LawforAll

advocatemmmohan

My photo
since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

Just for legal information but not form as legal opinion

WELCOME TO MY LEGAL WORLD - SHARE THE KNOWLEDGE

Friday, October 19, 2012

The Protection of Women Against Sexual Harassment at Work Place Bill, 2010 is still pending in Parliament though Lok Sabha is said to have passed that Bill in the first week of September, 2012. - There is still no proper mechanism in place to address the complaints of sexual harassment of the women lawyers in Bar Associations, lady doctors and nurses in the medical clinics and nursing homes, women architects working in the offices of the engineers and architects and so on and so forth. Lip service, hollow statements and inert and inadequate laws with sloppy enforcement are not enough for true and genuine up liftment of our half most precious population – the women.- guidelines in Vishaka should not remain symbolic and the following further directions are necessary until legislative enactment on the subject is in place. (i) The States and Union Territories which have not yet carried out adequate and appropriate amendments in their respective Civil Services Conduct Rules (By whatever name these Rules are called) shall do so within two months from today by providing that the report of the Complaints Committee shall be deemed to be an inquiry report in a disciplinary action under such Civil Services Conduct Rules. In other words, the disciplinary authority shall treat the report/findings etc. of the Complaints Committee as the findings in a disciplinary inquiry against the delinquent employee and shall act on such report accordingly. The findings and the report of the Complaints Committee shall not be treated as a mere preliminary investigation or inquiry leading to a disciplinary action but shall be treated as a finding/report in an inquiry into the misconduct of the delinquent. (ii) The States and Union Territories which have not carried out amendments in the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules shall now carry out amendments on the same lines, as noted above in clause (i) within two months. (iii) The States and Union Territories shall form adequate number of Complaints Committees so as to ensure that they function at taluka level, district level and state level. Those States and/or Union Territories which have formed only one Committee for the entire State shall now form adequate number of Complaints Committees within two months from today. Each of such Complaints Committees shall be headed by a woman and as far as possible in such Committees an independent member shall be associated. (iv) The State functionaries and private and public sector undertakings/organisations/bodies/institutions etc. shall put in place sufficient mechanism to ensure full implementation of the Vishaka guidelines and further provide that if the alleged harasser is found guilty, the complainant – victim is not forced to work with/under such harasser and where appropriate and possible the alleged harasser should be transferred. Further provision should be made that harassment and intimidation of witnesses and the complainants shall be met with severe disciplinary action. (v) The Bar Council of India shall ensure that all bar associations in the country and persons registered with the State Bar Councils follow the Vishaka guidelines. Similarly, Medical Council of India, Council of Architecture, Institute of Chartered Accountants, Institute of Company Secretaries and other statutory Institutes shall ensure that the organisations, bodies, associations, institutions and persons registered/affiliated with them follow the guidelines laid down by Vishaka. To achieve this, necessary instructions/circulars shall be issued by all the statutory bodies such as Bar Council of India, Medical Council of India, Council of Architecture, Institute of Company Secretaries within two months from today. On receipt of any complaint of sexual harassment at any of the places referred to above the same shall be dealt with by the statutory bodies in accordance with the Vishaka guidelines and the guidelines in the present order. We are of the view that if there is any non-compliance or non- adherence to the Vishaka guidelines, orders of this Court following Vishaka and the above directions, it will be open to the aggrieved persons to approach the respective High Courts. The High Court of such State would be in a better position to effectively consider the grievances raised in that regard.


                                                                  REPORTABLE




                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       ORIGINAL/APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NOS. 173-177 OF 1999

Medha Kotwal Lele and Others                           …… Petitioners

                   Vs.

Union of India and Others                                 ……Respondents


                                    WITH
                           T.C. (C) NO. 21 OF 2001
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5009 OF 2006
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5010 OF 2006

                                  JUDGMENT

R.M. LODHA, J.

            The Vishaka[1]   judgment came on 13.8.1997. Yet,15 years  after
the guidelines  were  laid  down  by  this  Court  for  the  prevention  and
redressal of sexual harassment and their due compliance  under  Article  141
of the Constitution of India until such  time  appropriate  legislation  was
enacted by the Parliament, many women still  struggle  to  have  their  most
basic rights protected at workplaces. The statutory law  is  not  in  place.
The Protection of Women Against Sexual Harassment at Work Place  Bill,  2010
is still pending in Parliament though Lok Sabha is said to have passed  that
Bill in the first week of September, 2012.   The belief of the  Constitution
framers in fairness and justice for women is yet to  be  fully  achieved  at
the workplaces in the country.
2.          This group of four matters – in the nature  of  public  interest
litigation – raises principally the grievance  that  women  continue  to  be
victims of sexual harassment at workplaces. The guidelines in  Vishaka1  are
followed in breach in substance and spirit by state  functionaries  and  all
other concerned.  The women workers  are  subjected  to  harassment  through
legal and extra legal methods  and  they  are  made  to  suffer  insult  and
indignity.
3.           Beijing  Declaration  and  Platform  for  Action,  inter  alia,
states, “Violence against women both violates and impairs or  nullifies  the
enjoyment by women of  human  rights  and  fundamental  freedoms…….  In  all
societies, to a greater or lesser degree, women and girls are  subjected  to
physical, sexual and psychological abuse that cuts across lines  of  income,
class and culture”.
4.          Vishaka guidelines require the employers at workplaces  as  well
as other responsible persons or institutions  to observe  them   and  ensure
the prevention of sexual harassment  to  women.  These  guidelines  read  as
under :
           “1. Duty  of  the  employer  or  other  responsible  persons  in
           workplaces and other institutions:
           It shall be the  duty  of  the  employer  or  other  responsible
           persons in workplaces or other institutions to prevent or  deter
           the commission of acts of sexual harassment and to  provide  the
           procedures for the resolution, settlement or prosecution of acts
           of sexual harassment by taking all steps required.
           2. Definition:
           For this purpose,  sexual  harassment  includes  such  unwelcome
           sexually  determined   behaviour   (whether   directly   or   by
           implication) as:
                 (a)   physical contact and advances;
                 (b)   a demand or request for sexual favours;
                 (c)   sexually-coloured remarks;
                 (d)   showing pornography;
                 (e)   any other unwelcome physical, verbal  or  non-verbal
           conduct of sexual nature.
           Where any of these acts is committed in circumstances whereunder
           the victim of such conduct has a reasonable apprehension that in
           relation to the victim's  employment  or  work  whether  she  is
           drawing  salary,  or  honorarium  or   voluntary,   whether   in
           government, public or private enterprise  such  conduct  can  be
           humiliating and may constitute a health and safety  problem.  It
           is discriminatory for instance when  the  woman  has  reasonable
           grounds to believe that her objection would disadvantage her  in
           connection with her employment or work including  recruiting  or
           promotion or when it creates a hostile work environment. Adverse
           consequences might be visited if the victim does not consent  to
           the conduct in question or raises any objection thereto.
           3. Preventive steps:
           All employers or persons in charge of workplace whether  in  the
           public or  private  sector  should  take  appropriate  steps  to
           prevent sexual harassment. Without prejudice to  the  generality
           of this obligation they should take the following steps:
           (a) Express prohibition of sexual harassment as defined above at
           the workplace should be notified, published  and  circulated  in
           appropriate ways.
           (b) The rules/regulations of government and public sector bodies
           relating   to   conduct   and    discipline    should    include
           rules/regulations prohibiting sexual harassment and provide  for
           appropriate penalties in such rules against the offender.
           (c) As regards  private  employers  steps  should  be  taken  to
           include the aforesaid prohibitions in the standing orders  under
           the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946.
           (d) Appropriate work conditions should be provided in respect of
           work, leisure, health and hygiene to further ensure  that  there
           is no hostile environment towards women  at  workplaces  and  no
           woman employee should have reasonable grounds  to  believe  that
           she is disadvantaged in connection with her employment.
           4. Criminal proceedings:
           Where such conduct amounts  to  a  specific  offence  under  the
           Indian Penal Code or under any other  law,  the  employer  shall
           initiate appropriate action in accordance with law by  making  a
           complaint with the appropriate authority.
           In particular, it should ensure that victims, or  witnesses  are
           not victimized  or  discriminated  against  while  dealing  with
           complaints  of  sexual  harassment.  The   victims   of   sexual
           harassment should have  the  option  to  seek  transfer  of  the
           perpetrator or their own transfer.
           5. Disciplinary action:
           Where such  conduct  amounts  to  misconduct  in  employment  as
           defined by the relevant service rules, appropriate  disciplinary
           action should be initiated by the employer  in  accordance  with
           those rules.
           6. Complaint mechanism:
           Whether or not such conduct constitutes an offence under law  or
           a  breach  of  the  service  rules,  an  appropriate   complaint
           mechanism should be created in the employer's  organization  for
           redress of the complaint made  by  the  victim.  Such  complaint
           mechanism should ensure time-bound treatment of complaints.
           7. Complaints Committee:
           The complaint mechanism, referred to in  (6)  above,  should  be
           adequate to provide, where necessary, a Complaints Committee,  a
           special counsellor  or  other  support  service,  including  the
           maintenance of confidentiality.
           The Complaints Committee should be headed by  a  woman  and  not
           less than half of its  members  should  be  women.  Further,  to
           prevent the possibility of any undue pressure or influence  from
           senior levels, such Complaints Committee should involve a  third
           party, either NGO or other body who is familiar with  the  issue
           of sexual harassment.
           The Complaints Committee must  make  an  annual  report  to  the
           Government Department concerned of  the  complaints  and  action
           taken by them.
           The employers and  person-in-charge  will  also  report  on  the
           compliance  with  the  aforesaid  guidelines  including  on  the
           reports  of  the  Complaints   Committee   to   the   Government
           Department.
           8. Workers' initiative:
           Employees should be allowed to raise issues of sexual harassment
           at workers' meeting and in other appropriate forum and it should
           be affirmatively discussed in employer-employee meetings.
           9. Awareness:
           Awareness of the rights  of  female  employees  in  this  regard
           should be created in particular  by  prominently  notifying  the
           guidelines (and appropriate  legislation  when  enacted  on  the
           subject) in a suitable manner.
           10. Third-party harassment:
           Where sexual harassment occurs as a result of an act or omission
           by any third party or  outsider,  the  employer  and  person-in-
           charge will take all steps necessary and  reasonable  to  assist
           the affected person in terms of support and preventive action.
           11. The Central/State  Governments  are  requested  to  consider
           adopting suitable measures including legislation to ensure  that
           the guidelines laid down by this order are also observed by  the
           employers in private sector.
           12. These guidelines will not  prejudice  any  rights  available
           under the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993.”





