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Friday, January 11, 2013

service matter = Whether the Principal, Government Medical College, Jammu, can reverte the appellants to their parent Department, namely, the Directorate of Health Service, Jammu. = The reversion/repatriation of the appellants to their parent department, i.e., the Directorate of Health Services, Jammu, is affirmed. The appellants who have continued to discharge their duties eversince their induction into service at the Government Medical College, Jammu (and/or at hospitals associated therewith), will be repatriated/reverted to the Directorate of Health Services, Jammu. Now, that the matter has attained finality, they must be relieved from their postings in the Directorate of Medical Education. So as to enable them to accept the reality of the situation, and to acclimatize them with the position emerging from our order, we consider it just and appropriate to direct, that the appellants be allowed to be continued at their present place of posting till 31.3.2013. They shall be relieved from their posting in the Directorate of Medical Education under all circumstances on the afternoon of 31.3.2013, for onward posting against a cadre post in the Directorate of Health Services. Disposed of in the aforesaid terms.


                                                                “REPORTABLE”

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 162 OF 2013
                  (Arising out of SLP (C) No.5042 of 2006)


Kavi Raj & Others                                        …. Appellants


                                   Versus

State of J&K & Ors.                                …. Respondents

                                    WITH

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 163 OF 2013
                   (Arising out of SLP (C) No.5893 of 2006

Reva Gaind & Others                                …. Appellants


                                   Versus

State of J&K & Ors.                                …. Respondents


                               J U D G M E N T


JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.

1.    Leave granted.
2.    Consequent upon the creation  of  posts  of  Assistant  Surgeons,  the
Health and Medical Education Department of the State  of  Jammu  &  Kashmir,
addressed a requisition to the Jammu &  Kashmir  Public  Service  Commission
(hereinafter referred to as “the  Public  Service  Commission”)  to  recruit
1255 posts of Assistant Surgeons.  Based on the aforesaid  requisition,  the
Public  Service  Commission  issued  a  notification  dated  31.12.1996  for
inviting applications for 1255 posts of Assistant Surgeons in the  pay-scale
of Rs.2200-4000.
Based on  the  aforesaid  notification,  an  advertisement
dated 2.1.1997 appeared in newspapers inviting applications for  1255  posts
of Assistant  Surgeons,  belonging  to  the  Health  and  Medical  Education
Department.
3.    In June, 1997 the  Public  Service  Commission  after  completing  the
process of selection, prepared a select list of successful candidates.  
The
names  of  the  appellants  herein,  appeared  in  the  list  of  successful
candidates.  Consequent upon the selection of the  appellants  as  Assistant
Surgeons by the Public Service Commission,  the  Department  of  Health  and
Medical  Education,  issued  an  order  dated   12.8.1997   appointing   the
appellants against the advertised posts of Assistant Surgeons.  
An  extract
of the aforesaid order,  relevant  to  the  present  controversy,  is  being
reproduced hereunder:
      “The candidates belonging to Jammu region  shall  report  to  Director
      Health Services, Jammu  and  those  belonging  to  Kashmir  region  to
      Director Health Services Kashmir for  further  postings.   As  regards
      migrant candidates they shall  report  to  Director,  Health  Services
      Jammu for further orders.”
                                                   (emphasis is ours)


It is not a  matter  of  dispute,  that  in  furtherance  of  the  order  of
appointment dated 12.8.1997, all the appellants reported  to  the  Director,
Health Services, Jammu as they all belonged to the Jammu region.  
The  next
step, as is evident from the extracted portion  of  the  appointment  order,
was the appellants’ actual posting.
4.    A Government Order pertaining to the posting  of  Assistant  Surgeons,
was issued by the Department of Health and Medical Education  on  17.7.1997.
Paragraph  5  of  the  aforesaid  Government  Order  is  relevant,  and   is
accordingly being extracted hereunder:
      “5.   The Doctors appointed against General category shall  be  posted
      in various Hospitals in the following orders:


      a)    Allopathic Dispensaries
      b)    Primary Health Centres and Police Hospitals;
      c)    Community Health Centres;
      d)    Sub-District Hospitals;
      e)    District Hospitals;
      f)    Hospitals of Jammu and Srinagar including  Evening/Urban  Clinic
           and after that in Medical Education and other organizations;
      g)    Surgeons shall be posted only in such Hospitals where  Operation
           Theatres are available and the Hospitals  are  housed  in  Govt.
           Buildings.”


Sub-paragraph (f) of paragraph 5 extracted hereinabove leaves  no  room  for
any doubt, that Assistant Surgeons could be posted  in  Hospitals  of  Jammu
and Srinagar  including  evening/urban  clinics,  “….and  after  that…”,  in
medical  education  and  other  organizations.  
In  consonance   with   the
Government  Order  dated  17.7.1997,  the  Principal,   Government   Medical
College, Jammu,  by  an  Office  Order  dated  30.12.1997,  posted  all  the
appellants against the vacant posts of Senior/Junior House Officers, at  the
Government Medical College, Jammu (and  at  hospitals  associated  with  the
said college).
5.    Despite posting of the appellants at the Government  Medical  College,
Jammu (and/or at hospitals associated therewith), on  30.12.1997;  
within  a
week thereof, by an order dated 7.1.1998, the Principal, Government  Medical College, Jammu, reverted the appellants to their parent Department,  namely, the Directorate of Health Service, Jammu.
The instant order  dated  7.1.1978
was first assailed by the appellants before the  High  Court  of  Jammu  and
Kashmir (hereinafter referred to as  “the  High  Court”).
  It  is  now  the
subject matter of challenge by them, before this Court.  Since  the  present
controversy relates to the order dated  7.1.1998,  whereby,  the  appellants
were ordered to be reverted/repatriated  to  their  parent  department,  the
same is being extracted hereunder:
      “Consequent to the  appointment  of  house  surgeons  in  the  various
      specialities in this institution, the  Assistant  Surgeons,  who  were
      temporarily deployed from the Directorate of Health Services, Jammu to
      meet the exigency of shortage of doctors  in  Govt.  Medical  College,
      Jammu, are hereby reverted to their parent  department.   The  doctors
      listed in Annexure-I attached hereto  stand  relieved  today  the  7th
      January, 1998 forenoon with the direction to report for  duty  to  the
      Director Health Services, Jammu.”
                                                        (emphasis is ours)


A perusal of the order extracted hereinabove  discloses  the  basis  of  the
alleged  repatriation  of  the  appellants  to  the  Directorate  of  Health
Services, Jammu.  
Firstly, the appellants’ parent  department  is  described
as, the Directorate of Health Services.  
Secondly,  the  appellants  posting
as Senior/Junior  House  Officers,  was  disclosed.   
Namely,  to  meet  the
exigency of shortage of doctors at the Government  Medical  College,  Jammu.
And 
thirdly,  that  the  aforesaid  posting  was  depicted  as  a  temporary
deployment from the Directorate of  Health  Services,  Jammu.   
Besides  the
main order dated 7.1.1998 extracted above, it is also relevant to  reproduce
the endorsement  made  at  serial  no.2  of  the  aforesaid  order,  to  the
Director, Health Services, Jammu.  
The same  is  therefore  being  extracted
below:
      “2.   Director Health Services, Jammu.  This is in  reference  to  his
      verbal  request  for  reversion  of  the  Assistant  Surgeons  to  the
      directorate to meet immediate needs in the health services.”
                                                    (emphasis is ours)


A perusal of the aforesaid endorsement discloses the fourth reason  for  the
alleged  repatriation  of  the  appellants  to  the  Directorate  of  Health
Services, Jammu, namely, to meet the immediate needs of  the  Department  of
Health Services.
6.    So as to assail the order dated 7.1.1998 whereby the  appellants  were
repatriated to  the  Directorate  of  Health  Services,  Jammu,  three  writ
petitions came to be filed before the High Court.  The details of  the  writ
petitions are being narrated hereinbelow:
      i)    Dr.Shazia Hamid vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir (SWP no.35/98)
      ii)   Dr.Rajni Malhotra vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir (SWP no.36/98)
      iii)  Dr.Sarita vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir (SWP no.37/98)


Having entertained the aforesaid writ petitions, the High Court  issued  the
following interim directions, on 8.1.1998:
     
 “The grievance of the petitioners is that they have been  deployed  to
      the Government Medical College Jammu by the Director Health  Services,
      Jammu and the Principal Medical College, Jammu has further posted them
      in Medical College, Jammu.  
They are being relieved by the  person  of
      the Principal Government  Medical  College  Jammu  who  is  having  no
      authority to transfer them and direct them to report back to  Director
      Health Services, Jammu.

  Issue notice to the respondents, issue notice in the CMP also.

  In the meanwhile, respondents are directed not to disturb  the  status
      of the petitioners till objections are filed and  considered  by  this
      Court.”


We are informed, that in compliance with the said  interim  directions,  all
the appellants  continued  to  discharge  their  duties  at  the  Government
Medical College, Jammu (and/or  at  hospitals  associated  therewith).  
And that 
eversince, upto  the  present  juncture,  despite  the  impugned  order
(passed by the Letters Patent Bench, of the High Court) having  been  passed
against them, the appellants posting  has  remained  unaltered.  
 Even  now,
they are discharging their duties at the Government Medical College,  Jammu,
(and/or the hospitals associated therewith).
7.    It is also relevant to mention herein, that the main ground  on  which
the appellants had assailed the impugned order  dated  7.1.1998  before  the
High Court was, that the same was not issued  by  the  competent  authority.
In this behalf, it was the case  of  the  appellants,  that  the  Secretary,
Department of Health and Medical Education being  the  appointing  authority
of  the  appellants;  the  Principal  Medical   College,   Jammu,   had   no
jurisdiction to issue the order dated 7.1.1998.  It seems  to  us,  that  in
order to get over the main ground of attack raised  at  the  behest  of  the
appellants, the Health, Family Welfare  and  Medical  Education  Department,
issued another order on 20.4.1998, with the same  effect  and  consequences.
The aforesaid order is also being extracted hereunder:
      “Whereas for public health care 1230 posts of Assistant Surgeons  were
      created vide Government Order No.129-HD of 1996  dated  4.12.96  under
      special recruitment drive programme and  referred  to  Public  Service
      Commission for selection of suitable candidates.


      Whereas public service commission vide their letter  No.PSC/1/Dr/AS/5-
      96  dated  10.6.97  recommended  a  panel  of  1097   candidates   for
      appointment of Assistant Surgeons.


      Whereas the Health, FW and Medical Education Deptt issued  appointment
      orders in favour of 1097  Assistant  Surgeons  and  directed  the  two
      directors of Health Services to post these doctors in rural areas  and
      other places in pursuance of  guidelines  as  embodied  in  Government
      Order no.635 HME of 1997 dated 17.7.97.


