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Wednesday, December 12, 2012

whether the insurer is obliged under law to indemnify the owner of a goods vehicle when the employees engaged by the hirer of the vehicle travel with the owner of the goods on the foundation that they should be treated as “employees” covered under the policy issued in accordance with the provision contained under Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for brevity “the Act”). The policy, exhibit R-2/3/A, clearly states that insurance is only for carriage of goods and does not cover use of carrying passengers other than employees not more than six in number coming under the purview of the 1923 Act. The language used in the policy reads as follows:- “The Policy does not cover : 1. Use for organized racing, pace-making reliability trial or speed testing 2. Use whilst dwaing a trailer except the towing (other then for reward) or any one disabled mechanically propelled vehicle. 3. Use for varying passengers in the vehicle except employees (other than driver) not exceeding six in number coming under the purview of Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923.” On a bare reading of the aforesaid policy, there can be no iota of doubt that the policy relates to the insured and it covers six employees (other than the driver, not exceeding six in number) and it is statutory in nature. It neither covers any other category of person nor does it increase any further liability in relation to quantum. 26. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we repel the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant and as a fall-out of the same, the appeals, being sans merit, stand dismissed without any order as to costs.


                                                                 Reportable
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  8925  OF 2012
              (Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 17272 of 2006)

Sanjeev Kumar Samrat                        ... Appellant

                                  Versus
National Insurance Co. Ltd. and others        ... Respondents
                                    WITH
                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  8926  OF 2012
              (Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 17273 of 2006)

Sanjeev Kumar Samrat                        ... Appellant

                                  Versus
National Insurance Co. Ltd.                          ... Respondent

                               J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J.

      Leave granted.

   2. The centripodal issue that emanates for consideration in these appeals
      is whether the insurer is obliged under law to indemnify the owner  of
      a goods vehicle when the employees engaged by the hirer of the vehicle
      travel with the owner of the goods on the foundation that they  should
      be  treated  as  “employees”  covered  under  the  policy  issued   in
      accordance with the provision contained under Section 147 of the Motor
      Vehicles Act, 1988 (for brevity “the Act”).

   3. The expose’ of facts are that a truck bearing HP/10/0821 was hired  on
      12.4.2000 for carrying iron rod and cement by one Durga Singh who  was
      travelling with the goods along with two of his labourers.   When  the
      vehicle was moving through Khara Patthar to Malethi, 1.5 KM  ahead  of
      Khara Patthar,  about  4.30  p.m.,  it  met  with  an  accident  as  a
      consequence of which the labourers, namely, Nagru Ram and Desh Raj and
      also Durga Singh, sustained injuries and eventually succumbed  to  the
      same.

   4. The legal heirs of all  the  deceased  persons  filed  separate  claim
      petitions under Section 166 of the  Act  before  the  Motor  Accidents
      Claims Tribunal (II), Shimla (for short “the tribunal”).   Before  the
      tribunal, respondent No. 3, namely, National Insurance  Company  Ltd.,
      apart from taking other pleas, principally took the stand that it  was
      not liable to indemnify the labourers  employed  by  the  hirer.   The
      owner of the truck, the present appellant, admitted the fact of hiring
      the truck but advanced the plea  that  the  insurer  was  under  legal
      obligation to indemnify the owner.

   5. On consideration of the evidence brought on record, the tribunal  came
      to hold that the legal representatives of Nagru Ram and Desh Raj  were
      covered as per the insurance policy, exhibit RW-2/3/A, as  the  policy
      covered six employees and  accordingly  fixed  the  liability  on  the
      insurer.  As far as the legal representative of Desh Raj is concerned,
      the tribunal treated him as the owner of the goods who was  travelling
      along with the goods and accordingly saddled the liability on the  3rd
      respondent therein.

   6. Being grieved by the  awards  passed  by  the  tribunal,  the  insurer
      preferred FAO (MBA) Nos. 175, 176 and 178  of  2003  before  the  High
      Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla.  In appeal,  the  learned  single
      Judge, by order dated 13.1.2006, allowed FAO Nos. 175 and 176 of  2003
      wherein the legal representatives of the deceased employees  were  the
      claimants.  
As far as FAO No. 178 of 2003 is concerned, the High Court
      concurred with the finding recorded by the tribunal that  
Durga  Singh
      was the owner of the goods and travelling along with  the  goods  and,
      therefore, the insurer was liable to pay  compensation  to  his  legal
      representatives.  
It is worthy to note that as the  insurance  company
      had already deposited the amount  of  compensation,  the  High  Court,
      placing reliance on the decision in National Insurance Company Ltd. v.
      Baljit Kaur and others[1], directed that the insurance company  having
      satisfied the award shall be entitled to recover the same  along  with
      interest from the owner-insured by  initiating  execution  proceedings
      before the tribunal.  
Hence, the present appeals at  the  instance  of
      the owner of the vehicle.

   7. We have heard Mr. Rajesh Gupta, learned counsel for the appellant, and
      Mr. M. K Dua, learned counsel for respondent No. 1.

   8. It is submitted by Mr. Gupta that the High Court has committed serious
      error in coming to hold that an employee of the hirer is  not  covered
      without appreciating the terms of the policy which covers  the  driver
      and six employees.
Learned Counsel has laid  emphasis  on  the  words
      “any person” used in Section 147 of the Act.  Referring  to  the  said
      provision, it is urged by him that the term “employee” has to be given
      a broader meaning keeping in view the language employed in the  policy
      and also in view of the fact that the Act is  a  piece  of  beneficial
      legislation.  It is his further submission that there is a distinction
      between “passenger” in a goods vehicle and an “employee” of the  hirer
      of  the  vehicle  but  the  High  Court  has  gravely  erred  by   not
      appreciating the said distinction in proper perspective.

   9. Mr. M.K. Dua, learned counsel for the first respondent, combating  the
      aforesaid proponements, contended that the decision  rendered  by  the
      High Court is absolutely flawless inasmuch as the  entire  controversy
      is covered by many a dictum of this Court  some  of  which  have  been
      appositely referred to by the High Court.  It is urged by him that the
      extended meaning which is argued to be given to the term “employee” by
      the appellant is not legally acceptable as the employee has to be that
      of the insurer.  It is canvassed by  him  that  there  is  a  manifest
      fallacy in the argument propounded on behalf of the appellant that the
      policy covers such kinds of employees though on the  plainest  reading
      of the policy, it would be vivid that the same  does  not  cover  such
      categories of employees.   It  is  his  further  submission  that  the
      policy in question is an “Act  Policy”  and  in  the  absence  of  any
      additional terms in  the  contract  of  insurance,  the  same  can  be
      broadened to travel beyond the language  employed  in  the  policy  to
      cover the employees of the owner  of  the  goods  making  the  insurer
      liable.

