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Thursday, December 6, 2012

whether after framing a Town Planning Scheme and the final scheme brought into force, after reserving plots for public purposes, providing compensation under Chapter V of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (for short ‘the MRTP Act’), can the land owner insist that the land be acquired only by following the provisions of Chapter VII of the MRTP Act, especially under Section 126 of the MRTP Act. We therefore hold that the provisions of Section 126 can apply only when the scheme is not sanctioned and the amount of compensation has not been determined by the Arbitrator. Therefore, in cases where town planning scheme is already sanctioned and the property vests in the State Government under Section 88 (a) of the Act, the question of resorting to Section 126(2) of the Act does not arise. 48. We also reject the contention that under the scheme, if any property is acquired by the Planning Authority and if it is required for the beneficial use of the persons, it is only then that the Arbitrator can fix the compensation and pass the award. If the property is taken over by the Planning Authority for the construction of its office and all civic amenities can be provided by the Planning Authority and if the office of the authority is located in an area where the scheme has been framed then it would be beneficial to the public as well. Since, it is also for a public purpose covered by the scheme, the contention that the area earmarked for the Town Planning Authority can be acquired only by following Section 126 of the Act, has no basis. 49. We find from the facts of the case that after completing the procedure under Chapter V, compensation was offered and paid to the appellant and the appeal preferred by the appellant was also dismissed by the Tribunal and therefore further acquisition of land under Section 126 does not arise. The High Court in our view has correctly interpreted the provisions of the Act which calls for no interference. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed without any order as to costs.


                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                   CIVIL APPEAL NOS.8708-8709      OF 2012
              [Arising out of SLP (C.) NOS. 6825-6826 OF 2010]


Jayesh Dhanesh Goragandhi                                  .. Appellant
                                   Versus
Municipal Corporation of
Greater Mumbai & Ors.                               .. Respondents



                               J U D G M E N T



K. S. Radhakrishnan, J.



1.    Leave granted.



2.    The question that has come up for consideration before us  is
 whether
after framing a Town Planning Scheme  and  the  final  scheme  brought  into
force, after reserving plots for  public  purposes,  providing  compensation
under Chapter V of the Maharashtra Regional  and  Town  Planning  Act,  1966
(for short ‘the MRTP Act’), can the land  owner  insist  that  the  land  be
acquired only by following the provisions of Chapter VII of  the  MRTP  Act,
especially under Section 126 of the MRTP Act.

Facts

3.     Vallabhadas Goragandhi was the original owner of  plot  No.  9  which
was renumbered as Final plot No.44 in the Town Planning Scheme for  Borivali
with few structures thereon.   
After  the  death  of  Vallabhadas,  his  son
Hiralal became the owner of the plot.  
Originally, that plot was  under  the
Borivali Municipal Council in  Thane  District,  Bombay.   
A  Town  Planning
Scheme was prepared under the Town Planning  Act,  1919  for  Borivali  with
effect  from  15.07.1919.   
In  the  year  1941,  Hiralal  expired  and  the
appellant herein and respondent Nos.3 to 6 are the legal heirs  of  Hiralal.




4.    The Bombay Town Planning Act, 1919 was replaced  by  the  Bombay  Town
Planning  Act,  1954  and  the  Borivali  Municipal  Council  declared   its
intention to vary the scheme prepared earlier.
Then  Government  of  Bombay
declared on 31.12.1956 the intention of the Municipal Council  to  vary  the
scheme.
With effect from 01.07.1957, Borivali Suburban  became  a  part  of
Greater Mumbai and  Municipal  Corporation  of  Greater  Mumbai  became  the
Planning Authority for that area.  
On 30.11.1959 vide Resolution  No.  1108,
the Municipal Corporation declared its intention to  vary  the  said  scheme
under the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954.
The  Municipal  Corporation  vide
its notification dated  10.12.1959  published  its  intention  to  vary  the
scheme.
On 21.01.1961, the scheme was approved and published  and  original
plot No.9 was renumbered as final plot No. 44.   
The  Municipal  Corporation
on 16.12.1961 informed the 6th respondent  Ranjit  Hiralal  that  the  above
mentioned  plot  was  reserved  for  public  purpose.  
The  Government   of
Maharashtra on 09.03.1962 sanctioned draft scheme (first variation)  wherein
the property in question was reserved  for  a  public  purpose.  
Later,  an
arbitrator was appointed under the Town Planning Act who served notice  upon
Smt. Jayantibai whose name was mentioned as owner of  the  property  in  the
Property Register Card.  
Two of the legal heirs (who were plaintiffs in  the
suit) sent a representation to the Corporation to release  their  land  from
reservation.



5.    The MRTP Act  came  into  force  with  effect  from  11.01.1967.  
 The
Corporation informed the legal heirs about the reservation of  the  property
in question for public purpose.
  Ranjit Harilal, the  6th  respondent  along
with his brother appeared before the Arbitrator on 03.01.1968  and  filed  a
detailed statement on 08.02.1968  objecting  the  reservation  of  land  for
Municipal Offices.  
The Arbitrator by its order  dated  10.04.1968  rejected
the objections raised by the owner of the property.  
Later  Smt.  Jayantibai
died on 11.01.1971.
The Arbitrator  gave  the  award  under  Section  72(3)
(xviii) of the MRTP Act on 9.6.1973, confirming  the  proposal  under  draft
scheme for reservation of the plot for  the  purpose  of  Municipal  Office.
The Town Planning Scheme for Borivali (II) (1st Variation) (final) was  then
published in the Government Gazette on 9.7.1973.
 Against the award  of  the
Arbitrator dated 9.07.1973, an  appeal  was  preferred  by  the  respondents
under Section 74 of the MRTP  Act  which  was  dismissed  by  the  Tribunal.
However, the rate of compensation was enhanced  from  Rs.15.60  to  Rs.21.53
per sq. mtr.  
The Government  of  Maharashtra  later  sanctioned  the  final
scheme on 17.07.1976 and the same was  notified  on  20.07.1976.   The  Town
Planning  Scheme  as  varied  came  into  effect   from   28.09.1976.  
The
Corporation later sent a notice to the owners of the plot calling upon  them
to collect the amount of compensation to the tune of Rs.1,17,918/-  and  the
Ward Officer of the Corporation also issued notice under Section 89  of  the
MRTP Act calling upon the legal heirs  to  remove  the  structure  from  the
property.




6.    The legal heirs of Hiralal challenged the above mentioned notice,  the
award of the Arbitrator and the decision of  the  Tribunal  by  filing  Writ
Petition (C) 1084 of 1978 before High Court of Bombay.
Writ  Petition  was,
however,  dismissed  by  a  learned  Single  Judge  of  the  High  Court  on
14.10.1981.
Writ Appeal No. 530  of  1981  was  preferred  challenging  the
above mentioned judgment which was also dismissed by the Division  Bench  on
03.12.1981.




7.    The Corporation later issued a notice under Section  89  of  the  MRTP
Act which was challenged by the legal heirs by filing a  civil  suit  before
the City Civil Court.  
The Court rejected  the  plaint  on  28.3.1988  under
Order VII Rule 11(d) of CPC on the ground that  under  Section  149  of  the
MRTP Act, the City Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and try  the
suit.  
The legal heirs then challenged the said order by filing  Appeal  No.
350 of 1988 before the High Court which was  set  aside  and  the  suit  was
restored to the file to be heard and decided  on  merits.   
The  City  Civil
Court vide its order dated 16/20.02.1995 decreed the suit in favour  of  the
legal heirs and liberty was granted to the Corporation to take  recourse  to
the proceedings under Chapter VII of the MRTP Act, particularly Section  126
for the purpose of acquisition of land.



8.    The Corporation then preferred First Appeal No. 442 of 1995 which  was
dismissed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court, against which  they
preferred LPA No. 17 of 2002 which was allowed by the High  Court  vide  its
judgment dated 06.05.2005.  
Aggrieved by the  judgment  of  the  High  Court
dated 06.05.2005, the appellant preferred SLP (C) No. 20750  of  2005.  
The
special  leave  petition  was,  however,  disposed  of  by  this  Court   on
24.10.2005 stating as follows:

       “It is stated by learned counsel for  the  petitioners  that  certain
      points which were really germane to  the  subject  matter  in  dispute
      before the High Court, had not been placed for its consideration.   It
      is stated that an appropriate application shall be  filed  before  the
      High Court for permission to urge those points.  If it  is  done,  the
      High Court shall deal with the matter in its proper perspective and in
      accordance with law which we express no opinion.

      The special leave petition is, accordingly, disposed of.”




 9.   Appellant then filed a  review  petition  No.10143  of  2006  with  an
 application for condonation of delay.  Following are the propositions  made
 in the review petition:




      “(1) Proposals for Development Plan must provide, inter alia, for:

      (a) allocating the use of land  for  purposes  such  as;  residential,
      industrial, commercial, agricultural, recreational.

      (b)  designation  of  land   for   public   purposes   like   schools,
      colleges....,markets...,Government   and   other    buildings....(vide
      section 22)

      (2) Town Planning Schemes prepared for implementing the [proposals  in
      the final Development plan should also make provisions for the matters
      specified in the Development Plan, including reservation, acquisition,
      or allotment of land required for all purposes  mentioned  in  Section
      59(1)(b). (vide Sections 59 & 64).

      (3 ) The  Arbitrator  appointed  in  accordance  with  Section  72  is
      required to define, demarcate and decide  the  areas  allotted  to  or
      reserved for the public purpose or purposes of the Planning Authority,
      and also the final plots.

      (4) All lands required, reserved or designated in a  Development  Plan
      or town planning scheme for a public purpose, are  deemed  to  be  the
      land needed for a public  purpose  within  the  meaning  of  the  Land
      Acquisition Act, 1894 (vide Section 125) and all such lands,  required
      or reserved for any public purpose specified in any  plan  or  scheme,
      may be  acquired  at  any  time  by  the  Planning  Authority  or  the
      Development Authority or any other appropriate Authority in accordance
      with the provisions contained in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894  (vide
      Section 126).

      (5) The cost of the scheme is required to be met wholly or in part  by
      a contribution to be levied by the Planning Authority  on  each  final
      plot calculated in proportion to the increment which is  estimated  to
      accrue in respect of such plot (vide Section  99).  The  cost  of  the
      scheme includes all sums payable by a Planning Authority and all  sums
      payable as compensation for lands reserved or allotted for any  public
      purpose or purpose of a Planning Authority which is solely  beneficial
      to the owners or residents within the area of the scheme.

      (6) Such plots of lands as are earmarked or reserved specifically  for
      a public purpose, but which are not solely beneficial to the owners or
      residents within the area of the scheme, would  not  fall  within  the
      jurisdiction  of  the  Arbitrator  since  the  estimated   amount   of
      compensation payable for such lands could not  be  determined  by  him
      following the criterion laid down in Section 72 of the Act.

      (7) The lands, which are specifically reserved for  a  public  purpose
      but not solely beneficial to the owners or the residential  within the
      area of  the  scheme,  would  have  to  be  compulsorily  acquired  in
      accordance with the Land Acquisition Act  following  the  mandates  of
      Sections 125 and 126. The compensation that would  become  payable  to
      the land owners for such acquisition would also not form part of  such
      cost of such scheme and no part of the compensation  amount  could  be
      met form the contribution to be levied by the  Planning  Authority  on
      each final plot.

      (8) The lands specifically reserved and earmarked for a public purpose
      in the scheme which is not solely beneficial  to  the  owners  or  the
      residents within the area of the scheme, are not  lands  “required  by
      the planning Authority” and hence, the  provisions  of  Section  88(a)
      have no application in respect of such lands.

      (9) The decision dated  23.12.2004  of  the  Division  Bench  of  this
      Hon’ble Court in Zahir Jahangir Vakil v. Pune  Municipal  Corporation,
      has no application to the present case since the nature  of  the  land
      which was the subject matter of  the  scheme  therein  was  completely
      different. In that case, out of the original  plot  (revised  plot  no
      77), two plots had been carved out - Final plot nos. 75 and 76.  While
      the Final Plot no. 76 was allotted to the landlord in substitution  of
      the original plot of land, the other final plot no.  75  was  reserved
      for a school. The purpose of the school is a public purpose,  and  was
      reserved solely for the benefit of the owners and residents within the
      area of the scheme and hence, the cost of the said land became payable
      as compensation derived from the contribution levied by  the  Planning
      Authority and became part of the cost of the scheme.

      (10) In Zahir  Jahangir  Vakil’s  case,  the  provisions  relating  to
      “Finance of Schemes” contained in Section 97 and in particular  clause
      (c) of Sub-section (1) thereof and sections 98 and 99,  among  others,
      had not been considered. Moreover, the interrelationship  between  the
      provisions in Sections 125 and 126  on  the  one  hand,  and  Sections
      22(b), 64(b)  and  97(1)(c)  read  with  Section  99  regarding  lands
      reserved for specific purpose in the development plan and in the  Town
      Planning Scheme, which are not solely  beneficial  to  the  owners  or
      residents within the area of the scheme had not been  considered.  The
      said decision, therefore, could not be regarded as a precedent for the
      questions involved in the present proceedings (vide Union of India  v.
      Dhanwanti Devi, (1996) 6 SCC 44, Para 9 and 10)”.




10.   The High Court condoned the delay in filing the  review  petition  and
examined the propositions and rejected all vide its order dated  16.10.2009.
 Further, the High Court also expressed the following view:

      “What is important to be noted first is that  all  the  grounds  which
      have been raised by way of the propositions  of  law  which  has  been
      advanced, were not part of the pleadings in the main Suit.  Since  the
      matter has arisen from the Suit, the said  pleadings  were  very  much
      necessary so that the other side could have had an opportunity to meet
      out those pleadings and led evidence in that regard.  Viewed from  any
      angle, we do not find any substance in the  afore-stated  propositions
      advanced on behalf of the petitioner.”







11.   In our view, once the SLP had been disposed of on 24.10.2005, all  the
findings recorded in the judgment of  the  High  Court  dated  6.5.2005  had
attained finality.  Liberty was, however, granted  on  the  request  of  the
appellant to raise certain points which they could not raise earlier  before
the High Court.  The High Court was also directed to deal with those  points
in accordance with law.



12.    Shri  Dushyant  Dave,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for   the
appellant, took us elaborately  through  the  MRTP  Act  especially  various
provisions of Chapter V of the Act dealing with the Town  Planning  Schemes.
Learned senior counsel submitted that when  a  land  is  clearly  identified
under the Development Plan or under the Town  Planning  Scheme  as  required
for specified public purpose and it is so designated and declared in such  a
scheme, whether the land owner thereof is a participant in the scheme  or  a
beneficiary of the scheme or not, such land could only be acquired in  terms
of the provisions contained in the Land  Acquisition  Act.   Learned  senior
counsel pointed out that Section 59 of the MRTP Act  opens  with  the  words
“subject to the provisions of this Act” and that has to be read  along  with
Section 126 of the Act which provides that such land which  is  required  or
reserved for any of the public purposes specified in any plan or scheme  may
be acquired  under  the  Land  Acquisition  Act.   Learned  senior  counsel,
therefore, submitted that any land which is required  or  reserved  for  any
public purposes specified in any plan or scheme would be deemed to  be  land
“needed for a public purpose” within the meaning  of  the  Land  Acquisition
Act and hence would have to be acquired in accordance  with  the  provisions
of the Land Acquisition Act.




