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Monday, August 20, 2012

Income TAX ACT, 1961: ss. 115JA/115JB and 234B/234C - MAT Companies - Interest on tax calculated on book profits - HELD: Interest u/ss 234B and 234C shall be payable on failure to pay advance tax in respect of tax payable u/ss 115JA/115JB - Circular No. 13/2001 dated 9.11.2001 issued by CBDT. The assessee in C.A. No. 135 of 2011 furnished a return of income on 28.11.1997 declaring total income as Nil. On 28.3.2000, an order u/s 143(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 was passed determining the total income as nil after set off of unabsorbed business loss and depreciation. The tax was levied on book profits determined as per the provisions of s.115JA. The interest u/s 234B was charged on tax on book profits as worked out in the order of assessment. The assessee's appeal was dismissed by the CIT (A) as also by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. The High Court following the judgment of Karnataka High Court in the case of Kwality Biscuits Ltd.1 held in favour of the assessee that interest u/s 234B could not be charged on the tax calculated on book profits. In the instant appeals, the question for consideration before the Court was: whether interest u/s 234B can be charged on the tax calculated on book profits u/s 115JA? Allowing the appeals of Revenue and dismissing those of the assesses, the Court HELD: 1.1 Sections 115J/115JA of the Income Tax Act, 1961 are special provisions, which provide that where in the case of an assessee, the total income as computed under the Act in respect of any previous year relevant to the assessment year is less than 30% of the book profit, the total income of the assessee shall be deemed to be an amount equal to 30% of such book profit. The object is to tax zero-tax companies. [para 7] [156-E-F] 1.2 The pre-requisite condition for applicability of s. 234B is that the assessee is liable to pay tax u/s 208 and the expression "assessed tax" is defined to mean the tax on the total income determined u/s143(1) or u/s 143(3) as reduced by the amount of tax deducted or collected at source. Thus, there is no exclusion of ss.115J/115JA in the levy of interest u/s 234B. The expression "assessed tax" is defined to mean the tax assessed on regular assessment which means the tax determined on the application of s. 115J/115JA in the regular assessment. [para 8] [157-B-D] 1.3 The view of the Karnataka High Court in Kwality Biscuits Ltd. that interest u/s 234-B could not be charged on the tax calculated on book profits, was not shared by the Gauhati High Court in Assam Bengal Carriers* Ltd and Madhya Pradesh High Court in Itarsi Oil and Flours (P.) Limited as also by the Bombay High Court in the case of Kotak Mahindra Finance Ltd. which decided the issue in favour of Revenue and against the assessee. It appears that none of the assessees challenged the decisions of the Gauhati High Court, Madhya Pradesh High Court as well as Bombay High Court in the Supreme Court. The judgment of the Karnataka High Court in Kwality Biscuits Ltd., which was confined to s.115J of the Act, was challenged by Revenue and its special leave petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court in limine. [(2006) 284 ITR 434]. However, the Karnataka High Court has thereafter in the case of Jindal Thermal Power Company Ltd. distinguished its own decision in case of Kwality Biscuits Ltd. and held that s. 115JB is a self-contained code pertaining to MAT, which imposed liability for payment of advance tax on MAT companies and, therefore, where such companies defaulted in payment of advance tax in respect of tax payable u/s 115JB, it was liable to pay interest u/ss 234B and 234C of the Act. [para 9] [158-B-H; 159-A-G] 1.4 Thus, it can be concluded that interest u/ss 234B and 234C shall be payable on failure to pay advance tax in respect of tax payable u/ss 115JA/115JB. Therefore, Circular No. 13/2001 dated 9.11.2001 issued by CBDT reported in 252 ITR (St.)50 has no application. Moreover, in any event, para 2 of that Circular itself indicates that a large number of companies liable to be taxed under MAT provisions of s.115JB were not making advance tax payments. In the said circular, it has been clarified that s.115JB is a self-contained code and thus, all companies were liable for payment of advance tax u/s 115JB and, consequently, provisions of ss.234B and 234C imposing interest on default in payment of advance tax were also applicable. [para 9] [158-G-H; 159-A-B] Kwality Biscuits Ltd. Vs. CIT (2000) 243 ITR 519 - distinguished. Assam Bengal Carriers Ltd. v. CIT (1999) 239 ITR 862; and Madhya Pradesh High Court in Itarsi Oil and Flours (P.) Limited v. CIT (2001) 250 ITR 686; CIT v. Kotak Mahindra Finance Ltd. (2003) 130 TAXMAN 730; Jindal Thermal Power Company Ltd. v. Dy. CIT (2006) 154 TAXMAN 547 - approved. Case Law Reference: (2000) 243 ITR 519 distinguished para 9 (1999) 239 ITR 862 approved para 9 (2001) 250 ITR 686 approved para 9 (2003) 130 TAXMAN 730 approved para 9 (2006) 154 TAXMAN 547 approved para 9 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 135 of 2011. From the Judgment & Order dated 06.02.2009 of the High Court of Bombay in ITA No. 1267 of 2008. With C.A. No. 136 of 2011, 459 of 2006 & 7429 of 2008. Bishwajit Bhattacharya, ASG, R.P. Bhatt, S. Ganesh, P.H. Parekh, H.R. Rao, T.M. Singh, Laxmi lyengar, Vikas Malhotra, Taj Singh, B.V. Balaram Das, Pratap Venugopal, Surekha Raman, Asha G. Nair, Namrata Sood (for K.J. John & Co.), Vishal Prasad, Shashank Kunwar, Soumi Guha Thakurta (for Parekh & Co.), Salil Kapoor, Sanat Kapoor, Ankit Gupta, Kamal Mohan Gupta for the appearing parties.


