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Tuesday, January 8, 2013

The complaint arises from alleged delay in disbursal and part non-disbursal of a loan of Rs.70 lakhs, sanctioned by the OPs to the Complainant for setting up a marine products processing unit. = the delay in disbursal of the term loan with subsidy as well as part non-release of the same after March 1995, was without any justifiable cause. This failure to provide proper service to their borrower, amounted to ‘deficiency of service’ on the part of the OPs, within the meaning of Section 2(1)(g) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. We are therefore of the view that the complainant is entitled to be compensated for the same. = Accordingly, the total compensation payable under all admissible heads is rounded off to Rs.25 lakhs. Cost of Rs one lakh is also awarded in favour of the Complainant. The OP/Tamilnadu Industrial Investment Corporation Limited, is directed to pay this amount of Rs.26 lakhs to the complainant, together with interest at 9% per annum, from the date of the complaint. The entire amount shall be paid within a period of three months, failing which the period of delay shall carry additional interest of 2% per annum.


NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION
NEW DELHI

ORIGINAL PETITION NO. 51 OF 1999

                                                       
M/s. Packer Sea Food (Pvt) Limited
Through its Managing Director Shri C.P.Azariah Samuel Raj
Having its registered office at College Road,
Nagercoil-1, Kanyakumari District
And having factory
At 74/2 Kulasekarapuram Village, Vazukamparai,
Agastheeswaram Taluk,
Kanyakumari District                                                                                                                 …..Complainant


Versus
The Tamilnadu Industrial Investment Corporation Ltd.,
27 Whites Road,
Madras: 600 014

2. The Branch Manager,
Tamilnadu Industrial Investment Corporation Ltd,
37 Cape Road,
Nagercoil- 629 001                                                                                                                .....Opposite parties
                                                                          

BEFORE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE  J. M. MALIK,
                              PRESIDING MEMBER
HON’BLE MR. VINAY KUMAR, MEMBER


For the Complainant             :     Mr. M.L. Mahajan, Advocate

For the Opposite parties       :     Mr. K.P. Toms, Advocate

 

PRONOUNCED ON:02.01.2013.

ORDER

PER MR.VINAY KUMAR, MEMBER

M/S Packer Sea Food Private Limited has filed this complaint against the Tamil Nadu Investment Corporation.  
The complaint arises from alleged delay in disbursal and part non-disbursal of a loan of Rs.70 lakhs, sanctioned by the OPs to the Complainant for setting up a marine products processing unit.

2.      The case of the Complainant is that the loan was sanctioned on 20.10.1993 
but only Rs.15.3 lakhs had been disbursed till 18.3.1994.  
By the time the complaint was filed, only Rs.44.83 lakhs had been released and remaining balance of Rs.25.17 lakhs and subsidy were never released.  
This was inspite of the fact that the Principal, Govt. College of Engineering, Tirunelveli, appointed by the OPs to evaluate the plant and machinery, had reported   that the building was worth Rs.41.58 lakhs, excluding cost of the land.         
3.      The complaint petition gives details of alleged “dillydallying attitude” of the OPs, which eventually forced him to write to the Complainant on 7.2.1996 stating that it was left with no alternative but to seek funding facilities from another source.   
This letter (Annexure P-49) stated:-  
“Therefore this is to require you to release the documents that we have deposited with you as additional collateral security to enable us to hypothicate with other financiers.  It is also noted that you yourself and the corporation alone shall be liable for losses, and other damages that we have incurred on account of “Dilly-dallying” tactics adopted by you for the past 1 ½ years in the disbursement to our project.  Since our project is nearing completion we have been driven to this extreme step as you have been dragging the matter unnecessarly and purposely for reasons best known to yourself.”

4.      According to the Complainant, the project has suffered delay of 2½ years due to failure of the OPs to make timely and sufficient disbursal of the sanctioned loan.  Even after arrangements were made to raise necessary funding from another source, the NOC was not released by the OPs.
 Therefore, the Complainant has sought the following reliefs against the OPs, for loss caused by their negligence, delay and failure to provide proper service—

“ (i)  Interest on delayed completion                               Rs.25.74
(ii)  Cost escalation                                                             Rs.95.99
(iii) interest arising out of non-release of sanctioned
     amount by respondent                                             Rs.2.97 

(iv) interest loan on account of delayed claim of
      subsidy amount                                                      Rs.1.94

(v)  EB minimum charges payable for the delayed
      Period                                                                   Rs.13.50

(vi) mental agony suffered because of the aforesaid
      causes                                                                Rs.10.00

(vii) loss of profit including contacting other persons
       for arranging loans/lacs                                      Rs.50.00”


5.      During the course of these proceedings, the Commission identified six issues for decision and directed on 6.9.2010 that—
“The complainant shall submit brief written arguments on the six issues, which are required to be decided in this complaint with reference to the evidence on each head and the quantum of claim on each head, copy of the same be furnished to the counsel for the opposite party within four weeks.  Thereafter, counsel for the opposite party shall file item-wise reply on each issue and furnish a copy of the same to the counsel for the complainant within four weeks.  Parties are at liberty to add issues to be decided”.

Accordingly, a brief written argument was filed by the Complainant on 9.11.2010.  In this, the following issues/heads are listed:-
          “a. Interest on Rs.25 lack taken from private party.
          b. Increase of cost or propitiate escalation cost.
c. Delay in release the subsidy by TIIC its actual cost/effect.
          d. Minimum Electricity Charges (EB)
          e. Business loss
          f. Mental Agony”
                           
