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Thursday, August 23, 2012

The first respondent is, therefore, directed to pay to the appellants the total amount of compensation in the sum of Rs. 13,44,000/- after giving credit to whatever payment already made by calculating the rate of interest from the date of application till realization. Such payment should be made in the proportion as set out by the Tribunal in the last para of its order dated 10.07.2007. With the above modification in the quantum of compensation and the rate of interest payable right from the date of application, the compensation shall be made within a period of three months from the date of this order. The appeals stand allowed as above.


                                                                  Reportable


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                     CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 5399-5400 OF 2012


 Rebeka Minz & Ors.                          ….Appellants

                                   VERSUS


Divisional Manager,
United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr.       …Respondents


                               J U D G M E N T



Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.

1.    These appeals at the  instance  of  the  claimants  before  the  Motor
Accidents claims Tribunals challenge the common order of the High  Court  of
Orissa, Cuttack dated 05.03.2009 passed in MACA  No.821  of  2007  and  MACA
No.953 of 2007.  MACA No. 821 of 2007 was preferred by the appellants  while
MACA No.953 of 2007 was preferred by the first respondent-Insurance  company
in the High Court.  The husband of the first appellant died in  an  accident
on 04.01.1995 when he was  returning  from  the  plant  site  on  a  scooter
bearing registration No. OR-06-7703 around 6.30 a.m. near NALCO Nagar on NH-
42 at a place called Smelter Chhak, due to rash  and  negligent  driving  of
the driver of the truck bearing registration No. ORA-4241.

2.    The appellants being the wife and children of the  deceased  preferred
the claim before the Motor Accidents Tribunal in MAC  case  No.21  of  1995.
The Tribunal, after analyzing the entire evidence placed before it,  awarded
a sum of Rs. 10,08,000/- as compensation along with interest at the rate  of
 7% per annum with effect from  03.02.1995  to  22.08.1995  and  again  from
16.01.2007 till the payment within one month.   While  the  appellants  were
aggrieved insofar as the Tribunal applied the multiplier 12 instead  of  17,
having regard to the fact that the deceased at the time of his death was  35
years old as well as non-grant of interest for  certain  period,  the  first
respondent was aggrieved of the very  award  of  compensation  itself.   The
High Court while disposing of the appeal reduced  the  compensation  awarded
by the Tribunal and also the rate of interest by holding as under:-
           “Considering the submissions of  the  learned  counsel  for  the
      parties and keeping in view findings  of  the  learned  Tribunal  with
      regard to the quantum of compensation amount awarded and the basis  on
      which the same has been arrived at, I feel, the  interest  of  justice
      would  be  best  served  if  the  awarded   compensation   amount   of
      Rs.10,08,000/- is modified and reduced  to  Rs.  5,00,000/-  which  is
      payable to the claimants.  The claimants are also entitled to interest
      @ 6% per annum from the date of the claim application, till deposit of
      the amount.  The impugned award is modified to the said extent.

           The appellant insurance company (in  MACA  No.953  of  2007)  is
      directed to deposit the modified compensation amount of Rs, 5,00,000/-
      along with interest @6% per annum from the date of  filling  of  claim
      application with the learned Tribunal within six weeks from today.  On
      deposit of the amount, the same shall be disbursed  to  the  claimants
      proportionately as per the direction of the learned tribunal given  in
      the impugned award.”

3.    At the very outset, it is needless to state that the High Court  while
reducing the quantum of compensation as well as the rate of interest  failed
to assign any reason.  The impugned order of the High  Court  being  a  non-
speaking order calls for interference in these appeals.

4.    As stated by us, the appellants,  namely,  the  claimants  alone  have
come forward with  these  appeals.   Therefore,  the  only  question  to  be
examined is as to what is the multiplier to be  applied,  which  ground  was
though raised before the High Court, we find that the  High  Court  has  not
ventured to answer the said question.  This  question  has  time  and  again
been considered by this Court.  In a recent decision of this Court,  namely,
Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Company Ltd. & Ors. – 2012 (6)  SCC  421-
to which one of us (Hon. G.S. Singhvi. J.) was a party, after  referring  to
the decision in Sarla Verma & Ors. v. Delhi Transport Corporation &  Anr.  –
2009 (6) SCC 121 wherein the formula under different headings including  the
one relating to selection of multiplier was quoted with approval.  The  said
formula has been set out in Sarla Verma (supra) in para 42  which  reads  as
under:-
        “42. We therefore hold that the multiplier to be used should be  as
      mentioned in Column (4) of  the  table  above  (prepared  by  applying
      Susamma Thomas, Trilok Chandra and  Charlie),  which  starts  with  an
      operative multiplier of 18 (for the age groups of 15 to 20 and  21  to
      25 years), reduced by one unit for every five years, that is M-17  for
      26 to 30 years, M-16 for 31 to 35 years, M-15 for 36 to 40 years, M-14
      for 41 to 45 years, and M-13 for 46 to 50 years, then reduced  by  two
      units for every five years, that is, M-11 for 51 to 55 years, M-9  for
      56 to 60 years, M-7 for 61 to 65 years and M-5 for 66 to 70 years.”

5.    The said part  of  the  formula  was  applied  in  the  said  reported
decision Santosh Devi v.  National  Insurance  Company  Ltd.  &  Ors.(supra)
referred to  above  while  working  out  the  compensation  payable  to  the
claimants therein.  We, therefore, follow the above  referred  to  decisions
and when the said formula is applied since the deceased was stated to be  35
years old at the time of his death, the multiplier would be 16 which has  to
be applied for calculating the compensation.   The Tribunal after  examining
the materials before it,  found  that  after  deducting  1/3rd  of  personal
expenses, the monthly income of the deceased  was  Rs.7,000/-  and  the  net
contribution to the family  was  ascertained  at  Rs.  84,000/-  per  annum.
Applying the multiplier of 16, the compensation works out to Rs. 13,44,000/-
.  Therefore, while setting aside the order of the High Court insofar as  it
reduced the quantum of compensation, we modify the compensation  payable  to
the appellants in a sum of Rs. 13,44,000/- [84,000/- x 16].   The  said  sum
of Rs. 13,44,000/-should carry interest at the rate of  7%  per  annum  from
the date of application till the date of realization.

6.    The first respondent is, therefore, directed to pay to the  appellants
the total amount of compensation in the sum of Rs. 13,44,000/- after  giving
credit to whatever payment already made by calculating the rate of  interest
from the date of application till realization.  Such payment should be  made
in the proportion as set out by the Tribunal in the last para of  its  order
dated  10.07.2007.   With  the  above  modification  in   the   quantum   of
compensation and the rate  of  interest  payable  right  from  the  date  of
application, the compensation shall be made within a period of three  months
from the date of this order.  The appeals stand allowed as above.


                                                      …..……….…………………………...J.
                                                              [G.S. Singhvi]




                                                         ……………………………………………J.
                                          [Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla]


New Delhi;
August 23, 2012


-----------------------
3


This appeal is directed against order dated 14.3.2008 of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (for short, ‘the National Commission’) whereby the application filed by the appellant for review of order dated 9.9.2004 was dismissedIn our view, the appellant cannot make any grievance against the cost specified in the revised allotment letters issued on 22.1.1999 and 25.1.1999 because he had voluntarily sought change in the mode of purchase and unequivocally agreed to pay the cost i.e. Rs.5,23,232/- . The appellant’s plea that the cost of the flat cannot be more than what was specified in the registered sale deed sounds attractive but lacks merit. A careful reading of letters dated 22.8.1998, 27.11.1998 and 15.5.1999 sent by the appellant to the respondent makes it clear that he had conveyed his unequivocal willingness for registration of the sale deed showing the cost of the flat as Rs.4,31,918/- although the actual cost was Rs.5,23,232/-. Having taken advantage of the offer made by the Board to get the deed registered at a price less than the actual cost of the flat, the appellant cannot turn around and demand refund of Rs.1,01,314/-. 18. The appellant’s grievance against the quantum of compensation awarded by the State Commission also merits rejection because the complaint filed by him was not bona fide.