                                                           REPORTABLE


               IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                 CIVIL APPEAL NO.135 OF 2011
          (arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 25746 of 2009)

Jt. C. I. T., Mumbai                                 ...
Appellant(s)

      versus

M/s Rolta India Ltd.                           ...
Respondent(s)


                           with
Civil Appeal No.136 of 2011 @ S.L.P. (C) No. 18367 of 2010,
Civil Appeal No. 459 of 2006 and Civil Appeal No. 7429 of
2008.



                          JUDGMENT


S.H. KAPADIA, CJI


         Leave granted.

2.       A short question which arises for determination in this

batch of cases is - whether interest under Section 234B can be

charged on the tax calculated on book profits under Section

115JA?     In other words, whether advance tax was at all

payable on book profits under Section 115JA?
                                                          2


3.     The lead matter in this batch of cases is Joint CIT v.

Rolta India Ltd. (Civil Appeal arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.

25746/09).



4.     Assessee furnished a return of income on 28.11.1997

declaring total income of Rs. Nil.   On 28.3.2000, an order

under Section 143(3) was passed determining the total income

at nil after set off    of unabsorbed business      loss and

depreciation. The tax was levied on the book profit worked out

at Rs. 1,52,61,834/- determined as per the provisions of

Section 115JA.    The interest under Section 234B of Rs.

39,73,167/- was charged on the tax on the book profit as

worked out in the order of assessment. Aggrieved by the said

order, the assessee went in appeal before CIT (A). The appeal

on the question in hand was dismissed.        On charging of

interest under Section 234B the appeal was dismissed by the

Tribunal on the ground that the case fell under Section 115JA

and not under Section 115J, hence, judgment of the

Karnataka High Court in the case of M/s Kwality Biscuits Ltd.

was not applicable.    At one stage the Bombay High Court

decided the matter in favour of the Department but later on by
                                                           3


way of review it took the view following the judgment of

Karnataka High Court in the case of Kwality Biscuits Ltd. that

interest under Section 234B cannot be charged on tax

calculated on book profits, hence, the CIT has come to this

Court by way of Civil Appeal(s).



5.      We quote hereinbelow Sections 234B and 234C of the

Income Tax Act, 1961 (in short "the Act"):

          "Interest for     defaults   in    payment   of
          advance tax.

          234B. (1) Subject to the other provisions of
          this section, where, in any financial year, an
          assessee who is liable to pay advance tax
          under section 208 has failed to pay such tax
          or, where the advance tax paid by such
          assessee under the provisions of section 210 is
          less than ninety per cent of the assessed tax,
          the assessee shall be liable to pay simple
          interest at the rate of one and one-half per
          cent for every month or part of a month
          comprised in the period from the 1st day of
          April next following such financial year to the
          date of determination of total income under
          sub-section (1) of section 143 and where a
          regular assessment is made, to the date of
          such regular assessment, on an amount equal
          to the assessed tax or, as the case may be, on
          the amount by which the advance tax paid as
          aforesaid falls short of the assessed tax.
                                                 4


Explanation 1.--In this section, "assessed tax"
means,--


(a) for the purposes of computing the interest
payable under section 140A, the tax on the
total income as declared in the return referred
to in that section;


(b) in any other case, the tax on the total
income determined under sub-section (1) of
section 143 or on regular assessment,


as reduced by the amount of tax deducted or
collected at source in accordance with the
provisions of Chapter XVII on any income
which is subject to such deduction or
collection and which is taken into account in
computing such total income.


Explanation 2.--Where, in relation to an
assessment year, an assessment is made for
the first time under section 147, the
assessment so made shall be regarded as a
regular assessment for the purposes of this
section.


Explanation 3.--In Explanation 1 and in sub-
section (3) "tax on the total income determined
under sub-section (1) of section 143" shall not
include the additional income-tax, if any,
payable under section 143.


(2) Where, before the date of determination of
total income under sub-section (1) of section
143 or completion of a regular assessment, tax
                                                  5


is paid by the assessee under section 140A or
otherwise,--


(i) interest shall be calculated in accordance
with the foregoing provisions of this section up
to the date on which the tax is so paid, and
reduced by the interest, if any, paid under
section 140A towards the interest chargeable
under this section;


(ii) thereafter, interest shall be calculated at
the rate aforesaid on the amount by which the
tax so paid together with the advance tax paid
falls short of the assessed tax.


(3) Where, as a result of an order of re-
assessment or re-computation under section
147, the amount on which interest was
payable under sub-section (1) is increased, the
assessee shall be liable to pay simple interest
at the rate of one and one-half per cent for
every month or part of a month comprised in
the period commencing on the day following
the date of determination of total income under
sub-section (1) of section 143 and where a
regular assessment is made as is referred to in
sub-section (1) following the date of such
regular assessment and ending on the date of
the re-assessment or re-computation under
section 147, on the amount by which the tax
on the total income determined on the basis of
the re-assessment or re-computation exceeds
the tax on the total income determined under
sub-section (1) of section 143 or on the basis
of the regular assessment aforesaid.


(4) Where, as a result of an order under section
154 or section 155 or section 250 or section
                                                    6


254 or section 260 or section 262 or section
263 or section 264 or an order of the
Settlement Commission under sub-section (4)
of section 245D, the amount on which interest
was payable under sub-section (1) or sub-
section (3) has been increased or reduced, as
the case may be, the interest shall be
increased or reduced accordingly, and--


(i) in a case where the interest is increased, the
Assessing Officer shall serve on the assessee a
notice of demand in the prescribed form
specifying the sum payable and such notice of
demand shall be deemed to be a notice under
section 156 and the provisions of this Act shall
apply accordingly;


(ii) in a case where the interest is reduced, the
excess interest paid, if any, shall be refunded.


(5) The provisions of this section shall apply in
respect of assessments for the assessment
year commencing on the 1st day of April, 1989
and subsequent assessment years.


