under Section 5-A of the A.P. Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971 (for short 'the Act') the validation, if at all, ought to have been of the so-called agreement of sale, dated 26.12.1999 alleged to have been executed by Linga Reddy in favour of Gangadasu. It is urged that when Gangadasu himself did not get any title, there was no basis for him to convey the property to Gangadhar, much less for Gangadhar to convey the property to his wife i.e., 2nd respondent herein. - Admittedly, Gangadasu executed an agreement of sale dated 01.06.2001in faovur of Gangadhar i.e., the husband of the 2nd respondent, before he acquired any saleable interest. Since the Act does not cover the transactions subsequent to the year 1998, it appears that a plea was raised to the effect that Gangadasu sold the land under document dated 01.08.1998 i.e., much prior to the agreement of sale, dated 26.12.1999 through which he is said to have purchased the property. Therefore, the whole exercise smacks of lack of jurisdiction, arbitrariness and non-application of mind. It is no doubt true that the Act provides for an appeal under Section 5-B of the Act against any order passed under Section 5-A of the Act. However, when the order is passed without jurisdiction and in blatant violation of the Act and the Rules made thereunder, the petitioners cannot be required to avail the remedy of appeal.

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE L.NARASIMHA REDDY        

Writ Petition No.12349 of 2012

26.09.2012
       
Smt. V.Manjula and others.

The Mandal Revenue Officer, Maklur Mandal and others.

Counsel for the petitioners: M/s. B.Venkata Rama Rao

Counsel for respondents: GP.for Revenue

<GIST:

>HEAD NOTE:  

?Cases referred:

ORDER:
The petitioners challenge the proceedings dated 29.08.2007 issued by the
Tahsildar, Maklur Mandal, 1st respondent herein under Section 5-A of the A.P.
Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1971 (for short 'the Act')
validating certain transactions in respect of an extent of Ac.1.25 guntas in
Survey No.322 and Ac.0.371/2 guntas in Survey No.335 of Manik Bhandar Village,
Maklur Mandal, Nizamabad District.

Petitioners 1 and 2 are the daughters and the 3rd petitioner is the wife of one
late Sri Vakeel Linga Reddy.  He was the pattadar of the land referred to above.
The petitioners contend that after the death of Linga Reddy, they succeeded to
the land and approached the 1st respondent with a request to issue pattadar pass
books and title deeds in their favour.  Through a memo, dated 30.03.2012, the
1st respondent informed the petitioners that according to the information
contained in the office records, Linga Reddy sold the said land through an
agreement of sale on 26.12.1999 in favour of one Sri Gangadasu S/o. Lakshman and 
the latter in turn transferred the same in favour of Gundala Lakapati Chinna
Gangadhar under an agreement of sale dated 01.06.2001.  He further stated that
on an application submitted by Lakapati Rajubai W/o. Gangadhar, 2nd respondent 
herein, under Section 5-A of the Act, the validation proceedings were issued on
29.08.2007.

The petitioners submit that the entire exercise undertaken by the 1st respondent
in passing the order, dated 29.08.2007 under Section 5-A of the Act is totally
untenable.  They submit that no notice was issued by the 1st respondent before
the impugned order was passed.  Another contention is that the validation, if at
all, ought to have been of the so-called agreement of sale, dated 26.12.1999
alleged to have been executed by Linga Reddy in favour of Gangadasu.  It is
urged that when Gangadasu himself did not get any title, there was no basis for
him to convey the property to Gangadhar, much less for Gangadhar to convey the
property to his wife i.e., 2nd respondent herein.  Other grounds are also urged.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order is contrary
to the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder.  He contends that
Linga Reddy did not execute any agreement of sale at all and in case, the 1st
respondent received any application under Section 5-A, the first and foremost
duty was to issue notice to the legal representatives of the person, who is said
to have executed the agreement.  Learned counsel further submits that when the
alleged agreement of sale was in favour of Gangadasu, there was no occasion for
the 1st respondent to pass orders of validation in favour of the 2nd respondent.

Learned Government Pleader for Revenue submits that the petitioners have an
effective alternative remedy by way of appeal under Section 5-B of the Act and
the writ petition is not maintainable.  He further submits the 1st respondent
has taken every step in accordance with law.

Notice Before Admission was ordered by this Court on 26.04.2012 and the
petitioners were permitted to serve notice.  When the notices taken out to
respondents 2 to 4 were returned unserved, permission was accorded to effect
substituted service.  Proof thereof is also filed.   However, respondents 2 to 4
did not enter appearance.

The entries in the revenue records would reflect the existence of title in
favour of an individual, in respect of any piece of agricultural land. The title
may accrue to an individual, either through succession or through transfer made
in accordance with law or through a decree passed by a competent Court of law.
Whenever rights are claimed on the basis of purchase, it is only the registered
sale deed, that can be taken into account.

Since the transactions of sale take place in villages, many a time, under
unregistered documents, the Legislature provided certain mechanisms for
validation of such transactions.  Section 5-A of the Act was added in the Act
with an objective of providing such facility.

Whenever an application is filed under Section 5-A of the Act, by a person with
a request to validate the transaction covered by an unregistered document, the
Tahsildar is required to issue notice to the executant, if he is alive or to his
legal representatives, if he is no more.  It is only when there is no dispute as
to the execution of such document, that an order in Form XIII (B) prescribed
under the Act can be passed, validating the transaction, duly collecting the
prescribed registration charges.  If there is any dispute as to the very
existence, the matter has to be left to the parties to be worked out in Courts
of law.

It is only when the transaction covered by an unregistered document executed by
a recognized owner is validated, that the transferee gets a right to alienate it
to another.  Before such validation, he does not get any right to sell the
property, in view of the principle that 'no man can convey a better title than
what he has'.  This being the purport of law on the subject, the question of
seeking validation of transaction covered by an unregistered document, not
validated by then does not arise.

In the instant case, there is no dispute that the land in Survey Nos.322 and 335
was held by Linga Reddy, father of petitioners 1 and 2 and husband of the 3rd
petitioner.  Rights were claimed by respondents 2 to 4 on the strength of an
agreement of sale/unregistered document, dated 26.12.1999, said to have been
executed by Lingareddy in favour of Gangadasu S/o. Lakshman.  Even if that
agreement of sale was true, it was only for Gangadasu, to seek validation under
Section 5-A of the Act by filing application.   In such an event, the 1st
respondent ought to have issued notice to the petitioners herein.  Admittedly,
the transaction covered by the said document was not validated.