5.          In these matters while  highlighting  few  individual  cases  of
sexual harassment at the workplaces, the  main  focus  is  on  the  lack  of
effective implementation of Vishaka  guidelines.   It  is  stated  that  the
attitude of neglect in establishing effective  and  comprehensive  mechanism
in letter and spirit of the Vishaka  guidelines by the  States  as  well  as
the employers in private and public sector has defeated the  very  objective
and purpose of the guidelines.
6.          In one of these matters,  Medha  Kotwal  Lele,  this  Court  has
passed certain orders from time to time. Notices  were  issued  to  all  the
State Governments. The States have filed their  responses.   On   26.4.2004,
after hearing the learned Attorney  General  and  learned  counsel  for  the
States, this Court directed as follows :
           “Complaints Committee as envisaged by the Supreme Court  in  its
           judgment in Vishaka’s case  will be  deemed  to  be  an  inquiry
           authority for the purposes of Central Civil  Services  (Conduct)
           Rules, 1964 (hereinafter called CCS Rules) and the report of the
           complaints Committee shall be deemed to  be  an  inquiry  report
           under the CCS Rules. Thereafter the disciplinary authority  will
           act on the report  in accordance with the rules.”




This Court further directed  in  the  order  dated  26.4.2004  that  similar
amendment shall be  carried  out  in  the  Industrial  Employment  (Standing
Orders)   Rules.   As   regards   educational   institutions    and    other
establishments, the Court observed that further directions would  be  issued
subsequently.
7.          On 17.1.2006, this Court in couple of these matters  passed  the
following order:

           “These matters relate to the complaints of sexual harassment  in
           working places. In Vishaka vs. State of Rajasthan, (1997)   6SCC
           241, this Court issued certain directions  as  to  how  to  deal
           with  the  problem.   All  the  States  were  parties  to   that
           proceedings.  Now, it appears  that  the  directions  issued  in
           Vishaka case  were  not  properly  implemented  by  the  various
           States/Departments/Institutions.  In a rejoinder affidavit filed
           on behalf of the petitioners, the details have  been  furnished.
           The counsel appearing for the States submit that they  would  do
           the needful at the earliest.
           It is not known whether the Committees as suggested  in  Vishaka
           case have been constituted in all  the  Departments/Institutions
           having members of the staff 50 and above  and  in  most  of  the
           District level offices in all the States members  of  the  staff
           working in some offices would be more than 50.  It is not  known
           whether the Committees as envisaged in  the  Vishaka  case  have
           been constituted in all these offices.  The number of complaints
           received and the steps taken in these complaints  are  also  not
           available.    We find it necessary to give some more  directions
           in this regard.
           We find that in order to co-ordinate the  steps  taken  in  this
           regard, there should be a State level officer, i.e., either  the
           Secretary of the Woman and Child Welfare Department or any other
           suitable officer who is in charge and concerned with the welfare
           of women and children in each State.  The Chief  Secretaries  of
           each State shall see that an officer is  appointed  as  a  nodal
           agent to collect the details and  to  give  suitable  directions
           whenever necessary.
           As regards factories, shops and  commercial  establishments  are
           concerned, the directions are  not  fully  complied  with.   The
           Labour Commissioner of each  State  shall  take  steps  in  that
           direction.  They shall work as nodal agency  as  regards  shops,
           factories, shops and commercial  establishments  are  concerned.
           They shall also collect the details regarding the complaints and
           also see that the required  Committee  is  established  in  such
           institutions.
           Counsel appearing for each State shall furnish the  details   as
           to what steps have been taken in  pursuance  of  this  direction
           within a period of eight weeks.  Details  may  be  furnished  as
           shown  in  the  format  furnished  by  the  petitioners  in  the
           paperbooks.  A copy of this format shall form part of the order.
            The above facts are required at the next date  of  hearing.   A
           copy of this order be sent to  the  Chief  Secretary  and  Chief
           Labour Commissioner of each State for taking suitable action.”




8.           From  the  affidavits  filed  by  the  State  Governments   the
following position emerges in respect of each of these States:
GOA
      The amendments in the Civil Services Conduct Rules and   the  Standing
Orders have not been made so far.

GUJARAT
      No amendments in the Civil Services Conduct Rules  and   the  Standing
Orders have been  made  so  far.  It  is  not  stated  that  all  Complaints
Committees are headed by women.  There is no information given   whether  in
such committees NGO members have been associated.
NCT OF DELHI
      The amendments in the Civil Services Conduct  Rules  have  been  made.
The   position  about  amendments  in  the  Standing  Orders  has  not  been
clarified.  It has not been specified that  all  Complaints  Committees  are
headed by women.
HIMACHAL PRADESH
      There is nothing to indicate that the State of  Himachal  Pradesh  has
made amendments in  the  Civil  Services  Conduct  Rules  and  the  Standing
Orders. No details of formation of Complaints Committees have been given.

HARYANA
      The amendments in the Government Employees (Conduct) Rules, 1966  have
been made.  However, it is  not specified that the  amendments  in  Standing
Orders have been made.

MAHARASHTRA
      Necessary amendments in Maharashtra Civil  Services  (Conduct)  Rules,
1974 have been made.  The Labour Commissioner has taken steps  for  amending
Mumbai Industrial Employment (Permanent Orders) Rules, 1959.
MIZORAM
      The State of Mizoram has amended Civil Services Conduct Rules and also
constituted Central Complaints Committee to look into complaints  pertaining
to cases of sexual  harassment  of  working  women  at  all  workplaces  for
preservation  and  enforcement.  A  notification  has  been  issued   giving
necessary directions to all private bodies.
SIKKIM
      The amendments in the Civil Services Conduct Rules have  been  carried
out and a notification  has  been  issued  for  constitution  of  complaints
committees by departments/institutions with 50 or above staff to  look  into
sexual harassment of women at workplaces.

UTTARANCHAL
      The State of Uttaranchal has carried out amendments in Civil  Services
Conduct Rules as well as the Standing Orders. The District Level  and  State
Level Complaints Committees have been constituted.
WEST BENGAL
       The  amendments  in  the  Rules  relating  to  duties,   rights   and
obligations of government employees have been made.  The amendments  in  the
Standing Orders have been carried out.  Out of 56 departments of  Government
of West Bengal, Complaints Committees have been  formed  in  48  departments
and out of 156 Directorates under  the  Government,   Complaints  Committees
have  been  formed  in  34  Directorates.   Of  24  institutions  under  the
Government, Complaints Committees have been formed in 6.
MADHYA PRADESH
      Although State of Madhya Pradesh has  made  amendments  in  the  Civil
Services Conduct Rules but no amendments have  been  made  in  the  Standing
Orders. The Complaints Committees have been constituted in every  office  of
every department right  from  the  Head  of  the  Department  level  to  the
District  and  Taluka  level.  The  District  Level  Committees  have   been
constituted under the chairmanship of  the  District  Collector.  The  steps
taken by the District Committees are monitored by the nodal departments.
PUNJAB
      The State of Punjab has carried out amendments in the  Civil  Services
Conduct Rules as well as the Standing Orders. 70 Complaints Committees  have
been constituted at  the  headquarters  of  different  Directorates  and  58
Complaints Committees have been constituted in various Field Offices.
ORISSA
      No amendments in the Civil Services Conduct  Rules  and  the  Standing
Orders have been made.
ANDHRA PRADESH
       Amendments in the Civil Services Conduct Rules and  in  the  Standing
Orders have been made.
KARNATAKA
      The amendments in the Civil Services Conduct Rules have been  made  by
the State of Karnataka but no amendments have  been  made  in  the  Standing
Orders. It is stated that in most of the committees,  the  number  of  women
members is above 50%.  The  Chairpersons  are  women  and  in  most  of  the
committees, an outside member, i.e., an NGO has been associated.
RAJASTHAN
      The State of  Rajasthan  has  carried  out  amendments  in  the  Civil
Services Conduct Rules but no  amendments  have  been  carried  out  in  the
Standing Orders.
BIHAR
      The State of Bihar has made amendments in the Civil  Services  Conduct
Rules but there is nothing to show that amendments in Standing  Orders  have
been made.  However,  only one Complaints  Committee  has  been  constituted
for the entire State.
MEGHALAYA
      The State of Meghalaya has  neither  carried  out  amendments  in  the
Civil Services Conduct Rules nor in the Standing Orders.
TRIPURA
      The State of Tripura has carried  out  the  amendments  in  the  Civil
Services Conduct Rules. There are no  Standing  Orders  applicable  in   the
State. 97 Complaints Committees have been constituted in most of  the  state
government departments and organisations.
ASSAM
      Amendments in the Civil Services Conduct Rules have been made  but  no
amendments have been carried out in the Standing Orders.
MANIPUR
      The State of Manipur has carried out amendments in the Civil  Services
Conduct  Rules,  but  no  definite  information  has  been  given  regarding
amendments in the Standing Orders.  Only one Complaints Committee  has  been
formed for the entire State.
UTTAR PRADESH
      Amendments both in the Civil Services Conduct Rules and  the  Standing
Orders have been carried out.

