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Thursday, August 30, 2012

Income Tax Act, 1961: Sections 2(47), 45, 155 - Compensation towards land acquisition - Enhanced compensation and interest thereon awarded by the Reference Court - Disputed in appeal - Included in assessment by the Assessing Officer - CIT (Appeals) holding that it did not accrue to the assessee since the entire amount was in dispute in first appeal - Tribunal upheld the order of CIT (Appeals) - High Court held that when the State is in appeal against the enhanced compensation and interest thereon the receipt of additional compensation and interest thereon was not taxable - On appeal, Held: The year in which enhanced compensation is received is the year of taxability - Even in cases where appeal is pending, and the assessee is permitted to withdraw the amount against security or otherwise, the receipt of such amounts is liable to be taxed under Section 45(5) - Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Sections 23(1), 23(1A), 23(2), 28, 34. Assessee filed its return of income for the assessment year 1999-2000 in which he did not offer the amount of enhanced compensation and the interest received thereon from Haryana Urban Development Authority (HUDA) towards acquisition of assessee's lands during the previous year relevant to the assessment year, on the plea that the amount of enhanced compensation received had not accrued to the assessee during the year of receipt as the entire amount was in dispute in appeal before the High Court which appeal stood filed by the State against the order of the Reference Court granting enhanced compensation. The amount was received by the assessee in terms of the interim order of the High Court against the assessee's furnishing security to the satisfaction of the executing court. According to the assessee, the interest received on enhanced compensation during the previous year was also not chargeable to tax on the same plea. The A.O. did not accept the contentions of the assessee on the ground that in terms of Section 45(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 enacted w.e.f. 1.4.88, the amount by which compensation or consideration stood enhanced or further enhanced by the Court, is deemed income chargeable under the head "Capital Gains" of the previous year in which the said amount came to be received. On appeal, CIT (A) came to the conclusion that since the enhanced compensation received was in dispute in the pending First Appeal, both the enhanced compensation as well as the interest thereon had not accrued to the assessee during the year of receipt as the entire amount was in dispute in First Appeal and that the assessee had received the said amount only against security furnished to the satisfaction of the executing court. Aggrieved by the decision of the CIT(A), the Department moved Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) which its order upheld the order of the CIT(A) and dismissed the appeal of the Department. Aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal the matter was carried in appeal to the High Court under Section 260A of the 1961 Act. The High Court held that the case is squarely covered by the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan Housing. According to the High Court, when the State is in appeal against the order of enhanced compensation and interest thereon the receipt of additional compensation and interest thereon was not taxable as income as the said two items were disputed by the Government in appeal. Hence the appeal by the Department. Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1. Under Section 45(1) of the Incomes tax Act, 1961, profits or gains arising from the transfer of a capital asset effected in the previous year is taken to be the income of the previous year in which the transfer took place and such profits are chargeable to tax under the head "Capital Gains". However, it was noticed that in cases where capital gains accrued or arose by way of compulsory acquisition, the additional compensation stood awarded in several stages by different appellate authorities which necessitated rectification of the original assessment at each stage. To provide for rectification of the assessment of the year in which capital gains was originally assessed, Section 155(7A) was also introduced. Since additional compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was awarded in several stages multiple rectifications had to be made to the original assessment which cause great difficulty in carrying out the required rectification and in effecting the recovery of additional demand. It was also noticed that repeated rectifications of assessment on account of enhancement of compensation by different courts often resulted in mistakes in computation of tax. Therefore, with a view to remove these difficulties, the Finance Act 1987 inserted Section 45(5) to provide for taxation of additional compensation in the year of receipt instead of in the year of transfer of the capital asset. Accordingly, additional compensation is treated as "deemed income" in the hands of the recipient even if the actual recipient happens to be a person different from the original transferor by reason of death, etc. For this purpose, the cost of acquisition in the hands of the receiver of the additional compensation is deemed to be nil. However, the compensation awarded in the first instance would continue to be chargeable as income under the head "Capital Gains", in the previous year in which transfer took place. At this stage, it may be noted, that, Section 45(1) stood further amended (w.e.f. 1.4.91) so as to include reference to Section 54H and Section 45(5)(a) which stood amended w.e.f. 1.4.88. [Para 16] [1041-C-H; 1042-A-B] 2. The important point to be noted is that in the case of compulsory acquisition of an asset, the capital gains in the compensation, as originally awarded, is charged to tax in the year in which the transfer by way of compulsory acquisition takes place, but additional compensation is brought to tax only in the year in which it is received. [Para 17] [1043-E] 3.1. Interest is different from compensation. However, interest paid on the excess amount under Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 Act depends upon a claim by the person whose land is acquired whereas interest under Section 34 is for delay in making payment. Interest under Section 28 is part of the amount of compensation whereas interest under Section 34 is only for delay in making payment after the compensation amount is determined. Interest under Section 28 is a part of enhanced value of the land which is not the case in the matter of payment of interest under Section 34. [Para 24] [1048-H; 1049-A-B] 3.2. Solatium means an integral part of compensation, interest would be payable on it. Section 34 postulates award of interest at 9% per annum from the date of taking possession only until it is paid or deposited. It is a mandatory provision. Basically Section 34 provides for payment of interest for delayed payment. [Para 25] [1049-E-F] Assistant Commissioner, Gadag Sub-Division, Gadag v. Mathapathi Basavannewwa and others AIR 1995 SC 2492; State of Tamil Nadu and others etc. v. L. Krishnan and others etc. AIR 1996 SC 497; Ram Chand & others etc v. Union of India & Ors. 1994(1) SCC 44; Shree Vijay Cotton & Oil Mills Ltd. v. State of Gujarat (1991) 1 SCC 262 and Sunder v. Union of India (2001) 7 SCC 211, relied on. 4. The judgment of this Court in Hindustan Housing was delivered on 29.7.86. It was prior to 1.4.88 when Section 45(5) stood incorporated by Finance Act 1987 w.e.f. 1.4.88. Further, the judgment of this Court in Hindustan Housing has been given in respect of assessment year 1956-57 under the Income-tax Act, 1922 whereas, the present case relates to the 1961 Act which defines the word "transfer" in much wider sense under Section 2(47). With the insertion of Section 45(5) in the 1961 Act w.e.f.1.4.88 a totally new scheme stood introduced keeping in mind cases of compulsory acquisition under the 1894 Act under which compensation is payable at multiple stages and amounts stand withdrawn by the assessee- claimants and used by the assessee(s) for several years, during which litigation is pending. It is in the context of Section 45(5) that the year of taxability has to be decided. It is significant to note that Section 12B of 1922 Act did not contain specific reference to compulsory acquisition as contained in Section 2(47) of the 1961 Act. [Para 28] [1050-H; 1051-A-D] Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal-II v. Hindustan Housing and Land Development Trust Ltd. (1986) 161 ITR 524 (SC), held inapplicable. 5. Section 23(1A) provides for additional amount. It takes care of increase in the value at the rate of 12 % per annum. Similarly, under Section 23(2) of the 1894 Act there is a provision for solatium which also represents part of enhanced compensation. Similarly, Section 28 empowers the court in its discretion to award interest on the excess amount of compensation over and above what is awarded by the Collector. It includes additional amount under Section 23(1A) and solatium under Section 23(2) of the said Act. Section 28 applies only in respect of the excess amount determined by the court after reference under Section 18. It depends upon the claim, unlike interest under Section 34 which depends on undue delay in making the award. It is true that "interest" is not compensation. It is equally true that Section 45(5) of the 1961 Act refers to compensation. Interest under Section 28 unlike interest under Section 34 is an accretion to the value, hence it is a part of enhanced compensation or consideration which is not the case with interest under Section 34 of the 1894 Act. So also additional amount under Section 23(1A) and solatium under Section 23(2) of the 1961 Act forms part of enhanced compensation under Section 45(5)(b) of the 1961 Act. [Para 33] [1053-A-F] 6. The assessed capital gain of that year shall be recomputed by taking the compensation or consideration as so reduced by such court, Tribunal or other authority to be the full value of the consideration. For giving effect to such recomputation, the provisions of the newly inserted (w.e.f. 1.4.2004) section 155(16) by the Finance Act, 2003 (32 of 2003) have been enacted. [Para 34] [1054-B-C] 7. The scheme of Section 45(5) of the 1961 Act was inserted w.e.f. 1.4.88 as an overriding provision. Compensation under the L.A. Act, 1894, arises and is payable in multiple stages which does not happen in cases of transfers by sale etc. Hence, the legislature had to step in and say that as and when the assessee-claimant is in receipt of enhanced compensation it shall be treated as "deemed income" and taxed on receipt basis. This is supported by insertion of clause (c) in Section 45(5) w.e.f. 1.4.04 and Section 155(16) which refers to a situation of a subsequent reduction by the Court, Tribunal or other authority and recomputation/amendment of the assessment order. Section 45(5) read as a whole (including clause "c") not only deals with re-working but also with the change in the full value of the consideration (computation) and since the enhanced compensation/consideration (including interest under Section 28 of the 1894 Act) becomes payable/paid under 1894 Act at different stages, the receipt of such enhanced compensation/consideration is to be taxed in the year of receipt subject to adjustment, if any, under Section 155(16) of the 1961 Act, later on. Hence, the year in which enhanced compensation is received is the year of taxability. Consequently, even in cases where pending appeal, the Court/Tribunal/Authority before which appeal is pending, permits the claimant to withdraw against security or otherwise the enhanced compensation (which is in dispute), the same is liable to be taxed under Section 45(5) of the 1961 Act. This is the scheme of Section 45(5) and Section 155(16) of the 1961 Act. It is clarified that even before the insertion of Section 45(5)(c) and Section 155(16) w.e.f. 1.4.04, the receipt of enhanced compensation under Section 45(5)(b) was taxable in the year of receipt which is only reinforced by insertion of clause (c) because the right to receive payment under the 1894 Act is not in doubt. It is important to note that compensation, including enhanced compensation/consideration under the 1894 Act, is based on the full value of property as on date of notification under Section 4 of that Act. When the Court/Tribunal directs payment of enhanced compensation under Section 23(1A), or Section 23(2) or under Section 28 of the 1894 Act it is on the basis that award of Collector or the Court, under reference, has not compensated the owner for the full value of the property as on date of notification. [Para 35] [1054-D-H; 1055-A-E] 8. In this batch of cases which relate back to assessment years 1991-92 and 1992-93, possibly the proceedings under the L.A. Act 1894 would have ended. In number of cases it is found that proceedings under the 1894 Act have been concluded and taxes have been paid. Therefore, by this judgment the law has been settled but it is directed that since matters are decade old and since this Court is not aware of what has happened in Land Acquisition Act proceedings in pending appeals, the recomputation on the basis of this judgment, particularly in the context of type of interest under Section 28 vis-vis interest under Section 34, additional compensation under Section 23(1A) and solatium under Section 23(2) of the 1894 Act, would be extremely difficult after all these years, will not be done. [Para 36] [1055-E-H] Case Law Reference : (1986) 161 ITR 524 (SC) held inapplicable Para 6 AIR 1995 SC 2492 relied on Para 22 AIR 1996 SC 497 relied on Para 22 1994(1) SCC 44 relied on Para 23 (1991) 1 SCC 262 relied on Para 23 (2001) 7 SCC 211 relied on Para 25 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4401 of 2009. From the Judgment & Order dated 16.05.2007 of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in ITA No. 222 of 2005. WITH C.A. Nos. 4402, 4403, 4404, 4405, 4406, 4407, 4408, 4409, 4410, 4411, 4412, 4413, 4414, 4415, 4416, 4417, 4418, 4419, 4420, 4422, 4423, 4424, 4425, 4426 of 2009. K. Radhakrishnan, H. Raghavendra Rao, Arijit Prasad, T.A. Khan, Rahul Kaushik, Amey Nargolkar, kunal Bahri, Gaurav Agrawal, M. Khairati and B.V. Balaram Das for the Appellants. S. Ganesh, Amar Dave, Ruby Singh Ahuja, Simran Brar, Abeer Kumar, Pragya Ohri, Karanjawala, Himanshu Upadhyaya, R.C. Kaushik, Kavin Gulati, Rashmi Singh and Avnish Pandey for the Respondents.