13.   Learned senior counsel also submitted that  the  High  Court  has  not
properly appreciated the scope and purpose of Section 88  of  the  MRTP  Act
which has to be read in the context of Section 126 of  the  MRTP  Act.   The
expression “vest absolutely” is used in a very limited sense in Section  88,
which involves only adjustment of different  values  between  the  allottees
and the other beneficiaries, limiting that much of lands which are  required
by Planning Authority, for its own purposes, while the  rest  of  the  lands
under the Scheme undergoes transformation of exchanging  in  the  rights  of
the land owners falling within the  scheme.   Learned  senior  counsel  also
submitted that  the  Act  does  not  lay  down  any  guidelines  as  to  the
circumstances that would justify acquisition of the land under Sections  125
and 126 on the one hand and extinguishment of the rights of  the  owners  in
the lands in terms of Section 88 with a meager  compensation  determined  by
the Arbitrator.  Learned senior counsel also referred  to  the  Preamble  of
the MRTP Act  and  submitted  that  the  object  of  the  Act  was  to  make
compulsory acquisition of land required for the public purposes  in  respect
of the Town Planning Schemes.   Learned  senior  counsel  also  referred  to
various judgments of this Court in support  of  its  contention.   Reference
was made to the judgments of this Court in Municipal Corporation of  Greater
Bombay and others v. Hindustan Pertoleum Corporation and  another  (2001)  8
SCC 143,  Shri Rangaswami, Textile Commissioner and  Others  v.   The  Sagar
Textile (P) Ltd. and Anr.  (1977)  2  SCC  578,  Sub-Committee  on  Judicial
Accountability v. Union of India and others (1991) 4  SCC  699,  Ram  Prasad
Narayan Sahi and another v. The State of  Bihar  and  others  (1953)  4  SCR
1129, The State of West Bengal  v. Mrs. Bela Banerjee and others (1954)  SCR
558, P. Vajravelu Mudaliar  v.  Special  Deputy  Collector,  Madras  &  Anr.
(1965) 1 SCR 614 etc.  Learned senior counsel also submitted what  Municipal
Corporation required is space for Municipal office of its own  approximately
50,000 sq. feet which the appellant is ready and willing  to  provide  while
carrying out the construction of the area in question free of cost.


14.    Shri  U.U.  Lalit,  learned  senior   counsel   for   the   Municipal
Corporation, took us through the provisions  of  the  MRTP  Act,  especially
Chapter V in respect of framing of the Town Planning  Scheme  and  submitted
that the said  chapter  is  a  full  and  comprehensive  provision  for  the
preparation of the Town Planning Scheme.  Learned senior  counsel  submitted
that once the town planning scheme is framed in  accordance  with  the  said
chapter and brought into force, the right, title of the  original  owner  of
the plot stands  extinguished  and  the  land  would  stand  vested  in  the
authority as per Section 88 of the MRTP Act.  Learned  senior  counsel  also
submitted that Chapter VII of the MRTP Act is not applicable in such a  case
and the question of resorting to Section 126 does not arise,  since  an  in-
built mechanism has already been provided in Chapter V of the Act.   Learned
senior counsel also submitted that the appellant  has  already  availed  all
the remedies available in Chapter  V  and  there  is  no  justification  for
invoking Section 126 of the MRTP  Act.   Learned  senior  counsel  submitted
that as per the Town Planning Scheme which came  into  force  on  20.09.1976
the final plot No. 44 stood reserved for municipal office  and  has  already
been allotted  to  the  Municipal  Corporation  and  they  are  in  physical
possession of the plot in question.  Learned senior counsel  also  submitted
that SLP filed against the original  judgment  dated  6.5.2005  has  already
been dismissed by this Court and the points which attained  finality  cannot
be reopened.



15.   Learned senior counsel also pointed  out  that  Municipal  Corporation
has already handed over the plot to M/s Vitrag Construction  and  they  have
already  started  construction   of   the   corporation   office   and   the
grounds/foundation work is already over.  Learned senior  counsel  submitted
that the Corporation  required  an  area  of  about  63,161.20  sq.  ft.  to
accommodate all the existing offices and, therefore, the offer made  by  the
appellant is legally unacceptable.



Maintainability of the Appeal



16.   We fully endorse the view expressed by the learned senior counsel  for
the Corporation that, on dismissal of the  SLP,  the  points  already  dealt
with and decided by the High  Court  had  attained  finality.   This  Court,
while disposing of the petition on 24.10.2005 permitted  the  appellants  to
raise those points which are germane to  the  “subject  matter”  for  which,
suitable pleadings should have been made in the plaint.  The High  Court  in
the review order dt. 16.10.2009 has clearly found that  the  grounds,  which
were raised in the review petition, were not part of the pleadings.  In  our
view, that itself is sufficient to reject this appeal.



17.   We have come  across  several  orders  passed  by  this  court  making
observations while dismissing the SLP  at  the  admission  stage,  that  too
without  hearing  the  opposite  side,  which  may  apparently  seem  to  be
innocuous but  may  generate  more  litigations  and  embarrassment  to  the
respective High Courts.  If this Court grants liberty to any party to  raise
“certain points”, those points should be clearly formulated in the order  of
this Court, so that the  High  Court  would  be  in  a  better  position  to
understand  the  points  left  to  be  decided  by  the  High  Court.    Non
formulation of such points by this Court creates confusion in  the  mind  of
the litigants giving room for more rounds of litigation.   Our  humble  view
is that this calls for serious  introspection.   Be  that  it  may,  we  are
inclined to examine the legal contentions urged before us.



18.   We have  already  stated  that  the  only  question  that  arises  for
consideration is whether the landowners can take recourse to Section 126  of
the MRTP Act, once the TP Scheme is framed and the  final  scheme  has  been
brought into force, vesting  the  land  in  the  Corporation  and  providing
compensation as provided in the Town Planning Scheme.



19.   The scope and ambit of MRTP Act came up  for  consideration  before  a
five  Judge  Bench  of  this  Court  in  Girnar  Traders  (3)  v.  State  of
Maharashtra and Others [(2011) 3 SCC 1] and this Court has  taken  the  view
that the provisions of the MRTP Act relate to  preparation,  submission  and
sanction of approval of different plans by the concerned  authorities  which
are aimed at achieving the object of planned  development  in  contradiction
to haphazard development. An owner/person interested in  the  land  and  who
wishes to object to the plans at the  appropriate  stage,  a  self-contained
adjudicatory machinery has been spelt out in the MRTP Act. Even  the  remedy
of appeal is available under the MRTP Act  with  a  complete  Chapter  being
devoted to acquisition  of  land  for  the  planned  development.  Providing
adjudicatory mechanism is one of  the  most  important  facets  of  deciding
whether a particular statute is a 'complete code' in itself or not.



20.   Various provisions of the Act comprehensively prescribe what  and  how
the steps are required to be taken by the authorities under the  Act,  right
from the stage of preparation of draft development plan to its  finalization
as well as preparation and finalization of all regional  and  town  planning
schemes.   Right  of  the  interested  person  to  raise  objections,   pre-
finalization of the respective plans,  is  specifically  provided.   Besides
providing right of objection to the owner of the  land  or  property,  which
fall within the development plan, the State Act also provides machinery  for
finalization and determination  of  disputes  between  the  authorities  and
private parties. Furthermore, a person is entitled  to  raise  all  disputes
including the dispute of ownership. The Arbitrator nominated under the  MRTP
Act has the jurisdiction to decide all such  matters.  The  jurisdiction  of
the Arbitrator is a limited one like estimation and payment of  compensation
in relation to plots in distinction  to  lands  as  defined  under  the  Act
within the four corners of the provisions of Sections 72 to 74 of  the  MRTP
Act with reference to Section 97 of the State Act.


21.   The MRTP Act is, therefore, a code in itself and has  one  predominant
purpose, i.e., planned development.  The principal purpose of the  MRTP  Act
can be achieved without the aid of the Land  Acquisition  Act  which  has  a
very limited and restricted application.   Whenever a land  is  required  or
reserved for any public purpose specified in any plan or  scheme  under  the
MRTP Act, the concerned authority may, with the exception of the  provisions
of Section 113A of the  State  Act,  i.e.  land  designated  under  the  Act
connected with the  development  of  the  new  town,  acquire  the  land  by
different modes i.e. (a) by paying an amount agreed (by agreement);  (b)  in
lieu of any such amount  by  granting  the  right  specified  under  Section
126(1)(b); and (c) by making an application  to  the  State  Government  for
acquiring such land under the Land  Acquisition  Act.  Section  126(2)  lays
down the procedure, primarily, as to how the application made under  Section
126(1)(c) is to be dealt  with  by  the  State  Government  and,  if  it  is
satisfied, to make a declaration in the Official Gazette to the effect  that
the land is needed for a public purpose, in the manner provided  in  Section
6 of the Land Acquisition Act. Section 126(3) deals with  the  procedure  to
be followed after declaration contemplated under  Section  126(2)  has  been
published.

22.   It is not necessary to  further  elaborate  the  scope  of  the  above
mentioned provisions since, so far as the present case is  concerned,  there
is no necessity  of  invoking  Chapter  VII  of  the  Act  since  after  the
publication of the final scheme, the land vested absolutely in the  Planning
Authority free from all encumbrances as per section 88(a) of the  MRTP  Act.
Now to examine, how the land stands vested under  Section  88  of  the  MRTP
Act, it is unnecessary to refer to few of the provisions of  the  MRTP  Act.
Section 2(9) defines ‘Development Plan’ under the MRTP Act  which  reads  as
follows:
      “(9) "Development plan" means  a  plan  for  the  development  or  re-
      development  of  the  area  within  the  jurisdiction  of  a  Planning
      Authority and includes revision of a development plan and proposal  of
      a Special Planning  Authority  for  development  of  land  within  its
      jurisdictions.”


23.   Sections 30 and 31 provide for submission of a draft Development  Plan
and sanction to draft Development Plan respectively.  Those  provisions  are
extracted hereunder for easy reference as it stood prior  to  the  Amendment
in 2011:
      “Section 30 - Submission of draft Development plan


      (1) The Planning Authority or as the case may  be,  the  said  Officer
      shall submit the draft Development Plan to the  State  Government  for
      sanction within a period of twelve months from the date of publication
      of the notice in the Official Gazette regarding its preparation  under
      section 26 :


           Provided that, the State Government may, on an application  by  a
      Planning Authority or the said Officer by an order in writing, and for
      adequate reasons which should be recorded, extend from  time  to  time
      the said period by such further period as  may  be  specified  in  the
      order but  not  in  any  case  exceeding  twenty-four  months  in  the
      aggregate.


      (2) The particulars referred to in sub-section (2) of section 26 shall
      also be submitted to the State Government.

      Section 31 - Sanction to draft Development plan


      (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, and not later than  one
      year from  the  date  of  receipt  of  such  plan  from  the  Planning
      Authority, or as the case may be, from the  said  Officer,  the  State
      Government may, after consulting the  Director  of  Town  Planning  by
      notification in the Official Gazette sanction  the  draft  Development
      Plan submitted to it for the whole area, or separately  for  any  part
      thereof, either without modification, or subject to such modifications
      as it may consider proper or return the draft Development plan to  the
      Planning Authority or as  the  case  may  be,  the  said  Officer  for
      modifying the plan as it may direct or refuse to accord  sanction  and
      direct the Planning Authority or the said Officer to prepare  a  fresh
      Development plan;


            Provided that, the State  Government  may,  if  it  thinks  fit,
      whether the said period has expired or not, extend from time to  time,
      by a notification in the Official Gazette, the period for  sanctioning
      the draft Development plan or refusing to accord sanction thereto,  by
      such further period as may be specified in the notification :


            Provided further that, where the modifications  proposed  to  be
      made by the State Government are of a substantial  nature,  the  State
      Government shall publish a notice in the Official Gazette and also  in
      local newspapers inviting objections and suggestions from  any  person
      in respect of the proposed modification within a period of sixty days,
      from the date of such notice.


      (2) The State Government may appoint an officer of rank not below that
      of a Class I Officer and direct him to hear any such person in respect
      of such objections and suggestions and submit his  report  thereon  to
      the State Government.


      (3) The State Government shall before according sanction to the  draft
      Development  plan  take  into  consideration   such   objections   and
      suggestions and the report of the officer.


      (4) The State Government shall fix  in  the  notification  under  sub-
      section (1) a date not earlier than one month from its publication  on
      which the final Development plan shall come into operation.


      (5) If a Development plan contains any proposal for the designation of
      any land for a purpose specified in clauses (b) and (c) of section 22,
      and if such land does not vest in the Planning  Authority,  the  State
      Government shall not include that in the Development plan,  unless  it
      is satisfied that the Planning Authority will be able to acquire  such
      land by private agreement or compulsory acquisition not later than ten
      years  from  the  date  on  which  the  Development  plan  comes  into
      operation.


      (6) A Development plan which has come into operation shall  be  called
      the "final Development plan" and shall, subject to the  provisions  of
      this Act, be binding on the Planning Authority.”





24.   The Provisions of Town Planning Scheme are covered  by  Chapter  V  of
the MRTP Act.  Section 59  deals  with  preparation  and  contents  of  town
planning scheme which reads as follows:
      “Section 59 - Preparation and contents of town planning scheme


      (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act or any  other  law  for  the
      time being in force-.


      (a) a Planning Authority may  for  the  purpose  of  implementing  the
      proposals in the final Development Plan,  prepare  one  or  more  town
      planning schemes for the area within its  jurisdiction,  or  any  part
      thereof;


      (b) a town planning scheme may make provision for any of the following
      matters, that is to say-


      (i) any of the matters specified in section 22;


      (ii) the laying out or re-laying out of land, either vacant or already
      built upon, including areas of comprehensive development;


      (iii) the suspension, as far  as  may  be  necessary  for  the  proper
      carrying  out  of  the  scheme,  of  any  rule,  by-law,   regulation,
      notification or order made or issued under any law for the time  being
      in force which the Legislature of the State is competent to make;


      (iv) such other matter not inconsistent with the object of  this  Act,
      as may be directed by the State Government.


      (2) In making provisions in a draft town planning scheme  for  any  of
      the matters referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1), it shall  be
      lawful for a Planning Authority with the approval of the  Director  of
      Town Planning and subject to the provisions of section 68  to  provide
      for suitable amendment of the Development plan.”





25.   Section 61 of the MRTP Act deals with the making  and  publication  of
draft scheme by means of  notice  which  is  extracted  hereunder  for  easy
reference:
      “Section 61 - Making and publication of draft scheme [by means of
      notice]:-


      (1) Not later than twelve months from the  date  of  the  declaration,
      subject, however, to sub-section (3) the Planning Authority shall,  in
      consultation with the Director of Town Planning, make a  draft  scheme
      for the area in  respect  of  which  the  declaration  was  made,  and
      published a notice in the Official Gazette, and in such  other  manner
      as may be prescribed stating that the draft scheme in respect of  such
      area has been made. The notice shall state the name of the place where
      a copy thereof shall be available for inspection  by  the  public  and
      shall state that copies thereof or any extract therefrom certified  to
      be correct shall be available for sale to the public at  a  reasonable
      price.


      (2) If the Planning Authority fails to make a draft scheme and publish
      a notice regarding its making within  the  period  specified  in  sub-
      section (1) or within the period extended under sub-section  (3),  the
      declaration shall lapse,  unless  the  State  Government  appoints  an
      Officer to prepare and submit the draft scheme to the State Government
      on behalf of the Planning Authority not later than twelve months  from
      the date of such appointment or the extended period under  sub-section
      (3); but any such lapse of declaration shall not  debar  the  Planning
      Authority from making a fresh declaration any time in respect  of  the
      same area.


      (3) The State Government may, on  application  made  by  the  Planning
      Authority or, as the case may be, the officer, from time  to  time  by
      notification in the Official Gazette, extend the period  specified  in
      sub-section (1) or (2) by such period not exceeding six months as  may
      be specified in the notification.”






26.   The power of State Government to require Planning  Authority  to  make
scheme is provided under Section 63 which is extracted hereunder:

      “Section 63 - Power of State Government to require Planning Authority
      to make scheme:-


      (1)  Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  this  Act,  the  State
      Government may, in respect of any  Planning  Authority  after  making
      such inquiry as it deems necessary, direct that Authority to make and
      submit for its sanction, a draft scheme in respect  of  any  land  in
      regard to which a town planning scheme may be  made  after  a  notice
      regarding its making  has  been  duly  published  in  the  prescribed
      manner.


      (2) If the Planning  Authority  fails  to  make  the  declaration  of
      intention to make a scheme within  three  months  from  the  date  of
      direction made under sub-section (1), the  State  Government  may  by
      notification in the Official Gazette, appoint an officer to make  and
      submit the draft scheme for the land to the State Government after  a
      notice regarding its making has been duly published as aforesaid] and
      thereupon the provisions of sections 60, 61 and 62 shall, as  far  as
      may be applicable, apply to the making of such a scheme.”






