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Thursday, December 13, 2012

the respondent sought a recall of the order dated 13.02.2008 on the ground that he could subsequently come to know that his marriage with the appellant was void on the ground that at the time of the said marriage the appellant was already married to one Rohit Kumar Mishra. In support, the respondent – husband had placed before the learned trial court the certificate of marriage dated 18.04.2003 between the appellant and the said Rohit Kumar Mishra issued by the competent authority under Section 13 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1954’)- It is only upon a declaration of nullity or annulment of the marriage between the parties by a competent court that any consideration of the question whether the parties had lived in a “relationship in the nature of marriage” would be justified. In the absence of any valid decree of nullity or the necessary declaration the court will have to proceed on the footing that the relationship between the parties is one of marriage and not in the nature of marriage. We would also like to emphasise that any determination of the validity of the marriage between the parties could have been made only by a competent court in an appropriate proceeding by and between the parties and in compliance with all other requirements of law. Mere production of a marriage certificate issued under Section 13 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 in support of the claimed first marriage of the appellant with Rohit Kumar Mishra was not sufficient for any of the courts, including the High Court, to render a complete and effective decision with regard to the marital status of the parties and that too in a collateral proceeding for maintenance. Consequently, we hold that in the present case until the invalidation of the marriage between the appellant and the respondent is made by a competent court it would only be correct to proceed on the basis that the appellant continues to be the wife of the respondent so as to entitle her to claim all benefits and protection available under the DV Act, 2005.


|REPORTABLE       |


           IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                  CRIMINAL APPELATE JURISDICTION

            CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos.2032-2033  of 2012
(Arising out of SLP (Criminal) Nos. 8076-8077 of 2010

Deoki Panjhiyara                                 ...Appellant

Versus

Shashi Bhushan Narayan Azad &  Anr.                    …Respondents



                            J  U  D  G  M  E  N T



RANJAN GOGOI, J.



1.    Leave granted.

2.    The appellant, who was married to the respondent in   the  year  2006,
had filed a petition under Section  12  of  the  Protection  of  Women  from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  ‘the  DV  Act’)
seeking certain reliefs  including  damages  and  maintenance.   During  the
pendency of the aforesaid application the appellant   filed  an  application
for interim maintenance which was granted by  the  learned  trial  court  on
13.02.2008 at the rate of Rs.2000/- per month.  The  order  of  the  learned
trial court was affirmed by the learned Sessions  Judge  on  09.07.2008.  As
against the aforesaid order, the respondent (husband) filed a Writ  Petition
before the High Court of Jharkhand.

3.    While the Writ Petition was pending, the respondent  sought  a  recall
of the order dated 13.02.2008 on the ground that he could subsequently  come
to know that his marriage with the appellant was void on the ground that  at
the time of the said marriage the  appellant  was  already  married  to  one
Rohit Kumar Mishra.  In support, the respondent – husband had placed  before
the learned  trial  court  the  certificate  of  marriage  dated  18.04.2003
between the appellant  and  the  said  Rohit  Kumar  Mishra  issued  by  the
competent authority under Section 13  of  the  Special  Marriage  Act,  1954
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 1954’).

4.   The learned trial court by order dated 7.8.2009 rejected the  aforesaid
application on the ground that notwithstanding the certificate issued  under
Section 13 of the  Act  of  1954,  proof  of  existence  of  the  conditions
enumerated in Section 15 of the Act would still required to be  adduced  and
only thereafter the certificate issued under Section 13 of the  Act  can  be
held to be valid.

5.      The  aforesaid  order  dated  07.08.2009  was  challenged   by   the
respondent-husband in a revision application before  the  High  Court  which
was heard alongwith the writ petition filed earlier.  Both  the  cases  were
disposed of by the impugned common order dated 09.04.2010 holding  that  the
marriage certificate dated 18.04.2003 issued under Section 13 of the Act  of
1954 was conclusive proof of the first marriage of the  appellant  with  one
Rohit Kumar Mishra which had the effect of rendering  the  marriage  between
the appellant and the respondent null and void.  Accordingly,  it  was  held
that as the appellant was not the legally wedded wife of the respondent  she
was not entitled to maintenance granted by the learned courts below.  It  is
against the aforesaid order of the High Court that the present appeals  have
been filed by the appellant – wife.

6.    We have heard Shri Gaurav Agarwal, learned counsel for  the  appellant
and Shri Mahesh Tiwari, learned counsel for the respondent.

7.    Learned counsel for the  appellant  has  strenuously  urged  that  the
allegation of the earlier marriage between the  appellant  and  Rohit  Kumar
Mishra had been denied by the appellant at all stages and the said  fact  is
not substantiated only by the Marriage Certificate dated  18.04.2003.   Even
assuming the marriage between the appellant and the respondent to  be  void,
the parties having lived together, a relationship in the nature of  marriage
had  existed  which  will  entitle  the  appellant  to  claim  and   receive
maintenance under  the  DV  Act,  2005.   Placing  the  legislative  history
leading to the aforesaid enactment, it is urged  that  in  the  Bill  placed
before the Parliament i.e. Protection from Domestic Violence Bill,  2002  an
“aggrieved person” and “relative” was, initially, defined in  the  following
terms :

      “Section 2………

      (a)  “aggrieved  person” means any woman who is or has  been  relative
      of the respondent and who alleges to have been  subjected  to  act  of
      domestic violence by the respondent;

      (b)…

      ( c )…

      (d)….

      (e)….

      (f)…

      (g)…

      (h)….

      (i)”relative” includes  any  person  related  by  blood,  marriage  or
      adoption and living with the respondent.”



      Thereafter, the different clauses of the Bill  were  considered  by  a
Parliamentary Standing Committee and recommendations were made  that  having
regard to the object sought to be  achieved  by  the  proposed  legislation,
namely, to protect women from domestic  violence  and  exploitation,  clause
(2)(i) defining “relative” may be suitably  amended  to  include  women  who
have been living in relationship akin to marriages as well as  in  marriages
considered invalid by law. Pursuant to the aforesaid recommendation made  by
the Standing Committee, in place of the expression “relative”  appearing  in
clause 2(i) of the Bill, the  expression  “domestic  relationship”  came  be
included in clause (f)  of  Section  2  of  the  Act.   Learned  counsel  by
referring  to  the  definition   of   “aggrieved   person”   and   “domestic
relationship”  as  appearing  in  the  DV  Act,  2005  has  urged  that  the
legislative intent to include women, living in marriages subsequently  found
to be illegal or even in relationships resembling  a  marriage,  within  the
protective umbrella of the DV Act is absolutely clear and the same  must  be
given its full effect.  It is submitted that  having  regard  to  the  above
even if the marriage of  the  appellant  and  the  respondent  was  void  on
account of the previous  marriage  of  the  appellant,  the  said  fact,  by
itself, will not disentitle the appellant  to  seek  maintenance  and  other
reliefs under the DV Act, 2005.

8.    Before proceeding further it will be appropriate to  notice,  at  this
stage, the definition of the expressions “aggrieved  person”  and  “domestic
relationship” appearing in Section 2(a) and (f) of the DV Act, 2005.

      “Section 2…..

      (a)   “aggrieved person” means any women who is, or  has  been,  in  a
      domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been
      subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent;

      (b)   ……

      (c)   ……

     d)     ……

      (e)   ……

      (f)   “domestic relationship” means a relationship between two persons
      who live or have, at any point of time, lived  together  in  a  shared
      household, when  they  are  related  by  consanguinity,  marriage,  or
      through a relationship in the nature  of  marriage,  adoption  or  are
      family members living together as a joint family.”



9.    Learned counsel, in all fairness, has also drawn the attention of  the
court to a decision rendered by a  coordinate  Bench  in   D.  Velusamy  vs.
D.Patchaimmal[1]  wherein  this  court  had  occasion   to   consider    the
provisions of Section 2(f) of the DV Act to come to the  conclusion  that  a
“relationship in the nature of marriage” is akin to a  common  law  marriage
which requires,  in addition to proof of the fact  that  parties  had  lived
together in a shared household as defined in Section 2(s)  of  the  DV  Act,
the following conditions to be satisfied:

      a) The couple must hold themselves out to society as  being  akin  to
         spouses.

      b) They must be of legal age to marry.

      c) They must be otherwise qualified to enter into a  legal  marriage,
         including being unmarried.

      d) They must have voluntarily cohabited and held  themselves  out  to
         the world as being akin to spouses for  a  significant  period  of
         time…….”

                                                                   [Para 33]




10.   Learned counsel has, however, pointed out  that  in  Velusamy  (supra)
the issue was with regard to the meaning of expression “wife”  as  appearing
in Section 125 Cr.P.C. and therefore reference to the provisions of  Section
2(f) of the DV Act, 2005 and the conclusions recorded were not required  for
a decision of the issues arising in the  case.  Additionally,  it  has  been
pointed out that while rendering its opinion  in  the  aforesaid  case  this
Court had no  occasion  to  take  into  account  the  deliberations  of  the
Parliamentary Standing Committee on the different clauses of  Protection  of
Women from Domestic Violence Bill, 2002. It is also urged that the  equation
of the expression “relationship in the nature of  marriage”  with  a  common
law marriage and the stipulation of the four requirements noticed  above  is
not  based  on  any  known  or  acceptable  authority  or  source  of   law.
Accordingly, it is submitted that the scope and expanse  of  the  expression
“relationship in the nature of marriage” is open  for  consideration  by  us
and, at any rate, a reference of the said question to a larger  bench  would
be justified.