6.      Per contra, the case of the OPs is that it is a corporation set up by the government of Tamil Nadu with branches all over the States and with the avowed objective of “extending financial assistance to various entrepreneurs in the State of Tamilnadu for development of industries in the State”.  
The loan to the Complainant was sanctioned on 20.10.1993 with clear terms and conditions, which were accepted by it on 17.1.1994.  
As per Clause 43 therein, collateral security for the loan was required to be provided by the Complainant.  
Delay in this, led to delay in disbursal of loan.  
OPs have further alleged that:-
a)      The Complainant sought sanction for purchase of two generator sets and an additional Plate Freezer from suppliers different from the ones originally purposed.
b)      The procedure for payment required the advance amount to be paid to the supplier through the opposite parties. Therefore, details were sought from the Complainant for change of suppliers of generator sets and motors.
d)      As per norms of disbursement release of loan amount for purchase of assets not envisaged in the scheme, was not permissible.  Such purchases could be made from contingency. But, contingency itself could be utilized after implementation of the full project. All equipments considered necessary for the project, should have been included by the complainant in the original project itself.
e)      Inspection of the factory building by the regional office of OPs revealed that the Complainant had not purchased any machinery as per the bills submitted.
f)       The machineries were erected in the factory premises by a fabricator, who was not a supplier as per the sanctioned scheme. 
g)      Principal Government College of Engineering Tirunelveli had valued the building at Rs.39,56,245/- and the machinery at Rs.21,60,000/-.  The valuation of machinery here was questioned by the OPs in their letter of 7.3.1994.
h)      If the borrower requests for change of equipment suppliers, the OPs have to verify the capacity, market reputation and comparative cost of the proposed supplier.  In the case of generator sets, the change of supplier was agreed by the OPs within a month, but the supply could not be effected as the Complainant did not accept the condition of payment after delivery of the generator sets.
i)        When the Complainant asked for NOC to raise working capital from another financier, there was an overdue of Rs 17 lakhs in his loan account. Therefore, the Complainant was asked to clear the overdue for issue of the NOC.
j)        Even after the loan account between the two parties was settled, the Marine Products Export Development Authority, Govt. of India informed that invoices/bills and receipts submitted by the Complainants to the OPs are fabricated and false.

7.      We have carefully considered the pleadings and evidence brought on record by the two sides and heard their counsels, Mr M L Mahajan for the complainant and Mr K P Toms for the OPs.  Mr Mahajan drew our attention to the sixteen page document (signed by the lender/OPs on 28.10.1993) containing the details of sanction of this term loan of Rs 70 lakhs (Annexure P-2). 
It projects total cost of the venture as Rs 155 lakhs, to be funded in the following manner—
                               Loan  from the OP          Rs 70 Lakhs
                               Subsidy/State capital      Rs 15 lakhs
                               Capital                             Rs 50 lakhs
                               Unsecured loans             Rs 20 lakhs
The loan of 70 lakhs was sanctioned for construction of the factory building and purchase of machinery required for the project. 
It was to be repaid  in 24 instalments, after a moratorium of 24 months from the date of the first disbursal. 
As per the terms, the disbursal for civil works and equipment was to be made after inspection and valuation. 
For this, a valuer was appointed by the OPs. 
Learned counsel pointed out that the valuer (Government College of Engineering,Tirunnelveli) submitted reports to the OPs, from time to time. Their reports from 3.11.1993 to 6.3.1994 (i.e. before the first disbursal by the OPs) show that an investment of Rs 44.95 lakhs in land & building and Rs 3.86 lakhs in machinery had already been made by the complainant. 

8.      Mr M L Mahajan, learned counsel for the complainant, argued that the total amount released by the OPs was only Rs 44.83 lakhs.
 No release was made after March 1995. 
Therefore, the balance of Rs 25.17 lakhs had to be raised from private sources at very high rates of interest, to ensure completion of the project.

9.      In reply, Mr K P Toms, learned counsel for the OPs filed additional written arguments on 24.9.2012 with records of disbursement to show that as on 29.3.2005, in all Rs 44.83 lakhs towards the term loan and Rs 9.51 lakhs towards subsidy had been released to the complainant. 
Learned counsel argued that subsidy and the term loan together  constituted only 55% of the project cost. 
Therefore, the commitment of the OPs was limited to funding 55% of the asset created under the project. The borrower had created assets worth Rs 89.36 lakhs only. The OPs were required to release only 55% thereof i.e. Rs 49.15 lakhs. Accordingly, actual release fell short by Rs 4.32 lakhs only which was retained by the OPs towards cost of the machinery supplied by M/S Rank Engineering Works. In this context, Mr K P Toms referred to the written response filed by the OP in this Commission on 17.5.1999. Para 23 therein states—
“With regard to paragraph 11 of the complaint, the statement issued by the banker for the account of M/s Rank Engineering Works did not a have any authenticity.  M/s. Lakshmi Vilas Bank, Nagercoil said to have issued statement of account for the company M/s Rank Engineering Works which was having its factory and office at Chennai.  The payments made to the said engineering company were sent to office at Chennai only.  Therefore, the statement issued by a bank at Nagercoil caused suspicion on the genuiness of the statement.  Besides this, the complainant reported to have paid Rs.21.60 lakhs  but the said engineering company has received Rs.4 lakhs only.  Further with regard to the allegation of demanding interest, it is stated that the complainant had to pay the interest accrued to the account and therefore, the second opposite party demanded the interest from the complainant.”

10.    This claim, made on behalf of the OPs, was challenged by Mr Mahajan, counsel for the complainant. He drew our attention to the report of 10.3.1995 submitted by the valuer, Government College of Engineering, appointed by the OP/Tamil Nadu Industrial Investment Corporation itself. The three items of equipment having, total value of Rs 21.60, lakhs figure as the last three items in the report signed by two senior lecturers of the Engineering Department of the College. When confronted with this piece of evidence on record, learned counsel for the OPs very gracefully concede that he had no answer for the same.   It is therefore, clear that the OPs have not verified their facts before filing the written response of 17.5.1999 and written arguments on 17.9.2012.  At this stage, we do not wish to make any further observation on this point.

11.    The evidence brought on record shows that the first three disbursals were made in March 1994.  In September 1994 the complainant was informed that further disbursal of the loan was decided by the OPs to be “withheld”. Thus, no release of loan or subsidy was made until  29.3.1995.  Rs 25.17 lakhs of loan and Rs 5.94 lakhs of subsidy i.e. 31.11 lakhs out of the commitment of Rs 85 lakhs, was never disbursed.  The final position is confirmed by the counsel for the OPs in the statement produced before us on 24.9.2012. 
The allegations of delay in disbursal and non-disbursal of the loan and subsidy are to be seen in this factual background.

12.    In the affidavit evidence filed on behalf of the OPs, delay is attributed mainly to the decision of the complainant to purchase generator sets and Plate Freezer from suppliers different from the ones ‘originally proposed’. The request was agreed by the OPs, in so far as the generators were concerned. But, there is no explanation why no advance was released in favour of the supplier. Nor is there an explanation why the condition of supply before payment was imposed when, as admitted in the affidavit evidence of the OPs, payment of advance to the suppliers was permissible, subject to the same being routed through the OPs. More importantly, there is no explanation for the resultant delay. 
Details in para 17 of the affidavit evidence of the complainant show that it was over three months.