Gangadasu is said to have sold the land to Gangadhar, husband of the 2nd
respondent through an unregistered document, dated 01.06.2001.  Stating that
Gangadasu died and she succeeded to the property, the 2nd respondent filed
application under Section 5-A of the Act before the 1st respondent.  On a
consideration of the same, the 1st respondent passed the impugned order.  The
facts referred to above clearly disclose that the impugned order was totally
untenable. Firstly, no notice was issued to the petitioners, before the
validation was ordered, despite the fact that the property was recorded in the
name of Linga Reddy and that the petitioners are his legal heirs.  The second is
that the validation, if at all, could have been of the so-called agreement,
dated 26.12.1999 said to have been executed by Linga Reddy in favour of
Gangadasu.  Admittedly, Gangadasu executed an agreement of sale dated  
01.06.2001in faovur of Gangadhar i.e., the husband of the 2nd respondent, before
he acquired any saleable interest.  Since the Act does not cover the
transactions subsequent to the year 1998, it appears that a plea was raised to
the effect that Gangadasu sold the land under document dated 01.08.1998 i.e.,
much prior to the agreement of sale, dated 26.12.1999 through which he is said
to have purchased the property.  Therefore, the whole exercise smacks of lack of
jurisdiction, arbitrariness and non-application of mind.

It is no doubt true that the Act provides for an appeal under Section 5-B of the
Act against any order passed under Section 5-A of the Act.  However, when the
order is passed without jurisdiction and in blatant violation of the Act and the
Rules made thereunder, the petitioners cannot be required to avail the remedy of
appeal.

Therefore, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order is set aside.  It
is however observed that it shall be open to respondents 2 to 4 to enforce the
rights, if any, vis--vis the land, in accordance with law.

The miscellaneous petition filed in this writ petition shall also stand disposed
of.  There shall be no order as to costs.
_______________________  
L. NARASIMHA REDDY, J.    
Dt. 26.09.2012

Order - XXII Rule - 4 The trial Court dismissed the I.A through order, dated 16-06-2006, holding that the legatee under Will cannot be brought on record as legal representative. However, it left open to the 1st respondent herein, who figured as 9th respondent in I.A. No.1503 of 2004, to come on record on her own accord.

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE L. NARASIMHA REDDY        
CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.561 OF 2012    

27-09-2012

Ponnuri Venkata Sai Sivananda Prabhu

Popuri Sunitha and others

Counsel for the Petitioner: Sri T. Durga Prasada Rao

Counsel for the Respondent No.1: Sri Sivalenka Ramachandra Prasad

<Gist:

>Head Note:

?Cases referred: NIL.

ORDER:


        The 2nd respondent herein filed O.S. No.123 of 2003 in the Court of the
Senor Civil Judge, Machilipatnam, for the relief of partition and separate
possession of the suit schedule properties.  The petitioner herein figured as
8th defendant in the suit.
       
        2.  During the pendency of the suit, the 1st defendant, by name, Tammana
Venkateswararao died.  The 1st respondent herein i.e. the plaintiff, filed
I.A.No.1503 of 2004 under Order - XXII Rule - 4 stating that according to the
information received by him, the deceased 1st defendant executed a Will in favour of the 1st respondent herein and that she may be brought on record as defendant No.9.
The trial Court dismissed the
I.A through order, dated 16-06-2006, holding that the legatee under Will cannot
be brought on record as legal representative. However, it left open to the 1st
respondent herein, who figured as
9th respondent in I.A. No.1503 of 2004, to come on record on her own accord.

        3.  The 1st respondent filed I.A. No.429 of 2009 under Order - I Rule - 10
CPC with a prayer to implead her as 9th defendant in the suit.  The application
was opposed by the petitioner.  The trial Court allowed the I.A. through order,
dated 29-08-2011.  Challenging the same, the present revision is filed by the
8th defendant in the suit.

        4.  Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel
for the 1st respondent.

        5.  On the death of the 1st defendant in the suit, efforts were made to
bring his legal representatives on record. The natural legal heirs did not come
forward.  On the information available to him, the plaintiff i.e. the 2nd
respondent herein, filed I.A.No.1503 of 2004 with a request to bring the 1st
respondent herein on record as 9th defendant, on the strength of a Will said, to
have executed by the deceased
1st defendant.  The trial Court rightly dismissed the I.A., observing that the
legatee under a Will of a deceased party to the suit cannot be brought on record
except when an application is made by such legatee himself.  It is in this
context, the 1st respondent filed I.A. and the same was allowed.

        6.  The plea of the petitioner that it is only on proof of the Will that
the 1st respondent can be brought on record is difficult to be accepted.  The
question as to whether the Will, relied upon by the
1st respondent, is true and genuine can be examined only in the trial of the
suit.  There cannot be any independent exercise for that purpose.  Further, even
to prove the Will, the person, who claims under it, must figured a party, be it
in the context of deposing as a witness or to take other steps in the matter.
Viewed from any angle, this Court does not find any basis to interfere with the
order under revision.

        7.   Hence, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed.  There shall be no
order as to costs.  The miscellaneous petition filed in this revision petition
also stands disposed of.
_______________________  
L. NARASIMHA REDDY, J    
September 27, 2012.

The petitioner claims it to be unnecessary to appoint an Executive Officer for Section 6 (c) temple and as per the various Government orders and policy decisions ending with 08-09-2010, institutions getting an income of below Rs.2,00,000/- were decided to be handed over to Archakas and fresh proposals for publication of institutions were directed not to be sent.

HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE G. BHAVANI PRASAD        

W.P. No.22074 of 2012

03/10/2012

T. Venkata Ramanaiah

The Government of Andhra Pradesh, represented by its Principal Secretary,
Revenue, Endowments Department, Hyderabad and 5 others  

COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER: Sri Raja Reddy Koneti      

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENTS: G.P. for Endowments for respondents 1 to 4        
Sri V.T.M. Prasad, learned standing counsel for R-5 Sri V. Venu Gopal Rao,
learned counsel for R-6
       
<Gist:

?CITATIONS:

ORDER:

         Heard Sri Raja Reddy Koneti, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri P.C.
Reddy, learned Assistant Government Pleader for Endowments for respondents 1 to
4, Sri V.T.M. Prasad, learned standing counsel for Endowments for the 5th
respondent and Sri V. Venugopal Rao, learned counsel for the 6th respondent.