      Whereas the two directors of Health Services in violation of  standing
      Government Orders deputed/attached/adjusted/detailed to  work  a  good
      number of new appointments in various health institutions and  offices
      thus defeating the very object of special recruitment drive.


      Now therefore  in  the  public  interest  and  health  care  the  said
      Assistant Surgeons are hereby detached with immediate effect from  the
      places where they have been deputed/attached/adjusted or  detailed  to
      work as the case may be and shall report to  respective  directors  of
      Health Services who shall post them strictly in  accordance  with  the
      guidelines as detailed in Government Order no.635 HME  of  1997  dated
      17.7.97 and report compliance to the Administrative Department  within
      fortnight positively.”
                                                    (emphasis is ours)


The order extracted hereinabove  narrates,  the  exact  sequence  of  events
leading to the eventual posting of the  appellants,  consequent  upon  their
selection as Assistant Surgeons.  It also needs to be emphasized,  that  the
order dated 20.4.1998 highlights the fact, that the original posting of  the
appellants at the Government Medical College,  Jammu  (and/or  at  hospitals
associated therewith), had been made by the Director of Health Services,  in
violation of Government Orders, and further that, their repatriation to  the
Directorate of Health Services, Jammu was in public interest.
8.    A learned Single Judge of the High Court  on  28.5.1998,  allowed  all
the three  writ  petitions  (wherein  the  order  dated  7.1.1998  had  been
assailed).  According to the understanding of the learned Single Judge,  the
concerned employees consent, prior to their appointment  on  deputation  was
mandatory.  Absence of consent,  according  to  the  learned  Single  Judge,
established that  their  appointment  at  the  Government  Medical  College,
Jammu, (and/or at  hospitals  associated  therewith),  was  not  by  way  of
deputation.  Since in the present case, the consent of  the  appellants  had
admittedly not been  obtained  prior  to  their  posting  vide  order  dated
30.12.1997,   the learned Single  Judge  concluded,  inter  alia,  that  the
authorities had wrongly assumed, that the posting of the appellants  at  the
Government  Medical  College,  Jammu   (and/or   at   hospitals   associated
therewith), was by way  of  deputation.   Accordingly,  the  learned  Single
Judge held, that there was no question of the reversion  of  the  appellants
to their parent department.  For, according to  the  learned  Single  Judge,
the  Government  Medical  College  Jammu  (and/or  at  hospitals  associated
therewith) comprised of the appellants parent department.    Based  thereon,
the learned Single  Judge  felt,  that  the  reversion/repatriation  of  the
appellants to the  Directorate  of  Health  Services,  Jammu,  lacked  legal
sanction.
9.    The learned Single Judge also relied upon the Government  Order  dated
17.7.1997 in order to conclude, that the posting of the  appellants  at  the
Government  Medical  College,  Jammu   (and/or   at   hospitals   associated
therewith)  was  not  beyond  their  cadre.   Referring  to  paragraph  5(f)
thereof, the learned Single Judge felt, that the posting of  the  appellants
was within the scope of the conditions of their employment.
10.   Besides the aforesaid, the learned Single Judge also  arrived  at  the
conclusion, that the Principal, Medical College, Jammu had  no  jurisdiction
whatsoever    to    issue    the    impugned    order     dated     7.1.1998
reverting/repatriating  the  appellants  to  the   Directorate   of   Health
Services, Jammu.  In this behalf, the learned Single Judge  felt,  that  the
Principal, Government Medical College, Jammu  had  passed  the  order  dated
7.1.1998, in his capacity as Head  of  the  Department,  which  was  not  in
consonance with the factual/legal position.
11.   The learned Single Judge summarized his conclusions as under:
      “In view of the above, it is held that:
      i)    The petitioners came to be appointed as Assistant Surgeons.
      ii)    The  Commissioner/Secretary  in  the   Health   and   Education
           Department passed clear orders  on  17th  July,  1997  that  the
           petitioners be appointed in Jammu Hospitals.
      iii)  That the Director Health Services merely  performed  ministerial
           act of issuing letter of appointments.  He acted  in  compliance
           of the Government Orders.
      iv)   That the petitioner  came  to  be  appointed  against  available
           vacancies.
      v)    The concept of the petitioner being on deputation would  not  be
           attracted to the facts of this case.  This is because  this  was
           the first appointments  of  the  petitioners.   The  concept  of
           parent department and department to which an employee is  to  be
           temporarily sent on deputation is missing in this case.
      vi)   The fine distinction pointed  out  on  the  basis  of  Rules  of
           Business may be legally correct, but no factual  foundation  has
           been laid down for sustaining the argument as projected  by  the
           State counsel.
      vii)  That the order passed during  the  period  when  Model  Code  of
           Conduct was in operation and when election process was  on,  was
           also not in accordance with law.”


