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Sunday, January 6, 2013

The analysis of the evidence afore-extracted, prima facie, shows that Sri S. Chaturvedi, presently Additional Deputy Commissioner of Police, Task Force (the then Assistant Commissioner of Police, Gopalapuram), orchestrated investigation to unduly benefit the 3rd respondent-landlord, and to the detriment of the petitioner-tenant (the victim). Under the protective umbrella of Sri S. Chaturvedi, Sri K. Venugopal, (the then Investigating Officer), short circuited the investigation and prepared a draft final report as "lack of evidence". = If the State's machinery fails to protect a citizen's life, liberty and property, and the investigation is conducted in such a manner as to help the accused, it is but appropriate that the Court should step in to prevent the miscarriage of justice perpetrated on the victim. "The law should not be seen to sit by limply, while those who defy it go free, and those who seek its protection lose hope." Courts have to ensure that the accused are punished, and the might or authority of the State is not used to shield them. If deficiency in investigation is visible or can be perceived by lifting the veil which hides realities or covers obvious deficiencies, courts have to deal with them with an iron hand within the framework of the law. It is the duty of the court to ensure that full and material facts are brought on record to avoid miscarriage of justice. The justice-delivery system cannot be allowed to be abused, misused and mutilated by subterfuge. (Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat9; Jennison v. Baker10 and Shakila Abdul Gafar Khan v. Vasant Raghunath Dhoble11).


THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAMESH RANGANATHAN            

WRIT PETITION No.25094 OF 2011  

28-02-2012


Smt.Anjali Jain

The Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad and 2 others

Counsel for the petitioner:  Sri M.V. Suresh

Counsel for respondents :  G.P. for Home; Sri P. Bhakthavastal

? Citations:
1) AIR 1974 SC 2105
2) AIR 1967 SC 295
3) AIR 1952 SC 317
4) AIR 1965 SC 1303
5) (2010) 3 SCC 571
6) (2010) 12 SCC 254
7) (2010) 6 SCC 1
8) 1994 Supp (1) SCC 145
9) (2004) 4 SCC 158
10) (1972) 1 ALL ER 997
11) (2003)7 SCC 749
12) (2011) 10 SCC 192
13) (1970) 1 SCC 653
14) (1998) 5 SCC 223
15) (2008) 5 SCC 413
16) (2009) 1 SCC 441
17) (2009)6 SCC 332
18) (2009)7 SCC 685
19) AIR 195 SC 1795
       20) (1995) 1 SCC 421
ORDER:
O.S. No.193 of 2008 was filed by a lady tenant of a flat seeking perpetual
injunction against her landlord.  The said suit was decreed in her favour.  O.S.
No.295 of 2008 filed by the landlord for eviction of the said lady tenant was
dismissed.
Thereafter, on the intervening night of 11th and 12th March, 2011,
the tenant, (petitioner in this Writ Petition), rushed to the police station
complaining of trespass, physical assault, attempt to rape and forcible eviction
by the landlord (3rd respondent in this Writ Petition).
The Investigating
Officer, who visited the apartment building (scene of the offence) on
12.03.2011, found the petitioner - tenant's belongings strewn on the pavement
outside the apartment building. 
Without even examining the complainant, and
having failed even to note the outcome of the two suits, (both of which ended in favour of the tenant), the Investigating officer, evidently at the behest of the then Assistant Commissioner of Police, Gopalapuram Division, prepared a draft
final report stating that the complaint "lacked evidence".   The Investigating
Officer's version, in short, is that the tenant had vacated the apartment on her own volition, and her complaint against the third respondent-landlord of trespass, attempted rape, assault etc lacked evidence or, in other words, the complaint was false. 
While even an idiot may find this version of the
respondent - police officials hard to believe, this Court is called upon to accept that such a conclusion is the justified outcome of an independent, impartial and fair investigation.
 For reasons stated hereinafter there are
justifiable reasons to believe that the Investigating Officer did not
impartially investigate the complaint, and the normal course of investigation
was derailed only to help the 3rd respondent-landlord, (whose attempts to evict
his tenant through the legal process had failed), escape the penal consequences
of his having forcibly evicted his inconvenient tenant from his flat which was
under her occupation.
2.      The petitioner, a house wife aged 32 years, has filed this Writ Petition to declare the failaure of the 1st respondent to take action on her representations dated 14.03.2011 and 18.03.2011 as illegal and arbitrary.
The
case of the petitioner, in brief, is that the 3rd respondent is the owner of
Flat No.402, 4th Floor, Saraswathi Residency, Padmarao Nagar, Secunderabad, of
which she was the tenant;
she filed O.S. No.193 of 2008 on the file of the Court
of the I Junior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Secunderabad seeking perpetual
injunction against the 3rd respondent, and obtained a decree;
the 3rd respondent
issued a quit notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, and
filed O.S. No.295 of 2008; the said suit filed by the 3rd respondent was
dismissed on the ground that the termination notice was not in accordance with
law;
while matters stood thus the 3rd respondent came to the flat, (under the
occupation of the petitioner), on 11.03.2011 around 2.30 p.m., along with his
muscle-men, and hit the petitioner as well as her family members; they threw
away the furniture and other articles belonging to the petitioner outside the
apartment compound, and took forcible possession of Flat No.402;
 the complaint
lodged by her on 12.03.2011 before the 2nd respondent was registered as F.I.R.
No.184 of 2011; as the 2nd respondent did not commence investigation despite
five months having elapsed, she filed a representation to the 1st respondent
and, as no action was taken on her complaint, she has invoked the jurisdiction
of this Court.
3.      When this Writ Petition was listed on 07.09.2011, Learned Government
Pleader for Home sought one week's time to file a counter-affidavit, and to
produce the records.  The petitioner's counsel was permitted to take out
personal notice on the 3rd respondent by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due.
The 2nd respondent filed counter-affidavit dated 13.09.2011 wherein he stated
that the investigating officer had visited the scene of the offence, and had
noticed that Flat No.402 was closed and vacant; there were some belongings i.e.,
cot, chairs, beds and other cloth bundles laid beside the main gate on the foot
path; nobody was present there to take care of those strewn articles;
investigation was completed and, prima facie, the allegations against the
accused were not established beyond reasonable doubt; permission was obtained  
from the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Gopalapuram Division, North Zone, on
18.06.2011 to refer the petitioner's complaint as lacking in evidence; though
attempts were made to serve the notice, the petitioner was evading receipt
thereof; a final report, under Section 173 Cr.P.C, would be filed shortly;  and
as there was no evidence to establish the guilt of the accused in the F.I.R, the
investigating officer had referred the complaint of the petitioner as lack of
evidence.
4.      On 19.09.2011, the Learned Government Pleader produced the records on
perusal of which this Court noticed that
it did not contain the statement of the
complainant under Section 161 Cr.P.C.
On being asked whether or not the
statement of the complainant had been recorded by the investigating officer,
Learned Government Pleader for Home sought time to enable the 2nd respondent to
file an additional counter-affidavit.  In his additional counter affidavit the
2nd respondent would state that, during the course of investigation, the
investigating officer had examined the petitioner and other witnesses, and had
recorded their detailed statements; the then investigating officer had visited
the scene of the offence, and had found some furniture and other articles on the
foot path at the main gate of the apartment; he had addressed a letter to the
Assistant Commissioner of Police, Gopalapuram Division to accord permission to
refer the complaint of the petitioner as lack of evidence; permission was
granted by the  then Assistant Commissioner of Police, Gopalapuram Division on
18.06.2011; consequent on the transfer of the then investigating officer, he had
taken up investigation; and, due to non-availability of the complainant, no
notice could be served on her.  
The additional counter-affidavit also notes that
this Court had examined the record, including the C.D. file in Cr. No.184 of
2011, on 19.09.2011 and had found the statement of the complainant (L.W-1)
missing; the records revealed that the then investigating officer had examined
the complainant, and had recorded her detailed statement on 12.03.2011 itself
i.e., on the very date of registration of the F.I.R; the said statement was misplaced; and he was tendering his apology to this Court for misplacing the statement of the petitioner. 
 He would further state that, on the instructions
of the Government Pleader for Home, he had immediately examined the complainant  
(on 11.10.2011), and had recorded her detailed statement; he had also recorded the statement of the daughter of the petitioner and other witnesses; he had finalized the investigation; and an appropriate report, under Section 173 Cr.P.C, would be filed shortly.
5.      In his counter-affidavit the 3rd respondent states that he is the owner of
Flat No.402.  He admits that O.S. No.295 of 2008 filed by him for eviction of
the petitioner from the flat was dismissed.  He would, however, deny having
forcibly dispossessed the petitioner on 11.03.2011 at about 2.30 p.m in
association with anti-social elements, or to have torn the petitioner's blouse
or to have tried to rape her.  He would submit that they did not throw away the
furniture and other house hold articles; he is not aware that a complaint was
filed before the 2nd respondent on 12.03.2011 against him; he is also unaware
whether the petitioner had given a complaint to the 1st respondent or that
F.I.R. No.184 of 2011 had been registered by the 2nd respondent against him as
alleged; he had never entered the demised premises at any point of time; and he
had not committed any illegal acts.  He would also state that the petitioner had
failed to pay rental arrears of Rs.97,800/- i.e., rent for 15 months and, when
he had demanded payment of rent, she had voluntarily vacated the premises
without his knowledge; and she had come up with false allegations only with the
intention of harassing him.
6.      On 18.10.2011 this Court noted that, while the earlier counter-affidavit
made no reference to the statement of the petitioner having been recorded, the
additional counter-affidavit states that, though the petitioner was examined as
early as on 12.03.2011 i.e., on the very day of registration of the F.I.R, the
said statement was misplaced; the additional counter-affidavit was silent as to
whether the said statement was traced subsequently or what action had been taken
in this regard; and, since the affidavits filed were vague, the 2nd respondent
should be present on 20.10.2011, along with the entire records.
7.      On 20.10.2011 this Court observed that it defied reason that a tenant who
voluntarily vacated the flat would, as contended by the Station House Officer,
come and give a complaint of trespass   and physical abuse by the landlord or
file a Writ Petition thereafter.
As the Assistant Commissioner of Police was
said to have directed closure of the case, and it was the erstwhile
investigating officer who was said to have recorded the missing statement of the
complainant, this Court directed their appearance on 21.10.2011 at 10.30 a.m.,
to enable the Court to record their statements.  The case diary which was
produced earlier was directed to be kept in a sealed cover with the Registrar
(Judicial) of the High Court.
8.      On 21.10.2011 both the Investigating Officer and the Assistant
Commissioner of Police who approved the proposal for closure were present in
Court, and their statements were recorded.  On being asked whether a draft final
report had been submitted to the Judicial Magistrate, the Assistant Commissioner of Police expressed ignorance, and sought to ascertain the position from the
Station House Officer.
Consequently the statement of the Station House Officer
was again recorded.  As two home guards had allegedly been deputed to serve a 
copy of the notice, along with the draft final report, on the complainant they
were directed to be present in Court on 27.10.2011 at 10.30 am.  This Court also
directed the complainant to be present in Court on 27.10.2011 to enable her
statement to be recorded.  Both the home-guards, who claimed to have been 
deputed to serve the notice along with the draft final report, were present on
27.10.2011 and their statements were also recorded.  The entire records,
including the record sheets from the office of the Assistant Commissioner of
Police, were retained in the custody of the Court.
9.      The documents, submitted by the Assistant Commissioner of Police, are 
copies of the F.I.R. dated 12.03.2011; a memo addressed by him on 17.03.2011; 
the draft final report submitted to him by the Inspector of Police,
Chilakalaguda on 22.06.2011 which he had approved on 26.06.2011; and the memo   
issued by him to the earlier Investigating Officer on 18.06.2011.  The draft
final report refers to the complaint given by the petitioner on 12.03.2011 at
12.30 a.m., regarding the incident which took place on 11.03.2011 at 2.30 p.m.
It merely notes that the occupants of the flats had stated that the petitioner,
along with her family members, was residing at Flat No.402 for one and half
years; they were not paying rent to the house owner because of which the owner
had complained against her to the flat owners association; the owner used to
attend her house for collecting rent, but she had threatened him with dire
consequences; suddenly on the night of 11/12.03.2011 the complainant and her 
husband had vacated the house without intimation to others; they took away all
the furniture, and vessels from the flat; they also kept some un-used furniture
and clothes on the foot path of the main gate of the apartment; and, after
getting oral instructions from the Inspector of Police, he was referring the
case for lack of evidence.