Interest for deferment of advance tax.


234C. (1) Where in any financial year,--


(a) the company which is liable to pay advance
tax under section 208 has failed to pay such
tax or--


(i) the advance tax paid by the company on its
current income on or before the 15th day of
                                                   7


June is less than fifteen per cent of the tax due
on the returned income or the amount of such
advance tax paid on or before the 15th day of
September is less than forty-five per cent of the
tax due on the returned income or the amount
of such advance tax paid on or before the 15th
day of December is less than seventy-five per
cent of the tax due on the returned income,
then, the company shall be liable to pay simple
interest at the rate of one and one-half per
cent per month for a period of three months on
the amount of the shortfall from fifteen per
cent or forty-five per cent or seventy-five per
cent, as the case may be, of the tax due on the
returned income;


(ii) the advance tax paid by the company on its
current income on or before the 15th day of
March is less than the tax due on the returned
income, then, the company shall be liable to
pay simple interest at the rate of one and one-
half per cent on the amount of the shortfall
from the tax due on the returned income:


Provided that if the advance tax paid by the
company on its current income on or before
the 15th day of June or the 15th day of
September, is not less than twelve per cent or,
as the case may be, thirty-six per cent of the
tax due on the returned income, then, it shall
not be liable to pay any interest on the amount
of the shortfall on those dates;


(b) the assessee, other than a company, who is
liable to pay advance tax under section 208
has failed to pay such tax or,--
                                                  8


(i) the advance tax paid by the assessee on his
current income on or before the 15th day of
September is less than thirty per cent of the
tax due on the returned income or the amount
of such advance tax paid on or before the 15th
day of December is less than sixty per cent of
the tax due on the returned income, then, the
assessee shall be liable to pay simple interest
at the rate of one and one-half per cent per
month for a period of three months on the
amount of the shortfall from thirty per cent or,
as the case may be, sixty per cent of the tax
due on the returned income;


(ii) the advance tax paid by the assessee on his
current income on or before the 15th day of
March is less than the tax due on the returned
income, then, the assessee shall be liable to
pay simple interest at the rate of one and one-
half per cent on the amount of the shortfall
from the tax due on the returned income:


Provided that nothing contained in this sub-
section shall apply to any shortfall in the
payment of the tax due on the returned income
where such shortfall is on account of under-
estimate or failure to estimate--


(a) the amount of capital gains; or


(b) income of the nature referred to in sub-
clause (ix) of clause (24) of section 2,


and the assessee has paid the whole of the
amount of tax payable in respect of income
referred to in clause (a) or clause (b), as the
case may be, had such income been a part of
                                                             9


          the total income, as part of the remaining
          instalments of advance tax which are due or
          where no such instalments are due, by the
          31st day of March of the financial year:


          Explanation.--In this section, "tax due on the
          returned income" means the tax chargeable on
          the total income declared in the return of
          income furnished by the assessee for the
          assessment year commencing on the 1st day of
          April immediately following the financial year
          in which the advance tax is paid or payable,
          as reduced by the amount of tax deductible or
          collectible at source in accordance with the
          provisions of Chapter XVII on any income
          which is subject to such deduction or
          collection and which is taken into account in
          computing such total income.


          (2) The provisions of this section shall apply in
          respect of assessments for the assessment
          year commencing on the 1st day of April, 1989
          and subsequent assessment years."


6.      At the outset, it may be stated that Sections 234B and

234C do not make any reference to Section 115J/115JA.

Section 234B lays down that where advance tax is required to

be paid under Section 208 and there is a failure on that if the

amount of advance tax paid under Section 210 is less than

90% of the assessed tax, then, in that case the assessee is

liable to pay interest.   Section 234C refers to interest for
                                                           1


deferment of advance tax. It says that if the assessee has to

pay advance tax on its current income on or before 15th of

June and the tax paid is less than 15% of the tax due on the

returned income or the amount of the advance tax paid on or

before 15th of September is less than 45% of the tax due on the

returned income or the amount of such advance tax paid on or

before 15th of December is less than 75% of the tax due on the

returned income, then the assessee shall be liable to pay

interest at the specified rate on the amount of the shortfall

from 15% or 45% or 75%, as the case may be, of the tax due

on the returned income.



7.      In   our   view,   Section   115J/115JA   are   special

provisions. Section 207 envisages that tax shall be payable in

advance during any financial year on current income in

accordance with the scheme provided in Sections 208 to 219

(both inclusive) in respect of the total income of the assessee

that would be chargeable to tax for the assessment year

immediately following that financial year.   Section 215(5) of

the Act defined what is "assessed tax", i.e., tax determined on

the basis of regular assessment so far as such tax relates to
                                                             1


income subject to advance tax. The evaluation of the current

income and the determination of the assessed income had to

be made in terms of the statutory scheme comprising Section

115J/115JA of the Act.        Hence, levying of interest was

inescapable.    The assessee was bound to pay advance tax

under the said scheme of the Act. Section 115J/115JA of the

Act were special provisions which provided that where in the

case of an assessee, the total income as computed under the

Act in respect of any previous year relevant to the assessment

year is less than 30% of the book profit, the total income of the

assessee shall be deemed to be an amount equal to 30% of

such book profit. The object is to tax zero-tax companies.



8.      Section 115J was inserted by Finance Act, 1987 w.e.f.

1.4.1988. This section was in force from 1.4.1988 to

31.3.1991.     After 1.4.1991, Section 115JA was inserted by

Finance Act of 1996 w.e.f. 1.4.1997. After insertion of Section

115JA, Section 115JB was inserted by Finance Act, 2000

w.e.f. 1.4.2001. It is clear from reading Sections 115JA and

115JB that the question whether a company which is liable to

pay tax under either provision does not assume importance
                                                             1


because specific provision(s) is made in the section saying that

all other provisions of the Act shall apply to the MAT Company

(Section     115JA(4)   and   Section   115JB(5)).     Similarly,

amendments have been made in the relevant Finance Acts

providing for payment of advance tax under Sections 115JA

and 115JB. So far as interest leviable under Section 234B is

concerned, the section is clear that it applies to all companies.