         The petitioner claims to be a hereditary Archaka of Sri Eswara and
Veerabhadra Swamy temple, Nallagatla village, Allagadda Mandal, Kurnool District
since 1992 along with his brother and the petitioner and his brother are claimed
to be in possession of Ac.20.18 cents as per the order of the Joint
Commissioner, Endowments, Department, dated 02-05-1974. The temple possessed     
another extent of Ac.29.41 cents fetching an annual income of Rs.1,59,000/- as
per the review meeting conducted by the Additional Commissioner-I, Endowments, 
Hyderabad dated 21-04-2011.  The petitioner claims it to be unnecessary to
appoint an Executive Officer for Section 6 (c) temple and as per the various
Government orders and policy decisions ending with 08-09-2010, institutions
getting an income of below Rs.2,00,000/- were decided to be handed over to
Archakas and fresh proposals for publication of institutions were directed not
to be sent. The petitioner claims to have made a representation on 26-11-2011 to
take action accordingly and to have filed W.P.No.17725 of 2011 in which this
Court directed on 14-10-2011 to consider his representation.  Orders were passed
only after filing the contempt case in C.C.No.891 of 2012 by the 2nd respondent
on 02-07-2012 referring to the temple getting an income of more than
Rs.2,00,000/-, contrary to the counter of the 5th respondent in the Contempt
Case itself about the income being Rs.1,58,000/-.  The income of the land in
possession of Archakas was also calculated at Rs.1,70,000/- for this purpose and
the 4th respondent was stated to have reported the income of the temple to be
Rs.2,23,600/- per year on the basis of the annual Maktha. The representation
being rejected on such grounds is unsustainable, the calculation being opposed
to the prescriptions of Section 65 and the calculation of income without
reference to the date of application of the petitioner is incorrect.  The
petitioner, therefore, desired the proceedings of the 2nd respondent dated
02-07-2012 to be quashed and respondents 2 to 4 to be directed to hand over the
management of the temple to him appointing him as a Single Trustee.  He also
desired the auction of the leasehold rights of the lands of the temple to be
stayed in the meanwhile.

        The counter affidavit of the Executive Officer of the 5th respondent is to
the effect that Goddess Ankalamma is also part and parcel of this temple as per
the scheme in O.A.No.241 of 1945 and the property register under Section 43 of
A.P. Act 30 of 1987.  The income from the land enjoyed by the Archakas has to be
included in the overall income of the temple for the purpose of calculation
under the A.P. Act 30 of 1987 and the auction of the leasehold rights for a
single year 2012-2013 in four bits fetched Rs.2,29,000/- in total which was
deposited by the highest bidders to the credit of the temple.  Therefore, the
5th respondent desired the writ petition to fail.

        The 6th respondent impleaded on his own application claimed in his counter
affidavit that the petitioner is working as Principal of Sivaranga Educational
College (B.Ed. College), Koilkuntla Village and Mandal, Kurnool District 30 Kms.
away from the temples and since more than 20 years, he was appointed as a
Lecturer and Principal at various places away from the subject temples.  The 6th
respondent is the own brother of the petitioner and he succeeded to Archakatvam
from his father, taken up by him as a full time profession.  The family was
allowed to cultivate Ac.20.18 cents out of Ac.60.20 cents of the temple and the
income derived from the lands has to be taken as a whole, which will be more
than Rs.3,00,000/-.  The petitioner could not have claimed the relief sought for
when he admitted that he and his brother, the 6th respondent, are performing
Archakatvam service without adding the 6th respondent as a party and hence, the
6th respondent also desired the writ petition to fail.

        The petitioner in his reply affidavit contended that Goddess Ankalamma is
a village deity whose temple is not part and parcel of this temple.  He claimed
that the auction amounts were inflated with the help of local people to deprive
the petitioner's rights and while the 6th respondent is the brother of the
petitioner, his rights are no way denied in the writ petition.  The petitioner
denied working as Lecturer or Principal and desired the writ petition to
succeed.

        The pleadings and the material papers on record disclose that the minutes
of the review meeting conducted by the Additional Commissioner-I, Endowments,
Hyderabad on 21-04-2011 at Kurnool for implementation of the circular of the
Commissioner, Endowments, disclosed that the Archaka is enjoying of Ac.20.18
cents of the temple land in lieu of rendering Archakatvam, while Ac.29.41 cents
of the temple land is fetching a total Maktha of Rs.1,59,800/- in respect of
which the Executive Officer was instructed to conduct a public auction.  The
Circular of the Commissioner, Endowments, dated 16-12-2008 authorized the
Archakas working in the temples as shown in its Annexure to look after the
affairs of the institutions with reference to the provisions of Sections 6 (c),
29 and 15 (2) of the A.P. Act 30 of 1987.  A review meeting held by the Minister
for Endowments on 08-09-2010 resulted in the minutes recording a direction to
all the officers not to send proposals for fresh publication of institutions and
also to handover the institutions getting income below Rs.2.00 lakhs to Archakas
as per the norms fixed.  The petitioner also relied on the earlier directions of
this Court in W.P.No.17725 of 2011 dated 14-10-2011 in which a learned Judge of
this Court directed passing of appropriate orders in accordance with law on the
representation of the petitioner for appointment as a Single Trustee on the
ground of the income of the temple being less than Rs.2,00,000/- per annum.  The
counter affidavit of the Executive Officer of the 5th respondent in C.C.No.891
of 2012 clearly shows that the amount fetched for 2011-2012 in respect of
Ac.36.16 cents in the possession of the temple is Rs.1,58,000/- only and it was
in conjunction with the supposed and presumed income of the land in the
possession of Archaka in an extent of Ac.20.18 cents fetching an amount of
Rs.1,78,000/-, which is a more fertile bit of land, the income was estimated at
Rs.3,28,000/-.  The impugned proceedings dated 02-07-2012 have to be appreciated
with reference to the above said factual background.