11.   Opposing the contentions advanced on behalf of the  appellant  learned
counsel for the respondent – husband has submitted that  the  object  behind
insertion of the expression “relationship in  the  nature  of  marriage”  in
Section 2(f) of the  DV Act  is to protect women  who have been misled  into
marriages by the male spouse by concealment of the  factum  of  the  earlier
marriage of the husband.  The Act  is  a  beneficial  piece  of  legislation
which  confers  protection  of  different  kinds  to  women  who  have  been
exploited or misled into a marriage.  Learned counsel has pointed  out  that
in the present case the situation is, however, otherwise. From the  marriage
certificate dated 18.04.2003 it is clear  that  the  appellant  was  already
married to one Rohit Kumar Mishra which fact was known to  her  but  not  to
the respondent.  The second marriage which is void and also gives rise to  a
bigamous relationship was voluntarily entered into by the appellant  without
the knowledge of the husband. Therefore, the appellant is  not  entitled  to
any of the benefits under the DV Act. In fact, grant of maintenance  in  the
present case would amount to conferment of benefit  and  protection  to  the
wrong doer which would go against the avowed  object  of  the  Act.  Learned
counsel has also submitted that the conduct of the appellant makes it  clear
that she had approached the court by suppressing  material  facts  and  with
unclean hands which disentitles her to  any  relief  either  in  law  or  in
equity.  In this regard the decision of this  court  in  S.P.  Changalvaraya
Naidu vs. Jagannath and others[2] has been placed before us.

12.   Having considered the submissions advanced  by  the  learned  counsels
for the contesting parties, we are of the view that  the  questions  raised,
namely, whether the appellant and the respondent have/had lived together  in
a shared household  after  their  marriage  on  4.12.2006;  if  the  parties
have/had lived together whether the same gives rise to relationship  in  the
nature of marriage within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the DV  Act,  2005;
whether the decision of this Court in Velusamy (supra) is  an  authoritative
pronouncement on the expression “relationship in  the  nature  of  marriage”
and if so whether the same would require reference to a  larger  Bench,  may
all be premature and  the  same  need  not  be  answered  for  the  present.
Instead,  in  the  first  instance,  the  matter  may  be  viewed  from  the
perspective indicated below.

13.   The Respondent before us had claimed (before the trial court  as  well
as the  High  Court)  that  the  marriage  between  him  and  the  appellant
solemnised on 4.12.2006, by performance of rituals in accordance with  Hindu
Law, was void on account of the  previous  marriage  between  the  appellant
with one Rohit Kumar Mishra. In support thereof, the respondent relied on  a
marriage certificate dated 18.4.2003 issued under Section 13 of the  Special
Marriage Act, 1954. Acting solely on the basis  of  the  aforesaid  marriage
certificate the learned trial court as well as the High Court had  proceeded
to determine the validity of the marriage between the  parties  though  both
the courts were exercising jurisdiction in  a  proceeding  for  maintenance.
However, till date, the marriage between the parties is yet to  be  annulled
by a competent court. What would be the  effect  of  the  above  has  to  be
determined first inasmuch as if, under the law,  the  marriage  between  the
parties still subsists the  appellant  would  continue  to  be  the  legally
married wife of the respondent so as to be  entitled  to  claim  maintenance
and other benefits under the DV Act,  2005.  Infact,  in  such  a  situation
there  will  be  no  occasion  for  the  Court  to  consider   whether   the
relationship between the parties is in the nature of a marriage.

14.   Admittedly, both the appellant and the respondent are governed by  the
provisions of the  Hindu  Marriage  Act,  1955.  Section  11  of  the  Hindu
Marriage  Act  makes  it  clear  that  a  marriage  solemnised   after   the
commencement of the Act “shall be null and  void  and  may,  on  a  petition
presented by either party thereto against the other party,  be  so  declared
by a decree of nullity if it  contravenes  any  one  of  the  conditions  so
specified in clauses (i), (iv) and (v) of Section 5.”

15.   While considering the provisions of Section 11 of the  Hindu  Marriage
Act, 1955 this Court in Yamunabai v. Anantrao[3] has taken the view  that  a
marriage covered by Section 11 is void-ipso-jure, that  is,  void  from  the
very inception. Such a marriage  has to be ignored as not  existing  in  law
at all. It was further held by this Court that a formal declaration  of  the
nullity of such a marriage is not a mandatory  requirement  though  such  an
option is available to either of the parties to a marriage.

      It must, however,  be noticed that in Yamunabai (supra) there  was  no
dispute between the parties either as regards the existence or the  validity
of the first marriage on the basis of which the second marriage was held  to
be ipso jure void.



16.   A similar view has been expressed by this Court in  a  later  decision
in M.M. Malhotra v.  Union  of  India[4]   wherein  the  view  expressed  in
Yamunabai (supra) was also noticed and reiterated.

17.   However, the facts in which the decision in M.M. Malhotra (supra)  was
rendered would require to be noticed in some detail:

      The appellant M.M. Malhotra was, inter alia, charged in a departmental
proceeding for contracting a plural marriage. In reply to the  charge  sheet
issued it was pointed out that the allegation of plural marriage was not  at
all tenable inasmuch as in a suit filed by  the  appellant  (M.M.  Malhotra)
for a declaration that the respondent (wife) was not his wife on account  of
her previous marriage to one D.J. Basu the said fact i.e. previous  marriage
was admitted by the wife leading to a declaration of the invalidity  of  the
marriage between the parties. The opinion of this  court  in  M.M.  Malhotra
(supra) was, therefore, once again rendered in  the  situation  where  there
was no dispute with regard to the factum of the earlier marriage of  one  of
the spouses.

18.   In the present case, however,  the  appellant  in  her  pleadings  had
clearly, categorically and consistently denied that she was married  to  any
person known  as  Rohit  Kumar  Mishra.  The  legitimacy,  authenticity  and
genuineness of the  marriage  certificate  dated  18.4.2003  has  also  been
questioned by the appellant. Though Section 11 of the  aforesaid  Act  gives
an option to either of the parties to a void marriage to seek a  declaration
of invalidity/nullity of such marriage, the exercise of such  option  cannot
be understood to be in all  situations  voluntarily.  Situations  may  arise
when recourse to a court for  a  declaration  regarding  the  nullity  of  a
marriage claimed by one of the spouses to be a void marriage, will  have  to
be insisted upon in departure to the normal rule.  This,  in  our  view,  is
the correct ratio of the decision of this Court  in  Yamunabai  (supra)  and
M.M. Malhotra (supra).  In this  regard,  we  may  take  note  of  a  recent
decision rendered by this Court  in  A.  Subash  Babu  v.  State  of  Andhra
Pradesh & Anr.[5] while dealing with the question  whether  the  wife  of  a
second marriage contracted during the validity of the first marriage of  the
husband would be a “person aggrieved” under Section 198 (1)(c) of  the  Code
of Criminal  Procedure  to  maintain  a  complaint  alleging  commission  of
offences under  section  494  and  495  IPC  by  the  husband.  The  passage
extracted below effectively illuminates the issue:

      “Though the law specifically does not cast obligation on either  party
      to seek declaration of nullity of marriage and it may be open  to  the
      parties even without recourse to the Court to treat the marriage as  a
      nullity,  such  a  course  is  neither  prudent  nor  intended  and  a
      declaration in terms of Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act will have
      to be  asked  for,  for  the  purpose  of  precaution  and/or  record.
      Therefore, until the declaration  contemplated  by  Section 11 of  the
      Hindu Marriage Act is made by a competent Court, the woman  with  whom
      second marriage is solemnized continues to  be  the  wife  within  the
      meaning of  Section 494 IPC  and  would  be  entitled  to  maintain  a
      complaint against her husband.”



19.    In the present case, if according to  the  respondent,  the  marriage
between him and the appellant was void on account of the  previous  marriage
between the appellant and Rohit Kumar Mishra the respondent  ought  to  have
obtained the necessary declaration from the competent court in view  of  the
highly contentious questions  raised  by  the  appellant  on  the  aforesaid
score.  It is only upon  a  declaration  of  nullity  or  annulment  of  the
marriage between the parties by a competent court that any consideration  of
the question whether the parties had lived in a “relationship in the  nature
of marriage” would be justified. In the  absence  of  any  valid  decree  of
nullity or the necessary declaration the court will have to proceed  on  the
footing that the relationship between the parties is  one  of  marriage  and
not in the nature of marriage. We would also  like  to  emphasise  that  any
determination of the validity of the  marriage  between  the  parties  could
have been made only by a competent court in  an  appropriate  proceeding  by
and between the parties and in compliance with  all  other  requirements  of
law. Mere production of a marriage certificate issued under  Section  13  of
the Special Marriage Act, 1954 in support of the claimed first  marriage  of
the appellant with Rohit Kumar Mishra was not  sufficient  for  any  of  the
courts, including the  High  Court,  to  render  a  complete  and  effective
decision with regard to the marital status of the parties and that too in  a
collateral proceeding for maintenance. Consequently, we  hold  that  in  the
present case until the invalidation of the marriage  between  the  appellant
and the respondent is made by a competent court it would only be correct  to
proceed on the basis that the appellant continues to  be  the  wife  of  the
respondent so as to  entitle  her  to  claim  all  benefits  and  protection
available under the DV Act, 2005.