                                                            REPORTABLE


                IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4401 OF 2009
              (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.17640 of 2008)
Commissioner of Income-tax, Faridabad                 ... Appellant (s)

                                 Versus

Ghanshyam (HUF)                                       ... Respondent(s)

                                 WITH

Civil Appeal No. 4402 of 2009 - Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.17644 of
2008
Civil Appeal No. 4403 of 2009 - Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.17643 of
2008
Civil Appeal No. 4404 of 2009 - Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.17645 of
2008
Civil Appeal No. 4405 of 2009 - Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.17642 of
2008
Civil Appeal No. 4406 of 2009 - Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.17641 of
2008
Civil Appeal No. 4407 of 2009 - Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.17647 of
2008
Civil Appeal No. 4408 of 2009 - Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.17646 of
2008
Civil Appeal No. 4409 of 2009 - Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.8350 of 2009


Civil Appeal No. 4410 of 2009 - Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.8451 of 2008
Civil Appeal No. 4411 of 2009 - Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.4832 of 2008
Civil Appeal No. 4412 of 2009 - Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.4833 of 2008
Civil Appeal No. 4413 of 2009 - Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.4834 of 2008
Civil Appeal No. 4414 of 2009 - Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.4835 of 2008
Civil Appeal No. 4415 of 2009 - Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.20657 of
2008
Civil Appeal No. 4416 of 2009 - Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.20658 of
2008
Civil Appeal No. 4417 of 2009 - Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.20659 of
2008
                                                                      2


Civil Appeal No. 4418 of 2009 - Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.7599 of
2009


Civil Appeal No. 4419 of 2009 - Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.3054 of 2008
Civil Appeal No. 4420 of 2009 - Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.3717 of 2009
Civil Appeal No. 4422 of 2009 - Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.4174 of 2009
Civil Appeal No. 4423 of 2009 - Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.31566 of
2008
Civil Appeal No. 4424 of 2009 - Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.713 of 2009
Civil Appeal No. 4425 of 2009 - Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.5300 of 2009
Civil Appeal No. 4426 of 2009 - Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.6378 of 2009

                          JUDGMENT


S. H. KAPADIA, J.

1.    Delay condoned.

2.    Leave granted.


3.    The controversy in the present batch of civil appeals pertains

to the interpretation of Section 45(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961,

as it stood prior to 1.4.2004.


FACTS IN THE LEAD MATTER

Civil Appeal No.      of 2009 - Arising out of S.L.P. (C)
No.17640 of 2008 - Commissioner of Income Tax, Faridabad
v. Ghanshyam (HUF).


4.    Assessee received enhanced compensation on its lands being

acquired by Haryana Urban Development Authority (HUDA) as also
                                                                 3


interest thereon during the previous year relevant to assessment

year 1999-2000.


5.   Assessee filed its return on income for the assessment year

1999-2000 in which he did not offer the amount of enhanced

compensation and the interest received thereon during the previous

year relevant to the assessment year for taxation, on the plea that

the amount of enhanced compensation received had not accrued to

the assessee during the year of receipt as the entire amount was in

dispute in appeal before the High Court which appeal stood filed by

the State against the order of the Reference Court granting

enhanced compensation. The amount was received by the assessee

in terms of the interim order of the High Court against the

assessee's furnishing security to the satisfaction of the executing

court. The interest received on enhanced compensation during the

previous year was also, according to the assessee, not chargeable to

tax on the same plea.


6.   The A.O. did not accept the contentions of the assessee on the

ground that in terms of Section 45(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961

("1961 Act", for short) enacted w.e.f. 1.4.88, the amount by which

compensation    or   consideration   stood   enhanced   or   further
                                                                   4


enhanced by the Court, is deemed income chargeable under the

head "Capital Gains" of the previous year in which the said amount

came to be received.     The A.O. accordingly brought to tax the

amount of enhanced compensation of Rs.87,13,517/- received by

the assessee during the previous year relevant to the assessment

year 1999-2000. Similarly, interest on enhanced compensation of

Rs.1,47,575/- received by the assessee during the previous year

was also brought to tax in the year of receipt. The assessee filed

appeal against the order of the A.O. in which he reiterated the

above contention. Assessee also placed reliance on the judgment of

this Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal-II            v.

Hindustan Housing and Land Development Trust Ltd. - (1986)

161 ITR 524 (SC). CIT (A) came to the conclusion that since the

enhanced compensation received was in dispute in the pending

First Appeal, both, the enhanced compensation as well as the

interest thereon had not accrued to the assessee during the year of

receipt as the entire amount was in dispute in First Appeal and

that the assessee had received the said amount only against

security furnished to the satisfaction of the executing court. At this

stage, it may be mentioned that the amount of enhanced

compensation sought to be taxed under Section 45(5) of the 1961
                                                                   5


Act was Rs.87,13,517/- whereas the interest               on enhanced

compensation     which   was   also   sought    to   be    taxed   was

Rs.1,47,575/-.


7.   Aggrieved by the decision of the CIT(A), the Department

moved Income-tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) which following its

order upheld the order of the CIT(A) and dismissed the appeal of

the Department.    Aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal the

matter was carried in appeal to the High Court under Section 260A

of the 1961 Act. By the impugned judgment it has been held that

the case is squarely covered by the judgment of the Supreme Court

in the case of Hindustan Housing (supra). According to the High

Court, when the State is in appeal against the order of enhanced

compensation and interest thereon the receipt of additional

compensation and interest thereon was not taxable as income as

the said two items were disputed by the Government in appeal.

Consequently, the Department's appeal was dismissed by the High

Court, hence this civil appeal is filed by the Department.



ISSUE
                                                                               6


8.   The short question to be decided in this batch of civil appeals

is : whether ITAT was right in ordering deletion of enhanced

compensation and interest thereon from the total income of the

assessee on the ground that the said two items, awarded by the

Reference Court, was under dispute in First Appeal before the High

Court.




Analysis of provisions of the 1961 Act

9.   We quote hereinbelow Section 2(47) of the 1961 Act which

reads as under:

     "2 - Definitions
     In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-

          (47) "transfer", in relation to a capital asset, includes,-

             (i) the sale, exchange or relinquishment of the asset; or

             (ii) the extinguishment of any rights therein; or

             (iii) the compulsory acquisition thereof under any law; or

             (iv) in a case where the asset is converted by the owner thereof
             into, or is treated by him as, stock-in-trade of a business
             carried on by him, such conversion or treatment; [or]

             (v) any transaction involving the allowing of the possession of
             any immovable property to be taken or retained in part
             performance of a contract of the nature referred to in Section
             53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882); or

             (vi) any transaction (whether by way of becoming a member
             of, or acquiring shares in, a co-operative society, company or
             other association of persons or by way of any agreement or any
                                                                                  7

             arrangement or in any other manner whatsoever) which has
             the effect of transferring, or enabling the enjoyment of, any
             immovable property.

                 Explanation.-For the purposes of sub-clauses (v) and (vi),
                 "immovable property" shall have the same meaning as in
                 clause (d) of Section 269UA."

10.   We also quote hereinbelow Section 45(1) of the 1961 Act as it

stood prior to 1.4.2004 which reads as under:

      "45 - Capital gains
      (1) Any profits or gains arising from the transfer of a capital asset
      effected in the previous year shall, save as otherwise provided in
      sections [***] [54, 54B, [***] [54D, [54E, [54EA, 54EB,] 54F [, 54G
      and 54H]]]]], be chargeable to income-tax under the head "Capital
      gains", and shall be deemed to be the income of the previous year in
      which the transfer took place."

11.   We also quote hereinbelow Section 45(5) of the 1961 Act as it

stood prior to 1.4.2004 which reads as under:


      "45 - Capital gains
      (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where the
      capital gain arises from the transfer of a capital asset, being a transfer
      by way of compulsory acquisition under any law, or a transfer the
      consideration for which was determined or approved by the Central
      Government or the Reserve Bank of India, and the compensation or
      the consideration for such transfer is enhanced or further enhanced by
      any court, Tribunal or other authority, the capital gain shall be dealt
      with in the following manner, namely :-

         (a) the capital gain computed with reference to the compensation
         awarded in the first instance or, as the case may be, the
         consideration determined or approved in the first instance by the
         Central Government or the Reserve Bank of India shall be
         chargeable as [income under the head "Capital gains" of the
         previous year in which such compensation or part thereof, or such
         consideration or part thereof, was first received]; and

         (b) the amount by which the compensation or consideration is
         enhanced or further enhanced by the court, Tribunal or other
         authority shall be deemed to be income chargeable under the head
                                                                                  8

         "Capital gains" of the previous year in which such amount is
         received by the assessee;"



12.   We also quote hereinbelow Section 45(5) of the 1961 Act after

1.4.2004 which reads as under:


      "45 - Capital gains
      (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where the
      capital gain arises from the transfer of a capital asset, being a transfer
      by way of compulsory acquisition under any law, or a transfer the
      consideration for which was determined or approved by the Central
      Government or the Reserve Bank of India, and the compensation or
      the consideration for such transfer is enhanced or further enhanced by
      any court, Tribunal or other authority, the capital gain shall be dealt
      with in the following manner, namely :-

         (a) the capital gain computed with reference to the compensation
         awarded in the first instance or, as the case may be, the
         consideration determined or approved in the first instance by the
         Central Government or the Reserve Bank of India shall be
         chargeable as [income under the head "Capital gains" of the
         previous year in which such compensation or part thereof, or such
         consideration or part thereof, was first received]; and

         (b) the amount by which the compensation or consideration is
         enhanced or further enhanced by the court, Tribunal or other
         authority shall be deemed to be income chargeable under the head
         "Capital gains" of the previous year in which such amount is
         received by the assessee;

         (c) where in the assessment for any year, the capital gain arising
         from the transfer of a capital asset is computed by taking the
         compensation or consideration referred to in clause (a) or, as the
         case may be, enhanced compensation or consideration referred to
         in clause (b), and subsequently such compensation or
         consideration is reduced by any court, Tribunal or other authority,
         such assessed capital gain of that year shall be recomputed by
         taking the compensation or consideration as so reduced by such
         court, Tribunal or other authority to be the full value of the
         consideration.