        The proviso to Section 6 (c) of A.P. Act 30 of 1987 enables the
Commissioner of Endowments to alter the classification assigned to an
institution or endowment in the list and enter the same in the appropriate list
in case the annual income of such institution or endowment calculated as per the
provision exceeds or falls below the limits specified in Clauses (a), (b) or (c)
for three consecutive years.  The impugned proceedings dated 02-07-2012 refer to
the income from the lands of the temple for the year 2010-2011 at Rs.2,23,600/-,
while assessing the probable income from the lands under the possession of the
Archakas to be included to make it Rs.3,40,000/-.  Similar was the counter
affidavit in C.C.No.891 of 2012 by the Executive Officer of the temple in
assessing the income for 2011-2012 at Rs.3,28,000/- including the income from
the lands in the possession of Archakas.  Section-6 directs the annual income of
a Charitable Institution or Endowment to be calculated as calculated for the
purpose of levy of contribution under Section 65 and Section 65 in sub-section
(1) directs the liability to pay contribution to be from the income derived by
the institution or Endowment, which, ex facie, cannot include the income derived
by the Archakas of the temple from the lands of the temple kept in their
possession, no part of which is credited by the Archakas to the temple funds.
Apart from stating that the contribution shall be with reference to the income
derived by the Institution or Endowment, the annual income was defined by sub-
section (5) of Section-65 and the learned standing counsel for Endowments seeks
to bring within the scope of the word "any other income" used in Section-65 (5)
(b) the income derived by the Archakas from the lands in their possession. The
reference to any other income should be read together with Dharmadayam in
Section 65 (5) (a) and it is seen from the item-iii of Section 65 (5) (b) that
deduction of amounts was specified with reference to the expenditure incurred
connected with the direct cultivation of lands held by the institution or
endowment indicating that items-(i) and (ii) also relate to such direct
cultivation of lands held by the institution or endowment for which revenue or
taxes or licence fees have to be paid and any other income does not, therefore,
appear to be capable of being construed to be in respect of the income derived
from the lands kept in the possession of Archakas.  The various items covered by
Section 65 (5) and Explanations 2 to 4 clearly indicate that as stated in sub-
sections (1) and (2), it is the income derived by the institution or endowment
itself that is relevant for Section 65 and no other income derived by any other
person even from the properties of the institution or endowment.

Be that as it may, the material on record, in any view, discloses the claim of
the 5th respondent to be about the income of the temple including the income
derived from the lands in the possession of Archakas to be exceeding
Rs.2,00,000/- in respect of two years and it is not known whether in the earlier
year prior to the said two years, the income so notionally calculated was
exceeding Rs.2,00,000/-.  At any rate, even if it were to be assumed as sought
for by the learned standing counsel for Endowments that the income from the
total lands could never have fetched less than Rs.2,00,000/- in the relevant
three years, the Commissioner, Endowments was not claimed to have altered the
classification of the temple in question under the proviso to Section-6 at any
time before or after the impugned proceedings dated 02-07-2012.  If it were so
and if the classification of the temple in question continued to be under
Section 6 (c), the request of the petitioner ought to have been considered with
reference to the various Government orders and policy decisions and directions
of the Government and the Commissioner, Endowments, referred to above. While no
expression of opinion is being made on the entitlement of the petitioner to be
so appointed under the existing Government orders or policy decisions, his
request could not have been rejected as has been done by the impugned
proceedings with reference to the supposed and presumed income from the lands of
the temple at a level higher than Rs.2,00,000/- under the circumstances, more
so, in the absence of any change of classification of the temple by the
Commissioner, Endowments, in exercise of his statutory power.

        The impugned proceedings have to be, therefore, nullified, while the inter
se claims between the petitioner and the 6th respondent will have to be duly
taken into account by the competent authority, while determining the request of
the petitioner afresh by observing the principles of natural justice in giving
an opportunity to both the petitioner and the 6th respondent to lay their
respective versions before the authority.  The writ petition has to be,
therefore, ordered setting aside the impugned proceedings and directing fresh
consideration of the representation of the petitioner dated 17-03-2012 in
accordance with law with an opportunity to the respondents 5 and 6 to place
their versions in this regard before the competent authority.

        Therefore, the proceedings of the 2nd respondent in RC.No.B5/10043/2012-1,
dated 02-07-2012 are set aside and the 2nd respondent shall duly consider and
pass appropriate orders in accordance with law on the representation of the
petitioner dated
17-03-2012 after notice to and giving every reasonable opportunity of making a
representation and having a hearing to the petitioner and respondents 5 and 6
and any other persons claiming to be interested or affected, as expeditiously as
possible, at any rate within 60 days from the communication of this order to the
2nd respondent and communicate the decision taken or orders passed to the 
petitioner and respondents 5 and 6 in order to enable them to pursue their
remedies as per law, in the event of any of them being aggrieved by any such
decision or order.  The writ petition is allowed accordingly without costs.
_____________________  
G. BHAVANI PRASAD, J    
Date: 03-10-2012

there were no goods in the vehicle at the time of said accident, the deceased cannot be held to be owner of the goods which he proposes to purchase for doing business after reaching the destination. By no stretch of imagination it can be said the deceased was travelling in the goods vehicle as owner of the goods. The inevitable conclusion would be that the deceased was travelling in the offending vehicle not as owner of the goods, but, as a gratuitous passenger. Hence, the insurer is not liable to pay any compensation to the claimants. The order of the Tribunal below is set aside and the appeal filed by the insurance company is allowed.