I. WITNESSES CAN BE EXAMINED/CROSS-EXAMINED IN PROCEEDINGS UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF                     
THE CONSTITUTION:    


10.     The High Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to entertain a petition
under Article 226 merely because, in considering the petitioner's right of
relief, questions of fact may fall to be determined. In a petition under Article
226 the High Court has jurisdiction to try issues both of fact and law.  On
consideration of the nature of the controversy the High Court can decide that it
should go into a disputed question of fact.  (Babubhai v. Nandlal1).  In a
proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution the normal rule is to decide
disputed questions on the basis of affidavits, but it is within the discretion
of the High Court whether or not to allow a person to be examined/cross-
examined.   Under Art. 226 there is ample power in the High Court to order
attendance of a deponent in Court for being examined/cross-examined. Where it is
not possible for the Court to arrive at a definite conclusion on account of
there being affidavits on either side containing allegations and counter-
allegations it would not only be desirable but, in the interest of justice, the
duty also of the Court to summon deponents for examination/cross-examination in
order to arrive at the truth. If the evidence led by the parties is tested by
examination/cross-examination it becomes easier to determine where the truth
lies.  (Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board2; State of Bombay v. 
Purshottam Jog Naik3; A.P.S.R.T. Corporation v. Satyanarayan Transports 
(Private) Ltd., Guntur4; Babubhai1).

II. EVIDENCE: 

11.     On 20.10.2011 Sri B. Anjaiah, Station House Officer stated on oath that he
was the in-charge Station House Officer on the date of receipt of the complaint;
the statement of the complainant was recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. on
12.03.2011, when the complaint was received; the said statement was misplaced;
he came to know that the statement of the complainant was misplaced only after
receipt of intimation from the Government Pleader for Home regarding the Writ
Petition being filed;  the Investigating Officer had recorded in Part-I Case
Diary that the statement of the complainant was recorded; that is how he came to
know that her statement was recorded on 12.03.2011; he had searched for the
statement in his office, and also in the office of the Assistant Commissioner of
Police to whom the Investigating Officer had forwarded the file; on 12.03.2011
the statement of the watchman of the apartment was recorded; on the same day,
statements of the residents of Flat Nos.401, 408, 409 were also recorded; and on
15.03.2011 the statements of two other witnesses were recorded.  He further
deposed that the entire file was sent to the Assistant Commissioner of Police on
20.05.2011 who accorded permission on 18.06.2011 to file a closure report; they
could not send the notice to the complainant because they were not aware of her
address; and he had deputed police constables to ascertain the address of the
complainant.  He, however,  contradicted his earlier statement by adding that he
was not aware whether any police constables were sent to find out the present
location of the complainant.
12.     On his being examined on 21.10.2011, Sri B. Anjaiah, Station House
Officer, stated that had deputed two process - men Sri Yella Reddy and Sri
Srinivas to serve the final report on the complainant in the 1st week of July,
2011; the final report under Section 173 Cr.P.C had not been submitted to the
Magistrate till date, as a copy thereof had not been served on the complainant.
On being examined again on 31.10.2011 Sri B. Anjaiah, Station House Officer,
stated that he had sent the notice to the complainant enclosing thereto the
report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. in the 1st week of July, 2011; and he did not
collect the notice from the process server though the notice was not served on
the complainant.
13.     The earlier Investigating Officer Sri K. Venugopal stated on oath on
21.10.2011 that he had received the complaint on 12.03.2011; he had recorded the
petitioner's statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. on 12.03.2011; he had perused
the file in the Court, and the file did not contain the statement of the
complainant dated 12.03.2011; while the said statement of the complainant under
Section 161 Cr.P.C. was available when the entire file was sent to the Assistant
Commissioner of Police, Gopalapuram Division on 24/25-05-2011, the said
statement had been misplaced; he was transferred to Amberpet Police Station in
the end of May, 2011; he was not aware when the said statement was misplaced or
as to how it got misplaced; no records are maintained in the police station to
show whether or not the statement of the complainant, or others, under Section
161 Cr.P.C. is recorded.
14.     Sri S. Chaturvedi, the Assistant Commissioner of Police, (presently the
Additional D.C.P. - Task Force) stated on oath on 21.10.2011 that he worked as
the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Gopalapuram from January, 2010 to
September, 2011; he held additional charge as Assistant Commissioner of Police
till 02.10.2011; a proposal was sent to him by the Investigating Officer, with
the endorsement of the Station House Officer, Chilakalaguda Police Station, that
the matter be closed for lack of evidence; he had perused the entire file, and
had then issued proceedings to refer the case as lack of evidence; the statement
of the complainant was part of the file when he had approved the proposal for
closure of the case for lack of evidence in June, 2011; after issuing the
proceedings, the entire file was sent back to the Chilakalaguda Police Station;
he was informed in September, 2011 by the Station House Officer that the Writ
Petition had been filed; after the counter-affidavit was filed by the Station
House Officer, he was informed by him that the statement of the complainant,
recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C, was missing; he had orally instructed the
Station House Officer to make efforts to trace the missing statement; the
Station House Officer had informed him in the last week of September, 2011 that
the statement of the complainant could not be traced.
15.     Sri M. Srinivas, Home-guard stated on oath on 27.10.2011 that his duty was
to serve summons; on 03.07.2011 Sri Anjaiah, the Station House Officer, had
handed over a copy of the notice to be served on the complainant, and had asked
him and Sri V. Yella Reddy, home-guard, to serve it on the complainant; he went
to the complainant's flat at Saraswathi Residency, Padmarao Nagar on 04.07.2011
at around 11.00 a.m; the complainant was not there and the new tenant, in
occupation of Flat No.402, had told them that, after vacating the flat, the
complainant was no longer residing there; they had also expressed ignorance of
the whereabouts of the complainant; he and the other home-guard had enquired
from the watchman, and the security guard of the flats, who told them to go near
Jain Mandir at Secunderabad, and enquire there regarding the complainant's
whereabouts; at around 12.00 noon they went to Jain Mandir; they did not go
inside the temple; they enquired from the people near the temple, whose names
they did not record nor do they recollect who these persons were, about the
whereabouts of the complainant; these persons expressed ignorance, and asked
them to enquire at the jewellery shops nearby; they visited some jewellery shops
in Secunderabad; they do not recollect the jewellery shops they went to; and
they discharge different duties on different dates. He did not recollect where
he went on 1st September. He was also unable to recollect the events which
transpired on 1st October, 2011, but was positive that he went to locate the
complainant on 4th July. He did not also recollect events which took place
either on 3rd of July or on the 5th of July, 2011.
16.     Sri V. Yella Reddy, home-guard attached to Chilakalaguda Police Station,
stated on oath that Sri Anjaiah, Station House Officer, had called them on
03.07.2011 at 8.00 p.m. asking them to handover a copy of the notice to be
served on the complainant; on 04.07.2011, at around 11.00 a.m., they went to
Flat No.402; on enquiry a lady had informed them that the complainant was not
residing there, as they had vacated the flat; they came down and asked the
security-guard who also informed them that the complainant had left the flat,
and had shifted residence to Secunderabad; there was only one security guard at
Saraswathi complex with whom they had caused enquiry; the security guard had
asked them to enquire at Jain Mandir, Secunderabad; they enquired from people
outside Jain Mandir whose names he did not recollect; those persons said that
there were Jains residing in Marredpalli; when they enquired from jewellery
shops at Marredpalli, whose particulars they do not recollect, regarding the
whereabouts of the complainant; the shop owners also expressed ignorance; they
came back and again went to Saraswathi complex on 05.10.2011, and enquired from
the owners of Flat No.402 as to whether the complainant was available there, and
whether they would be able to tell them about her whereabouts, but they
expressed ignorance; they had returned the summons to the station house officer,
Chilakalaguda police station on 8th July; no registers were maintained regarding
service of summons; except to mark their attendance in the police station in the
morning, no record was maintained in the police station regarding the places
they visited or the persons whom they contacted for service of summons; and he
was unable to recall events which transpired on 1st October, 2011.
17.     Smt. Anjali Jain (the petitioner-complainant) stated on oath on 27.10.2011
that the incident, for which she had filed the complaint, took place on
11.03.2011; the police officials did not receive the complaint given by her
husband; it is only when she accompanied him to the police station at 11.00 p.m.
on the night of 11.03.2011 that they registered the complaint; she gave a
complaint to the 2nd respondent on 11.03.2011; no statement was recorded from
her under Section 161 Cr.P.C. before 11.10.2011; on 11.03.2011 the 3rd
respondent, along with 50 goondas, had come over to Flat No.402 at 2.30 p.m.,
and had forcibly evicted her from the flat; when these people came over to her
residence, and started abusing them, her husband had rushed to Chilakalaguda
police station; during his absence the goondas, in the presence of the 3rd
respondent, his wife and his brother, had physically assaulted her, snatched her
jewellery and informed her that, in case she did not vacate the flat forthwith,
they would rape her; they removed the household articles from the flat, and
threw them all out on the road; they retained her air-conditioner; she left the
house hold articles there itself, and stayed in a hotel at Film City in Jubilee
Hills; after two or three days, they went over to the house of her cousin at
Zaheerabad; they have a film distribution office at Secunderabad; her statement,
under Section 161 Cr.P.C, was recorded in their office premises only on
11.10.2011; and she had lost her entire jewellery which was taken away by the
3rd respondent.
III. ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE:    
A. FAILURE TO SERVE A COPY OF THE DRAFT FINAL REPORT ON THE COMPLAINANT                   