20.   Our above conclusion would render consideration of any  of  the  other
issues raised wholly  unnecessary  and  academic.   Such  an  exercise  must
surely be avoided.

21.    We, accordingly, hold that the interference made by  the  High  Court
with the grant of maintenance in favour of the  appellant  was  not  at  all
justified. Accordingly, the order dated 09.04.2010 passed by the High  Court
is set aside and the present appeals, are allowed.



                                  …………… ……………………….J.
                                  [ P. SATHASIVAM ]



                                  ……………………………………J.
                                  [RANJAN  GOGOI]

New Delhi,
December  12, 2012


-----------------------
[1]         (2010) 10 SCC 469

[2]         AIR 1994 SC 853

[3]        AIR 1988 SC 645
[4]        2005 (8) SCC 351
[5]          2011 (7) SCC 616



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18





The analysis of the materials clearly show that two versions of the incident adduced by the prosecution are discrepant with each other In the light of the above discussion, even if we accept the evidence of prosecution witnesses that A-2 was having a sword and PW-3 sustained injuries at his instance, considering his individual act, he can only be convicted under Section 324 of IPC and taking note of his age and of the fact that he was in custody from 14.04.1992 till 09.05.1992 during the trial and again from 31.01.2011 to 12.04.2012 (roughly one year and four months), we feel that the ends of justice would be met by altering the sentence to the period already undergone. The conviction and sentence is modified to the extent mentioned above and Criminal Appeal No. 634 of 2012 is disposed of accordingly.By order dated 10.05.2012, this Court directed Dr. Mohammad Khalil Chisti – being a national of Pakistan-appellant in Crl.A. No. 634 of 2012 or his nominee to deposit a sum of Rs. 5 lakhs as security with the Registry of this Court within a period of two weeks from that date and on fulfilling the above condition, the appellant was permitted to leave India and visit his home country, i.e., Pakistan. It is informed to us that the said condition has been complied with and an amount of Rs. 5 lakhs was deposited. By another order dated 17.09.2012, this Court directed the Registry to invest the amount deposited by the appellant in an interest bearing account in any Nationalised Bank initially for a period of one year. In view of our conclusion that no further custody is required, the Registry is directed to return the said amount to Dr. Mohammed Khalil Chisti or his nominee forthwith. It is further directed that if the passport or any other document of the appellant is in the custody of the trial Court or any other authority of the Government of India, they are directed to return the same to him and he is free to return to his country without any restriction. Taking note of his age and academic qualification etc., to facilitate such course, the concerned department of the Government of India is directed to issue necessary visa and complete all the formalities for his smooth return to his country.In the light of the evidence and conclusion in respect of Yasir Chisti (A-1) and Akil Chisti (A-3), the appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 635 of 2012, taking note of their individual acts, they can only be convicted under Section 324 of IPC and also in view of the fact that A-1 and A-3 have served approximately 11 and 10 months respectively, the same would be sufficient and no further imprisonment is required, hence, both of them are directed to be released forthwith, if they are not required in any other case. 41) With the above modification, both the appeals are disposed of accordingly.


                                  REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                      1 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 634 OF 2012



Dr. Mohammad Khalil Chisti                    .... Appellant(s)

            Versus

State of Rajasthan & Ors.                     .... Respondent(s)

                                      2

                                    WITH


                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 635 OF 2012




Yasir Chisti & Anr.                                .... Appellant(s)

            Versus

State of Rajasthan                                    .... Respondent(s)






                               J U D G M E N T

P.Sathasivam,J.