27.   Section 64  provides  for  contents  of  draft  Scheme  which  are  as
follows:

      “Section 64 - Contents of draft scheme:-

      A draft scheme shall contain the following particulars so far as  may
      be necessary, that is to say,--


      (a) the ownership, area and tenure of each original plot;


      (b) reservation, acquisition or allotment of land required under sub-
      clause (i) of clause (b) of section 59 with a general  indication  of
      the uses to which such land is to be put and the terms and conditions
      subject to which, such land is to be put to such uses;


      (c) the extent to which it is proposed to alter the boundaries of the
      original plots by reconstitution;


      (d) an estimate of the total cost of the scheme and the net  cost  to
      be borne by the Planning Authority;


      (e) a full description of all the details of the scheme with  respect
      to such matters referred to in clause (b) of section  59  as  may  be
      applicable;


      (f) the laying out or re-laying out of land either vacant or  already
      built upon including areas of comprehensive development;


      (g) the filling up or reclamation of low  lying  swamp  or  unhealthy
      areas or levelling up of land;


      (h) any other prescribed particulars.”






28.   Section 65 deals with  the  reconstituted  plot.   The  same  is  also
extracted hereunder for easy reference:

      “Section 65 - Reconstituted plot:-

      (1) In the draft scheme, the size and  shape  of  every  reconstituted
      plot shall be determined, so far as may be, to render it suitable  for
      building purposes, and where a plot is already built upon,  to  ensure
      that the buildings as far as possible comply with  the  provisions  of
      the scheme as regards open spaces.


      (2) For the purpose of sub-section (1), a  draft  scheme  may  contain
      proposals--


      (a) to form a final plot by reconstitution  of  an  original  plot  by
      alteration of the boundaries of the original plot, if necessary;


      (b) to form a final plot from an original plot by the transfer  wholly
      or partly of the adjoining lands;


      (c) to provide, with the consent of  the  owners,  that  two  or  more
      original plots each of which is held in ownership in severally  or  in
      joint  ownership  shall  hereafter,  with  or  without  alteration  of
      boundaries be held in ownership in common as a final plot;


      (d) to allot a final  plot  to  any  owner  dispossessed  of  land  in
      furtherance of the scheme; and


      (e) to transfer the ownership of an original plot from one  person  to
      another.”






29.   Section 67 deals with the objections to draft scheme which reads as
follows:

      “Section 67 - Objections to draft scheme to be considered:-


      If within thirty days from the  date  of  the  publication  of  notice
      regarding the preparation of the draft  scheme,  any  person  affected
      thereby communicates in writing any objection relating to such scheme,
      the Planning Authority, or the officer appointed under sub-section (2)
      of section 61 or Section 63 shall consider such objection and may,  at
      any time before submitting the draft scheme to the State Government as
      hereinafter provided, modify such scheme as it or he thinks fit.”






30.   Section 68 deals with the power of State Government  to sanction
draft scheme, the same is extracted for easy reference:

      “Section 68 - Power of State Government to sanction draft scheme:-


      (1) The Planning Authority or,  as  the  case  may  be,  the  officer
      aforesaid shall, not later than six  months  from  the  date  of  the
      publication of the notice in  the  Official  Gazette,  regarding  the
      making of the draft scheme, submit the same  with  any  modifications
      which it or he  may  have  made  therein  together  with  a  copy  of
      objections received by it or him to the State Government,  and  shall
      at the same time apply for its sanction.


      (2) On receiving such application, after making such  inquiry  as  it
      may think fit and consulting the Director of Town Planning, the State
      Government may, not later than  six  months  from  the  date  of  its
      submission, notification in the Official Gazette, or not  later  than
      such further time as the State Government may extend, either sanction
      such draft scheme with or without modifications and subject  to  such
      conditions as it may think fit to impose or refuse to give sanction.


      (3) If the State Government sanctions such scheme, it shall  in  such
      notification state at what place and time the draft scheme  shall  be
      open to the inspection of the public and the State  Government  shall
      also state therein that copies of the scheme or any extract therefrom
      certified to be correct shall on application be available for sale to
      public at a reasonable price.”






31.   Section 72 deals with the powers and duties of the Arbitrator which
reads as follows:-



      “Section 72 - Arbitrator; his powers and duties:-

      (1) Within one month from the date on which the sanction of the State
      Governments to the draft scheme is published in the Official Gazette,
      the State Government shall for  purposes  of  one  or  more  planning
      schemes received by it for sanction  appoint  any  person  possessing
      such qualifications as may be prescribed to  be  an  Arbitrator  with
      sufficient establishment and  his  duties  shall  be  as  hereinafter
      provided.


      (2) The State Government may, if it thinks fit at  any  time,  remove
      for incompetence or misconduct or replace for any good and sufficient
      reason an Arbitrator appointed under this section and shall forthwith
      appoint another person to take his place and any  proceeding  pending
      before the Arbitrator immediately before the date of his  removal  or
      replacement shall be continued and disposed of by the new  Arbitrator
      appointed in his place.


      (3) In accordance with the  prescribed  procedure,  every  Arbitrator
      shall,--


      (i) after notice given  by  him  in  the  prescribed  manner  define,
      demarcate and decide the areas allotted  to,  or  reserved,  for  the
      public purpose or purposes of the Planning Authority,  and  also  the
      final plots;


      (ii) after notice given by him in the prescribed manner,  decide  the
      person or persons to whom a final plot is to be allotted;  when  such
      plot is to be allotted; and when such  plot  is  to  be  allotted  to
      persons in ownership in common, decide the shares of such person;


      (iii) estimate the value of and fix the difference between the values
      of the original plots and the values of the final plots  included  in
      the final scheme, in accordance  with  the  provisions  contained  in
      clause (f) of sub-section (1) of section 97;


      (iv) estimate the compensation payable for the loss of  the  area  of
      the original plot in accordance with  the  provisions,  contained  in
      clause (f) of sub-section  (1)  of  section  97  in  respect  of  any
      original plot which is wholly acquired under the scheme;


      (v) determine whether the areas allotted or reserved for  the  public
      purpose or purposes of the Planning Authority are  beneficial  wholly
      or partly to the owners or residents within the area of the scheme;


      (vi) estimate the proportion of the sums payable as  compensation  of
      each plot used, allotted  or  reserved  for  the  public  purpose  or
      purposes of the Planning Authority which is beneficial partly to  the
      owners or residents within the area of the scheme and partly  to  the
      general public, which shall be included in the cost of the scheme;


      (vii) determine the proportion of contribution to be levied  on  each
      plot used, allotted or reserved for a public purpose or  purposes  of
      the Planning Authority which is beneficial partly to  the  owners  or
      residents within the area of the scheme and  partly  to  the  general
      public;


      (viii) determine the amount of exemptions, if any, from  the  payment
      of the contribution that may  be  granted  in  respect  of  plots  or
      portions thereof  exclusively  used  or  occupied  for  religious  or
      charitable purposes at the date on which the final scheme is drawn up
      under clause (xviii) of this sub-section;


      (ix) estimate the value of final plots included in the  final  scheme
      and the increment to accrue in respect of such  plots  in  accordance
      with the provisions of section 98;


      (x) calculate the proportion in which the increment in respect of the
      final  plots  included  in  the  final  scheme  shall  be  liable  to
      contribution to the  cost  of  the  scheme  in  accordance  with  the
      provisions contained in section 97;


      (xi) calculate the contribution to  be  levied  on  each  final  plot
      included in the final scheme;


      (xii) determine the amount to be deducted from or added  to,  as  the
      case may be, the contribution leviable from a  person  in  accordance
      with the provisions contained in section 100;


      (xiii) provide for the total or partial transfer of any right  in  an
      original plot to a final plot or provide for the  extinction  of  any
      right in an original plot in accordance with the provisions contained
      in section 101;


      (xiv) estimate the amount of compensation payable under section 66;


      (xv) where a plot is subject to  a  mortgage  with  possession  or  a
      lease,  decide  the  proportion  of  compensation   payable   to   or
      contribution payable by the mortgagee or lessee on one hand  and  the
      mortgagor or lessor on the other;


      (xvi) estimate in reference to claims  made  before  him,  after  the
      notice given by him in the prescribed manner, the compensation to  be
      paid to the owner of any property or right  injuriously  affected  by
      the  making  of  a  town  planning  scheme  in  accordance  with  the
      provisions contained in section 102;


      (xvii) determine the period in which the works provided in the scheme
      shall be completed by the Planning Authority;


      (xviii) draw in the prescribed form the final  scheme  in  accordance
      with the draft scheme:


      Provided that--


      (a) he may make variations from the draft scheme;


      (b) he may with the previous sanction of the State  Government  after
      hearing  the  Planning  Authority  and  any  owners  who  may   raise
      objections make substantial variations in the draft scheme.


      Explanation,--For the purpose of  sub-clause  (b)  of  this  proviso,
      "substantial variation" means increase in the total cost of the draft
      scheme by more than 20 per cent. or two lacs of rupees  whichever  is
      higher, on account of the provision of new works or  the  reservation
      of additional sites for public purposes included in the final  scheme
      drawn up by the Arbitrator.


      (4) The Arbitrator shall decide  all  matters  referred  to  in  sub-
      section (3) within a period of twelve months from  the  date  of  his
      appointment; and in the case of an  Arbitrator  appointed  under  the
      Bombay Town Planning Act, 1915 (Bom. I of 1915) or  a  Town  Planning
      Officer appointed under the Bombay  Town  Planning  Act,  1954  (Bom.
      XXVII of 1955) (whose appointment is continued  under  section  165),
      within a period of twelve months from the  date  of  commencement  of
      this Act :


      Provided that, the State Government may, if it  thinks  fit,  whether
      the said period has expired or  not,  and  whether  all  the  matters
      referred to in sub-section (3) have been decided or not, extend  from
      time to time by a notification in the Official  Gazette,  the  period
      for deciding all the matters referred to in that sub-section  (3)  or
      any extended period therefor.”






32.   Section 74 deals with the Appeal, as provided  against  the  award  of
the Arbitrator which reads as follows:

      “Section 74 – Appeal:-

      (1) Any decision of the Arbitrator under clauses (iv) to  (xi),  (both
      inclusive) and clauses (xiv), (xv) and (xvi)  of  sub-section  (3)  of
      section 72 shall be forthwith  communicated  to  the  party  concerned
      including the Planning Authority; and  any  party  aggrieved  by  such
      decision may, within two months from the date of communication of  the
      decision, apply to the Arbitrator to make a reference to the  Tribunal
      of Appeal for decision of the appeal.


      (2) The provisions of sections 5, 12 and 14 of the  Indian  Limitation
      Act, 1963 (36 of 1963) shall apply to  appeals  submitted  under  this
      section.”






33.   Section 86 deals with sanction by State Government to final scheme
which reads as follows:

      “Section 86 - Sanction by State Government to final scheme:-


      (1) The State Government may, within a period of four months from  the
      date of receipt  of  the  final  scheme  under  section  82  from  the
      Arbitrator or within such further period as the State  Government  may
      extend, by notification in the Official Gazette, sanction  the  scheme
      or refuse to give such sanction  provided  that,  in  sanctioning  the
      scheme the State Government may make such modifications as may in  its
      opinion be  necessary,  for  the  purposes  of  correcting  an  error,
      irregularity or informality.


      (2) If the State Government sanctions such scheme, it shall  state  in
      the notification--


      (a) the place at which the final scheme is kept open to inspection  by
      the public and also  state  therein  that  copies  of  the  scheme  or
      extracts therefrom certified to be correct shall, on  application,  be
      available for sale to the public at a reasonable price;


      (b) a date (which shall not be earlier than one month after  the  date
      of the publication of the notification) on which all  the  liabilities
      created by the scheme shall take effect and  the  final  scheme  shall
      come into force:


      Provided that, the State Government may, from time to  time,  postpone
      such date, by notification in the Official Gazette,  by  such  period,
      not exceeding three months at a time as it thinks fit.


      (3) On and after the date fixed in such notification, a town  planning
      scheme shall have effect as if it were enacted in this Act.”





34.   Section 88 deals with the  effect  of  final  scheme  which  reads  as
follows:

      “Section 88 - Effect of final scheme:-



      On and after the day on which a final scheme comes into force--


      (a) all lands required by the Planning Authority shall, unless  it  is
      otherwise determined in such scheme, vest absolutely in  the  Planning
      Authority free from all encumbrances;


      (b) all rights in the original plots  which  have  been  reconstituted
      shall determine and the reconstituted plots shall  become  subject  to
      the rights settled by Arbitrator;


      (c) the Planning Authority shall  handover  possession  of  the  final
      plots to the owners to whom they are allotted in the final scheme.”




35.    The Town Planning Scheme envisaged under the MRTP Act is,  therefore,
a code by itself and the provisions relating to compensation are inbuilt  in
the  scheme  itself.   Provisions  of  Town  Planning  scheme  provide   for
computation of compensation by the Arbitrator and if a  party  is  aggrieved
by the determination of compensation by the arbitrator, a party has a  right
of appeal before the Tribunal under the provisions of the MRTP Act.  On  the
final scheme being sanctioned by the State Government under  Section  88(a),
the property vests free of all encumbrances in the State Government and  all
rights  of  the  original  holders  in  the  original  plot  of  land  stand
extinguished,  the  rights  of  the  parties  are  those  governed  by   the
provisions of the said scheme and cannot be dealt with outside the scheme.




36.   We have already noticed that, after coming into force  the  MRTP  Act,
the Corporation had informed the legal heirs about the  reservation  of  the
property in question for public purpose.  Legal heirs then  appeared  before
the Arbitrator and objections were filed  before  the  Arbitrator  objecting
the  reservation  of  property  in  question  for  municipal  office.    The
Arbitrator rejected the objections raised by the legal heirs and  passed  an
award on 09.06.1973 in  conformity  with  the  draft  scheme  under  Section
72(3)(xviii)  of  the  MRTP  Act.   The  Arbitrator  has  also  awarded  the
compensation and, aggrieved by the same, we have  already  indicated,  legal
heirs preferred an appeal under  Section  74  of  the  MRTP  Act  which  was
dismissed by the Tribunal.  However, the rate of compensation  was  enhanced
from Rs.15.60 to Rs.21.53  per  sq.  mtr.   Following  all  those  statutory
provisions, the Government of Maharashtra finally accorded sanction for  the
scheme in exercise of powers conferred under Section 86  of  the  MRTP  Act.
The effect and consequence of the  final  scheme  has  been  provided  under
Section 88 of the MRTP  Act.    Therefore,  once  the  final  Town  Planning
Scheme has been in force and vesting  of  the  land  on  the  Town  Planning
authority takes place as provided under Section 88(a) of the Act.




37.   We find that all the  above-mentioned  procedures  have  already  been
followed in the instant case resulting in vesting of the  plot  in  question
in the Planning Authority under Section  88(a)  of  the  MRTP  Act  and  the
amount of compensation was also paid.  The appellant contends that in  spite
of the fact that the plot stood vested in the Government  or  Town  Planning
Authority under Section 88(a) of the  MRTP  Act,  even  then  the  procedure
prescribed under Chapter VII will have to be followed including Section  126
of the MRTP Act.




38.   Appellant submits that  even  though  there  can  be  a  provision  of
reservation and/or compensation  under  the  Town  Planning  Scheme  of  any
portion of the land vested on the Town Planning Authority, for the  purposes
of  determining  compensation,  the  State  Government  has  to  follow  the
procedure  prescribed  under  Section  126(2)  of   the   Act   and   proper
compensation be paid under provisions of the Land Acquisition Act.   It  was
further submitted that the vesting provided under  Section  88(a)  on  final
scheme  being  sanctioned  by  State  Government,  would   be   subject   to
computation of compensation as contemplated under Sections  126(2)  and  (3)
of the Act.  Even though, in the earlier  part  of  the  judgment,  we  have
referred to Sections 125 and 126, it would be appropriate  to  extract  both
the sections in its entirety to appreciate the  contentions  raised  by  the
appellant.