  10.  To appreciate the controversy, it is necessary to  refer  to  certain
      statutory provisions.   Section  146  of  the  Act  provides  for  the
      necessity for injuries against third party risk.  On a reading of  the
      said provision, there can be no trace of doubt that the owner  of  the
      vehicle is statutorily obliged to obtain an insurance for the  vehicle
      to cover the third party risk, apart from the  exceptions  which  have
      been carved out in the said provision.  Section 147 of the  Act  deals
      with requirements of policies and limits of liability.   The  relevant
      part of Section 147 (1) is reproduced below:-
      “147. Requirements of policies and limits of liability.- (1) In  order
      to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance
      must be a policy which-


           (a) is issued by a person who is an authorised insurer; or


           (b) insures the person or classes of persons  specified  in  the
           policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2)—


              (i) against any liability which may be  incurred  by  him  in
              respect of the death of or  bodily  [injury  to  any  person,
              including owner of the goods or his authorised representative
              carried in the vehicle] or damage to any property of a  third
              party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a
              public place;


              (ii) against the death of or bodily injury to  any  passenger
              of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out  of  the
              use of the vehicle in a public place:


      Provided that a policy shall not be required—


           (i) to cover liability in respect of the death, arising  out  of
           and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person
           insured by the policy or in respect of bodily  injury  sustained
           by such an employee arising out of and  in  the  course  of  his
           employment other than a liability arising  under  the  Workmen's
           Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923) in respect of the  death  of,
           or bodily injury to, any such employee—


               (a) engaged in driving the vehicle, or


               (b) if it is a public service vehicle  engaged  as  conductor
               of the vehicle or in examining tickets on the vehicle, or


               (c) if it is a goods carriage, being carried in the  vehicle,
               or


        (ii) to cover any contractual liability.”


  11. Be it noted, before Section 147(1)(b)(i) came into  existence  in  the
      present incarnation, it stipulated that a policy of insurance must  be
      a policy which insured the person or classes of persons to the  extent
      specified in sub-section (2) against the liability incurred by him  in
      respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person  or  damage  to
      any property or third party caused by or arising out of the use of the
      vehicle in public place.
  12. Regard being had to the earlier  provision  and  the  amendment,  this
      Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Satpal Singh[2], scanned  the
      anatomy of the provision and also  of  Section  149  of  the  Act  and
      expressed the view  that  under  the  new  Act,  an  insurance  policy
      covering the third party risk does not exclude gratuitous passenger in
      a vehicle, no matter that the vehicle is of any type or class.  It was
      further opined that the decisions  rendered  under  the  1939  Act  in
      respect of gratuitous passengers were of no  avail  while  considering
      the liability of the insurer after the new Act came into force.
  13. The correctness of the said decision came up for consideration  before
      a three-Judge Bench in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Asha  Rani  and
      Others[3].  The learned Chief Justice, speaking for himself  and  H.K.
      Sema, J. took note of Section 147(1) prior to the  amendment  and  the
      amended  provision  and  the  objects  and  reasons  behind  the  said
      provision and came to hold as follows:-
        “The objects and reasons of clause 46 also state that  it  seeks  to
        amend Section 147 to include owner of the goods  or  his  authorised
        representative carried in the vehicle for the purposes of  liability
        under the insurance policy. It is no doubt true that  sometimes  the
        legislature amends the law by way of amplification and clarification
        of an inherent position which is there in the statute, but  a  plain
        meaning being given to the words used in the statute,  as  it  stood
        prior to its amendment of 1994, and as it stands subsequent  to  its
        amendment in 1994 and  bearing  in  mind  the  objects  and  reasons
        engrafted in the amended  provisions  referred  to  earlier,  it  is
        difficult for us to construe that the expression “including owner of
        the goods or his authorised representative carried in  the  vehicle”
        which was added  to  the  pre-existing  expression  “injury  to  any
        person” is either clarificatory or amplification of the pre-existing
        statute.  On  the  other  hand  it  clearly  demonstrates  that  the
        legislature wanted to bring within the  sweep  of  Section  147  and
        making it compulsory for the insurer to insure even  in  case  of  a
        goods  vehicle,  the  owner  of  the   goods   or   his   authorised
        representative being carried in a goods vehicle  when  that  vehicle
        met  with  an  accident  and  the  owner  of  the   goods   or   his
        representative   either   dies   or    suffers    bodily    injury.”
                   [Emphasis supplied]

14.   S.B. Sinha, J., in his concurring opinion, stated thus: -

        “Furthermore, sub-clause (i) of clause (b)  of  sub-section  (1)  of
        Section 147 speaks of liability which may be incurred by  the  owner
        of a vehicle in respect of death of or bodily injury to  any  person
        or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising  out
        of the use of the vehicle in a public place, whereas sub-clause (ii)
        thereof deals with liability which may be incurred by the owner of a
        vehicle against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of  a
        public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the  use  of  the
        vehicle in a public place.


            An owner of a passenger-carrying vehicle must pay  premium  for
        covering the risks of the passengers. If a liability other than  the
        limited liability provided for under the Act is to be enhanced under
        an insurance policy, additional premium is required to be paid.  But
        if the ratio of this Court's decision in New India Assurance Co.  v.
        Satpal Singh[4] is taken to its  logical  conclusion,  although  for
        such passengers, the owner of a goods carriage need not take out  an
        insurance policy, they would be deemed to have  been  covered  under
        the policy wherefor even no premium is required to be paid.”
                                                         [Emphasis supplied]
Being of the aforesaid view, the three-Judge Bench  overruled  the  decision
in Satpal Singh (supra).
15.   In Baljit Kaur (supra) and National Insurance  Co.  Ltd.  v.  Bommithi
Subbhayamma and Others[5], the aforesaid view was reiterated.

16.   In New India Assurance  Co.  Ltd.  v.  Vedwati  and  Others[6],  after
referring to the scheme of the Act and the earlier  pronouncements,  it  has
been held that the provisions  of  the  Act  do  not  enjoin  any  statutory
liability on the owner of a vehicle to  get  his  vehicle  insured  for  any
passenger travelling in a goods  carrier  and  the  insurer  would  have  no
liability therefor.

17.   In National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Cholleti Bharatamma  and  Others[7],
the Court laid down that the provisions engrafted under Section 147  of  the
Act do not enjoin any statutory liability on the owner of a vehicle  to  get
his vehicle insured for any passenger travelling  in  a  goods  vehicle  and
hence, any injury to any person in  Section  147(1)(b)  would  only  mean  a
third party and not a passenger travelling  in  a  goods  carriage,  whether
gratuitous or otherwise.

18.   At this juncture, we may refer with profit to the decision of a three-
Judge Bench in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Prembati Patel  and  Others[8]
wherein the legal representatives of the driver of the truck  had  succeeded
before the  High  Court  and  were  granted  compensation  of  Rs.2,10,000/-
repelling the contention of the insurer that the  liability  was  restricted
as provided under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (for short “the  1923
Act”).  After discussing the schematic  postulates  of  the  provision,  the
Court ruled that where a policy is taken by the owner of the goods  vehicle,
the liability of the insurance company would be  confined  to  that  arising
under the 1923 Act in case of an employer.  It  further  observed  that  the
insurance policy being in the nature of a contract, it  is  permissible  for
an owner to take such a policy whereunder the entire  liability  in  respect
of the death of or bodily injury to any such employee  as  is  described  in
Sub-Sections (a), (b) or (c) of the proviso  to  Section  147(1)(b)  may  be
fastened upon the insurance company and the insurer  may  become  liable  to
satisfy the entire award.  But for the said purpose, he may be  required  to
pay additional premium and the policy must clearly show that  the  liability
of the insurance company is unlimited.