13.    As noted earlier, the stoppage of further disbursals was communicated to the complainant on 15.9.1994. This was preceded by inspection by the Regional Office of the OPs. As per the affidavit evidence of the OPs, “The inspection revealed that the complainant had not purchased any machinery as per the bills admitted.”  However, the letter of 15.9.1994 (produced on record as Annexure P-9), which is a cryptic one para letter, gives no idea whatsoever of the reason for stoppage of further disbursements. But, a reading the affidavit evidence of the OPs, filed on 7.5.2008 together with the objections filed by the complainant on 5.10.1999, gives  a clear idea of the underlying reason.  
As per the complainant, it preferred to buy the generators from another supplier as it had quoted rates 20% lower than the one chosen by the OPs (Para26). 
The OPs do not respond to the question of rate difference but admit that “On 16.3.1994 the complainant requested for change of machinery supplier from M/s Mahanarayanee Investment and Trading Co.P. Ltd., Madurai to M/s Parry Engineering and Exports Limited for the purchase of 2 Generator set for which the second opposite party requested vide their letter dated 17.3.1994 the complainant to submit the original proforma invoice so as to take a decision on change of supplier. 
While it was so, on 29.3.94, the second opposite party issued a commitment letter to M/s Air Power India Ltd. guaranteeing payment subject to conditions on supply of machinery. A DD for Rs 6,13,000/- was forwarded to the said supplier as advance out of term loan  against subsidy eligibility................
Also, in another letter dated 6.6.94, the complainant reiterated the stand to purchase 2 Gensets from M/s Parry & Co., instead of M/s Mahanarayanee Investments and Trading Co. P.Ltd.”(Para 15).  
This is a clear admission that the OPs were in a hurry to procure the equipment, even before taking a final view on the request of the complainant to change the supplier.
14.    Following conclusions emerge from the detailed consideration above—
a.   Report of the valuer shows that even before the first disbursal by the OP,  investment of Rs 44.95 lakhs in the building and Rs 3.86 lakhs in machinery had been made by the complainant.
b.   Most of the machinery and equipment have been procured subsequent to the sanction of the loan by the OPs. Therefore, its value, as assessed by thevaluer rose from 3.86 lakhs in November 1993 to 49.71 lakhs in March 1995.

c.   The OPs disbursed part of the loan and subsidy but with long delays between disbursals. Admittedly, Rs 25.17 lakhs of the term loan and Rs 5.49 lakhs of subsidy remained undisbursed.


d.   Delay in disbursal is sought to be explained on the ground that the purchased machinery (though reflected in the evaluation report of 7.7.1994) was not found in the factory during subsequent inspection by the OPs. But, it is also admitted that Rs 16.88 lakhs were released in March 1995, based on the valuation report of 10.3.1995. There is no explanation as to what happened in between to satisfy the OPs that the ‘missing machinery’ was not physically missing. We are therefore, of the view that the delay on this account cannot be treated as bona fide conduct on the part of the OPs.

e.   The logic of proportionate release (i.e. OP’s commitment of loan as 55% of the project cost) is an unconvincing attempt to justify the delay.  It has merely remained an attempt to take the focus away from the inexplicable delay caused by the conduct of the OPs. This delay was a negation of their own avowed objective of extending financial assistance to entrepreneurs in Tamil Nadu for development of industries in the State.


f.      The delay in procurement of generator sets has not been objectively explained. On the contrary, OPs’ own evidence shows that it was caused by their attempt to procure it from a supplier of their choice (though, as revealed by the Complainant, at a higher cost), against the requirement of the complainant. In this case too, the delay cannot be called bona fide.

g.   In so far as the time taken in release of ‘No Objection Certificate’ to the borrower is concerned, we agree with the OPs that it could not have been issued before clearance of the outstanding amount by the complainant.

15.    The OPs have sought to rely upon the decision of H’ble Supreme Court of India in Karnataka State Industrial Industrial Investment and Development CorpnLtd., (2005) 4 SCC 456.      In this case, the respondent had taken a loan of Rs 116.30 lakhs from the Karnataka State Industrial Investment and Development Corpn (KSIIDC) in 1991. The borrower committed defaults in repayment. Therefore, the KSIIDC took over the unit in 1996 and sold it for Rs 171 lakhs in 1998 to a third party. The borrower filed a writ petition in the High Court praying for declaring the sale null and void. The High Court decided that borrower should be given an opportunity to make an offer to purchase on the same terms as agreed by the KSIIDC with the buyer. The decision of the learned single judge was challenged by the buyer in a writ appeal. The Division Bench  ordered the KSIIDC to re do the entire sale process and to give the borrower an opportunity to bring a better offer. Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the KSIIDC had acted in a bona fide manner and set aside the direction to it to redo the entire sale process. Facts in the case before us are entirely different. Therefore, in our view the case of the OP/Tamilnadu Industrial Investment Corporation gets no support from this decision.   

16.    In the result, we hold that the complainant has fully succeeded in establishing that 
the delay in disbursal of the term loan with subsidy as well as part non-release of the same after March 1995, was without any justifiable cause. This failure to provide proper service to their borrower, amounted to ‘deficiency of service’ on the part of the OPs, within the meaning of Section 2(1)(g) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. We are therefore of the view that the complainant is entitled to be compensated for the same. 

17.    The consequential cost of delay in disbursal and of non-disbursal itself, has been quantified by the complainant, as directed by this Commission.  As per written submission of the complainant, the value of total assets had risen to Rs.203.84 lakhs in May 1996 and Rs.274.39 lakhs by May 1997.  We do not consider it necessary to go into it.  Because, whatever the actual growth of the Unit set up by the complainant, the liability of the OPs in the context of the Consumer Complaint, will not travel beyond the consequences of delay in disbursement of the total agreed quantum of loan and subsidy as well as of non- disbursal of a part thereof.