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE C. PRAVEEN KUMAR        

C.M.A. No.369 OF 2004

14.09.2012

United India Insurance Co. Ltd

Mohd. Hussain and others

<GIST:

HEAD NOTE:  

Counsel for Appellant: Sri E. Venugopal Reddy

Counsel for Respondents:  Sri Radhive Reddy

?Cases referred
1 (2008) 8 SCC 246
2 (2007) 7 SCC 56
3 (2003) 2 SCC 223
4 (2008) 1 ALD SC 81 = 2007 (11) SCC 750
5 (2010) 14 SCC 768

JUDGMENT:  
1       The United India Insurance Company preferred the present appeal is
directed against the order dated 08.08.2003 passed in O.P.No.938 of 1997 on the
file of Motor Vehicles Accidents Claims Tribunal - cum - Additional District
Judge, Nizamabad wherein a sum of Rs.5,84,000/- was awarded as compensation to  
the claimants on account of death of one Saleem (hereinafter referred to as 'the
deceased').
2       The facts in issue are that on the intervening night of 16/17.11.1997 the
deceased was travelling in a TATA Van bearing No.MH-26-8303 from Nizamabad to  
Hyderabad as owner of the goods.  At about 2.00 AM when the van reached
outskirts of Toopran village, the driver of the offending van drove the same in
a rash and negligent manner and dashed against a lorry bearing No.KA-01-2223
from behind. As a result of which, the front portion of the van was completely
damaged causing injuries to the deceased. The deceased was initially shifted to
Gandhi Hospital, Secunderabad and thereafter while he was being shifted to
Ahmednagar hospital succumbed to the injuries. According to the claimants, the
deceased was hale and healthy and was earning Rs.10,000/- p.m. by doing chicken
business and as such made the above claim.
3       The first respondent who is the owner of the offending vehicle denied the
allegations made in the claim petition and contended that the vehicle was
insured with the second respondent and as such the second respondent alone is
responsible to pay the compensation.
4       The second respondent - insurance company filed counter contending that
they are not liable to pay any compensation as this is a clear case where the
deceased was travelling as a gratuitous passenger and policy does not cover the
risk of the death of the deceased in the said accident.
5       In support of their case the claimants examined three witnesses as P.Ws.1
to 3 and got marked Exs.A1 to A4. On behalf of the respondents R.Ws.1 and 2 were
examined and Exs.B.1 to B.3 were marked.
6       P.W.1 is the wife of the deceased and she is not an eyewitness to the
accident.  P.W.2 was examined as an eyewitness to the incident.  He
categorically stated that the accident had occurred due to the rash and
negligent driving of the driver of the van.  Ex.A.1 is the copy of the F.I.R,
which categorically describes the manner in which the incident took place. The
Tribunal having considered the evidence of P.W.2 coupled with Ex.A.1 held that
the driver of the offending van is responsible for the accident.  The said
finding of the Tribunal is based on proper appreciation of evidence warranting
no interference.  Even the learned counsel for the appellant did not dispute the
manner in which the accident took place.
7       P.W.1 who is the wife of the deceased stated in her evidence that her
husband was doing chicken business and was earning Rs.10,000/- p.m. and because  
of the death of her husband, the entire family is put to hardship.  P.W.3 was
examined to show that the deceased was doing chicken business and earning
Rs.10,000/- p.m. and after his death the chicken business was closed.
8       The Tribunal after considering the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 3 and Ex.A.2
medical certificate came to the conclusion that the deceased was 33 years of age
at the time of incident and after applying suitable multiplier, awarded
compensation of Rs.5,84,000/-. The said finding of the Tribunal with regard to
awarding compensation to the legal heirs of the deceased is based on proper
appreciation of entire evidence on record, which needs no interference.
9       The only point which the learned counsel for the appellant would contend
is that the insurance company is not liable to pay any compensation to the
claimants as the policy does not cover the risk of the death of the deceased.
According to him the claimants tried to project their case by showing as if the
deceased was travelling in the goods vehicle as owner of the goods. But the
evidence on record clearly establishes that there were no goods in the said
vehicle at the time of accident.  The witness categorically admits that the
lorry was empty and the deceased was going to Hyderabad to get chicken for doing
the said business.  Therefore, according to him, at the time of accident there
were no goods in the offending vehicle as such it cannot be said that the
deceased was travelling in the goods vehicle as owner of the goods.
10      R.W.1 who was examined on behalf of the appellant - insurance company,
deposed that the said vehicle was not carrying any goods and the passengers
travelling in the goods vehicle is violation of policy condition and that they
are not liable to pay any compensation to the claimants.  During cross-
examination R.W.1 admits that the policy is a comprehensive policy and six
labourers can travel in the vehicle as per the policy and premium was also paid
for two non-fare paying passengers, excluding the six labourers.  On the other
hand, R.W.2, who was examined as owner of the vehicle admits that the deceased
was travelling in his vehicle as a labourer and as such the insurance company is
liable to pay compensation.
11      Taking a clue from the admission made by R.Ws.1 and 2, the learned counsel
for the respondents/claimants would contend that the policy covers the death of
the deceased, as premium was paid for two non-fare paying passengers. Even
otherwise he contends that the evidence of R.W.2 would show that the deceased
was travelling as a labourer in the said vehicle at the time of accident and the
policy covers the risk of persons travelling in the vehicle as labourers.  The
said argument of the counsel for the respondents-claimants is unsustainable for
the reason that on one hand claimants are claiming damages on the ground that
the deceased was doing business of chicken and on the other hand R.W.2 deposes  
that the deceased was travelling in the vehicle as a labourer.  Both the pleas
cannot go together as they run contrary to each other.  Further, there are no
goods in the vehicle at the time of accident. For the reasons best known to
them, the claimants did not produce the panchanama of the scene of accident,
which would have disclosed the presence of goods in the vehicle at the time of
accident.  Even according to the contents of the claim petition and the evidence
of PWs.1 and 2, the deceased was going to Hyderabad to get the goods i.e.
chicken.  Thus, there is no evidence on record to show that the deceased boarded
the lorry with chicken.  The Tribunal, without giving any specific finding as to
the status of the deceased in the vehicle at the time of accident, on a surmise
held that the deceased was travelling along with the goods, made the owner and
the insurer of the vehicle jointly and severally liable to pay compensation to
the claimants.
12      The Supreme Court in National Insurance Company Limited Vs. Kousalyadevi1  
dealt with a situation where the deceased was travelling in a truck for the
purpose of collecting empty boxes as he was a vegetable dealer.  He was not
travelling in the truck as owner of the goods i.e. either with vegetables or
with the empty boxes.  He was travelling in the truck for the purpose other than
the one for which he was entitled to travel in a public carriage goods vehicle.
The Court held that the claimants are not entitled to any compensation from the
insurer as the deceased was only travelling as a passenger in the said vehicle
and not as an owner of the goods.  The Supreme Court while applying the
principle laid down in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd, Vs. Brij Mohan2  and in New
India Assurance Co. Ltd, Vs. Asha Rani3 held that the insurance company is not
liable to pay any amount as compensation to the claimants.   In Asharani case,
the Supreme Court observed that Sub Clause (i) of Clause (b) of Sub-Section 1 of
Section 147 of 1988 Act speaks of liability which the owner of a vehicle incurs
in case of death or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a
third party caused by or arising out of use of the vehicle in public place.  The
Court further held that an owner of a passenger carrying vehicle must pay
premium for covering the risk of passengers travelling in the said vehicle. The
said premium covers third party as also the owner of the goods or his authorized
representative and not a passenger carried in a goods vehicle whether for hire
or reward or otherwise.  While dealing the difference in the language of goods
vehicle appearing in the old Act and the goods carriage in the 1988 Act, the
Supreme Court in Thokchum Ongoi Sangeetha and another Vs. Oriental Insurance  
Company Limited and others4 held that the legislative intent was to prohibit
goods vehicles from carrying any passengers.  This is clear from the expression
"in addition to passengers" as contained in the definition of "goods vehicle" in
the old Act being omitted in the new Act. According to the Supreme Court, the
position is further clear as the expression used goods carriage is solely for
the "carriage of goods." Carrying of passengers in goods carriage was never
contemplated in the Act.  As stated earlier, Section 147 of the Act mandates
coverage against death or injury to any passenger of public service vehicle.
There is no reference to any passengers in "goods carriage."  Therefore, the
provisions of the Act do not enjoin any statutory liability on the owner of the
vehicle to get his vehicle insured for any passengers travelling in the goods
carriage and the insurer would have no liability therefor.
13      In view of the legal position indicated above and in the facts and
circumstances of the present case that there were no goods in the vehicle at the
time of said accident, the deceased cannot be held to be owner of the goods
which he proposes to purchase for doing business after reaching the destination.
By no stretch of imagination it can be said the deceased was travelling in the
goods vehicle as owner of the goods. The inevitable conclusion would be that the
deceased was travelling in the offending vehicle not as owner of the goods, but,
as a gratuitous passenger. Hence, the insurer is not liable to pay any
compensation to the claimants.  The order of the Tribunal below is set aside and
the appeal filed by the insurance company is allowed.
14      The Docket proceedings in the present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal indicate
that at the time of admission of the appeal, this Court directed the appellant
to deposit half of the decreetal amount and the first claimant was permitted to
withdraw the said amount without furnishing any security.  The learned counsel
for the respondents - claimants submitted that the claimant has withdrawn the
said amount treating the order passed by the Tribunal below with regard to the
quantum of compensation as a decree against the owner of the offending vehicle.
In view of the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in National
Insurance Company Vs. Bhukya5, the compensation amount if any deposited and  
withdrawn by the claimants shall not be recovered by the insurance company.
However, the insurer/claimants can take steps to recover the amounts which they
are entitled to from the owner of the vehicle by initiating proceedings before
the executing Court.
15      With the above observation, this appeal is accordingly allowed.  No order
as to costs.
       
