig or bore into the sub-soil;
to do all other acts necessary to ascertain whether the land is adapted for
such purpose;
to set out the boundaries of the land proposed to be taken and the intended
line of the work (if any) proposed to be made thereon;
to mark such levels, boundaries and line by placing marks and cutting
trenches; and,
where otherwise the survey cannot be completed and the levels taken and
the boundaries and line marked, to cut down and clear away any part of any
standing crop, fence or jungle:
Provided that no person shall enter into any building or upon any enclosed
court or garden attached to a dwelling house (unless with the consent of the
occupier thereof) without previously giving such occupier at least seven
days' notice in writing of his intention to do so.
5-A. Hearing of objections.—
(1) Any person interested in any land which
has been notified under Section 4, sub-section (1), as being needed or likely
to be needed for a public purpose or for a company may, within thirty days
from the date of the publication of the notification, object to the acquisition
of the land or of any land in the locality, as the case may be.
(2) Every objection under sub-section (1) shall be made to the Collector in
writing, and the Collector shall give the objector an opportunity of being
heard in person or by any person authorised by him in this behalf or by
pleader and shall, after hearing all such objections and after making such
further inquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary, either make a report in respect of the land which has been notified under Section 4, sub-section (1),
or make different reports in respect of different parcels of such land, to the
appropriate Government, containing his recommendations on the objections, together with the record of the proceedings held by him, for the decision of that Government. The decision of the appropriate Government on
the objections shall be final.
14Page 15
(3) For the purposes of this section, a person shall be deemed to be interested in land who would be entitled to claim an interest in compensation if
the land were acquired under this Act.
6. Declaration that land is required for a public purpose.
(1) Subject
to the provisions of Part VII of this Act, when the appropriate Government
is satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made under Section 5-A,
sub-section (2), that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or
for a Company, a declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary to such Government or of some officer duly authorised
to certify its orders, and different declarations may be made from time to
time in respect of different parcels of any land covered by the same notification under Section 4, sub-section (1), irrespective of whether one report or
different reports has or have been made (wherever required) under Section
5-A, sub-section (2):
Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a
notification under Section 4, sub-section (1)—
(i) * * *
(ii) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of
the publication of the notification:
Provided further that no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a Company, or
wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed
by a local authority.
Explanation 1.—In computing any of the periods referred to in the first proviso, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under Section 4, sub-section (1), is stayed by
an order of a Court shall be excluded.
Explanation 2.—Where the compensation to be awarded for such property
is to be paid out of the funds of a corporation owned or controlled by the
State, such compensation shall be deemed to be compensation paid out of
public revenues.
(2) Every declaration shall be published in the Official Gazette, and in two
daily newspapers circulating in the locality in which the land is situate of
which at least one shall be in the regional language, and the Collector shall
cause public notice of the substance of such declaration to be given at convenient places in the said locality (the last of the dates of such publication
and the giving of such public notice, being hereinafter referred to as the
date of the publication of the declaration), and such declaration shall state
the district or other territorial division in which the land is situate, the purpose for which it is needed, its approximate area, and, where a plan shall
have been made of the land, the place where such plan may be inspected.
15Page 16
(3) The said declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is
needed for a public purpose or for a Company, as the case may be; and,
after making such declaration, the appropriate Government may acquire the
land in manner hereinafter appearing.”
 21. An analysis of the above-reproduced provisions shows that Section 4
empowers the appropriate Government to initiate the proceedings for the
acquisition of land. Section 4(1) lays down that whenever it appears to the
appropriate Government that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be
needed for any public purpose or for a company, then a notification to that
effect is required to be published in the Official Gazette and two daily
newspapers having circulation in the locality. Of these, one paper has to be
in the regional language. A duty is also cast on the Collector, as defined in
Section 3(c), to cause public notice of the substance of such notification to
be given at convenient places in the locality. The last date of publication
and giving of public notice is treated as the date of publication of the
notification.