         Explanation.-For the purposes of this sub-section,-

         (i) in relation to the amount referred to in clause (b), the cost of
         acquisition and the cost of improvement shall be taken to be nil;
                                                                                  9

         (ii) the provisions of this sub-section shall apply also in a case
         where the transfer took place prior to the 1st day of April, 1988;

         (iii) where by reason of the death of the person who made the
         transfer, or for any other reason, the enhanced compensation or
         consideration is received by any other person, the amount referred
         to in clause (b) shall be deemed to be the income, chargeable to
         tax under the head "Capital gains", of such other person."

                                                    (emphasis supplied by us)

13.   We also quote hereinbelow Section 155(16) of the 1961 Act

after 1.4.2004 which reads as under:

      "PROCEDURE FOR ASSESSMENT
      155. Other amendments
      (16) Where in the assessment for any year, a capital gain arising from
      the transfer of a capital asset, being a transfer by way of compulsory
      acquisition under any law, or a transfer, the consideration for which
      was determined or approved by the Central Government or the
      Reserve Bank of India, is computed by taking the compensation or
      consideration as referred to in clause (a) or, as the case may be, the
      compensation or consideration enhanced or further enhanced as
      referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (5) of Section 45, to be the full
      value of consideration deemed to be received or accruing as a result of
      the transfer of the asset and subsequently such compensation or
      consideration is reduced by any court, Tribunal or other authority, the
      Assessing Officer shall amend the order of assessment so as to
      compute the capital gain by taking the compensation or consideration
      as so reduced by the court, Tribunal or any other authority to be the
      full value of consideration; and the provisions of Section 154 shall, so
      far as may be, apply thereto, and the period of four years shall be
      reckoned from the end of the previous year in which the order
      reducing the compensation was passed by the court, Tribunal or other
      authority."

14.   The following conditions need to be satisfied for taxing a

transaction as capital gains, viz., the subject-matter must be a

capital asset, the transaction must fall in the definition of

"transfer", there must be profit or loss called "Capital Gains" and
                                                                   1
                                                                    0
that the taxpayer has claimed exemption in whole or in part by

complying with legal provisions (Like Section 54F).


15.   Section 45(1) of the 1961 Act speaks about capital gains

arising out of "transfer" of a capital asset.   The definition of the

expression "transfer" is contained in Section 2(47) of the 1961 Act.

It has very wide meaning. What is taxable under Section 45(1) of

the 1961 Act is "profits and gains arising from a transfer of a

capital asset" and the charge of income-tax on the capital gains is a

charge on the income of the previous year in which the transfer

took place. Capital gain(s) is an artificial income. It is created by

the 1961 Act. Profit(s) arising from transfer of capital asset is made

chargeable to income-tax under Section 45(1) of the 1961 Act.

From the scheme of Section 45, it is clear that capital gains is not

an income which accrues from day-to-day during a specific period

but it arises at fixed point of time, namely, on the date of the

transfer. In short, Section 45 defines capital gains, it makes them

chargeable to tax and it allots the appropriate year for such charge.

It also enacts a deeming provision. Section 48 lays down mode of

computation of capital gains and deductions therefrom.
                                                                   1
                                                                    1
16.   The question which arises for determination is - why was

Section 45(5) inserted by the Finance Act, 1987, w.e.f. 1.4.88?

Under Section 45(1), profits or gains arising from the transfer of a

capital asset effected in the previous year is taken to be the income

of the previous year in which the transfer took place and such

profits are chargeable to tax under the head "Capital Gains".

However, it was noticed that in cases where capital gains accrued

or arose by way of compulsory acquisition, the additional

compensation    stood awarded     in several    stages by    different

appellate authorities which necessitated rectification of the original

assessment at each stage.       To provide for rectification of the

assessment of the year in which capital gains was originally

assessed, Section 155(7A) was also introduced. However, as stated

above, since additional compensation under the Land Acquisition

Act, 1894 was awarded in several stages multiple rectifications had

to be made to the original assessment which cause great difficulty

in carrying out the required rectification and in effecting the

recovery of additional demand. It was also noticed that repeated

rectifications of assessment on account of enhancement of

compensation by different courts often resulted in mistakes in

computation of tax.      Therefore, with a view to remove these
                                                                    1
                                                                     2
difficulties, the Finance Act 1987 inserted Section 45(5) to provide

for taxation of additional compensation in the year of receipt

instead of in the year of transfer of the capital asset. Accordingly,

additional compensation is treated as "deemed income" in the

hands of the recipient even if the actual recipient happens to be a

person different from the original transferor by reason of death, etc.

For this purpose, the cost of acquisition in the hands of the receiver

of the additional compensation is deemed to be nil. However, the

compensation awarded in the first instance would continue to be

chargeable as income under the head "Capital Gains", in the

previous year in which transfer took place. At this stage, it may be

noted, that, Section 45(1) stood further amended (w.e.f. 1.4.91) so

as to include reference to Section 54H and Section 45(5)(a) which,

as stated above, stood amended (w.e.f. 1.4.88).        The scope and

effect of the above amendments made in Section 45, as also

insertion of Section 54H, by Finance Act 1991, has been elaborated

in the following portion of the Departmental Circular No.621 dated

19.12.91:

     ``Streamlining the provisions relating to exemption for roll-
     over of capital gains-

           Capital gains are deemed to be income of the
     previous year in which the transfer giving rise to the
                                                           1
                                                            3
gains takes place except where otherwise provided.
According in the case of compulsory acquisition of
assets, the capital gains included in the compensation,
as originally awarded, is charged to tax in the year in
which the transfer by way of compulsory acquisition
takes place, but additional compensation is brought to
tax only in the year in which it is received.

      It has been brought to the notice of the
Government that in case of compulsory acquisition of
assets, at times there is a considerable gap between the
dates of acquisition and payment of compensation. The
result is that the existing provisions of capital gains
taxation operate harshly inasmuch as the affected
persons are unable to avail of the exemption for roll-
over of capital gains, within the specified time period
through investment in specified assets.

      Section 45 of the Income-tax Act has, therefore,
been amended to provide that capital gains arising from
the transfer of the capital asset by way of compulsory
acquisition under any law shall be charged to tax in the
previous year in which the compensation is first
received.

    This amendment takes effect retrospectively from
 st
1 April, 1988.

      Further, a new section 54H has been inserted in
the Income-tax Act, to provide that in cases where
compensation in respect of any asset acquired
compulsorily is received after the date of such transfer,
the period for investment in specified assets shall be
reckoned from the date of receipt of such compensation.
However, where the compensation was first received
before 1st April, 1991, and the period for making
investment in any specified asset has expired before 1st
October, 1991, such period shall stand extended up to
31st December, 1991.
                                                                1
                                                                 4
           This amendment takes effect from the 1st day of
      October, 1991."


17.   The important point to be noted is that in the case of

compulsory acquisition of an asset, the capital gains in the

compensation, as originally awarded, is charged to tax in the year

in which the transfer by way of compulsory acquisition takes place,

but additional compensation is brought to tax only in the year in

which it is received.


18.   Thus, Section 45(5) enacts overriding provisions and takes

care of a situation :

      --where the capital gains arises from the transfer of a
      capital asset, being--

            --a transfer by way of compulsory acquisition
            under any law, or

            --a transfer the consideration for which was
            determined   or   approved   by    the    Central
            Government or the Reserve Bank of India, and

      --the compensation or consideration for such transfer is
      enhanced or further enhanced by any court, tribunal or
      other authority.

      In such a situation, the capital gain so arising is, for
      and from assessment year 1988-89, to be dealt with as
      under:-

      (a)   the capital gain computed with reference to--
                                                                                1
                                                                                 5
                    --the compensation awarded in the first
                    instance or, as  the case may be

                    --the consideration determined or approved
                    in the first instance by the Central
                    Government or the Reserve Bank of India

                    is chargeable as income under the head
                    "Capital gains" of the previous year in which
                    such compensation or part thereof, or such
                    consideration or part thereof, was first
                    received; and

      (b)   the amount by which the compensation or
      consideration is enhanced or further enhanced by the
      court, tribunal or other authority is to be deemed to be
      the income chargeable under the head "Capital gains" of
      the previous year in which such amount is received by
      the assessee.


Analysis of the provisions of L.A. Act, 1894

19.   At the outset we quote hereinbelow Sections 23(1), 23(1A) and

23(2) of the 1894 Act which read as under:

      "23 - Matters to be considered in determining compensation
      (1) In determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for
      land acquired under this Act, the court shall take into consideration--

         first, the market-value of the land at the date of the publication of
         the notification under section 4, sub-section (1);

         secondly, the damage sustained by the person interested, by
         reason of the taking of any standing crops or trees which may be
         on the land at the time of the Collector's taking possession thereof;

         thirdly, the damage (if any), sustained by the person interested, at
         the time of the Collector's taking possession of the land, by reason
         of severing such land from his other land;

         fourthly, the damage (if any), sustained by the person interested,
         at the time of the Collector's taking possession of the land, by
                                                                                  1
                                                                                   6
         reason of the acquisition injuriously affecting his other property,
         movable or immovable, in any other manner, or his earnings;

         fifthly, if,    in consequence of the acquisition of the land by the
         Collector,       the person interested is compelled to change his
         residence      or place of business, the reasonable expenses (if any)
         incidental     to such change; and

         sixthly, the damage (if any) bona fide resulting from diminution of
         the profits of the land between the time of the publication of the
         declaration under section 6 and the time of the Collector's taking
         possession of the land.

      (1A) In addition to the market value of the land above provided, the
      Court shall in every case award an amount calculated at the rate of
      twelve per centum per annum on such market-value for the period
      commencing on and from the date of the publication of the notification
      under section 4, sub-section (1), in respect of such land to the date of
      the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land,
      whichever is earlier.

         Explanation.-In computing the period referred to in this sub-
         section, any period or periods during which the proceedings for the
         acquisition of the land were held up on account of any stay or
         injunction by the order of any court shall be excluded.

      (2) In addition to the market-value of the land as above provided, the
      court shall in every case award a sum of thirty per centum on such
      market-value, in consideration of the compulsory nature of the
      acquisition."



20.   We also quote hereinbelow Section 28 of the 1894 Act which
reads as under:

      "28. Collector may be directed to pay interest on excess
            compensation. -

      If the sum which, in the opinion of the court, the Collector ought to
      have awarded as compensation is in excess of the sum which the
      Collector did award as compensation, the award of the Court may
      direct that the Collector shall pay interest on such excess at the rate of
      [nine per centum] per annum from the date on which he took
      possession of the land to the date of payment of such excess into
      Court."