JAMMU AND KASHMIR
      The State of Jammu and Kashmir  has  carried  out  amendments  in  the
Civil Services Conduct Rules.  It is stated that steps are being  taken  for
 amendments  in the Standing Orders.

NAGALAND
      The amendments have been carried out in  the  Civil  Services  Conduct
Rules by the State of Nagaland but no amendments have been  carried  out  in
the Standing Orders.

ARUNACHAL PRADESH
      The State of Arunachal Pradesh has neither carried out  amendments  in
the Civil Services Conduct Rules nor in the Standing Orders. There  is  only
one State Level Committee for the entire State of Arunachal Pradesh.


KERALA
      Amendments in the Civil Services Conduct Rules and   in  the  Standing
Orders have been carried out. There are  52  Complaints  Committees  in  the
State. All such committees are headed by women  and  50%  members  of  these
committees are women and there is representation of  NGO  members  in  these
committees.



TAMILNADU
      The State of Tamil Nadu  has  carried  out  amendments  in  the  Civil
Services Conduct Rules.  However, no amendments in the Standing Orders  have
been made so far.

JHARKHAND
      The State of  Jharkhand  has  carried  out  amendments  in  the  Civil
Services Conduct Rules.  However, no amendments in the Standing Orders  have
been made so far.


9.           From  the  affidavits  filed  by  the  State  Governments,   it
transpires that the States  of  Orissa, Meghalaya,  Himachal  Pradesh,  Goa,
Arunachal Pradesh and  West  Bengal  have  amended  the  Rules  relating  to
duties, public rights and obligations of the government employees  but  have
not made amendments in Civil Services Conduct Rules. Similarly,  the  States
of  Sikkim,  Madhya  Pradesh,  Gujarat,  Mizoram,  Orissa,  Bihar,  Jammu  &
Kashmir,  Manipur,  Karnataka,  Rajasthan,  Meghalaya,   Haryana,   Himachal
Pradesh, Assam, NCT of Delhi, Goa, Nagaland,  Arunachal  Pradesh,  Jharkhand
and Tamil Nadu have not carried  out  amendments  in  the  Standing  Orders.
These States appear to have not implemented the order passed by  this  Court
on 26.4.2004 quoted above. The States which have carried out  amendments  in
the Civil Services Conduct Rules and the Standing Orders have  not  provided
that the report of the Complaints Committee shall be treated as a report  in
the disciplinary proceedings by an Inquiry Officer. What has  been  provided
by these States is that the inquiry, findings  and  recommendations  of  the
Complaints Committee shall be treated as a  mere  preliminary  investigation
leading to a disciplinary action against the delinquent.
10.         The States like Rajasthan, Meghalaya,  Himachal  Pradesh,  Assam
and Jammu and Kashmir seem to  have  not  formed  Complaints  Committees  as
envisaged in the Vishaka  guidelines. Some States have constituted only  one
Complaints Committee for the entire State.
11.          The Union Territories of Andaman  and  Nicobar  Islands,  Daman
and Diu, Lakshadweep, Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Puducherry  have  not  made
amendments in the Standing Orders. The Union Territory  of  Chandigarh  does
not seem to have carried  out  amendments  in  the  Civil  Services  Conduct
Rules. Some of the  Union  Territories  like  Dadra  and  Nagar  Haveli  and
Chandigarh are reported  to  have  not  yet  formed  Complaints  Committees.
Daman and Diu have formed one Complaints Committee for the Union  Territory.

12.         While we have marched forward substantially in  bringing  gender
parity  in  local  self-governments  but  the  representation  of  women  in
Parliament and the Legislative Assemblies is dismal  as the women  represent
only 10-11 per cent  of  the  total  seats.  India  ranks  129  out  of  147
countries in United Nations Gender Equality Index. This is  lower  than  all
South-Asian Countries except Afghanistan. Our Constitution framers  believed
in fairness and justice for women.  They provided in  the  Constitution  the
States’ commitment of  gender  parity  and  gender  equality  and  guarantee
against sexual harassment to women.
13.         The implementation of the guidelines in Vishaka  has to  be  not
only in form but substance and spirit so  as  to  make  available  safe  and
secure environment to women at the workplace in  every  aspect  and  thereby
enabling the working women to work with dignity, decency  and  due  respect.
There is still no proper mechanism in place to  address  the  complaints  of
sexual harassment of the women lawyers in  Bar  Associations,  lady  doctors
and nurses in the  medical  clinics  and  nursing  homes,  women  architects
working in the offices of the engineers and architects  and  so  on  and  so
forth.
14.         In Seema Lepcha[2]   this Court gave the following directions:

           “(i)  The State Government shall give comprehensive publicity to
           the notifications and orders issued by it in compliance  of  the
           guidelines framed by  this  Court  in  Vishaka’s  case  and  the
           directions given in Medha Kotwal’s  case  by  getting  the  same
           published  in the newspapers having maximum circulation  in  the
           State after every two months.
           (ii)   Wide  publicity  be  given  every  month  on  Doordarshan
           Station,  Sikkim  about  various  steps  taken  by   the   State
           Government  for  implementation  of  the  guidelines  framed  in
           Vishaka’s case and the directions given in Medha Kotwal’s case.
           (iii) Social Welfare Department and the Legal Service  Authority
           of the State of Sikkim shall also give  wide  publicity  to  the
           notifications and orders issued by the State Government not only
           for  the  Government  departments   of   the   State   and   its
           agencies/instrumentalities but also for the private companies.”




15.         As a largest democracy in the world, we have to combat  violence
against women. We are of the considered view  that  the  existing  laws,  if
necessary, be revised and appropriate new laws be enacted by Parliament  and
the State  Legislatures  to  protect  women  from  any  form  of  indecency,
indignity and disrespect at all places (in their homes as well as  outside),
prevent all forms of violence – domestic violence,  sexual  assault,  sexual
harassment at  the  workplace,  etc;  —  and  provide  new  initiatives  for
education and advancement of women and girls in all spheres of  life.  After
all they have limitless potential. Lip service, hollow statements and  inert
and inadequate laws with sloppy enforcement are  not  enough  for  true  and
genuine up liftment of our half most precious population – the women.
16.         In what we have discussed above, we are of the  considered  view
that guidelines in Vishaka should not remain  symbolic  and  the   following
further directions are necessary until legislative enactment on the  subject
is in place.
      (i)   The States and Union Territories which have not yet carried  out
adequate and appropriate  amendments  in  their  respective  Civil  Services
Conduct Rules (By whatever name these Rules are called) shall do  so  within
two months from today  by  providing  that  the  report  of  the  Complaints
Committee shall be deemed to be an inquiry report in a  disciplinary  action
under such Civil Services Conduct Rules.  In other words,  the  disciplinary
authority shall treat the report/findings etc. of the  Complaints  Committee
as the findings in a disciplinary inquiry against  the  delinquent  employee
and  shall  act on such report accordingly. The findings and the  report  of
the Complaints  Committee  shall  not  be  treated  as  a  mere  preliminary
investigation or inquiry leading to  a  disciplinary  action  but  shall  be
treated as a finding/report  in  an  inquiry  into  the  misconduct  of  the
delinquent.
      (ii)  The States and Union Territories  which  have  not  carried  out
amendments in the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders)  Rules  shall  now
carry out amendments on the same lines, as noted above in clause (i)  within
two months.
      (iii) The States and Union Territories shall form adequate  number  of
Complaints Committees so as to ensure that they  function at  taluka  level,
district level and state  level.   Those  States  and/or  Union  Territories
which have formed only one Committee for the entire  State  shall  now  form
adequate number of Complaints Committees within two months from today.  Each
of such Complaints Committees shall be headed by  a  woman  and  as  far  as
possible in such Committees an independent member shall be associated.
       (iv)   The  State  functionaries  and  private  and   public   sector
undertakings/organisations/bodies/institutions  etc.  shall  put  in   place
sufficient  mechanism  to  ensure  full  implementation   of   the   Vishaka
guidelines and further  provide  that  if  the  alleged  harasser  is  found
guilty, the complainant – victim is  not  forced  to  work  with/under  such
harasser and where appropriate and possible the alleged harasser  should  be
transferred.  Further  provision  should  be  made   that   harassment   and
intimidation of witnesses and the complainants  shall  be  met  with  severe
disciplinary action.
      (v)   The Bar Council of India shall ensure that all bar  associations
in the country and persons registered with the  State  Bar  Councils  follow
the Vishaka  guidelines. Similarly, Medical Council of  India,   Council  of
Architecture, Institute  of  Chartered  Accountants,  Institute  of  Company
Secretaries  and  other  statutory  Institutes   shall   ensure   that   the
organisations,    bodies,    associations,    institutions    and    persons
registered/affiliated with them follow the guidelines laid down by  Vishaka.
To achieve this, necessary instructions/circulars shall  be  issued  by  all
the statutory bodies such as  Bar  Council  of  India,  Medical  Council  of
India, Council of Architecture, Institute of Company Secretaries within  two
months from today. On receipt of any complaint of sexual harassment  at  any
of the places referred to  above  the  same  shall  be  dealt  with  by  the
statutory  bodies  in  accordance  with  the  Vishaka   guidelines  and  the
guidelines in the present order.
17.         We are of the view that if there is any non-compliance  or  non-
adherence to  the  Vishaka   guidelines,  orders  of  this  Court  following
Vishaka  and the above directions, it will be open to the aggrieved  persons
to approach the respective High Courts. The High Court of such  State  would
be in a better position to effectively consider  the  grievances  raised  in
that regard.
18.         Writ petitions (including T.C.)  and appeals are disposed of  as
above with no orders as to costs.