                                                              NON-REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5584 OF 2012
                 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 12334 of 2009)


S. Srinivasa Murthy                                      … Appellant


                                   versus


Karnataka Housing Board                                  … Respondent

                               J U D G M E N T
G. S. Singhvi, J.

1.    This appeal is directed against order dated 14.3.2008 of the  National
Consumer  Disputes  Redressal   Commission   (for   short,   ‘the   National
Commission’) whereby the application filed by the appellant  for  review  of
order dated 9.9.2004 was dismissed.

2.    In response to an advertisement  issued  by  Karnataka  Housing  Board
(respondent), which was published in the Times  of  India  dated  14.7.1993,
the appellant applied for allotment of a HIG flat in  Vth  Phase,  Yelahanka
under the self-financing scheme. He was allotted under  S-HIGA  Flat  No.37,
First Floor.  In the allotment letter issued on  29.11.1993,  the  tentative
cost of the flat was shown as Rs.3,40,000/-.

3.    As per the advertisement, the flat was to be ready for  occupation  by
December, 1994 but the construction of the flat was completed only  in  1998
and possession thereof was delivered to the appellant on 19.5.1999.

4.    In the meanwhile, the appellant sent letter dated  14.12.1998  to  the
Executive Engineer of the  respondent  with  the  request  that  he  may  be
permitted to change the  mode  of  purchase  from  lease-cum-sale  basis  to
outright sale basis.  He also conveyed his willingness to  pay  the  balance
amount required for that purpose. That letter reads as under:
      “From
      S.SRINIVASA MURTHY,
      QR 9/TYPE IV, TELECOM QUARTERS,
      C.T.O. COMPOUND, JUHU ROAD,
      MUMBAI-400054
      To


      The Executive Engineer,
      Karnataka Housing Board,
      KHB Metro No.1 Dn,
      BANGALORE-560064.


      Dear Sir,


              Sub:    Allotment   of    House    at    YELAHANKA-5    PHASE-
      SHIG-FF
                 Bangalore Metro Division I
                 ALLOTMENT CODE: 210-288-37: Request to purchase  the  above
                 under ABSOLUTE SALE DEED.


            This is to request you kindly permit me to change  the  purchase
      of the above allotment from LEASE-CUM-SALE  to  ABSOLUTE  SALE.  I  am
      willing to pay  the  balance  amount  required  for  this  purpose  on
      receiving a letter from you for  this  purpose.  Please  note  that  I
      require a letter indicating the balance amount to be paid  so  that  I
      can avail loan from my office and send you the payment.


            I shall await an early action on my request.


            Thanking you,
                                                           Yours faithfully,
      Mumbai,
      14-12-98
                                                       (S.SRINIVASA MURTHY)”



5.    The respondent accepted the request of the appellant  and  allotted  a
flat to him in 3500-Multi-tenaments at  Vth  Phase,  Yelahanka  on  outright
sale basis.   The cost of that flat was shown to be Rs.5,23,232/-.

6.    Upon receipt of the revised  allotment  letters  dated  22.1.1999  and
25.1.1999, the appellant sent communication dated 15.2.1999 to  the  Housing
Commissioner of the respondent and protested against the alleged failure  of
the concerned authority to take cognizance of the fact that he  had  already
deposited Rs.3,75,750/-.  Thereafter, the  respondent  issued  letter  dated
6.4.1999 indicating therein that  the  appellant  is  required  to  pay  the
balance  amount  of  Rs.1,57,482/-.   The  appellant  accepted  the  revised
allotment and deposited the remaining amount.

7.    During the interregnum, the  respondent  suggested  to  the  appellant
that for the purpose of registration of the sale  deed,  the  price  of  the
flat be  shown  as  Rs.4,31,918/-  so  that  he  will  be  required  to  pay
registration charges on 81% of the total cost. The  appellant  conveyed  his
acceptance vide letters  dated  22.8.1998,  27.11.1998  and  15.5.1999.  The
English translation of the last letter is reproduced below:
                         “(TRANSLATION)


           KARNATAKA HOUSING BOARD                       "CONSENT
                                   LETTER"


      I have been allotted by the Karnataka Housing Board  Flat  No.37-S-HIG
      'A' F.F. on full price basis  and  I  have  paid  the  full  value  of
      Rs.533232.00.

      I am agreeable to the decision of  the  Board  that  the  registration
      value should be 81% of the sale price namely Rs.43198.00 and the stamp
      duty should be paid over the said amount.

      If the remaining 19% of the value  is  included  in  the  registration
      value the registration charges will be higher. Hence I agree  to  have
      the registration done at 81% of the sale price and I will not ask  for
      refund of the remaining 19% of the sale price under any circumstances.


                                          NAME OF THE ALLOTTEE
                                                   Sd/-
                                        S.V. Srinivasa Murthy
      Date: 15.05.1999”



8.    After taking possession of the flat,  the  appellant  filed  complaint
under Section 17 of the Consumer  Protection  Act,  1986  (for  short,  ‘the
Act’) and claimed the following reliefs:

      “1.  Interest on basis cost of Rs.340000/- from 9.2.95

            to 18.5.99                                   310675-00

      2.   Refund of amount paid on 31.7.95                     23840-00

       3.    Interest   on   2   above   for   the   period   from   31.7.95



                 to 18.5.99                                    19435-00

      4.   Refund of amount paid on 13.1.96                    11910-00

      5.   Interest on 4 above for the period from 13.7.96 to

                 18.5.99                                               7255-
00

      6.    Refund of amount paid on 29.4.99                157482-00

      7.   Interest on 6 above for the period from 29.4.99 to

                 18.4.99                                               1890-
00

      8.    Compensation for delay deficiency in specification

              and mental tension                                50000-00

      9.     Costs of the complaint                               2000-00”



9.    In the counter filed on behalf of the respondent, the following  pleas
were taken:

(i)   The cost of the flat mentioned  in  the  allotment  letter  issued  on
29.11.1993 was tentative and the  same  was  revised  keeping  in  view  the
relevant factors including the cost of construction.

(ii)  The appellant is estopped from questioning the  demand  of  additional
cost because he had accepted the terms and  conditions  embodied  in  letter
dated 29.11.1993 without any objection and, later on, he voluntarily  sought
change of the mode of purchase from lease-cum-sale basis  to  outright  sale
basis.

(iii) The time schedule fixed for completion of the flat was also  tentative
and possession of the flat was handed over after completion of  construction
and ancillary works.

10.   The State Commission  rejected  the  appellant’s  plea  for  award  of
interest on the amount deposited by him and observed:
       “Since the amount has been  fixed  as  provisional  at  the  time  of
      issuing advertisement and subsequently cost has been raised on account
      of  the  escalation  and  the  said  amount  has  been  paid  by   the
      complainant, the complainant is not entitled to get  interest  on  the
      said amount as claimed in the complaint.”



11.   The appellant’s grievance that there were  deficiencies  in  the  flat
was also rejected  by  the  State  Commission  by  assigning  the  following
reasons:

      “The complainant has contended in his complaint and in  his  affidavit
      and his written arguments that the OP has handed over the flat not  as
      per the specification-but with one bath room less. This fact  has  not
      been disputed by the OP. But however, OP contended that  it  has  been
      changed as per the  advise  of,  Expert  body.  The  learned  advocate
      Mr.Venkataramaiah  submitted  that  in  so  far   as   violating   the
      specification is concerned, the Board being a Public Institution works
      under special schemes and the notification is according to the  scheme
      works out under a Special  Committee  constituted  for  that  purpose.
      Therefore,  the  contention  with  regard   to   alteration   of   the
      specifications in the building is not open to the complainant  as  the
      Board has reserved its right subject to the  scheme  approved  by  the
      committee while notifying the allotment itself.”