Accordingly, the learned Single Judge set aside  the  impugned  order  dated
7.1.1998 passed by the Principal, Medical College, Jammu..
12.   Dissatisfied with the judgment rendered by the  learned  Single  Judge
of the High Court on  28.5.1998,  the  State  Government  preferred  Letters
Patent Appeals.  Suffice it to state, that while disposing  of  the  Letters
Patent Appeals, the common decision rendered by the learned Single Judge  of
the High Court, was set aside by  the  Division  Bench  on  24.2.2006.   The
appellants before us, have raised a challenge to the  order  passed  by  the
Division Bench on 24.2.2006.
13.   The first Civil Appeal being disposed of by the instant common  order,
has been filed by Dr.Kavi Raj and others, whereas the second  one  has  been
filed by Dr.Reva Gaind and others.  Leaned counsel for  the  appellants,  at
the very inception informed us, that the  first  Civil  Appeal  survives  in
respect  of  only  five  appellants,  namely,  Dr.Kanchan  Anand,  Dr.Arpana
Sharma, Dr.Mehbooba Begum, Dr.Nidhi Sharma and Dr.Shama  Parveen  Bhat.   As
against the second Civil Appeal, it was  stated  to  be  surviving  only  in
respect of  Dr.Reva  Gaind,  Dr.Rachna  Wattal,  Dr.Mala  Mandla,  Dr.Karuna
Wazir, Dr.Ila Gupta, Dr.Simi Kandhari, Dr.Indu  Raina,  Dr.Shivani  Malhotra
and Dr.Surekha Bhat.  It is therefore apparent, that the instant  two  Civil
Appeals are presently surviving only in respect of  14  of  the  appellants,
fully described above.
14.   In order to canvass the  claim  of  the  appellants,  learned  counsel
invited our attention to the order of the Principal, Medical College,  Jammu
dated 30.12.1997, whereby, the appellants were assigned their first  posting
as Senior/Junior House Officers in different departments of  the  Government
Medical College, Jammu (and/or at hospitals  associated  therewith).   Based
thereon, it was the vehement contention of the  learned  counsel,  that  the
Division Bench of the  High  Court  seriously  erred  in  holding  that  the
appellants were appointed by way of deputation  to  the  Government  Medical
College, Jammu.  To further the contention, that  the  appellants  were  not
appointed to the Government Medical College, Jammu by way of deputation,  it
was pointed out, that the posts of  Assistant  Surgeons  against  which  the
appellants were appointed were created by the Health and  Medical  Education
Department.  The requisition to fill up 1255 posts  of  Assistant  Surgeons,
was also addressed by the Health and Medical Education  Department,  to  the
Public Service  Commission.  It   was  sought  to  be  canvassed,  that  the
Government Medical College, Jammu, was a part and parcel of  the  Department
of Health and Medical Education, and as such, it  was  submitted,  that  the
posting of the appellants at the Government Medical College,  Jammu  (and/or
at hospitals associated therewith) cannot be deemed to be a posting  by  way
of deputation.  It was accordingly submitted, that  the  appellants  posting
could not be deemed to be in a cadre, other than the  cadre  to  which  they
were substantively appointed.  Based on the  aforesaid  submission,  learned
counsel for the appellants endeavoured  to  suggest,  that  the  conclusions
recorded  by  the  learned  Single  Judge  were  fully  justified,  and   in
consonance with law.  Learned counsel accordingly prayed that  the  impugned
order dated 24.2.2006 be set aside.
15.   In addition to the submission advanced at the  hands  of  the  learned
counsel for the appellants, as has been noticed in the foregoing  paragraph,
it was also his vehement contention, that the posting of the appellants  was
in consonance with the express instructions of  the  State  Government.   In
this behalf, learned counsel placed reliance on the Government  Order  dated
17.7.1997, whereby norms for issuing posting orders  of  candidates  freshly
selected against the post of Assistant Surgeons, were  laid  down.   Placing
reliance  on  paragraph  5(f)  of  the  aforesaid  Government  Order   dated
17.7.1997 (extracted in paragraph 4 hereinabove) it was submitted, that  the
posting of the appellants  against  the  vacancies  in  the  Directorate  of
Medical Education, was clearly within the  purview  of  their  selection  to
posts in the Health and Medical Education Department.  Since the posting  of
the appellants was made  in  consonance  with  the  Government  Order  dated
17.7.1997, it was contended, that it was natural to infer that the same  was
within the cadre  to  which  they  were  selected  and  appointed.   It  was
therefore submitted, that the impugned order dated 7.1.1998  passed  by  the
Principal, Government Medical College, Jammu, must be deemed  to  have  been
issued on a misunderstanding, that the posting  of  the  appellants  at  the
Government Medical College, Jammu  (and/or  hospital  associated  therewith)
was beyond the scope of their legitimate posting.  For the aforesaid  reason
also, it was contended that the impugned order dated 7.1.1998 needed  to  be
set aside.
16.   We may also place on record the submission of the learned counsel  for
the appellants, on the same lines  as  the  determination  rendered  by  the
learned Single Judge of the High Court.  To avoid repetition, reference  may
be made to paragraph 8  above.   Learned  counsel,  endorsed  the  aforesaid
factual/legal position.
17.   In response to the submissions advanced at the hands  of  the  learned
counsel for the appellants, the contentions advanced at  the  hands  of  the
learned counsel for the respondents, though exhaustive during  hearing,  are
being summarised  hereunder, for an overview:
      i)    The Department of Health and Medical Education comprises of  two
           independent Directorates,  namely,  the  Directorate  of  Health
           Services and the Directorate of Medical Education.  The posts of
           Assistant Surgeons, against which the appellants  were  selected
           and  appointed  belonged  to  the  cadre  of  posts,  under  the
           Directorate of Health Services.
      ii)   Whereas, at  the  time  of  selection  and  appointment  of  the
           appellants, the Directorate of Health Services had  a  cadre  of
           Assistant Surgeons, the Directorate of Medical Education,  which
           included the Government Medical College, Jammu (and/or hospitals
           associated therewith),  did  not  have  any  post  of  Assistant
           Surgeons.  Therefore, the posting  of  the  appellants,  at  the
           Government Medical College Jammu (and/or at hospitals associated
           therewith) could only have been by way of deputation.
      iii)  Cadres under the Directorate of Health Services, as well as, the
           cadres under the Directorate of Medical Education are  regulated
           by separate rules.  While the Jammu & Kashmir Medical  Education
           (Gazetted)  Service  Recruitment   Rules,   1979,   govern   the
           conditions of service of gazetted employees of  the  Directorate
           of Medical Education; the Jammu  &  Kashmir  Medical  (Gazetted)
           Service Recruitment Rules,  1970  regulate  the  recruitment  of
           gazetted employees,  in  the  Directorate  of  Health  Services.
           Under the 1979 Rules referred to above, there  was  no  post  of
           Assistant Surgeons.  Therefore the posts of  Assistant  Surgeon,
           were clearly not included  in  the  cadre  of  posts  under  the
           Directorate of Medical Education.  It was also pointed out, that
           the post of Assistant Surgeon figure in the 1970 Rules  referred
           to above, and as such, the posts of Assistant  Surgeon,  find  a
           definite place in the cadre of posts, under the  Directorate  of
           Health Services.  It was sought to be inferred  from  the  above
           factual/legal position, that the appointment of  the  appellants
           was in the Directorate of Health Services, and their posting  at
           the Government Medical College, Jammu (and/or at  the  hospitals
           associated therewith) was by way of deputation.
      iv)   Referring to the impugned order passed  by  the  Division  Bench
           dated 24.2.2006, it was pointed out, that the appellants  before
           this Court had not disputed a vital  factual  position  recorded
           therein, namely, that the salary of the appellants continued  to
           be drawn from the Directorate of Health Services, for the entire
           duration during which the appellants had been rendering  service
           at  the  Government  Medical  College,  Jammu  (and/or  at   the
           hospitals associated therein).   It  was  submitted,  that  this
           factual  position  is  sufficient   to   establish,   that   the
           appointment of the appellants was to the Directorate  of  Health
           Services, and not in the Directorate of Medical Education.
18.    Having  given  our  thoughtful  consideration,  to  the   submissions
advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the rival parties,  we  are
of the view, that the submissions advanced on behalf of the respondents,  as
have been summarized  above  are  unexceptionable.   It  is  therefore,  not
possible for us to  accept  that  the  appointment  of  the  appellants  was
substantively made to a cadre under the Director of Medical  Education.   We
are also of the  view,  that  the  appointment  of  the  appellants  in  the
Directorate of Medical Education, was clearly by way of  deputation.   Their
posting at the Government Medical College Jammu  (and/or  at  the  hospitals
associated therewith) was most certainly  beyond  their  parent  cadre,  and
therefore,  by  way  of  deputation.   The   reasons   for   our   aforesaid
conclusions, are being recorded in the following paragraphs.
19.   Even though it is clear, that the posts  of  Assistant  Surgeons  were
created by  the  Health  and  Medical  Education  Department  of  the  State
Government, it is also clear that the aforesaid department is  comprised  of
two independent Directorates, namely, the  Directorate  of  Health  Services
and the Directorate of Medical Education.  The employees of each of the  two
Directorates are governed by a separate set of rules.  The  rules  governing
the conditions of service  of  gazetted  employees  of  the  Directorate  of
Medical Education, do not have the posts of Assistant Surgeons.   The  cadre
of Assistant Surgeons is only found in the rules of  recruitment  applicable
to gazettled employees of the Directorate of Health Service.  Secondly,  the
assertion made at the hands of the  learned  counsel  for  the  respondents,
that there were no posts of  Assistant  Surgeon  when  the  appellants  were
selected and posted at the Government Medical College, Jammu (and/or at  the
hospitals associated therewith), in the Directorate  of  Medical  Education,
has not been disputed by the learned counsel for  the  appellants.   In  the
absence of any posts of Assistant Surgeon  in  the  Directorate  of  Medical
Education, it is impossible to infer that the appellants (who were  selected
against the  posts  of  Assistant  Surgeons)  could  have  belonged  to  the
Directorate  of  Medical  Education.   Furthermore,  consequent   upon   the
selection of the appellants by  the  Public  Service  Commission  they  were
issued appointment orders  dated  12.8.1997.   A  relevant  extract  of  the
aforesaid appointment order, has been reproduced above.  A  perusal  of  the
same reveals,  that  such  of  the  candidates  who  had  been  selected  as
Assistant Surgeons, and belonged to Jammu region,  were  to  report  to  the
Director, Health Services, Jammu. Whereas, those belonging  to  the  Kashmir
region, were to report to  the  Director,  Health  Services,  Kashmir.   The
Directors of Health Services, Jammu  as  well  as  Kashmir,  are  admittedly
incharge  of  the  administrative  chain  of  command,  in  the   respective
Directorates of Health Services.  This  by  itself  demonstrates,  that  the
appointment of the appellants was to the  Directorate  of  Health  Services,
and not in the  Directorate  of  Medical  Education.   Fourthly,  the  order
issued by the Principal, Government Medical College, Jammu dated  30.12.1997
reveals, that the  appellants  were  being  posted  as  Senior/Junior  House
Officers.  The  posts  of  Senior/Junior  House  Officer  are  distinct  and
separate from the posts of Assistant Surgeons.  The posts  of  Senior/Junior
House Officers, are included in the cadre of posts  in  the  Directorate  of
Medical Education. The appellants posting as  Senior/Junior  House  Officers
also exhibits, that their appointment was  not  within  the  Directorate  of
Health Services, but was against posts outside  the  Directorate  of  Health
Services.  Furthermore, even the impugned order dated 7.1.1998  noted,  that
the appellants were being temporarily deployed  “…from  the  Directorate  of
Health Services, Jammu…” to meet the exigency of shortage of doctors at  the
Government Medical College, Jammu.  Sixthly, the endorsement at serial  no.2
of the order dated 7.1.1998 (extracted in paragraph 5 above)  reveals,  that
a request was made by the by the Director, Health Services, Jammu, that  the
appellants be reverted to the Directorate of Health Services,  to  meet  the
needs of the said service.   Seventhly,  the  order  of  the  Department  of
Health and Medical Education dated 20.4.1998 reveals, that  the  posting  of
the  appellants  at  the  Government  Medical  College,  Jammu  (and/or   at
hospitals associated therewith), was made by the  two  Directors  of  Health
Services in violation of Government  Orders,  thereby,  defeating  the  very
purpose for which the appellants were selected and  appointed.   Lastly,  is
the unrefuted assertion  at  the  hands  of  the  learned  counsel  for  the
respondents, that the salary of the appellants continued to  be  drawn  from
the Directorate of Health Services, for the  entire  duration  during  which
the appellants remained posted at  the  Government  Medical  College,  Jammu
(and/or at the hospitals associated therewith).   Had  the  appellants  been
legitimately working within their own cadre, their salary would  undoubtedly
have been drawn from the funds of  the  Directorate  of  Medical  Education.
This factual position puts a final seal on the matter, as it does not  leave
any room for any further imagination. Based on the  disbursement  of  salary
to the appellants from the funds of  Directorate  of  Health  Services,  the
appellants must be deemed to  be  substantive  employees  of  the  cadre  of
Assistant  Surgeons  of  the  Directorate  of  Health  Services.  There   is
therefore no room for any doubt,  that  the  appellants  were  substantively
appointed to the Directorate of Health Services, and not in the  Directorate
of Medical Education.
20.   Before concluding, it is essential to  deal  with  certain  inferences
drawn by the learned Single Judge of  the  High  Court.   According  to  the
learned Single Judge, prior consent of an employee is  imperative,  binding,
peremptory and mandatory, before he is  posted  on  deputation  outside  his
parent department.  No statutory  rule  has  been  brought  to  our  notice,
requiring prior consent of an employee,  before  his  deployment  against  a
post beyond his parent cadre.  The mere fact, that  the  appellants  consent
was not sought before their  posting  at  the  Government  Medical  College,
Jammu (and/or at the hospitals associated therewith) would not, in our  view
have any determinative effect  on  the  present  controversy.   Broadly,  an
employee can only be posted (or transferred) to a post against which  he  is
selected.  This would ensure his stationing,  within  the  cadre  of  posts,
under his principal  employer.   His  posting  may,  however,  be  regulated
differently, by statutory rules, governing his conditions  of  service.   In
the  absence  of  any  such  rules,  an  employee  cannot  be   posted   (or
transferred)  beyond  the  cadre  to  which  he  is  selected,  without  his
willingness/readiness.  Therefore, an employee’s posting (or  transfer),  to
a department other than the one to which he is appointed, against his  will,
would be  impermissible.   But  willingness  of  posting  beyond  the  cadre
(and/or parent department) need not be expressly sought. It can be  implied.
It need not be in the nature of a written consent.  Consent of  posting  (or
transfer) beyond the cadre (or parent  department)  is  inferable  from  the
conduct  of  the  employee,  who  does   not   protest   or   contest   such
posting/transfer.  In the present controversy, the  appellants  were  issued
posting orders by the Principal, Government Medical  College,  Jammu,  dated
30.12.1997.  They accepted the same, and  assumed  charge  as  Senior/Junior
House Officers at the  Government  Medical  College,  Jammu,  despite  their
selection and appointment as Assistant Surgeons.  Even  now,  they  wish  to
continue to serve against posts, in the Directorate  of  Medical  Education.
There cannot be any doubt, about their willingness/readiness to  serve  with
the borrowing Directorate.  The consent  of  the  appellants  is  tacit  and
unquestionable. We are therefore of the view, that the learned Single  Judge
of the High Court, clearly erred on the instant aspect of the matter.
21.   For the reasons expressed hereinabove,  we  are  satisfied,  that  the
impugned order passed by the Letters Patent  Bench  of  the  High  Court  on
24.2.2006, does not suffer from any factual or legal  infirmity.   The  same
is therefore, affirmed.
22.    Despite  having  recorded  our  conclusions  on  the  merits  of  the
controversy, it is also essential  for  us  to  take  into  consideration  a
technical plea advanced  at  the  hands  of  the  learned  counsel  for  the
appellants.  It was submitted on behalf of the appellants,  that  consequent
upon the decision by the learned Single Judge  (dated  28.5.1998),  whereby,
the impugned order  of  reversion/repatriation  of  the  appellants  to  the
Directorate of Health Services dated 7.1.1998 was  set  aside,  two  Letters
Patent Appeals, i.e., LPA (SW) no.88 of 2000, and LPA  (SW)  no.89  of  2000
were filed by the respondents herein  (to  impugn  the  common  order  dated
28.5.1998, passed by the  learned  Single  Judge).   In  the  first  of  the
aforesaid Letters Patent Appeals, 18 Assistant Surgeons  were  impleaded  as
respondents, whereas, in the  second  Letters  Patent  Appeal  24  Assistant
Surgeons were impleaded as  respondents.   It  was  pointed  out,  that  the
Letters Patent Appeal (SW) no.88 of 2000 was  dismissed  in  default..   The
said Letters Patent Appeal was never restored.  As such, it  was  submitted,
that the order passed by the learned Single Judge on 28.5.1998, relating  to
18  Assistant  Surgeons,  (impleaded  as  respondents   therein),   attained
finality.   Based  on  the  aforesaid  uncontroverted   position,   it   was
submitted, that it is imperative for  the  State  Government,  now  to  give
effect to the order of the learned Single Judge dated 28.5.1998,  pertaining
to the  aforesaid  18  Assistant  Surgeons,  (impleaded  as  respondents  in
LPA(SW) no.88 of 2000).  In  the  aforesaid  view  of  the  matter,  it  was
further submitted, that  the  binding  effect  in  connection  with  the  18
Assistant Surgeons,  should  be  extended  to  the  remaining  24  Assistant
Surgeons (who had been arrayed as respondents in LPA  (SW)  no.89  of  2000.
This, according to the learned counsel for the appellants, would  also  meet
the ends of justice, inasmuch as, all similarly situated  individuals,  must
be placed similarly.  According to learned counsel, if this position is  not
accepted, the appellants would  be  deprived  of  their  right  to  equality
before the law and  to  equal  protection  of  the  laws,  guaranteed  under
Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
23.   We have given our thoughtful consideration to the aforesaid  technical
plea advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for  the  appellants.   It
is not a matter of dispute, that LPA (SW)  no.89  of  2000  was  adjudicated
upon by the Division Bench on merits.  In terms of the instant order  passed
by us, we have affirmed the correctness of the order passed by  the  Letters
Patent Bench of the High Court on 24.2.2006.  Thus viewed, it is clear  that
the controversy was justly  adjudicated  upon  by  the  Division  Bench,  in
respect of 24 Assistant Surgeons.  The only question to  be  decided,  while
dealing with the technical  plea  advanced  at  the  hands  of  the  learned
counsel for the appellants is, whether the judgment  rendered  in  LPA  (SW)
no.88 of 2000 should be extended to LPA(SW) no.89 of 2000. Or  vice-a-versa,
whether  the order of the learned Single Judge, which has attained  finality
in respect of 18 Assistant Surgeons, should be  extended  to  the  other  24
Assistant Surgeons.
24.   In so far as  the  matter  pertaining  to  24  Assistant  Surgeons  is
concerned, the decision rendered by the High Court  on  24.2.2006  has  been
affirmed by us on merits.  It is therefore legitimate  to  infer,  that  the
matter has been wrongfully determined by the learned Single Judge.   We  are
of the view, that the decision of the controversy by this Court,  pertaining
to the 24 Assistant Surgeons (whose claim was decided by the impugned  order
dated 24.2.2006) constitutes a declaration of  law,  and  is  binding  under
Articles 141 of the Constitution of India.  Such being the  stature  of  the
determination rendered in respect of 24 Assistant Surgeons (whose claim  was
adjudicated by the Letters Patent Bench of High Court), we are of  the  view
that the same should, if permissible, also  be  extended  to  the  other  18
Assistant Surgeons.  Ordinarily, in a  situation  when  a  judgment  attains
finality between rival parties, it is not legitimate to  reopen  the  issue,
even for correcting an error, which emerges from a subsequent  adjudication.