19.   Keeping in view the aforesaid enunciation of law, it  is  to  be  seen
how the term “employee” used in Section 147 is required  to  be  understood.
Prior to that, it is necessary to state that as  per  Section  147(1)(b)(i),
the policy is required to cover a person including the owner  of  the  goods
or his authorised representative  carried  in  the  vehicle.   As  has  been
interpreted by this Court, an owner of the goods or his authorised agent  is
covered under the policy.  That is the statutory requirement.  It  does  not
cover any passenger.  We are absolutely conscious that  the  authorities  to
which we have referred to hereinbefore lay down the principle regarding non-
coverage of passengers.  The other principle that has been  stated  is  that
the  insurer’s  liability  as  regards  employee  is   restricted   to   the
compensation payable under the 1923 Act.   In  this  context,  the  question
that has been posed in the beginning to the effect whether the employees  of
the owner of goods would come  within  the  ambit  and  sweep  of  the  term
“employee” as used in Section 147(1), is to be answered.  In  this  context,
the proviso to Section 147(1)(b)  gains  significance.   The  categories  of
employees which have been enumerated in the sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c)  of
the proviso (i) to Section 147(1) are  the  driver  of  a  vehicle,  or  the
conductor of the vehicle if it is a public service vehicle or  in  examining
tickets on the vehicle, if it is a goods  carriage,  being  carried  in  the
vehicle.  It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that sub-
clause (c) is of wide import as it covers  employees  in  a  goods  carriage
being carried in a vehicle.  The  learned  counsel  for  the  insurer  would
submit that it should be read in the context of the entire  proviso,  regard
being had to the schematic concept  of  the  1923  Act  and  the  restricted
liability of the insurer.  It is further urged that contextually  read,  the
meaning  becomes  absolutely  plain  and  clear  that  employee   which   is
statutorily mandated to be taken by the insured only  covers  the  employees
employed or engaged by the employer as per the policy.

20.   It is the settled principle of law that the liability  of  an  insurer
for payment of compensation either could be statutory or contractual.  On  a
reading of the proviso to Sub-Section (1) of Section 147 of the Act,  it  is
demonstrable that the insurer is required  to  cover  the  risk  of  certain
categories of  employees  of  the  insured  stated  therein.  The  insurance
company is not under statutory obligation to cover all  kinds  of  employees
of the insurer as the statute  does  not  show  command.   That  apart,  the
liability of the  insurer  in  respect  of  the  said  covered  category  of
employees is limited to the extent of the liability that  arises  under  the
1923 Act.  There is also a stipulation in Section 147 that the owner of  the
vehicle is free to secure a policy of insurance  providing  wider  coverage.
In that event, needless to  say,  the  liability  would  travel  beyond  the
requirement of Section 147 of the Act, regard being had to  its  contractual
nature.  But, a pregnant one, the amount of premium would be different.

21.   At this stage, we may usefully refer to Section 167 of the  Act  which
reads as follows: -

         “167.  Option regarding claims for compensation in certain cases.-
         Notwithstanding anything contained in the  Workmen’s  Compensation
         Act, 1923 (8 of 1923) where the death of, or bodily injury to, any
         person gives rise to a claim for compensation under this  Act  and
         also under  the  Workmen’s  Compensation  Act,  1923,  the  person
         entitled to compensation may without prejudice to  the  provisions
         of Chapter X claim such compensation under either  of  those  Acts
         but not under both.”

From the aforesaid provision, it is  quite  vivid  that  where  a  death  or
bodily injury to any person gives rise to a claim under the Act as  well  as
under the 1923 Act,  the said  person  is  entitled  to  compensation  under
either of the Acts, but not under both.

22.   Coming to the scheme of the 1923 Act, it is worth noticing that  under
Section 3 of the said Act, the employer is liable  to  pay  compensation  to
the workman in respect of personal injury or death  caused  by  an  accident
arising out of or in the course of his employment.  Section 4  provides  the
procedure how the amount of compensation is  to  be  determined.    In  this
context, we may usefully quote a passage from Oriental  Insurance  Co.  Ltd.
v. Devireddy Konda Reddy and Others[9]: -

        “....Section 147 of the Act mandates  compulsory  coverage  against
        death of or bodily injury  to  any  passenger  of  “public  service
        vehicle”. The  proviso  makes  it  further  clear  that  compulsory
        coverage in respect of drivers and  conductors  of  public  service
        vehicle and employees carried in goods vehicle would be limited  to
        liability under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (in short “the
        WC Act”).  There  is  no  reference  to  any  passenger  in  “goods
        carriage.”                   [Underlining is ours]

23.   In Ved Prakash Garg v. Premi Devi and Others[10], after  referring  to
the scheme of the 1923 Act in the context of payment of penalty for  default
by the insurer under Section 4-A of the Act, this Court held thus: -

        “On a conjoint operation of the relevant schemes of  the  aforesaid
        twin Acts, in our view, there is no escape from the conclusion that
        the insurance companies will be liable to make good  not  only  the
        principal amounts of compensation payable by insured employers  but
        also interest thereon, if ordered by the Commissioner to be paid by
        the insured employers. Reason for this conclusion is obvious. As we
        have noted earlier the liability  to  pay  compensation  under  the
        Workmen's Compensation Act gets foisted on the employer provided it
        is shown that the workman concerned suffered from personal  injury,
        fatal or otherwise, by any motor accident arising out of and in the
        course of his employment. Such an accident is also covered  by  the
        statutory  coverage  contemplated  by  Section  147  of  the  Motor
        Vehicles Act read with the  identical  provisions  under  the  very
        contracts of insurance reflected by the policy which would make the
        insurance company liable to cover all such claims for  compensation
        for which statutory liability is  imposed  on  the  employer  under
        Section 3 read with Section 4-A of the Compensation Act.”
                                           [Emphasis supplied]

Thereafter, the Bench proceeded to state thus:-


        “So far as interest  is  concerned  it  is  almost  automatic  once
        default, on the part of the employer  in  paying  the  compensation
        due, takes place beyond the permissible  limit  of  one  month.  No
        element  of  penalty  is  involved  therein.  It  is  a   statutory
        elongation of the liability  of  the  employer  to  make  good  the
        principal amount  of  compensation  within  permissible  time-limit
        during which interest may not run but otherwise liability of paying
        interest on delayed compensation will ipso facto follow.”

Though the said decision was rendered in a different context,  yet  we  have
referred to the same only to highlight  the  liability  of  the  insurer  in
respect of certain classes of employees.