12.   On the issue of  delay  in  the  delivery  of  possession,  the  State
Commission partly  ruled  in  favour  of  the  appellant  and  directed  the
respondent to  pay  compensation  of  Rs.25,000/-.   This  is  evident  from
paragraph 11 of the State Commission’s order, which is extracted below:
       “As   far   as   the   delay   in    handing    over  the  possession
      of   the flat is concerned, the OP has contended  that  the  delay  in
      handing over the  possession  is  not  on  account  of  deficiency  in
      service, but on account of various acts of nature  administration  and
      various other problems  which  do  not  amount  to      deficiency  in
      service.  The  explanation  offered  by  the  OP    cannot  be  easily
      accepted.  According to the original advertisement  and  the  brochure
      issued by the Board the  flat will be ready and  has   to  be   handed
      over by  the  end of 1994 but actually the  flat  was  handed over  to
      the complainant  on   19.5.99.   There was no fault  on  the  part  of
      the complainant.  Under those circumstances we are of the opinion that
      ends of Justice will be met if we direct  the  OP  to  pay  a  sum  of
      Rs.25,000/- as compensation  to  the  complainant  for  the  delay  in
      handing over the flat.”




13.   The appeal preferred by the appellant against the order of  the  State
Commission was  dismissed  by  the  National  Commission  vide  order  dated
9.9.2004.  The National Commission agreed with  the  State  Commission  that
the cost indicated in the allotment letter was tentative and the  respondent
had the right to revise the same and further  that  the  appellant  was  not
entitled to complain against the cost mentioned  in  the  revised  allotment
letters because he had voluntarily sought change in the  mode  of  purchase.
The National Commission also held  that  the  compensation  awarded  by  the
State Commission was just and proper.

14.   The application filed by the  appellant  for  review  of  order  dated
9.9.2004 was also dismissed by the  National  Commission  vide  order  dated
14.3.2008, the relevant portion of which is extracted below:

      “Undisputedly, the tentative cost of the flat booked was Rs.3,40,000/-
      . It was enhanced from Rs.3,40,000/-  to  4,35,000/-  and  further  to
      Rs.4,83,000/-. Though the  Petitioner  had  paid  the  amount  as  per
      allotment letter dated 6.4.99 a further amount  of  Rs.1,57,482/-  was
      demanded which was also paid by him on 29.4.99 and the sale  deed  was
      registered. He took the possession on 19.5.99 which was promised to be
      given in 1994 Since the State Commission had already awarded  interest
      @ 12 p.a. which was in tune with the decision of the apex court in the
      case of GDA Vs. Balbir Singh - (2004) 5 SCC 65.  The  Appellant  could
      not clam interest @ 18% p.a. on the basis of earlier decisions of this
      Commission.”




15.   The appellant reiterated the  grievance  made  in  the  complaint  and
argued that the demand of  additional  price  by  the  respondent  was  only
unjustified and the State Commission and the National  Commission  committed
serious error by declining to entertain his prayer for award of interest  on
the amount already deposited by him and the  additional  cost.   He  further
argued that the respondent was not entitled to arbitrarily change  the  mode
of allotment from self-financing scheme to outright sale scheme  and  charge
higher price without paying interest on Rs.3,40,000/- deposited  by  him  in
furtherance of the initial allotment.  He  further  argued  that  the  State
Commission and the National Commission committed grave error by refusing  to
direct the respondent to refund the  excess  amount  of  Rs.1,57,482/-  with
interest.  In the end, he argued that the respondent should be  directed  to
refund Rs.1,01,314/- which was charged in excess of the  cost  of  the  flat
mentioned in the sale deed.

16.   Learned counsel for the respondent argued that the cost  of  the  flat
mentioned in the allotment letter issued on  29.11.1993  was  tentative  and
was  liable  to  revision  till  the  completion  of  construction  and  the
respondent did not commit any error by revising the cost from  Rs.3,40,000/-
to Rs.4,35,360/- and then to  Rs.4,83,000/-.  He  further  argued  that  the
appellant cannot complain against the demand of total cost of  Rs.5,23,232/-
because he had voluntarily  sought  change  in  the  mode  of  purchase  and
accepted the cost indicated in  the  revised  allotment  letters  issued  on
22.1.1999 and 25.1.1999. Learned counsel further argued that  the  appellant
is  estopped  from  questioning  the  cost  of  flat  indicated  in  revised
allotment letters  because  the  same  cost  has  been  charged  from  other
allottees of HIG house under the outright sale scheme.

17.   We have considered the respective arguments/submissions and  carefully
scanned the record.  In our view, the appellant cannot  make  any  grievance
against the cost specified  in  the  revised  allotment  letters  issued  on
22.1.1999 and 25.1.1999 because he had  voluntarily  sought  change  in  the
mode of purchase and unequivocally agreed to pay the cost i.e. Rs.5,23,232/-
.  The appellant’s plea that the cost of the flat cannot be more  than  what
was specified in the  registered  sale  deed  sounds  attractive  but  lacks
merit.  A  careful  reading  of  letters  dated  22.8.1998,  27.11.1998  and
15.5.1999 sent by the appellant to the respondent makes  it  clear  that  he
had conveyed his unequivocal willingness for registration of the  sale  deed
showing the cost of the flat as Rs.4,31,918/- although the actual  cost  was
Rs.5,23,232/-.  Having taken advantage of the offer made  by  the  Board  to
get the deed registered at a price less than the actual cost  of  the  flat,
the appellant cannot turn around and demand refund of Rs.1,01,314/-.

 18.  The appellant’s grievance against the quantum of compensation  awarded
by the State Commission also merits rejection because  the  complaint  filed
by him was not bona fide.

19.   In the result, the appeal is dismissed.




                                                       …...……..….………………….…J.
                                            [G.S. Singhvi]






                                                         …………..….………………….…J.
                                           [Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya]
New Delhi,
August 22, 2012.














“In the result I allow the writ petition, quash the order of dismissal dated February 11, 1988 and direct that the petitioner shall be reinstated in service forthwith with all consequential benefits from the date of his dismissal. Needless to say it would be open to the respondents, if so advised, to proceed against the petitioner afresh as per the Rules of the Education Code.” It is neither the pleaded case of the respondents nor it was argued before us that during the pendency of the enquiry, the appellant was kept under suspension and he was paid subsistence allowance. This being the position, there could be no justification to deny full salary to the appellant for the period between 5.11.2003 and 31.12.2005. 16. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned order is set aside and the respondents are directed to pay full salary and allowances to the appellant for the period between 5.11.2003 and 31.12.2005. The needful be done within a period of two months from today by getting prepared a demand draft in the appellant’s name, which shall be delivered at his residential address on or before the end of two months period.


                                                              NON-REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5372 OF 2012
                 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 23219 of 2010)

R.S. Misra                                               … Appellant
                                   Versus

Union of India and others                                     … Respondents


                               J U D G M E N T
G. S. Singhvi, J.

1.    This appeal is directed against order dated  5.2.2010  passed  by  the
Division Bench of the Delhi  High  Court  whereby  the  civil  miscellaneous
application filed by the appellant in Writ Petition No.3902/2008  for  issue
of a direction to the respondents to pay him salary for the  period  between
5.11.2003 and 24.1.2006 was dismissed.