25.    The  factual  position  in  the  present  controversy   is   slightly
different.  Before this Court two Special  Leave Petitions were filed.  
The
Assistant Surgeons against whom the Letters Patent Appeal was  dismissed  in
default, are also before this  Court.  
They  have  also  been  afforded  an opportunity of hearing.
This Court has expressed the opinion that the  order
passed by the Letters Patent Bench of the High Court on  24.2.2006  deserves
to be upheld.  If the Assistant Surgeons whose  Letters  Patent  Appeal  was
dismissed in default, had not been before this Court, it may not  have  been
possible for us to re-adjudicate upon their claim.
Since all  of  them  are
before us, and have been represented through counsel, we have  no  doubt  in
our mind, that the  determination  on  merits  in  the  instant  controversy
should be extended to them, as well.  Since such a choice  can  be  made  in
the present case, we are of the view, that the proposition  which  has  been
upheld as legal, should be extended to the others similarly  situated.   The
converse proposition, does not commend itself for acceptance.  It  would  be
unthinkable to implement an order,  which  has  been  set  aside  after  due
notice and hearing.  We therefore, find  no  merit  in  the  technical  plea
advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellants.
26.    The  reversion/repatriation  of  the  appellants  to   their   parent department, i.e., the Directorate of Health Services,  Jammu,  is  affirmed.
The appellants  who have  continued  to  discharge  their  duties  eversince
their induction into  service  at  the  Government  Medical  College,  Jammu
(and/or at hospitals associated therewith), will be repatriated/reverted  to
the Directorate of  Health  Services,  Jammu.  
 Now,  that  the  matter  has
attained finality,  they  must  be  relieved  from  their  postings  in  the
Directorate of Medical Education.  
So  as  to  enable  them  to  accept  the
reality of  the  situation,  and  to  acclimatize  them  with  the  position
emerging from our order,  we consider it just  and  appropriate  to  direct,
that the appellants be allowed to be continued at  their  present  place  of
posting till 31.3.2013.  
They shall be relieved from their  posting  in  the
Directorate of Medical Education under all circumstances  on  the  afternoon
of 31.3.2013, for onward posting against a cadre post in the Directorate  of
Health Services.
      Disposed of in the aforesaid terms.


                                       …………………………….J.
                                        (D.K. Jain)


                                        …………………………….J.
                                        (Jagdish Singh Khehar)
New Delhi;
January 9, 2013.
-----------------------
24


Section 50 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short ‘the NDPS Act’) = whether the empowered officer, acting under Section 50 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short ‘the NDPS Act’) is legally obliged to apprise the accused of his right to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate and whether such a procedure is mandatory under the provisions of the NDPS Act.= whether PW1, the officer who had conducted the search on the person of the appellant had followed the procedure laid down under Section 50 of the NDPS Act. On this question, there were conflicts of views by different Benches of this Court and the matter was referred to a five Judge Bench. This Court in Vijaysingh Chandubha Jadeja (supra) answered the question, stating that it is imperative on the part of the officer to apprise the person intended to be searched of his right under Section 50 of the NDPS Act, to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate. This Court also held that it is mandatory on the part of the authorized officer to make the accused aware of the existence of his right to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate, if so required by him and this mandatory provision requires strict compliance. The suspect may or may not choose to exercise the right provided to him under the said provision, but so far as the officer concerned, an obligation is cast on him under Section 50 of the NDPS Act to apprise the person of his right to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate. The question, as to whether this procedure has been complied with or not, in this case the deposition of PW1 assumes importance, which reads as follows: “He was apprised while telling the reason of being searched that he could be searched before any Magistrate or any Gazetted Officer if he wished. He gave his consent in written and said that I have faith on you, you can search me. Fard regarding apprising and consent is Ex.P- 3 on which I put my signature from A to B and the accused put his signature from C to D. E to F is the endorsement of the consent of the accused and G to H is signature, which has been written by the accused.” 8. The above statement of PW1 would clearly indicate that he had only informed the accused that he could be searched before any Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer if he so wished. The fact that the accused person has a right under Section 50 of the NDPS Act to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate was not made known to him. We are of the view that there is an obligation on the part of the empowered officer to inform the accused or the suspect of the existence of such a right to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate, if so required by him. Only if the suspect does not choose to exercise the right in spite of apprising him of his right, the empowered officer could conduct the search on the body of the person. 9. We may, in this connection, also examine the general maxim “ignorantia juris non excusat” and whether in such a situation the accused could take a defence that he was unaware of the procedure laid down in Section 50 of the NDPS Act. Ignorance does not normally afford any defence under the criminal law, since a person is presumed to know the law. Indisputedly ignorance of law often in reality exists, though as a general proposition, it is true, that knowledge of law must be imputed to every person. But it must be too much to impute knowledge in certain situations,for example, we cannot expect a rustic villager, totally illiterate, a poorman on the street, to be aware of the various law laid down in this countryi.e. leave aside the NDPS Act. We notice this fact is also within the knowledge of the legislature, possibly for that reason the legislature in its wisdom imposed an obligation on the authorized officer acting under Section 50 of the NDPS Act to inform the suspect of his right under Section 50 to be searched in the presence of a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate warranting strict compliance of that procedure. 10. We are of the view that non-compliance of this mandatory procedure has vitiated the entire proceedings initiated against the accused- appellant. We are of the view that the Special Court as well as the High Court has committed an error in not properly appreciating the scope of Section 50 of the NDPS Act. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. Consequently the conviction and sentence imposed by the Sessions Court and affirmed by the High Court are set aside. The accused-appellant, who is in jail, to be released forthwith, if not required in connection with any other case.


                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.817 OF 2008





Ashok Kumar Sharma                           …. Appellant

                                   Versus

State of Rajasthan                                …. Respondent



                               J U D G M E N T



K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.



1.    The short question that has come up for consideration in  this  appeal
is whether the empowered officer, acting under Section 50  of  the  Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short ‘the  NDPS  Act’)  is
legally obliged to apprise the accused of his right to be searched before  a
Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate and whether such a procedure  is  mandatory
under the provisions of the NDPS Act.



2.    PW1,  Additional  Superintendent  of  Police  (Crimes),  Jaipur  City,
Jaipur got secret  information  that  on 25.2.2001  one  Ashok  Kumar,   the
appellant herein would be selling smack to  a  person  near  Nandipur  under
Bridge.  After completing the formalities PW1  along  with  two  independent
witnesses reached near Nandpuri under Bridge.  At about 4.55 P.M.  a  person
came on a scooter, who was stopped by the police force and  was  questioned.
Exhibit P-3, notice was given by PW1 under Section 50 of  the  NDPS  Act  to
the appellant to get himself  searched  either  before  a  Magistrate  or  a
Gazetted officer.   The appellant gave his  consent  in  writing  on  Ex.P-3
itself stating that he has full confidence in him  and  agreed  for  search.
Upon search two packets had been recovered from the right and  left  pockets
of the pant of the appellant.   The  contra-banned    was  weighed  by  PW7,
goldsmith and the total weight of the  packets  was  344  gms.    From  each
packet two samples of 10 gms. were taken and sealed  and  remaining  packets
were sealed separately.  The appellant was then  arrested  and  the  scooter
was seized.