24.   It is worthy to note that sub-clause (i)(c) refers to an employee  who
is being carried in the vehicle covered by the policy.  Such  vehicle  being
a goods carriage, an employee has to be covered  by  the  statutory  policy.
On an apposite reading of  Sections  147  and  167  the  intendment  of  the
Legislature, as it appears to us, is to  cover  the  injury  to  any  person
including the owner of the goods or his  authorised  representative  carried
in a vehicle and an employee who is carried in the said vehicle.  It is  apt
to state here that the proviso commences in a different way.   A  policy  is
not required to cover the liability  of  the  employee  except  an  employee
covered under the 1923 Act and that too in respect of  an  employee  carried
in a vehicle.  To put it  differently,  it  does  not  cover  all  kinds  of
employees. Thus,  on  a  contextual  reading  of  the  provision,  schematic
analysis of the Act and the 1923 Act, it is quite limpid that the  statutory
policy only covers the employees of the insured, either employed or  engaged
by him in a goods carriage.  It does not cover any other  kind  of  employee
and therefore, someone who travels not being an authorised  agent  in  place
of the owner of goods, and claims to be an employee of the owner  of  goods,
cannot be covered by the  statutory  policy  and  to  hold  otherwise  would
tantamount to causing violence to the  language  employed  in  the  Statute.
Therefore, we conclude that the insurer would not  be  liable  to  indemnify
the insured.

25.   Presently, for the  sake  of  completeness,  we  shall  refer  to  the
policy.  The policy, exhibit R-2/3/A, clearly states that insurance is  only
for carriage of goods and does not cover use of  carrying  passengers  other
than employees not more than six in number coming under the purview  of  the
1923 Act.  The language used in the policy reads as follows:-

        “The Policy does not cover :

           1.    Use for organized racing, pace-making reliability trial or
           speed testing

           2. Use whilst dwaing a trailer except the towing (other then for
              reward) or any one disabled mechanically propelled vehicle.



           3.    Use for varying passengers in the vehicle except employees
           (other than driver) not exceeding six in number coming under the
           purview of Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923.”


      On a bare reading of the aforesaid policy, there can  be  no  iota  of
doubt that the policy relates to the insured and  it  covers  six  employees
(other than the driver, not exceeding six in number) and it is statutory  in
nature.  It neither  covers  any  other  category  of  person  nor  does  it
increase any further liability in relation to quantum.

  26. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we repel the contentions raised  by
      the learned counsel for the appellant and as a fall-out of  the  same,
      the appeals, being sans merit, stand dismissed without any order as to
      costs.


                                      ……………………............J.
                                       [K. S. Radhakrishnan]






                                                             ……………………………….J.
                                                               [Dipak Misra]
New Delhi;
December 11, 2012.

-----------------------
[1]    (2004) 2 SCC 1

[2]    (2000) 1 SCC 237

[3]    (2003) 2 SCC 223

[4]    (2000) 1 SCC 237

[5]    (2005) 12 SCC 243
[6]    (2007) 9 SCC 486
[7]    (2008) 1 SCC 423
[8]    (2005) 6 SCC 172
[9]    (2003) 2 SCC 339
[10]   (1997) 8 SCC 1



-----------------------
19





exempt from excise duty. The assessee utilizes cenvat duty paid Low Sulphur Heavy Stock (for short LSHS) as fuel input for generating steam. The steam so generated is utilized to generate electricity for the manufacture of fertilizer which is exempt from excise duty. According to the assessee, it is entitled to claim cenvat credit on the input, that is, LSHS even though fertilizer is exempt from excise duty. The correctness of this view was disputed by the Revenue.=whether under the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2002 an assessee is entitled to claim cenvat credit on duty paid LSHS utilized as an input in the manufacture of fertilizer exempt from duty.=There is an apparent conflict between GSFCL and Gujarat Narmada. 20. In GSFCL a view has been taken that modvat credit can be taken on LSHS used in the manufacture of fertilizer exempt from duty. Although this decision was rendered in the context of availing modvat credit under the Central Excise Rules, 1944 as they existed prior to the promulgation of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2002 the principle of law laid down is general and not specific to the Central Excise Rules, 1944. The decision rendered in Gujarat Narmada has been rendered in the context of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2002 and is, therefore, more apposite. However, since GSFCL does lay down a general principle of law, we have no option but to refer the issue to a larger Bench to resolve the conflict between GSFCL and Gujarat Narmada. The conflict to be resolved is whether under the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2002 an assessee is entitled to claim cenvat credit on duty paid LSHS utilized as an input in the manufacture of fertilizer exempt from duty. 21. The Registry may place the case papers before Hon’ble the Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench to decide the aforesaid conflict of views.


                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                     CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 4189-4196 OF 2010


Commissioner of Central Excise, Vadodara      …..Appellant

                                       Versus

Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilizers
Company Ltd.                                       …..Respondent



                               J U D G M E N T


Madan B. Lokur, J.

1.    The assessee utilizes cenvat duty paid Low Sulphur  Heavy  Stock  (for
short LSHS) as fuel input for generating steam.
The steam  so  generated  is
utilized to generate electricity for the manufacture of fertilizer which  is
exempt from excise duty.
According to the assessee, it is entitled to  claim
cenvat credit on the input, that is, LSHS even though fertilizer  is  exempt
from excise duty. The correctness of this view was disputed by the Revenue.


2.    Consequently, the Commissioner, Central Excise & Customs,  Vadodara-II
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Commissioner’) issued two  notices  to  the
assessee to show cause why cenvat credit wrongly availed by  it  should  not
be recovered under Rule 12 of the Cenvat  Credit  Rules,  2002  (hereinafter
referred to as Rules) read with Section  11A  of  the  Central  Excise  Act,
1944.  The assessee was also required to show  cause  why  interest  be  not
recovered on the wrongly availed  cenvat  credit  and  why  penalty  be  not
imposed on it.

3.    The first show cause notice issued  to  the  assessee  was  dated  8th
March 2004 and pertained to the period 31st March  2003  to  September  2003
while the second show cause notice was dated 28th July 2004 and was for  the
period October 2003 to March 2004.

4.    The assessee replied to both the show cause notices and  after  giving
the assessee an opportunity of hearing,  the  Commissioner  adjudicated  the
first show cause notice by passing an order adverse to the assessee on  24th
June 2004.  The second show cause notice was similarly  adjudicated  and  an
adverse order passed on 30th August 2004. By these orders, the  Commissioner
confirmed the demand of cenvat credit wrongly claimed by the assessee.   The
Commissioner also directed the assessee to  pay  interest  on  the  demanded
amount and also imposed personal penalty under Rule 13 of the Rules.
Proceedings before the Tribunal:
5.    Feeling aggrieved, the  assessee  preferred  two  appeals  before  the
Customs, Excise & Service Tax  Appellate  Tribunal  at  Mumbai  (hereinafter
referred  to  as  the  Tribunal).  The  appeals  were  numbered  as   Appeal
Nos.E/2517/2004 and E/3672/2004.