2.    While he was holding the post of Post Graduate Teacher (Chemistry)  in
Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan (for short, ‘KVS’),  the  appellant’s  services
were terminated by the  Commissioner,  KVS  under  Article  81  (b)  of  the
Education Code.  CWP No.3354 of 1994 filed by the appellant was  allowed  by
the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court vide order dated  19.9.1994
and the termination of his service was quashed.  The  operative  portion  of
that order reads as under:
           “In the result I allow the writ petition,  quash  the  order  of
           dismissal dated February 11, 1988 and direct that the petitioner
           shall be reinstated in service forthwith with all  consequential
           benefits from the date of his  dismissal.  Needless  to  say  it
           would be open to the respondents,  if  so  advised,  to  proceed
           against the petitioner afresh as per the Rules of the  Education
           Code.”



3.    LPA  No.116/1994  filed  by  the  respondents  was  dismissed  by  the
Division Bench of  the  High  Court.   Thereafter,   the  Commissioner,  KVS
passed order dated 3.10.2000 for  reinstatement  of  the  appellant  with  a
stipulation that the period during which  he  had  not  worked,  i.e.,  from
11.2.1988 to the date of joining the duty shall be treated as ‘dies-non’.

4.    Since the appellant was not given  consequential  benefits,  he  filed
Contempt Petition No. 550/2000 which was disposed of by the  learned  Single
Judge of the High Court vide order dated 25.1.2001, the relevant portion  of
which is reproduced below:
           “In this case judgment of the learned Single Judge has merged in
           the judgment passed in LPA. There is no dispute about one aspect
           that the petitioner has  been  appointed  vide  annexure-2  vide
           order 3.10.2000 at page 33. In case there is non  compliance  of
           order of Division Bench then petitioner is at liberty to file  a
           fresh petition. With the above observations, the application and
           petition stand disposed of.”



5.    The appellant sent legal notice dated 20.2.2001 through  his  advocate
for grant of consequential benefits but the same was  rejected  vide  letter
dated 4.4.2001. Thereupon, he filed  Contempt  Petition  No.  151/2001.  The
learned Single Judge noted that the appellant had  already  been  reinstated
and a sum of Rs.11,48,625/- were paid to him by way of arrears  of  pay  and
allowances and directed the  non-petitioner  in  the  contempt  petition  to
consider his case for grant of such  benefits  to  which  he  may  be  found
entitled. The learned Single Judge also made it clear that if the  appellant
feels aggrieved by the decision of the competent authority then he shall  be
free to avail appropriate legal remedy.

6.    In the meanwhile, the  appellant  was  served  with  memorandum  dated
11.3.2002 and was called upon to  explain  as  to  why  disciplinary  action
should not be taken against him under Article 81(b) of  the  Education  Code
on six allegations,  three  of  which  related  to  misbehaviour  with  girl
students. The Enquiry Officer/Summary  Enquiry  Committee  submitted  report
dated 9.4.2002  with  the  finding  that  allegations  leveled  against  the
appellant have been  proved.  After  considering  the  Enquiry  Report,  the
Commissioner issued memorandum  dated  31.3.2003  proposing  to  pass  final
order under Article 81(b) of the Education Code and gave opportunity to  the
appellant to make representation in the context  of  the  findings  recorded
against  him.  The  appellant  submitted   detailed   representation   dated
15.4.2003 to contest the findings recorded  in  the  Enquiry  Report.  After
considering the same, the Commissioner, KVS  passed  order  dated  5.11.2003
and terminated the appellant’s service with immediate effect.

7.    The appellant challenged  memorandum  dated  31.3.2003  by  filing  an
application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, which  was
registered as OA No.2008/2003. He also  filed  a  miscellaneous  application
for stay of order dated  5.11.2003  passed  by  the  Commissioner,  KVS  for
termination of his service.  By an order  dated  29.12.2003,  the  Principal
Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal  (for  short,  ‘the  Tribunal’)
stayed the  operation  of  order  dated  5.11.2003.  The  Commissioner,  KVS
challenged that order in WP(C) No. 3141/2004, which was disposed of  by  the
Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  vide  order  dated   16.8.2004,   the
substantive portion of which reads as under:

           “Petition is disposed of by providing that the termination order
           passed against the petitioner shall remain in abeyance  for  two
           months from this period. Tribunal is directed to dispose of  the
           OA of the respondent expeditiously.

           During this period, respondent will be deemed to be  in  service
           and petitioner shall pay 50% of  his  salaries  subject  to  the
           outcome of the OA. Respondent will not however enter the  school
           premises for discharge of his duties during this period in  view
           of the nature of allegations levelled  against  him.  This  will
           not, however be any expression of opinion on the merit of the OA
           or the nature of charges against the respondent.”


8.    OA No.2008/2003 was finally disposed of by  the  Tribunal  vide  order
dated 15.12.2005 and a direction was issued  to  the  Commissioner,  KVS  to
pass fresh order after considering the representation made by the  appellant
and  keeping  in  view  his  forthcoming  superannuation  with  effect  from
31.12.2005. Simultaneously, it  was  directed  that  the  respondents  shall
continue to pay 50% salary till the decision was taken in the matter.

9.    In view of the aforesaid  order  of  the  Tribunal,  the  Commissioner
considered  the  appellant’s   representation   and   passed   order   dated
20/24.01.2006 whereby he  again  terminated  the  appellant’s  service  with
immediate effect under Article 81(b) of  the  Education  Code  and  directed
that the amount payable to him in  terms  of  the  Tribunal’s  order  and  3
months pay and allowances in lieu of notice be paid to him immediately.  The
operative portion of that order reads as under:

           “Considering the gravity of the proven immoral behaviour towards
           girl students, I hereby terminate  the  services  of  Shri  R.S.
           Misra with  immediate  effect  pursuant  to  the  provisions  of
           Article 81(b) of Education Code  for  Kendriya  Vidyalaya.  This
           order is issued in compliance to the Orders dated 15.12.2005  of
           Hon’ble CAT, Principal Bench, New Delhi in Original  Application
           No.2008 of 2003. The amount payable to Sh.R.S. Misra in terms of
           Hon’ble CAT’s order as well as three month’s pay and  allowances
           in lieu of notice period also in terms of Article 81(b) be  paid
           to him immediately.”



10.    The  appeal  filed  by  the  appellant  against  the  order  of   the
Commissioner was dismissed  by  the  Vice-Chairman,  KVS  vide  order  dated
18/21.4.2006.

11.   The appellant challenged the order  of  termination  as  well  as  the
appellate order in OA No. 996/2006, which was dismissed by the  Tribunal  by
observing that the exercise of power by  the  Chairman,  KVS  under  Article
81(b) did not suffer from any legal error. The writ petition  filed  by  the
appellant was dismissed by the Division Bench of the Delhi High  Court.  The
same was the fate of review petition filed by him before the High Court  and
SLP(C) Nos.8219-8220/2010 filed before this Court.

12.   Having failed to convince the Tribunal, the High Court and this  Court
to  quash  the  termination  of  his  service,  the  appellant  filed  Civil
Miscellaneous Application No. 14140/2009 in Writ Petition  No.3902/2008  and
prayed that a direction be issued to the respondents to pay him full  salary
for the period between 5.11.2003 and 24.1.2006.

13.   The Division Bench of the High Court referred  to  the  earlier  order
passed  in  WP(C)  No.  3141/2004  whereby  direction  was  given   to   the
respondents to pay 50% of salary to the appellant subject to the outcome  of
OA No.2008/2003, order  dated  15.12.2005  passed  by  the  Tribunal  in  OA
No.2008/2003 and held that in view of  the  directions  contained  in  those
orders, the appellant is not entitled to more than 50% salary.