3.    PW1 gave a written report to the Station House Officer, Malviya  Nagar
Police Station, Jaipur to register FIR No.112/2001 under Section  8  and  21
of the NDPS Act.  Ex-P-19, report of the Public  Analyst  of  the  Rajasthan
State Forensic Laboratory, Jaipur showed  that  the  samples  contained  the
presence of diacetylmorphine (Heroin).  On completion of the  investigation,
challan was filed against the accused.  Learned Special Judge,  NDPS  framed
the charge under Sections 8 and 21 of the  NDPS  Act.   Before  the  Special
Judge, prosecution examined 14 witnesses and produced Ex. P1  to  P19.   The
accused-appellant in  his  statement  under  Section  313  of  the  Code  of
Criminal Procedure stated that false case had been foisted against him.

4.    The Sessions Court after having found guilty, convicted the  appellant
and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years and to  pay
a  fine  of  Rs.1  lakh  and,  in  default,  to  further  under  go   simple
imprisonment for one year.  The appellant preferred Criminal Appeal  No.1157
of 2003 before the High Court under Section 374  of  the  Code  of  Criminal
Procedure.  The appeal was, however, rejected by the High Court on  9.2.2007
against which this appeal has been preferred by way of special leave.

5.    Ms. C.K. Sucharita, learned amicus curiae appearing for the appellant-
accused submitted that the High Court has committed a  grave  error  in  not
appreciating  the  fact  that  the  conviction  was  vitiated  by  the  non-
compliance of the procedure laid  down  in  Section  50  of  the  NDPS  Act.
Learned counsel took us to the evidence of PW1 and submitted  that  PW1  had
not disclosed the fact that the accused had a right to be searched before  a
Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate, if so required by him.  According  to  the
learned  counsel  non-compliance  of  that  procedure  vitiated  the  entire
proceedings initiated against the appellant.  In support of  her  contention
reliance was placed on a Judgment of  this  court  in  Vijaysingh  Chandubha
Jadeja v. State of Gujart (2011) 1 SCC 609.

6.     Mr.  Amit  Lubhaya,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  State  of
Rajasthan, on the other hand, contended that the Sessions Court has  rightly
convicted the appellant and there has been a substantial compliance  of  the
procedure laid down under Section 50 of the -

NDPS Act.  Learned counsel further submitted that the High Court in  a  well
considered order has  affirmed  the  conviction  as  well  as  the  sentence
imposed by the Special Judge.

7.    We are in this case concerned only with the question whether PW1,  the
officer who had conducted the search on the  person  of  the  appellant  had
followed the procedure laid down under Section 50  of  the  NDPS  Act.    On
this question, there were conflicts of views by different  Benches  of  this
Court and the matter was referred to a five  Judge  Bench.   This  Court  in
Vijaysingh Chandubha Jadeja (supra) answered the question, stating  that  it
is imperative on the part of the officer to apprise the person  intended  to
be searched of his right under Section 50 of the NDPS Act,  to  be  searched
before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate.  This Court also held that it  is
mandatory on the part of the authorized officer to make  the  accused  aware
of the existence of his right to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or  a
Magistrate, if so required by him  and  this  mandatory  provision  requires
strict compliance.  The suspect may or may not choose to exercise the  right
provided to him under  the  said  provision,  but  so  far  as  the  officer
concerned, an obligation is cast on him under Section 50 of the NDPS Act  to
apprise the person of his right to be searched before a Gazetted Officer  or
a Magistrate.  The question, as to whether this procedure has been  complied
with or not, in this case the deposition of PW1  assumes  importance,  which
reads as follows:

      “He was apprised while telling the reason of being  searched  that  he
      could be searched before any Magistrate or any Gazetted Officer if  he
      wished.  He gave his consent in written and said that I have faith  on
      you, you can search me.  Fard regarding apprising and consent is Ex.P-
      3 on which I put my signature from A to B  and  the  accused  put  his
      signature from C to D. E to F is the endorsement of the consent of the
      accused and G to H  is  signature,  which  has  been  written  by  the
      accused.”




8.    The above statement of PW1 would clearly indicate  that  he  had  only
informed the accused that he could be searched before any  Magistrate  or  a
Gazetted Officer if he so wished.  The fact that the accused  person  has  a
right under Section 50 of the NDPS Act to  be  searched  before  a  Gazetted
Officer or a Magistrate was not made known to him.  We are of the view  that
there is an obligation on the part of the empowered officer  to  inform  the
accused or the suspect of the existence of  such  a  right  to  be  searched
before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate, if so required by him.   Only  if
the suspect does not choose to exercise the right in spite of apprising  him
of his right, the empowered officer could conduct the search on the body  of
the person.

9.     We  may,  in  this  connection,  also  examine  the   general   maxim
“ignorantia juris non excusat” and whether in such a situation  the  accused
could take a defence that he was unaware  of  the  procedure  laid  down  in
Section 50 of the NDPS Act.  Ignorance does not normally afford any  defence
under the criminal law,  since  a  person  is  presumed  to  know  the  law.
Indisputedly ignorance of law often in reality exists, though as  a  general
proposition, it is true, that knowledge of law  must  be  imputed  to  every
person.  But it must be too much to impute knowledge in certain  situations,
for example, we cannot expect a rustic villager, totally illiterate, a  poor
man on the street, to be aware of the various law laid down in this  country
i.e. leave aside the NDPS Act.  We notice  this  fact  is  also  within  the
knowledge of the legislature, possibly for that reason  the  legislature  in
its wisdom imposed an obligation on  the  authorized  officer  acting  under
Section 50 of the NDPS Act to inform the suspect of his right under  Section
50 to be searched in the presence of a  Gazetted  Officer  or  a  Magistrate
warranting strict compliance of that procedure.

10.   We are of the view that non-compliance  of  this  mandatory  procedure
has  vitiated  the  entire  proceedings  initiated  against   the   accused-
appellant.  We are of the view that the Special Court as well  as  the  High
Court has committed an error in  not  properly  appreciating  the  scope  of
Section  50  of  the  NDPS  Act.   The  appeal   is,   therefore,   allowed.
Consequently the conviction and sentence imposed by the Sessions  Court  and
affirmed by the High Court are set aside.  The accused-appellant, who is  in
jail, to be released forthwith,  if not  required  in  connection  with  any
other case.



                                                              …………………………..J.
                                                      (K.S. Radhakrishnan)


                                                 ….....……………………J.
                                                 (Dipak Misra)
New Delhi,
January 9, 2013


for quashing the proceedings in Complaint Case No.628 of 2011 (Sudha Kant Pandey v. K.L. Singh & Anr.) under Sections 403 and 406 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the‘IPC’).=A complaint made after a lapse of 15 years is barred by the provisions of Section 468 Cr.P.C., and the High Court has erred in holding the same to be a continuing offence. As, in pursuance of the High Court’s order dated 25.5.2001, the representation of respondent no.2 dated 21.3.2001 was decided by the Managing Director, IFFCO vide order dated 15.10.2001, the limitation period began from the date of the said order, or at the most from 29.10.2001, that is, the date on which, the order of rejection was communicated. The initiation of criminal proceedings is nothing but an attempt by the frustrated litigant to give vent to his frustration, by invoking the jurisdiction of the criminal court and thus, the proceedings are liable to be quashed .= “In cases where there is a delay in lodging a FIR, the Court has to look for a plausible explanation for such delay. In absence of such an explanation, the delay may be fatal. The reason for quashing such proceedings may not be merely that the allegations were an afterthought or had given a coloured version of events. In such cases the court should carefully examine the facts before it for the reason that a frustrated litigant who failed to succeed before the Civil Court may initiate criminal proceedings just to harass the other side with mala fide intentions or the ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance on the other party. Chagrined and frustrated litigants should not be permitted to give vent to their frustrations by cheaply invoking the jurisdiction of the criminal court. The court proceedings ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment and persecution. In such a case, where an FIR is lodged clearly with a view to spite the other party because of a private and personal grudge and to enmesh the other party in long and arduous criminal proceedings, the court may take a view that it amounts to an abuse of the process of law in the facts and circumstances of the case.-The instant appeals are squarely covered by the observations made in Kishan Singh (Supra) and thus, the proceedings must be labeled as nothing more than an abuse of the process of the court, particularly in view of the fact that, with respect to enact the same subject matter, various complaint cases had already been filed by respondent No.2 and his brother, which were all dismissed on merits, after the examination of witnesses. In such a fact-situation, Complaint Case No. 628 of 2011, filed on 31.5.2001 was not maintainable. Thus, the Magistrate concerned committed a grave error by entertaining the said case, and wrongly took cognizance and issued summons to the appellants. 34. In view of above, the appeals are allowed. The impugned judgment dated 13.3.2012 is set aside and the proceedings in Complaint Case No. 628 of 2011 pending before the Additional C.J.M., Allahabad, are hereby quashed.


REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 61 of 2013




      Udai Shankar Awasthi                             …Appellant


                                   Versus


      State of U.P. & Anr.                                  …Respondents


                                   WITH


                        CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 62 of 2013




                               J U D G M E N T


      Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.


      1.    Both these appeals have  been  preferred  against  the  impugned
      judgment and order dated  13.3.2012,  passed  by  the  High  Court  of
      Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Misc.  Application  No.  41827  of
      2011, by which the High Court has rejected the  petition  filed  under
      Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure,1973  (hereinafter  referred
      to as the ‘Cr.P.C.’) 
for quashing the proceedings  in  Complaint  Case
      No.628 of 2011 (Sudha Kant Pandey v. K.L. Singh & Anr.) under Sections 403 and 406 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the‘IPC’).