18.    The effect of this delay has been quantified by the Complainant in six heads, as per the direction of this Commission, mentioned earlier in this order. Expectedly, it has not been challenged by the OPs. 
 Towards the non-released sums of loan and subsidy interest, Rs.13.16 lakhs has been claimed at 36% per annum.  
We consider it proper to limit it to 18%.  
Cost escalation for building and machinery, calculated at 12 and 10% respectively, are considered reasonable and acceptable.  This comes to Rs.11.75 lakhs. 
Similarly, business loss at 10% for five months is considered reasonable and therefore the claimed amount of Rs.6.45 lakhs is allowed.  
However, we do deem it proper to allow the minimum electricity charge claimed by the Complainant, as it would have been   payable, in  any case.   Finally, there is no case for allowing further compensation of Rs.25 lakhs claimed towards mental pain and agony, as interest on delay in releases cost escalation as well as business loss have separately been allowed.

19.    Accordingly, the total compensation payable under all admissible heads is rounded off to Rs.25 lakhs.  Cost of Rs one lakh is also awarded in favour of the Complainant.  The OP/Tamilnadu Industrial Investment Corporation Limited, is directed to pay this amount of Rs.26 lakhs to the complainant, together with interest at 9% per annum, from the date of the complaint.  The entire amount shall be paid within a period of three months, failing which the period of delay shall carry additional interest of 2% per annum.  
.…………………………
(J. M. MALIK, J.)
PRESIDING MEMBER

………………………….
                                                                            (VINAY KUMAR)
                                      MEMBER
s./-






































































“The Debt Relief Scheme, 2008 is undoubtedly a welfare measure and announced in order to give relief to the farmers those who availed loans prior to 31-03-07 even by reconstructing and rescheduling in the year 2004 and 2006. The significance was attached to those cut off dates as fixed in guidelines in respect of its disbursal, over due and remains unpaid. The gap in between the period of disbursal and over due is nine months only. If the contention of the learned counsel for opposite party is accepted that one year period has to be computed from the date of sanction of loan, the loans disbursed in the month of January, February or March, 2007 could not be overdue by 31-12-07. If that is the position, why cut off date was given in the guideline as 31-12-07. Being a beneficial legislation a liberal approach can be made in applying those guidelines as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the complainant. Therefore, we opine that the complainant is entitled to the benefits of loan waiver scheme and its non application amounted to deficiency of service.”


NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION
NEW DELHI

REVISION PETITION NO. 1707 OF 2012
(Against the order dated 27.01.2012 in Appeal No.174/2011 of the State Commission, Andhra Pradesh)

Andhra Bank,
Prathipadu Village & Mandal,
Guntur District,
Andrha Pradesh                                                                                                                                              ……….Petitioner

Versus
Vajrala Venkata Reddy,
S/o Tirupathi Reddy,
Agriculturist,
R/o Patamallayapalem Village,
Parathipadu Mandal & Post,
Guntur District,
Andhra Pradesh                                                        .....Respondent   


REVISION PETITION NO. 1708 OF 2012
(Against the order dated 27.01.2012 in Appeal No.175/2011 of the State Commission, Andhra Pradesh)


Andhra Bank,
Prathipadu Village & Mandal,
Guntur District,
Andrha Pradesh                                                                                                                                           ……….Petitioner

Versus
Chennuboina Srinivasa Rao
S/o Venkateswarlu,
Agriculturist,
R/o Parathipadu Mandal & Post,
Guntur District,
Andhra Pradesh                                                                                                                                              .....Respondent 

REVISION PETITION NO. 1709 OF 2012
(Against the order dated 27.01.2012 in Appeal No.176/2011 of the State Commission, Andhra Pradesh)

Andhra Bank,
Prathipadu Village & Mandal,
Guntur District,
Andrha Pradesh                                                                                                                                         ……….Petitioner
Versus
Shaik Abdul Vahab,
S/o Abdul Jani,
Agriculturist,
R/o Parathipadu Mandal & Post,
Guntur District,
Andhra Pradesh                                                                                                                                          .....Respondent   

BEFORE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE  J. M. MALIK,
                              PRESIDING MEMBER
HON’BLE MR. VINAY KUMAR, MEMBER

For the Petitioner             :     Mr. R. P. Vats, Advocate with
                                                Ms Reema, Advocate
                                       
For the Respondent       :      Mr. B. S. Sai, Advocate


PRONOUNCED ON:03.01.2013.

ORDER

PER MR.VINAY KUMAR, MEMBER

These three revision petitions have been filed by Andhra Bank against three separate orders of the Andhra Pradesh State Consumer Disputes RedressalCommission in distinct appeals.  Although, the details of loan transaction are distinct in each case, the issue involved in all the three cases is identical.  The three revisions are therefore taken up together for consideration in this common order. 

2.      In all the three cases gold loans for agricultural purposes were taken on different dates in the month of March 2007.  The respective loan amounts were Rs.49,000/-, Rs.60,000/- and Rs.27,600/-.  In the year 2008, the Central Government announced a scheme for waiver of all agricultural loans and gold loans within the relevant guidelines.  The case of the Complainants was not considered by the OP/Andhra Bank.  The latter allegedly tried to auction the gold ornaments pledged for the loan.  Therefore, a consumer complaint was filed before the District Consumer Forum, Guntur.  The District Forum, rejected the contention of OP/Andhra Bank that as per condition no.5 of the loan agreement signed by the borrower, the loan was repayable with interest within one year from the date of sanction and therefore, the Complainant was not eligible for benefit of waiver under the Central Government Scheme.  The District Forum, allowed the Complaint with the following order:-
“The Debt Relief Scheme, 2008 is undoubtedly a welfare measure and announced in order to give relief to the farmers those who availed loans prior to 31-03-07 even by reconstructing and rescheduling in the year 2004 and 2006.  The significance was attached to those cut off dates as fixed in guidelines in respect of its disbursal, over due and remains unpaid.  The gap in between the period of disbursal and over due is nine months only.  If the contention of the learned counsel for opposite party is accepted that one year period has to be computed from the date of sanction of loan, the loans disbursed in the month of January, February or March, 2007 could not be overdue by 31-12-07.  If that is the position, why cut off date was given in the guideline as 31-12-07.  Being a beneficial legislation a liberal approach can be made in applying those guidelines as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the complainant.  Therefore, we opine that the complainant is entitled to the benefits of loan waiver scheme and its non application amounted to deficiency of service.”