6.    For reasons that are not apparent from the record, both  appeals  were
referred to a larger Bench and heard by the Vice-President and  two  members
of the Tribunal (hereinafter referred  to  for  convenience  as  the  larger
Bench).  By an order dated 27th December 2006/4th January 2007,  the  larger
Bench held that the assessee was entitled to  claim  cenvat  credit  on  the
LSHS used as input for producing steam and electricity for  the  manufacture
of fertilizer. According to the  larger  Bench,  the  issue  raised  by  the
assessee was fully covered in its favour by a decision of  the  Tribunal  in
Gujarat  Narmada  Fertilizers  Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of  Central  Excise,
Vadodara, 2004 (176) ELT 200 (Tri. – Mumbai)  against  which  the  Revenue’s
appeal before the Gujarat High Court  was  dismissed  since  no  substantial
question  of  law  arose.   The  decision  of  the  Gujarat  High  Court  is
Commissioner of Central Excise and Customs v.  Gujarat  Narmada  Fertilizers
Co. Ltd., 2006 (193) ELT 136 (Gujarat).

7.    The Tribunal was, therefore, of the opinion  that  the  issue  was  no
longer res integra and the decision earlier rendered  by  the  Tribunal  was
binding upon the parties. The reference made to the larger  Bench  was  then
answered in the following terms:-
           “The reference is thus answered by holding  that  the  assessees
           are eligible to cenvat credit of duty paid on that  quantity  of
           LSHS which was used for producing steam and electricity used  in
           turn in  relation  to  manufacture  of  exempted  goods,  namely
           fertilizers.”


8.    Pursuant to the decision of the larger Bench, the substantive  appeals
were placed before a Division Bench of the  Tribunal.   By  an  order  dated
10th April 2008 (impugned before us) the  Division  Bench  of  the  Tribunal
allowed the assessee’s appeals relying on the decision of the larger Bench.

Earlier proceedings in this Court:
9.    In the meanwhile, the  Revenue  preferred  an  appeal  to  this  Court
against the decision of the larger Bench of the Tribunal. By a judgment  and
order dated 17th August 2009 (rendered after the impugned  order  passed  by
the Tribunal), this Court in  Commissioner  of  Central  Excise  v.  Gujarat
Narmada Fertilizers Company Limited, (2009) 9 SCC 101 set  aside  the  order
of the larger Bench and decided the issue raised in favour of the Revenue.

10.   This Court held that the Tribunal (and later the Gujarat  High  Court)
did not correctly appreciate the legal  position  in  Gujarat  Narmada.   In
coming to this conclusion, this Court referred to Rule 6 of the Rules.   For
convenience, Rule 6(1) and 6(2) of the Rules are reproduced  and  they  read
as follows:-
           “6. Obligation of manufacturer of dutiable and excisable goods-


           (1) The CENVAT credit shall not be allowed on such  quantity  of
           inputs which is used  in  the  manufacture  of  exempted  goods,
           except in the circumstances mentioned in sub-rule (2).

           Provided xxx xxx xxx

           (2) Where a manufacturer avails of CENVAT credit in  respect  of
           any inputs, except inputs intended  to  be  used  as  fuel,  and
           manufactures such final products which are chargeable to duty as
           well as exempted goods, then, the  manufacturer  shall  maintain
           separate accounts for  receipt,  consumption  and  inventory  of
           inputs meant for  use  in  the  manufacture  of  dutiable  final
           products and the  quantity  of  inputs  meant  for  use  in  the
           manufacture of exempted goods and take  CENVAT  credit  only  on
           that quantity of  inputs  which  is  intended  for  use  in  the
           manufacture of dutiable goods.”

11.   This Court was of the view that Rule 6(1) of the Rules is plenary  and
that cenvat credit for duty paid inputs used in the manufacture of  exempted
final products is not allowable.  Rule 6(1) of the Rules covers all  inputs,
including fuel. On the other hand, Rule 6(2) of the Rules  refers  to  other
inputs (other than fuel) used in or in relation to the  manufacture  of  the
final product (dutiable and exempted).
12.   This Court further held that on a cumulative reading of Rule 6(1)  and
Rule 6(2) of the Rules it is clear that the legal effect  of  Rule  6(1)  of
the Rules is applicable to all inputs,  including  fuel.  Therefore,  cenvat
credit will not  be  permissible  on  the  quantity  of  fuel  used  in  the
manufacture of exempted goods.  As  regards  non-fuel  inputs,  an  assessee
would have to maintain separate accounts or be governed by Rule 6(3) of  the
Rules.

13.   As mentioned above, when the substantive appeals  were  taken  up  for
consideration by the Division Bench of the Tribunal, the  decision  of  this
Court in Gujarat Narmada was not available.  Accordingly,  by  the  impugned
order, the Division Bench of the Tribunal allowed the appeals filed  by  the
assessee relying on the decision of the larger Bench of the Tribunal. It  is
under these circumstances that the Revenue is before us.
Submissions:
14.   The first and in fact the only contention of  the  learned  Additional
Solicitor General appearing for the Revenue was that these  appeals  deserve
to be allowed in view of the decision rendered  by  this  Court  in  Gujarat
Narmada. It was submitted that the orders impugned  in  these  appeals  were
dependent upon the order passed by the larger Bench of the Tribunal on  27th
December 2006/4th January 2007. The decision  of  the  larger  Bench  having
been set aside by this Court in Gujarat Narmada the substratum of  the  case
of the assessee is wiped out.

15.   On the other hand, the submission of learned counsel for the  assessee
was that the issue whether LSHS is an “input” as defined  in  Rule  2(g)  of
the Rules is debatable. According to the assessee,  it  should  be  given  a
wide meaning, but in Maruti Suzuki Ltd. v. Commissioner of  Central  Excise,
Delhi-III (2009) 9 SCC 193 this Court gave “input”  a  restrictive  meaning.
The correctness of this view was  doubted  in  Ramala  Sahkari  Chini  Mills
Limited, Uttar Pradesh v. Commissioner, Central Excise, Meerut-I, (2010)  14
SCC 744 and the issue has been referred to a larger Bench of this Court.  It
was submitted that if it is held in  these  appeals  that  LSHS  is  not  an
input, then the assessee would be adversely  affected.  It  was,  therefore,
submitted that these appeals may also be referred to a larger  Bench  or  we
may await the decision of the larger Bench of this Court.

 16.  On merits, it was submitted that while deciding Gujarat  Narmada  this
Court did not notice its earlier decision in Commissioner of Central  Excise
Vadodara v. Gujarat State Fertilizers & Chemicals Ltd., (2008)  15  SCC  46.
In GSFCL it was clearly held in favour of  the  assessee  that  a  claim  of
modvat credit on LSHS is justified if it  is  used  in  the  manufacture  of
steam, which in turn is used  in  the  generation  of  electricity  for  the
manufacture  of  fertilizer  exempt  from  duty.  Since  that  decision  was
overlooked, this Court  fell  into  error  while  deciding  Gujarat  Narmada
against the assessee.

17.   Assuming “input” is not given a restrictive meaning, then in  view  of
GSFCL the issue whether the assessee is entitled to claim cenvat  credit  on
duty paid LSHS is no longer open to  discussion  and  the  appeals  must  be
dismissed on that basis alone.

18.   In response, the learned Additional Solicitor General  submitted  that
the interpretation of “input” does not arise in these  appeals  and  we  may
proceed on the basis that “input” as defined in Rule 2(g) of the  Rules  may
be given a broad interpretation and that LSHS utilized by  the  assessee  is
an input for the manufacture of fertilizer exempted from  duty.  The  second
step, namely, entitlement to cenvat credit does not necessarily follow  even
if the first  step  is  decided  in  favour  of  the  assessee.  There  was,
therefore, no necessity of referring these appeals  to  a  larger  Bench  of
this Court and the case was fully covered in favour of the Revenue  in  view
of Gujarat Narmada.