21.   We also quote hereinbelow Section 34 of the 1894 which
reads as under:
                                                                              1
                                                                               7
      "34. Payment of interest.-
      When the amount of such compensation is not paid or deposited on or
      before taking possession of the land, the Collector shall pay the
      amount awarded with interest thereon at the rate of nine per centum
      per annum from the time of so taking possession until it shall have
      been so paid or deposited.

         Provided that if such compensation or any part thereof is not paid
         or deposited within a period of one year from the date on which
         possession is taken, interest at the rate of fifteen per centum per
         annum shall be payable from the date of expiry of the said period
         of one year on the amount of compensation or part thereof which
         has not been paid or deposited before the date of such expiry."



22.   Section 23(1A) was introduced in the 1894 Act to mitigate the

hardship caused to the owner of the land who is deprived of its

enjoyment by taking possession from him and using it for public

purpose, because of considerable delay in making the award and

offering payment thereof [See : Assistant Commissioner, Gadag

Sub-Division, Gadag v. Mathapathi Basavannewwa and others -

AIR 1995 SC 2492]. To obviate such hardship, Section 23(1A) was

introduced and the Legislature envisaged that the owner is entitled

to 12% per annum additional amount on the market value for a

period commencing on or from the date of publication of the

notification under Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act upto the date of the

award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land,

whichever is earlier. The additional amount payable under Section

23(1A) of the 1894 Act is neither interest nor solatium.                 It is an
                                                                  1
                                                                   8
additional compensation designed to compensate the owner of the

land, for the rise in price during the pendency of the land

acquisition proceedings.   It is a measure to offset the effect of

inflation and the continuous rise in the value of properties. [See:

State of Tamil Nadu and others etc. v. L. Krishnan and others

etc. - AIR 1996 SC 497].     Therefore, the amount payable under

Section 23(1A) of the 1894 Act is an additional compensation in

respect to the acquisition and has to be reckoned as part of the

market value of the land.     Sub-section (1A) of Section 23 was

introduced by Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984.              It

provides that in every case the Court shall award an amount as

additional compensation at the rate of 12% per annum on the

market value of the land for the period commencing on and from

the date of publication of the notification under Section 4(1) to the

date of the award of the Collector or to the date of taking

possession of the land, whichever is earlier. In other words sub-

section (1A) of Section 23 provides for additional compensation.

The said sub-section takes care of increase in the value at the rate

of 12% per annum.
                                                                  1
                                                                   9
23.   In addition to the market value of the land, as above provided,

the Court shall in every case award a sum of 30% on such market

value, in consideration of the compulsory nature of acquisition.

This is under Section 23(2) of the 1894 Act. In short, Section 23(2)

talks about solatium. Award of solatium is mandatory. Similarly,

payment of additional amount under Section 23(1A) is mandatory.

The award of interest under Section 28 of the 1894 Act is

discretionary.   Section 28 applies when the amount originally

awarded has been paid or deposited and when the Court awards

excess amount.    In such cases interest on that excess alone is

payable. Section 28 empowers the Court to award interest on the

excess amount of compensation awarded by it over the amount

awarded by the Collector. The compensation awarded by the Court

includes the additional compensation awarded under Section

23(1A) and the solatium under Section 23(2) of the said Act. This

award of interest is not mandatory but is left to the discretion of

the Court. Section 28 is applicable only in respect of the excess

amount, which is determined by the Court after a reference under

Section 18 of the 1894 Act. Section 28 does not apply to cases of

undue delay in making award for compensation [See: Ram Chand

& others etc v. Union of India & Ors. - 1994(1) SCC 44]. In the
                                                                 2
                                                                  0
case of Shree Vijay Cotton & Oil Mills Ltd. v. State of Gujarat -

(1991) 1 SCC 262, this Court has held that interest is different

from compensation.


24.   To sum up, interest is different from compensation. However,

interest paid on the excess amount under Section 28 of the 1894

Act depends upon a claim by the person whose land is acquired

whereas interest under Section 34 is for delay in making payment.

This vital difference needs to be kept in mind in deciding this

matter.   Interest under Section 28 is part of the amount of

compensation whereas interest under Section 34 is only for delay

in making payment after the compensation amount is determined.

Interest under Section 28 is a part of enhanced value of the land

which is not the case in the matter of payment of interest under

Section 34.


25.   It is clear from reading of Sections 23(1A), 23(2) as also

Section 28 of the 1894 Act that additional benefits are available on

the market value of the acquired lands under Section 23(1A) and

23(2) whereas Section 28 is available in respect of the entire

compensation.    It was held by the Constitution Bench of the

Supreme Court in Sunder v. Union of India - (2001) 7 SCC 211,
                                                                  2
                                                                   1
that "indeed the language of Section 28 does not even remotely

refer to market value alone and in terms it talks of compensation or

the sum equivalent thereto.        Thus, interest awardable under

Section 28, would include within its ambit both the market value

and the statutory solatium. It would be thus evident that even the

provisions of Section 28 authorise the grant of interest on solatium

as well." Thus solatium means an integral part of compensation,

interest would be payable on it.    Section 34 postulates award of

interest at 9% per annum from the date of taking possession only

until it is paid or deposited. It is a mandatory provision. Basically

Section 34 provides for payment of interest for delayed payment.


Taxability of additional compensation and interest
under Section 45(5) of the 1961 Act in the context
of the provisions of L.A. Act, 1894

26.   The question before this Court is : whether additional amount

under Section 23(1A), solatium under Section 23(2), interest paid

on excess compensation under Section 28 and interest under

Section 34 of the 1894 Act, could be treated as part of the

compensation under Section 45(5) of the 1961 Act?


27.   In the case of Hindustan Housing (supra) certain lands

belonging to the assessee-company, which was in the business of
                                                                2
                                                                 2
dealing in land and which maintained its account on mercantile

system, were first requisitioned and then compulsorily acquired by

the State Government.     The Land Acquisition Officer awarded

Rs.24,97,249/- as compensation. On appeal the Arbitrator made

an award at Rs.30,10,873/- with interest at 5% from the date of

acquisition. Thereupon, the State preferred an appeal to the High

Court. Pending the appeal, the State Government deposited in the

Court Rs.7,36,691/- being the additional amount payable under

the award and the assessee was permitted to withdraw that

additional amount on furnishing a security bond for refunding the

amount in the event of the said Appeal being allowed. On receiving

the amount, the assessee credited it in its suspense account on the

same date. The question was : whether the additional amount of

Rs.7,24,914/- could be taxed as the income on the ground that it

became payable pursuant to the award of the Arbitrator.        The

Tribunal held that the amount did not accrue to the assessee as its

income and was, therefore, not taxable in the assessment year

1956-57. The financial year in which the additional amount came

to be withdrawn ended on 31.3.56. It was held by this Court that

although award was made on 29.7.1955, enhancing the amount of

compensation payable to the assessee, the entire amount was in
                                                                  2
                                                                   3
dispute in the appeal filed by the State. Therefore, there was no

absolute right to receive the amount at that stage. It was held that

if the Appeal was to be allowed in its entirety, the right to payment

of enhanced compensation would have fallen altogether. Therefore,

according to this Court, the extra amount of compensation of

Rs.7,24,914/- was not income arising or accruing to the assessee

during the previous year relevant to the assessment year 1956-57.


28.   The question is : whether the judgment of this Court in

Hindustan Housing (supra) would apply to the present case which

arises under the Income-tax Act, 1961? At the outset, it may be

noted that the judgment of this Court in Hindustan Housing

(supra) was delivered on 29.7.86.     It was prior to 1.4.88 when

Section 45(5) stood incorporated by Finance Act 1987 w.e.f. 1.4.88.

Further, the judgment of this Court in Hindustan Housing (supra)

has been given in respect of assessment year 1956-57 under the

Income-tax Act, 1922 whereas, in the present case, we are

concerned with the 1961 Act which defines the word "transfer" in

much wider sense under Section 2(47).       Lastly, for the reasons

given hereinafter, particularly in the context of introduction of

Section 45(5) of the 1961 Act w.e.f.1.4.88 a totally new scheme
                                                                     2
                                                                      4
stood introduced keeping in mind cases of compulsory acquisition

under the 1894 Act under which compensation is payable at

multiple stages and amounts stand withdrawn by the assessee-

claimants and used by the assessee(s) for several years, during

which litigation is pending. It is in the context of Section 45(5) that

we need to decide the year of taxability. It is significant to note that

Section 12B of 1922 Act did not contain specific reference to

compulsory acquisition as contained in Section 2(47) of the 1961

Act.    Therefore, in our view, the judgment of this Court in

Hindustan Housing (supra) is not applicable to the present case.


29.    From Section 45 it is clear that capital gains are not income

accruing from day to day. It is deemed income which arises at a

fixed point of time, viz, date of transfer.      Section 45(5), newly

inserted by the Finance Act, 1987, w.e.f. 1.4.88 and subsequently

amended, retrospectively w.e.f. 1.4.88, by the Finance Act, 1991,

enacts overriding provision and takes care of a situation -


             where the capital gains arise from the transfer of a
       capital asset, being a transfer by way of compulsory
       acquisition and the compensation for such transfer stands
       enhanced in stages by any court, tribunal or authority. In
       such a situation, the capital gains so arising is, for and from
       assessment year 1988-89, has to be dealt with as under : -
                                                                  2
                                                                   5
           (i)  the capital gains computed with respect to the
           compensation awarded in the first instance would be
           chargeable as Income under the head "Capital Gains" of
           the previous year in which such compensation or part
           thereof was first received; and

           (ii)  amount by which compensation or consideration
           is enhanced or further enhanced by the court, tribunal
           or authority is to be Deemed Income chargeable under
           the head "Capital Gains" of the previous year in which
           such amount is received by the assessee.

30.   For the said purpose, the cost of acquisition is to be taken as

Nil [See: Explanation (i)]. Also, where the enhanced compensation

is received by any person, other than the transferor by reason of

the death of the transferor or for any reason, the amount of such

additional compensation or additional consideration is to be

deemed to be the income of the recipient of the previous year in

which such amount is received by him.


31.   Two aspects need to be highlighted. Firstly, Section 45(5) of

the 1961 Act deals with transfer(s) by way of compulsory

acquisition and not by way of transfers by way of sales etc. covered

by Section 45(1) of the 1961 Act. Secondly, Section 45(5) of the

1961 Act talks about enhanced compensation or consideration

which in terms of L.A. Act 1894 results in payment of additional

compensation.
                                                                   2
                                                                    6


32.   The issue to be decided before us - what is the meaning of the

words "enhanced compensation/consideration" in Section 45(5)(b)

of the 1961 Act?     Will it cover "interest"?    These questions also

bring in the concept of the year of taxability.


33.   It is to answer the above questions that we have analysed the

provisions of Sections 23, 23(1A), 23(2), 28 and 34 of the 1894 Act.