                                                           ……………………..     J.
                                                          (R.M. Lodha)


                                          ………………………J.
                                                          (Anil R. Dave)




                                                           ……………………..     J.
                                                          (Ranjan Gogoi)


NEW DELHI.
OCTOBER  19, 2012.
-----------------------
[1]    Vishaka and Others v. State of Rajasthan and Others; [(1997) 6 SCC
241]
[2]    Seema Lepcha v. State of Sikkim & Ors. [Petition for Special Leave
to Appeal (Civil) No. 34153/2010 decided on 3.2.2012]

-----------------------
19


whether the seller is entitled to forfeit the earnest money deposit where the sale of an immovable property falls through by reason of the fault or failure of the purchaser. - We are, therefore, of the view that the seller was justified in forfeiting the amount of Rs.7,00,000/- as per the relevant clause, since the earnest money was primarily a security for the due performance of the agreement and, consequently, the seller is entitled to forfeit the entire deposit. The High Court has, therefore, committed an error in reversing the judgment of the trial court. 20. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. However, there will be no order as to costs.


                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7588 OF 2012
                [Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 4605 of 2012]
Satish Batra                                             .. Appellant
                                   Versus
Sudhir Rawal                                             .. Respondent

                               J U D G M E N T

K. S. Radhakrishnan, J.

1.    Leave granted.



2.    The question that has come up for  consideration  in  this  appeal  is
whether the seller is entitled to forfeit the earnest  money  deposit  where
the sale of an immovable property falls through by reason of  the  fault  or
failure of the purchaser.


3.    An Agreement for Sale  of  property  bearing  No.  14/11,  2nd  Floor,
Punjabi Bagh, New Delhi was entered into between the appellant (Seller)  and
the respondent (Purchaser)  on  29.11.2005  for  a  total  consideration  of
Rs.70,00,000/- to be paid on or before 5.3.2006 and, towards earnest  money,
an amount of Rs.4,00,000/- was paid on 29.11.2005 and another  Rs.3,00,000/-
on 30.11.2005, that means, altogether Rs.7,00,000/- was paid, being  10%  of
the total sale consideration.   The purchaser, however, could  not  pay  the
balance amount of Rs.63,00,000/- before  5.3.2006,  consequently,  the  sale
deed could not be executed. Seller, therefore, did not  return  the  earnest
money to the purchaser.


4.    Consequently, the purchaser,  as  plaintiff,  instituted  a  suit  No.
764/08/06 before the  Additional  District  Judge,  Delhi  for  recovery  of
Rs.7,00,000/- from the seller-defendant of the earnest money  paid  by  him.
Defendant contested the suit stating that,  as  per  the  agreement,  he  is
entitled to forfeit the amount of earnest money, if there was a  failure  on
the part  of  the  purchaser-plaintiff  in  paying  the  balance  amount  of
Rs.63,00,000/-.


5.    The trial Court dismissed the  suit  holding  that  the  defendant  is
entitled to retain the amount of  earnest  money  since  the  plaintiff  had
failed to pay the balance amount of Rs.63,00,000/- before 5.3.2006.


6.    Aggrieved by the judgment of the  Additional  District  Judge,  Delhi,
plaintiff took up the matter in appeal before the High  Court  of  Delhi  by
filing R.F.A. No. 137 of 2010.  The High  Court,  placing  reliance  on  the
judgment of this Court in Fateh Chand v. Balkishan Dass AIR  1963  SC  1405,
took the view that the seller is entitled to forfeit only a  nominal  amount
and not the entire amount of Rs.7,00,000/-.  The  High  Court  further  held
that the seller can forfeit an amount of Rs.50,000/- out of  the  amount  of
Rs.7,00,000/- and he is bound to refund the balance amount of  Rs.6,50,000/-
to the purchaser.  To this extent, a decree was also  passed  in  favour  of
purchaser against the seller.  It was also held that the purchaser  is  also
entitled to interest @ 12% per annum from  29.11.2005  till  the  amount  is
paid.


7.    Aggrieved by the said judgment of the High Court, the seller has  come
up with this appeal.


8.    We have heard the learned counsel on either  side  at  length.   Facts
are undisputed.  The only question is whether  the  seller  is  entitled  to
retain the entire amount of Rs.7,00,000/- received towards earnest money  or
not.  The fact that the purchaser was at fault in  not  paying  the  balance
consideration of Rs.63,00,000/- is also not disputed.  The question  whether
the seller can retain the entire amount of earnest money  depends  upon  the
terms of the agreement.  Relevant clause of the  Agreement  for  Sale  dated
29.11.2005 is extracted here under for easy reference:
      “e)    If  the  prospective  purchaser  fail  to  fulfill  the   above
           condition.  The transaction shall stand  cancelled  and  earnest
           money will be  forfeited.   In  case  I  fail  to  complete  the
           transaction as stipulated above.  The  purchaser  will  get  the
           DOUBLE amount of the earnest  money.   In  the  both  condition,
           DEALER will get 4% Commission from the faulty party.”


The clause, therefore, stipulates that if the  purchaser  fails  to  fulfill
the conditions mentioned in  the  agreement,  the  transaction  shall  stand
cancelled and earnest money will be forfeited.  On the other  hand,  if  the
seller fails to complete the transaction, the  purchaser  would  get  double
the amount of earnest money.  Indisputedly the purchaser failed  to  perform
his part of the contract, then  the  question  is  whether  the  seller  can
forfeit the entire earnest money.

9.    The question raised is no more res  integra.   In  (Kunwar)  Chiranjit
Singh v. Har Swarup AIR 1926 P.C. 1, it  has  been  held  that  the  earnest
money is part of the purchase price when the transaction  goes  forward  and
it is forfeited when the transaction falls through, by reason of  the  fault
or failure of the  purchaser.   In  Fateh  Chand  (supra),  this  Court  was
interpreting the conditions  of  an  agreement  dated  21.3.1949.   By  that
agreement, the plaintiff contracted to sell his rights in the land  and  the
building to Seth Fateh Chand (defendant). It was recited  in  the  agreement
that the plaintiff agreed to sell the  building  together  with  ‘pattadari’
rights appertaining to the land admeasuring 2433 sq. yards for Rs.1,12,500/-
 and that Rs.1,000/- was paid to him as earnest money at  the  time  of  the
execution of the  agreement.   The  conditions  of  the  agreement  were  as
follows:

      "(1) I, the executant,  shall  deliver  the  actual  possession,  i.e.
      complete vacant possession of kothi (bungalow) to the  vendee  on  the
      30th March, 1949, and the vendee shall have to give another cheque for
      Rs. 24,000/- to me, out of the sale price.


      (2) Then the vendee shall have to get the sale  (deed)  registered  by
      the 1st of June, 1949. If, on account of any reason, the vendee  fails
      to get the said sale-deed registered by June, 1949, then this  sum  of
      Rs. 25,000/- (twenty-five thousand) mentioned above shall be deemed to
      be forfeited and the agreement cancelled.  Moreover, the vendee  shall
      have to deliver back the  complete  vacant  possession  of  the  kothi
      (bungalow) to me, the executant. If due to certain reason,  any  delay
      takes place on my part in the registration of the  sale-deed,  by  the
      1st June 1949, then I, the executant, shall be liable to pay a further
      sum of Rs. 25,000/- as damages, apart from the aforesaid  sum  of  Rs.
      25,000/- to the  vendee,  and  the  bargain  shall  be  deemed  to  be
      cancelled."

Plaintiff, on 25.3.1949, received Rs.24,000/- and  delivered  possession  of
the building and the land in his occupation to the defendant.

10.   Alleging that  the  agreement  was  rescinded  because  the  defendant
committed default in performing the agreement and  the  sum  of  Rs.25,000/-
paid by the defendant stood forfeited.  Plaintiff instituted  a  suit.   The
defendant resisted the  claim  contending  inter  alia  that  the  plaintiff
having committed breach of the contract could  not  forfeit  the  amount  of
Rs.25,000/- received by him.  The matter  ultimately  came  to  this  Court.
This Court considered as to whether the plaintiff could forfeit the  amount.
Noticing that the defendant had conceded that the plaintiff was entitled  to
forfeit the amount which was paid  as  earnest  money,  the  Court  held  as
follows:
      “(16)  ……….The  contract  provided  for  forfeiture  of  Rs.  25,000/-
      consisting of Rs. 1000/-paid as earnest money and Rs. 24,000/- paid as
      part of the purchase  price.  The  defendant  has  conceded  that  the
      plaintiff was entitled to forfeit the amount of Rs. 1,000/- which  was
      paid as earnest money. We cannot however agree  with  the  High  Court
      that  10  per  cent  of  the  price  may  be  regarded  as  reasonable
      compensation in relation to the value of the contract as a  whole,  as
      that in our opinion is assessed on arbitrary assumption. The plaintiff
      failed to prove the loss suffered by him in consequence of the  breach
      of the contract committed by the defendant, and we are unable to  find
      any principle on which compensation equal to ten percent of the agreed
      price could be awarded  to  the  plaintiff.  The  plaintiff  has  been
      allowed Rs. 1,000/-which was the earnest money as part of the damages.
      Besides he had use of the remaining sum of Rs. 24,000/-,  and  we  can
      rightly presume that he must have been deriving  advantage  from  that
      amount throughout this period. In the absence therefore of  any  proof
      of damage arising from the breach of the contract we  are  of  opinion
      that the  amount  of  Rs.  1,000/-  (earnest  money)  which  has  been
      forfeited, and the advantage that the plaintiff must have derived from
      the possession of the remaining sum of  Rs.  24,000/-during  all  this
      period would be sufficient compensation to him. It may be  added  that
      the plaintiff has separately claimed mesne profits for being kept  out
      of possession for which he has got a decree  and  therefore  the  fact
      that the plaintiff was out of possession cannot be taken into  account
      in determining damages for this purpose.' The  decree  passed  by  the
      High Court awarding Rs. 11,250/- as  damages  to  the  plaintiff  must
      therefore be set aside.”