3.      The appeal of Andhra Bank has been dismissed in the impugned order by the Andhra Pradesh State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission.  The State Commission has gone into the details of the eligibility criteria as contained in Section 4 of the Agricultural Debt Waiver and Debt Relief Scheme 2008. The Clause relevant to the case of the Complainant reads as follows:-
“4.1   The amount eligible for debt waiver or debt relief, as the case may be (hereinafter referred to as the ‘eligible amount’), shall comprise of :
(a)     In the case of a short-term production loan, the amount of such loan (together with applicable interest):
(i)      disbursed up to March 31, 2007 and overdue as on December 31, 2007 and remaining unpaid until February 29, 2008.”

In this context the State Commission has observed that the loan was admittedly disbursed before 31.3.2007.  Referring to the stipulation to the Condition no.5 in the loan agreement, the State Commission has observed that what is prescribed as period for repayment of loan has no role to play in the field where guidelines were framed by Central Government under a welfare scheme for the farmers, on account of poverty and drought.

4.      We have carefully considered the records, as filed by the two parties and heard Mr. R.P. Vats, Advocate for the revision petitioner/Andhra Bank and Mr.B.S. Sai, Advocate for the respondents/Complainants.  Learned counsel for the revision petitioner argued that the eligibility criteria as laid down in Clause 4.1 (a) (i) prescribed three requirements. He agreed that the first is met in all the three cases, as the respective loans were sanctioned/disbursed in March, 2007, but argued that the second condition was not met.   In this regard, he drew our attention to Clause 5 in the ‘Declarations of the applicant’, in the loan application cum sanction document. It states:-
“I undertake to repay the loan amount together with interest at 9.5% p.a. with monthly/quarterly rests, appraising charges and other bank charges within one year from the date of sanction or demand from the bank.”
According to learned counsel, in these cases neither the period of one year was over nor any demand for repayment had been raised by the Bank. Therefore, the loans cannot be considered ‘overdue as on 31.12.2007’.  The inherent fallacy of this argument is apparent.  Its acceptance would mean that all such loans which were disbursed by the OP within a period of one year ending 31.12.2007, would fall beyond consideration under the Government of India Scheme  2008, on the ground of not being overdue. But, loans disbursed upto 31.3.2007 are specifically made eligible for consideration under the scheme. Therefore, we reject this contention and hold that it has rightly been rejected by the State Commission as well as the District Forum.

5.      The sole argument pursued in the revision petition is inconsistency of approach in the State Commission. It is alleged that in two similar appeals, the appeal of the Bank has been allowed.  We do not wish to delve any further into it, as each case stand on its own facts.  In the result, we find no merit in these revision petitions and the same are dismissed as such. No orders as to costs. 
.……………Sd./-……………
(J. M. MALIK, J.)
PRESIDING MEMBER

…………Sd./-……………….
                                                                                                                                                   (VINAY KUMAR)                                                                                                                                                                                     MEMBER
s./-



Monday, January 7, 2013

whether the appellant actually intended to submit to decree and whether the order passed by the Court on 01.8.2010 in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 could be construed as "decree or order passed by the Family Court with consent of parties". When the parties are entangled in various litigations and are posing strict resistance to the litigations filed by them, it is highly improbable that appellant would have made an endorsement in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 that "I submit to decree". This is all the more so, when the respondent has made a serious allegations against the appellant in the petition in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009. When the respondent had not withdrawn those allegations, it is highly improbable that appellant would have voluntarily submitted to decree in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009.The appellant only made an endorsement that "I submit to decree". There was no compromise petition filed by either parties reducing the compromise in to writing. There is nothing to show that appellant was asked whether she is voluntarily and willingly compromising the matter. In the absence of any such materials or compromise memo by the parties, the endorsement made by the appellant in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 that "I submit to decree" cannot be construed as the decree or order passed by the Family Court with the consent of the parties, so as to bar appeal under Section 19(2) of Family Courts Act. In our considered view, the endorsement made in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 cannot be construed as a decree or order passed with the consent of the parties. In the light of serious allegations against the appellant, she has to be given an opportunity to put forth her case.


IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

DATED :     10.08.2012

CORAM :

THE HONOURABLE Mrs.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI
and
THE HONOURABLE Mr.JUSTICE R.SUBBIAH

Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.1520 OF 2011

Anitha Alfred .. Appellant.

vs.

K.Alfred .. Respondent.

Civil Miscellaneous Appeal filed under Section 28 of Hindu Marriage Act and Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act against the Order dated 01.08.2010 made in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 on the file of I Additional Family Court Judge, Chennai

For Appellant : Mr.N.F.J.Ponnudurai

For Respondent : Mr.K.Kannan


JUDGMENT
R.BANUMATHI,J
This appeal arises out of the order in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 (01.8.2010) allowing the divorce petition filed by the respondent-husband and dissolving the marriage between the appellant-wife and the respondent-husband solemnized on 10.07.1989.


2. Brief facts are:-
  Appellant and the respondent got married on 10.7.1989.
 The marriage was love marriage and appellant-wife converted into Christianity before the marriage.
Out of the wedlock, a daughter by name Darren and son by name Steen Jack were born on 13.07.1992 and 29.11.1996 respectively.  
Respondent got the job as seamen.  Out of the earnings, Respondent is said to have purchased a Flat at New No.34/2 (Old No.109/2), East Vanniyar street, Best Apartments, K.K.Nagar (West), Chennai-78.  
In April, 2006, the respondent was rendered jobless and he had come back from his employment of seamen.
Thereafter, differences arose between the parties and both the appellant and the respondent were living in the house at New No.34/2, (Old No.109/2), East Vanniar Street, Best Apartment, K.K.Nagar (West), Chennai-78.  
There are allegations and counter allegations by both appellant as well as the respondent.
 Respondent issued a legal notice to the appellant on 13.11.2006 seeking divorce.  
Since then there were number of proceedings complaint lodged by the appellant under Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Women Harassment Act (Crime No.16 of 2007 on the file of T14, Mangadu Police Station, Chennai-101); 
maintenance proceedings (M.C.No.79 of 2007 on the file of I Additional Family Court, Chennai); and civil suit in respect of the possession of the Flat at New No.34/2 (Old No.109/2), East Vanniyar street, Best Apartments, K.K.Nagar (West), Chennai-78 (O.S.No.1026 of 2007 on the file of III Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai) and also another proceedings under Domestic Violence Act (C.C.No.6969 of 2007, on the file of XXIII Metropolitan Magistrate Court, Saidapet, Chennai).