14.   We have heard the appellant, who has appeared in person  and  Shri  S.
Rajappa, learned counsel for  the  respondents  and  carefully  perused  the
record. In our opinion, the  impugned  order  is  liable  to  be  set  aside
because the view taken by the High Court on the appellant’s  entitlement  to
get full salary for the period between 5.11.2003 and 31.12.2005 is  ex-facie
erroneous. Once the  Tribunal  allowed  OA  No.2008/2003  and  directed  the
Commissioner to pass fresh order under Article 81(b) of the  Education  Code
after  considering  the  representation  submitted  by  the  appellant,  the
earlier order  terminating  his  service  will  be  deemed  to  have  become
redundant and the appellant will be deemed to be continuing in  service  for
all purposes. This conclusion is buttressed by  the  fact  that  vide  order
dated 24.1.2006, the Commissioner passed fresh order under Article 81(b)  of
the Education Code and terminated the  appellant’s  service  with  immediate
effect. The order passed by the High Court in  WP(C)  No.  3141/2004  was  a
sort of interim arrangement made to dilute the  impact  of  the  stay  order
passed by the Tribunal on 29.12.2003.  Therefore,  the  same  could  not  be
relied upon by the respondents and the High Court for denying the  appellant
of his right to get full salary between 5.11.2003 and 31.12.2005.

15.   It is neither the pleaded case of the respondents nor  it  was  argued
before us that during the pendency of the enquiry, the  appellant  was  kept
under suspension and he was  paid  subsistence  allowance.  This  being  the
position, there could be  no  justification  to  deny  full  salary  to  the
appellant for the period between 5.11.2003 and 31.12.2005.

16.   In the result, the appeal is allowed, the impugned order is set  aside
and the respondents are directed to pay full salary and  allowances  to  the
appellant for the period between 5.11.2003 and 31.12.2005.  The  needful  be
done within a period of two months from today by getting prepared  a  demand
draft in the appellant’s name, which shall be delivered at  his  residential
address on or before the end of two months period.


                                                    …..…...……..….………………….…J.
                                           [G.S. Singhvi]




                                                       ….…………..….………………….…J.
                                     [Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla]
New Delhi,
August 22, 2012.


-----------------------
8


Respondent No.3 is directed to pay to the appellant total compensation of Rs.34,38,747/- within a period of 3 months by getting prepared a demand draft in her name which shall be delivered at her residence. While doing so, respondent No.3 shall be free to deduct the amount already paid to the appellant pursuant to the award passed by the Tribunal and/or the impugned judgment. If law permits it to do so, respondent No.3 shall be free to recover the amount of compensation from respondent Nos.1 and 2. Relying on the decision in Nizam's Institute of Medical Sciences v. Prasanth S. Dhananka (supra) and assuming the claimant’s life expectancy to be 55 years, we deem it appropriate to award attendant charges at the rate of Rs.2000/- per month and physiotherapy expenses at the rate of Rs.3000/- per month. With regard to the head of physical and mental pains the amount is enhanced to Rs.3,00,000/- and another Rs.3,00,000/- is awarded under the heads of loss of amenities and loss of life expectancy.As per the disability certificate issued on 23.8.2006, the appellant had virtually become vegetable and, therefore, she is not in a position to look after herself what to say of discharging her functions as partner of Tirupati Enterprises. Therefore, by applying the multiplier of 17, the future loss of earning would come to Rs.3,67,200/-.


                                                              NON-REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  5945    OF 2012
                  (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 7396 of 2011)


Kavita                                             … Appellant

                                   versus



Deepak and Others                                         … Respondents



                               J U D G M E N T
G. S. Singhvi, J.

1.    Leave granted.

2.    Feeling dissatisfied with the enhancement granted by  the  High  Court
in the amount of compensation awarded by the Motor Accident Claims  Tribunal
(for short, ‘the Tribunal’), the appellant has preferred this appeal.

3.    In an accident, which occurred on  2.5.2004,  the  appellant  suffered
grievous injuries. She was initially treated at Government hospital,  Ratlam
and then at Bhandari Hospital, Indore. On 4.5.2004, she was admitted in  CHL
Apollo Hospital. She remained  in  Intensive  Care  Unit  from  4.5.2004  to
25.5.2004 and in the private ward from 25.5.2004 to 26.6.2004.  As  per  the
medical advice given at Indore she was taken to Mumbai, Chennai and  finally
to Delhi for treatment.  At the time of accident, the  appellant’s  age  was
about 30 years and she was working partner in Tirupati Enterprises.

4.    At Bhandari Hospital, Indore she was treated by Dr.  Rajesh  Gangwani,
Dr. Srikant Rege, Dr. Parag Aggarwal and Dr. Sunil Athwale.  At Bombay,  she
was treated by Dr. B. S. Singhal, Dr. Bhagwati, Dr. K. K. Garg, Dr.  Anukant
Mittal,  Dr.  Khandilkar,  Dr.  Kenny  and  Dr.   Bhatt.    The   Disability
Certificate issued  by  Dr.  Sunil  Athwale,  who  was  Neuro  Physician  at
Bhandari Hospital, Indore reads as under:

                  “DISABILITY CERTIFICATE

      This is to certify that Smt. Kavita Singhal w/o Mr. Deepak Singhal R/o
      100 old agrawal nagar indore aged 31 yrs met with an RTA on 02-05-2004
      mid night on Ratlam - Indore State Highway Road.


      She was taken to Indore On ICU on wheels & was given artificial 02  on
      the way which was 135 KM. We reached Indore nearly at 7.30 AM. and was
      admitted in Bhandari hospital. During transit fluid  lesusitation  was
      done & heamodyriameis was maintained. (1.5 Its I/v & I unit blood  was
      given). CT scan was done nearly after 10 hrs. of injury.  Onwards  she
      is under my treatment and the patient is experienced as below:


      First MR Study of the brain (on 1.5 T ) and the  report  of  the  same
      reveals:


      FINDINGS:-
      Multiple DWI TI FLAIR & T2 hyperintense  signals  are  noted  in  left
      basal  ganglia,  right  frontal  periventricular  white  matter,  left
      thalamus  &  right  basi  frontal  region  with  areas   of   magnetic
      susceptibility in it suggesting haemorrhage.


      T2  FLAIR hyperintense signals are noted diffusely in corpus callosum,
          cinglate     gyrus    and     periventricular     white     matter
      (frontoperietal suggestive of diffuse axonal injury).


      Second MR of brain has done and the report of the same reveals:


      FINDINGS:- O1d MRI Scan of brain dated 22/05/04 compared and following
      changes noted:


      Follow up scan reveals that complete resolution of the posterior inter
      hemispheric sub  dural  collection  noted  in  left  occipito  parital
      region. Old haemorrhagic products - noted in the left  basal  ganglia,
      left anterior thalamus, right frontal periventricular white matter and
      right basi frontal region (mild decrease in size as  compared  to  old
      study especially in right basal ganglia). Diffuse axonal injury  noted
      in corpus callosum, cingulated gyrus 85 periventricular  white  matter
      noted (mild decrease as compared to old study)


      She was discharged from CHL on 26/06/2004 in a vegetative stage,  with
      a RT for feeding. That time she was unable to communicate in, any way.
      She was undergoing extensive Physiotheraphy there and was advised  the
      same to continue.



      PRESENT STATUS:



      *      The patient follows elementary simple commands but with      no
      other Communication, Verbal or Sign Language.
      *      Patient  has  marked  Spastic  Quadra  paresis,  despite   anti
      spastic drugs.
    * Patient is incontinent.
    * Disability assessed around 90 %.”