18.     In his counter-affidavit the 2nd respondent stated that, after permission
was obtained from the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Gopalapuram Division,
North Zone on 18.06.2011 to refer the petitioner's complaint as lacking in
evidence, attempts were made to serve the notice, but the petitioner was evading
receipt thereof.  In his additional counter-affidavit the 2nd respondent stated
that due to non-availability of the complainant, no notice could be served on
her.  Sri B. Anjaiah stated on oath on 20.10.2011 that they could not send the
notice to the complainant because they were not aware of her address.  Initially
Sri B. Anjaiah stated that he had deputed police constables to ascertain the
address of the complainant.  He later added that he was not aware whether any
police constables were sent to find out the present location of the complainant.
Curiously, in his subsequent statement of 21.10.2011, Sri B. Anjaiah
contradicted his earlier statement of 20.10.2011, and stated that he had deputed
two process-men Sri Yella Reddy and Sri Srinivas to serve the notice along with
the final report in the 1st week of July, 2011; the final report had not been
submitted to the Magistrate till date, as a copy thereof had not been served on
the complainant; and he did not collect the notice from the process-server
though the notices were not served on the complainant.
19.     Even more curious are the mutual contradictions in the statements of the
two home-guards who allegedly made attempts to serve the notice on the
complainant.  While stating that, on 03.07.2011, Sri B. Anjaiah - the Station
House Officer - had handed over a copy of the notice to be served on the
complainant, Sri M. Srinivas deposed that they had enquired from the watchman,
and the security guards of the flats, who told them to go near Jain Mandir at
Secunderabad, and later they also visited some jewellery shops at Secunderabad,
(whose names he did not recollect), to ascertain the complainant's whereabouts.
While Sri M. Srinivas was certain that a copy of the notice, to be served on the
complainant, was handed over to him on 03.07.2011, he expressed ignorance of
where he went nearly two/three months thereafter on the 1st of September or on
the 1st of October, 2011.  He also admitted that he did not recollect events
which took place on the 5th of July, 2011.  While Sri M. Srinivas stated that
they had enquired from both the watchman and the security guard regarding the
whereabouts of the complainant, Sri V. Yella Reddy (the other home guard) stated
that they had enquired from the security guard who was there at the complex.  No
reference is made by him of their enquiring, the whereabouts of the complainant,
from the watchman.  He also stated that they had visited Jain Mandir and
jewellery shops at Maredpalli, but admitted that he did not recollect the names
of persons from whom they had enquired regarding the petitioner's whereabouts,
or the names of the jewellery shops they had visited in this regard.  Contrary
to what Sri M. Srinivas stated, Sri V. Yella Reddy stated that they had again
gone to the apartments on 05.10.2011.  He also stated that they had returned the
summons to the Station House Officer (Sri B.Anjaiah) on 08.07.2011 which
contradicts the statement of Sri B. Anjaiah that he did not collect the notice
from the process server.  Sri V. Yella Reddy also admitted that no registers
were maintained regarding service of summons and, except to mark their
attendance in the morning, no record was maintained in the police station
regarding the places they visited or the persons whom they contacted for service
of summons.  Sri V. Yella Reddy also admitted that he did not recollect events
which transpired on 1st October, 2011.  The notice, allegedly sent to the
complainant, has also not been placed before this Court for its perusal.  Even
if it is presumed that a notice was made ready to be served on the complainant,
(which itself is doubtful), the evidence of the police officials and homeguards
reveal that they were not even aware of the whereabouts of the complainant
resulting in their not serving the notice on her.  This falsifies the averment
in the counter affidavit filed by the 2nd respondent that the petitioner
(complainant) was evading receipt of the notice.