      Section 125 - Compulsory acquisition of land, needed for  purposes  of
      Regional plan, Development plan or Town planning schemes, etc.:-

      Any  land  required,  reserved  or  designated  in  a  Regional  plan,
      Development plan or Town Planning  Scheme  for  a  public  purpose  or
      purposes including plans for any area of comprehensive development  or
      for any new town shall be deemed  to  be  land  needed  for  a  public
      purpose within the meaning of the Land Acquisition  Act,  1894  (I  of
      1894).

      Section 126  -  Acquisition  of  land  required  for  public  purposes
      specified in plans:-


      (1)  Where  after  the  publication  of  a  draft  Regional  Plan,   a
      Development or any other plan or Town Planning  Scheme,  any  land  is
      required or reserved for any of the public purposes specified  in  any
      plan or scheme under this Act at  any  time  the  planning  Authority,
      Development  Authority,  or  as  the  case  may  be,  any  Appropriate
      Authority may, expect as otherwise provided in  section  113A  acquire
      the land,--


      (a) by agreement by paying an amount agreed to, or


      (b) in lieu of any such amount, by  granting  the  land-owner  or  the
      lessee,  subject,  however,  to  the  lessee  paying  the  lessor   or
      depositing with  the  Planning  Authority,  Development  Authority  or
      Appropriate Authority, as the case may be, for payment to the  lessor,
      an amount equivalent to the value  of  the  lessor's  interest  to  be
      determined by any of the said Authorities concerned on  the  basis  of
      the principles laid down in the  Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894  (I  of
      1894), Floor Space Index  (FSI)  or  Transferable  Development  Rights
      (TDR) against the area of land surrendered free of cost and free  from
      all encumbrances, and also further additional  Floor  Space  Index  or
      Transferable   Development   Rights   against   the   development   or
      construction of the amenity on the surrendered land at  his  cost,  as
      the Final Development Control  Regulations  prepared  in  this  behalf
      provide, or


      (c) by making an application to the  State  Government  for  acquiring
      such land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (I of  1894),  and  the
      land (together with the amenity, if any so developed  or  constructed)
      so acquired  by  agreement  or  by  grant  of  Floor  Space  Index  or
      additional Floor Space Index or Transferable Development Rights  under
      this section or under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (I of  1890),  as
      the case may be, shall vest absolutely free from all  encumbrances  in
      the Planning Authority, Development Authority, or as the case may  be,
      any Appropriate Authority.


      (2) On receipt  of  such  application,  if  the  State  Government  is
      satisfied that the land specified in the application is needed for the
      public purpose therein specified, or if the State  Government  (except
      in cases falling under section 49 and except as  provided  in  section
      113A) itself is of opinion) that any land included in any such plan is
      needed for any public purpose, it  may  make  a  declaration  to  that
      effect in the Official Gazette, in the manner provided in section 6 of
      the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (I of 1894), in  respect  of  the  said
      land. The declaration so  published  shall,  notwithstanding  anything
      contained in the said Act, be deemed to be  a  declaration  duly  made
      under the said section:


      Provided that, subject to the provisions of sub-section (4),  no  such
      declaration shall be made after the expiry of one year from  the  date
      of publication of the draft Regional Plan,  Development  Plan  or  any
      other Plan, or Scheme, as the case may be.


      (3) On publication of a declaration under  the  said  section  6,  the
      collector shall proceed to take order for the acquisition of the  land
      under the said Act; and the provisions of that Act shall apply to  the
      acquisition of the said land with the  modification  that  the  market
      value of the land shall be,-


      (i) where the land is to be acquired for the purposes of a  new  town,
      the market  value  prevailing  on  the  date  of  publication  of  the
      notification constituting or declaring the Development  Authority  for
      such town;


      (ii) where the land is acquired for the purposes of a Special Planning
      Authority the market value prevailing on the date  of  publication  of
      the notification of the area as undeveloped area; and


      (iii) in any other case the market value on the date of publication of
      the interim development plan, the draft development plan or  the  plan
      for the area or areas  for  comprehensive  development,  whichever  is
      earlier, or as the case may be, the date or publication of  the  draft
      Town Planning Scheme:


      Provided that, nothing in this sub-section shall affect the  date  for
      the purpose of determining the market value  of  land  in  respect  of
      which proceedings for acquisition commenced before the commencement of
      the Maharashtra Regional and Town  Planning  (Second  Amendment)  Act,
      1972 (Mah. XI of 1973):


      Provided further that, for the purpose of clause  (ii)  of  this  sub-
      section,  the  market  value  in  respect  of  land  included  in  any
      undeveloped area notified under sub-section (1) of section 40 prior to
      the commencement of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning (Second
      Amendment) Act, 1972 (Mah. XI of 1973),  shall  be  the  market  value
      prevailing on the date of such commencement.


      (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the proviso  to  sub-section
      (2) and sub-section (3), if a declaration, is  not  made,  within  the
      period referred to in  sub-section  (2)  (or  having  been  made,  the
      aforesaid period  expired  on  the  commencement  of  the  Maharashtra
      Regional and Town Planning (Amendment) Act, 1993 (Mah. X  of  1994))],
      the State Government may make a fresh declaration  for  acquiring  the
      land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (I of 1894), in  the  manner
      provided by sub-sections (2) and (3) of this section, subject  to  the
      modification that the market value of the land  shall  be  the  market
      value at the date of declaration in the  Official  Gazette,  made  for
      acquiring the land afresh.





39.   This Court had occasion to consider the scope  of  provisions  of  the
Bombay Town Planning Act in State of  Gujarat  v.  Shantilal  Mangaldas  and
Others AIR 1969 SC 634.  Though there was no provision  similar  to  Section
126 prescribing for payment of compensation following the  Land  Acquisition
Act in the Bombay Town Planning Act, Section 53 of the Bombay Town  Planning
Act is in pari materia with Section 88 of  the  MRTP  Act.   In  that  case,
placing reliance on judgment of this  Court  in  P.  Vajravelu  Mudaliar  v.
Special Deputy Collector, Madras and Another [(1965)  1  SCR  614],  it  was
contended that Section 53 (similar to  Section  88  of  the  MRTP  Act)  and
Section 67, in any event, infringed Article 14 of the Constitution of  India
and were on that account void.   Repealing  the  contention,  the  court  in
Shantilal Mangaldas held as follows:

      “There is no option under that Act to acquire the  land  either  under
      the Land Acquisition Act or under the Town  Planning  Act.   Once  the
      draft town planning scheme is sanctioned, the land becomes subject  to
      the provisions of the  Town  Planning  Act,  and  on  the  final  town
      planning scheme being sanctioned by statutory operation the  title  of
      the various owners is readjusted and the lands  needed  for  a  public
      purpose vest in the local authority.  Land required  for  any  of  the
      purposes of a town planning scheme cannot be acquired  otherwise  than
      under the Act, for it is a settled rule of interpretation of  statutes
      that when power is given under a statute to do a certain  thing  in  a
      certain way, the thing must be done in that way or  not.   Taylor  Vs.
      Taylor, (1875) 1 ChD 426.  Again it cannot be said that because it  is
      possible for the State, if so, minded, to acquire lands for  a  public
      purpose of a local authority, the statutory effect  given  to  a  town
      planning scheme results in discrimination  between  persons  similarly
      circumstanced.  In P. Vajravelu Mudaliar’s case (1965) 1 SCR 614,  the
      Court struck down the acquisition on the ground that  when  the  lands
      are acquired by the State Government for a housing  scheme  under  the
      Madras Amending Act, the claimant gets much smaller compensation  than
      the compensation he would get  if  the  land  or  similar  lands  were
      acquired for the same public purpose under the Land  Acquisition  Act,
      1894.  It was held that the discrimination between persons whose lands
      were acquired for housing schemes and those whose lands were  acquired
      for other public purposes could not be sustained on any  principle  of
      reasonable classification founded on intelligible differentia which  a
      rational relation to the object sought  to  be  achieved.   One  broad
      ground of distinction between P. Vajravelu Mudaliar’s  case  (1965)  1
      SCR 614 and this case is clear, the acquisition was struck down in  P.
      Vajravelu  Mudaliar’s  case  (1965)  1  SCR  614  because  the   State
      Government could resort to one of the two methods of  acquisition  the
      Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the Land Acquisition (Madras Amendment)
      Act, 1961 and no guidance was  given  by  the  Legislature  about  the
      statute which should be resorted to in a given case of acquisition for
      a housing scheme.  Power to  choose  could,  therefore,  be  exercised
      arbitrarily.  Under the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1955,  there  is  no
      acquisition by the State Government of land needed for a town planning
      scheme.  When the Town Planning Scheme comes into operation  the  land
      needed by a local authority  vests  by  virtue  of  S.53(a)  and  that
      vesting for purposes of the guarantee under Article  31(2)  is  deemed
      compulsory acquisition for a  public  purpose.   To  lands  which  are
      subject to the scheme, the provisions of Sections 53 and 67 apply, and
      the compensation is determined only in the manner  prescribed  by  the
      Act.  There are therefore two separate provisions, one for acquisition
      by the State Government, and the other in which the statutory  vesting
      of land operates as acquisition for the purpose of  town  planning  by
      the local authority.  The State Government can acquire the land  under
      the Land Acquisition Act, and  the  local  authority  only  under  the
      Bombay Town Planning Act.  There is no option to the  local  authority
      to resort to one or the other of the alternative methods which  result
      in requisition.  The contention that the provisions of Sections 53 and
      67 are invalid on the ground that they deny the  equal  protection  of
      the laws or equality before the laws must, therefore, stand rejected.”




40.   It was also urged  in  that  case  that  ‘vesting’  under  Section  53
(section 88 of  the  present  Act)  is  not  a  valid  vesting  because  the
Government cannot  expropriate  property  of  a  citizen  without  providing
compensation in respect thereof.  The Court held as follows:

      “26.  The principal argument which found favour with the High Court in
      holding Section 53 ultra vires, is that when a plot  is  reconstituted
      and out of that plot a smaller area is given  to  the  owner  and  the
      remaining is utilized vests  in  the  local  authority  for  a  public
      purpose, and since the Act does not provide  for  giving  compensation
      which is a just equivalent of the land expropriated  at  the  date  of
      extinction of interest the guaranteed right  under  Article  31(2)  is
      infringed.  While adopting  that  reasoning,  counsel  for  the  first
      respondent adopted another line of approach also.   Counsel  contended
      that under the scheme of the Act the entire area of the land belonging
      to the owner vests in the local authority, and when the  final  scheme
      is framed in lieu of the ownership of the original plot, the owner  is
      given a reconstituted plot by the local authority and compensation  in
      money is determined in respect of  the  land  appropriated  to  public
      purposes according to the rules contained in Secs. 67 and  71  of  the
      Act.  Such a scheme for compensation is, it  was  urged,  inconsistent
      with the guarantee under Article 31(2) for  two  reasons  –  (1)  that
      compensation for the entire land is not provided; and (2) that payment
      of compensation in money is not  provided  even  in  respect  of  land
      appropriated to public use.  The second branch of the argument is  not
      sustainable for reasons already set out, and the first branch  of  the
      argument is wholly without substance.  Section  53  does  not  provide
      that the reconstituted plot is transferred or is to be  deemed  to  be
      transferred from the local authority to  the  owner  of  the  original
      plot.  In terms Section 53 provides for statutory re-adjustment of the
      rights of the owners of the original plots of land.  When  the  scheme
      comes into force all rights in the original plots are extinguished and
      simultaneously therewith ownership springs in the reconstituted plots.
       There is no vesting of the original plots in the local authority  nor
      transfer of the rights of the local  authority  in  the  reconstituted
      plots.  A part or even the whole plot belonging to an owner may go  to
      form a reconstituted plot which may be allotted to another person,  or
      may be appropriated to public purposes under the scheme.   The  source
      of the power to appropriate the whole or part of the original plot  in
      forming a reconstituted plot is  statutory.   It  does  not  predicate
      ownership of the plot in the local authority and no process  –  actual
      or notional – of transfer is contemplated in that appropriation.   The
      lands covered by the scheme are subjected by the Act to the  power  of
      the local authority to readjust  titles,  but  no  reconstituted  plot
      vests at any stage in the local authority unless it is  needed  for  a
      purpose of the authority.  Even under clause (a)  of  section  53  the
      vesting in a local authority of land required by it is on  the  coming
      into force of the scheme.  The concept that lands vest  in  the  local
      authority when the intention to a make a scheme is notified is against
      the plain intendment of the Act.”




41.   The  provisions  of  Bombay  Town  Planning  Act  again  came  up  for
consideration before this  Court  in  Prakash  Amichand  Shah  v.  State  of
Gujarat and Others; 1986 (1) SCC 581 wherein this Court again  examined  the
provisions of the Bombay Town Planning Act, particularly the  provisions  of
Sections 53 and 67 to 71, which  deal  with  the  Scheme  and  consequential
acquisition.  The Court held that the acquisition of  land  under  the  Town
Planning Scheme by the local authority under Section 53 cannot  be  said  to
be discriminatory or offending the equality clause on the  ground  that  the
local  authority  has  an  option  to  acquire  the  land  under  the   Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 which is a more favourable method  of  acquisition  as
regards the land owner.  In Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd.  v.  G.J.  Desai
[1969 UJ (SC) 575] the Court, while  dealing  with  the  provisions  of  the
above-mentioned Act, observed as follows:

      “When the Town Planning Scheme comes into operation the land needed by
      a local authority vests by virtue of Section 53(a)  and  that  vesting
      for purposes of the guarantee under Art. 31(2)  is  deemed  compulsory
      acquisition for a public purpose. To lands which are  subject  to  the
      scheme,  the  provisions  of  Sections  53  and  67  apply,  and   the
      compensation is determined only in the manner prescribed by  the  Act.
      There are therefore two separate provisions one for the acquisition by
      State Government and the other in which the statutory vesting of  land
      operates as acquisition for the purpose of town planning by the  local
      authority. The State Government can acquire the land  under  the  Land
      Acquisition Act, and the local authority only under  the  Bombay  Town
      Planning Act. There is no option to the local authority to  resort  to
      one  or  the  other  of  the  alternative  methods  which  result   in
      acquisition. Hence the provisions of   Sections  53  and  67  are  not
      invalid on the ground that they deny equal protection of the  loss  or
      equality before laws.”

      19. In order to appreciate the contentions  of  the  appellant  it  is
      necessary to look at the object of the legislation in  question  as  a
      whole. The object of the Act is not just acquiring a bit of land  here
      or a bit of land there for some public purpose. It consists of several
      activities which have as their ultimate object the orderly development
      of an urban area. It envisages the preparation of a development  plan,
      allocation of land for various private and public uses, preparation of
      a Town Planning Scheme and making provisions for future development of
      the area in question. The various aspects of a  Town  Planning  Scheme
      have already been set out. On the final Town  Planning  Scheme  coming
      into force under section 53 of the Act there is an  automatic  vesting
      of  all  lands  required  by  the  local  authority  unless  otherwise
      provided, in  the  local  authority.  It  is  not  a  case  where  the
      provisions of the Land Acquisition Act,1894 have to be set  in  motion
      either by the Collector or by the Government.”




42.   In this connection, we may also refer to the judgment  of  this  Court
in Nagpur Improvement Trust and Another v. Vithal Rao and Others  [AIR  1973
SC 689].  In that case this Court held that the Government can  acquire  the
land for a housing accommodation scheme either under  the  Land  Acquisition
Act or under the Improvement Act.  The Court held that it enables the  State
Government to discriminate between one owner equally situated  from  another
owner.