3. In these circumstances, appellant filed petition for divorce in F.C.O.P.No.3839 of 2009 on the ground of cruelty under Section 10 (1)(x) of Indian Divorce Act.  
Respondent also filed I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 under Section 10(1)(x)(ix) read with Section 14 of Indian Divorce Act seeking divorce.

4. Resisting the divorce petition filed by the respondent [I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009], appellant filed counter denying the allegations.  She has alleged that respondent compelled her to sign in the Deed of divorce, in order to marry some other lady which she refused.  Appellant had also referred the criminal case and also maintenance proceedings and the criminal proceedings pending under Domestic Violence Act in C.C.No.6769 of 2007.  Filing a detailed counter, she strongly resisted the petition for divorce filed by the respondent-husband.

5. In the divorce petition [F.C.O.P.No.3839 of 2010) filed by the appellant, on 16.7.2010, appellant made an endorsement withdrawing the petition.  In view of the endorsement, the said petition (F.C.O.P.No.3839 of 2010) was dismissed as withdrawn.  
On the same day (16.7.2010), appellant is said to have made an endorsement in the divorce petition (I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009) filed by the respondent that "I submit to decree".  
Thereafter, the divorce petition in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 was posted for orders on 01.8.2010. On 01.8.2010, I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 was allowed on the ground that the averments in the petition stands uncontroverted by the appellant.

6. Mr.N.F.J.Ponnudurai, learned counsel for appellant contended that 
appellant was misled to make such an endorsement in the petition and she never intended to submit to decree nor compromised the matter.  
It was further submitted that in the absence of any counsel or any legal aid obtained by her, appellant made the said endorsement in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 and the same cannot be construed as compromise nor does it amount to "uncontroverting the allegations".  
It was further submitted that if the matter was treated as one of compromise, the order in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 would have been passed on the same day, but the same was adjourned to 01.8.2010.  
Drawing our attention to the order dated 01.8.2010, it was submitted that the learned trial judge erred in saying that the allegations in the petition remain uncontroverted.

7. Drawing our attention to the various proceedings, Mr.K.Kannan, learned counsel for respondent submitted that respondent-husband was subjected to harassment by filing number of proceedings viz., criminal proceedings, proceedings under Domestic Violence Act, civil suit and subjected the respondent to harassment and that the appellant does not want to put an end to the proceedings so instituted and she wants to pursue further. 
 It was further submitted that appellant having made an endorsement in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 that "I submit to decree", it is not open to her to resile from the same.  
Learned counsel would further submit that the order in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 dated 01.8.2010 is by consent as per Section 19(2) of Family Courts Act, 1984 and no appeal shall lie from a decree or order passed by the Family Court with the consent of the parties and the order in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 dated 01.8.2010 being passed by consent, the appeal is not maintainable.

8. We have carefully considered the submissions and perused the materials on record.  We have also heard the counsels appearing for the appellant-wife and the respondent-husband.
9. Appellant-wife filed F.C.O.P.No.3839 of 2009 under Section 10(1)(x) of Indian Divorce Act seeking divorce.  On 16.7.2010, in F.C.O.P.No.3839 of 2009, appellant made an endorsement that "she is withdrawing F.C.O.P.No.3839 of 2009 and the same may be dismissed as withdrawn'.  In view of the endorsement made by the appellant, on the same day i.e. on 16.7.2010, F.C.O.P.No.3839 of 2009 was dismissed as withdrawn.  According to appellant, her decision to withdraw F.C.O.P.No.3839 of 2009 was voluntary and the same was in order to better bringing up her children.  On the same day on 16.7.2010, appellant also made an endorsement in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 that "I submit to decree" and the order in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 dissolving the marriage between the appellant and respondent was passed on 01.8.2010.   According to the appellant, the endorsement "I submit to decree" was not voluntary and that it was forced upon by the respondent as well as by the Court.  Appellant contends that she did not have any legal assistance and if she was explained about the legal implications, she would have written in clear terms as "I consent to divorce" and she would not have made an endorsement as 'I submit to decree'.

10. The point now falling for consideration is
whether the appellant actually intended to submit to decree and whether the order passed by the Court on 01.8.2010 in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 could be construed as "decree or order passed by the Family Court with consent of parties".

11. The impugned order in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 dated 01.8.2010 reads as under:-
"4. From the affidavit as well as documents the petitioner has proved the averments in the petition.  The averments in the petition stand uncontroverted by the respondent.  Therefore, the petitioner is entitled for divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion.
5. In the result, this petition is allowed and the marriage solemnized between the petitioner and the respondent on 10.7.1989 at Victorious Cross Church, Ashok Nagar, Chennai is dissolved by granting decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion.  No costs."

12. In the above order, it is stated that the averments in the petition stands uncontroverted by the appellant-wife.
Trial Court was not right in saying that the averments in the petition stand uncontroverted.
As pointed out earlier, appellant-wife filed the counter referring to various proceedings and also vehemently opposing the allegations made in the petition in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009.
When the appellant had filed a detailed counter vehemently denying the allegations in the petition, the learned trial judge was not right in saying that the averments in the petition remain uncontroverted.

13. Contention of appellant is that the endorsement in the petition "I submit to decree" was not voluntary.  
By keeping in view the conduct of the parties and various proceedings, in our considered view the said  contention of the appellant is fortified.
Let us now briefly refer to various proceedings instituted by the parties in particular the appellant.  After the differences arose between the parties, alleging that the respondent-husband had demanded dowry and that he had also harassed her, appellant lodged a criminal complaint before the Commissioner of Police.
Based on which, a case was registered in Crime No.16 of 2007 under Section 498(A) IPC read with Section 4 of Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Women Harassment Act on the file of T-14, Mangadu Police Station and subsequently, charge sheet was filed in C.C.No.115 of 2007 on the file of Judicial Magistrate, Tambaram.
Later the same was transferred to the District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate, Sriperumbudur and re-numbered in C.C.No.325 of 2008 and the trial is pending.