The pre-requisite condition for applicability of Section 234B is

that assessee is liable to pay tax under Section 208 and the

expression "assessed tax" is defined to mean the tax on the

total income determined under Section 143(1) or under

Section 143(3) as reduced by the amount of tax deducted or

collected at source.    Thus, there is no exclusion of Section

115J/115JA in the levy of interest under Section 234B. The

expression "assessed tax" is defined to mean the tax assessed

on regular assessment which means the tax determined on the

application of Section 115J/115JA in the regular assessment.



9.         The question which remains to be considered is

whether the assessee, which is a MAT Company, was not in a

position to estimate its profits of the current year prior to the
                                                            1


end of the financial year on 31st March. In this connection the

assessee placed reliance on the judgment of the Karnataka

High Court in the case of Kwality Biscuits Ltd. v. CIT reported

in (2000) 243 ITR 519 and, according to the Karnataka High

Court, the profit as computed under the Income Tax Act, 1961

had to be prepared and thereafter the book profit as

contemplated under Section 115J of the Act had to be

determined and then, the liability of the assessee to pay tax

under Section 115J of the Act arose, only if the total income as

computed under the provisions of the Act was less than 30%

of the book profit. According to the Karnataka High Court, this

entire exercise of computing income or the book profits of the

company could be done only at the end of the financial year

and hence the provisions of Sections 207, 208, 209 and 210

(predecessors of Sections 234B and 234C) were not applicable

until and unless the accounts stood audited and the balance

sheet stood prepared, because till then even the assessee may

not know whether the provisions of Section 115J would be

applied or not. The Court, therefore, held that the liability

would arise only after the profit is determined in accordance

with the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 and, therefore,
                                                          1


interest under Sections 234B and 234C is not leviable in cases

where Section 115J applied. This view of the Karnataka High

Court in Kwality Biscuits Ltd. was not shared by the Gauhati

High Court in Assam Bengal Carriers Ltd. v. CIT reported in

(1999) 239 ITR 862 and Madhya Pradesh High Court in Itarsi

Oil and Flours (P.) Limited v. CIT reported in (2001) 250 ITR

686 as also by the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v.

Kotak Mahindra Finance Ltd. reported in (2003) 130 TAXMAN

730 which decided the issue in favour of the Department and

against the assessee. It appears that none of the assessees

challenged the decisions of the Gauhati High Court, Madhya

Pradesh High Court as well as Bombay High Court in the

Supreme Court. However, it may be noted that the judgment

of the Karnataka High Court in Kwality Biscuits Ltd.      was

confined to Section 115J of the Act. The Order of the Supreme

Court dismissing the Special Leave Petition in limine filed by

the Department against Kwality Biscuits Ltd. is reported in

(2006) 284 ITR 434. Thus, the judgment of Karnataka High

Court in Kwality Biscuits stood affirmed. However, the

Karnataka High Court has thereafter in the case of Jindal

Thermal Power Company Ltd. v. Dy. CIT reported in (2006)
                                                          1


154 TAXMAN 547 distinguished its own decision in case of

Kwality Biscuits Ltd. (supra) and held that Section 115JB,

with which we are concerned, is a self-contained code

pertaining to MAT, which imposed liability for payment of

advance tax on MAT companies and, therefore, where such

companies defaulted in payment of advance tax in respect of

tax payable under Section 115JB, it was liable to pay interest

under Sections 234B and 234C of the Act. Thus, it can be

concluded that interest under Sections 234B and 234C shall

be payable on failure to pay advance tax in respect of tax

payable under Section 115JA/115JB. For the aforestated

reasons, Circular No. 13/2001 dated 9.11.2001 issued by

CBDT reported in 252 ITR(St.)50 has no application. Moreover,

in any event, para 2 of that Circular itself indicates that a

large number of companies liable to be taxed under MAT

provisions of Section 115JB were not making advance tax

payments. In the said circular, it has been clarified that

Section   115JB is a self-contained code      and thus, all

companies were liable for payment of advance tax under

Section 115JB and consequently provisions of Sections 234B

and 234C imposing interest on default in payment of advance
                                                                          1


tax were also applicable.



10.     For the aforestated reasons CIT succeeds in the civil

appeal arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 25746 of 2009 (Jt. CIT v.

Rolta India Ltd.) as also in the civil appeal arising out of S.L.P.

(C) No. 18367 of 2010 (CIT-3       v.    Export Credit Guarantee

Corporation of India Ltd.). Consequently, Civil Appeal No. 459

of 2006 (Nahar Exports v. CIT) and Civil Appeal No. 7429 of

2008 (Lakshmi Precision Screws Ltd. v. CIT) stand dismissed

with no order as to costs.