43.   The scope of various provisions in Chapter VII of the MRTP Act  itself
came up for consideration before this Court in Laxminarayan R.  Bhattad  and
Others v. State of Maharashtra and Another [(2003)  5  SCC  413].   In  that
case, the petitioner claimed an entitlement of TDR in lieu  of  compensation
which he was claiming under the provision of Section 126 of  the  MRTP  Act.
Rejecting the contention, this Court held as follows:

      “61.  The State while granting sanction could have modified the Scheme
      prepared by the Arbitrator. While doing so it was permissible for  the
      State to make any modification with the  Arbitrator's  Scheme  stating
      that TDR in lieu of compensation would be granted. Having not said  so
      it is not for the appellant to contend that the State would  be  bound
      by its purported directives despite statutory interdicts contained  in
      Section 86 and 88 of the Act.
      62. In view of our findings aforementioned the third  reason  assigned
      by the Corporation must  also  be  upheld.  We  may  notice  that  the
      appellant herein has given up the question of  applicability  of  Rule
      10(2) before the High Court. The High Court in its  impugned  judgment
      recorded "we may add that under Rule 10(2) of the D.C. Rules of  1967,
      additional FSI in lieu of the compensation  was  provided  in  certain
      cases. There,  is  however,  no  dispute  that  petitioners  were  not
      eligible for grant  of  additional  FSI  under  the  said  Rule  10(2)
      inasmuch as the original plot belonging to the petitioners or any part
      thereof did not form part of the final plots which  were  allotted  to
      them nor were the plots allotted to the petitioners  affected  by  the
      road."
      63. A legal right to have an additional FSI or TDR can be claimed only
      in terms of a statute or statutory regulations and not otherwise.
      64. By reason of the provisions contained in Section 88  of  the  Act,
      original plot No. 433 vested in the State whereas the final plots Nos.
      694 and 713 became the property of the appellants. Title on  the  land
      having been conferred under a statute, it  is  idle  to  contend  that
      there is no automatic vesting.
      65. Reliance placed by Mr. Devarajan on State of  Gujarat  (supra)  is
      misplaced. In that case the question  which  arose  for  consideration
      related to a draft Scheme sanctioned by the Government on 17th August,
      1942 under the Bombay Town Planning Act, 1915. The  Scheme  which  had
      commenced under the 1915 Act continued under the Bombay Town  Planning
      Act, 27 of 1955. The Respondents' land was acquired under  the  Scheme
      where after the plot was reconstituted into two, one each reserved for
      the respondent and the local authority  respectively.  A  compensation
      was awarded for reservation of the said land in the local authority on
      the basis of market value as on  18th  April,  1927.  The  said  order
      having been questioned, construction of Section 53 of the Bombay  Town
      Planning Act came up for consideration. This Court held:
      "27. The principal argument which found favour with the High Court  in
      holding Section 53 ultra vires is that when a  plot  is  reconstituted
      and out of that plot a smaller area is given  to  the  owner  and  the
      remaining area is utilised for public purpose, the  area  so  utilised
      vests in the local authority for a pubic purpose, and  since  the  Act
      does not provide for giving compensation which is a just equivalent of
      the land expropriated at the  date  of  extinction  of  interest,  the
      guaranteed right under Article 31(2) is infringed. While adopting that
      reasoning counsel for the first respondent  adopted  another  line  of
      approach also. Counsel contended that under the scheme of the Act  the
      entire area of the land belonging to the  owner  vests  in  the  local
      authority, and when  he  final  scheme  is  framed,  in  lieu  of  the
      ownership of the original plot, the owner  is  given  a  reconstituted
      plot by the local authority, and compensation in money  is  determined
      in respect of the land appropriated to public  purposes  according  to
      the rules contained in Sections 67 and 71 of the Act.  Such  a  scheme
      for compensation is, it was urged,  inconsistent  with  the  guarantee
      under Article 31(2) for two reasons - (1) that  compensation  for  the
      entire land is not provided; and (2) that payment of  compensation  in
      money is not provided even in respect of land appropriated  to  public
      use. The second branch of the argument is not sustainable for  reasons
      already set out, and the  first  branch  of  the  argument  is  wholly
      without substance. Section 53 does not provide that the  reconstituted
      plot is transferred or is to be deemed  to  be  transferred  from  the
      local authority to the owner of the original plot. In terms Section 53
      provides for statutory re-adjustment of the rights of  the  owners  of
      the original plots of land. When  the  scheme  comes  into  force  all
      rights in the  original  plots  are  extinguished  and  simultaneously
      therewith ownership springs in the reconstituted plots.  There  is  no
      vesting of the original plots in the local authority nor  transfer  of
      the rights of the local authority in the reconstituted plots.  A  part
      of even the whole plot  belonging  to  an  owner  may  go  to  from  a
      reconstituted plot which may be allotted to another person, or may  be
      appropriated to public purposes under the scheme. The  source  of  the
      power to appropriate the whole or a  part  of  the  original  plot  in
      forming a reconstituted plot  is  statutory.  It  does  not  predicate
      ownership of the plot in the local authority, and no process -  actual
      or notional - of transfer is contemplated in that  appropriation.  The
      lands covered by the scheme are subjected by the Act to the  power  of
      the local authority to re-adjust titles, but  no  reconstituted  plots
      vests at any stage in the local authority unless it is  needed  for  a
      purpose of the authority. Even under Clause  (a)  of  Section  53  the
      vesting in a local authority of land required by it is on  the  coming
      into force of the scheme. The concept than lands  vest  in  the  local
      authority when the intention to make a scheme is notified  is  against
      the plain intendment of the Act."
      66. The observations of this Court to the effect  that  there  was  no
      vesting of the original plots in the local authority nor was there any
      question of transfer of the rights in the  reconstituted  plots,  were
      made having regard to the  arguments  made  therein  that  the  entire
      original plot as such vested in the local authority. This  Court  held
      that right in the original plot extinguished and the ownership in  the
      reconstituted plot stood transferred only with the coming  into  force
      the Scheme and not prior thereto. In that case, the Scheme was held to
      be intra vires Article 31 of the Constitution.
      67. Furthermore in this case the original plot and  the  reconstituted
      plot is not the same as was the  case  in  the  State  of  Gujarat  v.
      Shantilal Mangaldas (1969) 1 SCC 509.
      68. In terms of the provisions of the Act, the statutory vesting  took
      place only upon sanctioning of the  Scheme  in  terms  of  Section  88
      thereof and not prior thereto, wherefor the amount of compensation  as
      determined by the Arbitrator would be payable to the appellants”.
                                                         (Emphasis supplied)


44.   Judgments referred to above as well as the  judgment  in  Laxminarayan
(supra) would clearly indicate that the scheme of town  planning  under  the
MRTP Act is a code by itself, which has a  provision  for  determination  of
compensation, right of appeal,  dispute  resolution  mechanism  etc.   On  a
detailed survey of the provisions of the MRTP Act and the related  judgments
interpreting the provisions of the Bombay Town Planning  Act  and  the  MRTP
Act, it may be noted that the provisions of scheme contained  in  Chapter  V
of the Act is a self operative scheme by itself.

45.   The Town Planning Scheme,  as  per  the  Act,  is  meant  for  planned
developments of certain local areas depending on various  factors  in  order
to make available utilities and facilities to  the  general  public  in  the
said  area.  
 For  the  purpose  of  said  Town  Planning  Schemes,  various
facilities, utilities and services are required to  be  provided  for  which
certain lands are required.   
These Town Planning Schemes are for  immediate
need of the  community  and  not  for  acquisition  on  deferred  basis  and
therefore these sections under Chapter V provide a machinery to prepare  and
develop the area and implement such schemes in presenti. 
 These schemes  are
not for future  projections  but  for  making  available  resources  at  the
immediate time. 
 In view of these  circumstances,  the  lands  required  for
implementation of various utilities and facilities, services of  any  public
need and requirement would be for a public purpose and  therefore  the  same
have to be made available the Government immediately so as to implement  the
scheme.

46.    Once the town planning scheme is  finally  sanctioned  under  Section
86, compensation is finally  determined  by  the  Arbitrator,  the  property
vests under Section 88 in the State Government, then there  is  no  question
of resorting to further acquisition under Section 126(2) of  the  Act.  
The
words “town planning scheme” used in Section 126(2) is  in  respect  of  the
town planning scheme which is yet  to  be  finalized  and  sanctioned  under
Section  86  by  the  State  Government  as  a  final  scheme  for  inviting
objections under Section 67  of  the  Act.  
Provisions  of  Section  126(2)
providing for acquisition of land, therefore will apply only  prior  to  the
town planning scheme is finally sanctioned under the  provision  of  Section
86 of the Act.



47.   We therefore hold that the provisions of Section 126  can  apply  only
when the scheme is not sanctioned and the amount  of  compensation  has  not
been determined by the Arbitrator.  Therefore, in cases where town  planning
scheme is already sanctioned and the property vests in the State  Government
under Section 88 (a) of the  Act,  the  question  of  resorting  to  Section
126(2) of the Act does not arise.



48.   We also reject the contention that under the scheme,
if  any  property
is acquired by the  Planning  Authority  and  if  it  is  required  for  the
beneficial use of the persons, it is only then that the Arbitrator  can  fix
the compensation and pass the award.
If the property is taken over  by  the
Planning Authority  for  the  construction  of  its  office  and  all  civic
amenities can be provided by the Planning Authority and  if  the  office  of
the authority is located in an area where the scheme has  been  framed  then
it would be beneficial to the public as well.
 Since,  it  is  also  for  a
public  purpose  covered  by  the  scheme,  the  contention  that  the  area
earmarked for the Town Planning Authority can be acquired only by  following
Section 126 of the Act, has no basis.



49.   We find  from  the  facts  of  the  case  that  after  completing  the
procedure under  Chapter  V,  compensation  was  offered  and  paid  to  the
appellant and the appeal preferred by the appellant was  also  dismissed  by
the Tribunal and therefore further acquisition of  land  under  Section  126
does not arise.  The High Court in our view has  correctly  interpreted  the
provisions of the Act which calls  for  no  interference.   The  appeal  is,
therefore, dismissed without any order as to costs.



                                            ……………………………………….…J
                                            (K. S. RADHAKRISHNAN)





                                            ………………………………………..J.
                                            (DIPAK MISRA)
New Delhi,
December 4, 2012

Wednesday, December 5, 2012

whether a cryptic telephonic intimation given to the police can be described as a First Information Report for the purposes of Section 154 of the Criminal Procedure;


                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2026 OF 2009

Surajit Sarkar                                     …..Appellant

                             Versus


State of West Bengal                                     …..Respondent




                               J U D G M E N T

Madan B. Lokur, J.

   1. The principal issues  before  us  are
whether  a  cryptic  telephonic
   intimation given to the police can be described as  a  First  Information
   Report for the purposes of Section 154 of the Criminal Procedure; 
whether
   the testimony of PW-7 Sanatan Sarkar and  PW-8  Achintya  Sarkar  can  be
   accepted for upholding the conviction of Surajit Sarkar (the  appellant);
   
whether Surajit Sarkar can be convicted of murder  even  though  his  co-
   accused have been acquitted and finally 
whether Surajit Sarkar did commit
   the murder of Gour Chandra Sarkar.
   2. In our view, the first issue must be answered in the negative. We also
   hold that the testimony of PW-7 Sanatan Sarkar cannot be accepted, but we
   do accept the testimony of PW-8 Achintya Sarkar. We  find  no  reason  to
   hold that merely because those accused  with  Surajit  Sarkar  have  been
   acquitted, he too must be acquitted of the charge against  him.  However,
   we find, on the testimony of PW-8 Achintya Sarkar, that Surajit Sarkar is
   liable to be punished not for the murder of Gour Chandra Sarkar  but  for
   culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 of
   the Indian Penal Code.
   The facts:


   3. On 21st March 1995, Susanta Sarkar’s father Gour  Chandra  Sarkar  had
   gone on his cycle to the Gobindapur bazaar in the evening. At about  9.00
   pm while he (Susanta Sarkar) was in his house, he heard a  cry  from  his
   mother. On inquiring from her, he learnt that Bishnu Sarkar informed  her
   that Gour Chandra Sarkar had been murdered at about 8/8.30 pm  apparently
   in front of Bimal Poddar’s house.
   4. Susanta Sarkar immediately rushed to the spot  and  found  his  father
   lying senseless on the ground with bloody injuries. On raising  a  noise,
   some villagers gathered there and  advised  him  to  lodge  a  complaint.
   Thereafter, he went to his uncle’s house  (Bishnu  Sarkar’s  father)  and
   wrote out a complaint.
   5. Later, he came to know at  about  10/10.30  pm  that  the  police  had
   reached the place of occurrence. Thereupon, he too went to the  place  of
   occurrence and met the police. In his presence, the  police  seized  some
   items, including his father’s wrist watch and cycle.  After  the  seizure
   proceedings were over at about 11.55 pm he handed over to the police  his
   complaint addressed to the  officer-in-charge  Police  Station  Santipur,
   District Nadia.
   6. In his complaint, Susanta Sarkar  stated  the  broad  facts  mentioned
   above, namely, that his father had gone to the Gobindapur bazaar  in  the
   evening; that he came to know his  father  had  been  murdered  at  about
   8.30/9.00 pm in front of Bimal Poddar’s house; that he went to the  place
   of occurrence and found his father lying on  the  road  with  a  bleeding
   injury.
   7. He also stated in his complaint that there was a dispute  between  the
   members of his family and that of Gour Sarkar and some people engaged  by
   him. On 8th March 1995 there was a scuffle between the two parties and  a
   case was pending in that regard. His brother Nimai Sarkar was in jail  as
   a result of that incident. Gour Sarkar’s party had also been in jail  but
   had been released a day or two earlier.  Susanta  Sarkar  stated  in  his
   complaint that he firmly believed that six members of Gour Sarkar’s party
   murdered his father Gour Chandra Sarkar due to the grudge that they bore.
   8. Based on the complaint given by Susanta Sarkar,  a  First  Information
   Report (FIR) was registered in Police Station Santipur, District Nadia on
   22nd March 1995 at about 00.45 am  and  formal  investigations  commenced
   into offences punishable under Section  302  read  with  Section  34  and
   Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code (for short the  IPC)  against  the
   six accused persons. On conclusion of the investigations, a charge  sheet
   was filed against them. Charges were framed against the  accused  persons
   but they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
   9. Although the prosecution produced fourteen witnesses, we are concerned
   with the evidence of only some of them.
   10.      PW-1  Susanta  Sarkar  confirmed  what  he  had  stated  in  his
   complaint. He added that his younger brother Achintya Sarkar (aged  about
   12/13 years when the incident took place) returned  home  that  night  at
   about 2/2.30 am and informed  the  witness  that  Surajit  Sarkar,  Adhir
   Sarkar and Sukumar Sarkar had killed Gour Chandra Sarkar.  When  Achintya
   Sarkar opposed them, Bara Gopal Sarkar, Jamai Gopal  Sarkar  and  Bhebesh
   Sarkar chased him and so he fled away. (These were the same persons named
   by Susanta Sarkar in his complaint). In  his  cross-examination,  Susanta
   Sarkar stated that he did not ask Achintya Sarkar where he was till  2.30
   am.
   11.      PW-2 Bishnu Sarkar stated that he had  gone  to  the  Gobindapur
   market that evening. When he was returning home, he saw 5/6 persons  near
   the primary school. He could identify Surajit Sarkar in  the  torchlight.
   When he proceeded further, he saw Gour Chandra Sarkar lying senseless  on
   the road with injuries on his chest, head and hand  etc.  He  immediately
   went and narrated what he saw to Gour  Chandra  Sarkar’s  wife.  Although
   this witness turned hostile, he stated  that  he  was  present  when  the
   inquest and seizure of articles took place later that night.
   12.      PW-3 Parash Biswas was a panchayat member of Gobindapur village.
   He was in a meeting when he learnt of the murder of Gour Chandra  Sarkar.
   He went to the place of occurrence and saw the dead body. Thereafter,  he
   telephonically informed the  police  station  of  the  incident  but  did
   nothing further. From the deposition of  PW-11  Krishnapada  Mazumdar  of
   Police Station Santipur, it appears that  the  telephone  call  was  made
   around 9.35 pm when a General Diary entry was made by him to  the  effect
   that an unknown person gave information about the murder  of  an  unknown
   person at Arpara, Police Station Santipur, District Nadia.
   13.      PW-7 Sanatan Sarkar was a neighbor of Gour Chandra Sarkar and an
   eyewitness to his  murder.  He  testified  that  he  was  returning  from
   Gobindapur to Arpara with Achintya Sarkar  and  Gour  Chandra  Sarkar  at
   about 8.30 pm on 21st March 1995. On the way, near a primary school,  5/6
   persons surrounded Gour Chandra Sarkar. He saw Surajit  Sarkar  from  the
   light of his torch assaulting Gour Chandra Sarkar with  a  rod.  He  also
   identified Adhir Sarkar and Sukumar Sarkar at the place of occurrence and
   said that they chased him (Gour Chandra Sarkar).  He  did  not  say  that
   Adhir Sarkar and Sukumar Sarkar assaulted Gour Chandra Sarkar and he  did
   not identify anybody else at the place of occurrence.  The  witness  said
   that he escaped from the place of occurrence and went home.  He  came  to
   know the next morning that Gour Chandra Sarkar had  died.  It  transpires
   from the evidence of the investigating  officer  PW-14  Pradyut  Banerjee
   that even though Sanatan Sarkar was an eyewitness, he was  examined  only
   on 10th May 1995 about a month and an half after the incident.
   14.      PW-8 Achintya Sarkar, son of Gour Chandra  Sarkar  was  also  an
   eyewitness. He was about 12/13 years old when the incident took place. In
   his testimony he stated that he,  his  father  and  Sanatan  Sarkar  were
   returning to their village from Gobindapur at about  8/8.30  pm  on  21st
   March 1995. When they were near a school, he saw from his torchlight that
   Surajit Sarkar was assaulting his father with a rod. Then Sukumar  Sarkar
   followed by Adhir Sarkar assaulted his father with a rod. He tried to  go
   to his father but was chased away by Gopal Sarkar, Jamai Gopal Sarkar and
   Bhebesh Sarkar. He was afraid that they might kill him. He stated that he
   returned home that night at about 2.00 pm. When the police  came  to  his
   house thereafter, he narrated the incident to them.
   15.      PW-9 Dr. Partha Sarathi Saha  confirmed  the  injuries  on  Gour
   Chandra Sarkar and stated that a hard, blunt  weapon  could  have  caused
   them. The injuries were:
   (1)1½” cut mark over the right front parietal region.
   (2) ½” cut mark over the back of right parietal region.
   16.      There were some abrasion marks over  the  right  ear  and  right
   knee. He also found that the right  parietal  bone  was  fractured.   The
   membrane and brain matter were ruptured. There  was  a  fracture  of  the
   right 6th & 7th ribs and a fracture of the lower end of right radius  and
   dislocation of the right elbow  joint.  In  his  cross  examination  this
   witness stated that injury (1) and (2) above may  be  caused  by  contact
   with a hard and blunt weapon and even by a fall.
   17.      PW-14 Pradyut Banerjee the investigating officer  confirmed  the
   events as investigated by him. He also confirmed the  seizures  made  and
   generally  supported  the  case  of  the  prosecution.  In   his   cross-
   examination, he stated that he examined Achintya Sarkar at his  residence
   at about 2.10 am on 22nd March 1995. At that time,  Achintya  Sarkar  did
   not say that he was chased away by Gopal Sarkar, Jamai Gopal  Sarkar  and
   Bhebesh Sarkar. He had stated that Surajit Sarkar assaulted his father.
   Decision of the Trial Court:
   18.      The principal contention of the defence before the  Trial  Court
   was that the telephonic intimation given by PW-3 Parash  Biswas  must  be
   treated as the FIR for the  purposes  of  Section  154  of  the  Criminal
   Procedure Code (for  short  the  Cr.P.C.).  Consequently,  the  complaint
   lodged by PW-1 Susanta Sarkar would not  be  the  FIR  and  the  contents
   thereof would be hit by Section 162 of the Cr.P.C.
   19.      The Trial  Judge  rejected  this  contention  holding  that  the
   ingredients of Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. were not made out and that  the
   telephonic message given by an unknown person with regard to the death of
   another unknown person could not be treated as an FIR.   In  arriving  at
   this conclusion the Trial Judge relied on Ramsinh Bavaji Jadeja v.  State
   of Gujarat, (1994) 2 SCC 685.
   20.      On the merits of the prosecution case, the Trial  Court  was  of
   the view that even though some of the witnesses were interested witnesses
   and had some enmity with the accused persons, their evidence could not be
   thrown out only for this reason.  It was held that there was  no  dispute
   about the time and place of the incident.  There was also no dispute that
   Gour Chandra Sarkar had met a homicidal death.  The  only  question  that
   remained under these  circumstances  was  who  had  killed  Gour  Chandra
   Sarkar.
   21.      The Trial Judge held that there  was  insufficient  evidence  to
   implicate Bara Gopal Sarkar, Jamai Gopal Sarkar and Bhebesh  Sarkar  with
   the incident.  They were not identified by PW-7 Sanatan Sarkar  and  even
   according to the testimony of PW-8 Achintya Sarkar they had not dealt any
   blows on Gour Chandra Sarkar and had only chased him away from the  scene
   of the crime.  Accordingly, the Trial Judge acquitted Bara Gopal  Sarkar,
   Jamai Gopal Sarkar and Bhebesh Sarkar.
   22.      With regard to two other accused persons, namely, Sukumar Sarkar
   and Adhir Sarkar, the Trial Court held that  even  though  PW-8  Achintya
   Sarkar had stated in his evidence that  they  had  dealt  blows  on  Gour
   Chandra Sarkar yet, since during the investigations, PW-8 Achintya Sarkar
   had informed the investigating officer that he saw  only  Surajit  Sarkar
   giving blows to Gour Chandra  Sarkar,  the  Trial  Judge  gave  them  the
   benefit of doubt and accordingly acquitted them.
   23.      The Trial Judge was  of  the  view  that  there  was  sufficient
   evidence that Surajit Sarkar had assaulted Gour Chandra  Sarkar  with  an
   iron rod and had caused severe injuries on his head.  It  was  held  that
   the prosecution had successfully proved beyond all reasonable doubt  that
   Surajit Sarkar had murdered Gour Chandra  Sarkar.   Accordingly,  he  was
   held  punishable  for  the  offence  of  murder  and  sentenced  to  life
   imprisonment.




   Decision of the High Court:
   24.      The State did not appeal  against  the  acquittal  of  the  five
   accused persons.  However, Surajit Sarkar filed C.R.A.  No.  17  of  1998
   which was heard by the Calcutta High Court. By  its  judgment  and  order
   dated 24th April 2009, the High Court upheld the  conviction  of  Surajit
   Sarkar and the sentence awarded to him.
   25.      Before the High Court, it was submitted that the complaint  made
   by PW-1 Susanta Sarkar could not be treated as an FIR.   This  contention
   was rejected by the  High  Court  holding  that  the  telephonic  message
   received from an unknown person in  respect  of  the  murder  of  another
   unknown person was cryptic and anonymous and the ingredients  of  Section
   154 of the Cr.P.C. were not made out. As such, it could not be treated as
   an FIR.  The High Court relied on Tapinder  Singh  v.  State  of  Punjab,
   (1970) 2 SCC 113, Soma Bhai v. State of Gujarat, (1975)  4  SCC  257  and
   Ramsinh Bavaji Jadeja.
   26.      The second  contention  before  the  High  Court  was  that  the
   prosecution witnesses  were  interested  witnesses  and  therefore  their
   evidence was not credible. The High Court considered this contention  and
   rejected it on  the  ground  that  there  was  no  contradiction  in  the
   statements of the witnesses.
   27.      The next contention before the High Court was that there was  an
   infirmity in the FIR since important facts affecting the  probability  of
   the case had been left out.  The High Court rejected this contention  and
   held that an FIR is not an encyclopedia of the events said to have  taken
   place.  The FIR only results in  setting  the  investigative  process  in
   motion and in this case the investigation was carried out satisfactorily.
    The failure  of  the  complainant  to  mention  from  whom  he  got  the
   information regarding the murder of Gour Chandra Sarkar was not material.
   28.      It was argued before the High Court that the  investigation  was
   shoddy inasmuch as the investigating officer did not  seize  the  torches
   from which the eyewitnesses had seen the crime.  The High Court held that
   this could not be treated as an omission to discredit the witnesses.  For
   this purpose, reliance was placed on Balo Jadav v. State of Bihar, (1997)
   5 SCC 360.
   29.      Continuing with the argument of a shoddy investigation,  it  was
   contended that there was considerable delay  in  the  examination  of  an
   eyewitness (PW-7 Sanatan Sarkar).  The High  Court  held  that  since  no
   question was asked of the investigating officer regarding  the  delay  in
   examination of the witness, the investigation cannot be faulted  on  this
   ground.  It was held that if asked, the investigating officer could  have
   given an explanation which might have been acceptable.  Reliance in  this
   regard was placed on Ranbir and Ors. v. State of Punjab, (1973) 2 SCC 444
   and Bodhraj v. State of J & K, (2002) 8 SCC 45.
   30.      The last contention urged before the High Court was  that  since
   the co-accused had been acquitted after having been given the benefit  of
   doubt, it would not be correct to  hold  Surajit  Sarkar  guilty  of  the
   offence of murder. This contention was also rejected in view of Komal  v.
   State of U.P., (2002) 7 SCC 82 and Gangadhar Behera v. State  of  Orissa,
   (2002) 8 SCC 381.




   Contentions:
   31.      Before us, it was contended that the telephonic message received
   by the Police Station at Santipur and which  was  noted  in  the  General
   Diary should be treated as the FIR and not the  complaint  made  by  PW-1
   Susanta Sarkar.
   32.      The second contention was that  the  presence  of  PW-7  Sanatan
   Sarkar and indeed of PW-8 Achintya Sarkar at the place of occurrence  was
   doubtful.  In this context, it was pointed out that PW-8 Achintya  Sarkar
   did not mention the presence of PW-7  Sanatan  Sarkar  at  the  place  of
   occurrence.  As far as PW-8 Achintya Sarkar  is  concerned,  he  was  not
   traceable till 2.00 am the next day which by itself casts a doubt on  his
   whereabouts.  Moreover, this witness stated that he returned home at 2.00
   am on 22nd March 1995 but in his cross-examination he stated  that  after
   he fled from the place of occurrence he returned to the  same  place  and
   saw his father  lying  dead  with  bloody  injuries.   In  view  of  this
   contradiction, this witness could not be believed.
   33.      The third contention urged was that the prosecution case looks a
   little doubtful inasmuch as PW-8 Achintya Sarkar, a boy  of  12/13  years
   did not reach home on the fateful evening till 2.00 am the next  day  and
   yet there was no complaint by anybody in the  family  about  the  missing
   child. This was said to be a  little  odd,  and  particularly  since  his
   father had been murdered, his family ought to have been a little  worried
   about his safety and ought to have made a complaint to the police in this
   regard.  It was submitted that this  conduct  of  Gour  Chandra  Sarkar’s
   family was inexplicable.
   34.      The final contention urged was that if five persons  were  given
   the benefit of doubt and found not guilty of the murder of  Gour  Chandra
   Sarkar, there was no reasonable basis for coming to the  conclusion  that
   Surajit Sarkar alone had committed the murder of Gour Chandra Sarkar.
   Discussion:
        1)  Whether a telephonic intimation is an FIR:

   35.      As far the first contention is  concerned  that  the  telephonic
   call should be treated as the FIR and not  the  complaint  made  by  PW-1
   Susanta Sarkar, we find no merit in the submission.
   36.      Section 154 (1) of the Cr.P.C. which is relevant for our purpose
   reads as follows :-

1 “154. Information in cognizable cases.

        1) Every information relating to  the  commission  of  a  cognizable
           offence, if given orally to an officer  in  charge  of  a  police
           station, shall  be  reduced  to  writing  by  him  or  under  his
           direction, and be read over to  the  informant;  and  every  such
           information, whether given in writing or reduced  to  writing  as
           aforesaid, shall be signed by  the  person  giving  it,  and  the
           substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept  by  such
           officer in such form as the State  Government  may  prescribe  in
           this behalf.

  37. A bare reading of this section makes it clear that even  though  oral
  information given by an officer in charge of  a  police  station  can  be
  treated as an FIR, yet some procedural formalities  are  required  to  be
  completed.  They include reducing the information in writing and  reading
  it over to the informant and  obtaining  his  or  her  signature  on  the
  transcribed information.
  38. In the case of a telephonic conversation  received  from  an  unknown
  person, the question of reading over that information  to  the  anonymous
  informant does not arise nor does the appending of  a  signature  to  the
  information, as recorded, arise.
  39. However, we are not going into any  technicalities  on  the  subject,
  keeping in mind technological advances made in communication systems. All
  we need say is that it is now well  settled  by  a  series  of  decisions
  rendered by this Court that a cryptic telephonic  information  cannot  be
  treated as an FIR. In this case, the  telephonic  information  is  rather
  cryptic and was recorded in the General Diary as follows:
     “Today in the marginally noted time I  received  an  information  over
     Telephone from an unknown person Gobindapur, P.S. Santipur, Nadia that
     today (21.03.1992) night one unknown person was  murdered  at  Arpara,
     P.S. Santipur, Nadia.
     Accordingly I noted the fact in G.D., and informed the matter to  O.C.
     Santipur P.S. (N).
                                                              Sd/-
                                             K.P. Majumdar, S.I.”

  40. In Ramsing Bavaji Jadeja, this Court relied  on  Tapinder  Singh  and
  Soma Bhai and Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of West Bengal, (1994) 2  SCC
  220 to hold that a cryptic message given on telephone cannot  be  treated
  as an FIR merely because that information was first in point of time  and
  had been recorded in the Daily Diary of the police station. It  was  also
  held that the object and purpose of a telephonic message is not to  lodge
  a first information report but a request to the officer in charge of  the
  police station to reach the place of occurrence.
  41. This view was reiterated in Mundrika Mahto v. State of Bihar,  (2002)
  9 SCC 183, State of Andhra Pradesh v. V.V. Panduranga Rao, (2009) 15  SCC
  211 and Sidhartha Vashisht v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2010) 6  SCC  1.  We
  see no reason to take a view different from the one consistently taken by
  this Court in all these cases.
  42. We may only add that it is a matter of regret that despite the law on
  the subject being well-settled, such an argument is raised once again.
          2) Presence of PW-7 at the place of occurrence:

  43. The investigations into the crime do leave  much  to  be  desired  as
  pointed out by learned counsel for Surajit Sarkar. The  conduct  of  PW-7
  Sanatan Sarkar was quite unnatural and a little odd  and  ought  to  have
  been looked into by the police. This  witness  was  a  neighbour  of  the
  victim and it appears from his testimony  that  after  he  witnessed  the
  attack on Gour Chandra Sarkar, he did not bother to inform  the  victim’s
  family, or anybody else  and  simply  went  home.  This  witness  further
  deposed that he came to know of the death of Gour Chandra Sarkar only the
  next morning.
  44. We also find it quite strange that the investigating officer examined
  PW-7 Sanatan Sarkar only on 10th May 1995 that is after  a  gap  of  more
  than a month and a half of the incident. One charitable  explanation  for
  this delay is that PW-8 Achintya Sarkar did not mention the  presence  of
  PW-7 Sanatan Sarkar at the place of  occurrence.  This  possibility  gave
  rise to another submission by learned counsel for the Surajit Sarkar that
  perhaps PW-7 Sanatan Sarkar was not present at the place of occurrence.
  45. Learned counsel for Surajit Sarkar relied upon Ganesh Bhavan Patel v.
  State of Maharashtra, (1978) 4  SCC  371  to  contend  that  the  delayed
  examination of PW-7 Sanatan Sarkar throws some doubt on his  presence  at
  the place of occurrence. In that case, there was a delay of a  few  hours
  by the investigating officer in examining the  eyewitnesses  and  it  was
  observed:
      “Delay of a few hours, simpliciter, in recording  the  statements  of
      eyewitnesses may not, by itself, amount to a serious infirmity in the
      prosecution case. But it may assume such a  character  if  there  are
      concomitant  circumstances  to  suggest  that  the  investigator  was
      deliberately marking time with a view to decide about the shape to be
      given to the case and the eyewitnesses to be introduced.”