Our view:

19.   There is an apparent conflict between GSFCL and Gujarat Narmada.
20.   In GSFCL a view has been taken that modvat  credit  can  be  taken  on
LSHS used in the manufacture of fertilizer exempt from duty.  
Although  this
decision was rendered in the context of availing  modvat  credit  under  the
Central Excise Rules, 1944 as they existed prior to the promulgation of  the
Cenvat Credit Rules, 2002 the principle of law laid down is general and  not
specific to the  Central  Excise  Rules,  1944.  
The  decision  rendered  in
Gujarat Narmada has been rendered  in  the  context  of  the  Cenvat  Credit
Rules, 2002 and is, therefore, more apposite. 
However, since GSFCL does  lay
down a general principle of law, we have no option but to  refer  the  issue
to a larger  Bench  to  resolve  the  conflict  between  GSFCL  and  Gujarat
Narmada. 
The conflict to be resolved is  whether  under  the  Cenvat  Credit
Rules, 2002 an assessee is entitled to claim  cenvat  credit  on  duty  paid
LSHS utilized as an input in  the  manufacture  of  fertilizer  exempt  from
duty.
21.   The Registry may place  the  case  papers  before  Hon’ble  the  Chief
Justice for constituting a larger Bench to decide the aforesaid conflict  of
views.

                                      ….…….……………………..J.
                                        (Swatanter Kumar)





                                                    ….…….……………………..J.
                                        (Madan B. Lokur)
New Delhi;
December 11, 2012




preliminary objections to the maintainability of the compensation applications filed by the appellants. They contended that the appellants had not initiated separate proceedings either under Section 10 or under Section 36B of the MRTP Act alleging unfair trade practices by the respondents and in the absence of any such separate proceedings initiated by the respondents before the MRTP Commission, the compensation applications of the appellants under Section 12B of the MRTP Act were not maintainable.- In fact, Section 12B was introduced in the MRTP Act by Act 30 of 1984 as an independent remedy for a claimant in addition to a suit that he may file to claim any loss or damage that he may suffer by reason of any monopolistic or restrictive or unfair trade practice as would be clear from sub-section (4) of Section 12B quoted above. -In the absence of any such indication of this intention of Parliament to make the provisions of Section 12B of the MRTP Act dependent on initiation of an inquiry or proceeding under Section 10 or Section 36B of the MRTP Act, the Competition Appellate Tribunal clearly erred in coming to the conclusion that interdependence of the provisions of Section 10 or Section 36B with Section 12B cannot be lost sight of and in the absence of a separate proceeding alleging unfair, monopolistic or restrictive trade practice, an application for compensation under Section 12B of the MRTP Act is not maintainable.We, therefore, set aside the impugned orders of the Competition Appellate Tribunal, but leave it open to the respondents to raise a plea before the Competition Appellate Tribunal that the appellants have not made out any case of monopolistic or restrictive trade practice or unfair trade practice in terms of Section 12B of the MRTP Act and if such plea is raised it will be decided by the Competition Appellate Tribunal on its own merits following the decision of this Court in Saurabh Prakash v. DLF Universal Ltd. (supra). The appeals are allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.


                                                                  Reportable

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO._8920_ OF 2012
                (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 28463 of 2011)


Girish Chandra Gupta                                  … Appellant

                                   Versus


M/s Uttar Pradesh Industrial
Development Corporation Ltd. & Ors.            … Respondents


                                    With

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO._8921_ OF 2012
                (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 17380 of 2012)

James Kutty P.C. & Anr.                                    … Appellants

                                   Versus


M/s Tread Stone Ltd. & Ors.                          … Respondents



                               J U D G M E N T

A. K. PATNAIK, J.



      Leave granted.


   2. The facts very briefly in these two appeals are  that  the  appellants
      filed compensation applications C.A. No.110 of  1997 and  C.A.  No.126
      of 2008 under Section 12B of  the  Monopolies  and  Restrictive  Trade
      Practices Act, 1969 (for short ‘the MRTP Act’) before  the  Monopolies
      and Restrictive  Trade  Practices  Commission  (for  short  ‘the  MRTP
      Commission’) constituted under the MRTP Act.
By Section 66(1) of  the
      Competition Act,  2002,  the  MRTP  Act  was  repealed  and  the  MRTP
      Commission was dissolved.  Section 66(3) of the Competition Act,  2002
      provided that all cases pertaining to monopolistic trade practices  or
      restrictive trade practices pending before the MRTP Commission  shall,
      on the commencement of the Competition  (Amendment)  Ordinance,  2009,
      stand transferred to the Competition  Appellate  Tribunal  constituted
      under the Competition Act,  2002  and  shall  be  adjudicated  by  the
      Appellate Tribunal in accordance with the provisions of the  MRTP  Act
      as if the MRTP Act had  not  been  repealed.  
Consequently,  the  two
      compensation applications filed by the appellants stood transferred to
      the Competition Appellate Tribunal.
Before the Competition  Appellate
      Tribunal, the  respondents  in  the  two  appeals  raised
 preliminary
      objections to the maintainability  of  the  compensation  applications
      filed by the appellants.
They contended that
  the appellants  had  not
      initiated separate  proceedings  either  under  Section  10  or  under
      Section 36B of the MRTP Act alleging unfair  trade  practices  by  the
      respondents and in  the  absence  of  any  such  separate  proceedings
      initiated  by  the  respondents  before  the  MRTP   Commission,   the
      compensation applications of the appellants under Section 12B  of  the
      MRTP Act were not maintainable.

   3. This preliminary question raised by the respondents was also raised in
      C.A. No.108 of 2005 filed by  Info  Electronics  System  Ltd.  against
      Sutran Corporation and
the Competition Appellate Tribunal by its order
      dated 29.03.2011 passed in  C.A.  No.108  of  2005  (Info  Electronics
      System Ltd. v. Sutran Corporation) held, 
relying on a judgment of this
      Court in Saurabh Prakash v. DLF Universal Ltd.  [(2007)  1  SCC  228],
      that  in  the  absence  of  separate  proceedings   alleging   unfair,
      monopolistic  or  restrictive  trade  practice,  an  application   for
      compensation under section 12B of the MRTP Act is not maintainable and
      accordingly dismissed C.A. No.108 of 2005.  
Following  the  aforesaid
      order dated  29.03.2011  in  C.A.  No.108  of  2005,  the  Competition
      Appellate Tribunal also dismissed C.A. No.126 of  2008  on  26.04.2012
      and C.A. No.110 of 1997 on 20.05.2011 filed by the appellants  in  the
      Civil Appeals before us.
Aggrieved, the appellants have  filed  these
      appeals.