-------------------------------
C.PRAVEEN KUMAR, J.    
14.09.2012

No interim injunction - Apart from that it is also not stated as to at what time on 06-02-2012, defendant Nos.3, 4 and 5 came to the schedule of property and threatened him. There is also nothing on record to know whether he initiated any criminal proceedings against defendant Nos.1 and 2 etc., as stated by him in paragraph No.7 of the plaint, and if not why. it is apparent that there is a dispute with regard to ownership over the schedule of property between defendant Nos.1 to 5 on one hand and defendant Nos.6 and 7 on the other and the same cannot be decided in the present proceedings and even determination of the same also not helpful to the plaintiff since he failed to prove his tenancy over the schedule property and that as per Ex.B-4 letter of the Tahsildar, Malkajgiri Mandal, Ranga Reddy District to the Station House Officer, Malkajgiri Police Station dated 17-12-2011, he is a trespasser over plot No.14 of schedule property and patta for the schedule property is in the name of the predecessor of defendant Nos.1 to 4. Thus, there is no prima facie case or balance of convenience in favour of the plaintiff for granting temporary injunction and if the same is not granted no loss much less irreparable loss would be caused to the plaintiff.

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE B.N. RAO NALLA        

CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No.644 OF 2012        

05-10-2012

T. Satyanarayana

Y. Lakshma Reddy @ Lachi Reddy & 6 others  

Counsel for the appellant: Sri K. Mallikarjuna Rao(481)

Counsel for respondent Nos.1 to 4: Sri Resu Mahender Reddy(910)

Counsel for respondent No.5:  Sri K. Rathanagapani Reddy

(C-4414)

<GIST:

>HEAD NOTE:  

?CASES REFERRED:    

C/15

JUDGMENT:  
        This Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is preferred against the dismissal of I.A.
No.559 of 2012, a petition for grant of temporary injunction for the schedule of
property, in O.S. No.163 of 2012 vide order dated
07-06-2012 by the learned II Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy District,
Hyderabad.  The original suit is filed seeking permanent injunction.

        2.  The appellant herein is the petitioner - plaintiff and the respondents
are respondents - defendants in the impugned application before the trial Court.

        3.  For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as they
arrayed in the suit.

        4.  The case of the plaintiff is that he is tenant, oral tenancy, of
defendant Nos.6 and 7 in the schedule of property wherein he is carrying on
bamboo business for the past several years periodically and paying rents to
defendant Nos.6 and 7 regularly.  However, defendant Nos.1 to 5 are trying to
interfere with his peaceful possession and enjoyment in the schedule property,
for which he gave report to the police, but of no avail.  Defendant Nos.6 and 7
are the original owners, as such, defendant Nos.1 to 5 are not entitled to
interfere with his possession over the schedule property.  Hence, he filed the
suit for permanent injunction and the impugned application for temporary
injunction against defendant Nos.1 to 5 only though defendant Nos.6 and 7 are
shown as parties to the petition.