As discussed hereinabove, Section 23(1A) provides for additional

amount. It takes care of increase in the value at the rate of 12 %

per annum. Similarly, under Section 23(2) of the 1894 Act there is

a provision for solatium which also represents part of enhanced

compensation.     Similarly, Section 28 empowers the court in its

discretion to award interest on the excess amount of compensation

over and above what is awarded by the Collector.           It includes

additional amount under Section 23(1A) and solatium under

Section 23(2) of the said Act. Section 28 of the 1894 Act applies

only in respect of the excess amount determined by the court after

reference under Section 18 of the 1894 Act. It depends upon the

claim, unlike interest under Section 34 which depends on undue

delay in making the award.         It is true that "interest" is not

compensation. It is equally true that Section 45(5) of the 1961 Act
                                                                   2
                                                                    7
refers to compensation. But as discussed hereinabove, we have to

go by the provisions of the 1894 Act which awards "interest" both

as an accretion in the value of the lands acquired and interest for

undue delay.    Interest under Section 28 unlike interest under

Section 34 is an accretion to the value, hence it is a part of

enhanced compensation or consideration which is not the case with

interest under Section 34 of the 1894 Act.        So also additional

amount under Section 23(1A) and solatium under Section 23(2) of

the 1961 Act forms part of enhanced compensation under Section

45(5)(b) of the 1961 Act. In fact, what we have stated hereinabove

is reinforced by the newly inserted clause (c) in Section 45(5) by the

Finance Act, 2003 w.e.f.1.4.2004.        This newly added clause

envisages a situation where in the assessment for any year,-


           -the capital gain arising from the transfer of a capital
           asset is computed by taking the-

           -compensation or consideration referred to in clause (a)
           of section 45(5) or, as the case may be,

           -enhanced compensation or consideration referred to in
           clause (b) of section 45(5),

           and subsequently such compensation or consideration
           is reduced by any court, Tribunal or other authority.
                                                                     2
                                                                      8
34.   In such a situation, such assessed capital gain of that year

shall be recomputed by taking the compensation or consideration

as so reduced by such court, Tribunal or other authority to be the

full value of the consideration.         For giving effect to such

recomputation,   the   provisions   of   the   newly   inserted   (w.e.f.

1.4.2004) section 155(16) by the Finance Act, 2003 (32 of 2003),

have been enacted.


35.   It was urged on behalf of the assessee that Section 45(5)(b) of

the 1961 Act deals only with re-working, its object is not to convert

the amount of enhanced compensation into deemed income on

receipt. We find no merit in this argument. The scheme of Section

45(5) of the 1961 Act was inserted w.e.f. 1.4.88 as an overriding

provision.   As stated above, compensation under the L.A. Act,

1894, arises and is payable in multiple stages which does not

happen in cases of transfers by sale etc. Hence, the legislature had

to step in and say that as and when the assessee-claimant is in

receipt of enhanced compensation it shall be treated as "deemed

income" and taxed on receipt basis. Our above understanding is

supported by insertion of clause (c) in Section 45(5) w.e.f. 1.4.04

and Section 155(16) which refers to a situation of a subsequent
                                                                    2
                                                                     9
reduction   by   the   Court,   Tribunal   or   other   authority   and

recomputation/amendment of the assessment order. Section 45(5)

read as a whole (including clause "c") not only deals with re-

working as urged on behalf of the assessee but also with the

change in the full value of the consideration (computation) and

since the enhanced compensation/consideration (including interest

under Section 28 of the 1894 Act) becomes payable/paid under

1894 Act at different stages, the receipt of such enhanced

compensation/consideration is to be taxed in the year of receipt

subject to adjustment, if any, under Section 155(16) of the 1961

Act, later on. Hence, the year in which enhanced compensation is

received is the year of taxability.    Consequently, even in cases

where pending appeal, the Court/Tribunal/Authority before which

appeal is pending, permits the claimant to withdraw against

security or otherwise the enhanced compensation (which is in

dispute), the same is liable to be taxed under Section 45(5) of the

1961 Act. This is the scheme of Section 45(5) and Section 155(16)

of the 1961 Act. We may clarify that even before the insertion of

Section 45(5)(c) and Section 155(16) w.e.f. 1.4.04, the receipt of

enhanced compensation under Section 45(5)(b) was taxable in the

year of receipt which is only reinforced by insertion of clause (c)
                                                                      3
                                                                       0
because the right to receive payment under the 1894 Act is not in

doubt.    It is important to note that compensation, including

enhanced compensation/consideration under the 1894 Act, is

based on the full value of property as on date of notification under

Section 4 of that Act. When the Court/Tribunal directs payment of

enhanced compensation under Section 23(1A), or Section 23(2) or

under Section 28 of the 1894 Act it is on the basis that award of

Collector or the Court, under reference, has not compensated the

owner for the full value of the property as on date of notification.


36.   Having settled the controversy going on for last two decades,

we are of the view that in this batch of cases which relate back to

assessment years 1991-92 and 1992-93, possibly the proceedings

under the L.A. Act 1894 would have ended. In number of cases we

find that proceedings under the 1894 Act have been concluded and

taxes have been paid. Therefore, by this judgment we have settled

the law but we direct that since matters are decade old and since

we are not aware of what has happened in Land Acquisition Act

proceedings in pending appeals, the recomputation on the basis of

our judgment herein, particularly in the context of type of interest

under Section 28 vis-`-vis interest under Section 34, additional
                                                                                         3
                                                                                          1
compensation under Section 23(1A) and solatium under Section

23(2) of the 1894 Act, would be extremely difficult after all these

years, will not be done.



37.     Subject to what is stated hereinabove, we allow the civil

appeal of the Department with no order as to cost.



Civil   Appeal   No.   of   2009   -   Arising   out   of   S.L.P.   (C)   No.17644 of 2008
Civil   Appeal   No.   of   2009   -   Arising   out   of   S.L.P.   (C)   No.17643 of 2008
Civil   Appeal   No.   of   2009   -   Arising   out   of   S.L.P.   (C)   No.17645 of 2008
Civil   Appeal   No.   of   2009   -   Arising   out   of   S.L.P.   (C)   No.17642 of 2008
Civil   Appeal   No.   of   2009   -   Arising   out   of   S.L.P.   (C)   No.17641 of 2008
Civil   Appeal   No.   of   2009   -   Arising   out   of   S.L.P.   (C)   No.17647 of 2008
Civil   Appeal   No.   of   2009   -   Arising   out   of   S.L.P.   (C)   No.17646 of 2008
Civil   Appeal   No.   of   2009   -   Arising   out   of   S.L.P.   (C)   No.8350 of 2009

Civil   Appeal   No.   of   2009   -   Arising   out   of   S.L.P.   (C)   No.8451 of 2008
Civil   Appeal   No.   of   2009   -   Arising   out   of   S.L.P.   (C)   No.4832 of 2008
Civil   Appeal   No.   of   2009   -   Arising   out   of   S.L.P.   (C)   No.4833 of 2008
Civil   Appeal   No.   of   2009   -   Arising   out   of   S.L.P.   (C)   No.4834 of 2008
Civil   Appeal   No.   of   2009   -   Arising   out   of   S.L.P.   (C)   No.4835 of 2008
Civil   Appeal   No.   of   2009   -   Arising   out   of   S.L.P.   (C)   No.20657 of 2008
Civil   Appeal   No.   of   2009   -   Arising   out   of   S.L.P.   (C)   No.20658 of 2008
Civil   Appeal   No.   of   2009   -   Arising   out   of   S.L.P.   (C)   No.20659 of 2008

Civil Appeal No.       of 2009 - Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.7599 of 2009

Civil   Appeal   No.   of   2009   -   Arising   out   of   S.L.P.   (C)   No.3054 of 2008
Civil   Appeal   No.   of   2009   -   Arising   out   of   S.L.P.   (C)   No.3717 of 2009
Civil   Appeal   No.   of   2009   -   Arising   out   of   S.L.P.   (C)   No.4174 of 2009
Civil   Appeal   No.   of   2009   -   Arising   out   of   S.L.P.   (C)   No.31566 of 2008
Civil   Appeal   No.   of   2009   -   Arising   out   of   S.L.P.   (C)   No.713 of 2009
Civil   Appeal   No.   of   2009   -   Arising   out   of   S.L.P.   (C)   No.5300 of 2009
Civil   Appeal   No.   of   2009   -   Arising   out   of   S.L.P.   (C)   No.6378 of 2009


38.     For the reasons given and also subject to what is stated
hereinabove in Civil Appeal No.                    of 2009 - Arising out of S.L.P.
                                                                      3
                                                                       2

(C) No.17640 of 2008 - Commissioner of Income Tax, Faridabad v.

Ghanshyam (HUF), the civil appeals filed by the Department stand
allowed with no order as to costs.




                                       .................................J.
                                       (S.H. Kapadia)



                                       ................................J.
                                      (AFTAB ALAM)
New Delhi;
July 16, 2009.

Wednesday, August 29, 2012

rash and negligent driving of the driver.“Protection of society and stamping out criminal proclivity must be the object of law which must be achieved by imposing appropriate sentence. Therefore, law as a corner-stone of the edifice of “order” should meet the challenges confronting the society. Friedman in his “Law in Changing Society” stated that, “State of criminal law continues to be – as it should be – a decisive reflection of social consciousness of society”. Therefore, in operating the sentencing system, law should adopt the corrective machinery or the deterrence based on factual matrix. By deft modulation sentencing process be stern where it should be, and tempered with mercy where it warrants to be.”In view of the aforesaid, we have to weigh whether the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant as regards the mitigating factors deserves acceptance. Compassion is being sought on the ground of young age and mercy is being invoked on the foundation of solemnization of marriage. The date of occurrence is in the month of March, 2006. The scars on the collective cannot be said to have been forgotten. Weighing the individual difficulty as against the social order, collective conscience and the duty of the Court, we are disposed to think that the substantive sentence affirmed by the High Court does not warrant any interference and, accordingly, we concur with the same. 31. Consequently, the appeal, being devoid of any substance, stands dismissed.


                             IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1325            OF 2012
             (Arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 9132 of 2011


Guru Basavaraj @ Benne Settappa                      ... Appellant
                                   Versus
State of Karnataka                                     ... Respondent



                               J U D G M E N T


Dipak Misra, J.


      Leave granted.

2.    In this appeal preferred by special leave under  Article  136  of  the
Constitution of India, the  assail  is  to  the  judgment  and  order  dated
21.06.2011 in Criminal Revision Petition No. 2284  of  2009  passed  by  the
High Court of Karnataka Circuit Bench at Dharwad whereby the High court  has
concurred with the judgment of conviction and order of  sentence  passed  by
the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Hospet in Criminal Appeal No. 58  of  2008
wherein the appellate court had set aside the sentence under Section 279  of
the Indian Penal  Code,  1860  (for  short  “the  IPC”)   and  affirmed  the
conviction and sentence for offences punishable under Sections 337, 338  and
304 A of the IPC as passed by the Judicial Magistrate First  Class,  Hospet.