11.   We are of the view that the High Court  has  completely  misunderstood
the dictum laid down in the above mentioned judgment and  came  to  a  wrong
conclusion of law for more than one reason, which will be more evident  when
we scan through the subsequent judgments of this Court.

12.    In Shree Hanuman Cotton Mills and Others v. Tata  Air  Craft  Limited
1969 (3) SCC 522, this Court  elaborately  discussed  the  principles  which
emerged from the expression “earnest money”.  That  was  a  case  where  the
appellant therein entered into a contract with the respondent  for  purchase
of aero scrap.   According to the contract, the buyer had  to  deposit  with
the company 25% of the total amount and that deposit was to remain with  the
company as the earnest money to be adjusted in the final bills.   Buyer  was
bound to pay the full value less the deposit before taking delivery  of  the
stores.  In case of default by  the  buyer,  the  company  was  entitled  to
forfeit unconditionally the earnest money paid by the buyer and  cancel  the
contract.   The appellant advanced a sum of Rs.25,000/- (being  25%  of  the
total  amount)  agreeing  to  pay  the  balance  in  two  installments.   On
appellant’s failure to pay any further amount, respondent forfeited the  sum
of Rs.25,000/-, which according to it, was earnest money and  cancelled  the
contract.  Appellant filed a suit for recovery  of  the  said  amount.   The
trial Court held that the sum was paid by way of deposit  or  earnest  money
which was primarily a security for the performance of the contract and  that
the  respondent  was  entitled  to  forfeit  the  deposit  amount  when  the
appellant committed a breach of the contract and dismissed  the  suit.   The
High Court confirmed the decision taken by the trial  Court.    This  Court,
considering the scope of the term “earnest”, laid down  certain  principles,
which are as follows:
           “21. From a review of the decisions cited above,  the  following
      principles emerge regarding “earnest””
              1) It must be given at the moment at  which  the  contract  is
                 concluded.
              2) It  represents  a  guarantee  that  the  contract  will  be
                 fulfilled or, in other words, “earnest” is  given  to  bind
                 the contract.
              3) It is part of the purchase price when  the  transaction  is
                 carried out.
              4) It is forfeited  when  the  transaction  falls  through  by
                 reason of the default or failure of the purchaser.
              5) Unless there is anything to the contrary in  the  terms  of
                 the contract, on default committed by the buyer, the seller
                 is entitled to forfeit the earnest.”




13.   In Delhi  Development  Authority  v.  Grihstrapana  Cooperative  Group
Housing Society Ltd. 1995  Supp  (1)  SCC  751,  this  Court  following  the
judgment of the Privy Council in Har Swaroop and Shree Hanuman Cotton  Mills
(supra), held that the forfeiture of the earnest money was legal.

14.   In V. Lakshmanan v. B.R. Mangalgiri and others (1995) Suppl.  (2)  SCC
33, this Court held as follows:
           “The question then is whether the respondents  are  entitled  to
      forfeit the entire amount.  It is seen that a specific covenant  under
      the contract was that respondents are entitled to  forfeit  the  money
      paid under the contract.  So when the contract  fell  through  by  the
      default committed by the appellant, as part of the contract, they  are
      entitled to forfeit the entire amount.”



15.   In Housing Urban Development Authority and another  v.  Kewal  Krishan
Goel  and  others  (1996)  4  SCC  249,  the  question  that  came  up   for
consideration before this Court was, where a land is allotted, the  allottee
deposited some installments but thereafter  intimated  the  authority  about
his incapacity to pay up the balance installments and requested  for  refund
of the money paid, was the  allotting  authority  entitled  to  forfeit  the
earnest money deposited by  the  allottee  or  could  be  only  entitled  to
forfeit 10% of the total amount deposited by the allottee till  the  request
is made?  Following the judgment in  Shree  Hanuman  Cotton  Mills  (supra),
this Court held that the allottee having accepted the allotment  and  having
made some payment on installments basis, then made a  request  to  surrender
the land, has committed default on his part and,  therefore,  the  competent
authority would be fully justified in forfeiting  the  earnest  money  which
had been deposited and not the 10% of the amount deposited, as held  by  the
High Court.  In that case, this Court took the view that the  earnest  money
represented the guarantee that the contract would be fulfilled.


 16.  This Court, again, in Videocon  Properties  Ltd.  v.  Dr.  Bhalchandra
 Laboratories and others (2004) 3 SCC 711, dealt with  a  case  of  sale  of
 immovable property. It  was  a  case  where  the  plaintiff-appellants  had
 entered into an agreement with the respondents-defendants on  13.5.1994  to
 sell  the  landed  property  owned  by  the  respondents  and  a   sum   of
 Rs.38,00,000/- was paid by the appellants as deposit or  earnest  money  on
 the execution of the agreement.  In that  case,  this  Court  examined  the
 nature and character of the earnest money deposit and took  the  view  that
 the words used in the agreement alone would not  be  determinative  of  the
 character of the “earnest money” but really the intention  of  the  parties
 and surrounding circumstances.  The  Court  held  that  the  earnest  money
 serves two purposes  of  being  part-payment  of  the  purchase  money  and
 security for the performance of the contract by the  party  concerned.   In
 that case, on facts, after interpreting various clauses of  the  agreement,
 the Court held as follows:
           “15.  Coming to the facts of the  case,  it  is  seen  from  the
      agreement dated 13.5.1994 entered into between parties -  particularly
      Clause 1, which specifies  more  than  one  enumerated  categories  of
      payment to be made by the  purchaser  in  the  manner  and  at  stages
      indicated therein, as consideration for the ultimate sale to  be  made
      and completed. The further fact that the sum of Rs. 38 lakhs had to be
      paid on the date of execution of the agreement itself, with the  other
      remaining categories of sums being stipulated for payment at different
      and subsequent stages as well as execution of the  sale  deed  by  the
      Vendors taken together with the contents of the  stipulation  made  in
      Clause 2.3, providing for the return of it,  if  for  any  reason  the
      Vendors fail to fulfill their obligations  under  Clause  2,  strongly
      supports  and  strengthens  the  claim  of  the  appellants  that  the
      intention of the parties in the case on hand is in effect to treat the
      sum of Rs. 38 lakhs to be part of the prepaid purchase-money  and  not
      pure and simple earnest money deposit  of  the  restricted  sense  and
      tenor, wholly unrelated to the purchase price as such in  any  manner.
      The mention made in the agreement or description of the same otherwise
      as "deposit or  earnest  money"  and  not  merely  as  earnest  money,
      inevitably leads to the inescapable conclusion that the  same  has  to
      and was really meant to  serve  both  purposes  as  envisaged  in  the
      decision noticed supra. In  substance,  it  is,  therefore,  really  a
      deposit or payment of advance as well and  for  that  matter  actually
      part payment of purchase price, only. In the teeth of the further fact
      situation that the sale could not be completed  by  execution  of  the
      sale deed in this case only due to lapses and inabilities on the  part
      of the respondents - irrespective of bonafides or  otherwise  involved
      in such delay and lapses,  the  amount  of  rupees  33  lakhs  becomes
      refundable by the Vendors to the purchasers as of the prepaid purchase
      price deposited with the Vendors. Consequently, the sum of  rupees  38
      lakhs to  be  refunded  would  attract  the  first  limb  or  part  of
      Section 55(6)(b) of the Transfer of Property Act itself and  therefore
      necessarily, as held by the learned Single Judge, the defendants prima
      facie became liable to refund the same with interest due  thereon,  in
      terms of Clause 2.3 of the agreement Therefore, the  statutory  charge
      envisaged therein would get attracted to and encompass  the  whole  of
      the sum of rupees 38 lakhs and the interest due thereon…….”

In the above mentioned case, the Court also held as follows:
      “14.  …………Further, it is not the description  by  words  used  in  the
      agreement only that would be determinative of the character of the sum
      but really the intention of parties and surrounding  circumstances  as
      well, that have to be baked into and what may be called an advance may
      really be a deposit or earnest money and what is termed as 'a  deposit
      or earnest money' may ultimately turn out to be really an  advance  or
      part of purchase price. Earnest money or deposit  also,  thus,  serves
      two purposes of being part payment of the purchase money and  security
      for the performances of the contract by the party concerned, who  paid
      it.”




17.   Law is, therefore, clear that to justify  the  forfeiture  of  advance
money being part of ‘earnest money’ the terms  of  the  contract  should  be
clear and explicit.  Earnest money is paid or given at  the  time  when  the
contract is entered into and, as a pledge for its  due  performance  by  the
depositor to be forfeited in case  of  non-performance,  by  the  depositor.
There can be converse situation also that if the  seller  fails  to  perform
the contract the purchaser can also get the double the amount, if it  is  so
stipulated.  It is also the law that part payment of purchase  price  cannot
be forfeited unless it is  a  guarantee  for  the  due  performance  of  the
contract.  In other words, if the payment is made only towards part  payment
of consideration and not intended  as  earnest  money  then  the  forfeiture
clause will not apply.