1)    These appeals are directed  against  the  common  judgment  and  order
dated 20.12.2011 passed by the  High  Court  of  Judicature  for  Rajasthan,
Bench at Jaipur in D.B. Criminal Appeal Nos. 189 and  188  of  2011  whereby
the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed  the  appeals  filed  by  the
appellants herein and affirmed the judgment dated 31.01.2011 passed  by  the
Court of Additional Sessions Judge (Fast  Track)  No.1,  Ajmer  in  Sessions
Case No.157 of 2001.
2)    Brief facts
(a)   The case relates to a fight between  two  groups  of  Khadim  Mohalla,
Jhalra, Ajmer which culminated into the death of one Idris and  registration
of 2 FIRs being Nos. 90 and 91 of 1992.
(b)   On 14.04.1992, an altercation took place between Khalil  Chisti  (A-2)
and Khurshid Pahalwan – cousin of Aslam Chisti (the complainant in  FIR  No.
90 of 1992) during a function at the house of one Shabbir on account of  old
rivalry.
On the same evening, Khurshid had called Idris-cousin  brother  of
Shabbir for having the matter resolved by way of a  compromise  between  the
two parties.
 In pursuance of the same,  Idris,  Shamim,  Aslam,  Mustqueem,
Asif, Sagir and Javed (relatives) proceeded  towards  the  house  of  Khalil
Chisti where they found  Khalil  Chisti  (A-2),  Yasir  Chisti  (A-1),  Akil
Chisti (A-3) and Farukh Chisti (A-4) who were  already  present  there.
  On
entering the house, they realized that Khalil (A-2) was having sword in  his
hand and Farukh (A-4) was holding a gun whereas Yasir and Akil  were  having
revolvers and the accused party immediately closed the door from behind  and
Khalil Chisti (A-2) shouted “no one should escape, kill all  of  them.”
 On
seeing their intention, the complainant party tried to run in order to  save
their lives at which time Farukh (A-4) fired a shot at Idris which  resulted
into injury to his right eye.  Khalil (A-2) also gave a sword  blow  to  the
complainant-Aslam Chisti which struck on his forehead  and  Yasir  and  Akil
also opened fire.  Later on, considering  the  injured  to  have  been  shot
dead, the accused persons fled away.  Subsequently, Khurshid and Shamim  had
taken Aslam Chisti and Idris to the hospital where Idris  succumbed  to  his
injuries.
(c)   On the same day, i.e., on  14.04.1992,  Aslam  Chisti  lodged  an  FIR
being No. 90 of 1992 at Police Station  Ganj,  Ajmer  against  Yasir  (A-1),
Khalil (A-2), Akil (A-3) and Farukh (A-4).
(d)   On the same day, at about 10:30 to 11:00 p.m., another FIR  being  No.
91 of 1992 was registered at P.S. Ganj, Ajmer on the statement made by  Akil
Chisti, while under treatment, wherein he stated that at about 5:00 to  5:30
p.m., when he along with  other  persons  were  sitting  in  his  house,  he
suddenly noticed pelting of stones on the grills of the house.  When all  of
them went on the roof top  to  understand  the  matter,  they  found  Idris,
Shamim, Aslam, Mustqueem, Asif, Sagir and Javed standing  there  duly  armed
with weapons.
On enquiring about the same, Idris stabbed Farukh (A-4)  with
a knife and Shamim opened fire on Akil (A-3) which missed  the  target.   In
the meantime, Akil (A-3) brought a rifle of his father but Sagir,  Asif  and
Javed snatched the same from him and Aslam stabbed him into his  waist  from
behind leading to his collapse.  Asif also opened fire on to him  which  hit
Idris.  A number of persons had gathered in  the  neighbourhood  on  hearing
the hue and cry.
(e)   After  investigation,  chargesheets  were  filed  against  4  persons,
namely, Yasir, Khalil, Akil and Farukh in FIR No. 90 of 1992 and  against  6
persons, namely, Shamim, Aslam, Mustqueem, Asif, Sagir and  Javed  in  Cross
FIR No. 91 of 1992 and both  the  cases  were  committed  to  the  Court  of
Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) No.1, Ajmer and  were  registered  as
Sessions Case No. 157/2001 (FIR No.90/1992) and Sessions Case  No.  178/2001
(FIR No.91/1992).
(f)   The trial Court, by judgment dated 31.01.2011  in  Sessions  Case  No.
157 of 2001, convicted Farukh Chisti (A-4),  Yasir  Chisti  (A-1)  and  Akil
Chisti (A-3) under Sections 302 and 324 read with Section 34 of  the  Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (in short  ‘the  IPC’)  whereas  Khalil  Chisti  (A-2)  was
convicted under Sections 302 and 324 of the IPC.   A-1,  A-2,  A-3  and  A-4
were sentenced to undergo RI for life along with a fine of Rs. 20,000/-,  in
default, to further undergo RI for a period of  6  months  for  the  offence
punishable under Section 302 of IPC.  They all  were  further  sentenced  to
undergo simple imprisonment for 2 years along with a fine  of  Rs.  2,000/-,
in default, to further undergo simple  imprisonment  for  1  month  for  the
offence punishable under Section 324 read with Section 34 of IPC.
(g)   On the same day, the trial Court  convicted  the  accused  persons  in
Session Case No. 178 of 2001 and sentenced all of them to suffer RI  for  10
years alongwith a fine of Rs.10,000/-, in default,  to  further  undergo  RI
for 6 months for the offence punishable under Section 307 read with  Section
149 of IPC.  They were further sentenced to RI for  2  years  under  Section
148 of IPC, RI for 3 years  with  a  fine  of  Rs.1,000/-,  in  default,  to
undergo RI for one month under Section 452 and RI for 2 years under  Section
324 read with Section 149 of IPC.  Challenging the said  judgment,  all  the
accused persons named in FIR 91 of 1992 filed Criminal  Appeal  No.  131  of
2011 before the High Court which is still pending.
(h)   Challenging the judgment in Session Case No.  157/2001,  Yasir  Chisti
and Akil Chisti filed  D.B.  Criminal  Appeal  No.  188/2011,  Dr.  Mohammad
Khalil Chisti filed D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 189 of 2011 and  Farukh  Chisti
filed D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 423 of 2011 before  the  High  Court.   By  a
common judgment dated 20.12.2011, the High Court dismissed all  the  appeals
and affirmed the judgment passed by the trial Court.
(i)   Aggrieved by the said judgment, Dr. Mohammad Khalil  Chisti  preferred
Criminal Appeal No. 634 of 2012 and Yasir Chisti and Akil  Chisti  preferred
Criminal Appeal No. 635 of 2012 before this Court.
 3)   Heard Mr. Uday U. Lalit,  learned  senior  counsel  for  Dr.  Mohammed
Khalil Chisti –appellant in Criminal Appeal No.  634  of  2012,  Mr.  K.T.S.
Tulsi, learned senior counsel for Yasir Chisti and Akil  Chisti,  appellants
in Criminal Appeal No. 635 of 2012, Mr. Rahul  Verma,  learned  counsel  and
Jasbir Singh Malik, learned Additional Advocate General  for  the  State  in
both the appeals and Mr. Mukul Gupta, learned senior counsel for  the  Union
of India in Criminal Appeal No. 634 of 2012.
Contentions:
4)    After taking us through FIR No. 90 of 1992 and Cross  FIR  No.  91  of
1992 dated 14.04.1992, the entire material relied on by the prosecution  and
defence, the decision of the trial Court in Session Case  No.  157  of  2001
and Session Case No. 178 of 2001 and the reasoning of the impugned  decision
of the High Court, Mr. Lalit as well as Mr.  K.T.S.  Tulsi,  learned  senior
counsel  contended  that  the  members  of  the  complainants’  party   were
aggressors, they formed an unlawful assembly armed with various weapons  and
had climbed upon the roof of their premises in order  to  beat  the  accused
persons in furtherance of their common  object.   It  is  further  submitted
that the appellants/accused  persons  had  not  committed  any  offence  and
whatever they did was in exercise of their right of private defence.   There
is no evidence on record to show that the accused persons  were  having  any
common  object  to  commit  murder  of  the  deceased-Idris.   They  further
submitted that the trial Court as well as the  High  Court  failed  to  take
into consideration the fact that  the  complainant  party  including  Idris,
Aslam, Asif, Shamim, Mustqueem, Sagir and Javed  were  duly  armed  and  had
come to the place of  the  accused  persons.   In  such  circumstances,  the
accused appellants deserve to get the benefit of right  of  private  defence
on their person.  They also submitted that there is no  explanation  by  the
prosecution as to how Farukh (A-4) and Akil (A-3) sustained injuries.   They
also contended that the prosecution  suppressed  the  true  genesis  of  the
incident.
5)    On the other hand, learned counsel for the State  submitted  that  the
judgment of the trial Court as well as the High Court is based  on  evidence
and in the light of the settled principles of law.  It is pointed  out  that
the accused appellants, after full preparation, sent a message to  Khurshid,
Shamim, Idris and other members of the complainant party to  meet  at  their
house.  It is pointed out that as soon as the  members  of  the  complainant
party started climbing the stairs of their house and moved towards the  roof
top, the accused appellants followed them and inflicted injuries by  use  of
various weapons, consequently, Idris and Aslam were  seriously  injured  and
later on Idris succumbed to his injuries.  Finally, they submitted that  the
prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable  doubt  and  the  impugned
judgment does not suffer from any infirmity or illegality.
6)    We have carefully considered the rival  submissions  and  perused  all
the relevant materials.
Discussion:
7)    It is not in dispute that in respect of the same  incident  that  took
place on 14.04.1992, there had been two FIRs, namely, FIR  No.  90  of  1992
and Cross FIR No. 91 of 1992.  In these appeals, we are concerned about  FIR
No. 90 of  1992  in  which  the  present  appellants  and  one  Farukh  were
implicated as accused.  The said FIR  was  registered  on  the  basis  of  a
complaint made by one Syed Md. Aslam who was examined  as  PW-3.   He  is  a
resident of Mian House, Khadim Mohalla, Ajmer.  In  the  complaint,  it  has
been stated that on 14.04.1992, on the occasion of “Peela Ki  Rasm”  at  the
place of Shabbir, an altercation took place between Khalil Chisti (A-2)  and
Khurshid Pahalwan on account of old rivalry  following  which  Khurshid  had
called his brother Idris in the evening in order to  finally  sort  out  the
matter by way of a compromise.  When  Idris,  Shamim-his  relative  and  Md.
Aslam Chisti-the complainant went to the house of  Khurshid  at  that  time,
one Tariq Mohammed informed them that Khalil Chisti is calling  them  for  a
compromise following which, all of them, namely, Idris, Shamim,  Md.  Aslam,
Khurshid, his brother Sagir went  to  the  house  of  Khalil.   On  reaching
there, they found that Khalil, Farukh, Yasir and Akil were present there  at
home.  It has been further stated that having entered into  the  house,  the
accused party closed the door from behind  and  Khalil  shouted  that  “they
should not escape, kill all of them”.   It  has  been  further  stated  that
Khalil was armed with a sword and Farukh was carrying a  rifle.   When  they
tried to escape, at that time, Farukh (A-4) opened fire on Idris  (deceased)
which hit at his right eye and he fell down.  Khalil (A-2) gave a blow  with
the sword to the head of Md. Aslam Chisti-the complainant  which  struck  on
his forehead and hit his temple and eye.  Akil (A-3) and  Yasir  (A-1),  who
were armed with revolvers also opened fire.  All  the  accused  persons  ran
away and Khurshid and Shamim had  taken  Idris  to  the  hospital  where  he
succumbed to his injuries.  The above statement was recorded  at  5.45  p.m.
on 14.04.1992.
8)    Though we are not directly concerned about the cross  FIR  No.  91  of
1992 dated 14.04.1992, in view of the plea and the defence  of  the  present
appellants, it is desirable to note down the  contents  of  the  same.   The
complainant in this cross FIR is Akil Chisti (A-3),  the  appellant  in  the
present appeal.  The  following  persons  were  shown  as  accused,  namely,
Idris, Shamim, Aslam, Mustqueem, Asif, Sagir and Javed.   According  to  the
complainant, Akil Chisti, who is  a  resident  of  Baitool,  Jhalra,  Dargah
Sharief, Ajmer that on 14.04.1992 at 5 to 5.30 p.m.,  when  he  was  in  the
room of Farukh Chisti, they  suddenly  noticed  pelting  of  stones  on  the
grills of their house. When they went on  the  roof  top,  they  found  that
Idris, his brother Shamim, Aslam, Mustqueem,  Asif,  Sagir  and  Javed  were
standing there, armed with weapons and Shamim was armed with a  country-made
pistol.  When Farooq questioned about pelting of stones, Idris  stabbed  him
with a knife.  Shamim opened fire on him which  missed  him.   It  has  been
further stated that Akil-the complainant brought a  12-bore  licensed  rifle
of his father but Sagir, Asif and Javed  snatched  it  from  him  and  Aslam
inflicted stab wounds in his waist from  behind  and  he  fell  down.   Asif
opened fire from his rifle which missed him and hit Md. Idris.  A number  of
persons had gathered in the neighbourhood who raised a clamour “maar diya  -
maar diya”.  These people assaulted them by  entering  inside  their  house.
The above statement was recorded  at  10.30  p.m.  by  SHO  Police  Station,
Ajmer.
9)    It is relevant to note that in respect of FIR  No.  90  of  1992,  the
present appellants and one Farukh  were  convicted  and  sentenced  to  life
imprisonment by the trial Court as  affirmed  by  the  High  Court.   It  is
brought to our notice that in respect of cross FIR No. 91 of 1992, the  same
trial Judge on the same day i.e. 31.01.2011 convicted and sentenced  all  of
them for various offences and the appeals filed  against  those  convictions
is still pending in the High Court.
10)   Now, let us consider the witnesses and  materials  relied  on  by  the
prosecution and the defence.
Aslam Chisti (PW-3):
11)   In his evidence, he deposed that deceased Idris  was  his  cousin  and
Khurshid and Sahir were also  his  cousins.   Shamim  is  his  real  younger
brother.  He identified Khalil Chisti (A-2),  a  Pakistani  citizen  in  the
Court.  He was familiar with accused Farukh, Yasir and  Akil.   He  narrated
that he came to know from  his  father  that  some  altercation  took  place
between Khalil Chisti (A-2) and Khurshid Pahalwan on account of old  rivalry
on the occasion of “Peela ki Rasm” at the  place  of  Shabbir.   He  further
narrated that in the evening of 14.04.1992, when he was  at  his  home  with
his brothers Shamim and Idris, the son of Khurshid came to  their  residence
and informed that his father  was  calling  all  of  them.   After  reaching
there, Khurshid asked them to sort out the matter.   In  the  meantime,  one
Tariq Mohammad informed them that Khalil Chisti (A-2) has called them for  a
meeting.  He along with others went to  the  residence  of  Khurshid.   From
there, he, along with the deceased-Idris, Shamim,  Khurshid,  Sagir,  Javed,
Mustqueem and Asif proceeded towards the house of  Khalil  and  on  reaching
there they noticed that Khalil was  standing  at  the  entrance.   On  their
entering into the house of Khalil, the other persons  present  there  closed
the door from behind and Khalil shouted to kill all of them.   In  order  to
save their lives, he along with Idris, Shamim, Asif and others climbed  over
the Baitool Manzil and reached the roof top of Kaptan house.  At that  time,
accused Khalil, Farukh, Yasir and Akil came to that  place  and  Khalil  was
carrying a bare sword and Farukh was armed with  a  rifle,  Yasir  and  Akil
were holding rifles.  Farukh fixed the target and  shot  fired  his  brother
Idris.  The bullet had hit  on  the  right  eye  of  Idris  leading  to  his
collapse there itself.  Khalil hit two injuries of sword in  his  skull  and
forehead.  Akil and Yasir  had  also  opened  fires  from  their  respective
revolvers but they managed to escape. He admitted that  the  fire  triggered
from the revolver of Akil and Yasir had hit  none.  In  the  course  of  the
above narration, PW-3 admitted that two police personnel had arrived on  the
roof top, particularly, when Akil and Yasir were firing.  From the  evidence
of PW-3, it is clear that though he narrated the prosecution case about  the
involvement of the present appellants as well as  the  role  of  Farukh,  he
admitted the arrival of two police personnel,  viz.,  Bhanwar  Singh  (PW-4)
and Bhanwarlal Sharma (PW-5) on the  roof  top  when  Akil  and  Yasir  were
firing.
Bhanwar Singh (PW-4):
12)   At the relevant time, PW-4 was posted as LHC at Police  Post  Tripolia
Gate, Police Station Ganj, Ajmer.  In his evidence, he has  stated  that  on
14.04.1992, at about  4.30  p.m.,  he  received  information  from  wireless
control room that a quarrel has broken out  at  Jhalra.   On  receiving  the
said information, PW-4 and Bhanwar Lal Sharma (PW-5), reached the  spot  and
went to the house of Ahmed Chisti.  On enquiry, they came to know that  some
altercation took place on the issue of children in the  morning.   In  order
to make a call to the Control Room, both of them went to the  room  situated
at the first floor of  house  of  one  Ahmed  Chisti  and  while  they  were
returning, they found 5-6 persons duly armed with sword  and  hockey  sticks
climbed upstairs from the ground.  They  tried  to  prevent  them  but  they
didn’t stop.  Out of them, he knew Shamim,  Aslam  and  Idris.   He  further
deposed that they were shouting “bring out Farukh”, “bring out Pakistani (A-
2) and where he is, we will kill him”.  He also  stated  that  in  spite  of
their intervention, the assailants reached at the roof  top  of  the  second
floor of that house.  Both PWs 4 and 5 followed them.  He also  stated  that
he had seen Farukh Chisti (A-4) with a 12 bore gun with him.  Khalil  (A-2),
Yasir and Akil were having swords with them.  Farukh went to  the  roof  and
fired from his gun and the shot hit the  right  eye  of  Idris,  because  of
which, he died on the spot.  When PW-5 came in between,  he  also  sustained
injuries.  He was there at the same place till 11.30 p.m.  and  after  11.30
p.m. he went to Tripolia Gate, P.S. made  necessary  entries  in  the  daily
diary in his own handwriting which is Exh. P-3.  He left  constable  Bhanwar
Lal Sharma (PW-5) at the place of incident.