                                 .......................................CJI
                                 (S. H. Kapadia)



                                 ...........................................J.
                                                        (K.S. Panicker
Radhakrishnan)



                                 ...........................................J.
                                 (Swatanter Kumar)
New Delhi;
January 7, 2011

Income Tax Act, 1961 - s.115JB(2)- Explanation, Clause (i) read with proviso - Appellant-assessee had revalued its fixed assets as on 31st March, 2000 (relevant to assessment year 2000-01) - Resultant surplus stood added to the cost of the assets - Revaluation reserve of equivalent amount was created on the liability side - During assessment year 2001-02, Rs.26,11,74,000/-, being the differential depreciation, transferred out of revaluation reserve and credited to P & L Account which the A.O. disallowed and consequently said sum of Rs. 26,11,74,000/- stood added back to the net profits - Challenge to, by assessee - Held: Clause (i) of the explanation to s.115JB(2) mandates reduction from the net profits the amount(s) withdrawn from the reserves earlier created, provided such amount(s) is credited to P & L Account - Adjustment made in the P & L Account was primarily in the nature of contra adjustment in the P & L Account and not a case of effective credit in the P & L Account (as contemplated in clause (i) of Explanation) - Assessee credited amount to the extent of the additional depreciation from the revaluation reserve only to present a more healthy balance sheet to its shareholders enabling the assessee possibly to pay out a good dividend - The proviso to clause (i) of the Explanation to s.115JB(2) comes in the way of the claim for reduction made by the assessee under clause (i) to the Explanation - As the amount of revaluation reserves had not gone to increase the book profits at the time it was created, the benefit of reduction cannot be allowed. MAT provisions - Object of - Held: Is to bring out the real profit of the companies - The thrust is to find out the real working results of the company. The appellant-assessee is a widely held quoted limited company engaged in the business of manufacture of yarn and polyester. The assessee had revalued its fixed assets as on 31st March, 2000 and the resultant surplus of Rs.288,58,19,000/- stood added to the cost of the assets on the asset side of the balance sheet and to equalize both sides thereof the revaluation reserve of an equivalent amount was created on the liability side of the balance sheet. The figure of profit remained untouched during the assessment year 2000-01 so far as the revaluation of assets to the tune of Rs.288,58,19,000/- was concerned. During the assessment year 2001-02, an amount of Rs.26,11,74,000/-, being the differential depreciation, was transferred out of the said revaluation reserve of Rs.288,58,19,000/- and credited to the P & L Account which the AO disallowed and consequently the said sum of Rs. 26,11,74,000/- stood added back to the net profits. The A.O., while computing the book profit under Section 115JB of the Act, did not allow reduction of the afore- stated amount of Rs.26,11,74,000/- on the ground that the revaluation reserve stood created in the assessment year 2000-01 and had not been added back while computing the book profit in that year in terms of the proviso to clause (i) of explanation to Section 115JB. This order was upheld by the C.I.T. (A) and by the ITAT and by the High Court. Hence the present appeal. Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD:1. Book profit is not defined in the Income Tax Act, 1961. It is income computed under the company law. By virtue of the MAT provisions, in the case of a company whose total income as computed under the normal provisions of the Act is less than 30% of the book profit, the total income chargeable to tax will be 30% of the book profit as computed. For the purposes of Section 115J, book profit will be the net profit as shown in the P & L Account prepared in accordance with the provisions of Schedule VI to Companies Act, 1956 after certain adjustments. The net profit will be increased by income tax paid or payable, amount carried to any reserve, provision made for liabilities etc. provided the amount(s) is debited to the P & L Account. The amount so arrived at is to be reduced by item (i) to item (vii) including amounts withdrawn from reserves, if any such amount is credited to P & L Account. Clauses (i) to (vii) of the explanation to Section 115JB(2) represent items of reduction from the net profits. Clause (i) mandates reduction for the amount(s) withdrawn from the reserves earlier created, provided such amount(s) is credited to P & L Account. Such credit is mandated so that the true working result gets reflected in the financial statement of the assessee-company. The said clause (i) contemplates only those reserves which actually affect the net profits as shown in the P & L Account (see also clause (ii) for comparison). The object of various clauses (i) to clause (vii) is to find out the true working result of the assessee-company. [Para 20] [867-D-H; 868-A] 2. In the present case, the adjustment made in the P & L Account was as per Accounting Standards 6 and 10 read with Guidance Note issued by Institute of Chartered Accountants of India which is in conformity with Section 211 of the Companies Act. The said adjustment was primarily in the nature of contra adjustment in the P & L Account and not a case of effective credit in the P & L Account (as contemplated in clause (i) of explanation). The credit in the P & L Account implies that the P & L Account per se has been effectively credited by the said amount. Thus, the amount withdrawn from any reserve must in effect impact the net profit as shown in the P & L Account. As per accounting principles, the contra adjustment does not at all affect any particular account to which it has been carried. Unless an adjustment has the effect of increasing the net profit as shown in the P & L Account, that entry cannot be said to be a credit to the P & L Account and, therefore, though the amount has been literally credited to the P & L Account, however, in substance there is no credit to P & L Account. MAT provisions were introduced as number of zero tax companies had grown. It was found that companies had earned substantial book profits and had paid huge dividends but paid no tax. In the present case, had the assessee deducted the full depreciation from the profit before depreciation during the accounting year ending 31.3.2001, it would have shown a loss and in which event it could not have paid the dividends and, therefore, the assessee credited the amount to the extent of the additional depreciation from the revaluation reserve to present a more healthy balance sheet to its shareholders enabling the assessee possibly to pay out a good dividend. It is precisely to tax these kinds of companies that MAT provisions had been introduced. The object of MAT provisions is to bring out the real profit of the companies. The thrust is to find out the real working results of the company. Thus, the reduction sought by the assessee under clause (i) to the explanation to Section 115JB(2) in respect of depreciation has been rightly rejected by the AO. [Para 21] [868-B-H; 869-A] 3. The revaluation reserve of Rs.288,58,19,000/- was created during earlier assessment year 2000-01. During the accounting year ending 31.3.2001 (assessment year 2001-02), the profits of assessee stood at Rs.120,18,97,000/- whereas depreciation stood at Rs.127,57,06,000/-. Depreciation is a no-cash charge against the profits. Thus, company had a loss of Rs.7,38,09,000/- (i.e. Rs.127,57,06,000/- of depreciation as against profit of Rs.120,18,97,000/-). However, by withdrawing `26,11,74,000/-, being the differential depreciation, from the revaluation reserve of Rs.288,58,19,000/-(which is only a notional adjustment entry to balance both sides of the balance sheet) and reducing it from the depreciation of Rs.127,57,06,000/-, the assessee artificially brings down the depreciation only to Rs.101,45,32,000/- which is then deducted from the profits before depreciation amounting to Rs.120,18,97,000/- so that there is a profit of Rs.18,73,65,000/-. This is how the loss of Rs.7,38,09,000 got converted to profit of Rs.18,73,65,000/-. Thus, the financial statement for the year ending 31.3.2001 is made to look healthy. The said reasons are in addition to the reasons given by the Authorities below while rejecting the claim of the assessee. [Paras 22, 23] [869-B-F] 4. Under the provisions, as they then existed, certain adjustments were required to be made to the net profit as shown in the P & L Account. One such adjustment stipulated that the net profit shall be reduced by the amount(s) withdrawn from any reserves, if any such amount is credited to the P & L Account. Thus, if the reserves created had gone to increase the book profits in any year when the provisions of Section 115JB were applicable, the assessee became entitled to reduce the amount withdrawn from such reserves if such withdrawal is credited to P & L Account. From the facts, it is clear that neither the said amount of Rs.288,58,19,000/- nor Rs.26,11,74,000/- had ever gone to increase the book profits in the said year ending 31.3.2000 (being the financial year). Thus, when such amount(s) has not gone to increase the book value at the time of creation of reserve(s), there is no question of reducing the amount transferred from such revaluation reserves to the P & L Account. Thus, the proviso to clause (i) of the explanation to Section 115JB(2) comes in the way of the claim for reduction made by the assessee. The reduction under clause (i) to the explanation could have been availed only if such revaluation reserve had gone to increase the book profits. As the amount of revaluation reserves had not gone to increase the book profits at the time it was created, the benefit of reduction cannot be allowed. Further, the revaluation reserve stood created during the earlier assessment year 2000-01. As regards the argument on behalf of the assessee that creation of such reserve did not impact the profits of that year, though the facts show that though the profit was not impacted, depreciation as the head of A/c. was impacted. By inter play of the balance sheet items with Profit & Loss A/c. items the assesseehas sought to project the loss of Rs.7,38,09,000/- as profit of Rs.18,73,65,000/-. [Para 24] [870-C-H; 871-A-B] CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 33 of 2011. From the Judgment & Order dated 22.9.2009 of the High Court of New Delhi at Delhi in ITA No. 851 of 2009. Ajay Vohra, Kavita Jha for the Appellant. Bishwajit Bhattacharya, ASG, Rahul Kaushik, Yatinder Chaudhary, Ajay Singh and B.V. Balaram Das for the Respondent.