3.    The broad essential  facts  leading  to  the  trial  of  the  accused-
appellant (hereinafter  referred  to  as  ‘the  accused’)      are  that  on
25.03.2006,  about  10.15  a.m.,   the   accused-driver   was   driving   an
unregistered new tractor on National Highway No. 13 at bypass road near  the
open well of one Golya Naik.   The tractor turned turtle  towards  the  left
side and caused simple injuries to many people who were sitting  inside  the
trailer of the tractor and grievous injuries  to  three  persons.    Injured
Kotraiah succumbed to the injuries sustained in the accident.  Be it  noted,
all the injured persons were  travelling  along  with  their  goods  in  the
trailer of the said tractor.

4.    After the accident took  place,  the  concerned  police  sub-inspector
(PSI) reached the spot, recorded the statement of the  injured  persons  and
after returning to the police  station  registered  an  FIR  and  thereafter
proceeded to the spot,  prepared the  sketch  map,  seized  the  vehicle  in
question and sent the dead  body  for  post-mortem.   After  completing  the
investigation, he placed the charge-sheet before  the  Competent  Court  for
the offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304-A  of  the  IPC
read with Section 187 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

5.    The prosecution, in order to substantiate  the  allegations,  examined
10 witnesses and got a number of documents marked as exhibits P-1 to P-24.

6.    The accused, in his statement under Section 313  Cr.P.C.,  denied  the
incriminating material brought against him  and  took  the  stand  that  the
accident occurred due to mechanical failure and  not  because  of  rash  and
negligent driving.  However, he chose not to adduce any evidence.

7.    The learned Magistrate acquitted the  accused  of  the  offence  under
Section 187 of the 1988 Act and convicted him for  the  offences  punishable
under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304-A of the IPC and sentenced him  to  pay
a certain sum as fine and, in default of payment of  the  same,  to  undergo
simple imprisonment for a specific period in respect of the  offences  under
Sections 279 and 337 and Section 338 of the IPC As far as the offence  under
Section 304-A of the IPC is concerned, the learned  Magistrate  imposed  the
sentence of simple imprisonment of six months and  to  pay  a  fine  of  Rs.
2000/- and, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment of 45 days.

8.    On an appeal being preferred assailing the  conviction  and  sentence,
the learned appellate Judge basically posed two questions,  namely,  whether
the findings recorded by the trial  court  are  erroneous  and  whether  the
sentence passed by the  trial  court  required  to  be  interfered  with  in
appeal.   After analysing the evidence, the appellate  court  came  to  hold
that it had been proven beyond doubt that the accused being the driver of  a
newly purchased unregistered tractor not only overloaded  tamarind  bags  on
the old trailer but also allowed 22  passengers  to  travel  on  the  loaded
trailer and due to  his  negligence,  the  trailer  got  detached  from  the
tractor as a consequence of which it turned turtle by the side of the  road.
  That apart, after detachment of the trailer, the tractor moved  up  to  30
feet which clearly reflected that the tractor was in high speed.

9.    The learned appellate Judge concurred with the  view  of  the  learned
Magistrate that the accident had not occurred due to mechanical  defect  but
there was rash and negligence on the part of the accused and  the  same  had
been established by the unimpeachable  evidence  of  independent  witnesses.
Because of the aforesaid  view,  he  answered  the  first  question  in  the
negative.  As far as the second question  is  concerned,  he  sustained  the
conviction in respect of  all  the  offences  but  set  aside  the  sentence
imposed for the offence punishable under Section 279 of the IPC.

10.    Questioning  the  legal  sustainability  of  the  conviction,  it  is
submitted by Mr. S. N. Bhat, learned counsel for  the  appellant,  that  all
the courts have fallen into grave error by expressing the opinion  that  the
accident had not occurred due to mechanical failure,  namely,  due  to  non-
functioning of the  hydraulic  system  in  a  proper  manner,  and  such  an
expression of opinion  vividly  exposits  perversity  of  approach.   It  is
further urged by him that when the  appellant  has  been  acquitted  of  the
offence punishable under Section 279 of the IPC,  he  could  not  have  been
punished in respect  of  the  rest  of  the  offences.   The  last  limb  of
submission of Mr. Bhatt is that at the time of the accident,  the  appellant
was 22 years of age and, in the meantime, his marriage has taken place  and,
therefore, the same should be regarded as acceptable mitigating factors  and
the  substantive  sentence  should  be  restricted  to  the  period  already
undergone in custody and the quantum of fine be enhanced.

11.   Ms. Vishruti  Vijay,  learned  counsel  for  the  State,  per  contra,
contended that the analysis of the evidence made by the  learned  Magistrate
as  well  as  by  the  appellate  court  are  absolutely  flawless  and  the
concurrence thereof by the High Court, in no manner, can  be  stated  to  be
perverse. It is put forth by him that there  is  ample  evidence  on  record
that the incident took place due to rash and negligent act on  the  part  of
the appellant  and  the  said  finding,  being  appositely  founded  on  the
material on record,  does  not  warrant  any  interference  by  this  Court.
Commenting on the submission that the appellant  has  been  acquitted  under
Section 279 of the IPC and hence, he deserves to be acquitted in respect  of
the other offences, it is  propounded  by  Ms.  Vishruti  Vijay  that  on  a
studied perusal of the judgment of the learned appellate Judge, it is  quite
clear that he has maintained the  conviction  and  not  imposed  a  separate
sentence under Section 279 of the IPC and,  for  that  reason,  he  has  set
aside the sentence but not the  conviction.   The  learned  counsel  further
submitted that regard being had  to  the  careless,  negligent  and  callous
attitude that has been exhibited by the  drivers  who  are  expected  to  be
professionals, the rate of road accidents that has extremely gone  high  and
further, in the case at hand, when so many people have  been  injured,  some
have  sustained  grievous  injuries  and  a  life  has  been  lost,  lenient
delineation would be an anathema to the concept of adequate punishment.

12.   First, we shall deal with the facet of rash and negligent  driving  of
the driver.  The learned counsel for the appellant has  submitted  that  the
vehicle turned turtle due to mechanical failure i.e. non-functioning of  the
hydraulic system in a proper manner.  To appreciate the said submission,  we
have carefully perused the material brought on record and the analysis  made
by the courts below.  On a careful scrutiny of the same, we  find  that  all
the courts have placed reliance on independent  witnesses  as  well  as  the
testimony of PW-10, the Motor Vehicle Inspector.  The manner  in  which  the
accident occurred due to detachment of the trailer from the tractor and  the
distance to which the tractor moved vividly  reveals  that  the  vehicle  in
question was driven recklessly at a high  speed.   The  plea  of  mechanical
failure as  put  forth  by  the  accused  was  not  even  suggested  to  the
Inspector. What is sought to be emphasised before this Court  is  that  PW-3
has deposed that the accident  occurred  due  to  mechanical  failure.   The
trial court as well as the High Court has not accepted the testimony of  PW-
3 as  he  is  only  an  agriculturist  while  the  other  technical  experts
including the Motor Vehicle  Inspector  have  deposed  about  the  rash  and
negligent driving.  Analysing the evidence in entirety,  the  learned  trial
judge as well as the appellate judge has returned  the  finding  as  regards
the rash and negligent driving.  The appellate court, on  further  scrutiny,
has found that the evidence on record clearly  shows  that  the  driver  has
taken the vehicle to the left side of the  road  and,  in  the  process,  he
moved away from the main road to the ‘kachcha’ road  and  thereby  the  link
between the tractor and the  trailer  got  detached.   The  High  Court  has
opined that the accused has not taken care to see  that  the  speed  of  the
tractor was within limit so that the trailer could not be detached.  In  our
considered view, the analysis of the factual score in this regard cannot  be
regarded to be perverse and, therefore, not liable to be unsettled  by  this
Court.

13.   The next limb of submission of the learned counsel for  the  appellant
is that when he has been acquitted under Section 279 of the IPC,  he  cannot
be punished in respect of the other offences as the allegation of  rash  and
negligent act  cannot  be  treated  to  have  been  proven.   The  aforesaid
submission, on a first blush, may look quite attractive,  but  on  a  deeper
scrutiny of the judgment passed by the appellate court, it melts into  total
insignificance.  The learned appellate judge, after due appreciation of  the
evidence on record as expected of  an  appellate  court,  has  come  to  the
conclusion that the accused was driving the vehicle in a rash and  negligent
manner.  After ascribing some reason, he has  thought  it  apposite  that  a
separate sentence should not be imposed under Section 279 of the  IPC,  and,
accordingly, he has set aside the sentence awarded by the trial  court.   It
is apposite to state here that there is  a  distinction  between  conviction
and sentence.  A conviction is the proof of  the  offence  committed  by  an
accused.  It  is  the  proof  of  guilt  of  the  offence.   The  punishment
component is the sentence.  In Rama Narang v. Ramesh Narang  and  others[1],
a three-Judge Bench of this Court, after referring to  Section  354  of  the
Code of Criminal Procedure, has stated that every judgment  referred  to  in
Section 353 of the Code, shall, inter alia, specify  the  offence  of  which
the accused is convicted and the punishment to which he is sentenced.   This
Court, while dealing with the power of the High Court under  Section  389(1)
of the Code, has observed that ordinarily an order of conviction  by  itself
is not capable of execution under the Code, but it is the order of  sentence
or an order awarding compensation or imposing fine or release  on  probation
which are capable of  execution  and  which,  if  not  suspended,  would  be
required to be executed by the authorities.   It  has  been  further  stated
that in certain situations, the order of conviction  can  be  executable  in
the sense that it may incur a disqualification.  We  have  referred  to  the
aforesaid authority only to highlight that there is a distinction between  a
conviction and a sentence.  In the instant case,  as  the  judgment  of  the
appellate court would show, the view has  been  expressed  that  a  separate
sentence under Section 279 of the IPC is  not  necessary  and,  accordingly,
the said sentence has been set aside.  The reading of  the  entire  judgment
makes it graphically clear that the conviction under Section 279 of the  IPC
has not been annulled.   It  is  noticeable  that  the  rash  and  negligent
driving by the accused that resulted in the causation  of  injuries  to  the
persons travelling in the trailer has been proved.  There is no  cavil  that
some have been seriously injured and one person who was  grievously  injured
breathed his last.  Thus, the submission of  the  learned  counsel  for  the
appellant that he has been acquitted of the offence  under  Section  279  of
the IPC does not deserve acceptance, and, accordingly,  we,  unhesitatingly,
repel the same.

14.   The last plank  of  submission  of  Mr.  Bhat  is  that  the  accused-
appellant was a young man of 22 years at the time of the occurrence  and  in
the meantime, he has entered into wedlock  and,  therefore,  maintaining  of
substantive sentence would be inapposite,  and  in  fitness  of  things,  it
should be restricted to the period already undergone and the amount of  fine
may be enhanced with the stipulation that it shall be paid  as  compensation
to the victims of the accident.