      2.    Facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals are:
      A.    M/s. Manish Engineering Enterprises of  which  respondent  No.2,
      Sudha Kant Pandey, claims to be the proprietor, was given a work order
      by  M/s.  Indian  Farmers  Fertilizer  Cooperative  Ltd.  (hereinafter
      referred to as “IFFCO”), Phulpur unit,  on 1.2.1996 for the purpose of
      conducting  repairs  in  their  plant  worth  an  estimated  value  of
      Rs.13,88,750/-. The said work  order  was  subsequently  cancelled  by
      IFFCO on 7.2.1996.
      B.     Aggrieved,  M/s.  Manish   Engineering   Enterprises   made   a
      representation  dated  21.3.2001,  to  IFFCO  requesting  it  to  make
      payments for the work allegedly done by it. As there was  no  response
      from the management of IFFCO, the said  concern  filed  Writ  Petition
      No. 19922 of 2001  before the  High  Court  of  Allahabad,  seeking  a
      direction  by  it  to  IFFCO  for  the  payment  of   an   amount   of
      Rs.22,81,530.22 for alleged work done by it.
      C.    The High Court disposed of the said  Writ  Petition  vide  order
      dated 25.5.2001, directing IFFCO  to  dispose  of  the  representation
      dated 21.3.2001, submitted by the said concern within a  period  of  6
      weeks.   In pursuance of the order of the High Court dated  25.5.2001,
      the  said  representation  dated  21.3.2001,  was  considered  by  the
      Managing Director of IFFCO and was rejected by way of a speaking order
      dated 15.10.2001, and the same was communicated to  the  said  concern
      vide letter dated 29.10.2001.
      D.    M/s. Manish Engineering Enterprises filed Writ Petition No. 7231
      of 2002 before the High Court of Allahabad for  the  recovery  of  the
      said amount, which stood disposed of vide order dated 20.2.2002,  with
      a direction to pursue  the  remedy  available  under  the  arbitration
      clause contained  in  the  agreement  executed  in  pursuance  of  the
      aforementioned work order.
      E.     M/s.   Manish   Engineering   Enterprises   filed   Arbitration
      Application No. 24 of 2002 before the High Court  of  Allahabad  under
      Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996  (hereinafter
      referred  to  as  ‘the  Act  1996’)  on  24.5.2002,  praying  for  the
      appointment of an arbitrator, in view of the fact that the application
      made by the said concern for the purpose of appointing an  arbitrator,
      had been rejected by IFFCO  as  being  time  barred.  The  High  Court
      therefore, vide judgment and  order  dated  17.10.2003,  appointed  an
      arbitrator. However, the said arbitrator expressed  his  inability  to
      work.  Thus,  vide  order  dated  13.2.2004,  another  arbitrator  was
      appointed.
      F.    M/s. Manish Engineering Enterprises filed a  Claim  Petition  on
      various counts, including one for an amount of  Rs.9,27,182/-  towards
      the alleged removal of  items  from  their  godown  within  the  IFFCO
      premises.
            The learned arbitrator so appointed, framed a  large  number  of
      issues and rejected in particular, the claim  of  alleged  removal  of
      items from the godown of M/s. Manish Enterprises, located  within  the
      IFFCO premises (being issue No.13),  though  he  accepted  some  other
      claims vide award dated 11.3.2007.
            IFFCO filed an application under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 for
      the purpose of setting aside the award  dated  11.3.2007,  before  the
      District Court, Allahabad and the matter is sub-judice.
      G.      Mr.   Sabha   Kant   Pandey,   the   brother   of   respondent
      no.2/complainant, filed Complaint Case No. 4948 of  2009  against  the
      officers of IFFCO on 23.11.2009 under Sections 323, 504, 506, 406  and
      120-B IPC before the  court  of  Special  Chief  Judicial  Magistrate,
      Allahabad. Therein, some witnesses including the said complainant were
      examined.
      H.    Sabha Kant Pandey, the brother of respondent no.2 filed  another
      Complaint  Case No. 26528 of 2009, against the appellants  and  others
      under Sections 147, 148, 323, 504, 506, 201 and 379 IPC. In  the  said
      complainant, the brother of respondent  no.2  was  examined  alongwith
      others as a witness.
      I.    Complaint case no. 4948  of  2009  was  rejected  by  way  of  a
      speaking order passed by the Special Chief Judicial  Magistrate,  vide
      order dated 20.3.2010 under Section 203 Cr.P.C.
      J.    Respondent no.2  filed  Criminal  Complaint  No.  1090  of  2010
      against the appellants and others on  2.4.2010,  under  Sections  323,
      504, 506,  406  and  120-B  IPC  before  the  Special  Chief  Judicial
      Magistrate, Allahabad. After  investigating  the  matter,  the  police
      submitted a report on 18.4.2010  stating  that,  allegations  made  in
      complaint case no. 1090 of 2010 were false.
      K.    The Additional  Chief  Judicial  Magistrate,  vide  order  dated
      18.8.2011 dismissed complaint case no. 26528  of  2009  filed  by  the
      brother of respondent no.2.
      L.    Respondent no.2 filed another complaint case no. 628 of 2011  on
      31.5.2011 under Sections 403 and  406  IPC,  in  which,  after  taking
      cognizance, summons  were  issued  to  the  present  appellants  under
      Sections 403 and 406 IPC on 16.7.2011, and vide order dated 22.9.2011,
      bailable warrants were issued against the appellants by the Addl. CJM,
      Allahabad. Subsequently, vide order dated   21.11.2011,   non-bailable
      warrants were also issued against one of the appellants by  the  Addl.
      CJM, Allahabad.
            In view of the fact that K.L. Singh, appellant  in the connected
      appeal, could not be served properly as the correct  address  was  not
      given, on being requested, the Addl.  CJM  withdrew  the  non-bailable
      warrants on 17.12.2011.
      M.    Aggrieved, the appellants filed Criminal Misc.  Application  No.
      41827 of 2011 under Section 482 Cr.P.C.  before  the  High  Court  for
      quashing the said criminal proceedings, which has been dismissed  vide
      impugned judgment and order.
            Hence, these appeals.


      3.    Shri Mukul Rohtagi and Shri Nagendra Rai, learned senior counsel
      appearing for the appellants, have submitted  that  as  the  complaint
      cases filed by the brother of the respondent no.2  in  regard  to  the
      same subject matter were dismissed by the  magistrate  concerned,  the
      question of entertaining a fresh complaint could not  arise.  A  fresh
      complaint cannot be entertained during the pendency of  the  complaint
      case filed by respondent No. 2, with  respect  to  which,  the  police
      filed a final report, stating the same to be a false  complaint.    It
      was further submitted, that there was suppression of  material  facts,
      as in Complaint Case  No.  628  of  2011,  dismissal  of  the  earlier
      complaint was not disclosed.
 Furthermore, as  the  matter  is  purely
      civil in nature, and in view of the fact that arbitration  proceedings
      with respect to the very same subject matter are presently sub-judice,
      and the claim of respondent  no.2  on  this  count  has  already  been
      rejected   by   the   arbitrator,   entertaining/continuing   criminal
      proceedings in the said matter is clearly an abuse of the  process  of
      the court.
Moreover, the alleged claim is related  to  the  period  of
      1996. 
A complaint made after a lapse of 15  years  is  barred  by  the
      provisions of Section 468 Cr.P.C., and the High  Court  has  erred  in
      holding the same to be a continuing offence.  As, in pursuance of  the
      High Court’s order dated 25.5.2001, the representation  of  respondent
      no.2 dated 21.3.2001 was decided by the Managing Director, IFFCO  vide
      order dated 15.10.2001, the limitation period began from the  date  of
      the said order, or at the most from  29.10.2001, that is, the date  on
      which, the order of rejection was communicated.
            The initiation  of  criminal  proceedings   is  nothing  but  an
      attempt by the frustrated litigant  to give vent to  his  frustration,
      by invoking the jurisdiction of  the  criminal  court  and  thus,  the
      proceedings are liable to be quashed.


      4.     Per  contra,  Shri  Devrrat,  learned  counsel  appearing   for
      respondent no.2, has submitted that the High Court  has  rightly  held
      that the same was in fact, a case of  continuing  offence.  Therefore,
      the question of limitation does not arise. The law does  not  prohibit
      the initiation of criminal proceedings where there has been breach  of
      trust and further,  in  such  a  case,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that
      arbitration  proceedings  are  pending,  a   criminal   complaint   is
      maintainable, and the court  concerned  has  rightly  entertained  the
      same. There is no prohibition in law as regards maintaining  a  second
      application, even though the earlier application has  been  dismissed.
      Thus, the appeals are liable to be dismissed.


      5.    We have considered the rival submissions made by learned counsel
      for the parties as well as by Shri Gaurav  Bhatia  and  Shri  Annurat,
      learned counsel appearing for the  State  of  U.P.  and   perused  the
      record.
            In light of the facts of these cases, it is  desirable  to  deal
      first, with the legal issues involved herein.


      LIMITATION IN CRIMINAL CASES- Section 468 Cr.P.C.:
      6.    Section 468 Cr.P.C. places an embargo  upon  court  from  taking
      cognizance of an offence after the expiry  of  the  limitation  period
      provided therein.
Section 469 prescribes when the period of limitation
      begins.
Section 473 enables the court to condone delay, provided  that
      the  court  is  satisfied  with  the  explanation  furnished  by   the
      prosecution/complainant, and  where,  in  the  interests  of  justice,
      extension of the period of limitation is called for.
The principle  of
      condonation of delay is based on the  general  rule  of  the  criminal
      justice system which states that a  crime  never  dies,  as  has  been
      explained by way of the legal maxim, nullum tempus aut locus  occurrit
      regi (lapse of time is no bar to the  Crown  for  the  purpose  of  it
      initiating proceeding  against  offenders).  
A  criminal  offence  is
      considered as a wrong against the State and  also  the  society  as  a
      whole, even though the same has been committed against an individual.


      7.    The question of delay in launching a criminal prosecution may be
      a circumstance to be taken into  consideration  while  arriving  at  a
      final decision, however, the same may  not  itself  be  a  ground  for
      dismissing the complaint at the  threshold.  
Moreover,  the  issue  of
      limitation must be examined in light of the gravity of the  charge  in
      question. (Vide: Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty, AIR  2007  SC
      2762; Sajjan Kumar v. Central Bureau of Investigation,  (2010)  9  SCC
      368; and Noida Entrepreneurs Association v. Noida & Ors., AIR 2011  SC
      2112).


      8.    The court, while condoning delay has to record the  reasons  for
      its satisfaction, and the same must be manifest in the  order  of  the
      court  itself.  The  court  is  further  required  to  state  in   its
      conclusion, while condoning  such  delay,  that  such  condonation  is
      required in the interest of justice.  (Vide: State of  Maharashtra  v.
      Sharad  Chandra Vinayak Dongre & Ors., AIR 1995 SC 231; and  State  of
      H.P. v. Tara Dutt & Anr., AIR 2000 SC 297).


      9.          To sum up, the law  of  limitation  prescribed  under  the
      Cr.P.C., must be observed, but in certain  exceptional  circumstances,
      taking into consideration the gravity of the  charge,  the  Court  may
      condone  delay, recording reasons for the same, in the event  that  it
      is found necessary to condone such delay in the interest  of  justice.




      CONTINUING OFFENCE:
      10.   Section 472 Cr.P.C.  provides  that  in  case  of  a  continuing
      offence, a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment of
      the time period during which the offence  continues.
The  expression,
      ‘continuing offence’ has not been defined in the Cr.P.C. because it is
      one of those expressions which does not have a fixed connotation,  and
      therefore, the formula of universal application cannot  be  formulated
      in this respect.