   4. Mr. Siddharth Bhatnagar, learned counsel  for  the  appellant  in  the
      Civil Appeal arising out of S.L.P. (C)  No.28463  of  2011,
submitted
      that this Court has not held in Saurabh Prakash v. DLF Universal  Ltd.
      (supra), on  which  the  Competition  Appellate  Tribunal  has  placed
      reliance, that in the absence of any separate proceedings either under
      Section 10 or  Section  36B  of  the  MRTP  Act,  an  application  for
      compensation under Section 12B of the MRTP Act  is  not  maintainable.
      He submitted that
a reading of Section 12B  of  the  MRTP  Act  rather
      shows that an independent proceeding under Section 12B of the MRTP Act
      for compensation can be initiated by an applicant.
He relied  on  the
      decision in M/s Pennwalt (I) Ltd. & Anr. v. Monopolies and Restrictive
      Trade Practices Commission & Ors. [AIR 1999 DELHI 23] in which,  after
      examining the provisions of Sections 10, 36B and other  provisions  of
      the MRTP Act,
  the Delhi High Court has held that the proceedings under
      Section 12B of the MRTP Act are not  dependent  on  proceedings  under
      Section 10 or 36B of the MRTP Act and that a  preliminary  inquiry  as
      envisaged in Section 11 or Section 36C is not a condition precedent to
      the maintainability of the claim under Section 12B of the MRTP Act.

   5. Mr. Rakesh Uttamchandra Upadhyay, learned counsel for the  respondents
      in the Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.28463  of  2011,  on  the
      other hand, submitted that a claim for compensation under Section  12B
      of the MRTP Act cannot be decided  without  an  inquiry  either  under
      Section 10 or under Section 36B of the MRTP Act.   He  submitted  that
      the view taken by the Competition Appellate Tribunal  that  without  a
      proceeding either under Section 10 or Section 36B of the  MRTP  Act  a
      claim for compensation under Section 12B  of  the  MRTP  Act  was  not
      maintainable is, therefore, correct.  He further  submitted  that  the
      case of the respondent U.P. Industrial Development Corporation Limited
      in C.A. No.110 of 1997 was that the grievance of the appellant did not
      relate to any unfair  trade  practice  but  relates  to  a  breach  of
      contract and such a claim for compensation cannot be entertained under
      Section 12B of the MRTP Act.

   6. Mr. Alex Joseph, learned counsel  for  the  appellants  in  the  Civil
      Appeal arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.17380 of 2012, submitted that  the
      Delhi High Court in yet another decision in R.C.  Sood  And  Co.  (P.)
      Ltd. & Ors. v. Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission &
      Anr. [1996 Vol.86 Company cases 626 Delhi] has
 held  that  it  is  not
      necessary that the MRTP Commission should first inquire or investigate
      into the allegations of monopolistic,  restrictive  and  unfair  trade
      practices carried on by any person or undertaking  under  Section  10,
      Section 36B or Section 37(1) of the MRTP Act before issuing notice  in
      the application filed under Section 12B  of  the  MRTP  Act  and  sub-
      section (3) of Section 12B of the MRTP Act clearly shows that the MRTP
      Commission is required to make an inquiry into the allegations set out
      in the application filed under sub-section (1) of Section 12B and only
      after making such an inquiry pass an order directing the owner of  the
      undertaking  or  the  person  who  has   indulged   in   monopolistic,
      restrictive  and  unfair  trade  practice,  to  make  payment  to  the
      applicant of the amount determined by the MRTP Commission.

   7. Mrs. Kiran Suri, learned counsel  for  the  respondent  in  the  Civil
      Appeal arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.17380 of 2012, submitted that  the
      jurisdiction of the MRTP Commission is based on a  finding  of  unfair
      trade practice and such finding can only be recorded under Section 36B
      of the MRTP Act.  She submitted  that  Section  11  of  the  MRTP  Act
      empowers the Director General to make  an  inquiry  and  there  is  no
      mechanism of inquiry in Section 12B of the MRTP Act.   She  vehemently
      argued that Section 12B of the MRTP Act, therefore, cannot be read  as
      an independent Code.

   8. We have considered the submissions of  the  learned  counsel  for  the
      parties and we find that in Saurabh  Prakash  v.  DLF  Universal  Ltd.
      (supra) this  Court  was  called  upon  to  decide  whether  the  MRTP
      Commission had jurisdiction to entertain an application under  Section
      12B of the MRTP Act  when  no  case  of  indulgence  in  unfair  trade
      practice or restrictive trade practice was made  out  and  this  Court
      held that the power of the MRTP Commission to  award  compensation  is
      restricted to a case where loss or damage had been caused as a  result
      of monopolistic or restrictive or unfair trade practice but it had  no
      jurisdiction where damage is claimed for mere breach of contract.   In
      the aforesaid decision  in  Saurabh  Prakash  v.  DLF  Universal  Ltd.
      (supra) on which reliance has been placed by the Competition Appellate
      Tribunal in the impugned orders, this Court did not  at  all  consider
      the question whether an application under Section 12B of the MRTP  Act
      was maintainable without initiation  of  separate  proceedings  either
      under Section 10 or under Section 36B of the MRTP Act.

   9. The decision of the Division Bench of the  Delhi  High  Court  in  M/s
      Pennwalt (I) Ltd. & Anr. v. Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices
      Commission & Ors. (supra) and the decision of the learned Single Judge
      of the Delhi High Court in R.C. Sood And  Co.  (P.)  Ltd.  &  Ors.  v.
      Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission & Anr.  (supra),
      cited before us by the learned counsel for  the  appellants,  however,
      hold that an application for compensation under  Section  12B  of  the
      MRTP Act was maintainable without any proceeding being initiated under
      Section 10 or Section 36B of  the  MRTP  Act.   We  have  perused  the
      aforesaid two decisions of the Division Bench and the  learned  Single
      Judge of the Delhi High  Court  and  in  our  considered  opinion  the
      Division Bench as well as the learned Single Judge of the  Delhi  High
      Court have correctly interpreted the provisions of  Sections  10,  12B
      and 36B of the MRTP Act.

  10.  Sections 10, 12B and 36B of the MRTP Act are extracted hereinbelow:

       “10. Inquiry into monopolistic or  restrictive  trade  practices  by
       Commission - The Commission may inquiry into -
       
       (a) any restrictive trade practice -
       
       (i) upon receiving  a  complaint  of  facts  which  constitute  such
       practice from any trade  association  or  from  any  consumer  or  a
       registered consumers' association, whether such consumer is a member
       of that consumers' association or not, or
       
       (ii) upon a reference made to it by  the  Central  Government  or  a
       State Government, or
       
       (iii) upon an application made to it by the Director General, or
       
       (iv) upon its own knowledge or information;
       
       (b) any monopolistic trade practice, upon a reference made to it  by
       the Central Government or upon an application  made  to  it  by  the
       Director General or upon its own knowledge or information.