14. The appellant is alleged to have gone to the respondent's rented residence at Kerugambakkam, Chennai-101.  Alleging that the appellant-wife had committed theft in the respondent's residence at Kerugambakkam, the respondent-husband lodged a police complaint in T-14 Mangadu Police Station.  Since the police did not take any action, the respondent had filed a direction petition in Crl.O.P.No.6936 of 2007 dated 14.03.2007 directing the Police to register the case.   Police registered the case against the appellant in Crime No.330 of 2007 for theft and the said First Information Report was closed in three days.  Respondent filed further investigation petition before the District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate, Sriperumbudur and the same was dismissed on 05.03.2010.   Against which the respondent filed Crl.R.C.No.1231 of 2010 before the Principal Sessions Court, Kancheepuram and the same is also said to be pending.

15. Appellant also filed Maintenance Case before the I Additional Family Court in M.C.No.79 of 2007 and the same was dismissed for default on 26.02.2008.  Stating that the respondent is trying to dispossess her from New Door No.34/2 (Old No.109/2), East Vanniar Street, Best Apartment, K.K.Nagar (West), Chennai-78, appellant also filed a civil suit in O.S.No.1026 of 2007 for permanent injunction and by the judgment dated 14.6.2007, the said suit was decreed.
Alleging that the respondent is continually violating appellant's right and threatened her, appellant filed petition under Sections 18,19,20 and 21 of Domestic Violence Act before XXIII Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai.  By the order dated 12.01.2009, the said petition was allowed.
The XXIII Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidapet, Chennai directed the respondent to allot kitchen and one bed room to the appellant and also directed the respondent to pay maintenance of Rs.500/- each per month to each of the two children i.e. Rs.1000/- per month.

16. When the parties are entangled in various litigations and are posing strict resistance to the litigations filed by them, it is highly improbable that appellant would have made an endorsement in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 that "I submit to decree".  
This is all the more so,  when the respondent has made a serious allegations against  the appellant in the petition in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009.  When the respondent had not withdrawn those allegations, it is highly improbable that appellant would have voluntarily submitted to decree in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009.


17. Learned counsel for respondent mainly contended that in view of the endorsement made and the decree passed by the Court, as per Section 19(2) of Family Courts Act, no appeal shall lie and the same is to be construed as the order passed with the consent of the parties and therefore, as per Section 19(2) of the Act, no appeal shall lie from the order passed by the Family Court with the consent of the parties.  
The appellant only made an endorsement that "I submit to decree".  There was no compromise petition filed by either parties reducing the compromise in to writing.  There is nothing to show that appellant was asked whether she is voluntarily and willingly compromising the matter.  In the absence of any such materials or compromise memo by the parties, the endorsement made by the appellant in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 that "I submit to decree" cannot be construed as the decree or order passed by the Family Court with the consent of the parties, so as to bar appeal under Section 19(2) of Family Courts Act. 
 In our considered view, the endorsement made in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 cannot be construed as a decree or order passed with the consent of the parties.
In the light of serious allegations against the appellant, she has to be given an opportunity to put forth her case.


18. For the foregoing reasons, the order in I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009  on the file of I Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Chennai is set aside and this appeal is allowed.  I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 is  ordered to be restored on file.  I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 is remitted back to the Family Court, Chennai.  The Family Court, Chennai is directed to take up I.D.O.P.No.3962 of 2009 and afford sufficient opportunity to the appellant as well as the respondent and proceed with the matter afresh in accordance with law.
Consequently, connected M.P. is closed.  No costs.


              (R.B.I., J.)      (R.P.S.,J.)
                 10.08.2012
Index: Yes/No
Internet:Yes/No
bbr
To
The Principal Judge,
Family Court,
Chennai.









R.BANUMATHI, J
                                                                             and    
R.SUBBIAH,J
bbr










                                                                                     Judgment in
 C.M.A.No.1520 of 2011













                                                                                    10.08.2012



"27. Jurisdiction:- (1) The court of Judicial Magistrate of the first class or the Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, within the local limits of which- (a) the person aggrieved permanently or temporarily resides or carries on business or is employed; or (b) the respondent resides or carries on business or is employed; or (c) the cause of action has arisen, shall be the competent court to grant a protection order and other orders under this Act and to try offences under this Act. (2) Any order made under this Act shall be enforceable throughout India."= A close reading of the above provision would make it abundantly clear that for filing a petition seeking protection orders, it is not necessary that there should have arisen a cause of action or atleast a part of cause of action, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Judicial Magistrate concerned. It is enough if the aggrieved person permanently or temporarily resides or carries on business or is employed within the local limits of the said Judicial Magistrate.


IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS

DATED 17.07.2012

CORAM

THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE S.NAGAMUTHU

Crl.OP No.14609 of 2012
and
M.P.Nos.1 and 2 of 2012



Yusuf Allabuksh .. Petitioner

Vs

1. Julakia Bee

2. Reshma .. Respondents





Prayer:- Criminal Original Petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C., to call for the records and quash the complaint in C.M.P.No.172/2012 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate, Kallakurichi.

For Petitioner : Mr.R.Rajarajan

For Respondent 1   : Mr.A.Abdul Lathif


- - - - -

O R D E R

The petitioner is the first respondent in C.M.P.No.172 of 2012 on the file of the learned Judicial Magistrate, Kallakurichi.  The first respondent herein is the complainant and the second respondent herein is the second respondent before the lower Court as well.

2. The first respondent has filed the said petition under the provisions of The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, seeking maintenance, share in the household and other reliefs as provided in Section 18 of the said Act.
Seeking to quash the said proceedings, the petitioner has come up with this criminal original petition.

3. In this petition, the only ground raised by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner is that the learned Judicial Magistrate, Kallakurichi has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the said petition.  
According to the petitioner, the marriage between the petitioner and the first respondent was solemnized on 22.04.1984 in Mumbai.
After the said wedlock, they lived together as husband and wife in Mumbai and five children were also born to them in Mumbai.  Thus, according to the petitioner, they lived as husband and wife at Mumbai for about 27 years.
Unfortunately, difference of opinion between the petitioner and the first respondent arose on account of the love marriage of their daughter, which was against their wish.   
Thereafter, in the year 2008, the first respondent left her matrimonial home.

4. Thus, according to the petitioner, the entire cause of action for the petition arose only in Mumbai and therefore, a Magistrate Court in Maharashtra State alone has got jurisdiction to entertain the petition.  
In other words, there is no cause of action within the jurisdiction of the learned Judicial Magistrate, Kallakurichi.  Thus, the said Court has got no territorial jurisdiction and therefore the proceeding, is wholly without jurisdiction, he contended.