      11.    In  Balakrishna  Savalram  Pujari  Waghmare  &  Ors.  v.  Shree
      Dnyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan & Ors., AIR 1959 SC 798, this Court dealt
      with the aforementioned issue, and observed that a continuing  offence
      is an act which creates a continuing source of injury, and renders the
      doer of the act responsible and liable for  the  continuation  of  the
      said injury. In case  a   wrongful  act  causes  an  injury  which  is
      complete,  there  is  no  continuing  wrong  even  though  the  damage
      resulting from the said act may continue. If the wrongful  act  is  of
      such character that the injury caused by it itself continues, then the
      said act constitutes a continuing wrong. The distinction  between  the
      two wrongs therefore depends, upon the effect of the injury.
           In the said case, the court dealt with a case of  a wrongful act
      of forcible ouster, and held that the  resulting  injury  caused,  was
      complete at the date of the ouster itself,  and therefore there was no
      scope for the application of Section  23  of  the  Limitation  Act  in
      relation to the said case.


      12.   In Gokak Patel Volkart Ltd. v. Dundayya Gurushiddaiah Hiremath &
       Ors.,  (1991) 2 SCC 141, this Court dealt with the issue and held  as
      under:
               “According to the Blacks'  Law  Dictionary,  Fifth  Edition,
               'Continuing' means ‘enduring; not terminated by a single act
               or fact; subsisting for a definite  period  or  intended  to
               cover  or  apply  to  successive  similar   obligations   or
               occurrences.’ Continuing offence means ‘type of crime  which
               is committed over a span of time.’ As to period  of  statute
               of limitation in a continuing offence, the last act  of  the
               offence  controls  for  commencement  of  the   period.   ‘A
               continuing offence, such that  only  the  last  act  thereof
               within the period of the  statute  of  limitations  need  be
               alleged in the indictment or information, is one  which  may
               consist of separate acts or a course of  conduct  but  which
               arises from that singleness of thought,  purpose  or  action
               which may be deemed a single impulse.’ So also a 'Continuous
               Crime' means "one consisting of a continuous series of acts,
               which endures after the  period  of  consummation,  as,  the
               offence of  carrying  concealed  weapons.  In  the  case  of
               instantaneous crimes, the statute of  limitation  begins  to
               run with the consummation, while in the case  of  continuous
               crimes it only begins with the  cessation  of  the  criminal
               conduct or act."




      13.   While deciding the case in Gokak  Patel  Volkart  Ltd.  (Supra),
      this Court placed reliance upon its earlier judgment in State of Bihar
      v. Deokaran Nenshi & Anr., AIR 1973 SC 908, wherein  the  court  while
      dealing with the case of continuance of an offence has held as under:
               “A  continuing  offence  is  one  which  is  susceptible  of
               continuance and is distinguishable from  the  one  which  is
               committed once and for all. It  is  one  of  those  offences
               which arises out of a failure to obey or comply with a  rule
               or  its  requirement  and  which  involves  a  penalty,  the
               liability  for  which  continues  until  the  rule  or   its
               requirement is obeyed or complied with.  On  every  occasion
               that such disobedience or non-compliance occurs and  recurs,
               there is the offence committed. The distinction between  the
               two kinds of offences is between an act  or  omission  which
               constitutes an offence once  and  for  all  and  an  act  or
               omission which continues and therefore, constitutes a  fresh
               offence every time or occasion on which it continues. In the
               case of a continuing offence, there is thus  the  ingredient
               of continuance of the offence which is absent in the case of
               an offence which takes place when  an  act  or  omission  is
               committed once and for all.”


      (See also: Bhagirath Kanoria & Ors. v. State  of  M.P.,  AIR  1984  SC
      1688; and Amrit Lal Chum v. Devoprasad Dutta Roy, AIR 1988 SC 733).


      14.   In M/s. Raymond Limited & Anr.,  Etc.  Etc.  v.  Madhya  Pradesh
      Electricity Board & Ors., Etc. Etc., AIR 2001 SC 238, this Court  held
      as  under:
               “It  cannot  legitimately  be  contended   that   the   word
               "continuously" has  one  definite  meaning  only  to  convey
               uninterrupted ness in time sequence or essence  and  on  the
               other hand the very  word  would  also  mean  'recurring  at
               repeated intervals so as to be of repeated occurrence'. That
               apart, used as an adjective it draws colour from the context
               too.”




      15.   In Sankar Dastidar v. Smt. Banjula Dastidar & Anr., AIR 2007  SC
      514, this Court observed as under:
               “A suit for damages, in our opinion, stands on  a  different
               footing vis--vis a continuous wrong in respect of  enjoyment
               of one's right in a property. When a right of way is claimed
               whether public or private over a certain land over which the
               tort-teaser has no right of possession, the  breaches  would
               be continuing one. It is, however, indisputable that  unless
               the wrong is a continuing one, period of limitation does not
               stop running. Once the period begins to  run,  it  does  not
               stop except  where  the  provisions  of  Section 22  of  the
               Limitation Act would apply.”


           The Court further held:
               “Articles 68, 69 and 91 of the Limitation Act  govern  suits
               in  respect  of  movable  property.  For  specific   movable
               property  lost  or   acquired   by   theft,   or   dishonest
               misappropriation  or  conversion;   knowledge   as   regards
               possession of the party  shall  be  the  starting  point  of
               limitation in terms of Article 68. For  any  other  specific
               movable property, the time from which the period  begins  to
               run would be when the property is wrongfully taken, in terms
               of  Article  69.  Article  91  provides  for  a  period   of
               limitation  in  respect  of  a  suit  for  compensation  for
               wrongfully taking or injuring or  wrongfully  detaining  any
               other specific movable property. The  time  from  which  the
               period  begins  to  run  would  be  when  the  property   is
               wrongfully  taken  or  injured  or   when   the   detainer's
               possession becomes unlawful.”


      16.   Thus, in view of  the  above,  the  law  on  the  issue  can  be
      summarised  to the effect that, in the case of a  continuing  offence,
      the ingredients of the offence continue, i.e., endure even  after  the
      period of consummation,  whereas  in  an  instantaneous  offence,  the
      offence takes place once and for all i.e. when the same actually takes
      place.  In such cases, there is no continuing offence, even though the
      damage resulting from the injury may itself continue.
   
  SECOND COMPLAINT ON SAME FACTS-MAINTAINABILITY:
      17.   While considering the issue at hand in Shiv Shankar  Singh  v.
      State of  Bihar  &  Anr.,  (2012)  1  SCC  130,  this  Court,  after
      considering its earlier judgments in Pramatha Nath Talukdar v. Saroj
      Ranjan Sarkar  AIR 1962 SC 876; Jatinder Singh & Ors. v. Ranjit Kaur
      AIR 2001 SC 784; Mahesh Chand v. B. Janardhan Reddy & Anr., AIR 2003
      SC 702; Poonam Chand Jain & Anr. v. Fazru AIR 2005 SC 38 held:

                 “It is evident that the law does  not  prohibit  filing  or
                 entertaining of the second complaint even on the same facts
                 provided the earlier complaint  has  been  decided  on  the
                 basis of insufficient material or the order has been passed
                 without understanding the nature of the  complaint  or  the
                 complete facts could not be  placed  before  the  court  or
                 where the complainant came  to  know  certain  facts  after
                 disposal of the first complaint which could have tilted the
                 balance in his favour. However, second complaint would  not
                 be maintainable wherein  the  earlier  complaint  has  been
                 disposed of on  full  consideration  of  the  case  of  the
                 complainant on merit.”


      18.   The present appeals require to be decided on the  basis  of  the
      settled legal propositions referred to hereinabove.


            Complaint Case No.4948 of 2009 was filed by Sabha  Kant  Pandey,
      brother of respondent no.2, wherein, he claimed to be a partner in the
      firm  M/s  Manish  Engineering  Enterprises,  against   one   of   the
      appellants and other officers of IFFCO, under Sections 323, 504,  506,
      406 and 120B IPC at  Police  Statition  Phulpur,  District  Allahabad,
      alleging that the said Firm had been given  a  separate  godown/office
      within the IFFCO compound, wherein their articles worth Rs.30-40 lacs,
      as well as  their  documents  were  kept.   The  complainant  was  not
      permitted to remove them and additionally,   even the payment for  the
      work done by the firm was not made, on certain technical grounds.  The
      officers of  IFFCO,  including  Mr.  U.S.  Awasthi  -  the  appellant,
      misbehaved with the complainant and kept the said articles worth Rs.30-
      40 lacs, as also the important documents, in  addition  to  the  entry
      gate pass required  to enter the plant  by  the  complainant  and  his
      brother  Sudhakant  (respondent  no.2  herein),  therefore  making  it
      impossible for them to access their godown.


      19.   The complaint was dealt  with  appropriately  by  the  competent
      court,  wherein  the  present  complainant  was  also  examined  as  a
      prosecution witness. The Court took note of the fact  of  pendency  of
      the Arbitration Proceedings with respect to the payment of  dues,  and
      came to the conclusion that  the  complaint  had  been  filed  to  put
      pressure  on  IFFCO  to  obtain  payments.   The  said  complaint  was
      dismissed on merits.


      20.   Complaint Case No.26528 of 2009  was  then  filed  by  Sabhakant
      Pandey, brother of respondent no.2, against one of the appellants  and
      also other officers of IFFCO under Sections 147, 148, 323,  504,  506,
      201 and 379 IPC in Police Statition Phulpur, Allahabad, making similar
      allegations, and giving full  particulars  of  the  outstanding  dues.
      That complaint was heard and  disposed  of  by  the  competent  court,
      taking note of the fact that there had been a cross-complaint  by  the
      officers of IFFCO, wherein allegations were made to the effect that on
      19.12.2008, Arbitration Proceedings in Case No.1 of 2007 took place at
      the residence of the Arbitrator, a retired Judge of the Allahabad High
      Court, wherein Sabha Kant Pandey and Sudha Kant Pandey misbehaved with
      the Arbitrator, and he was hence forced to adjourn the hearing of  the
      case.  Subsequently, they stood in front of  his   house  and  shouted
      slogans, abusing the officers of IFFCO and even tried to beat them up.
       The court dismissed the said complaint after recording the  following
      findings:
                 “In the opinion  of  the  court,  the  complaint  filed  by
                 Sabhakant  Pandey  is  imaginary,  a  bald  story  with  an
                 intention  to  put  illegal  pressure  and  by  suppressing
                 material facts in the complaint.”