13)   Since PW-4 contradicted his statement made under Section  161  of  the
Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973  (in  short  ‘the  Code’),  the  Public
Prosecutor sought for permission to cross examine him.  Even in  the  cross-
examination, he admitted that he made a statement to police and at the  time
of incident, deceased-Idris and others were armed  with  swords  and  hockey
sticks and they were going upstairs which is Exh. P-4.  Though  PW-4  turned
hostile, to some  extent,  he  being  a  police  constable,  on  receipt  of
information and after recording the same in the diary  he  left  the  police
station along with Bhanwar Lal Sharma (PW-5)  another  police  constable  to
the spot and noticed that the complainant parties rushed  towards  the  roof
top with sword and hockey  sticks.   It  is  also  clear  that  the  present
accused  appellants  were  inside  the  house  of  Khalil  Chisti  and   the
complainant’s group reached there with arms.  It has been  also  made  clear
that he was accompanied by another constable PW-5  and  after  noticing  the
incident, he rushed to P.S. Tripoli and made necessary entries leaving  PW-5
at the spot.  As rightly pointed out  by  learned  senior  counsel  for  the
appellants, the presence of PWs 4 and  5  at  the  relevant  spot  and  time
cannot be disputed.  It is also clear from the evidence  of  PW-4  that  the
complainant parties reached the spot armed with  sword  and  hockey  sticks.
The presence of the complainants with arms is the subject  matter  of  Cross
FIR No. 91 of 1992.
Bhanwar Lal Sharma (PW-5):
14)   At the relevant time, he was posted as a  police  constable  with  the
police station of Tripolia Gate and was on duty  on  14.04.1992.   According
to him, on that day,  around  4.30  p.m.,  he  and  another  constable  PW-4
received an  information  on  wireless  from  the  Police  Control  Room  in
Tripolia P.S. that some fight is  going  on  at  Jhalra.   On  hearing  such
information, both of them went to Jhalra and noticed that there was no  such
brawl.  In order to inform the same to the Control Room, they  went  to  the
house of one Ahmed Chisti by  using  the  stairs.   At  the  same  time,  he
noticed Shamim (A-6 in Cross FIR) running upstairs with hockey stick in  his
hand, Aslam (A-1 in Cross FIR) armed with sword  and  two  more  people  who
were armed with weapons were going upstairs.  Both of them (PW-4 and  (PW-5)
tried to stop them but they did not stop.  Both of them went to  the  Chisti
Manzil’s room and on the roof, they noticed Shamim Chisti  and  others  were
abusing Farukh and others and then they went  to  Jamil  Chisti’s  room  and
started pelting stones.  After seeing the seriousness of the  situation  and
to avoid untoward incident, PW-5 went downstairs to call other police  staff
while PW-4 remained on the roof.  He also heard the sound of  a  shot  being
fired.  When he came back after making a call, he saw  Idris  was  lying  on
the Kaptan’s room and was bodily injured.  At the place  of  incident  where
Idris was lying, a 12-bore gun was also found 10-15 ft. away from the  spot.
 He also explained that based on his message, other police men came  to  the
spot.  He also mentioned the  injuries  sustained  by  him  when  they  were
trying to stop Shamim and others on the stairs.  He  further  narrated  that
in the midnight, around 12.50 a.m., they came  to  Tripolia  Gate  P.S.  and
made necessary entries of their arrival time which is Exh.  P-3.   Since  he
contradicted his statement  under  Section  161  of  the  Code,  the  Public
Prosecutor sought permission of the court in  order  to  cross-examine  him.
Even in the cross-examination, he asserted that at the time of the  incident
only Shamim (A-6 in Cross FIR) was  throwing  stones  downstairs  with  full
force in Jamil Chisti’s house.  He also mentioned about the fights and  FIRs
were registered against Aslam and Shamim.
15)   Like PW-4, PW-5 narrated the incident starting  from  the  receipt  of
wireless message till the clash at Jamil Chisti’s house.  It is relevant  to
point out that PWs 4 and 5 were not associated with any group, on the  other
hand, they were policemen of the Tripoli P.S. having jurisdiction  over  the
area.  The entries  in  the  concerned  registers  of  their  departure  and
arrival to the police station also prove their statement.  In the  light  of
their statement, we have carefully analyzed their evidence and it  is  clear
that the complainant’s party came to  the  spot  with  weapons  like  sword,
hockey sticks and few from that group also pelted  stones.   These  aspects,
though the trial Court and the High  Court  failed  to  give  credence,  the
appellants are  justified  in  claiming  that  the  complainants  group  was
responsible for the incident and the injuries caused to them.

Evidence of PWs 6, 13 and 18:
16)   At the instance of the counsel for the State, we  were  taken  through
the evidence of PWs 6, 13 and 18.  No doubt, they supported the  prosecution
stand and claim that it was the appellants  who  caused  the  injuries  and,
particularly, Idris  died  due  to  the  shot  fired  by  Farukh  using  his
revolver.  They also stated that they sustained injuries due  to  the  sword
used by Khalil Chisti (A-2).  It is also their  claim  that  the  other  two
accused Yasir Chisti  and  Akil  Chisti,   A-1  and  A-3  respectively  used
revolver but their shots had hit none.  Like PWs 6,  13  and  18,  PW-3  who
sustained sword injury at the instance  of  A-2  also  explained  about  the
prosecution case.  It is also seen from the evidence of PW-3 that Farukh (A-
4) also sustained  injuries  for  which  there  is  no  explanation  by  the
prosecution.  Relying on the evidence of PWs 3, 6  13  and  18  even  if  we
accept the case of the prosecution,  the  statement  of  official  witnesses
examined on the side of the prosecution, namely, PWs 4 and  5  clearly  show
that the complainants were rushing towards the house of  Chisti  with  sword
and hockey sticks and  also  pelted  stones.   In  these  circumstances,  as
rightly pointed out by the counsel for the appellants, the complainants  who
were accused in the cross case were also responsible  for  their  individual
act.
Occurrence at the residence of A2:
17)   All the prosecution witnesses, namely, PWs  3,  4,  5,  6  13  and  18
deposed that the incident occurred at the residence of A-2,  namely,  Chisti
Manzil.  It is also clear from  the  categorical  statement  of  two  police
constables, viz., PWs 4 and 5 that on receipt of a  phone  call,  they  left
Tripoli PS and reached the house of  Kaptan  which  is  adjacent  to  Chisti
Manzil.  It is clear that it was not the appellants/accused who went out  of
their house with arms, but even according to the prosecution witnesses,  the
incident took place at the residence of A-2.  It is also clear that  all  of
them entered the said house with weapons like sword and hockey sticks  which
we have already noted from the evidence relied on by the prosecution.
No explanation as to how Farukh (A-4) and Akil (A-3) sustained injuries:

18)    The  prosecution  document,  viz.,  injury  report  of  Farukh  dated
14.04.1992 and injury report of Akil dated 14.04.1992 have  been  placed  as
Annexure P-5 (Colly).  The injury report relating  to  Farukh  Chisti  (A-4)
issued by the Department of  Medical  Jurist,  J.L.N.  Medical  College  and
Hospital, Ajmer reads as under:-
        “Admitted in MSW II, Time-5.45 p.m. date – 14.4.1992,   839/92
             Department of Medical and Health, Rajasthan, Jaipur
                             Injury Report Form
                            Accompanied by Police
Injury Report of Shri Farukh Chisti s/o Shri Sadiq Chisti, age 26 years,
Caste-Muslim, Resident of Khadim Mohalla, Ajmer, Police Report
No…………..dated……….enclosed.

|Nature  |Size of|Hurt |Normal |Which  |Identificat|X-Ray  |Special  |
|of      |each   |on   |or     |type of|ion mark of|Tajbeez|descripti|
|injury  |injury |which|grievou|weapon |the injured|       |on       |
|of      |in     |part |s      |caused |           |       |         |
|slash,  |inches,|of   |       |hurt   |           |       |         |
|wound,  |length,|the  |       |       |           |       |         |
|crushing|width  |body |       |       |           |       |         |
|etc.    |and    |     |       |       |           |       |         |
|        |depth  |     |       |       |           |       |         |
|1       |2      |3    |4      |   5   |    6      |  7    |  8      |
|Stab wound 4x0.5 cm x depth in| Sharp |M.F.1 ½ x  |       |Fresh    |
|on umbilical region, right    |       |½  cm old  |       |         |
|lateral to umbilical obliquely|       |scar on    |       |         |
|placed                        |       |left side  |       |         |
|Stab 4x3/4 cm x on left       |       |of right   |       |         |
|lateral side of chest wall 6  |       |leg upper  |       |         |
|cm below axilla in mid axillur|       |third      |       |         |
|line.                         |       |           |       |         |
|Stab wound 3x1x? on left      |       |           |       |         |
|scapular region               |       |           |       |         |
|Injured in the state of shock |       |           |       |         |
|        |        |        |        |   |Opinion    |        |        |
|        |        |        |        |   |after      |        |        |
|        |        |        |        |   |surgical   |        |        |
|        |        |        |        |   |note       |        |        |

                                             Sd/-
                                          Dr. V.D. Kavia, MD
                                      Reader, Head of Department
                                     Department of Medical Jurist
                                  J.L.N.  Medical  College   and   Hospital,
Ajmer”



Operative notes of Farukh Chisti reads as follows:
                               Operative notes

Patient Name : Farukh Chishti
No. 9741
                                           Date : 14/4/92

Surgical Pathology – Stab wound

                   1. Abdomen
                   2. Lt. Chest
                   3. Back
Anaesthesia – G.A.

Operation – Explanatory haprotomy and repair of the tear in stomach.
Incision – Continuation of the stab wound (Rt. Paramedian) – On exploration
it was found that there was a tear in the anterior stomach wall up to the
serosa.  The vessel was bleeding which was ligated and tear sutured and
closed in layers.

The wounds on the chest (Lt. side and back were muscle deep and sutured in
single layer.

Dr. Neera Jain                          Surgeons
Dr. Sanjay Kolani                       Dr. B.L. Laddha
                                       Dr. K.K. Dangayeh
                                          Dr. Paramjeet Singh
                                       Dr. Ashok Naraina

Forwarded in original to SHO, PS Ganj in continuation to IR No. 839/92
Injury Nos. 2 & 3 are simple and Injury No. 1 is grievous (dangerous) in
nature.”

The injury report of Akil Chisti (A-3) reads as under:
       “Admitted in MSW II, Time-5.45 p.m. date – 14.4.1992,   839/92
             Department of Medical and Health, Rajasthan, Jaipur
                             Injury Report Form
Injury Report of Shri Akil Chisti s/o Shri Jamil Chisti, age 24 years,
Caste-Muslim, Resident of Police Report No…………..dated……….
enclosed.



|Nature  |Size of|Hurt |Normal |Which  |Identificat|X-Ray  |Special  |
|of      |each   |on   |or     |type of|ion mark of|Tajbeez|descripti|
|injury  |injury |which|grievou|weapon |the injured|       |on       |
|or      |in     |part |s      |caused |           |       |         |
|slash,  |inches,|of   |       |hurt   |           |       |         |
|wound,  |length,|the  |       |       |           |       |         |
|crushing|width  |body |       |       |           |       |         |
|etc.    |and    |     |       |       |           |       |         |
|        |depth  |     |       |       |           |       |         |
|1       |2      |3    |4      |   5   |    6      |  7    |  8      |
|Stab wound 4x1 cm x …..       | Sharp |M.         |3x1 cm |Fresh    |
|Back of left region           |       |           |       |         |
|Obliquely placed              |       |           |       |         |
|        |        |        |        |   |Opinion    |Old scar|        |
|        |        |        |        |   |after      |on outer|        |
|        |        |        |        |   |surgical   |side of |        |
|        |        |        |        |   |note       |back and|        |
|        |        |        |        |   |           |right   |        |
|        |        |        |        |   |           |heal    |        |

                                             Sd/-
                                          Dr. V.D. Kavia, MD
                                      Reader, Head of Department
                                     Department of Medical Jurist
                                  J.L.N.  Medical  College   and   Hospital,
Ajmer”


Operative notes of Akil Chisti reads thus:
                              “Operative notes

Patient Name :  Akil Chisti
R.No. 9740
                                           Date : 14/4/92

Surgical Pathology –Cut wound back



Anaesthesia – L.A.

Operation – Repair of the wound.

Notes : There was a wound on the back side near midline in lumber region
which was muscle deep and sutured in layers.



Dr. Neera Jain                          Surgeons
Dr. Sanjay Kolani                       Dr. B.L. Laddha
                                       Dr. K.K. Dangayeh
                                          Dr. Paramjeet Singh
                                       Dr. Ashok Naraina

                    Sd/-
               (Dr. K.K. Dangayeh)


Forwarded in original to SHO, PS Ganj in continuation to IR No. 840/92
Injury No. 1 is simple in nature.”

19)   The above ‘injury reports’ of Farukh Chisti and Akil  Chisti  as  well
as their respective  ‘operative  notes’  clearly  show  that  both  of  them
sustained injuries on 14.04.1992 in the same incident.  The report  relating
to Farukh shows that he sustained stab wound injuries  due  to  the  use  of
sharp edged weapons.  Operative notes relating to him also show that  injury
Nos. 2 and 3 are simple and injury no. 1 is grievous (dangerous) in  nature.
 Injury report relating to Akil Chisti also shows  that  he  sustained  stab
wound injuries by use of  sharp  edged  weapon.   Though  all  the  relevant
aspects, namely, the  injuries  sustained  by  two  accused  appellants  are
available  in  the  materials  placed  by  the  prosecution,  there  is   no
explanation at all as to  how  they  sustained  those  injuries.   In  other
words, the prosecution failed to prove the genesis of the  incident  and  in
fact they suppressed the same.
20)   In Lakshmi Singh and Others vs. State of  Bihar,  (1976)  4  SCC  394,
this Court held that:
      “… … It is well settled that fouler the crime, higher the  proof,  and
      hence in a murder case where one of the  accused  is  proved  to  have
      sustained injuries in the course of  the  same  occurrence,  the  non-
      explanation of such injuries by the prosecution is a  manifest  defect
      in the prosecution case and shows that the origin and genesis  of  the
      occurrence  had  been  deliberately  suppressed  which  leads  to  the
      irresistible conclusion that the prosecution has not come out  with  a
      true version of the occurrence. … …”


It is clear that where the prosecution fails to explain the injuries on  the
accused, two results follow:  (1)  that  the  evidence  of  the  prosecution
witness is untrue and (2) that the injuries probabilize the  plea  taken  by
the  appellants.   In  a  murder  case,  non-explanation  of  the   injuries
sustained by the accused at about the time  of  the  occurrence  or  in  the
course of altercation is a very important circumstance from which the  court
can draw the following inferences:
       “(1) that the prosecution has suppressed the genesis and  the  origin
      of the occurrence and has thus not presented the true version;


      (2) that the witnesses who have denied the presence of the injuries on
      the person of the accused are lying  on  a  most  material  point  and
      therefore their evidence is unreliable;


      (3) that in case  there  is  a  defence  version  which  explains  the
      injuries on the person of the accused it is rendered probable so as to
      throw doubt on the prosecution case.”