5.    The appellant filed a petition  through  her  husband  -  Shri  Deepak
Singhal under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for  short,  ‘the
Act’) for award of compensation to the tune of Rs.85 lakhs by alleging  that
the accident was caused due to rash  and  negligent  driving  of  the  truck
owned by respondent No.1 and driven by respondent  No.2.  She  alleged  that
the truck dashed against the Maruti Esteem car in which she  was  travelling
and as a result of the accident she suffered injuries to  her  head,  mouth,
right ear and other parts of the body and  consequentially  she  has  become
disabled from doing her routine work.

6.    In the written statement filed on behalf of the insurance company,  it
was pleaded that the accident was not  caused  due  to  rash  and  negligent
driving of the truck and that  the  driver  was  not  holding  a  valid  and
effective driving licence on the date of accident.

7.    The driver of the truck was prosecuted  for  offences  under  Sections
279, 337 and 338 IPC.   During  the  trial,  he  made  confession  that  the
accident was caused due to his rash and negligent driving.  The trial  Court
convicted the driver and imposed a fine of  Rs.2,000/-  and  in  default  to
undergo three months imprisonment.

8.    After recording evidence of the parties,  the  Tribunal  passed  award
dated 5.1.2007 and ordained the respondents to  pay  total  compensation  of
Rs.4 lakh with interest at the rate of 6% per  annum.  The  Tribunal  relied
upon the statements of the appellant’s husband – Shri Deepak  Singhal,  Shri
Pushpender Garg, who was driving the Car and two  other  occupants,  namely,
Prashant Agarwal and Renu, the Charge Sheet filed in the criminal case,  the
confession of the driver and the judgment of the trial Court  and  concluded
that the accident took place due  to  rash  and  negligent  driving  of  the
truck.  The Tribunal then  considered  the  issue  relating  to  quantam  of
compensation, referred to oral and documentary evidence and  concluded  that
it would be just  to  award  Rs.2,50,000/-  under  the  head  of  treatment,
Rs.1,25,000/- under the head of permanent disability and  Rs.25,000/-  under
the head of pain and suffering.

9.    The appellant challenged the award of the  Tribunal  in  Miscellaneous
Appeal No.870 of 2007.  During the pendency of  the  appeal,  she  filed  IA
No.180/2010 under Order 41 Rule 27 for bringing on record the bills to  show
that  she had spent Rs.5,94,013/- on treatment and as on the date of  filing
the application, Rs.7,76,480/- had been spent on treatment.

10.   The learned Single Judge of  the  Madhya  Pradesh  High  Court  partly
allowed the appeal and enhanced the compensation by a sum of  Rs.12,76,480/-
with interest at the rate of 7.5% on the enhanced amount  payable  from  the
date of the claim petition till realization. The  reasons  assigned  by  the
High Court for enhancement of the compensation are contained in paragraph  6
of the impugned judgment which is extracted below:

      “6.After having heard learned  counsel  for  the  parties,  under  the
      directions of the Court counsel appearing on  behalf  of  the  parties
      were directed to verify the bills which are available till decision by
      the claims Tribunal. Admittedly, those bill are  of  Rs.7,76,480/-.  I
      have also perused the bills, after verification in the opinion of this
      Court the Tribunal has refused to grant the  Bills  of  Rs.5,26,480/-,
      without any reason. However, in the opinion of this Court such  amount
      deserves to be allowed in the head of medical expenses in addition  to
      the amount awarded by the Tribunal. In the opinion of  this  Court  in
      the head  of  pain  and  suffering  Rs.25,000/-  as  awarded  is  also
      inadequate; I further add Rs.25,000/- in the said head, looking to her
      position. In the heads of attendant, future  medical  expenses  in  my
      opinion Rs.2,00,000/- in each of the heads  deserves  to  be  granted,
      because the appellant is required an attendant for whole life. Some of
      the bills of physiotherapy has been produced  along  with  application
      under Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC. After going through those bill I am not
      satisfied that such bills should be awarded at this stage, because  it
      is in sequence. In some of the  bills  there  is  overwriting  on  the
      dates. In some of the bills there is  signature  of  Sangita,  but  in
      other bills there is thumb impression. Thus  I  am  not  allowing  the
      bills of under 41 Rule 27 of CPC as filed before this  Court,  but  at
      the same time during pendency of this  appeal  some  medical  expenses
      would have been made, therefore, in the said head Rs.50,000/- is being
      awarded. In the head of  future  loss  of  earning  due  to  the  said
      permanent disability in the opinion of this Court a  lump  sum  amount
      deserves to be granted, because the Income Tax papers of the firm  are
      available on record and she was the partner in the said firm. Business
      is being carried  out  by  other  partners  who  are  family  members.
      Therefore, lump sum amount deserves  to  be  granted.  In  my  opinion
      Rs.2,75,000/- further deserves to be allowed making the total  in  the
      head of permanent disability Rs.4,00,000/-.  Thus,  the  total  amount
      comes to Rs.16,76,480/-. The Tribunal has already awarded Rs.4,00,000/-
      , after deducting the same the net amount  comes  to  Rs.  12,76,480/-
      which is liable to be enhanced.”




11.   Learned counsel for the appellant argued that  even  though  the  High
Court has enhanced the compensation, the same  cannot  be  treated  as  just
because as a  result  of  the  accident  the  appellant  suffered  permanent
disability and has virtually become a vegetable and would require  treatment
throughout her life. He submitted that due  to  neurological  deformity  the
appellant is not in a position to do  any  work  and  had  to  give  up  her
partnership in Triupati Enterprises where she was  earning  Rs.12,000/-  per
month. Not only this, she lost her memory and capacity of  hearing  and  has
spent about Rs.10.5 lakhs for treatment. Learned  counsel  relied  upon  the
statement of Dr. Rajesh Gangwani and Dr. Sunil Athwale, who treated her  and
who were examined before the Tribunal to show that present mental  state  of
the appellant  is  of  a  six  year  old  and  she  would  require  constant
physiotherapy and support of one attendant at  all  times.  Learned  counsel
submitted  that  the  compensation  awarded  under  the  head  of  pain  and
suffering is wholly inadequate and the  amount  of  compensation  should  be
adequately enhanced keeping in view the fact that due to escalation  in  the
cost of medical treatment, the appellant  will  have  to  incur  substantial
expenses in future medical treatment, physiotherapy and nursing. In  support
of his arguments, the learned counsel relied  upon  the  judgments  of  this
Court in Nizam’s Institute of  Medical  Sciences  v.  Prasanth  S.  Dhananka
(2009) 6 SCC 1, Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Mohd. Nasir  (2009)  6
SCC 280 and Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar (2011) 1 SCC 343.

12.   Learned counsel for the insurance company argued that the  enhancement
granted by the High Court is just fair and reasonable and does  not  require
to be further enhanced.

13.   We have considered the respective submission. In  R.D.  Hattangadi  v.
Pest Control (India) Private Limited (1995) 1 SCC 551, this  Court  observed
that the exercise  for  determination  of  compensation  in  accident  cases
involve some guess work, some hypothetical  consideration,  some  amount  of
sympathy linked with the nature  of  disability.   But  these  elements  are
required to be considered  in  an  objective  manner.   In  that  case,  the
claimant was a retired judge and practicing when he  met  with  an  accident
that  caused  100%  disability  and  paraplegia  below  the   waist.   While
determining compensation payable to him  in  a  claim  filed  under  Section
110A, Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, this Court referred to the judgment  of  the
Court of Appeal in Ward v. James (1965) 1 All ER  563,  Halsbury's  Laws  of
England, 4th Edition, Volume 12 (page 446) and observed:
      “When compensation is to be awarded for pain and suffering and loss of
      amenity of life, the special circumstances of the claimant have to  be
      taken into account including his age, the unusual deprivation  he  has
      suffered, the effect  thereof  on  his  future  life.  The  amount  of
      compensation for non-pecuniary loss is not easy to determine  but  the
      award must reflect that different circumstances have been  taken  into
      consideration.”