       12B. Power of the Commission to award compensation. – (1) Where,  as
       a result  of  the  monopolistic  or  restrictive,  or  unfair  trade
       practice, carried on by any undertaking or any person, any  loss  or
       damage is caused to the Central Government, or any State  Government
       or any trader or class or traders or any consumer,  such  government
       or, as the case may be, trader or class of traders or consumer  may,
       without prejudice to the right of such government, trader  or  class
       of traders or consumer to institute a suit for the recovery  of  any
       compensation for the loss or damage so caused, make  an  application
       to  the  Commission  for  an  order  for  the  recovery  from   that
       undertaking or owner thereof or, as  the  case  may  be,  from  such
       person,  of  such  amount  as  the  Commission  may  determine,   as
       compensation for the loss or damage so caused.


       (2) Where any loss or damage  referred  to  in  sub-section  (l)  is
       caused to numerous persons having the same interest, one or more  of
       such persons may, with the permission of  the  Commission,  make  an
       application, under that sub-section, for and on behalf  of,  or  for
       the benefit  of,  the  persons  so  interested,  and  thereupon  the
       provisions of rule 8 of Order I of the First Schedule to the Code of
       Civil Procedure, 1908 (5  of  1908),  shall  apply  subject  to  the
       modification that every reference therein to a suit or decree  shall
       be construed as a reference to the application before the Commission
       and the order of the Commission thereon.


       (3) The Commission may, after an inquiry made into  the  allegations
       made in the application filed under sub-section (1), make  an  order
       directing the owner of the  undertaking  or  other  person  to  make
       payment, to the  applicant,  of  the  amount  determined  by  it  as
       realisable from the undertaking or the owner  thereof,  or,  as  the
       case may be, from the other person, as compensation for the loss  or
       damage caused to the applicant by  reason  of  any  monopolistic  or
       restrictive, or unfair trade practice carried on by such undertaking
       or other person.


       (4) Where a decree for the recovery of any  amount  as  compensation
       for any loss or damage referred  to  in  sub-section  (l)  has  been
       passed by any court in favour of any person or persons  referred  to
       in sub-section (1), or, as the case may  be,  sub-section  (2),  the
       amount, if any, paid or recovered in pursuance of the order made  by
       the Commission under sub-section(3) shall be  set  off  against  the
       amount  payable  under   such   decree   and   the   decree   shall,
       notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of  Civil  Procedure,
       1908 (5 of 1908), or any other law for the time being in  force,  be
       executable for the balance, if any, left after such set off.


       36B. Inquiry  into  unfair  trade  practices  by  Commission  -  The
       Commission may inquire into any unfair trade practice, -
       
       (a) upon receiving a  complaint  of  facts  which  constitutes  such
       practice from any trade  association  or  from  any  consumer  or  a
       registered consumers' association, whether such consumer is a member
       of that consumers' association or not; or
       
       (b) upon a reference made to it by the Central Government or a State
       Government; or
       
       (c) upon an application made to it by the Director General; or
       
       (d) upon its own knowledge or information.”




11.     On a reading of sub-section (1) of Section 12B of the MRTP  Act,  it
will be clear that where, as a result of the  monopolistic  or  restrictive,
or unfair trade practice, carried on by any undertaking or any  person,  any
loss or damage is caused to the Central Government, or any State  Government
or any trader or class or traders or any consumer, such  government  or,  as
the case may be, trader  or  class  of  traders  or  consumer  may  make  an
application to the MRTP Commission for an order for the recovery  from  that
undertaking or owner thereof or, as the case may be, from  such  person,  of
such amount as the MRTP Commission may determine, as  compensation  for  the
loss or damage so caused.  Sub-section (3) of Section 12B of  the  MRTP  Act
further provides that the MRTP Commission may, after an  inquiry  made  into
the allegations made in the application filed under  sub-section  (1),  make
an order directing the owner of the undertaking  or  other  person  to  make
payment, to the applicant, of the amount  determined  by  it  as  realisable
from the undertaking or the owner thereof, or, as  case  may  be,  from  the
other person,  as  compensation  for  the  loss  or  damage  caused  to  the
applicant by reason of any monopolistic  or  restrictive,  or  unfair  trade
practice carried on by such undertaking or other  person.   Thus,  the  MRTP
Commission has been vested with the powers under sub-section (3) of  Section
12B of the MRTP Act to make an inquiry to the  allegations  of  monopolistic
or restrictive or unfair trade practice made in the application filed  under
sub-section (1) of Section 12B of the MRTP Act and to determine  the  amount
of compensation realizable from the undertaking or the  owner  thereof,  or,
as case may be, from the other person, towards loss or damage caused to  the
applicant by reason of any monopolistic  or  restrictive,  or  unfair  trade
practice carried on by such  undertaking  or  other  person.   These  powers
vested in the MRTP Commission under sub-section (3) of Section  12B  of  the
MRTP Act are independent of its powers under Section 10 and Section  36B  of
the MRTP Act.

12.      In fact, Section 12B was introduced in the MRTP Act by  Act  30  of
1984 as an independent remedy for a claimant in addition to a suit  that  he
may file to claim any loss or damage that he may suffer  by  reason  of  any
monopolistic or restrictive or unfair trade practice as would be clear  from
sub-section (4) of Section 12B quoted above.  
There is no reference  at  all
in Section 12B of the MRTP Act to the provisions of  either  Section  10  or
Section 36B of the MRTP Act and if Parliament intended  that  the  power  of
the MRTP Commission to award compensation under Section 12B of the MRTP  Act
was to be dependent on the exercise  of  power  of  MRTP  Commission  either
under Section 10 or under Section 36B of  the  MRTP  Act,  Parliament  would
have made this intention clear in the language of some provision in  Section
12B of the MRTP Act.
There is also no reference in either Section 10 or  in
Section 36B of the MRTP Act to any of the provisions of Section 12B  of  the
MRTP Act and if the Parliament intended to make Sections 10, 12B and 36B  of
the MRTP Act interdependent, there would have been some indication  of  this
intention of Parliament in Section 10 or in Section 36B  of  the  MRTP  Act.
In the absence of any such indication of this  intention  of  Parliament  to
make the provisions of Section 12B of the MRTP Act dependent  on  initiation
of an inquiry or proceeding under Section 10 or  Section  36B  of  the  MRTP
Act, the Competition Appellate Tribunal  clearly  erred  in  coming  to  the
conclusion that interdependence of the provisions of Section 10  or  Section
36B with Section 12B cannot be lost  sight  of  and  in  the  absence  of  a
separate proceeding  alleging  unfair,  monopolistic  or  restrictive  trade
practice, an application for compensation under Section 12B of the MRTP  Act
is not maintainable.

13. We,  therefore,  set  aside  the  impugned  orders  of  the  Competition
    Appellate Tribunal, but leave it open to the respondents to raise a plea
    before the Competition Appellate Tribunal that the appellants  have  not
    made out any case of  monopolistic  or  restrictive  trade  practice  or
    unfair trade practice in terms of Section 12B of the  MRTP  Act  and  if
    such plea is raised it will be  decided  by  the  Competition  Appellate
    Tribunal on its own merits following  the  decision  of  this  Court  in
    Saurabh Prakash v. DLF Universal Ltd. (supra).  The appeals are allowed.
     There shall be no order as to costs.

                                                               .……………………….J.
                                                               (A. K.
Patnaik)



                                                               ………………………..J.
                                                               (Swatanter
Kumar)

New Delhi,
December 11, 2012.
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