18.   When we examine the clauses in the instant case,  it  is  amply  clear
that the clause extracted herein above was included in the  contract  at  the
moment at which the contract was entered into.  It represents the  guarantee
that the contract would be fulfilled.  In other words,  ‘earnest’  is  given
to bind the contract, which is  a  part  of  the  purchase  price  when  the
transaction is carried out and it will be  forfeited  when  the  transaction
falls through by reason of the default or failure of the  purchaser.   There
is no other clause militates against the clauses extracted in the  agreement
dated 29.11.2011.


19.   We are, therefore, of the  view  that  the  seller  was  justified  in
forfeiting the amount of Rs.7,00,000/- as per  the  relevant  clause,  since
the earnest money was primarily a security for the due  performance  of  the
agreement and, consequently, the seller is entitled to  forfeit  the  entire
deposit.  The High Court has, therefore, committed  an  error  in  reversing
the judgment of the trial court.


20.   Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment  of  the
High Court is set aside.  However, there will be no order as to costs.



                                            ……………………………………….…J
                                            (K. S. RADHAKRISHNAN)





                                            ………………………………………..J.
                                            (DIPAK MISRA)
New Delhi,
October 18, 2012


The claim petition OA No. (1) 2 of 2010 was preferred by the 3rd respondent against the Southern and Eastern Central Railways before the Railway Claims Tribunal, Chennai Bench claiming an amount of Rs.9,46,85,726/- together with the interest @ 12% per annum from the date of filing of the petition till the date of payment and also for other consequential reliefs. 4. In the claim petition, the appellant herein filed I.A. 3/2011 for intervention claiming to be an interested party stating that its presence is necessary for a proper adjudication of the claim. I.A.4/2011 was also preferred by the 2nd respondent herein Central Railway to implead three other parties, namely Subham Sugar Agencies, Umesh Chaudhary, Ex. Goods Supervisor, Tatuha and Ambika Sugars Ltd., contending that the Railway Claims Tribunal (for short ‘Tribunal’) has no jurisdiction to proceed with the case since it involved contractual disputes, criminal conspiracy, cheating and that a complaint filed by the above mentioned parties are pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Muzaffarpur, Bihar. 5. The Tribunal heard both the applications, i.e. I.A.3/2011 and I.A.4/2011 and a common order was passed on 15.4.2011, stating that inter se disputes between private parties cannot be decided by the Tribunal in a claim petition. It also took the view that the Railway Administration through those parties is trying to linger on with the proceedings and, under no circumstance, the application for impleading the other three parties can be entertained. Both I.A.3/2011 and I.A.4/2011 were accordingly dismissed. On going through the Railways Act, 1989, the Tribunal Act as well as the 1990 Rules and the statutory forms, we are of the considered view that what the Tribunal has to inquire into and determine is the claim against the Railway Administration, that is whether the Railway Administration is at fault in discharging its responsibilities under the Railways Act, Rules and Regulations and not the inter se disputes between the claimants and third parties. In view of the above facts and circumstances of the case, we find no error in the view taken by the Tribunal, which was affirmed by the High Court. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed. We, however, make it clear that we are not expressing our opinion on the merits of the case and the same has to be adjudicated by the Tribunal in accordance with law.


                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7589 OF 2012
               [Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 33740 of 2011]

Shree Shyam Agency                                       .. Appellant
                                   Versus
Union of India & Others                                  .. Respondents

                               J U D G M E N T

K. S. Radhakrishnan, J.

1.    Leave granted.

2.    We are, in this  appeal,  concerned  with  the  question  whether  the
appellant is legally entitled to be intervened in a claim petition filed  by
the 3rd respondent herein under Section 16 of the  Railway  Claims  Tribunal
Act, 1987 (for short ‘Tribunal Act’).

3.    The claim petition OA No. (1) 2 of  2010  was  preferred  by  the  3rd
respondent against the Southern and  Eastern  Central  Railways  before  the
Railway   Claims   Tribunal,   Chennai   Bench   claiming   an   amount   of
Rs.9,46,85,726/- together with the interest @ 12% per annum  from  the  date
of filing of the petition till the  date  of  payment  and  also  for  other
consequential reliefs.

4.    In the claim petition, the appellant  herein  filed  I.A.  3/2011  for
intervention claiming to be an interested party stating  that  its  presence
is necessary for a proper adjudication of the claim.   I.A.4/2011  was  also
preferred by the 2nd respondent herein  Central  Railway  to  implead  three
other parties, namely Subham Sugar  Agencies,  Umesh  Chaudhary,  Ex.  Goods
Supervisor, Tatuha and Ambika  Sugars  Ltd.,  contending  that  the  Railway
Claims Tribunal (for short ‘Tribunal’) has no jurisdiction to  proceed  with
the case  since  it  involved  contractual  disputes,  criminal  conspiracy,
cheating and that a complaint filed  by  the  above  mentioned  parties  are
pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Muzaffarpur, Bihar.

5.     The  Tribunal  heard  both  the  applications,  i.e.  I.A.3/2011  and
I.A.4/2011 and a common order was passed on 15.4.2011,  stating  that  inter
se disputes between private parties cannot be decided by the Tribunal  in  a
claim petition.  It also took  the  view  that  the  Railway  Administration
through those parties is trying to  linger  on  with  the  proceedings  and,
under no circumstance,  the  application  for  impleading  the  other  three
parties  can  be  entertained.   Both   I.A.3/2011   and   I.A.4/2011   were
accordingly dismissed.


6.    Aggrieved by the order passed by the Tribunal, C.R.P.  (PD)  No.  1713
of 2011 was preferred by the appellant herein, CRP (PD)  No.  2152  of  2011
and CRP (PD) No. 2153 of 2011  by  Southern  Railway  and  Central  Railway,
before the High  Court  of  Judicature  at  Madras.   All  the  three  civil
revision petitions were heard and a common  order  was  passed  on  9.9.2011
dismissing all the revision petitions and confirming  the  order  passed  by
the Tribunal, against which the appellant in C.R.P. (PD) No.  1713  of  2011
has  come  up  before  this  Court  with  the  present   appeal.     Railway
Administration, however, accepted the order passed  by  the  Tribunal  which
has been affirmed by the High Court by the impugned judgment.

7.    For disposal of this appeal, reference to few facts is necessary.
Claimant, the third respondent herein a company having its  head  office  at
Chennai, is engaged in the business of manufacturer of white  crystal  sugar
having its factories at Thirumanthankudi village, Papiasam Taluk,  Thanjavur
District and A. Chittur Village, Virudhachalam  Taluk,  Cuddalore  District.
They used to sell free sugar in Northern Indian markets consisting  of  West
Bengal, Bihar, etc. by transporting the consignments in  racks  through  the
services provided by the Railways.  Railway receipts are  made  out  showing
the consignee as “Self” which are thereafter endorsed by  the  consignor  to
the buyer on payment of the sale price.  The endorsed consignee/buyer  takes
delivery of goods  of  the  respective  destinations  by  surrender  of  the
Railway Receipts.  Claimant states that a  dealer,  by  name  Shubham  Sugar
Agencies, Kolkata, placed an order with the claimant for purchase  of  27000
quintal of free sale sugar with  payment  conditions  stipulating  that  the
endorsed railway receipts would  be  released  on  receipt  of  entire  sale
consideration.  Claimant stated that it has booked consignment  on  1.2.2010
for transportation from Kumbakonam to Fatuha, Bihar  and  that  the  railway
receipts were drawn as “Self” and were in the custody of  the  claimant  and
that the purchaser was expected to remit the sale price and get the  railway
receipts endorsed in its favour.   The  goods  reached  the  destination  on
10.2.1010.  The buyer failed to pay the sale price and the goods, as  stated
by the appellant,  were  kept  at  the  railway  godown  incurring  wharfage
charges.     Further, it was stated that the claimant then sent a letter  to
the Senior DGM/Southern Railway/Trichy on 23.4.2010 and  informed  that  the
railway receipts were in the custody of the claimant  and  requested  either
to  shift  the  consignment  to  other  destination  or  bring  it  back  to
Kumbakonam.   The  claimant  was,  however,  informed  on  4.5.2010  by  the
Railways that the consignment was delivered at Fatuha on  10.2.2010  on  the
strength of Indemnity Note without disclosing the  person  to  whom  it  was
delivered.  Claimant maintained the stand that since the  consignments  were
booked under “Self” basis,  the  delivery  to  a  third  party  was  without
authority and amounted to negligence, misconduct  and  misappropriation  and
hence, the Railway Administration is  legally  liable  to  pay  compensation
being the value of the goods for non-delivery.

8.    Appellant, however, maintained the stand that it was the purchaser  of
sugar from the claimant through broker Shubham Sugar Agencies,  Kolkata  and
that the entire payment was  made  by  it  on  instruction  through  various
instruments like cheques/RTGS etc. which was accepted  and  acknowledged  by
the  claimant.    Further,  it  was  also  pleaded  that  the  claimant  has
suppressed the full facts.   It  was  stated  that  the  appellant  had  not
obtained the delivery  of  sugar  without  payment  and  out  of  the  total
consideration of Rs.7,87,52,850/-, it  had  already  paid  Rs.7,30,22,052.40
and the balance of a sum of Rs.57,30,797.60 was offered,  but  the  claimant
did not accept.

9.    We are, in this appeal, primarily concerned with the question  whether
the appellant has got the  right  to  get  itself  impleaded  in  the  Claim
Petition No. OA(1) No.2 of 2010 pending before the Tribunal and whether  the
findings recorded by the Tribunal as well as  the  High  Court  are  legally
sustainable or not.    Since  the  claim  petition  is  pending  before  the
Tribunal, we are not expressing any opinion on the merits of the case.   But
the question whether the Railway Administration and  the  appellant  therein
are proper and necessary parties to the claim petition, has to be decided.