   46.      We are concerned with a case where there is a delay of  a  month
   and a half in examining an eyewitness. Perhaps  what  can  charitably  be
   said in defence of the investigating officer in the present case,  unlike
   in Ganesh Bhavan Patel, is that it was not mentioned  to  him  that  PW-7
   Sanatan Sarkar was an eyewitness. Even so, it reflects very poorly on the
   investigations.
   47.      Learned counsel for the State relied upon a passage  from  Banti
   v. State of M.P., (2004) 1 SCC 414. This passage reiterates  a  principle
   earlier laid down that the investigating  officer  must  be  specifically
   asked to furnish an  explanation  for  the  delay  in  examination  of  a
   witness. The passage is as follows:
     “As regards the delayed examination of certain witnesses, this Court in
     several decisions has held that unless  the  investigating  officer  is
     categorically asked as to why there was delay  in  examination  of  the
     witnesses the defence cannot gain any advantage therefrom. It cannot be
     laid down as a rule of universal application that if there is any delay
     in examination of a particular witness, the prosecution version becomes
     suspect. It would depend  upon  several  factors.  If  the  explanation
     offered for the delayed examination is plausible and acceptable and the
     court accepts the same as plausible, there is no  reason  to  interfere
     with the conclusion (See Ranbir v. State of Punjab [(1973) 2  SCC  444]
     and Bodhraj v. State of J&K [(2002) 8 SCC 45]).”


  48. In Banti the delay in examining the eyewitnesses was two days,  while
  in Ranbir Singh the delay was apparently of four days and in  Bodhraj  it
  was apparently about one  week.  In  none  of  these  decisions  was  the
  investigating officer asked to give  an  explanation  for  the  delay  in
  examination of a witness.
  49. In State of U.P. v. Satish, (2005) 3 SCC 114  relied  on  by  learned
  counsel for the State, the reason for the delay  in  examination  of  the
  witnesses is  not  quite  clear.  But,  this  Court  reiterated  the  two
  principles earlier recognized, namely, that mere delay in examination  of
  a witness does not make the prosecution  version  suspect  and  that  the
  investigating  officer  must  be  asked  the  reason  for  the  delay  in
  examination  of  the  witness.  Ganesh  Bhavan  Patel  was  explained  by
  observing that delay in examination of the witnesses  was  not  the  only
  determinative factor – in fact, there were several factors taken together
  along with the delayed examination of witnesses that provided  the  basis
  for acquittal.
  50. Finally, reference was made by  learned  counsel  for  the  State  to
  Shyamal Ghosh v. State of W.B., (2012) 7 SCC  646  to  contend  that  the
  delayed examination of a witness will not vitiate the  prosecution  case.
  We agree that delay per se may not be a clinching factor but  when  there
  is a whole range of facts that need to be explained but cannot, then  the
  cumulative effect of all the facts could have an impact on  the  case  of
  the prosecution.
  51. If the evidence on record is looked at in perspective,  namely,  that
  PW-7 Sanatan Sarkar an eyewitness to  the  incident  did  not  bother  to
  inform anybody in the family of Gour Chandra Sarkar about the assault  on
  his neighbour; that this eyewitness was  examined  by  the  investigating
  officer more than a month and a  half  after  the  occurrence;  that  the
  presence of this witness was not mentioned by PW-8 Achintya  Sarkar  also
  an eyewitness to the incident, leads us to  have  some  doubt  about  the
  presence of PW-7 Sanatan Sarkar at the place of occurrence.
  52. Learned counsel for the State submitted while relying on  Visveswaran
  v. State, (2003) 6 SCC 73, C. Muniappan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2010)  9
  SCC 567 and Sheo Shankar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2011)  3  SCC  654
  that a  defective  investigation  need  not  necessarily  result  in  the
  acquittal of an accused person.
53.   In Visveswaran all that this Court observed was that:
     “In defective investigation, the only requirement is of extra  caution
     by courts while evaluating evidence. It would not be  just  to  acquit
     the accused  solely  as  a  result  of  defective  investigation.  Any
     deficiency or irregularity in investigation need not necessarily  lead
     to rejection of the case of prosecution when it is otherwise proved.”


     Similarly, in Muniappan this Court held:
     “The law on this  issue  is  well  settled  that  the  defect  in  the
     investigation by itself cannot be a ground for acquittal.  If  primacy
     is given to such  designed  or  negligent  investigations  or  to  the
     omissions or  lapses  by  perfunctory  investigation,  the  faith  and
     confidence of the people in the criminal justice administration  would
     be eroded. Where  there  has  been  negligence  on  the  part  of  the
     investigating agency or omissions, etc. which  resulted  in  defective
     investigation, there is a legal obligation on the part of the court to
     examine the prosecution evidence dehors  such  lapses,  carefully,  to
     find out whether the said evidence is reliable  or  not  and  to  what
     extent it is reliable and as  to  whether  such  lapses  affected  the
     object of finding out the truth.”


     Finally in Sheo Shankar Singh it was held as follows:
     “Deficiencies in investigation by way of omissions and lapses  on  the
     part of investigating agency cannot  in  themselves  justify  a  total
     rejection of the prosecution case.”


   54. We are not prepared to accept as a broad proposition of law  that  in
   no case can defective or shoddy investigations lead to an  acquittal.  It
   would eventually depend on the defects pointed out. If the  investigation
   results in the real culprit of an  offence  not  being  identified,  then
   acquittal of the accused must follow. It  would  not  be  permissible  to
   ignore the defects in an investigation and hold an innocent person guilty
   of an offence which he has  not  committed.  The  investigation  must  be
   precise and focused and must lead to the inevitable conclusion  that  the
   accused has committed the crime.  If  the  investigating  officer  leaves
   glaring loopholes in  the  investigation,  the  defence  would  be  fully
   entitled to exploit the lacunae. In such a situation,  it  would  not  be
   correct for the prosecution to argue that the Court should gloss over the
   gaps and find the accused person guilty. If this were permitted  in  law,
   the prosecution could have an innocent person put behind bars on  trumped
   up charges. Clearly, this is impermissible and  this  is  not  what  this
   Court has said.
   55. It  is  clear  from  the  record  that  the  investigation  has  left
   unanswered several questions regarding PW-7  Sanatan  Sarkar.  Under  the
   circumstances, it is difficult to accept that  PW-7  Sanatan  Sarkar  was
   present at the place and  at  the  time  when  Gour  Chandra  Sarkar  was
   attacked.
          3) Evidence of PW-8 Achintya Sarkar:

   56. We are now left only with the evidence of PW-8 Achintya  Sarkar.   In
   the case of this witness also the facts are a little odd in  as  much  as
   when the crime took place he was about 12/13  years  old.   When  he  was
   chased away by Gopal Sarkar, Jamai Gopal Sarkar and  Bhebesh  Sarkar,  he
   naturally feared for his life and went into hiding. It is not clear  what
   his movements were thereafter.
   57. In his deposition, PW-8 Achintya Sarkar stated that he came  back  to
   the place of occurrence and saw the dead body of his father.  This  could
   have been only around midnight on  21st  March  1995  after  the  inquest
   proceedings were over and the seizure of  some  items  at  the  place  of
   occurrence was concluded by the police.  Assuming this to be  so,  it  is
   not clear where PW-8 Achintya Sarkar hid himself after that and why.   In
   any event, he came back home only at 2.00 am on 22nd March 1995  when  he
   told his  brother  PW-1  Susanta  Sarkar  about  the  incident  and  soon
   thereafter narrated the events to the investigating officer.
   58. While the reaction of PW-8 Achintya Sarkar is understandable, what is
   not understandable is the conduct of  his  family.  The  members  of  his
   family seem to have not taken any action to find out the  whereabouts  of
   PW-8 Achintya Sarkar after they came to know about  the  murder  of  Gour
   Chandra Sarkar.  We would imagine that on coming to know of  the  murder,
   the primary concern of the family would have  been  the  safety  of  PW-8
   Achintya Sarkar.  However, no efforts appear to have been made to  locate
   his whereabouts or to search for him or even to inform the  police  about
   his disappearance.
   59. However, merely because PW-8 Achintya Sarkar and his family  acted  a
   little strangely would not necessarily lead to the conclusion  that  this
   witness should not be believed. There is nothing  on  record  to  suggest
   that he was not at the place of occurrence when his father  Gour  Chandra
   Sarkar was attacked.  There is also nothing on record which could lead to
   any inference or conclusion that PW-8 Achintya Sarkar  made  up  a  story
   about the attack on his father by Surajit Sarkar.
   60. It is true that  there  is  some  discrepancy  or  some  gap  in  the
   whereabouts of PW-8 Achintya Sarkar between the time of  the  attack  and
   his returning home at 2.00 a.m. on 22nd March 1995 but that by itself  is
   not enough to discredit this witness, more so when he was not  asked  any
   question on his whereabouts.
   61. Also, this discrepancy does not destroy the substratum of the case of
   the prosecution and therefore there is no reason to throw it out on  this
   ground. What is a minor discrepancy has recently been dealt with in  Syed
   Ahmed v. State of Karnataka, (2012) 8 SCC 527 (authored  by  one  of  us,
   Lokur, J.) and the view expressed therein need not be repeated.
   62. We find that PW-8 Achintya Sarkar successfully withstood  his  cross-
   examination and we agree with the Trial Court and the High Court that  he
   was a credible witness who ought to be believed when he says that he  was
   at the place of occurrence and that he saw his father Gour Chandra Sarkar
   being attacked by the Surajit Sarkar.
          4) Acquittal of co-accused:

   63. The final contention of learned counsel for Surajit Sarkar  was  that
   since five of the accused persons were given the benefit of  doubt  there
   is no reason why he should not be given the benefit of doubt.
   64. In Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1956  SC  460  this  Court
   held, in a case where some accused persons were acquitted and some others
   were convicted, as follows:
      “The highest that can be or has been said on behalf of the  appellants
      in this case is that two of the  four  accused  have  been  acquitted,
      though the evidence against them, so far as the direct testimony went,
      was the same as against the appellants also; but it does not follow as
      a necessary corollary that because the other  two  accused  have  been
      acquitted by the High Court the  appellants  also  must  be  similarly
      acquitted.”

  65. Learned counsel for the State drew our attention to Komal in which it
  was held that merely because  some  of  the  accused  persons  have  been
  acquitted by being given the benefit of doubt does not  necessarily  mean
  that all the accused persons must be given the benefit of doubt.  It  was
  observed that:
     “….the complicity of two accused persons  who  were  armed  with  guns
     having been doubted by the High Court itself, they have  already  been
     acquitted which cannot in any manner affect the  prosecution  case  so
     far as the appellants are concerned against whom  the  witnesses  have
     consistently  deposed  and  their  evidence  has  been  found  to   be
     credible.”


     66.   Similarly, in Gangadhar Behera reliance was placed on  Gurcharan
     Singh and it was held:
     “Merely because some of  the  accused  persons  have  been  acquitted,
     though evidence against all of them, so far as direct testimony  went,
     was the same does not lead as a necessary  corollary  that  those  who
     have been convicted must also be acquitted. It is  always  open  to  a
     court to differentiate the accused who had been acquitted  from  those
     who were convicted.”


   67. Gangadhar Behera was cited with approval somewhat recently in Prathap
   v. State of Kerala, (2010) 12 SCC 79.
   68. We agree that Surajit Sarkar cannot be absolved of his involvement in
   the death of Gour Chandra Sarkar merely because the other accused persons
   were either not identified by the eyewitnesses or had no role to play  in
   the attack on Gour Chandra Sarkar.  There  is  the  cogent  and  reliable
   evidence of PW-8 Achintya Sarkar to hold  that  Surajit  Sarkar  attacked
   Gour  Chandra  Sarkar  which  ultimately  resulted  in  his  death.   The
   contention of learned counsel for Surajit Sarkar is rejected.
   69. We may mention that learned counsel for Surajit Sarkar submitted that
   there was a delay in forwarding the  FIR  to  the  concerned  Magistrate.
   Since no foundation has been  laid  for  this  contention  nor  was  this
   contention urged either before the Trial Court or before the  High  Court
   we see no reason to entertain it at this stage.
   Is it a case of murder:
   70. What now remains to be considered is whether Surajit Sarkar  intended
   to murder Gour Chandra Sarkar or is it a case of  culpable  homicide  not
   amounting to murder?
   71. Given the nature of injuries, it is difficult to accept the view that
   Surajit Sarkar intended to cause the death of Gour Chandra Sarkar or that
   the injuries were  so  imminently  dangerous  that  they  would,  in  all
   probability, cause death.  The  murder  of  Gour  Chandra  Sarkar  would,
   therefore, be ruled out. Nevertheless, the injuries  were  quite  serious
   and inflicted by Surajit Sarkar on Gour Chandra  Sarkar’s  head  with  an
   iron rod, as stated by PW-8 Achintya Sarkar. We can surely credit Surajit
   Sarkar with the knowledge that if a person is hit with an iron rod on the
   head, then the act is likely to cause the death of the victim. That being
   so, in our opinion, it would be more appropriate to hold  Surajit  Sarkar
   guilty of an offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder.  Since
   we attribute to him the knowledge of his actions, he should  be  punished
   under the second part of Section 304 of the IPC.
   Conclusion:
   72. Accordingly, we set aside the conviction of Surajit  Sarkar  for  the
   offence of the murder of Gour Chandra Sarkar. However, we hold him guilty
   of an offence punishable under the second part of Section 304 of the IPC.
   He is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 10 (ten)
   years. The fine and default sentence  awarded  by  the  Trial  Court  are
   maintained.
   73. The appeal is disposed of on the above terms.




                                       .………………………. J.
                                      (Swatanter Kumar)






                                                              ….……………………. J.
                                        (Madan B. Lokur)
   New Delhi;
   December 4, 2012


whether, despite the sole eyewitness to the incident turning hostile, could the Trial Court and the High Court legitimately hold that the appellant committed the murder of Dalip Singh.


                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 862 OF 2008


Gudu Ram                                     …..Appellant

                             Versus

State of Himachal Pradesh                    …..Respondent


                               J U D G M E N T

Madan B. Lokur, J.

1.    The question before us is
 whether, despite the sole eyewitness to  the
incident  turning  hostile,  could  the  Trial  Court  and  the  High  Court
legitimately hold that the appellant committed the murder  of  Dalip  Singh.

In our opinion, 
despite the sole eyewitness  turning  hostile,  
it  can  and
should be held on the facts of this  case  that  though  the  appellant  did
commit a crime, it was not of murder but culpable homicide not amounting  to
murder.