21)   It is further clear that the omission on the part of  the  prosecution
to explain the injuries on the person of the accused  assumes  much  greater
importance where the evidence consists of interested or  inimical  witnesses
or where the defence gives a version  which  competes  in  probability  with
that of the prosecution one.  However, there may be  cases  where  the  non-
explanation  of  the  injuries  by  the  prosecution  may  not  affect   the
prosecution case.  This principle would apply to cases  where  the  injuries
sustained by the accused are minor and superficial or where the evidence  is
so clear and cogent, that it outweighs the effect of  the  omission  on  the
part of the prosecution to explain the injuries.
22)   In Waman and Others  vs.  State  of  Maharashtra,  (2011)  7  SCC  295
wherein one of us (P. Sathasivam, J.) reiterated the  very  same  principles
and held that:
      “36. Ordinarily, the prosecution is not obliged to explain each injury
      on an accused even though the injuries might have been caused  in  the
      course of occurrence, if the injuries are minor in nature, however, if
      the prosecution fails to explain a  grievous  injury  on  one  of  the
      accused persons which is established to have been caused in the course
      of  the  same  occurrence  then  certainly  the  court  looks  at  the
      prosecution case with a  little  suspicion  on  the  ground  that  the
      prosecution has suppressed the true version of the incident.  However,
      if the evidence is clear, cogent and creditworthy then non-explanation
      of certain injuries sustained by the deceased or injury on the accused
      ipso facto cannot be the  basis  to  discard  the  entire  prosecution
      case.”


 23)  Mr. Tulsi, learned senior  counsel  for  the  appellants  in  Criminal
Appeal  No.  635  of  2012  contended  by  pointing  out  that   since   the
complainant’s were the aggressors,  armed  with  sword,  hockey  sticks  and
pelted stones, the appellants/accused are entitled to  avail  the  right  of
private defence for which he relied  on  various  principles  enunciated  by
this Court.
24)   In Raghubir Singh vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. (2011) 12  SCC  235,
the following conclusion in para 16 has been pressed into service:
      “16. In the light of the facts that have  been  enumerated  above,  it
      would be seen that the observations of the High Court that both  sides
      had come to do battle appears to be justified as this is an assessment
      on an appreciation of the evidence which cannot be said to be palpably
      wrong so as to invite the intervention of this Court. The  observation
      in Gajanand case that in order to bring the matter within a free fight
      both sides have to come armed  and  prepared  to  do  battle  must  be
      applied in the present case with the result that each accused would be
      liable for his individual act.”


25)   In Krishnan vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2006) 11 SCC 304, the  following
principles have been relied on:
      “15. It is now well settled  that  the  onus  is  on  the  accused  to
      establish that his action was in exercise  of  the  right  of  private
      defence. The plea can be established  either  by  letting  in  defence
      evidence or from the prosecution evidence itself, but cannot be  based
      on speculation or mere surmises. The accused need not  take  the  plea
      explicitly. He can succeed in his plea if he is able to bring out from
      the evidence of the prosecution witnesses or other evidence  that  the
      apparent criminal act was committed by him in exercise of his right of
      private defence. He should make  out  circumstances  that  would  have
      reasonably caused an apprehension in his mind  that  he  would  suffer
      death or grievous hurt if he does not exercise his  right  of  private
      defence. There is a clear distinction between  the  nature  of  burden
      that is cast on an accused under Section 105 of the Evidence Act (read
      with Sections 96 to 106 of the Penal Code)  to  establish  a  plea  of
      private defence and the burden that is cast on the  prosecution  under
      Section 101 of the Evidence Act to prove its case. The burden  on  the
      accused is not as onerous as that which lies on the prosecution. While
      the prosecution is required to prove  its  case  beyond  a  reasonable
      doubt,  the  accused  can  discharge  his  onus  by   establishing   a
      preponderance of probability (vide Partap v. State of U.P,  Salim  Zia
      v. State of U.P. and Mohinder Pal Jolly v. State of Punjab.


      16. In Sekar v. State this Court observed: (SCC p. 355)
      “A plea of right of private defence cannot be based  on  surmises  and
      speculation. While considering whether the right of private defence is
      available to an accused, it is not relevant  whether  he  may  have  a
      chance to inflict severe and mortal injury on the aggressor. In  order
      to find whether right of private defence  is  available  or  not,  the
      injuries received by the accused,  the  imminence  of  threat  to  his
      safety, the injuries caused  by  the  accused  and  the  circumstances
      whether the accused had time to have recourse  to  public  authorities
      are all relevant factors to be considered. Whether in a particular set
      of circumstances, a person acted in  the  exercise  of  the  right  of
      private defence, is a question of fact to be determined on  the  facts
      and  circumstances  of  each  case.  No  test  in  the  abstract   for
      determining such a question can be  laid  down.  In  determining  this
      question  of  fact,  the  court  must  consider  all  the  surrounding
      circumstances. It is not necessary for the accused to plead in so many
      words that he acted in self-defence. If the  circumstances  show  that
      the right of private defence was legitimately exercised, it is open to
      the court to consider such a plea. In a  given  case,  the  court  can
      consider it even if the accused has not  taken  it,  if  the  same  is
      available to be considered from the material on record.”
                                         (emphasis supplied)
      17. The above legal position was  reiterated  in  Rizan  v.  State  of
      Chhattisgarh. After an exhaustive reference to  several  decisions  of
      this Court, this Court  summarised  the  nature  of  plea  of  private
      defence required to be put forth and the degree of proof in support of
      it, thus: (SCC pp. 670-71, para 13)
      “Under Section 105 of the Evidence Act, 1872, the burden of  proof  is
      on the accused, who sets up the plea  of  self-defence,  and,  in  the
      absence of proof, it is not possible for  the  court  to  presume  the
      truth of the plea of self-defence. The court shall presume the absence
      of such circumstances. It  is  for  the  accused  to  place  necessary
      material on record either by himself adducing positive evidence or  by
      eliciting  necessary  facts  from  the  witnesses  examined  for   the
      prosecution. An accused taking  the  plea  of  the  right  of  private
      defence is not required to call evidence; he can establish his plea by
      reference to circumstances transpiring from the  prosecution  evidence
      itself. The question in such a case would be a question  of  assessing
      the true effect of the prosecution evidence, and not a question of the
      accused discharging any burden. When the right of private  defence  is
      pleaded, the  defence  must  be  a  reasonable  and  probable  version
      satisfying the court that the harm caused by the accused was necessary
      for either warding off the attack  or  for  forestalling  the  further
      reasonable apprehension from the side of the accused.  The  burden  of
      establishing the plea of self-defence is on the accused and the burden
      stands discharged by showing preponderance of probabilities in  favour
      of that plea on the basis of the material on record. …
      The accused need not prove the  existence  of  the  right  of  private
      defence beyond reasonable doubt. It is enough for him to show as in  a
      civil case that the preponderance of probabilities is in favour of his
      plea.”
                                          (emphasis supplied)”
26)   In Babulal Bhagwan Khandare and  Another  vs.  State  of  Maharashtra,
(2005) 10 SCC 404, this Court held  that  non-explanation  of  the  injuries
sustained by the accused at about the time of occurrence or  in  the  course
of altercation is a very important circumstance.  It was further  held  that
the right of self defence  is  a  very  valuable  right,  serving  a  social
purpose and should not be construed narrowly.
27)   It is clear that it is the duty of  the  prosecution  to  explain  the
injuries sustained by the accused and establish the genesis of the  incident
by placing acceptable materials.  In the  case  on  hand,  we  have  already
pointed out there is enough material to show that in the course of the  very
same incident Farukh (A-4) and  Akil  (A-3)  also  sustained  injuries.   In
fact, Farukh sustained  grievous  injury  by  use  of  sharp  edged  weapon.
However, these injuries were not explained at all by the prosecution.
28)   Mr. Jasbir Singh Malik, learned counsel for the State by relying on  a
decision of this Court reported in Mitthulal and Another vs.  The  State  of
Madhya Pradesh, (1975) 3 SCC 529  submitted  that  evidence  in  cross  case
cannot be relied upon.  It is true that in the  said  decision,  this  Court
held that it has not accepted the  procedure  followed  by  the  High  Court
which has based its conclusion not only on the finding recorded in the  case
against the appellants therein and the four other  accused  but  also  taken
into account the  evidence  recorded  in  the  cross  case  against  Ganpat,
Rajdhar and others.  This Court held that the course  adopted  by  the  High
Court was clearly  impermissible.   There  is  no  dispute  about  the  said
proposition and in fact in the case on hand, neither  the  trial  court  nor
the High Court relied on the evidence led in the cross  case  but  the  same
were tried separately and in fact appeals are still pending before the  High
Court against the conviction in the cross case.
29)   The other decision relied on by  the  State  counsel  is  reported  in
Sambhu Das alias Bijoy Das and Another vs. State of  Assam,  (2010)  10  SCC
374 which shows that this Court in exercise of its powers under Article  136
of the Constitution will not reopen the findings  of  the  High  Court  when
there are concurrent findings of facts and  there  is  no  question  of  law
involved and the conclusion is not perverse.  The  above  proposition  holds
good.  We also reiterate that Article  136  of  the  Constitution  does  not
confer a right of appeal on a party.  It only  confers  discretionary  power
on this Court to be exercised  sparingly  to  interfere  in  suitable  cases
where  grave  mis-carriage  of  justice  has  resulted  from  illegality  or
misapprehension or mistake in reading evidence or from  ignoring,  excluding
or illegally admitting material evidence.
Summary:
30)   The analysis of the prosecution case, undoubtedly, has  led  two  sets
of evidence.  The evidence adduced suggest that the accused in  the  present
appeals are to some extent victims of armed aggression at the hands  of  the
deceased and his companions.  We have pointed out that Tariq  Mohammad  (PW-
1) deposed that he saw Idris (deceased) with a  knife  in  his  hand,  Mohd.
Aslam (PW-3), Sagir (PW-6), Shamim (PW-18)  and  others  armed  with  sticks
left for the house of the Farukh (A-4).  It was also deposed by him that  he
tried to stop Idris and others  but  in  vain.   Bhanwar  Singh  (PW-4)  and
Bhanwar Lal Sharma (PW-5) –the police constables, examined on  the  side  of
the prosecution, were present at the scene  of  offence.   We  have  already
dealt with the evidence of these two witnesses which clearly show  that  the
complainant’s party, i.e., accused in FIR No. 91 of  1992  were  armed  with
sword, hockey sticks etc. and entered into  Chisti  Manzil,  hurled  abuses,
threw stones on the inmates and exhorted to kill  Khalil  Chisti  (A-2)  and
Farukh (A-4).  These persons also deposed  that  Idris  (deceased)  and  the
accused in FIR No. 91 of 1992 were the aggressors in the incident.  PWs 4  &
5 were categorized as independent witnesses by the  trial  Court.   Even  in
their evidence, they did not attribute any specific overt act to Khalil  (A-
2).  M.A. Tariq I.O. (PW-25)  also  deposed  that  the  complainant’s  party
forcibly entered the house of the  appellants  herein  with  the  intent  to
attack them.
31)   Mohd. Aslam (PW-3), Sagir  Ahmed  (PW-6),  Sayeed  Javed  (PW-13)  and
Shamim  (PW-18)  were  examined  as  eye  witnesses   to   the   occurrence.
Admittedly, none of them offered any explanation to  the  admitted  injuries
received by Farukh (A-4) and Akil (A-3).  We have already  adverted  to  the
details as to the injury report relating to these persons.  In  the  absence
of any explanation by the prosecution, we are of  the  view  that  they  are
guilty of suppressing the real genesis of the occurrence.  The  trial  Court
had also condemned the  evidence  of  PW-18  for  narrating  a  parrot  like
version and also pointed out numerous improvements made.
32)   The analysis of the materials clearly show that two  versions  of  the
incident adduced by the prosecution are  discrepant  with  each  other.
 In
such a situation where the prosecution leads two sets of evidence  each  one
which contradicts and strikes at the other and shows it  to  be  unreliable,
the result would necessarily be  that  the  Court  would  be  left  with  no
reliable and trustworthy evidence upon which the conviction of  the  accused
might be  based.  
Though  the  accused  would  have  the  benefit  of  such
situation and the counsel appearing for the appellants prayed for  acquittal
of the appellants of all the charges, in view of  the  principles  which  we
have already discussed, we  are  of  the  view  that  each  accused  can  be
fastened with individual liability taking into  consideration  the  specific
role or part attributed to each of the accused.  In other words, both  sides
can be convicted for their individual acts and normally no right of  private
defence is available to either party  and  they  will  be  guilty  of  their
respective acts.
33)   Having regard to the facts and circumstances of  the  role  attributed
to Khalil (A-2), we are of the view that there is no scope for invoking  the
applicability of Section 34 IPC against  him.  Even  independent  witnesses,
viz., PWs 4 and 5 do not attribute any overt act to him.
34)   As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the  appellants,  in
the light of the case and cross-case, it would be in the fitness  of  things
that the respective appeals preferred  by  the  appellants  against  Session
Case No. 157 of 2011 and the one preferred by the convicts in Sessions  Case
No. 178 of 2011 ought to have been heard and disposed of  simultaneously  by
the High Court.  Unfortunately, such recourse has not been  adopted  by  the
High Court and we were informed that the other appeal (Crl. Appeal  No.  131
of 2011) relating to Sessions Case No. 178 of 2011 is still pending  on  the
file of the High Court.