                                                           REPORTABLE


                 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                  CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                CIVIL APPEAL NO.               OF 2011
             (arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 35133 of 2009)

Indo Rama Synthetics (I) Ltd.                        ...
Appellant(s)

        versus

C.I.T., New Delhi.                                           ...
Respondent(s)




                          JUDGMENT

S.H. KAPADIA, CJI


1.       Leave granted.

Facts

2.       Assessee is a widely held quoted limited company and

is engaged in the business of manufacture of yarn and

polyester.

3.       During the previous year ending 31.3.2000 relevant to

the assessment year 2000-01, fixed assets were revalued

resulting in increase in the net book value of such assets by

Rs.288,58,19,000/-, which was credited to the revaluation
                                                                2


reserve.    Consequently, the balance sheet for the preceding

assessment year, resulted in enhancement of cost of fixed

assets by the said amount with corresponding credit to

revaluation reserve.

4.         For the previous year ending 31.3.2001, relevant to

the assessment year 2001-02, the P & L Account showed the

charge of depreciation at Rs.127,57,06,000/- which was

reduced by transfer from revaluation reserve to the extent of

Rs.26,11,74,000/- resulting in a net debit on account of

depreciation     of   Rs.101,45,32,000/-.      The    A.O.,   while

computing the book profit under Section 115JB of the Act, did

not   allow     reduction   of   the   afore-stated   amount     of

Rs.26,11,74,000/- on the ground that the revaluation reserve

stood created in the assessment year 2000-01 and had not

been added back while computing the book profit in that year

in terms of the proviso to clause (i) of explanation to Section

115JB.      This order was upheld by the C.I.T. (A) and by the

ITAT and by the High Court, hence, this civil appeal is filed by

the assessee.

5.         In the present case, the controversy is whether the

amount transferred from the revaluation reserve and set off
                                                                 3


against the amount of depreciation debited to P & L Account

can be excluded in terms of clause (i) of explanation to Section

115JB(2) read with the proviso.

Case of the Assessee

6.       It is the case of the assessee that the main provision of

clause (i) seeks to exclude from the net profit, as per P & L

Account, any amount withdrawn from any reserves and

credited to P & L Account.         According to the assessee, the

proviso introduces a caveat by providing that such exclusion

can be made only in circumstances where the book profit of

the year in which the reserve is created (out of which the

withdrawal has been made in the subsequent years) has been

increased to the extent of such reserve. Thus, according to the

assessee, the said proviso has no application to cases like the

present one because in this case the revaluation reserve is

created, inter alia, for revaluation of assets, which are

ordinarily stated in the balance sheet at the historical cost of

acquisition by debiting the value of the fixed assets to the

extent   of   revaluation   with   corresponding   credit   to   the

revaluation reserve. Such creation of the revaluation reserve

does not impact the P & L Account in the year of creation of
                                                              4


such reserves.    That, such revaluation reserve is not a free

reserve. It is not available for distribution of profits. Unlike

revenue   reserves,   a   "revaluation   reserve"   is   not   an

Appropriation of Profits and the same is not debited by way of

debit entry through the P & L Account. That, a revaluation

reserve is in the nature of adjustment entry to balance both

sides of the balance sheet. That, the treatment of revaluation

reserve is governed by the Accounting Standards 10 and 6 and

the Guidance Note on Treatment of Reserves Created on

Revaluation of Fixed Assets issued by the Institute of

Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI).     That, in the year in