      9. Broadly speaking while fixing an amount of compensation payable  to
      a victim of an accident, the damages have to be assessed separately as
      pecuniary damages and special damages.  Pecuniary  damages  are  those
      which the victim has actually incurred and which is capable  of  being
      calculated in terms of money; whereas non-pecuniary damages are  those
      which are incapable of being assessed by arithmetical calculations. In
      order  to  appreciate  two  concepts  pecuniary  damages  may  include
      expenses incurred by the claimant: (i) medical attendance;  (ii)  loss
      of earning of profit upto the date  of  trial;  (iii)  other  material
      loss. So far non-pecuniary damages are concerned, they may include (i)
      damages  for  mental  and  physical  shock,  pain  suffering,  already
      suffered  or  likely  to  be  suffered  in  future;  (ii)  damages  to
      compensate for the loss of amenities  of  life  which  may  include  a
      variety of matters i.e. on account of injury the claimant may  not  be
      able to walk run or sit; (iii) damages for the loss of expectation  of
      life, i.e. on account of injury the normal  longevity  of  the  person
      concerned is  shortened;  (iv)  inconvenience,  hardship,  discomfort,
      disappointment frustration and mental stress in life.


      10. In cannot be disputed that because of the accident  the  appellant
      who was an active practising lawyer has become paraplegic  on  account
      of the injuries sustained by him.  It  is  really  difficult  in  this
      background to assess the exact amount of compensation for the pain and
      agony suffered by the appellant and for  having  become  a  life  long
      handicapped. No amount of compensation can restore the physical  frame
      of the appellant. That is why it has been said by courts that whenever
      any amount is determined as the compensation payable  for  any  injury
      suffered during an accident, the object is to compensate  such  injury
      "so far as money can compensate" because it is  impossible  to  equate
      the money with the human sufferings or  personal  deprivations.  Money
      cannot renew a broken and shattered physical frame.”



14.   In Arvind Kumar Mishra v. New India Assurance  Co.  Ltd.  and  another
(2010) 10 SCC 254, the Court sought to assess future  earnings  of  a  final
year engineering student who received injuries to  the  brain  among  others
which  resulted  in  70%  permanent  disability  and  he  needed  a   helper
throughout his life. The Court observed:

      “We do not intend to review in detail state of authorities in relation
      to assessment of all damages for personal injury. Suffice  it  to  say
      that the basis of assessment of all damages  for  personal  injury  is
      compensation. The whole idea is  to  put  the  claimant  in  the  same
      position as he was in so far as money  can.  Perfect  compensation  is
      hardly possible but one has to keep in mind that the victim  has  done
      no wrong; he has suffered at the hands of the wrongdoer and the  court
      must take care to give him full and fair compensation for that he  had
      suffered. In some cases for personal injury, the  claim  could  be  in
      respect of life time's earnings lost because, though he will live,  he
      cannot earn his living. In others, the claim may be made  for  partial
      loss of earnings. Each case has to be considered in the light  of  its
      own facts and at the end, one must ask whether the sum  awarded  is  a
      fair and reasonable sum.”
                                                         (emphasis supplied)



15.   In Nizam's Institute of  Medical  Sciences  v.  Prasanth  S.  Dhananka
(2009) 6 SCC 1, this Court  was  called  upon  to  assess  the  compensation
payable under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 to  the  victim  of  medical
negligence who was left completely  paralyzed  at  the  age  of  20.   After
detailed examination of the issue, the Court observed as under:
      “39. We must emphasize that the Court has to strike a balance  between
      the inflated and unreasonable demands of  a  victim  and  the  equally
      untenable claim of the opposite party saying that nothing is  payable.
      Sympathy for the victim does not, and should not, come in the  way  of
      making a correct assessment, but if a case is made out, the Court must
      not  be  chary  of  awarding  adequate  compensation.  The   "adequate
      compensation" that we speak of, must to some extent, be a rule of  the
      thumb measure, and as  a  balance  has  to  be  struck,  it  would  be
      difficult to satisfy all the parties concerned. It must also be  borne
      in mind that life has its pitfalls and is not smooth sailing all along
      the way (as a claimant would have us  believe)  as  the  hiccups  that
      invariably come about cannot be visualized. Life it is said is akin to
      a ride on a roller coaster where a meteoric rise is often followed  by
      an equally spectacular fall, and the distance between the two  (as  in
      this very case) is a minute or a yard. At the same time we often  find
      that a person injured in an accident  leaves  his  family  in  greater
      distress, vis-`a-vis a family in a case of death. In the latter  case,
      the  initial  shock  gives  way  to  a  feeling  of  resignation   and
      acceptance, and in time, compels the family to move on. The case of an
      injured and disabled person is, however, more pitiable and the feeling
      of hurt, helplessness, despair and often destitution enures every day.
      The support that is needed by a severely handicapped person  comes  at
      an enormous price, physical, financial and emotional, not only on  the
      victim but even more so on his family and attendants  and  the  stress
      saps their energy and destroys their equanimity. We can also visualize
      the anxiety of the complainant and his parents for  the  future  after
      the latter, as must  all  of  us,  inevitably  fade  away.  We,  have,
      therefore computed the compensation keeping in mind that his brilliant
      career has been cut short and there is, as of now, no  possibility  of
      improvement in his condition, the compensation will  ensure  a  steady
      and reasonable income to him for a time when he is unable to earn  for
      himself.”




16.   In Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar (2011) 1 SCC  343,  this  Court  considered
large number of precedents and laid down the following propositions:

      “The provision of the motor Vehicles Act, 1988 ('the Act', for  short)
      makes it  clear  that  the  award  must  be  just,  which  means  that
      compensation should, to the  extent  possible,  fully  and  adequately
      restore the claimant to the position prior to the accident. The object
      of awarding damages is to make good the loss suffered as a  result  of
      wrong done as far as money can  do  so,  in  a  fair,  reasonable  and
      equitable manner. The court or the Tribunal shall have to  assess  the
      damages objectively and exclude from consideration any speculation  or
      fancy,  though  some  conjecture  with  reference  to  the  nature  of
      disability and its consequences, is inevitable. A person is  not  only
      to be compensated for the physical injury, but also for the loss which
      he suffered as a result of such injury. This means that he  is  to  be
      compensated for his inability to lead a full life,  his  inability  to
      enjoy those normal amenities which he would have enjoyed but  for  the
      injuries, and his inability to earn as much as  he  used  to  earn  or
      could have earned.


      The heads under which compensation is awarded in personal injury cases
      are the following:


      Pecuniary damages (Special damages)
      (i)  Expenses  relating  to  treatment,  hospitalisation,   medicines,
      transportation, nourishing food, and miscellaneous expenditure.
      (ii) Loss of earnings (and other gains) which the injured  would  have
      made had he not been injured, comprising:
      (a) Loss of earning during the period of treatment;
      (b) Loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability.
      (iii) Future medical expenses.
      Non-pecuniary damages (General damages)
      (iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma as a  consequence  of  the
      injuries.
      (v) Loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage).
      (vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of normal longevity).


      In routine personal injury cases, compensation will  be  awarded  only
      under heads (i), (ii)(a) and (iv). It is  only  in  serious  cases  of
      injury, where there is specific  medical  evidence  corroborating  the
      evidence of the claimant, that compensation will be granted under  any
      of the heads (ii)(b), (iii), (v) and (vi) relating to loss  of  future
      earnings on account of permanent disability, future medical  expenses,
      loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage) and  loss  of
      expectation of life.”