        5.  Defendant No.5 filed counter on behalf of himself and also on behalf
of defendant Nos.1 to 4 denying the case of the plaintiff.
Their case is that Y. Narsa Reddy, who is grandfather of defendant Nos.1 to 4,
was original owner and possessor of the schedule property i.e. the land
admeasuring Acs.3-31 guntas in Survey Nos.741, 742, 743 and after his demise Y.
Gandi Reddy, father of defendant Nos.1 to 4, succeeded to the property and
during his life time he converted the land into house plots and after his demise
on 13-05-1996, defendant Nos.1 to 4 succeeded to the schedule property.  In
2011, defendant No.5 purchased Northern part of plot No.9 and plot Nos.10, 11
and 14 of a total extent of 990 square yards in Survey Nos.741, 742 and 743
under the registered sale deed dated 26-11-2011.  Thus, defendant Nos.1 to 5 are
in possession and enjoyment of their respective extents, but when defendant
Nos.6 and 7 tried to encroach the plots of defendants Nos.1 to 5, defendant No.5
lodged a complaint against defendant Nos.6 and 7 in Malkajgiri Police Station
and the same was registered as Crime No.369 of 2009 and on enquiry by the
Malkajgiri Mandal Tahsildar on request of the police concerned, it is revealed
that Plot No.14 of 266 square yards in Survey Nos.741, 742 and 743 of Malkajgiri
Mandal was encroached by the plaintiff.  Questioning the same, defendant Nos.6
and 7 filed a writ petition, in which the plaintiff herein filed an affidavit as
third party supporting the case of defendant Nos.6 and 7, however the said writ
petition was dismissed on merits.
        6.  Based on the rival pleadings, the following point was framed by the
trial Court for determination of the impugned application:
       
"Whether the petitioners/plaintiffs have made out prima facie case, balance of
convenience and irreparable loss in their favour?"


        7.  In support of his case, plaintiff got marked Exs.A-1 to A-21 and on
behalf of defendant Nos.1 to 5, they got marked Exs.B-1 to B-8.

8.  The trial court after an elaborate consideration of each and every document
coupled with the pleadings and the material on record, dismissed the petition
with costs holding that the plaintiff failed to prove his tenancy over the
schedule property and his pleadings are of camouflage nature and that he was
projected by defendant Nos.6 and 7.  Assailing the same, plaintiff preferred
this appeal.

9.  Heard the learned counsel on either side and perused the material available
on record.

10.  Now the contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiff is that the
trial Court failed to see that since defendant Nos.6 and 7 are owners and the
plaintiff being their tenant over the schedule property by doing bamboo sticks
business approached the Court seeking to protect his legal possession over the
same as tenant and that though there is sufficient evidence in respect of his
possession as tenant on the schedule property, the trial Court refused to grant
temporary injunction erroneously holding that defendant Nos.6 and 7 projected
him to file the suit seeking injunction against defendant Nos.1 to 5.
11.  On the other hand, learned counsel for defendant Nos.1 to 5 supporting the
impugned order contended that the trial Court rightly dismissed the impugned
application holding that the plaintiff failed to prove his tenancy and
possession over the schedule property and is projected by defendant Nos.6 and 7,
as such, the impugned order does not require interference of this Court.

12.  Now the point that arises for consideration is whether there are any
grounds for allowing this appeal?

POINT:

13.  As seen from the impugned order, the schedule of property for which the
plaintiff seeks temporary injunction is covered by
Plot Nos.9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 16 in Survey Nos.741, 742 and 743 of
Malkajgiri covered by common boundaries.  Now, the main issue that requires to
be determined for granting interim injunction is as to who is in lawful
possession of the schedule property and whether there is prima facie case and
balance of convenience in favour of the plaintiff and suffering irreparable
loss.  The case of the plaintiff is that he is in lawful possession of the
schedule property as tenant by obtaining the same on oral lease from its
original owners i.e. defendant Nos.6 and 7, but defendant Nos.1 to 5 are trying
to interfere with his peaceful possession and enjoyment over the same.  However,
it is apparent from the material on record that there is a dispute with regard
to ownership over the schedule property between defendant Nos.1 to 5 on one hand
and defendant Nos.6 and 7 on the other.  In view of the same, as seen from the
material on record, as rightly pointed out by the trial court,
the plaintiff intentionally avoided to say specifically as to on which date he
was inducted as tenant in the schedule property by respondent Nos.6 and 7 and
since how long he is in possession of the same as it may not correlate with the
alleged ownership of defendant Nos.6 and 7.  It is also not mentioned as to
whether defendant Nos.6 and 7 are owners of the schedule property jointly or for
different extents and in case for different extents, for what extent and for
which part they are owners.  He also failed to file number of rent receipts
except Exs.A-1 and A-2 for the month of January 2012, which is just before
filing of this suit to show his alleged tenancy, and if he was really in
possession of the entire or part of the schedule property from a long period,
definitely he must have filed sufficient number of rent receipts to show his
possession and tenancy over the schedule property.

14.  Further, plaintiff filed Ex.A-3 property tax receipt for H.No.13-1, Yadav
Nagar for the year 2009-10 stating that he paid the same for the schedule
property.  But, it is not his case that a house is existing in the schedule
property and the schedule of property also does not disclose the same.  Hence,
it can be said that Ex.A-3 does not relate to the schedule property and the same
shows that the plaintiff approached the Court with unclean hands.  Therefore,
the trial Court rightly ignored Ex.A-3 property tax receipt as there does not
exist any house in the schedule property even according to the plaintiff
himself.  Likewise Exs.A-7 to A-11 are also not helpful to the plaintiff as they
are between defendant Nos.1 to 5 and defendant Nos.6 and 7 with regard to
ownership of the schedule property and as rightly held by the trial Court there
appears to be dispute of title about schedule property and there is no need to
go into that question in the present proceedings for temporary injunction and
even if the ownership of the schedule property is determined, the same is not
helpful to the plaintiff since the evidence produced by him does not establish
his tenancy either on the part or whole of the schedule property and the
relationship of tenant and landlord between himself and defendant Nos.6 and 7.

15.  Exs.A-12 and A-13 are complaint and private complaint respectively filed by
defendant No.6 against defendant Nos.1 and 2 stating that they are interfering
and trespassing into the schedule property.  Thus, these documents reveals that
defendant No.6 is claiming ownership over the schedule property and in that
event defendant No.6 is expected to file a suit against defendant Nos.1 and 2
etc. to protect his right, title and interest over the schedule property but not
the plaintiff after a period of about six months on the pretext of alleged
tenancy.