which the revaluation reserve is created, the amount of such

reserve is not debited to P & L Account and is credited directly

to a revaluation reserve as provided by ICAI and, thus, the

profit as reflected in the P & L Account is not depressed by the

creation of the reserve and, is, therefore, effectively increased

to that extent.   Thus, there is no question of increasing the

amount shown in the P & L Account further by the revaluation

amount as per Section 115JB, as the profit has, in any case,

not been reduced by such an amount in the first place. That,

since in the year of creation of reserves the book profit suffers
                                                            5


full tax, without the same being affected by creation of such

revaluation reserves, in the year of withdrawal, the amount

withdrawn would be liable to be reduced while computing the

book profit.   It cannot be said that even if the entire book

profit has suffered tax in the year of creation of reserve, the

revaluation reserve created in that year should artificially

again be added back for computing such book profit. That, by

the Finance Act, 2007, w.e.f. 1.4.2007, clause (iia) is inserted

in Section 115JB under which the depreciation on historical

cost alone would be taken into account while calculating the

book profit. In other words, depreciation attributable to the

revaluation of the fixed assets to be debited to the P & L

Account cannot be taken into account to calculate book profit

w.e.f. the assessment year 2007-08.

Relevant Provisions

7.      We quote hereinbelow the relevant provisions of

Section 115JB, which reads as under:

          Special provision for payment of tax by
          certain companies.
          115JB.     (1)  Notwithstanding     anything
          contained in any other provision of this Act,
          where in the case of an assessee, being a
          company, the income-tax, payable on the total
                                                  6


income as computed under this Act in respect
of any previous year relevant to the
assessment year commencing on or after the
1st day of April, 2001, is less than seven and
one-half per cent of its book profit, such book
profit shall be deemed to be the total income of
the assessee and the tax payable by the
assessee on such total income shall be the
amount of income-tax at the rate of seven and
one-half per cent.

(2) Every assessee, being a company, shall, for
the purposes of this section, prepare its profit
and loss account for the relevant previous year
in accordance with the provisions of Parts II
and III of Schedule VI to the Companies Act,
1956 (1 of 1956) :

Provided that while preparing the annual
accounts including profit and loss account,--
         (i) the accounting policies;
        (ii) the accounting standards adopted
for preparing such accounts including profit
and loss account;
       (iii) the method and rates adopted for
calculating the depreciation,
shall be the same as have been adopted for the
purpose of preparing such accounts including
profit and loss account and laid before the
company at its annual general meeting in
accordance with the provisions of section 210
of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956) :

Explanation.--For the purposes of this section,
"book profit" means the net profit as shown in
the profit and loss account for the relevant
previous year prepared under sub-section (2),
as increased by--

     (b)the amounts carried to any reserves,
                                                              7


                by whatever name called, other than a
                    reserve specified under section
                    33AC; or

          if any amount referred to in clauses (a) to (f) is
          debited to the profit and loss account, and as
          reduced by--
                  (i) the amount withdrawn from any
          reserve or provision (excluding a reserve
          created before the 1st day of April, 1997
          otherwise than by way of a debit to the profit
          and loss account), if any such amount is
          credited to the profit and loss account:

          Provided that where this section is applicable
          to an assessee in any previous year, the
          amount withdrawn from reserves created or
          provisions made in a previous year relevant to
          the assessment year commencing on or after
          the 1st day of April, 1997 shall not be reduced
          from the book profit unless the book profit of
          such year has been increased by those
          reserves or provisions (out of which the said
          amount      was     withdrawn)    under     this
          Explanation or Explanation below the second
          proviso to section 115JA, as the case may be;


8.      Before answering the submissions advanced on behalf

of the assessee, we wish to explain the history of MAT

provisions, which is as follows:

History of MAT Provisions

9.      MAT is applicable only where the normal total income

computed is less than 30% of the book profit.
                                                                  8


10.     MAT was introduced by the Finance Act of 1996 w.e.f.

1.4.1997. This was necessary due to a rise in the number of

zero-tax companies paying marginal tax which situation arose

in view of preferences granted in the form of exemptions,

deductions and high rates of depreciation.              The rate of

minimum tax was kept at 30% of the book profit as deemed

total income.     MAT was levied under Section 115JA from

assessment year 1997-98. Section 115JA is made inoperative

w.e.f. 1.4.2001. In its place, the Finance Act, 2000 inserted

Section 115JB. The new provision provides that all companies

having book profit under the Companies Act, shall be liable to

pay MAT at a specified rate of the book profit.            It further

provides   that    every    MAT    company    shall     follow   same

accounting   policies      and   standards   as   are   followed   for

preparing its statutory account.

11.     For the purposes of the afore-stated provision, "book

profit" means the net profit as shown in the P & L Account in

the relevant previous year in accordance with the provisions of

Part II and Part III of the Schedule VI to the Companies Act,

subject to certain adjustments which increases or decreases

the book profit.     Thus, even under Section 115J, certain
                                                              9


adjustments were to be made to the net profits as shown in

the P & L Account. One such adjustment stipulates that the

net profit shall be decreased by the amount withdrawn from

any reserves, if any such amount is credited to the P & L

Account.       Some companies have taken advantage of Section

115J by decreasing their net profit by the amount withdrawn

from the reserve created in the same year itself, though the

reserve when created had not gone to increase the book profit.