10.   The Tribunal has  been  established  under  the  Tribunal  Act,  1987.
Reference to its preamble would indicate  the  purpose  and  object  of  its
creation. The Preamble of the Tribunal Act, 1987 reads as follows:
           “An Act  to  provide  for  establishment  of  a  Railway  Claims
      Tribunal for inquiring into and determining claims against  a  railway
      administration for loss, destruction, damage,  deterioration  or  non-
      delivery of animals or goods entrusted to it to be carried by  railway
      or for the refund of fares or freight or for compensation for death or
      injury to passengers occurring as a result  of  railway  accidents  or
      untoward incidents and for matters connected therewith  or  incidental
      thereto.”

It is evident from the preamble that the Tribunal has been  established  for
inquiring  into   and   determining   the   claims   against   the   Railway
Administration for loss, destruction, damage, deterioration or  non-delivery
of animals or the goods entrusted to it to be carried  by  railway  and  not
for adjudication of any claim or dispute against a third party.

11.   Chapter III of the Tribunal Act deals with  the  jurisdiction,  powers
and authority of the Claims Tribunal.   Section  13  of  the  Tribunal  Acts
reads as follows:
| |                                                                      |
| |                                                                      |
| |“13. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of Claims Tribunal.-(1) The   |
| |Claims Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, all    |
| |such jurisdiction, powers and authority as were exercisable           |
| |immediately before that day by any civil court or a Claims            |
| |Commissioner appointed under the provisions of the Railways Act,-     |
| |relating to the responsibility of the railway administrations as      |
| |carriers under Chapter VII of the Railways Act in respect of claims   |
| |for-                                                                  |
| |                                                                      |
| |compensation for loss, destruction, damage, deterioration or          |
| |non-delivery of animals or goods entrusted to a railway administration|
| |for carriage by railway;                                              |
| |                                                                      |
| |compensation payable under section 82A of the Railways Act or the     |
| |rules made thereunder; and                                            |
| |                                                                      |
| |(b)   in respect of the claims for refund of fares or part thereof or |
| |for refund of any freight paid in respect of animals or goods         |
| |entrusted to a railway administration to be carried by railway.       |
| |                                                                      |
| |(1A) The Claims Tribunal shall also exercise, on and from the date of |
| |commencement of the provisions of section 124A of the Railways Act,   |
| |1989 (24 of 1989), all such jurisdiction, powers and authority as were|
| |exercisable immediately before that date by any civil court in respect|
| |of claims for compensation now payable by the railway administration  |
| |under section 124A of the said Act or the rules made thereunder.      |
| |                                                                      |
| |(2)  The provisions of the Railways Act 1989 (24 of 1989) and the     |
| |rules made thereunder shall, so far as may be, be applicable to the   |
| |inquiring into or determining, any claims by the Claims Tribunal under|
| |this Act.”                                                            |
| |                                                                      |


Section 16 of  the  Tribunal  Act  deals  with  the  application  to  Claims
Tribunal and reads as follows:
           “16. Application to Claims Tribunal.- (1) A person  seeking  any
      relief in respect of the matters referred to in  sub-sections  (1)  or
      sub-section (1A) of section 13 may make an application to  the  Claims
      Tribunal.


      (2) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be in such form  and
      be accompanied by such documents or other evidence and by such fee  in
      respect of the filing of such application and by such other  fees  for
      the service or execution of processes as may be prescribed :


          Provided that no such fee  shall  be  payable  in  respect  of  an
      application under sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section (1) or,
      as the case may be, sub-section (1A) of section 13.”

Section 18 of the Tribunal Act  deals  with  the  procedure  and  powers  of
Claims Tribunal and the same reads as follows:
           “18. Procedure and powers of Claims Tribunal.-  (1)  The  Claims
      Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code  of
      Civil Procedure, 1908  (5  of  1908),  but  shall  be  guided  by  the
      principles of nature justice and, subject to the other  provisions  of
      this Act and of any rules, the Claims Tribunal shall  have  powers  to
      regulate its own procedure including the fixing of places and times of
      its enquiry.


      (2)  The  Claims  Tribunal   shall   decide   every   application   as
      expeditiously as possible and ordinarily every  application  shall  be
      decided  on  a  perusal  of  documents,  written  representations  and
      affidavits and after hearing such oral arguments as may be advanced.


      (3) The Claims Tribunal shall have, for the  purposes  of  discharging
      its functions under this Act, the same power as are vested in a  Civil
      Court under the Code of Civil  Procedure,  1908  (5  of  1908),  while
      trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely :


              a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of  any  person  and
                 examining him on oath;
              b) requiring the discovery and production of documents;
              c) receiving evidence on affidavits;
              d) subject to the provisions of sections 123 and  124  of  the
                 Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872),  requisitioning  any
                 public record  or  document  or  copy  of  such  record  or
                 document from any office;
              e) issuing commissions for the  examination  of  witnesses  or
                 documents;
              f) reviewing its decisions;
              g) dismissing an application for default  or  deciding  it  ex
                 parte;
              h) setting aside any order of dismissal of any application for
                 default or any order passed by it ex parte;
              i) any other mater which may be prescribed.”

      Rule 44 of the Railway Claims Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1989 confers
inherent powers on the Tribunal to meet the ends of justice.  On a  conjoint
reading of the above mentioned provisions, it is  clear  that  the  Tribunal
has been constituted to adjudicate the claim made against the  Railways  and
not against a third party.  The claim petition, it is seen, is based on  the
contract of carriage entered into between the claimant and the railways.


12.   The question to be decided by the  Tribunal  is  whether  the  Railway
administration has caused any loss, destruction,  damage,  deterioration  or
non-delivery of animals or goods entrusted to it to be  carried  by  railway
or the refund of fares or freight or for compensation for  death  or  injury
to the passengers as a result of railway  accidents  or  untoward  incidents
etc.  Chapter III of  the  Act  deals  with  the  jurisdiction,  powers  and
authority of the Tribunal.

13.   Section 13(1)(a) of the Tribunal Act, as  already  indicated,  confers
exclusive jurisdiction on the Tribunal to  decide  the  responsibilities  of
the Railways as carriers under Chapter VII of  the  Railways  Act,  1989  in
respect to the above mentioned claims made against  the  railways.   Chapter
IX of the Railways Act, 1989 deals with carriage of goods.   Section  61  of
the  Railways  Act,  1989  says  that  every  railway  administration  shall
maintain the rate-books etc. for carriage of goods and  Section  62  imposes
conditions for receiving etc. of goods.  Section 65 is  also  important  for
the purpose of disposal of this case and hence extracted hereunder:

           “65. Railway receipt. (1) A railway administration shall,-


           (a) in a case where the goods are  to  he  loaded  by  a  person
               entrusting such goods, on the completion of such loading; or


           (b) in any other case, on the acceptance of  the  goods  by  it,
               issue a railway receipt in such form as may be specified  by
               the Central Government.


           (2) A railway receipt shall  be  prima  facie  evidence  of  the
      weight and the number of packages stated therein:


           Provided that in the case of  a  consignment  in  wagon-load  or
      train-load and the weight or the number of packages is not checked  by
      a railway servant authorized in this behalf, and a statement  to  that
      effect is recorded in such railway  receipt  by  him,  the  burden  of
      proving the weight or, as the case may  be,  the  number  of  packages
      stated therein, shall lie on  the  consignor,  the  consignee  or  the
      endorsee.”

Section 74 of the Railways Act, 1989 deals with the passing of  property  in
the goods covered by railway receipt and the same reads as follows:
           “74.  Passing of  property  in  the  goods  covered  by  railway
      receipt.-  The property  in  the  consignment  covered  by  a  railway
      receipt shall pass to the consignee or the endorsee, as the  case  may
      be, on the delivery of such railway receipt to him and he  shall  have
      all the rights and liabilities of the consignor.”

Section 76 of the Railways Act, 1989 deals with the surrender of railway
receipt and reads as follows:
           “76. Surrender of railway receipt.-  The railway  administration
      shall deliver the consignment under a railway receipt on the surrender
      of such railway receipt:


           Provided that in case the railway receipt  is  not  forthcoming,
      the consignment may be  delivered  to  the  person,  entitled  in  the
      opinion of the railway administration to receive the  goods,  in  such
      manner as may be prescribed.”




Section 77 deals with the power of railway administration to  deliver  goods
or sale proceeds thereof in certain cases which reads as follows:


           “77. Power of railway administration to deliver  goods  or  sale
      proceeds  thereof  in  certain  cases.-Where  no  railway  receipt  is
      forthcoming  and  any  consignment  or  the  sale  proceeds   of   any
      consignment  are  claimed  by  two  or  more  persons,   the   railway
      administration may withhold  delivery  of  such  consignment  or  sale
      proceeds, as the case may be, and shall deliver  such  consignment  or
      sale proceeds in such manner as may be prescribed.”




Section 87 of the Railways Act,  1989  confers  rule  making  power  on  the
Central Government, the relevant portion of which reads as under:
           “87. Power to make rules in respect of matters in this Chapter.-
      (1) The Central Government may, by notification, make rules  to  carry
      out the purposes of this Chapter.