5. But the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent would firmly oppose this petition.  According to him, though it is true that the marriage was held in Mumbai, the matrimonial life was in Mumbai and all the children were born in Mumbai, however, the first respondent has now returned to Saraswathi Nagar, Thirukovilur Road, Thyagadurgam, where she has been living permanently with her sister under her care and custody.   The learned counsel would further contend that as per Section 27 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 the learned Judicial Magistrate, Kallakurichi has got territorial jurisdiction to entertain the complaint.

6. I have considered the above submissions and I have perused the records carefully.

7. Before going into the facts of the case, let me first refer to Section 27 of the Act, which reads as follows:
"27. Jurisdiction:- (1) The court of Judicial Magistrate of the first class or the Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, within the local limits of which-
(a) the person aggrieved permanently or temporarily resides or carries on business or is employed; or
(b) the respondent resides or carries on business or is employed; or
(c) the cause of action has arisen, 
shall be the competent court to grant a protection order and other orders under this Act and to try offences under this Act.
(2) Any order made under this Act shall be enforceable throughout India."
A close reading of the above provision would make it abundantly clear that for filing a petition seeking protection orders, it is not necessary that there should have arisen a cause of action or atleast a part of cause of action, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Judicial Magistrate concerned.  It is enough if the aggrieved person permanently or temporarily resides or carries on business or is employed within the local limits of the said Judicial Magistrate.  In this case, according to the first respondent, she temporarily resides in Saraswathi Nagar, Thirukovilur Road, Thyagadurgam, which falls within the jurisdiction of the learned Judicial Magistrate, Kallakurichi.  Thus, in my considered opinion, as per Section 27 of the Act, the learned Judicial Magistrate, Kallakurichi has got territorial jurisdiction to entertain the complaint.

8. But, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that simply because a person, either permanently or temporarily, resides within the jurisdiction of the Court, the said Court cannot have jurisdiction unless there has arisen atleast a part of the cause of action within his jurisdiction.
 In order to support this argument, the learned counsel relied on a Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union Bank of India Vs. M/s.Seppo Rally Oy and Another reported in AIR 2000 SC 62.  I have gone through the said judgment.  That was a case decided under the Consumer Protection Act.  The question before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was as to whether a mere residence of the opposite party, in the absence of any part of cause of action, will give raise to the jurisdiction of the District Forum to entertain the complaint.
 In the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had to consider sub-section 2 to Section 11 of the Consumer Protection Act which reads as follows:
"11(2) A complaint shall be instituted in a District Forum, within the local limits of whose jurisdiction,-
(a) the opposite party or each of the opposite parties, where there are more than one, at the time of the institution of the complaint, actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or has a branch office or personally works for gain; or
(b) any of the opposite parties, where there are more than one at the time of the institution of the complaint, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business or have a branch office or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the permission of the District Forum is given, or the opposite parties who do not reside, or carry on business or have a branch office or personally work for gain, as the case may be, acquiesce in such institution; or
(c) the cause of action, wholly or in part arises."
In paragraph 12 of the same judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:
"12. Under Section 17 of the Act a State Commission has jurisdiction to decide complaints of the value between rupees five and twenty lakhs but there is no such provision as contained in Sub-section (2) of Section 11 of the Act applicable to State Commission.  Section 18 of the Act does not make provision of Sub-section (2) of Section 11 applicable to the State Commission.  Each State has its own State Commission.  There is purpose for it.  First appeal of the District Forum situated within the State lies to the State Commission and then State Commission can take cognizance of the dispute arising within that State.  It cannot be the intention of the Legislature that dispute arising in one State could be taken congizance by State Commission of other State. We have to have purposive interpretation of the provisions and we have to hold that similar provisions as contained in Sub-section (2) of Section 11 with modifications as may be necessary, shall be applicable to the State Commission.  In fact these are the basic provisions conferring territorial jurisdiction on a tribunal otherwise it will lead to absurd situations......" (Emphasis added)
9. Referring to the above judgment, the learned counsel  would submit that in the case on hand also, if we have purposive interpretation of Section 27 of the Act, it will be obvious that for entertaining a complaint, the Magistrate should look for at least a part of cause of action within his territorial jurisdiction.

10. Though attractive, the said argument of the learned counsel does not persuade me at all.  There can be no doubt that while interpreting Section 27 of the Act, we should have regard for the purpose behind the Act.
In other words, purposive interpretation of the provisions of the Act alone will achieve the object of the Act.
With this in mind, let us see as to
what is the purpose behind the Act.  
There are as many as five objects enumerated in Clause 4 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Act.
It is evident that the purpose of the Act is to provide for more effective protection of the rights of the women guaranteed under the Constitution who are victims of violence of any kind occurring within the family and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.  
Thus, it is obvious that the main purpose for which the Act has been brought into force is only to protect the rights of women and to protect the victims of domestic violence.  
If the rights of such victims are to be protected, then we have to liberally interpret Section 27 of the Act, in favour of the victims.  
That is the reason why, the Parliament itself, in Section 27(1)(a) of the Act, has envisaged that the aggrieved person can approach the Magistrate within whose territorial jurisdiction she, either permanently or temporarily, resides.  
Had it been the intention of the Legislature that such complaint should be entertained only by a Magistrate having jurisdiction over the whole or a part of the cause of action, then the Parliament would not have, in unequivocal terms, expressed so in Section 27(1)(a) of the Act.  
This clearly brings to light the intention of the Legislature to be liberal and considerate only towards the victims of domestic violence. If the interpretation which is sought to be made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted, then in many cases, it may not be workable for the victims to go over to the Court situated at a far off place, within whose jurisdiction the cause of action has arisen.  
It will only cause unnecessary hardship to the victims to travel such a long distance spending money and time.  
Therefore, in my considered opinion, if  purposive interpretation is made to Section 27 of the Act, then it would emerge that the victim can approach the Magistrate within whose local jurisdiction, she either permanently or temporarily, resides at the time she seeks protection order, notwithstanding the fact that either whole or part of the cause of action has not arisen within the local limits of the said Magistrate.

11. In such view of the matter, in the case on hand, I hold that the learned Judicial Magistrate, Kallakurichi has got territorial jurisdiction to entertain the case.

12. In the result, I find no merit in this petition, the petition fails and the same is accordingly dismissed. Consequently the connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed.










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