15.   The aforesaid  submission,  in  our  considered  opinion,  requires  a
careful and cautious examination.  What is basically sought to be argued  on
behalf  of  the  appellant  is  that  there  are  mitigating   circumstances
warranting lenient treatment.  As we perceive, two aspects, namely, (i)  the
age of the accused at the  time  of  the  accident;  and  (ii)  his  present
marital status, have been highlighted  as  mitigating  factors.   Before  we
dwell upon whether these two  aspects  should  be  regarded  as  extenuating
factors to reduce the sentence in a crime of  this  nature  in  the  present
social context, we think it apt to  refer  to  certain  authorities  in  the
field.


16.   In State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias  Raju[2],  while  dealing  with
the concept of adequate punishment in relation to an offence  under  Section
304-A of the IPC, the Court stated that considerations of undue sympathy  in
such cases will not only lead  to  miscarriage  of  justice  but  will  also
undermine the confidence of the public  in  the  efficacy  of  the  criminal
justice dispensation  system.  It  need  be  hardly  pointed  out  that  the
imposition of a sentence of fine of  Rs.  250  on  the  driver  of  a  Motor
Vehicle for an offence under Section 304-A of the IPC and that  too  without
any extenuating or mitigating circumstance is bound to shock the  conscience
of any one and will unmistakably leave the impression that the trial  was  a
mockery of justice.  Thereafter, this Court enhanced  the  sentence  to  six
months rigorous imprisonment with fine of  Rs.  1000  and,  in  default,  to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months.


17.   In Sevaka Perumal and another v. State of Tamil Nadu[3], it  has  been
emphasized  that  undue  sympathy  resulting  in  imposition  of  inadequate
sentence would do more harm to the justice system and undermine  the  public
confidence in the efficacy of law.


18.   In Jashubha Bharatsinh Gohil and Ors.  v.  State  of  Gujarat[4],  the
Court, adverting to the  new  challenges  of  sentencing,  opined  that  the
courts are constantly faced with the situation where they  are  required  to
answer to new challenges and mould  the  sentencing  system  to  meet  those
challenges. Protection of society and deterring the criminal is  the  avowed
object of law and that is required to be achieved  by  imposing  appropriate
sentence.

19.   In Dalbir Singh v. State of Haryana[5], this Court expressed thus:

      “Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents  in  India  and
      the devastating consequences visiting the victims and their  families,
      criminal  courts  cannot  treat  the  nature  of  the  offence   under
      Section 304A IPC  as   attracting   the   benevolent   provisions   of
      Section 4 of the PO Act. While considering the quantum of sentence, to
      be imposed for the offence of  causing  death  by  rash  or  negligent
      driving of automobiles, one of  the  prime  considerations  should  be
      deterrence.”

Thereafter,  the  Court  proceeded  to  highlight  what  is  expected  of  a
professional driver:

      “A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost
      throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform  himself  that
      he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or  inattentiveness
      when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and
      should not take a  chance  thinking  that  a  rash  driving  need  not
      necessarily cause any accident; or even if any accident occurs it need
      not necessarily result in the death of any human  being;  or  even  if
      such death ensues he might  not  be  convicted  of  the  offence;  and
      lastly, that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with  leniently
      by the court. He must always keep in his mind the fear psyche that  if
      he is convicted of the offence for causing death of a human being  due
      to his callous driving of vehicle he cannot escape from jail sentence.
      This is the role which the courts can play, particularly at the  level
      of trial courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to
      callous driving of automobiles.”



20.   In State of Karnataka v. Sharanappa Basanagouda Aregoudar[6],  it  has
been ruled that if the accused  are  found  guilty  of  rash  and  negligent
driving, courts have to be on guard to ensure that they do  not  escape  the
clutches of law very lightly. The sentence  imposed  by  the  courts  should
have deterrent effect on potential wrong-doers and  it  should  commensurate
with the seriousness of  the  offence.  Of  course,  the  courts  are  given
discretion in the matter of sentence to take stock of the wide  and  varying
range of facts that might be relevant for fixing the  quantum  of  sentence,
but the discretion  shall  be  exercised  with  due  regard  to  the  larger
interest of the society and it is needless to add that passing  of  sentence
on the offender is probably the most public face  of  the  criminal  justice
system.

21.   In State of M.P. v. Saleem alias Chamaru  and  Anr.[7],  it  has  been
ruled that the object should be to protect society and the avowed object  of
law is achieved by imposing appropriate sentence to deter the  criminal.  It
is expected that the courts would operate the sentencing  system  so  as  to
impose such sentence which reflects the conscience of the  society  and  the
sentencing process has to be stern where it should be.


22.   Yet again in B. Nagabhushanam V.  State of  Karnataka[8],  the  Court,
taking note of the fact  that  the  vehicle  was  being  driven  rashly  and
negligently, opined that six months' simple imprisonment and a direction  to
the appellant to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- for  commission  of  the  offence
punishable under Section 304-A and simple imprisonment for one month and  to
pay a fine of Rs. 500/- for the offence punishable under Section 279 of  the
Indian Penal Code cannot be said to be shocking.


23.   Recently, in State of Punjab v.  Balwinder  Singh  and  Ors.[9],  this
Court while dealing with the concept of sentencing, has stated thus:


      “While considering the quantum of  sentence  to  be  imposed  for  the
      offence of causing death or injury by rash and  negligent  driving  of
      automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. The
      persons driving motor vehicles cannot and should  not  take  a  chance
      thinking that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with leniently
      by the Court”.

24.   In Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra[10],  it  has  been
laid down that sentencing is an  important  task  in  relation  to  criminal
justice dispensation system. One of the prime  objectives  of  the  criminal
law is imposition of appropriate, adequate, just and proportionate  sentence
commensurate with the nature and gravity of crime and the  manner  in  which
the crime is done. There  is  no  straitjacket  formula  for  sentencing  an
accused on proof of crime. The courts have evolved certain principles:  twin
objective of the  sentencing  policy  is  deterrence  and  correction.  What
sentence  would  meet  the  ends  of  justice  depends  on  the  facts   and
circumstances of each case and the court must keep in mind  the  gravity  of
the crime, motive for the  crime,  nature  of  the  offence  and  all  other
attendant circumstances.  It has been further opined that the  principle  of
proportionality in sentencing a crime-doer is well  entrenched  in  criminal
jurisprudence. As  a  matter  of  law,  the  proportion  between  crime  and
punishment bears  the  most  relevant  influence  in  the  determination  of
sentencing the crime-doer. The court has  to  take  into  consideration  all
aspects including the social interest and  conscience  of  the  society  for
award of appropriate sentence.

25.   In State TR. P.S. Lodhi Colony, New Delhi v.  Sanjeev  Nanda[11],  one
of us (K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.), in his separate opinion, pertaining  to  the
conception of adequate sentencing, has expressed thus:

      “Law demands that the offender should be adequately punished  for  the
      crime, so that it can  deter  the  offender  and  other  persons  from
      committing similar offences.  Nature and circumstances of the offence;
      the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the  seriousness  of  the
      offence; to afford adequate deterrence to the conduct and  to  protect
      the public from such crimes are certain factors to be considered while
      imposing the sentence.”


26.   From the aforesaid authorities, it is luminous  that  this  Court  has
expressed its concern on imposition  of  adequate  sentence  in  respect  of
commission of offences regard being had to the nature  of  the  offence  and
demand of the conscience of the society. That apart, the  concern  has  been
to impose adequate sentence for the offence punishable under  Section  304-A
of the IPC.  It is  worthy  to  note  that  in  certain  circumstances,  the
mitigating factors have been taken into consideration but  the  said  aspect
is dependent on the facts of each case.  As the trend of  authorities  would
show, the  proficiency  in  professional  driving  is  emphasized  upon  and
deviation therefrom that results in rash and negligent  driving  and  causes
accident has been condemned.  In a motor accident, when a number  of  people
sustain injuries and a death occurs, it  creates  a  stir  in  the  society;
sense of fear prevails all around.   The  negligence  of  one  shatters  the
tranquility of the collective.  When such an accident  occurs,  it  has  the
effect potentiality of making  victims  in  many  a  layer  and  creating  a
concavity in the social fabric.  The  agony  and  anguish  of  the  affected
persons, both direct and vicarious, can have nightmarish effect. It has  its
impact on the society and the impact is felt more when accidents take  place
quite often because of rash driving  by  drunken,  negligent  or,  for  that
matter, adventurous drivers who have, in a way, no concern for  others.   Be
it noted, grant of compensation under the provisions of the  Motor  Vehicles
Act, 1988 is in a different sphere altogether.  Grant of compensation  under
Section 357(3) with a direction that the same should be paid to  the  person
who has suffered any loss or injury by reason  of  the  act  for  which  the
accused has been sentenced has a different contour and the same  is  not  to
be regarded as a substitute in all circumstances for adequate sentence.

27. Recently, this Court in  Rattiram  &  Ors.  v.  State  of  M.P.  Through
Inspector of Police[12], though in a  different  context,  has  stated  that
criminal jurisprudence, with the passage  of  time,  has  laid  emphasis  on
victimology which fundamentally is a perception of a  trial  from  the  view
point of the criminal as well as the victim.  Both are viewed in the  social
context.  The view of the victim is given due regard and respect in  certain
countries. It is the duty of the court to see that  the  victim’s  right  is
protected.


28.   We may note with profit that an appropriate  punishment  works  as  an
eye-opener for the persons who are not careful  while  driving  vehicles  on
the road and exhibit a careless  attitude  possibly  harbouring  the  notion
that they would be shown indulgence or lives of others are  like  “flies  to
the wanton boys”.  They totally forget that the lives of many are  in  their
hands, and the sublimity of safety of a human being  is  given  an  indecent
burial by their rash and negligent act.


29.   There can hardly be any cavil  that  there  has  to  be  a  proportion
between the crime and the punishment.  It is the duty of the  court  to  see
that appropriate sentence is imposed regard being had to the  commission  of
the crime and its impact on the social order.  The  cry  of  the  collective
for justice which includes adequate punishment cannot  be  lightly  ignored.
In Siriya alias Shri Lal v. State of M.P.[13], it has been held as  follows:
-

      “Protection of society and stamping out criminal  proclivity  must  be
      the object of law which  must  be  achieved  by  imposing  appropriate
      sentence.  Therefore, law as a corner-stone of the edifice of  “order”
      should meet the challenges confronting the society.  Friedman  in  his
      “Law  in  Changing  Society”  stated  that,  “State  of  criminal  law
      continues to be – as it should be – a decisive  reflection  of  social
      consciousness of society”.  Therefore,  in  operating  the  sentencing
      system, law should adopt the corrective machinery  or  the  deterrence
      based on factual matrix.  By deft  modulation  sentencing  process  be
      stern where it should be, and tempered with mercy where it warrants to
      be.”