B. MISSING STATEMENT OF THE COMPLAINANT           

20.     In her statement on oath before this Court, the petitioner-complainant
denied that her statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. was recorded by the police
at any time before 11.10.2011 when such a statement was recorded in their Film
Distribution Office at Secunderabad. The counter-affidavit of the second
respondent dated 13.09.2011 makes no reference to the statement of the
complainant having been recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C.  It is only on the
records being placed before it that this Court found that it did not contain the
statement of the complainant under Section 161 Cr.P.C.   An additional counter
affidavit was filed by the 2nd respondent thereafter wherein it is stated that,
while the complainant's statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. was recorded as
early as on 12.03.2011 itself i.e., on the very date of registration of the
F.I.R, it was misplaced.  In his statement on oath before this Court on
20.10.2011, Sri B. Anjaiah stated that the investigating officer had recorded,
in Part I Case Diary, that the statement of the complainant was recorded; that
is how he came to know that her statement was recorded on 12.03.2011; and he had
searched for the statement in his office, and also in the office of the
Assistant Commissioner of Police, but the said statement could not be traced.
Sri K. Venugopal, the Investigating Officer, reiterated that the petitioner's
statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. was recorded on 12.03.2011.  While admitting
that the file placed before this Court did not contain the said statement, he
stated that it was evident that the said statement had been misplaced; and he
was not aware as to how the said statement was misplaced.  His admission, that
no records were maintained in the police station to show whether or not the
statement of the complainant or others, under Section 161 Cr.P.C, is recorded
not only contradicts the statement of Sri B. Anjaiah that in the Part I Case
Diary Sri K. Venugopal had recorded that the statement of the complainant under
Section 161 Cr.P.C. had been recorded; but also gives rise to a strong suspicion
that the Part I case diary may well have been interpolated later to cover up the
lapse of the Investigating Officer in failing to record the statement of the
complainant under Section 161 Cr.P.C.  The very fact that the draft final report
makes no reference to the civil suits filed both by the petitioner and the 3rd
respondent against each other (both of which ended in the petitioner's favour)
would also go to show that her statement was not recorded for if, indeed, her
statement was recorded, and the matter investigated fairly, these aspects would
certainly have come to light. While the draft final report refers to the
complaint lodged by the petitioner, it makes no reference either to her
statement having been recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. on 12.03.2011, or of
the suits filed both by her and her landlord against each other.   The 3rd
respondent, in his counter affidavit, admits that O.S. No.295 of 2008 filed by
him for eviction of the petitioner-tenant from the flat was dismissed.  He,
however, denies having entered the flat at any point of time. He would state
that the petitioner had voluntarily vacated the premises without his knowledge,
and she had come up with false allegations later only with the intention of
harassing him.  Prima facie the counter-affidavit filed by the 3rd respondent is
also false.
21.     It defies credulity that a person who, the respondents would contend, had
voluntarily vacate her flat, would throw her belongings on the pavement outside
the apartment building, and give a police complaint in the middle of the night
against the landlord of being forcibly ousted from the flat, more so when the
suit filed by her seeking permanent injunction against the 3rd respondent-
landlord was decreed, and the suit filed by the 3rd respondent-landlord for
eviction of the petitioner-tenant from the flat was dismissed.  The clumsy
efforts of the respondent police officers to cover up their lapse in recording
the statement of the complainant under Section 161 Cr.P.C. before the draft
final report was prepared and approved, and their attempts to mislead this
Court, necessitates a serious view being taken of the entire episode.
22.     The role of the then Assistant Commissioner of Police, Gopalapuram in this
sordid episode needs specific mention.  Within five days of the complaint being
filed on 12.03.2011 he had instructed the Investigating Officer, by memo dated
17.03.2011, to elicit whether any previous enmity existed between both the
parties i.e., the complainant and the alleged accused.  He also directed the
investigating officer to examine the neighbours and other witnesses, (his letter
does not refer to the need to examine the complainant); elicit the truth behind
this incident, finalise the case within a fortnight, and report compliance.
Curiously neither of the counter affidavits filed before this Court, nor the
statements recorded on oath, (including that of the Assistant Commissioner),
make any reference to this memo dated 17.03.2011 having been issued.  The
unseemly urgency displayed by the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Gopalapuram  
to have the case closed is evident from his memo dated 17.03.2011 asking the
investigating officer to complete investigation within a fortnight, and in
according permission on 18.06.2011 to the Investigating Officer to refer the
case as "lack of evidence".
23.     While several Writ Petitions are filed daily before this Court questioning
the inordinate delay in investigation of several months, and in some cases
years, the reasons which prompted the Assistant Commissioner to evince special
interest in this case, direct the investigating Officer to investigate in a
particular manner, and complete investigation within a fortnight, and in
according permission to file a report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. as "lack of
evidence", are not difficult to perceive.  This needless haste, coupled with the
fact that the complainant's statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. was not recorded
prior thereto and that the investigating officer had not even taken note of the
suit filed by the complainant, seeking permanent injunction against her land-
lord having been decreed, and the suit filed by the 3rd respondent-landlord for
eviction of the complainant - tenant had been dismissed, does indicate, prima
facie, that the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Gopalapuram had orchestrated
the investigation in a manner to favour the 3rd respondent-landlord.  This case
is illustrative of the systemic malaise in the prevalent criminal investigation
machinery.  The rot which has set in, if not promptly stemmed, may sound the
death-knell of the criminal justice delivery system in this country.

IV. ACTION TO BE TAKEN:    
(i). TRANSFER OF INVESTIGATION:     


24.     Article 21 of the Constitution of India, in its broad application, not
only takes within its fold enforcement of the rights of an accused but also the
rights of the victim. The State has a duty to enforce the human rights of a
citizen providing for fair and impartial investigation against any person
accused of commission of a cognizable offence. (State of West Bengal v.
Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, West Bengal5). Fair investigation
is a part of the constitutional rights guaranteed under Articles 20 and 21 of
the Constitution of India. Investigation must be fair, transparent and judicious
as it is the minimum requirement of the rule of law. The investigating agency
cannot be permitted to conduct investigation in a tainted and biased manner.
(Babubhai v. State of Gujarat6).  The aim of criminal justice is two-fold.
Severely punishing and sufficiently preventing a crime. Both these objects can
be achieved only by a fair investigation into the commission of a crime.  An
investigation must be fair and effective, must proceed in a proper direction in
consonance with the ingredients of the offence, and not in a haphazard manner.
(Sidhartha Vashisht v. State (NCT of Delhi)7). A fair and impartial
investigation by an independent agency is essential in larger public interest.
(Mohd. Anis v. Union of India8).
25.     If the State's machinery fails to protect a citizen's life, liberty and
property, and the investigation is conducted in such a manner as to help the
accused, it is but appropriate that the Court should step in to prevent the
miscarriage of justice perpetrated on the victim. "The law should not be seen to
sit by limply, while those who defy it go free, and those who seek its
protection lose hope." Courts have to ensure that the accused are punished, and
the might or authority of the State is not used to shield them. If deficiency in
investigation is visible or can be perceived by lifting the veil which hides
realities or covers obvious deficiencies, courts have to deal with them with an
iron hand within the framework of the law. It is the duty of the court to ensure
that full and material facts are brought on record to avoid miscarriage of
justice. The justice-delivery system cannot be allowed to be abused, misused and
mutilated by subterfuge. (Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh v. State of Gujarat9;
Jennison v. Baker10 and Shakila Abdul Gafar Khan v. Vasant Raghunath Dhoble11).
26.     The criminal investigation system must be insulated from discriminatory
standards or yardsticks of the type prohibited by the mandate of the
Constitution. (Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh9). The investigation into a criminal
offence must be free from all objectionable features or infirmities which may
legitimately lead to a grievance that the investigation was unfair or had been
carried out with an ulterior motive which has an adverse impact on the case.
(Mohd. Imran Khan v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi12; Babubhai6). It is not only
the responsibility of the investigating agency but as well as that of the courts
to ensure that investigation is fair. An equally enforceable canon of the
criminal law is that a high degree of responsibility lies upon the investigating
agency not to conduct investigation in a tainted and unfair manner. The
investigation should not, prima facie, be indicative of a biased mind and every
effort should be made to bring the guilty to law as nobody stands above law
dehors his position and influence in society. (Sidhartha Vashisht7).
27.     In the case of a malafide exercise of power by a police officer, the court
may interfere with the investigation. (S.N. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari13;
Babubhai6). Where the court comes to the conclusion that there are serious
irregularities in the investigation, or that the investigation has been done
with the object of helping a party, it may direct further investigation.  In
exceptional circumstances the court, in order to prevent miscarriage of criminal
justice, may, if it considers it necessary, direct investigation de novo, or
even transfer the investigation to an independent agency.  Where non-
interference of the court would ultimately result in failure of justice, the
court must interfere. In such a situation, it may be in the interests of justice
that an independent agency chosen by the High Court makes a fresh investigation.
(Babubhai6; K. Chandrasekhar v. State of Kerala14; Ramachandran v. R.
Udhayakumar15; Nirmal Singh Kahlo v. State of Punjab16; Mithabhai Pashabhai
Patel v. State of Gujarat17; and Kishan Lal v. Dharmendra Bafn18).
28.     The analysis of the evidence afore-extracted, prima facie, shows that Sri
S. Chaturvedi, presently Additional Deputy Commissioner of Police, Task Force
(the then Assistant Commissioner of Police, Gopalapuram), orchestrated
investigation to unduly benefit the 3rd respondent-landlord, and to the
detriment of the petitioner-tenant (the victim).  Under the protective umbrella
of Sri S. Chaturvedi, Sri K. Venugopal, (the then Investigating Officer), short
circuited the investigation and prepared a draft final report as "lack of
evidence".  The concocted story of the petitioner-tenant having vacated her flat
on her own accord falls to ground in the face of overwhelming evidence to the
contrary.  The petitioner's articles and belongings were found strewn on the
pavement outside the apartment building, the day after she gave her complaint.
The suit filed by her against the 3rd respondent-landlord for permanent
injunction was decreed, and the suit filed by the 3rd respondent- landlord
seeking her eviction was dismissed long before the incident which took place on
11.03.2011. A person, who voluntarily vacated occupation of the flat, would not
go to the police station in the middle of the night and complain that she has
been forcibly evicted, more so when the landlord's attempts earlier to evict her
through the legal process had failed. Prima facie it does appear that the 3rd
respondent-landlord, having failed to evict the petitioner-tenant from the flat
through the legal process, took law into his own hands and used musclemen to
have her and her family members evicted from his flat; the respondent police
officials sought to ensure that the 3rd respondent-landlord, despite his illegal
and high handed acts of trespass into the flat and physical assault and
attempted rape, was not brought to justice; and the petitioner's complaint was
sought to be given a quick and quiet burial.
29.     Since a draft final report has not yet been filed before the Magistrate it
is but appropriate, in the aforesaid circumstances, that the petitioner's
complaint be investigated afresh by an independent agency.  The Commissioner of
Police, Hyderabad shall entrust investigation, into the complaint filed by the
petitioner, to the CBCID which shall conduct investigation in a fair,
transparent and impartial manner uninfluenced either by the previous
investigation or by any observations made in this order.  It is made clear that
Sri S. Chaturvedi, the Additional Deputy Commissioner of Police, Task Force, Sri
K. Venugopal, the then investigating officer and Sri B. Anjaiah, the Station
House Officer shall not, in any manner, be associated with the investigation
being caused afresh into the petitioner's complaint.  While this Court was
initially inclined to monitor the investigation to be conducted afresh by the
CBCID, bearing in mind that monitoring of investigation is resorted to only in
exceptional circumstances and as there is no reason to doubt that the CBCID
would conduct investigation in a fair, transparent and impartial manner, it may
not be appropriate for this Court to monitor the investigation.  It is, however,
made clear that the investigation shall be completed within four months from
today; and, on completion of investigation and before a final report under
Section 173 Cr.P.C. is filed, the investigating officer (in the CBCID
department) shall place a copy of the draft final report, along with the
enclosures including the statement of witnesses examined by him, for this
Court's perusal.