16.  On the other hand, Exs.B-1 and B-2 show the right, title and interest of
defendant Nos.1 to 5 over the schedule property.  Further, Ex.B-4, the report
dated 17-12-2011 of the Tahsildar, Malkjgiri Mandal, after conducting inspection
over the schedule property on the request of the Station House Officer,
Malkajgiri Police Station on Ex.B-3 complaint lodged by defendant No.5, shows
that the plaintiff is a trespasser on plot No.14 of the schedule property.  As
per Ex.B-6 proceedings issued by the Special Deputy Collector, Hyderabad,
defendant Nos.1 to 4 are having pattadar passbooks for the schedule property.
Ex.B-7 issued by the Deputy Commissioner of Greater Hyderabad Municipal
Corporation, Malkajgiri also shows that there is no house in the schedule
property much less with door No.13-1 as found hereinabove.  Ex.A-20 bunch of
photographs show that the schedule property is a vacant site and the same is
evident from Ex.B-8 photographs as well as Ex.A-19 lay out plan, which shows
that there are house plots.  In view of the above, Exs.A-4 and A-5 trade licence
and payment receipt are also not helpful to the case of the plaintiff as the
same can be obtained easily.

17.  Further, the record shows that defendant No.6 filed
W.P. No.25021 of 2011 to protect his possession over the schedule property
seeking a direction to the Station House Officer, Malkajgiri for preventing the
criminal activities of defendant Nos.1 and 2 herein over the schedule of
property stating that they trespassed in to plot Nos.9, 10, 11 and 12
admeasuring 1042 square yards in Survey Nos.741, 742 and 743.  But,
surprisingly, he did not claim ownership over plot Nos.13, 14 and 16 which are
also part of the schedule of property.  However, in the present proceedings,
plaintiff seeks interim injunction for the schedule of property which includes
plot Nos.9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 16 in the same Survey Nos.741, 742 and 743,
but Ex.B-4 report of the Tahsildar, Malkajgiri Mandal, Ranga Reddy District
shows that the schedule of property is vacant site consisting of plots and the
plaintiff is encroacher on plot No.14.  Therefore, it is crystal clear that the
plaintiff is not the tenant of defendant Nos.6 and 7 and as rightly held by the
trial Court the plaintiff is projected by defendant Nos.6 and 7 against
defendant Nos.1 to 5 in view of the dispute between them with regard to title
over the schedule of property.

18.  Apart from the above, as seen from the plaint, the case of the plaintiff is
that in August, 2011 itself defendant Nos.1 and 2 trespassed into the land in
question and set up stone-cum-wire fencing and placed a board in the land by
threatening him with dire consequences in spite of his protest and questioning
the same defendant Nos.6 and 7 filed criminal complaint against defendant Nos.1
and 2 for criminal trespass and mischief and that thereafter also periodically
defendant Nos.1 and 2 have been sending groups of people to the shop and
threatening him to close his shop.  It is also his case that when defendant
Nos.1 and 2 came to the schedule of property and threatened him on 05-02-2012 at
9-00 am, he approached Malkajgiri Police Station and tendered complaint on 06-
02-2012, but the Station House Officer refused to receive the same, as such, he
was in the process of approaching the Criminal Court for taking cognizance of
the complaint.  However, on 06-02-2012 also as defendant Nos.3, 4 and 5 came to
the schedule property and threatened him, he initiated the present proceedings.
Thus, when the case of the plaintiff himself is that in August, 2011 itself,
defendant Nos.1 and 2 trespassed into the land in question and set up stone-cum-
wire fencing, thereafter the question of again their (defendant Nos.1 and 2)
sending groups of people to the plaintiff and threatening him to close his
business does not arise.  Further, if the plaintiff's case is taken to be true
also, the question is why he did not approach the Court at that time itself and
he failed to explain as to what prevented him from approaching the Court at that
time and that he has not given the dates on which defendant Nos.1 and 2 send the
groups of people to him.  Further, plaintiff's case is that on 05-02-2012 at 9-
00 am, defendant Nos.1 and 2 came to the schedule property and threatened him to
go out of the land in question, for which he went to Malkajgiri Police Station
on 06-02-2012 to tender the complaint against them which was of no use.  Here
also, it is not stated as to why there was a delay of one day in giving police
complaint, if the same is true, and why he did not produce the complaint copy,
which the police refused to receive, to show the alleged acts of defendant Nos.1
and 2, which reveals that the same is false and baseless and concocted for the
purpose of the present suit.  Apart from that it is also not stated as to at
what time on 06-02-2012, defendant Nos.3, 4 and 5 came to the schedule of
property and threatened him.  There is also nothing on record to know whether he
initiated any criminal proceedings against defendant Nos.1 and 2 etc., as stated
by him in paragraph No.7 of the plaint, and if not why.  These circumstances
also create any amount of doubt as to tenancy of the plaintiff over the schedule
property and strengthen the case of defendant Nos.1 to 5 that he is set up by
defendant Nos.6 and 7.

19.  In the circumstances, viewed from any angle, as found hereinabove, it is
apparent that there is a dispute with regard to ownership over the schedule of
property between defendant Nos.1 to 5 on one hand and defendant Nos.6 and 7 on 
the other and the same cannot be decided in the present proceedings and even
determination of the same also not helpful to the plaintiff since he failed to
prove his tenancy over the schedule property and that as per Ex.B-4 letter of
the Tahsildar, Malkajgiri Mandal, Ranga Reddy District to the Station House
Officer, Malkajgiri Police Station dated 17-12-2011, he is a trespasser over
plot No.14 of schedule property and patta for the schedule property is in the
name of the predecessor of defendant Nos.1 to 4.  Thus, there is no prima facie
case or balance of convenience in favour of the plaintiff for granting temporary
injunction and if the same is not granted no loss much less irreparable loss
would be caused to the plaintiff.

20.  For the aforesaid reasons, this Court is of the view that the trial Court
rightly dismissed the impugned application refusing to grant
temporary injunction in favour of the plaintiff for the schedule of property and
the same does not warrant interference of this Court.
The point is accordingly answered.

21.  Therefore, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is dismissed confirming the order
dated 07-06-2012 in I.A. No.559 of 2012 in
O.S. No.163 of 2012 passed by the learned II Additional District Judge, Ranga
Reddy District, Hyderabad.  The miscellaneous applications,
if any, pending are closed.  It is needless to mention here that the trial Court
shall dispose of the main suit uninfluenced by the observations,
if any, made in this judgment.  No order as to costs.

__________________  
B.N. RAO NALLA, J  
Date:05-10-2012.