30.   In view of the aforesaid, we have  to  weigh  whether  the  submission
advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant as regards the  mitigating
factors deserves acceptance.  Compassion is being sought on  the  ground  of
young age and mercy is being invoked on the foundation of  solemnization  of
marriage.  The date of occurrence is in  the  month  of  March,  2006.   The
scars on the collective cannot be said to  have  been  forgotten.   Weighing
the  individual  difficulty  as  against  the   social   order,   collective
conscience and the duty of the Court, we are  disposed  to  think  that  the
substantive sentence affirmed  by  the  High  Court  does  not  warrant  any
interference and, accordingly, we concur with the same.

31.   Consequently, the  appeal,  being  devoid  of  any  substance,  stands
dismissed.

                                                             ……………………………….J.
                                                       [K. S. Radhakrishnan]


                                                             ……………………………….J.
                                 [Dipak Misra]
New Delhi;
August  29, 2012.
-----------------------
[1]    (1995) 2 SCC 513
[2]    (1987) 1 SCC 538
[3]    (1991) 3 SCC 471
[4]    (1994) 4 SCC 353
[5]    (2000) 5 SCC 82
[6]    (2002) 3 SCC 738
[7]    (2005) 5 SCC 554
[8]    (2008) 5 SCC 730
[9]    (2012) 2 SCC 182
[10]   (2012) 2 SCC 648
[11]   2012 (7) SCALE 120
[12]   AIR 2012 SCW 1772
[13]   AIR 2008 SC 2314


Proliferation of arms and ammunition, whether licensed or not, in the country disrupts the social order and development, vitiates law and order situation, directly contributes towards lethality of violent acts which needs to be curbed. We are sorry to note the law enforcing agencies and to certain extent the courts in the country always treat the crimes lightly without noticing the havoc they can create - to the ordinary peace loving citizens of this country and to the national security and the integrity and the unity of this nation. We may indicate, the case in hand shows, how casually and lightly, these types of cases are being dealt with by the courts.- Section 25(1)(a) of the Arms Act, he has necessarily to undergo the minimum mandatory sentence, prescribed under the Statute. 11. The Chief Judicial Magistrate has overlooked this vital fact and awarded only one year’s R.I. and a fine of Rs.100/-, which was confirmed by the Sessions Court. The High Court has made it worst by reducing the sentence to the period already undergone, which was only seven days, in a case where the accused should have undergone a minimum sentence of three years and fine under Section 25(1)(a) of the Arms Act. 12. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the order of sentence passed by the High Court as well as the courts below and order that the respondent-accused has to undergo a minimum period of three years sentence as prescribed under Section 25(1)(a) of the Arms Act and also with a fine of Rs.5000/-, in default, another three months simple imprisonment.


                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION



               CRIMINAL   APPEAL  NO.1324             OF 2012
               @ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.5389 of 2011




State of M.P.                                           …    Appellant

                                   Versus

Ayub Khan                                         …     Respondent



                               J U D G M E N T



K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.



1.    Leave granted.




2.    Proliferation of arms and ammunition, whether licensed or not, in  the
country disrupts the social order and development, vitiates  law  and  order
situation, directly contributes towards  lethality  of  violent  acts  which
needs to be curbed.  We are sorry to note the law enforcing agencies and  to
certain extent the courts in the country always  treat  the  crimes  lightly
without noticing the havoc they can create -

to the ordinary peace loving citizens of this country and  to  the  national
security and the integrity and the unity of this nation.  We  may  indicate,
the case in hand shows, how casually and lightly, these types of  cases  are
being dealt with by the courts.



3.     ASI S.S. Gaur and P.P. Mrigwas while on patrol duty apprehended  that
the accused on 13.09.2005 at 8.30 pm while they were  coming  from  Bakaniya
to Mrigwas Road, Guna, M.P.  The accused was found to be  in  possession  of
country made barrel gun with two round bullets and 50 grams  of  explosives,
without any  licence.   The  accused  was  charge-sheeted  for  the  offence
punishable under Section 25(1)(a) of the Arms  Act,  1959  (for  short  ‘the
Arms Act’) and was tried before the Court of the Judicial  Magistrate  First
Class, Chachoda.  From the side of  the  prosecution  seven  witnesses  were
examined.  After considering the oral and documentary  evidence,  the  court
came to the conclusion that the accused was  guilty  of  the  offence  under
Section 25(1)(a) of the Arms Act and  on  sentence,  the  court  passed  the
following order:

           “There is no previous crime in  the  name  of  the  accused  and
           certainly the accused is the first time offender  but  from  the
           possession of the accused a rifle was  found  illegally  in  his
           possession, therefore, it is  not  proper  to  adopt  a  lenient
           approach towards the accused.  Only in view of the time taken by
           the trial and the time already spent by the accused in  custody,
           the accused is not punished with  the  maximum  punishment  and,
           therefore, the accused Ayub Khan is sentenced -

           to one year of R.I. and a  fine  of  Rs.100/-  for  the  offence
           punishable u/w 25(1)(a) of the Arms Act.”

4.    The Court then noticed that the accused was in  custody  from  14.9.05
to  20.9.05 and the said period was  deducted  from  the  original  sentence
applying Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure .



5.    Aggrieved by the said order the accused filed Criminal  Appeal  No.170
of 2008 before the Additional Sessions Judge, Chachoda on  the  ground  that
the conviction of the accused under Section 25(1)(a) of  the  Arms  Act  was
illegal and that the accused had not committed any offence.  The  Additional
Sessions Judge,  however,  vide  his  order  dated  9.7.2008  confirmed  the
conviction and the sentence awarded by the Chief  Judicial  Magistrate.  The
accused then filed Criminal Revision No.472 of 2008 before the Hon’ble  High
Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior.  The  High  Court  confirmed  the
order of conviction passed by the trial court but so far as the sentence  is
concerned, the High Court passed the following order on 15.01.2009:

           “so far as the period of sentence is concerned, looking  to  the
           limited prayer made by the counsel for the  petitioner  and  the
           nature of offence and the fact that the petitioner  has  already
           served substantive period of jail sentence the purpose would  be
           served in case the jail sentence awarded to  the  petitioner  is
           reduced to the period already undergone, subject  to  depositing
           fine of Rs.5,000/- within a period of two months, in default the
           -

           petitioner shall suffer jail sentence  awarded  by  the  Learned
           Court below.”

6.    Aggrieved  by  the  said  order,  the  State  of  Madhya  Pradesh  has
approached this Court.



7.    Learned counsel appearing for the State submitted that the High  Court
and the courts below have committed an error in  not  awarding  the  minimum
statutory sentence to  the  accused,  even  after,  convicting  him  for  an
offence committed under Section 25(1)(a) of the Arms Act.   Learned  counsel
submitted that as per the said Section the  minimum  statutory  sentence  is
three years but the same can be extended to  seven  years  and  the  accused
shall also be liable to fine.  Learned counsel appearing for the respondent-
accused submitted that on the peculiar facts and circumstances of  the  case
on hand, the High Court was justified  in  confining  the  sentence  of  the
accused to the period already undergone subject to depositing  the  fine  of
Rs.5,000/-.



8.    We are of the view that the Chief Judicial Magistrate as well  as  the
Sessions Court have committed an error in the manner in which  sentence  has
been awarded and the High Court  has  committed  a  grievous  error  in  not
awarding the proper sentence after having found  the  accused  guilty  under
Section 25(1)(a) of the Arms Act.  Error is apparent  on  the  face  of  the
High Court’s order.  The High Court has -

confined the sentence to the period the accused was in custody stating  that
he had already served substantive period of jail sentence.  We are sorry  to
note that the High Court has not taken pains to examine what was the  period
he had served by way of substantive sentence.  The accused  was  in  custody
only for seven days i.e. from 14.9.05 to 20.9.05.  We fail to  see  how  the
High  Court  has  reached  a  finding  that  the  accused  had  served   the
substantive period of jail sentence.



9.    We are of the view, that the High Court  and  the  courts  below  have
committed a serious error in not awarding  the  minimum  mandatory  sentence
prescribed under the Statute.  Chapter V of the  Arms  Act  deals  with  the
offences and penalties.  The accused  was  charge-sheeted  for  the  offence
under Section  25(1)(a)  of  the  Arms  Act  for  which   minimum  mandatory
sentence was not less than  three  years.   For  reference  sake,  the  said
provision, in its entirety, is extracted hereunder:

      “25.Punishment for certain offences --(1) Whoever

           (a) manufactures, sells, transfers, converts, repairs, tests  or
           proves,  or exposes  or offers for sale or transfer, or  has  in
           his possession  for sale, transfer, conversion,  repair, test or
           proof, any arms or ammunition in contravention of section 5;  or



           (b)  shortens  the  barrel  of  a   firearm   or   converts   an
           imitation firearm into a firearm in contravention of section  6;
           or

           -

           (c)         *     *    *     *      *

           (d) brings into, or takes   out   of,   India,   any   arms   or
           ammunition of  any  class or  description  in  contravention  of
            section 11

            shall be  punishable with  imprisonment for  a term which shall
           not be less than  three years but which   may  extend  to  seven
           years and shall also be liable to fine.”



10.   Legislature, in its wisdom, has fixed  a  mandatory  minimum  sentence
for certain offences - keeping, possessing arms and ammunition is a  serious
offence which shall not be less  than  three  years.   Legislature,  in  its
wisdom, felt that there should be a  mandatory  minimum  sentence  for  such
offences having felt the  increased  need  to  provide  for  more  stringent
punishment to curb unauthorised access to arms  and  ammunition,  especially
in a situation where we are facing with menace of terrorism and  other  anti
national activities.  A person who is found to be in possession  of  country
made barrel gun with two  round  bullets  and  50  grams  explosive  without
licence, must in the absence of proof to the  contrary  be  presumed  to  be
carrying it with the intention of using it when an opportunity  arise  which
would be  detrimental  to  the  people  at  large.   Possibly,  taking  into
consideration all those aspects, including the national interest and  safety
of the fellow citizens, the Legislature  in  its  wisdom  has  prescribed  a
minimum mandatory sentence.  Once the  accused  was  found  guilty  for  the
offence committed under -

Section 25(1)(a) of the Arms Act, he has necessarily to undergo the  minimum
mandatory sentence, prescribed  under the Statute.

11.   The Chief Judicial Magistrate  has  overlooked  this  vital  fact  and
awarded only one year’s R.I. and a fine of Rs.100/-, which was confirmed  by
the Sessions Court.  The High Court  has  made  it  worst  by  reducing  the
sentence to the period already undergone, which was only seven  days,  in  a
case where the accused should have undergone a  minimum  sentence  of  three
years and fine under Section 25(1)(a) of the Arms Act.

12.   We, therefore, allow this appeal, set  aside  the  order  of  sentence
passed by the High Court as well as the courts  below  and  order  that  the
respondent-accused has to undergo a minimum period of three  years  sentence
as prescribed under Section 25(1)(a) of the Arms Act and also  with  a  fine
of Rs.5000/-, in default, another three months simple imprisonment.




…..……....................................J
                                                  (K.S. Radhakrishnan)



                                …..……......................................J
                                             (Dipak Misra)
NEW DELHI
August  29 , 2012