22. Section 4(2) lays down that after publication of the notification under Section 4(1), any officer authorised by the Government in this behalf,
his servants or workmen can enter upon and survey and take levels of any
land in the locality, dig or bore into the sub-soil, and to do all other acts necessary for ascertaining that the land is suitable for the purpose of acquisition. The officer concerned, his servants or workmen can fix the boundaries
of the land proposed to be acquired and the intended line of the work, if
16Page 17
any, proposed to be made on it. They can also mark such levels and boundaries by marks and cutting trenches and cut down and clear any part of any
standing crops, fence or jungle for the purpose of completing the survey,
and taking level, and marking of boundaries and line. However, neither the
officer nor his servants or workmen can, without the consent of the occupier, enter into any building or upon any enclosed court or garden attached
to a dwelling house without giving seven days' notice to the occupier.
23. Section 5-A, which embodies the most important dimension of the
rules of natural justice, lays down that any person interested in any land notified under Section 4(1) may, within 30 days of publication of the notification, submit objection in writing against the proposed acquisition of land or
of any land in the locality to the Collector. The Collector is required to give
the objector an opportunity of being heard either in person or by any person
authorised by him or by pleader. After hearing the objector(s) and making
such further inquiry, as he may think necessary, the Collector has to make a
report in respect of land notified under Section 4(1) with his recommendations on the objections and forward the same to the Government along with
the record of the proceedings held by him. The Collector can make different reports in respect of different parcels of land proposed to be acquired.
24. Upon receipt of the Collector's report, the appropriate Government is
required to take action under Section 6(1) which lays down that if after
considering the report, if any, made under Section 5-A(2), the appropriate
17Page 18
Government is satisfied that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, then a declaration to that effect is required to be made under the signatures of a Secretary to the Government or of some officer duly authorised
to certify its orders. This section also envisages making of different declarations from time to time in respect of different parcels of land covered by
the same notification issued under Section 4(1). In terms of clause (ii) of
the proviso to Section 6(1), no declaration in respect of any particular land
covered by a notification issued under Section 4(1), which is published
after 24.9.1989 can be made after expiry of one year from the date of publication of the notification. To put it differently, a declaration is required to
be made under Section 6(1) within one year from the date of publication of
the notification under Section 4(1).
25. In terms of Section 6(2), every declaration made under Section 6(1)
is required to be published in the Official Gazette and in two daily newspapers having circulation in the locality in which the land proposed to be acquired is situated. Of these, at least one must be in the regional language.
The Collector is also required to cause public notice of the substance of
such declaration to be given at convenient places in the locality. The declaration to be published under Section 6(2) must contain the district or
other territorial division in which the land is situate, the purpose for which
it is needed, its approximate area or a plan is made in respect of land and
the place where such plan can be inspected.
18Page 19
26. Section 6(3) lays down that the declaration made under Section 6(1)
shall be conclusive evidence of the fact that land is needed for a public purpose.
27. After publication of the declaration under Section 6(1), the Collector
is required to take order from the State Government for the acquisition of
land and cause it to be measured and planned (Sections 7 and 8). The next
stage is the issue of public notice and individual notice to the persons interested in the land to file their claim for compensation. Section 11 envisages
holding of an enquiry into the claim and passing of an award by the Collector who is required to take into consideration the provisions contained in
Section 23.
28. In Munshi Singh v. Union of India (1973) 2 SCC 337, this Court emphasised the importance of Section 5-A in the following words:
“ … Sub-section (2) of Section 5-A makes it obligatory on the Collector to
give an objector an opportunity of being heard. After hearing all objections
and making further inquiry he is to make a report to the appropriate Government containing his recommendation on the objections. The decision of
the appropriate Government on the objections is then final. The declaration
under Section 6 has to be made after the appropriate Government is satisfied, on a consideration of the report, if any, made by the Collector under
Section 5-A(2). The legislature has, therefore, made complete provisions
for the persons interested to file objections against the proposed acquisition
and for the disposal of their objections. It is only in cases of urgency that
special powers have been conferred on the appropriate Government to dispense with the provisions of Section 5-A.”