           (2) In particular, and without prejudice to  the  generality  of
      the foregoing power, such rules may provide for  all  or  any  of  the
      following matters namely:-


           xxx         xxx        xxx
           xxx         xxx        xxx


           (e)   the manner in  which  the  consignment  may  be  delivered
                 without a railway receipt under section 76;
           (f)   the manner of delivery of consignment or the sale proceeds
                 to the person entitled thereto under section 77;


           xxx         xxx        xxx
           xxx         xxx        xxx”



14.   The Central Government in exercise of its powers conferred by  Clauses
(e) and (f) of Section 87(2) of the Railways Act, 1989 read with Section  22
of the General  Clauses  Act,  1897  has  framed  the  Railways  (Manner  of
Delivery of Consignments  and  Sale  Proceeds  in  the  Absence  of  Railway
Receipt), Rules, 1990 (for short “1990 Rules”).

15.   The appellant or the Railway  administration  has  no  case  that  M/s
Subham Sugar Agencies, Calcutta, the consignee  had  presented  the  railway
receipt for claiming the  goods.   On  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  the
specific stand of  the  railway  administration  that  the  consignment  was
delivered at Fatuha on 10.2.2010  to  a  third  party  on  the  strength  of
“Indemnity Note” and not on  production  of  the  “Railway  Receipt”.   1990
Rules,  as  already  indicated,  deals  with  the  manner  of  delivery   of
consignments and sale proceeds in the  absence  of  railway  receipt.   Sub-
rules (1) and (2) of Rule 3 of 1990 Rules is relevant for  our  purpose  and
the same is extracted hereunder:
           “3. Delivery of consignments when the  railway  receipt  is  not
      forthcoming:- (1) Where the railway receipt is  not  forthcoming,  the
      consignment may be delivered to the person, who in the opinion of  the
      railway administration is entitled to receive the goods and who  shall
      receive the same on the execution of any Indemnity Note  as  specified
      in Form I:


           Provided;  however,  that  if  the  consignee  is  a  Government
      official in his official  capacity,  such  delivery  may  be  made  on
      unstamped Indemnity Note).


           (2) Where  the  railway  receipt  is  not  forthcoming  and  the
      consignment is addressed by the sender to self, delivery shall not  be
      made unless Indemnity Note, duly executed in Forms  I-A  and  I-B  are
      produced by the persons claiming delivery of the consignment.”

Rule 5 of the 1990 Rules deals with delivery  of  perishable  articles  when
the railway receipt is not forthcoming and the same reads as follows:
           “(5) Delivery of perishable articles when the railway receipt is
      not forthcoming:- (1)  notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  these
      rules, where the consignment consists of perishable articles  and  the
      railway receipt is not forthcoming, such consignment may be  delivered
      to the person who, in the opinion of  the  railway  administration  is
      entitled to receive such consignments,  and  such  person  shall  take
      delivery subject to the following conditions, namely:-


              a) if the invoice copy of the railway receipt is available  at
                 the time of taking delivery and the booking is to be  named
                 consignee who is  claiming  delivery,  such  person  shall,
                 before taking delivery execute an Indemnity Note  specified
                 in Form I; or


              b) (i) if the invoice copy  of  the  railway  receipt  is  not
                 available at the time of taking delivery; or



                     ii)  if  such  invoice  copy  is  available  and   the
                         consignment is booked to “self”,


            Such person shall, deposit an amount equivalent to the  cost  of
            consignment by way of security  apart  from  freight  and  other
            charges before taking delivery of such consignment.


           (2)   If any amount has been deposited by way of security  under
      clause (b) of sub-rule (1), such  amount  shall  be  refunded  by  the
      railway administration on production of the original  railway  receipt
      within six months from the date of taking such delivery.


           (3) In the absence of original railway  receipt  refund  may  be
      granted on execution of an Indemnity Note in Form I or I-A and I-B, as
      the case may be, provided the invoice copy of the railway  receipt  is
      available and the particulars of consignment  can  be  connected  with
      reference to the invoice copy, within six  months  from  the  date  of
      taking delivery.”

16.   Form I under Rule 3(1) of the 1990 Rules  deals  with  the  “Indemnity
Note” that when the consignment is to be delivered to the ‘person’,  not  to
‘self’.  If it is to a ‘person’ then he has to  furnish  an  indemnity  note
signed by the ‘consignee’.  Sub-rule  (2)  of  Rule  3  specifically  states
that, when the railway receipt is not forthcoming  and  the  consignment  is
addressed to “Self”, delivery shall not be made unless Indemnity Note,  duly
executed in Forms I-A and I-B are produced by the persons claiming  delivery
of the consignment.  The relevant portion of Form I-A and I-B are  extracted
below for easy reference:




                                  “Form I-A


                               [See Rule 3(2)]
                           FORM OF INDEMNITY NOTE


      _______ RAILWAY


                               INDEMNITY NOTE


            ** I/We hereby  acknowledge  to  have  received  from  _________
      Railway ______ valued at Rs.___________ which  was  dispatched  by  **
      me/us and booked to self/as value payable, from the _______ Station of
      the ________ Railway on or about the ________ day of _____ the railway
      receipt for which has been ______________ and ** for myself, my heirs,
      executors and administrators / and  for  our  Company  /  Firm,  their
      assigns, and successors.


              **  I/We  undertake  in  consideration  of  such  delivery  as
      aforesaid to hold.
           *  President of India, his agents and servants the  ____________
      railway  administration,  its  agents  and   servants   harmless   and
      indemnified in respect of all claims to the said goods.
           **  I/We  also  undertake  to  pay  on  demand  to  the  railway
      administration freight charges, undercharges, wharfage and  any  other
      charges that  may  be  subsequently  found  due  in  respect  of  this
      transaction.
           And ** I/We the undersigned,  signing  below  the  consignor  of
      these goods certify that the first signor is the bona  fide  owner  of
      the goods; and that ** I/We undertaken the whole of the said liability
      equally with the consignor, and for this  purpose  **  I/We  affix  **
      my/our signature hereto.

      Signature of Witness _______   Signature of Consignor______
      Father’s name ____________   **Father’s name __________
      Age ____________________   Age _____________________
      Profession _______________   Profession ________________
      Residence _______________   Residence ________________


                                             _______________________________
                                        Designation and Seal of the Co./Form


                                               _____________________________
                                        Registered Office/Place of business”






Signature of witness___________   Signature of Surety__________
Father’s name________________     **Father’s name____________
Age________________________  Age______________________
Profession___________________     Profession_________________”


                                  “Form I-B


                               [See Rule 3(2)]
                           FORM OF INDEMNITY NOTE


      _______ RAILWAY


                               INDEMNITY NOTE


            ** I/We hereby  acknowledge  to  have  received  from  _________
      Railway ______  valued  at  Rs.___________  which  was  dispatched  by
      ________ from _____ Station of the ________ Railway on  or  about  the
      ________ day of _____   and  booked  to  self/as  value  payable,  the
      railway receipt for which has been ______________ and **  for  myself,
      my heirs, executors and administrators / and for our Company  /  Firm,
      their assigns, and successors.


              **  I/We  undertake  in  consideration  of  such  delivery  as
      aforesaid to hold.
           *  President of India, his agents and servants the  ____________
      Railway  Administration,  its  agents  and   servants   harmless   and
      indemnified in respect of all claims to the said goods.
           **  I/We  also  undertake  to  pay  on  demand  to  the  railway
      Administration freight charges, wharfage and any  other  charges  that
      may be subsequently found due in respect of this transaction.
           ** I enclose a copy of a stamp Indemnity Note  executed  by  the
      consignor and countersigned by the Station Master  of  the  Forwarding
      Station which has been duly endorsed by the  Consignor  in  my  favour
      authorizing me to take delivery of the consignments on his behalf.
           And ** I/We the undersigned, signing below the person authorized
      by the consignor to take delivery of the goods.  I hereby certify that
      the first signor is the bona fide owner  of  the  goods  and  **  I/We
      undertake the whole of the said liability equally with the signor, and
      for this purpose **I/We affix ** my/our signature hereby.

      Signature of Witness _______   Signature of Consignor______
      Father’s name ____________   Father’s name __________
      Age ____________________   Age _____________________
      Profession _______________   Profession ________________
      Residence _______________   Residence ________________






                                             _______________________________
                                        Designation and Seal of the Co./Form


                                               _____________________________
                                        Registered Office/Place of business”






Signature of witness___________   Signature of Surety__________
Father’s name________________     **Father’s name____________
Age________________________  Age______________________
Profession___________________     Profession_________________”



17.   In Form 1-A, Indemnity Note, the  consignor  has  to  sign  certifying
that his is the bona fide owner of goods.  Form 1-B, Indemnity Note, has  to
be signed by the consignor authorizing the person  to  take  delivery.   The
copy of a stamped Indemnity Note has to be executed  by  the  consignor  and
counter signed by the Station Master of the forwarding  station.   In  other
words, all the formalities prescribed under Form 1-A and Form  1-B  have  to
be complied with, when the  Railway  Receipt  is  not  forthcoming  and  the
consignment is addressed by the sender to Self.  The Railways cannot  effect
delivery unless those formalities have been complied with.

18.   On going through the Railways Act, 1989, the Tribunal Act as  well  as
the 1990 Rules and the statutory forms, we are of the considered  view  that
what the Tribunal has to inquire into and determine  is  the  claim  against
the Railway Administration, that is whether the  Railway  Administration  is
at fault in discharging its responsibilities under the Railways  Act,  Rules
and Regulations and not the inter se  disputes  between  the  claimants  and
third parties.

19.   In view of the above facts and circumstances of the case, we  find  no
error in the view taken by the Tribunal, which  was  affirmed  by  the  High
Court.  Consequently, the appeal is dismissed.  We, however, make  it  clear
that we are not expressing our opinion on the merits of  the  case  and  the
same has to be adjudicated by the Tribunal in accordance with law.




                                            ……………………………………….…J
                                            (K. S. RADHAKRISHNAN)







                                            ………………………………………..J.
                                            (DIPAK MISRA)
New Delhi,
October 18, 2012