(ii). INITIATION OF CRIMINAL CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS:        
30.     Sri B. Anjaiah, the Station House Officer and Sri G. Avanidhar Goud, the
3rd respondent-landlord have filed false counter-affidavits.  Sri S. Chaturvedi,
the Additional Deputy Commissioner of Police - Task force, Sri K. Venugopal, the
then Investigating Officer, Sri B. Anjaiah-the Station House Officer, and Sri M.
Srinivas and Sri V. Yella Reddy, the Home-guards/process servers have made false
statements on oath before this Court in their endeavour to deflect the course of
justice, and to prevent this Court from ascertaining the truth.         Section 2(c)
of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 defines criminal contempt as "the
publication (whether by words, spoken or written or by signs or visible
representation or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act
whatsoever to (1) scandalise or tend to scandalise or lower or tend to lower the
authority of any court; (2) prejudice or interfere or tend to interfere with the
due course of judicial proceedings; or (3) interfere or tend to interfere with,
or obstruct or tend to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other
manner. Thus any conduct which has the tendency to interfere with the
administration of justice, or the due course of judicial proceedings, amounts to
the commission of criminal contempt. (Dhananjay Sharma v. State of Haryana19).
The word 'interfere', in this context means any action which checks or hampers
the functioning or hinders or tends to prevent the performance of duty i.e.,
obstacles or impediments which hinder, impede or in any manner interrupt or
prevent the administration of justice. If recourse to falsehood is taken with an
oblique motive, the same would definitely hinder, hamper or impede the even flow
of justice, and would prevent the courts from performing their legal duties as
they are supposed to do. (Chandra Shashi v. Anil Kumar Verma20; Words and
Phrases (Permanent Edn.), Vol. 22).
31.     In Chandra Shashi20, the respondent produced a false and fabricated
certificate to defeat the claim of his wife for transfer of a case. This action
was found to interfere with the administration of justice. The Supreme Court
observed:
"The stream of administration of justice has to remain unpolluted so that purity
of court's atmosphere may give vitality to all the organs of the State.
Polluters of judicial firmament are, therefore, required to be well taken care
of to maintain the sublimity of court's environment; so also to enable it to
administer justice fairly and to the satisfaction of all concerned. Anyone who
takes recourse to fraud deflects the course of judicial proceedings; or if
anything is done with oblique motive, the same interferes with the
administration of justice. Such persons are required to be properly dealt with,
not only to punish them for the wrong done, but also to deter others from
indulging in similar acts which shake the faith of people in the system of
administration of justice." (emphasis supplied).

32.     Anyone who makes an attempt to impede or undermine or obstruct the free 
flow of the unsoiled stream of justice by resorting to false evidence, commits
criminal contempt of the court and renders himself liable to be dealt with in
accordance with the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act. Filing of false
affidavits or making false statement on oath in Courts aims at striking a blow
at the rule of law, and no court can ignore such conduct which has the tendency
to shake public confidence in judicial institutions. It would be a public
disaster if the fountain of justice is allowed to be poisoned by anyone
resorting to filing of false affidavits or giving of false statements or
fabricating false evidence in a court of law. The stream of justice has to be
kept clear and pure and anyone soiling its purity must be dealt with sternly so
that the message percolates loud and clear that no one can be permitted to
undermine the dignity of the court and interfere with the due course of judicial
proceedings or the administration of justice. (Dhananjay Sharma19; Chandra
Shashi20).  To enable the courts to ward off unjustified interference in their
working, those who indulge in acts like perjury, prevarication and motivated
falsehoods have to be appropriately dealt with, without which it would not be
possible for any court to administer justice. (Chandra Shashi20).
33.     Prima facie, the false affidavits filed by Sri B. Anjaiah and Sri G.
Avanidhar Goud; and the false statements on oath by Sri S Chaturvedi, Sri B.
Anjaiah, Sri K. Venugopal, Sri M. Srinivas and Sri V. Yella Reddy constitute
criminal Contempt of Court.  The Registrar-General of the High Court shall
forthwith initiate suo-motu criminal contempt proceedings, under the Contempt of
Courts Act, against the five police officials/personnel and Sri G. Avanidhar
Goud, the 3rd respondent-landlord.

(iii). INITIATION OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS:     

34.     A copy of this order shall be sent to the Chief Secretary, Government of
Andhra Pradesh forthwith, and he shall initiate disciplinary proceedings against
the five police officials/personnel for dereliction and gross negligence in the
discharge of their duties, and for derailing the course of investigation to
unduly favour Sri Sri G. Avanidhar Goud, the 3rd respondent-landlord.
35.     Respondents 2 and 3 in this Writ Petition, Sri S. Chaturvedi, (Additional
Deputy Commissioner of Police, Task Force) and Sri K. Venugopal, (the previous
investigating officer), shall pay exemplary costs of Rs.5,000/- each to the
petitioner within two months from today.  With the above observations and
directions, the Writ Petition stands disposed of.

Date:    28 .02.2012                  
____________________________    
RAMESH RANGANATHAN, J

The word "execution" is not defined in any enactment. = There is a general perception that, once a document is presented before a Registrar, and the executant thereof, admits his signature, or thumb impression thereon, the Registrar has no option, but to register the document. In other words, even if the executant pleads ignorance of the contents, or urges that his signature was taken on a blank paper and that legal obligations, which he did not subscribe to, were incorporated therein, the Registrar cannot refuse registration.- the expression "person executing" is not identical with the expression "person signing". It was observed, that the words, 'person executing', "... mean something more, namely, the person, who by a valid execution enters into obligation under the instrument."- "The mere fact that the signature on the document was admitted is not treated as execution of the document so as to make it the imperative duty of the Registrar to register the document. The admission of signature therein cannot be taken to be conclusive and as constituting admission, of execution of the document." :a gift made by a Muslim, that delivery of possession is treated as an independent requirement, the same becomes relevant as regards gifts governed by Section 123 of the TP Act also in the context of ascertaining the consent of the party to the transaction. A transfer through gift becomes complete, only when it is made by the donar and accepted by the donee. If what is gifted is an item of immovable property, acceptance can be discerned from the act of delivery of possession. In case, the property is in possession of a tenant, the delivery can be affected through attornment of tenancy. If the donar and donee reside in the gifted premises, no independent act of delivery possession becomes necessary. Where, however, the property is in possession of a different individual and no specific acts of bringing the possession under the control of donee are taken, the effectiveness of acceptance of the gift suffers a dent.


THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE L. NARASIMHA REDDY        

SECOND APPEAL No.1238 of 2010    

05-01-2012.

Between:

Duddumpudi Venkatarayudu  

Duddumpudi Rajagopal alias Tatabbai and another

Counsel for the Appellant: Mr. T.S. Venkata Ramana

Counsel for the Respondents:Mr. M.V.S. Suresh Kumar  


?Cases referred                 :       AIR (15) 1928 P.C. 38      
                                                AIR (37) 1950 MADRAS 239  
                                                AIR (36) MADRAS 775  
                                                AIR (11) 1924 MADRAS 810  
FB
                                                AIR 1954 PATNA 556  

ORDER:
       
         The sole defendant in O.S.No.108 of 2002 is the appellant in this
second appeal.  For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to, as
arrayed in the suit.

        2.  The 2nd plaintiff is the mother of the 1st plaintiff and the
defendant.  The suit was filed for the relief of declaration of title in respect
of the suit schedule property and for recovery of possession by evicting the
defendant therefrom.  Alternatively, it was pleaded that if any construction in
the schedule property is found to have been removed, then, a sum of Rs.50,000/-
be awarded towards value of the removed construction in addition to the recovery
of possession. Prohibitory injunction to restrain the defendant from making any
construction thereon or from interfering in any manner over the plaint schedule
property after possession thereof is delivered to the 1st plaintiff and
mandatory injunction directing him to remove new constructions if any made; were
also claimed.

3.  It was pleaded that the suit schedule property was purchased by the 2nd
plaintiff through a sale deed, dated 16-11-1981 (marked as Ex.A1) and that with
her permission, her elder son, the defendant, was living therein.  The 2nd
plaintiff is stated to have executed through her GPA, a gift deed on 06-03-2000
(marked as Ex.A-2) in respect of the suit schedule property, in favour of the
1st plaintiff and that through another document, dated 18-03-1998, she gifted
the vacant site of 121 sq.yds., to the defendant.  During the lifetime of their
father, the 1st plaintiff and the defendants are said to have partitioned all
the joint family properties, except the family house and a site and that they
were said to have been partitioned under a partition deed.
       
4.  It was pleaded that the 2nd plaintiff, who was residing with the 1st
plaintiff, an employee of the Central Government, went to Samalkot in the recent
past, when the 1st plaintiff proceeded to Newzealand.  It was alleged that when
the defendant was proclaiming rights of ownership over the suit schedule
property, the wife of the 1st plaintiff found from the Registrar's office that a
deed of revocation was executed by the 2nd plaintiff on 21-08-2000 (marked as
Ex.A-3) cancelling the gift executed in favour of the
1st plaintiff on 06-03-2000, and that another gift deed, dated
13-10-2000 (marked as Ex.A-4) was executed in favour of the defendant in respect
of the same property.  Alleging that the defendant played fraud upon the 2nd
plaintiff in procuring the documents Exs.A-3 and A-4, the plaintiff filed the
suit for the reliefs mentioned above.