29. In State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh (1980) 2 SCC 471, the Court
observed as under:
19Page 20
“ … it is fundamental that compulsory taking of a man's property is a serious matter and the smaller the man the more serious the matter. Hearing
him before depriving him is both reasonable and pre-emptive of arbitrariness, and denial of this administrative fairness is constitutional anathema
except for good reasons. Save in real urgency where public interest does
not brook even the minimum time needed to give a hearing land acquisition
authorities should not, having regard to Articles 14 (and 19), burke an enquiry under Section 17 of the Act. Here a slumbering process, pending for
years and suddenly exciting itself into immediate forcible taking, makes a
travesty of emergency power.”
30. In Shyam Nandan Prasad v. State of Bihar (1993) 4 SCC 255, this
Court reiterated that compliance of Section 5-A is mandatory and observed:
“ … The decision of the Collector is supposedly final unless the appropriate Government chooses to interfere therein and cause affectation, suo motu or on the application of any person interested in the land. These requirements obviously lead to the positive conclusion that the proceeding
before the Collector is a blend of public and individual enquiry. The person interested, or known to be interested, in the land is to be served personally of the notification, giving him the opportunity of objecting to the acquisition and awakening him to such right. That the objection is to be in writing, is indicative of the fact that the enquiry into the objection is to focus his individual cause as well as public cause. That at the time of the enquiry, for which prior notice shall be essential, the objector has the right to appear in person or through pleader and substantiate his objection by evidence and argument.”
31. In Raghbir Singh Sehrawat’s case (supra), this Court referred to the
judgments in Munshi Singh v. Union of India (1973) 2 SCC 337, State of
Punjab v. Gurdial Singh (1980) 2 SCC 471, Shyam Nandan Prasad v. State
of Bihar (1993) 4 SCC 255, Union of India v. Mukesh Hans (2004) 8 SCC
14, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai (2005)
7 SCC 627, Radhy Shyam v. State of U.P. (2011) 5 SCC 553 and
observed:
20Page 21
“In this context, it is necessary to remember that the rules of natural justice
have been ingrained in the scheme of Section 5-A with a view to ensure
that before any person is deprived of his land by way of compulsory
acquisition, he must get an opportunity to oppose the decision of the State
Government and/or its agencies/instrumentalities to acquire the particular
parcel of land. At the hearing, the objector can make an effort to convince
the Land Acquisition Collector to make recommendation against the
acquisition of his land. He can also point out that the land proposed to be
acquired is not suitable for the purpose specified in the notification issued
under Section 4(1). Not only this, he can produce evidence to show that
another piece of land is available and the same can be utilised for execution
of the particular project or scheme. Though it is neither possible nor
desirable to make a list of the grounds on which the landowner can
persuade the Collector to make recommendations against the proposed
acquisition of land, but what is important is that the Collector should give a
fair opportunity of hearing to the objector and objectively consider his plea
against the acquisition of land. Only thereafter, he should make
recommendations supported by brief reasons as to why the particular piece
of land should or should not be acquired and whether or not the plea put
forward by the objector merits acceptance. In other words, the
recommendations made by the Collector must reflect objective application
of mind to the objections filed by the landowners and other interested
persons.”
32. In Kamal Trading (P) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal (supra), this
Court again considered the scope of Section 5-A and observed:
“13. Section 5-A(1) of the LA Act gives a right to any person interested
in any land which has been notified under Section 4(1) as being needed or
likely to be needed for a public purpose to raise objections to the
acquisition of the said land. Sub-section (2) of Section 5-A requires the
Collector to give the objector an opportunity of being heard in person or by
any person authorised by him in this behalf. After hearing the objections,
the Collector can, if he thinks it necessary, make further inquiry.