35)   Coming to the other accused,  namely,  Yasir  Chisti  (A-1)  and  Akil
Chisti (A-3),  they  cannot  be  punished  and  fastened  the  liability  of
individual acts committed by them with the aid of  Section  34  IPC  without
acceptable materials.   Though  the  prosecution  witnesses  mentioned  that
these appellants had a pistol, they did not state whether anyone was hit  by
that pistol fire and no specific evidence was led in that the shot  emanated
from the pistol in their hand.  Even Mohd. Aslam  (PW-3)  -  the  informant,
stated before the Court that these appellants fired from their  pistols  but
no one was hit from that fire.
36)   As discussed earlier, the evidence of PWs 4 & 5 –  police  constables,
clearly shows that the complainant’s party was armed with sword  and  hockey
sticks and were abusing and pelting stones.  Sagir  (PW-6),  though  deposed
that the present appellants had a revolver and they fired from that  pistol,
without telling whether anybody was injured from such firing.   PW-4  –  one
of the prosecution  witnesses,  police  constable,  had  denied  that  these
appellants had revolvers, in fact, PWs 4 and 5 did not attribute  any  overt
done by the appellants, i.e., A-1 and A-3 and categorically stated that  the
complainant’s party was the armed aggressors.   It is relevant to point  out
that on the same day in Sessions Case No. 178 of 2001, the  informant  along
with five other co-accused was convicted under Sections 307, 324,  326,  452
and 148 IPC read with Section 149 IPC.  We are also  satisfied  that  though
the prosecution witnesses have stated  that  these  appellants  were  having
revolvers, the evidence of PWs 4 & 5 clearly shows  that  the  complainant’s
party were aggressors and the  present  appellants  were  not  carrying  any
revolver.
37)    In  the  light  of  the  facts  that  have  been  enumerated   above,
particularly, from the evidence of PWs 4 & 5 –  police  constables  attached
to the Tripolia Police Chowki, P.S. Ganj, and the materials abundantly  show
that the deceased and the complainant’s party were  also  armed  with  sword
and hockey sticks.  In the  absence  of  evidence  of  fire  shot  from  the
revolvers of A-1 and A-3 and in view of the statement of PWs 3, 6, 13  &  18
alleging against the present  appellants,  in  order  to  bring  the  matter
within a free fight both sides have to come armed and prepared to do  battle
must be applied in the present case with the result that each accused  would
be liable for his individual act alone.
Conclusion:
38)   In the light of the above discussion, even if we accept  the  evidence
of prosecution witnesses that A-2 was having  a  sword  and  PW-3  sustained
injuries at his instance, considering his individual act,  he  can  only  be
convicted under Section 324 of IPC and taking note of his  age  and  of  the
fact that he was in custody  from  14.04.1992  till  09.05.1992  during  the
trial and again from 31.01.2011 to 12.04.2012 (roughly  one  year  and  four
months), we feel that the ends of justice  would  be  met  by  altering  the
sentence to the period already undergone.  The conviction  and  sentence  is
modified to the extent mentioned above and Criminal Appeal No. 634  of  2012
is disposed of accordingly.
39)   By order dated 10.05.2012, this Court  directed  Dr.  Mohammad  Khalil
Chisti – being a national of Pakistan-appellant in Crl.A. No.  634  of  2012
or his nominee to deposit a  sum  of  Rs.  5  lakhs  as  security  with  the
Registry of this Court within a period of two weeks from that  date  and  on
fulfilling the above condition, the appellant was permitted to  leave  India
and visit his home country, i.e., Pakistan.  It is informed to us  that  the
said condition has been complied with and an  amount  of  Rs.  5  lakhs  was
deposited. By another  order  dated  17.09.2012,  this  Court  directed  the
Registry to invest the amount deposited by  the  appellant  in  an  interest
bearing account in any Nationalised Bank  initially  for  a  period  of  one
year.  In view of our conclusion that no further custody  is  required,  the
Registry is directed to return  the  said  amount  to  Dr.  Mohammed  Khalil
Chisti or his nominee  forthwith.   It  is  further  directed  that  if  the
passport or any other document of the appellant is in  the  custody  of  the
trial Court or any other authority of the  Government  of  India,  they  are
directed to return the same to him and he is free to return to  his  country
without any restriction.  Taking note of his age and academic  qualification
etc., to facilitate such course, the concerned department of the  Government
of  India  is  directed  to  issue  necessary  visa  and  complete  all  the
formalities for his smooth return to his country.
40)   In the light of the  evidence  and  conclusion  in  respect  of  Yasir
Chisti (A-1) and Akil Chisti (A-3), the appellants in  Criminal  Appeal  No.
635 of 2012, taking  note  of  their  individual  acts,  they  can  only  be
convicted under Section 324 of IPC and also in view of  the  fact  that  A-1
and A-3 have served approximately 11 and 10 months  respectively,  the  same
would be sufficient and no further imprisonment is required, hence, both  of
them are directed to be released forthwith, if they are not required in  any
other case.
41)   With  the  above  modification,  both  the  appeals  are  disposed  of
accordingly.




                            ...…………….…………………………J.


                                 (P. SATHASIVAM)






                            ...…....…………………………………J.


                              (RANJAN GOGOI)



NEW DELHI;
DECEMBER 12, 2012.

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