5.  The defendant filed a written statement denying the allegations.  He stated
that the 2nd plaintiff never executed any gift deed in favour of the 1st
plaintiff.  He alleged that the 1st plaintiff got the GPA in favour of one of
his employees from the 2nd plaintiff and Ex.A-2 was brought into existence
through the said G.P.A.  He pleaded that the 2nd plaintiff realised the fraud
played upon her and on her own accord and free will executed a deed of
cancellation (Ex.A-3) and a gift deed (Ex.A-4), in his favour.  He further
stated that the 1st plaintiff was never in possession of the property.  He
further pleaded that the 2nd plaintiff did not instruct any one to file a suit
on her behalf and her signatures were forged at various documents, including the
plaint.  He raised an objection as to the maintainability of the suit.

6.  The plaintiff filed a rejoinder, explaining certain facts stated in the
written statement.

7.  The trial Court decreed the suit through judgment, dated 07-02-1956.  The
defendant filed A.S.No.1 of 2006 in the court of the VII Additional District
Munsif, Kakinada.  The appeal was dismissed on 26-07-2000.  Hence, this second
appeal.

8.  Sri T.S.Venkata Ramana, learned counsel for the defendant submits that
alleged gift deed (Ex.A-2) in favour of the 1st plaintiff was not proved as
required under law, particularly when the 2nd plaintiff (PW-1) the executant
thereof, stated that she did not sign upon it.  He contends that the very
registration of Ex.A-2 is shrouded in mystery since PW-1 disputed her signatures
thereon and the document has said to be presented for registration by a power of
attorney.  He further submits that Ex.A-3 the revocation deed and Ex.A-4 gift
deed in favour of the defendant were not challenged in the suit and in that view
of the matter, there was no basis for granting relief to the plaintiffs.  It is
urged that at no point of time, the 1st plaintiff was in possession of the
property and assuming that Ex.A-2 was proved, there was no delivery of the
possession of the property.  Learned counsel submits that the judgment rendered
by the trial Court and the lower appellate Court are contrary to the settled
principles of law.

9.  Sri M.V.S. Suresh Kumar, learned counsel for the
plaintiffs submits that the very fact that the 2nd plaintiff is said to have
executed Exs.A-3 and A-4 are sufficient to hold that Ex.A2 is proved.  He
submits that the possession of the defendant over the schedule property was
permissive and that he does not derive any right in respect thereof.  Learned
counsel submits that the minor discrepancies in the deposition of PW-1 are
referable to her old age and ill health and that the lower appellate Court has
taken the correct view of the matter and, granted appropriate relief.
       
10.  The pleadings before the trial Court comprised of plaint, written statement
and rejoinder.

11.  The following issues were framed by the trial Court:
1. Whether the 2nd plaintiff executed gift deed in favour of the 1st plaintiff?

2. Whether the 2nd plaintiff executed revocation deed, dated 21.08.2000?

3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the declaration prayed for?

4. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to possession?
5. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the alternative relief of recovery of
possession and recovery of Rs.50,000/-?
12.  On behalf of the plaintiff, PWs-1 to 7 were examined and Exs.A-1 to A-9
were filed.  On behalf of the defendant, DWs.1 to 4 were examined.  The trial
Court appointed a commissioner and the reports were taken on record as Exs.C-1
and C-2.  Exs.X-1 to X-4 were also taken on record and on the suit being
decreed, the defendant filed A.S.No.41 of 2006.

13.  The following points were framed for consideration by the lower appellate
Court:
1. Whether the 2nd plaintiff executed Ex.A-2 gift deed, dated 06-03-2000
bequeathing the suit schedule property to the 1st plaintiff, as such, it is
valid and binding on the defendant?

2. Whether the 2nd plaintiff cancelled the gift deed, Ex.A-2, dated 06-03-2000
by executing Ex.X-1 (Equivalent to Ex.A-3) and executed Ex.X-2 (Equivalent to
Ex.A-4) deed, dated 13-10-2000 in favour of defendant?

3. If the 2nd plaintiff cancelled Ex.A-2, dated
06-03-2000 by executing Exs.X-1 and X-2 whether the act of 2nd plaintiff is
valid under the eye of law?

4. Whether the 1st plaintiff is entitled for declaration of title over the suit
schedule property with consequential recovery of possession by ejecting the
defendant with damages of RS.50,000/-?

5. Whether the 1st plaintiff is entitled for permanent injunction, prohibitory
injunction and mandatory injunction as prayed for?

6. Whether the trial court erroneously appreciated the evidence on record and
decreed the suit of the plaintiff, as such the judgment and decree of the trial
court warranted any interference of this court or not?

The appeal was dismissed.

14.  The second appeal was admitted on finding that the following substantial
questions of law arise for consideration:
1) The lower court and appellate court failed to see that PW.1 admitted in her
evidence that she did not sign on the plaint and she denied signature on the
chief affidavit Ex.A-2 and the plaint?

2) The lower court and the appellate court failed to see that when PW.1 denied
her signature on Ex.a2 it cannot be said that Ex.A-2 gift deed was executed by
the 1st plaintiff with her free will and consent?

3) The lower court and appellate court failed to see that Ex.A-2 gift deed was
not registered by the 1st plaintiff and it was alleged to have been registered
by the power of attorney holder?

15.  Now it needs to be seen as to whether the defendants satisfied this Court
as to the existence of such questions and if so, how the said questions are to
be answered.

16.  The facts in brief, as reflected in the pleadings have already been
mentioned.  The dispute is, mostly between the two sons of the 2nd plaintiff
i.e., 1st plaintiff and defendant.  Both of them are laying claim to the
property held by their mother PW-1, and two separate deeds of gifts i.e. Ex.A-2
and Ex.A-4, respectively.

17.  The defendant raised a plea that PW-1, their mother, did not instruct any
one to file a suit, on her behalf.  If, in fact, she did not instruct anyone to
file the suit, a serious defect would creep into the proceedings.  It is only
the 2nd plaintiff that could have asserted that Exs.A-3 and A-4 were not
executed by her.  In case, she has executed the said documents and did not
disown them, the
1st plaintiff can claim against the relief against the defendant, if necessary,
by impleading their mother as one of the defendants.

18.  The 2nd plaintiff deposed as it PW-1.  In her cross-examination, it was
elicited through her that she did not sign the plaint or the affidavit filed in
lieu of chief-examination.  Her statement reads:
"the signature on plaint is not mine.  The signature on chief affidavit is not
mine. I have not filed any evidence with reference to the document executed in
the name of defendant."

19.  Once PW-1 stated that she did not sign the plaint or affidavit in lieu of
chief-examination, the very foundation for the suit becomes shaky.  It is true
that the evidence of PW-1 was not consistent and in several places, she made
contradictory statements.   However, that was also the case vis--vis Ex.A-2 a
gift deed in favour of the 1st plaintiff.  To be precise, she deposed:

"I do not know what is the document executed by me in favour of the 1st
plaintiff for the said land.  I do not know the contents of the documents.  I
signed the documents at the instance of the
1st plaintiff without knowing the contents. ...... .........
I executed that document when I was in hospital bed."

Similar statements were made as regards her terms with the defendant.

20.  When such is the condition or version of PW-1 i.e. the
2nd plaintiff, it is difficult to imagine that she gave specific instructions to
any counsel to file a suit on her behalf.  Further, it is not as if the parties
are helpless, if PW-1 was not in a position to take independent decisions.
Appointment of a next friend, as provided for under Order - XXXII CPC could have
been resorted to. Once, the 2nd plaintiff stated that she did not sign the
plaint and the affidavit in lieu of chief-examination, the trial Court ought not
to have treated the suit as properly instituted.  Even if a doubt in this regard
did not arise when the suit was numbered, at least when such facts came to light
at a later stage, there was no basis or justification for the Court to proceed
with the suit.  The plaint insofar as it related tEo the 2nd plaintiff ought to
have been returned, for presentation in accordance with law.  Therefore, the
first substantial question of law is found to be existing in this case, and it
is answered in favour of the defendant.

21.  Though Plaintiffs 1 and 2 sought the relief of declaration of title vis--
vis the suit schedule property, in fact the relief is claimed by the 1st
plaintiff alone.  The reason is that throughout the plaint, the emphasis is on
the validity and legality of Ex.A-2 the gift deed in favour of the 1st plaintiff
and invalidity of Exs.A-3 and A-4.  If Ex.A-2 is validly executed and if it is
continues to be valid, there is no question of the 2nd plaintiff holding any
right or title over the property.  In that view of the matter, the further
question as to whether there was a revocation thereof through Ex.A-3 and whether
the subsequent gift through Ex.A-4 in favour of the defendant is valid?, would
arise.  The defendant raised a specific plea that Ex.A-2 was not signed by PW-1
at all.  In the ordinary course of things, if a deed of cancellation is
executed, cancelling the deed of gift, the necessity to verify the proof of the
gift deed may not arise.  The reason is that an act of cancellation presupposed
the existence of what is sought to be cancelled.  Where, however, there is any
amount of uncertainty and a plea is raised to the effect that the gift deed was
not executed at all and cancellation was resorted to as a precautionary measure,
the necessity to prove the gift deed, independently, would subsist.

22.  Further, Section 68 of the Evidence Act mandates that if a document, which
is required by law, to be attested, cannot be used as evidence until one
attesting witness, at least, has been called, for the purpose of proving its
execution. Alternative methods are also indicated.  If the deed is registered,
the necessity to examine the attestors may not arise unless, the executant of
the document denies his signatures on it.  In the instant case, Ex.A-2 is a gift
deed and it is required to be attested under Section 123 of the Transfer of
Property Act (for short 'TP Act').  In the plaint, it was mentioned that though
the document was signed by PW-1, it was presented for registration by her GPA
(PW-6).