Thereafter, he has to make a report to the appropriate Government
containing his recommendations on the objections together with the record
of the proceedings held by him for the decision of the appropriate
Government and the decision of the appropriate Government on the
objections shall be final.
14. It must be borne in mind that the proceedings under the LA Act are
based on the principle of eminent domain and Section 5-A is the only
protection available to a person whose lands are sought to be acquired. It is
a minimal safeguard afforded to him by law to protect himself from
21Page 22
arbitrary acquisition by pointing out to the authority concerned, inter alia,
that the important ingredient, namely, “public purpose” is absent in the
proposed acquisition or the acquisition is mala fide.
The LA Act being an
expropriatory legislation, its provisions will have to be strictly construed.
15. Hearing contemplated under Section 5-A(2) is necessary to enable
the Collector to deal effectively with the objections raised against the
proposed acquisition and make a report. The report of the Collector
referred to in this provision is not an empty formality because it is required
to be placed before the appropriate Government together with the
Collector’s recommendations and the record of the case. It is only upon
receipt of the said report that the Government can take a final decision on
the objections. It is pertinent to note that declaration under Section 6 has to
be made only after the appropriate Government is satisfied on the
consideration of the report, if any, made by the Collector under Section 5-
A(2). As said by this Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd., the
appropriate Government while issuing declaration under Section 6 of the
LA Act is required to apply its mind not only to the objections filed by the
owner of the land in question, but also to the report which is submitted by
the Collector upon making such further inquiry thereon as he thinks
necessary and also the recommendations made by him in that behalf.
16. Sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the LA Act makes a declaration
under Section 6 conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public
purpose. Formation of opinion by the appropriate Government as regards
the public purpose must be preceded by application of mind as regards
consideration of relevant factors and rejection of irrelevant ones. It is,
therefore, that the hearing contemplated under Section 5-A and the report
made by the Land Acquisition Officer and his recommendations assume
importance. It is implicit in this provision that before making declaration
under Section 6 of the LA Act, the State Government must have the benefit
of a report containing recommendations of the Collector submitted under
Section 5-A(2) of the LA Act. The recommendations must indicate
objective application of mind.”
33. The ratio of the aforesaid judgments is that 
Section 5-A(2), which
represents statutory embodiment of the rule of audi alteram partem, gives
an opportunity to the objector to make an endeavour to convince the
Collector that his land is not required for the public purpose specified in the
notification issued under Section 4(1) or that there are other valid reasons
for not acquiring the same. 
That section also makes it obligatory for the
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Collector to submit report(s) to the appropriate Government containing his
recommendations on the objections, together with the record of the
proceedings held by him so that the Government may take appropriate
decision on the objections. 
Section 6(1) provides that if the appropriate
Government is satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made by the
Collector under Section 5-A(2) that particular land is needed for the
specified public purpose then a declaration should be made. This
necessarily implies that the State Government is required to apply mind to
the report of the Collector and take final decision on the objections filed by
the landowners and other interested persons. Then and then only, a
declaration can be made under Section 6(1).
34. As a sequel to the above discussion, we hold that the decision taken at the level of the Chief Minister was not in consonance with the scheme of Section 5-A(2) read with Section 6(1).
We further hold that the State
Government’s refusal to release the appellants’ land resulted in violation of
their right to equality granted under Article 14 of the Constitution.
35. In the result, the appeals are allowed, the impugned order is set aside
and the declaration issued by the State Government under Section 6(1) is
quashed. However, it is made clear that this judgment shall not preclude
the State Government from taking fresh decision after objectively
considering the objections filed by the appellants under Section 5-A(1).
36. If the final decision of the State Government is adverse to the
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appellants, then they shall be free to challenge the same before an
appropriate judicial forum and urge all legally permissible contentions in
support of their cause.
......... ...............................................J.
(G.S. SINGHVI)
......... ...............................................J.
(RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI)
..........................................................J.
(KURIAN JOSEPH)
New Delhi;
April 02, 2013.
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