The facts:
2.    PW-2 Sheetal Singh was an employee of the Himachal  Pradesh  Transport
Corporation, posted  in  a  workshop  of  the  Corporation  at  Taradevi  in
Himachal Pradesh.
He was living in a rented accommodation and for  the  last
about one year, his brother PW-1 Jai Pal Singh and the deceased Dalip  Singh
(his cousin brother) were living  with  him.
The  appellant  (a  cousin  of
Sheetal Singh’s wife) joined them in the rented accommodation about  a  week
prior to the alleged murder of Dalip Singh by the appellant.
3.    On the intervening night of  12th  and  13th  November,  2003  Sheetal
Singh was at work.
Around 8 p.m., the appellant, Dalip  Singh  and  Jai  Pal
Singh planned to cook some meat and  consume  some  whisky  brought  by  the
appellant.
4.    During the consumption of drinks and dinner, a minor brawl took  place
between the appellant and Dalip Singh as a result of Dalip  Singh’s  refusal
to consume more whisky.
At that time, Jai  Pal  Singh  intervened  and  some
sort of a truce was worked out.
5.    Later, Jai Pal Singh went to urinate and upon  his  return,  he  found
the appellant and Dalip Singh involved in a scuffle.
To prevent the  scuffle
from escalating, Jai Pal  Singh  asked  Dalip  Singh  to  accompany  him  to
Sheetal Singh’s place of work so that Dalip  Singh  could  spend  the  night
over there away from the appellant.
6.    According to the prosecution, 
when Jai Pal Singh and Dalip  Singh  had
walked about 50-60 yards, the appellant appeared from  behind  and  hit  Jai
Pal Singh on the head with a thapi and pushed him into the bushes. 
(A  thapi
is a wooden object shaped like a cricket bat used for beating clothes  while
washing). 
Thereafter, the appellant hit  Dalip  Singh  with  the  thapi  and
pushed him also into the bushes.
7.    Jai Pal Singh did not sustain any serious injury and so he got up  and
went to inform Sheetal Singh about the incident.
8.    Thereafter, Sheetal Singh accompanied by Jai Pal  Singh  went  to  the
rented accommodation of Sheetal Singh since Jai Pal Singh had told him  that
a quarrel had taken place in the rented accommodation  between  Dalip  Singh
and the appellant.
When they did not find  either  the  appellant  or  Dalip
Singh in the rented accommodation, they went to search for them and at  that
time, upon hearing some cries, they came  upon  Dalip  Singh  lying  in  the
bushes.  The appellant was apparently not traceable.
9.    Both Jai Pal Singh and Sheetal Singh brought Dalip Singh back  to  the
rented accommodation. Thereafter an ambulance was  called  and  Dalip  Singh
was taken to the hospital where he succumbed to his injuries.
10.   The appellant was charged with having committed the  murder  of  Dalip
Singh. He pleaded not guilty and claimed  trial.  In  all,  the  prosecution
examined 17 witnesses and  also  produced  several  documents  and  articles
during the trial.
Decision of the Trial Judge:
11.   The Trial Judge analyzed the  statements  of  the  witnesses  and  the
documents on record and concluded that  the  appellant  had  murdered  Dalip
Singh.  It  was  held  that  the  appellant’s   presence   in   the   rented
accommodation along with Jai Pal Singh and Dalip Singh  on  the  intervening
night of 12th and 13th November, 2003 was not in dispute.  It was also  held
that Dalip Singh died an unnatural death.
12.   It was argued before the Trial Judge that the sole  eye  witness,  Jai
Pal Singh had stated in his cross examination that he had not actually  seen
the appellant beat Dalip Singh or push him into  the  bushes.  This  witness
was then cross-examined by the Public Prosecutor on the ground that  he  was
suppressing the truth. However, the Trial Judge relied on  the  evidence  of
Jai Pal Singh and held that he had positively  deposed  that  the  appellant
had attacked Dalip Singh. Even though Jai Pal Singh may  not  have  actually
seen the attack, but it was clear that the  appellant  had  hit  and  pushed
Dalip Singh in the bushes after the attack on Jai Pal Singh.
13.   In addition, the Trial Judge  also  noted  the  disappearance  of  the
appellant in the middle of the night from the place of  occurrence  and  his
being later located in his  village.  This  gave  room  for  suspicion  with
regard to the conduct of the appellant post the incident.
14.   The Trial Judge noticed the statement of PW-7 Rajinder  Singh  to  the
effect that there was some land dispute between the family  of  Dalip  Singh
and Jai Pal Singh and that they were on inimical terms. However, he  was  of
the view that the terms between them were  not  so  strained  as  made  out,
otherwise there was no  reason  for  Dalip  Singh  to  stay  in  the  rented
accommodation along with Sheetal Singh and Jai Pal Singh for about  a  year.
The Trial Judge also took note of the suspicion expressed by  PW-7  Rajinder
Singh that Jai Pal Singh may have caused the death of Dalip  Singh  but  did
not give much credence to this suspicion in view of  the  statement  of  Jai
Pal Singh.  The  attempt  to  shift  the  blame  onto  Jai  Pal  Singh  was,
accordingly, discounted.
15.    The  Trial  Judge  also  took  into  account  the  recovery,   during
interrogation, of a bloodstained pajama from  the  appellant’s  house.  This
pajama had human bloodstains as per  the  report  of  the  forensic  science
laboratory.  It was noted that though the bloodstains  on  the  pajama  were
not matched with the blood group of Dalip Singh, the  appellant  had  failed
to explain the bloodstains.
16.   The Trial Judge noted the injuries on Dalip Singh as  given  by  PW-16
Dr.  Uvi  Tyagi,  Registrar,  Department  of  Forensic  Medicine,  I.G.M.C.,
Shimla. The injuries suffered by Dalip Singh were found to  be  ante  mortem
and were as follows:-
           1. Two contusions on forehead 2 cm. above left eyebrow  2.5  cm.
              apart from each other each of size 1 cm. in dimension, bluish
              in colour.

           2. A grazed abrasion over the root of the nose 2.5 cm.  brownish
              in colour.

           3. On opening the  dressing  (which  was  completely  soaked  in
              blood) surgically stitched wounds over the  occipital  region
              of the head.  They were four in number.

17.    The  doctor  was  of  the  opinion  that  Dalip  Singh  died  due  to
hemorrhagic shock as a result of the ante  mortem  head  injuries.   He  was
also of the opinion that the injuries could possibly have been caused  by  a
wooden stick or thapi. The Trial Judge noted that Jai  Pal  Singh  was  also
injured and, as per the medical opinion, a blunt  wooden  stick  could  have
caused his injury.
18.   The appellant admitted in his statement recorded under Section 313  of
the Code of Criminal Procedure that he was residing with Sheetal  Singh.  He
admitted his presence in the rented accommodation on the  intervening  night
of 12th and 13th November, 2003  but  denied  having  consumed  any  drinks.
According to him, only Jai Pal Singh and  Dalip  Singh  were  drinking.   He
denied having had a brawl with Dalip Singh and denied any knowledge  of  the
events which resulted in the death of Dalip Singh. In fact, he  stated  that
he had left Taradevi for  his  village  before  the  alleged  incident  took
place. The appellant did not produce any witness in defence.
19.   On the basis of the above material, the  Trial  Judge  held  that  the
appellant had murdered Dalip Singh and accordingly he was convicted  for  an
offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.
Decision of the High Court:
20.   Feeling aggrieved by the conviction and sentence passed by  the  Trial
Judge, the appellant preferred an appeal to the High Court.  By  a  judgment
and order dated 31.10.2007 passed by the High Court of Himachal  Pradesh  in
Criminal Appeal No.562 of 2004, the  conviction  of  the  appellant  for  an
offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal  Code  was  upheld.
The High Court held that there was  sufficient  evidence  to  conclude  that
none other than the appellant caused the death of Dalip Singh.
Evidence of a hostile witness:
21.    The  prime  question  that  we  are  required  to  consider  is   the
credibility of Jai Pal Singh since he was the only eyewitness to  the  crime
and had turned hostile.
22.   Jai Pal Singh stated in his examination in chief as follows:
      “When we were still going, Gudu also came  from  behind  and  gave  me
      beatings with the help of a wooden stick and threw  me  aside  in  the
      bushes. Gudu then also gave beatings to Dalip Singh and threw  him  in
      the bushes. I alone went to Sheetal Singh and informed him  about  the
      occurrence. Sheetal Singh came with me to the scene of occurrence  and
      on search, we found Dalip Singh lying  in  injured  condition  at  the
      place where quarrel had taken  place  outside  the  house  of  Sheetal
      Singh. Dalip Singh had sustained  injuries  on  his  head,  which  was
      bleeding and, therefore,  we  took  him  to  Snowdon  Hospital  in  an
      ambulance, where he was declared as dead.”


In his cross-examination, Jai Pal Singh stated as follows:


      “After sustaining hurt at the place of occurrence, I have fallen  down
      to the depth of about 5 feet. I did not see Gudu causing  injuries  to
      Dalip Singh, but I only noticed him when he threw Dalip Singh near  me
      in the bushes.  I could not see Gudu while throwing Dalip Singh in the
      bushes. When Dalip Singh fell down, his head had  struck  against  the
      ground.”

Later during his cross-examination, it is recorded as follows:
      “At this stage, the learned  public  prosecutor  seeks  permission  to
      cross-examine  the  witness  on  the  ground  that  the   witness   is
      suppressing  the  truth.  Heard.   Keeping  in  view  the  substantial
      variation in the statement of the witness recorded in  the  court  and
      recorded under Section 161 Cr. P.C. with regard to the actual position
      of beatings.  Learned Public Prosecutor is permitted to  cross-examine
      the witness.


      xxxxx Cross-examination      xxxxx (by learned P.P.)
      “My statement was recorded by the police. I had not seen  the  accused
      Gudu giving beatings to Dalip Singh with any thing and I also did  not
      see the accused Gudu throwing Dalip Singh in the  bushes.  (Confronted
      with portion A to A with police statement  of  the  witness  Ext.  PB,
      wherein it is so recorded). I did not state this to the police. It  is
      incorrect to suggest that I have deposed falsely  today  in  collusion
      with the accused.”




23.   The law on the treatment of the evidence of a hostile witness is  that
the evidence of such a witness need not be completely rejected only  because
he has turned hostile. The Court must, however, be circumspect in  accepting
his testimony and, to the extent possible, look for its corroboration.
24.   In Karuppanna Thevar v. State of T.N., (1976)  1  SCC  31  this  Court
held that the testimony of a hostile witness may not  be  rejected  outright
“but the court has at least to be aware that,  prima  facie  a  witness  who
makes different statements at different times has no regard for  truth.  The
court should therefore be slow to act on the testimony  of  such  a  witness
and, normally, it should look for corroboration to his evidence.”
25.   Similarly,
 in Bhagwan Singh v. State of  Haryana,  (1976)  1  SCC  389
this Court held:
      “But the fact that the court gave  permission  to  the  prosecutor  to
      cross-examine his own witness, thus characterising  him  as,  what  is
      described as  a  hostile  witness,  does  not  completely  efface  his
      evidence. The evidence remains admissible in the trial and there is no
      legal bar to base a conviction upon his testimony if  corroborated  by
      other reliable evidence.”

(Incidentally this passage is incorrectly attributed to P.N. Bhagwati, J  in
Rabindra Kumar Dey v. State of Orissa,  (1976)  4  SCC  23.   It  should  be
correctly attributed to P.K. Goswami, J).

26.   These basic principles have been  reiterated  recently  in  Bhajju  v.
State of M.P., (2012) 4 SCC 327 and Ramesh Harijan v. State of U.P.,  (2012)
5 SCC 777. In Bhajju one of us (Swatanter Kumar, J) held for the Court:
      “The view that the evidence of the witness who  has  been  called  and
      cross-examined by the party with the leave of  the  court,  cannot  be
      believed or disbelieved in part and has to be excluded altogether,  is
      not the correct exposition of law.”

27.   If we consider the totality of the evidence of Jai Pal  Singh,  it  is
clear that he categorically stated that the appellant attacked  him  with  a
wooden stick like a thapi and pushed him in the bushes. To this  extent  the
evidence of Jai Pal Singh is quite clear and he did not  recant  from  this.
Then he goes on to say that though he noticed  the  appellant,  he  did  not
actually see him beat Dalip Singh or throw him in the bushes. But  the  fact
is that Dalip Singh was beaten by someone and pushed into the bushes.  There
is nothing to suggest the presence of any third person. The presence of  the
appellant (and none other) at the scene of occurrence is not in doubt.
28.   The medical evidence shows that injuries on Jai Pal Singh  could  have
been caused by a blunt wooden  stick  such  as  a  thapi.   Again,  to  this
extent, the evidence of Jai Pal Singh is  consistent.  As  per  the  medical
evidence, the injuries on Dalip Singh could  also  have  been  caused  by  a
similar wooden stick or thapi. Under these circumstances, the conclusion  is
inescapable that none other than the appellant attacked Jai  Pal  Singh  and
Dalip Singh and inflicted injuries on them with a thapi.
29.   To this, we may add the conduct of the appellant, which leaves  a  lot
to be desired.
30.   The Trial Judge and the High Court found it suspicious (and so do  we)
that on the intervening night of 12th and 13th November, 2003 the  appellant
should leave Taradevi and go to his  village  at  Rohru.  According  to  the
statement of the appellant under Section 313 of  the  Cr.P.C.  he  had  left
Taradevi before the incident took place. This may or may not  be  true,  but
it is certainly relevant for appreciating his conduct. In this  context,  it
would be worthwhile to refer to Section 8 of the Evidence  Act,  1872  which
makes relevant the conduct of the appellant subsequent to the crime.
31.   Similarly, the recovery of a bloodstained pajama from the  appellant’s
house adds to the circumstances  that  call  for  an  explanation  from  the
appellant. However, no explanation has been forthcoming on either issue.
32.   No doubt, proof cannot be substituted by robust suspicion. But if  all
the facts and circumstances point to only one conclusion,  it  is  difficult
to ignore them and  even  in  a  case  of  circumstantial  evidence,  it  is
possible to secure a conviction. The present case  is  much  stronger  since
there is an eyewitness to the incident and both  the  Trial  Court  and  the
High Court accepted the version of events given by Jai Pal  Singh.  In  such
circumstances,  we  should  not  normally  interfere  with  the   conclusion
expressed concurrently by the Trial  Court  and  the  High  Court.  We  have
recently expressed this view in Ramachandran v. State of  Kerala  2012  (10)
SCALE  592  and  it  need  not  be  repeated.  Interference   is,   however,
permissible  in  exceptional  circumstances  –  but  we  do  not  find   the
circumstances of this case to be exceptional.
33.   We are, therefore, prepared to agree with  the  Trial  Court  and  the
High Court that Jai Pal Singh was a credible witness and that his  testimony
to the extent that it implicates the appellant should be accepted.
34.   We are in agreement with the Trial Judge  that  the  insinuation  that
Jai Pal Singh committed the crime  was  too  nebulous.  The  family  dispute
between Jai Pal  Singh  and  Dalip  Singh  was  obviously  not  particularly
serious since Dalip Singh had ventured to stay with Jai Pal  Singh  and  his
brother Sheetal Singh in the same rented accommodation for about  one  year.
In any event, this was not even the case set up  by  the  appellant  in  his
statement under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C.
Intention to kill:
35.   The next question to be considered is whether the  appellant  had  the
intention to kill Dalip Singh. Here we have  some  difficulty  in  accepting
the understanding of the events as narrated by the Trial Court and the  High
Court.
36.   It is true that  the  appellant  caused  multiple  injuries  on  Dalip
Singh, but it is difficult to infer from this that  the  appellant  intended
to kill him. His intention seems to have been to injure Jai  Pal  Singh  and
to severely injure Dalip Singh and after beating them up with  a  thapi,  he
pushed them into the bushes and walked away. It cannot be imagined that  his
intention was to injure Jai Pal Singh but kill Dalip Singh  –  he  would  be
leaving behind Jai Pal Singh as an eyewitness.
37.   It seems to us that the conduct of Jai Pal Singh also  points  to  the
intentions of the appellant. Jai Pal Singh did not  expect  the  assault  on
Dalip Singh to be fatal, otherwise he would have tended to the needs of  the
victim rather than have gone to call  Sheetal  Singh.   That  the  delay  in
attending to Dalip Singh may have eventually led to  his  death  is  another
matter altogether, but the attack was not so severe (in  the  estimation  of
Jai Pal Singh) as to have imminently caused the death of Dalip Singh.
38.   Even though the situation is pregnant with  hypotheses,  it  is  quite
clear that the appellant had no intention to kill Dalip Singh and  even  the
rejection  of  the  hypotheses  cannot  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  the
appellant intended to kill Dalip Singh.
39.   However, the nature and number of injuries  and  their  location  (the
skull) as well as the “weapon” used (a small wooden cricket bat) lead us  to
conclude that to a reasonable person, an attack of the  nature  launched  by
the appellant on Dalip  Singh  could  cause  his  death.  While  it  may  be
difficult to delve into the mind of the attacker to decode  his  intentions,
knowledge of the consequences of his actions can certainly be attributed  to
him.

40.   Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the  appellant  had  knowledge
that his actions are likely to cause the death of  Dalip  Singh.  He  would,
therefore, be guilty of  culpable  homicide  not  amounting  to  murder  and
liable to be sentenced under the second part of Section 304 of the IPC.

Conclusion :
41.   Under the circumstances, we partly allow this  appeal  and  set  aside
the conviction of the appellant for the murder of Dalip  Singh  but  convict
him of an offence punishable under the second part of  Section  304  of  the
IPC.

42.   We have been informed that the appellant has  already  undergone  over
eight years  of  actual  imprisonment  and  almost  eleven  years  including
remissions earned. Under the circumstances, we sentence him to  imprisonment
for the period already undergone.



43.   The appeal is disposed of on the above terms.


                                      ……….…………………….. J.
                                        (Swatanter Kumar)



                                                           ….….…………………….. J.
                                        (Madan B. Lokur)
New Delhi;
December 4, 2012