17.    In  Sri  Ramachandrappa  v.  The  Manager,  Royal  Sundaram  Alliance
Insurance Company Limited (2011) 13 SCC 236, the Court observed:


      “8. The compensation is usually based upon the loss of the  claimant's
      earnings or earning capacity, or upon the loss of particular faculties
      or members or use of such members, ordinarily  in  accordance  with  a
      definite schedule. The Courts have time and again  observed  that  the
      compensation to be awarded is not measured by the nature, location  or
      degree of the injury, but rather  by  the  extent  or  degree  of  the
      incapacity resulting from the injury. The Tribunals  are  expected  to
      make an award determining the  amount  of  compensation  which  should
      appear to be just, fair and proper.


      9. The term  "disability",  as  so  used,  ordinarily  means  loss  or
      impairment of earning power and has been held not to mean  loss  of  a
      member of the body. If the physical efficiency because of  the  injury
      has substantially impaired or if he is unable to perform the same work
      with the same ease as before he was injured or is unable to  do  heavy
      work which he was able to do  previous  to  his  injury,  he  will  be
      entitled to suitable compensation. Disability benefits are  ordinarily
      graded on the basis of the character of the disability as  partial  or
      total, and  as  temporary  or  permanent.  No  definite  rule  can  be
      established as to what constitutes partial  incapacity  in  cases  not
      covered by a schedule or fixed liabilities, since facts will differ in
      practically every case.”





18.   In light of the principles laid down in the aforementioned  cases,  it
is suffice to say that in determining the quantum  of  compensation  payable
to  the  victims  of  accident,  who  are  disabled  either  permanently  or
temporarily, efforts should always be made to  award  adequate  compensation
not only for the physical injury and treatment, but also  for  the  loss  of
earning and inability to lead a  normal  life  and  enjoy  amenities,  which
would have been enjoyed but for the disability caused due to  the  accident.
The amount awarded under the head of loss of earning capacity  are  distinct
and do not overlap with the amount awarded for pain, suffering and  loss  of
enjoyment of life or the amount awarded for medical expenses.

19.   Dr. Rajesh Gangwani, who was  examined  before  the  Tribunal  deposed
that the appellant is kept alive by feeding through a pipe and nursing  care
is required for daily routine work also. He stated  that  she  had  suffered
75% permanent disability and there seems to be no  probability  of  recovery
as she has lost  her  capacity  for  hearing,  understanding,  speaking  and
establishing interaction. However, he also stated that  since  appellant  is
still under treatment, final conclusion about  permanent  disability  cannot
be established. Dr  Sunil  Athwale,   deposed  that  appellant  was  gaining
consciousness slowly but the status of sense was at the lowest level and  no
improvement has  come  in  the  last  2  and  half  years.  He  stated  that
probability of further improvement is negligible and  food  and  liquid  are
given through pipes. He stated that disability should  be  treated  as  100%
but he had not shown 90% as  permanent  disability  in  the  certificate  as
while treatment continues, hope  of  improvement  always  prevails.  On  the
basis of the same,  the  Tribunal  held  that  the  appellant  had  suffered
permanent disability however  the  presumption  cannot  be  drawn  that  she
suffered 75% permanent disability because she is still undergoing  treatment
and  the  doctor  himself  had  deposed  that  final  conclusion   regarding
permanent  disability  cannot  be  established  till  the   time   treatment
continues. The High Court did not record  any  finding  on  this  issue  but
increased the amount awarded towards permanent disability  and  future  loss
of earning.  Since the discharge certificate was issued  on  26.6.2004,  the
claimant  had  made  little  progress  up  till  the  time  the   disability
certificate was issued on 23.8.2006 and even till date she continues  to  be
in a vegetative state and requires an attendant at all times  and  continued
physiotherapy, we are not inclined to approve the approach of  the  Tribunal
and High Court granting a lump sum compensation because both failed to  take
into consideration the loss of income during the period  of  treatment  when
the appellant  was  totally  incapacitated.   Even  if  the  income  of  the
appellant is taken to be Rs.2,000/- , the loss of income during  the  period
of treatment, which continued till the judgment of the High Court i.e.  from
2.5.2004 to 18.5.2010 would be Rs.1,47,000/- approximately.

20.   As per the disability certificate issued on 23.8.2006,  the  appellant
had virtually become vegetable and, therefore, she is not in a  position  to
look after herself what to say of discharging her functions  as  partner  of
Tirupati Enterprises.  Therefore, by applying  the  multiplier  of  17,  the
future    loss    of    earning     would     come     to     Rs.3,67,200/-.


21.   In light of the decision in Raj  Kumar  v.  Ajay  Kumar  (supra),  the
Tribunal and High Court erred in failing to  award  compensation  under  the
heads of loss of amenities and loss of expectation of life. Relying  on  the
decision in Nizam's Institute of Medical Sciences v.  Prasanth  S.  Dhananka
(supra) and assuming the claimant’s life expectancy to be 55 years, we  deem
it appropriate to award attendant charges  at  the  rate  of  Rs.2000/-  per
month and physiotherapy expenses at the rate of Rs.3000/-  per  month.  With
regard to the head of physical and mental pains the amount  is  enhanced  to
Rs.3,00,000/- and another Rs.3,00,000/- is awarded under the heads  of  loss
of amenities and loss of life expectancy.

22.   In the result, the appeal is partly allowed, the impugned judgment  is
modified  and  it  is  held  that  the  appellant  shall  be   entitled   to
compensation under different heads of which the  details  are  given  below:


|Head                |Values              |Calculation      |Total         |
|Medical treatment   |as awarded by the High Court          |Rs. 7,76,480/-|
|Medical expenses    |as awarded by the High Court          |Rs. 50,000/-  |
|during the pendency |                                      |              |
|of the appeal       |                                      |              |
|Attendant charges   |Rs.2,000/- per month|Rs.2000 x 12 x 25|Rs.6,00,000/- |
|                    |for 25 years        |                 |              |
|Future medical      |Rs.3,000/- per month|Rs.3000 x 12 x 25|Rs.9,00,000/- |
|expenses            |for 25 years        |                 |              |
|(physiotherapy)     |                    |                 |              |
|Loss of earning     |Rs.2,000/- monthly  |Rs.2000 x 12 x 6 |Rs.1,45,067/- |
|during the period of|income for the      |+ Rs.2000 x 16/30|              |
|treatment           |period between date |                 |              |
|                    |of accident 2.5.2004|                 |              |
|                    |and High Court order|                 |              |
|                    |18.5.2010           |                 |              |
|Loss of future      |taking multiplier of|Rs.24,000 x 17 x |Rs.3,67,200/- |
|earnings on account |17 for age of 30    |90/100           |              |
|of permanent        |years, disability as|                 |              |
|disability          |90%, annual income  |                 |              |
|                    |as Rs.24,000/-      |                 |              |
|Physical and mental |                                      |Rs. 3,00,000/-|
|pains               |                                      |              |
|Loss of amenities   |                                      |Rs.3,00,000/- |
|and loss of         |                                      |              |
|expectation of life |                                      |              |
|Total               |                                      |Rs.34,38,747/-|


23.     Respondent  No.3  is  directed  to  pay  to  the   appellant   total
compensation of Rs.34,38,747/- within  a  period  of  3  months  by  getting
prepared a demand draft  in  her  name  which  shall  be  delivered  at  her
residence.  While doing so, respondent No.3 shall  be  free  to  deduct  the
amount already paid to the appellant pursuant to the  award  passed  by  the
Tribunal and/or the  impugned  judgment.   If  law  permits  it  to  do  so,
respondent No.3 shall be free to recover the  amount  of  compensation  from
respondent Nos.1 and 2.

                                                       …...……..….………………….…J.
                                               [G.S. Singhvi]






                                                         …………..….………………….…J.
                                              [Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya]
New Delhi,
August 22, 2012.