23.  The necessity for the plaintiff, to prove a document would arise when the
defendant denies the execution thereof.  An extraordinary situation is noticed
in this case.  PW-1 stated that she did not know the contents of Ex.A-2 and that
she was unwell when it was executed and that she did not sign that document at
all.  Though this was elicited in her cross-examination, no damage control was
done, either by making suggestions in any re-examination or by adducing any
other evidence.  Some of the statements made by her in the cross-examination
vis--vis Ex.A-2 have already been extracted in the previous paragraphs.  She
said that she does not know the contents of the document.  In addition to that,
she said:
"I cannot give particulars of the document.  By that time, I am unwell.  I was
in hospital by that time. I was on saline for three months and intake of food
was not good."

At another place, she stated:
"I do not know who drafted and typed Ex.A-2.  I was seriously ill by the date of
Ex.A-2 and it was being plan to take me to USA for treatment.  My condition was
not good by the date of Ex.A-2."

        24.  Proof of the execution of any document, which is relied upon by a
party to a suit, is one of the most important steps in the proceedings.    The
Evidence Act stipulated the method of proving a document either through primary
or secondary evidence.   What is required to be proved, is the execution of
document than its existence.   The word "execution" is not defined in any
enactment.  More often than not, the proof of signature on a document, is taken,
or treated, as proof of execution thereof.

        25.  A close scrutiny of the process, known as "execution of a document"
brings about several legal aspects or principles to light.  This area is mostly
covered by the Registration Act.  Sections 34 and 35 prescribe the manner in
which the Registrar is required to admit a document to registration.  Sections
77 thereof provides the remedy of filing of a suit, in the event of the
registration being refused.

        26.  There is a general perception that, once a document is presented
before a Registrar, and the executant thereof, admits his signature, or thumb
impression thereon, the Registrar has no option, but to register the document.
In other words, even if the executant pleads ignorance of the contents, or urges
that his signature was taken on a blank paper and that legal obligations, which
he did not subscribe to, were incorporated therein, the Registrar cannot refuse
registration.  The Privy Council and the High Courts of Madras and Patna made
valuable contribution in this area of law.

27.  In Puranchand Nahatta v. Monmothonath Mukherji1, 
Their Lordships of the
Privy Council held that the expression "person executing" is not identical with the expression "person signing".  
It was observed, that the words, 'person executing',
"... mean something more, namely, the person, who by a valid execution enters into obligation under the instrument."

28.  According to this, "execution" would mean the admission on the part of the
executant, that he subjected himself, to an obligation under the instrument.
This principle was followed by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in
Sayyaparaju Surayya v. Koduri Kondamma2.  That case arose under Section 77 of
the Registration Act.  The Sub-Registrar refused to register a document, when
the signatory thereof denied the execution.  It was alleged that his signatures
were taken on  blank papers and that the document was brought into existence.
The Division Bench discussed the purport of Sections 35 and 77 of the Act with
reference to the decided cases and held :

        "The admission required, therefore, is admission of the execution of the
document. It may be a sale-deed, it may be a mortgage deed. It is not enough for
the person, who is the ostensible executant, to admit his signature on a paper
on which, may be, the document is ultimately engrossed. The identity of the
papers on which the signature occurs is not sufficient. If a man says that he
signed a blank paper on the representation that it was required for presenting a
petition, as in the present case, or if a man signs a completed document on the
representation that his signature or thumb impression is required as an
attesting witness, that admission of the signature or thumb impression in those
circumstances cannot be construed to be an admission of the execution of the
document." 
29.  The judgment in Bapanayya v. Bangararaju3, rendered by a learned single
Judge, which held otherwise, was over-ruled.  Reliance was placed upon a
judgment rendered by a Full Bench of Madras High Court in Guruvayya v.
Venkataratnam4  The facts of the case before the Full Bench were: two documents,
have been procured from a person, in respect of two items of property, and later
on, the purchasers erased the contents of the documents, keeping the signature
in tact.  Documents, in respect of a larger extent of property were brought into
existence.  When the documents were presented for registration, the executant
admitted his signature, but denied the contents.  Manipulation of the contents,
was complained of.  It was urged on behalf of the purchaser that the Registrar
has no option, but to register the document, once the signature on the documents
was admitted by the executant.  On refusal of registration, suit was filed under
Section 77 of the Registration Act and the matter landed before the Full Bench.
The view taken by the Registrar, that the document cannot be registered if the
executant disputes the contents was upheld.  The gist of the judgment of the
Full Bench was summarized as under:

        "The mere fact that the signature on the document was admitted is not
treated as execution of the document so as to make it the imperative duty of the
Registrar to register the document. The admission of signature therein cannot be
taken to be conclusive and as constituting admission, of execution of the
document." 

        30.  In Rajendra Singh v. Ramganit Singh5, the Patna High Court observed
that execution consists in signing a document written out, read over and
understood; and does not consist in merely signing a name upon a blank sheet of
paper.

        31.  It therefore emerges that the person can be said to have executed the
document, only when he knows the contents thereof and subscribes his signature,
or puts his thumb impression.  Once that is done, the question as to whether the
obligations created under the document are lawful or not would be outside the
scope of the power of a Registrar, or for that matter, of a Court.  That
exercise can be undertaken, if only the transaction covered by the document is
challenged.

        32.  In the instant case, PW.1 stated in unequivocal terms that she was
not aware of the contents of Ex.A.2.  Though her signature upon it was not
disputed, she cannot be said to have executed the document, once she was 
ignorant about the contents.  Putting the signature on a document is not an
empty formality.  That act must connote the consent of the signatory, to abide
by the obligations, which arise under the document, or at least, the knowledge
thereof.

33.  Free will and being in a position to take an independent decision of sine qua non for an individual to bring into existence a valid contract.  Since the transaction of a gift is the one not suggested by any consideration, the satisfaction of these two aspects is required to be much more.  When the party was not in a position to take any decision, and was in a serious distress, any
commitment procured from such person is prone to be treated as tainted with undue influence, or coercion.  If the witness, after recovering from the distress, states that she did not know the contents of document when she signed
it, a valid gift cannot be said to have been made even if the other requirements of law are satisfied.  Therefore, the second substantial question of law is answered in favour of the defendant.

34.  A serious dispute arises as to whether a valid registration of Ex.A-2 has
taken place at all.  The reason is that the document was presented for
registration by a power of attorney.  Detailed procedure in prescribed under the
Registration Act and the Rules made thereunder, in this regard.  It is not clear
that the procedure was followed.  Another aspect of the matter is about delivery
of possession.

35.  Though it is in respect of a gift made by a Muslim, that delivery of
possession is treated as an independent requirement, the same becomes relevant 
as regards gifts governed by Section 123 of the TP Act also in the context of
ascertaining the consent of the party to the transaction.  A transfer through
gift becomes complete, only when it is made by the donar and accepted by the
donee.  If what is gifted is an item of immovable property, acceptance can be
discerned from the act of delivery of possession.  In case, the property is in
possession of a tenant, the delivery can be affected through attornment of
tenancy.  If the donar and donee reside in the gifted premises, no independent
act of delivery possession becomes necessary.  Where, however, the property is
in possession of a different individual and no specific acts of bringing the
possession under the control of donee are taken, the effectiveness of acceptance
of the gift suffers a dent.

36.  The suit schedule property, in the instant case, was in the possession of
the defendant even before the gift was made.  That was accepted by PW-1 and 
nothing contrary was indicated.  After Ex.A-1 also, the defendant continued to
be in possession. Though it was stated in the plaint that the defendant remained
in possession of the property with the consent of the 1st plaintiff, who deposed
as PW-2, he did not state the manner in which such consent was given.  For all
practical purposes, Ex.A-2 did not bring about any qualitative change of the
possession of the defendant over the suit schedule property.  Therefore, from
this point of view also, there was no valid gift in favour of the 1st plaintiff.

37.  For the foregoing reasons, the Second Appeal is allowed.  The judgments
rendered by both the Courts below are set aside.  There shall be no order as to
costs.

____________________  
L. NARASIMHA REDDY, J    
January 05, 2012.

How to prove a partition = An individual can certainly acquire title to an item of property, if it has fallen to his share in a partition. If the partition is through a decree of a Court or a written document, filing of the decree or the document, as the case may be, would go a very long way in establishing the title. If on the other hand, the partition is oral, the evidence to prove it, can be adduced. Such evidence may comprise of the depositions of the persons, who were allotted shares, or those acquainted with the partition or the revenue records, that reflect the partition. The basic aspects that are required to be stated and proved in relation to partition are, the composition of the joint family or coparcenery i.e., the members comprising of it, the existence of the properties that are held by it, the shares that are allotted to various coparceners and in particular, the person pleading the partition. The plaint is blissfully silent in all these aspects. 15. Sometimes, the necessity to prove the facts that are pleaded in a suit may not arise in case the defendants do not dispute it.


THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE L. NARASIMHA REDDY        

SECOND APPEAL No.1383 of 2004    

05-01-2012.