      21.   Complaint  Case  No.1090  of  2010  was  filed  by  the  present
      complainant,  respondent  no.2  against  the  appellant  Udai  Shankar
      Awasthi and other officers of IFFCO under Sections 323, 504, 506,  406
      and 120B IPC, making similar allegations  as  were  mentioned  in  the
      first complaint, to the effect that articles worth  Rs.15-20  lacs  in
      each godown were  lying  in  the  premises  of  IFFCO,  and  that  the
      complainant was not permitted to remove the same.  In the  said  case,
      after investigation, the police filed the final  report  stating  that
      all the allegations made in the complaint were false.  The  concluding
      part of the report reads as under:
                       “For last 6 months no body has turned up to  get  his
                 statement recorded in spite of notice.  The application had
                 been  filed  on  false  facts  and  complaint  was   bogus,
                 forceless and baseless and was liable to be dismissed.”


      22.   So far as the present complaint is concerned, the same has  been
      filed under Sections 415, 406 and 403 IPC, wherein the allegation that
      their Bill had been cleared on 10.7.1996, but the  requisite  payment,
      to the tune of Rs.22,81,530/- was not made to the complainant.   Their
      claim for payment was wrongly rejected. Certain articles and documents
      belonging to the complainant were lying within the premises  of  IFFCO
      and the same were not returned to the complainant despite requests for
      the same.  In this case, after taking cognizance, summons were  issued
      on 16.7.2011, under Sections 403 and 406 IPC, though  the  case  under
      Section 415 IPC stood rejected.


      23.   It is evident that in the said complaint, no reference was  made
      by the complainant as regards the Arbitration Proceedings.  There  was
      also no disclosure of facts to show that earlier complaints in respect
      of the same subject matter, had been dismissed on merits by  the  same
      court.


      24.   A copy of the Award made by the Arbitrator was placed on record,
      wherein issue no.13 which dealt with  the  present  controversy,  i.e.
      some material and documents were placed in the premises of  IFFCO  and
      the return of the same was refused.  The claim as  regards  the  same,
      has been rejected.   There has been no mention of such claim  and  its
      rejection by the said concern, in either of the writ  petitions  filed
      before the High  Court  earlier  or  even  for  that  matter,  in  the
      application filed by the said concern before IFFCO, for the purpose of
      making appointment of an arbitrator, or in the application filed under
      Section 11 of the Act, 1996 before the High Court.


      25.   In the counter affidavit filed by respondent no.2, it  has  been
      submitted that the contract was terminated by IFFCO  fraudulently,  to
      usurp the entire amount towards the work done by  it  and  that  IFFCO
      took illegal possession of all the goods and articles belonging to the
      firm lying within its premises, and as the amount had not  been  paid,
      the officers  were  guilty  of  criminal  breach  of  trust  and  were
      therefore, liable to be punished.   However,  the  fact  that  earlier
      complaints had been filed by the brother of respondent no.2 Sabha Kant
      Pandey  has  been  admitted.   It  has  further  been  admitted   that
      Arbitration  Proceedings  are  still  pending,   but   it   has   also
      simultaneously been urged that criminal prosecution has nothing to  do
      with the Arbitral award.


      26.  The Magistrate had issued summons without meeting  the  mandatory
      requirement of Section 202 Cr.P.C., though the appellants were outside
      his  territorial  jurisdiction.    
The  provisions  of  Section  202 Cr.P.C. were amended vide Amendment Act 2005, making it  mandatory  to postpone the issue of process where the accused  resides  in  an  area beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Magistrate  concerned.  
The
      same was found necessary in order to  protect  innocent  persons  from
      being harassed by unscrupulous persons and making it  obligatory  upon
      the Magistrate  to  enquire  into  the  case  himself,  or  
to  direct
      investigation to be made by a police officer, or by such other  person
      as he thinks fit for the purpose of finding out whether or not,  there
      was sufficient  ground  for  proceeding  against  the  accused  before
      issuing summons in such cases.. (See also: Shivjee Singh  v.  Nagendra
      Tiwary & Ors., AIR 2010 SC 2261; and National Bank of Oman v. Barakara
      Abdul Aziz & Anr., JT 2012 (12) SC 432).


      27.   Section 403 IPC provides for a maximum punishment of 2 years, or
      fine or both; and Section 406 IPC provides for a maximum punishment of
      3 years, or  fine  or  both.    The  limitation  period  within  which
      cognizance must be taken, as per the  provisions  of  Section  468  of
      Cr.P.C. is  three years.  In the case of an instantaneous offence,  as
      per the provisions of Section  469  of  the  Cr.P.C.,  the  period  of
      limitation commences on the date of offence.
In  the  instant  case,
      admittedly, the claim of the said  firm  was  rejected  by  way  of  a
      speaking order dated 15.10.2001, in pursuance of the order of the High
      Court dated 25.5.2001, and the said order was communicated vide letter
      dated 29.10.2001.
Respondent No. 2 correctly understood the nature of
      the offence and, therefore, subsequently approached the High Court for
      the purpose of seeking recovery of outstanding dues, wherein the  High
      Court  directed  him  to  pursue  the  remedy  available   under   the
      arbitration agreement between the parties.
 In such a fact  situation,
      it is beyond our imagination as to how the offence involved herein can
      possibly be termed as a  continuing  offence.
 In  fact,  the  damage
      caused by virtue of non-payment of their  dues,  if  any,  is  legally
      sustainable, may continue, but the offence is  most  certainly  not  a
      continuing offence, as the same has not recurred subsequent  to  order
      dated  15.10.2001,  even  though  the  effect  caused  by  it  may  be
      continuous in nature.


           In Arun Vyas & Ors. v. Anita Vyas, AIR 1999 SC 2071, this  Court
      held that in a case of cruelty, the starting point of limitation would
      be the last act of cruelty.  (See also: Ramesh  &  Ors.  v.  State  of
      Tamil Nadu, AIR 2005 SC 1989).


      28.   Approaching the court at a belated stage for a  rightful  cause,
      or even for the violation of the fundamental rights, has  always  been
      considered as a good ground for its rejection at the  threshold.   The
      ground taken by the learned counsel for  respondent  No.  2  that  the
      cause of action arose on 20.10.2009 and 5.11.2009, as  the  appellants
      refused to return money and other materials, articles and record, does
      not have substance worth consideration.  In case a  representation  is
      made by the person aggrieved and the same is rejected by the competent
      statutory authority, and such an order is communicated to  the  person
      aggrieved, making repeated representations will not enable  the  party
      to explain the delay.


      29.   In Rabindra Nath Bose & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR  1970
      SC  470,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  Government  rejected  a
      representation  and  communicated  such  rejection  to  the  applicant
      therein,  his  subsequent  representations  were  entertained  by  the
      Government.  A Constitution Bench of this Court held as under:


               “He says that the representations were being received by the
               government all the time. But there is a limit  to  the  time
               which   can   be   considered    reasonable    for    making
               representations. If  the  Government  has  turned  down  one
               representation, the  making  of  another  representation  on
               similar lines would not enable the  petitioners  to  explain
               the delay.”                           (Emphasis added)




      30.   In State of Orissa v. Sri Pyarimohan Samantaray & Ors., AIR 1976
      SC 2617; State of Orissa etc. v. Shri Arun Kumar Patnaik & Anr.  etc.,
      etc., AIR 1976 SC 1639; and  Swatantar Singh v.  State  of  Haryana  &
      Ors., AIR 1997 SC 2105, a similar view has been reiterated.


      31.   The view taken by this Court in Rabindra Math Bose  (Supra)  has
      been approved and followed in Sri Krishna Coconut  Co.  etc.  v.  East
      Godavari Coconut and  Tobacco  Market  Committee,  AIR  1967  SC  973,
      Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. & Anr. v. K. Thangappan &  Anr.,  AIR
      2006 SC 1581; and Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Dugal Kumar, AIR 2008  SC
      3000.


      32.   In Kishan Singh (dead) thr. Lrs. v. Gurpal Singh & Ors. AIR 2010
      SC 3624, this court while dealing with a case of inordinate  delay  in
      launching a criminal prosecution, has held as under:
               “In cases where there is a delay in lodging a FIR, the Court
               has to look for a plausible explanation for such  delay.  In
               absence of such an explanation, the delay may be fatal.  The
               reason for quashing such proceedings may not be merely  that
               the allegations were an afterthought or had given a coloured
               version of events. In such cases the court should  carefully
               examine the facts before it for the reason that a frustrated
               litigant who failed to succeed before the  Civil  Court  may
               initiate criminal proceedings just to harass the other  side
               with mala fide intentions or the ulterior motive of wreaking
               vengeance on  the  other  party.  Chagrined  and  frustrated
               litigants should not be permitted  to  give  vent  to  their
               frustrations by cheaply invoking  the  jurisdiction  of  the
               criminal court.  The  court  proceedings  ought  not  to  be
               permitted to degenerate into  a  weapon  of  harassment  and
               persecution. In such a case, where an FIR is lodged  clearly
               with a view to spite the other party because  of  a  private
               and personal grudge and to enmesh the other  party  in  long
               and arduous criminal proceedings, the court may take a  view
               that it amounts to an abuse of the process  of  law  in  the
               facts and circumstances of  the  case.  (Vide  :  Chandrapal
               Singh & Ors. v. Maharaj Singh &  Anr.,  AIR  1982  SC  1238;
               State of Haryana & Ors. v. Ch. Bhajan Lal & Ors.,  AIR  1992
               SC 604; G. Sagar Suri & Anr. v. State  of  U.P.&  Ors.,  AIR
               2000 SC 754; and Gorige Pentaiah v. State of  A.P.  &  Ors.,
               (2008) 12 SCC 531).”




      33.   The instant appeals are squarely  covered  by  the  observations
      made in Kishan Singh (Supra) and thus, the proceedings must be labeled
      as  nothing  more  than  an  abuse  of  the  process  of  the   court,
      particularly in view of the fact that, with respect to enact the  same
      subject matter, various complaint cases  had  already  been  filed  by
      respondent No.2 and his brother, which were all dismissed  on  merits,
      after  the  examination  of  witnesses.   
In  such  a  fact-situation,
      Complaint  Case  No.  628  of  2011,  filed  on  31.5.2001   was   not
      maintainable.  
Thus, the Magistrate concerned committed a grave  error by entertaining the said case, and wrongly took cognizance and  issued summons to the appellants.


      34.   In view  of  above,  the  appeals  are  allowed.   The  impugned
      judgment dated 13.3.2012 is set aside and the proceedings in Complaint
      Case No. 628 of 2011 pending before the Additional C.J.M.,  Allahabad,
      are hereby quashed.





     …….…………….....................J.
                                              (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)



     ............………............................J.
                                        (JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR)



      New Delhi,
      January 9, 2013