Maturi Rangaiah

Mutyala Venkata Lakshamma (died) and others  

Counsel for the Appellant:Mr. M.V.S. Suresh Kumar

Counsel for the Respondents:    Mr. A. Giridhar Rao Mr. P. Venkat Rao

ORDER:
       
         The unsuccessful plaintiff in O.S.No.84 of 1989 on the file of the
Subordinate Judge, Markapur, is the appellant.  He filed the suit for
declaration of title and perpetual injunction in respect of the suit schedule
properties comprising of Item No.1: a House at Nekhunambad Village and Item 
No.2: Acs.3-74 cents of land at Salakalaveedu village of Prakasam District.  He
pleaded that item No.2 and the eastern portion of the item No.1 fell to his
share in a partition that took place in the year 1966 and that thereafter, he
purchased the western portion of item No.1 from one Mr. Maturi Subbarangaiah and
ever since then he is in exclusive possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule
properties. 
 According to him, the
1st respondent was the kept mistress and respondent Nos.2 and 3 (defendant Nos.2 
and 3) are the daughters, of late Maturi Subbarangaiah.  
Respondent Nos.4 to 7
are the legal representatives of the 1st respondent.

2.  The appellant pleaded that the entries in the revenue records and the
proceedings that ensued before the Land Reforms Tribunal confirm his ownership
and possession over the property.  His grievance was that one week prior to the
filing of the suit, the respondents and their followers, who were shown as
defendant Nos.6 to 10 in the suit, threatened to dispossess him from the
property.

        3.  2nd defendant filed a written statement i.e. the
2nd respondent herein, and the same was adopted by the other contesting
defendants.  According to them, the schedule properties are the self-
acquisitions of Maturi Subbarangaiah and that the appellant is the stranger to
the Maturi family much less related to Subbarangaiah.  According to them, the
surname of the appellant is Darimadugu and not Maturi, and that he is a native
of Racherla village.  They further pleaded that the father of the appellant came
to the house of Subbarangaiah as a farm servant.  It was alleged that Maturi
Rangasayamma wife of Subbaraigaiah filed O.S.No.60 of 1971 in the court of
District Munsif, Giddalur for maintenance for herself and her daughter, 3rd
respondent herein, and that the appellant managed to get certain documents filed
by Subbarangaiah making him to believe that unless partition is pleaded, charge
may be created against all his properties.  It was also pleaded that
Subbarangiaah executed a Will on 09-01-1984 in favour of the 1st respondent
bequeathing the suit schedule properties.  They pleaded that the appellant was
never in the possession and enjoyment of the schedule properties and that he has
no concern whatever.

4.  The trial court dismissed the suit through judgment, dated 17-04-1996.  The
appellant filed A.S.No.138 of 1996 in the Court of IV Additional District Judge,
(Fast Track Court), Ongole.  The appeal was dismissed on 30-06-2004.  Hence,
this Second Appeal.

5.  M.V.S.Suresh Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant submits that his
client filed various documents such as, the orders of the Land Reforms Tribunal
(Ex.A-1), sale deed executed by Subba Rangaiah in favour of the appellant (Ex.A-
2), certified copy of deposition in O.S. No.60 of 1971 (Ex.A5) and other
documents; and still the relief was not granted.  He contends that excessive
importance was given to certain proceedings initiated before the revenue
authorities that the approach adopted by the trial Court and the lower appellate
court cannot be countenanced in law.

6.  Sri A. Giridhar Rao & P. Venkat Rao, learned counsels for the respondents,
on the other hand, submit that the suit was filed as a speculative measure and
that the falsity of the claim in the plaint is evident from the fact that though
the appellant was neither coparcener nor co-owner of late Subbaranaigah,
partition was pleaded between them. They further submit that the trial Court and
the lower appellate Court found that item No.1 of the schedule property on the
one hand and the one said to have been purchased under Ex.A-2 are different from
each other and that the appellant never acquired any title over item No.2 of the
schedule property.  It is also urged that the appellant made an effort to knock
away the property of Subbarangiah by taking advantage of his acquaintance with
him, as well as the differences between Subbarangaiah and his wife.

7.  The suit was filed for the reliefs of declaration of title and injunction in
respect of the schedule properties.  While the appellant pleaded that the
properties have fallen to his share in a family partition that took place in the
year 1966, the respondents flatly denied his entitlement to the suit properties.
A detailed written statement was filed narrating the manner in which the
appellant got acquaintance with the family of Subbarangaiah and the attempt said
to have been made by him, to knock away the properties.

8.  The trial court framed the following issues for consideration:
1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the declaration of his title over the
plaint schedule property as prayed for?

2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for permanent injunction restraining the
defendants from entering upon plaint schedule properties and dispossession the
plaintiff therefrom or from interfering with the possession and enjoyment of the
same?

3. Whether the will dated 09-01-1994 alleged to have been executed by late
Subbarangaih is true, valid and binding on plaintiff?

4. Whether the alleged admissions made by late Maturi Subbarangaiah are true,
valid and binding on defendant Nos.1 to 3 and if so, what are their effect?

5. Whether the sale deed, dated 22-06-1989, executed by defendant No.1 in favour
of defendant Nos.2 and 3 is true, valid and binding on the plaintiff?

6. Whether the cause of action set up in the plaint is true?

7. Whether the defendant Nos.1 and 4 to 10 are necessary parties to the suit?


9.  On behalf of the appellant, PWs.1 to 3 were examined and Exs.A-1 to A-7 were
filed.  On behalf of the respondents, DWs.1 to 8 were examined and Exs.B-1 to B-
8 were filed.

10.  The trial Court appointed a Commissioner.  The report and the plan
submitted by the Commissioner, were taken on record as Exs.C-1 and C-2.  Ex.X-1
is the entry in the Admission Register.

11.  Upon dismissal of the suit, the appellant herein filed A.S.No.138 of 1996.
The lower appellate court framed the following points for its consideration:-
1. Whether the suit is barred under Section 58 of the Limitation Act?

2. Whether the plaintiff can question the genuineness of Ex.B1 will dated 09-01-
1984?

3. Whether Ex.B1 Will, dated 09-01-1984 is true, valid and binding on the
plaintiff?

4. Whether the partition pleaded by the plaintiff is true, valid and binding on
the defendants?

5. Whether the plaintiff was in possession of suit property as on the date of
suit or earlier?

The appeal was dismissed.

12.  The basic premise on which the appellant claimed the relief of declaration
of title was that half of the item No.1 and the entire item No.2 of the schedule
property have fallen to his share in a family partition that is said to have
taken place in the year 1966.  Remaining half of the item No.1 was said to have
been purchased by him through Ex.A-2. 

13.  An individual can certainly acquire title to an item of property, if it has
fallen to his share in a partition.  If the partition is through a decree of a
Court or a written document, filing of the decree or the document, as the case
may be, would go a very long way in establishing the title.  
If on the other
hand, the partition is oral, the evidence to prove it, can be adduced.  Such
evidence may comprise of the depositions of the persons, who were allotted
shares, or those acquainted with the partition or the revenue records, that
reflect the partition.

14.  In the instant case, except stating that the property has fallen to his
share, the appellant did not elaborate the manner in which the partition has
taken place.
The basic aspects that are required to be stated and proved in
relation to partition are, the composition of the joint family or coparcenery
i.e., the members comprising of it, the existence of the properties that are
held by it, the shares that are allotted to various coparceners and in
particular, the person pleading the partition.  The plaint is blissfully silent
in all these aspects.

15.  Sometimes, the necessity to prove the facts that are pleaded in a suit may
not arise in case the defendants do not dispute it. 
 If there is not only a
specific denial, but also a fresh case presented by the defendant, the plaintiff
would be under obligation to file a rejoinder apart from proving the facts
pleaded by him in the plaint.
The plea raised by the defendant that the
appellant is a stranger to the Maturi family, his father came to the house of
Subbarangaiah as a farm servant and that no partition has taken place during the
life time of Subbarangaiah, 
were not at all contradicted by filing any
rejoinder.  Added to that, the appellant did not prove the factum of partition
much less the details thereof.  Hence, there was a clear failure on the part of
the appellant to prove the case pleaded by him.

16.  Much reliance was placed by the appellant upon orders passed by the Land
Reforms Tribunal, filed as Ex.A-1, and deposition of Subbarangaiah in O.S.No.60
of 1971, filed as Ex.A-5.  An observation by the Tribunal does not confer title.
So far as Ex.A-5 is concerned, the appellant is not a party to O.S.No.60 of 1971
nor that was a suit for declaration of any rights.  It was suit filed by the
wife of Subbarangiah for maintenance and that ended in compromise.  No rights
can be said to have accrued to the appellant from the decree passed in that
suit.

17.  The appellant has also relied upon the deposition of Subbarangaiah in
O.S.No.60 of 1971 (Ex.A-5).  Assuming that there was any admission, it does not
enure to the benefit of the appellant, particularly, when the scope of the suit
itself was very limited.  
At any rate, the deposition of a witness in a suit
looses its significance, if the suit was either dismissed for default or was decreed on the basis of compromise. 

18.  It may be true that the entries in the revenue records for a particular period were in favour of the appellant vis-a-vis the suit schedule properties.
However, at the instance of the respondents, the entries are said to have been
altered in favour of the respondents and Ex.B-8 is filed in that behalf.  
Though
Ex.B-1 was not proved, it does not make much difference, as long as the
appellant herein failed to prove facts pleaded by him.  This Court does not find
any basis to interfere with the judgments passed by the trial Court and the
lower appellate Court.

19.  The second appeal is dismissed.  There shall be no order as to costs.
____________________  
L. NARASIMHA REDDY, J    
January 05, 2012.