Such adjustments led to lowering of profits and, consequently,

the quantum of tax payable got reduced. Thus, by amending

Section 115J, it was provided that "book profit" will be allowed

to be decreased by the amount withdrawn from any reserves

only in two cases:

      (i)      if such reserve has been created in the previous

               year relevant to the assessment year commencing

               w.e.f. 1.4.1998

                                 OR

      (ii)     if the reserve so created in the previous year has

               gone to increase the book profit in any year when

               Section 115J was applicable.

12.          The Finance Act, 2002 now specifically provides vide
                                                           1


Section 115JB that the amounts withdrawn from any reserves,

if credited to the P & L Account, shall be reduced from the

book profit. It also provides that any amount withdrawn from

such reserves created on or after 1.4.1997 and which is

credited to P & L Account shall not be reduced from the book

profit, unless the book profit in the year of creation of such

reserves stood increased by the amount transferred to such

reserves at that time.

Scope of Section 115JB

13.     The expression "book profit" for the purposes of

Section 115JB has been defined in the explanation to Section

115JB(2) to mean: -

        the net profit as shown in the P & L Account for the

relevant previous year prepared under Section 115JB(2), as

increased by the amount(s) mentioned in clauses (a) to (f) and

as reduced by the amount(s) covered by clauses (i) to (vii) of

the said explanation.

14.     It is, thus, clear that what is "book profit" has been

defined and explained in the above explanation.       Section

115JB is a self-contained code.    It applies notwithstanding

other provisions of the Act.      There is no scope for any
                                                             1


allowances or deductions under any other section from what is

deemed to be total income of the company (assessee).

15.     The first step for arriving at the "book profit" is that

the net profit as shown in the P & L Account for the relevant

previous year prepared under Section 115JB(2) has to be

increased by the amount(s) in clauses (a) to (f) if such

amount(s) is debited to the P & L Account. Clause (b) refers to

amount(s) carried to any reserves by whatever name called.

As stated above, such increase needs to be made only if any

amount referred to in clauses (a) to (f) is debited to P & L

Account.

16.     The second step for arriving at the "book profit" is that

the net profit as shown in the P & L Account for the relevant

previous year prepared under Section 115JB(2) and as

increased by any amount, as stated above, has to be reduced

by the amount(s) in clauses (i) to (vii).

17.     For the purposes of deciding this case it may be noted

that we are concerned with clause (i) which inter alia refers to

an amount(s) withdrawn from any reserves if any such

amount(s) is credited to P & L Account. During the relevant

assessment year, clause (i) had an exception to such
                                                            1


exclusion. That exception was in the form of a proviso which

inter alia stated that the exclusion in clause (i) to the

explanation will not apply "to the amount(s) withdrawn from

reserves created in a previous year relevant to the assessment

year 1997-98 or any subsequent assessment year unless the

book profit of such year stood increased by those reserves (out

of which the said amount(s) stood withdrawn)".

18.     Thus, the book profits calculation would be as under:

Take profit as per P & L Account                             xx
Add: (if debited to P & L Account)
(a) Income tax paid/ payable & provision                     xx
(b) Any transfer for reserves                                xx
(c) Unascertained liabilities (contingent)                   xx
(d) Provision for losses of subsidiaries                     xx
(e) Dividend paid/ proposed                                  xx
(f) Expenses relating to exempt income under sections        xx
    10, 10A, 10B, 11, 12
Less: (if credited to P & L Account)
(i) Withdrawal from reserves or provisions subject to        xx
    proviso

Q.:     Could   Rs.26,11,74,000/-,    being   the   differential

depreciation recouped from the revaluation reserves created

during the earlier assessment year 2000-01, be said to be

credited in the P & L Account during the assessment year in

question in terms of clause (i) to the explanation to Section

115JB(2)?
                                                                  1




19.      The brief facts apropos this issue are that the assessee

had revalued its fixed assets as on 31st March, 2000 and the

resultant surplus of Rs.288,58,19,000/- stood added to the

cost of the assets on the asset side of the balance sheet and to

equalize both sides thereof the revaluation reserve of an

equivalent amount was created on the liability side of the

balance sheet. Thus, the said reserve was merely an

adjustment entry.     The figure of profit remained untouched

during the assessment year 2000-01 so far as the revaluation

of assets to the tune of Rs.288,58,19,000/- was concerned.

During    the   assessment       year    2001-02,   an   amount    of

Rs.26,11,74,000/-, being the differential depreciation, was

transferred     out   of   the    said    revaluation    reserve   of

Rs.288,58,19,000/- and credited to the P & L Account which

the AO disallowed and consequently the said sum of

Rs.26,11,74,000/- stood added back to the net profits. Hence,

this civil appeal is filed by the assessee.



20.      Book profit is not defined in the Act.          It is income

computed under the company law.               By virtue of the MAT
                                                            1


provisions, in the case of a company whose total income as

computed under the normal provisions of the Act is less than

30% of the book profit, the total income chargeable to tax will

be 30% of the book profit as computed. For the purposes of

Section 115J, book profit will be the net profit as shown in the

P & L Account prepared in accordance with the provisions of

Schedule   VI   to   Companies     Act,   1956   after   certain

adjustments. The net profit will be increased by income tax

paid or payable, amount carried to any reserve, provision

made for liabilities etc. provided the amount(s) is debited to

the P & L Account. The amount so arrived at is to be reduced

by item (i) to item (vii) including amounts withdrawn from

reserves, if any such amount is credited to P & L Account.

Clauses (i) to (vii) of the explanation to Section 115JB(2)

represent items of reduction from the net profits. Clause (i)

mandates reduction for the amount(s) withdrawn from the

reserves earlier created, provided such amount(s) is credited to

P & L Account. Such credit is mandated so that the true

working result gets reflected in the financial statement of the

assessee-company. The said clause (i) contemplates only those

reserves which actually affect the net profits as shown in the
                                                           1


P & L Account (see also clause (ii) for comparison). The object

of various clauses (i) to clause (vii) is to find out the true

working result of the assessee-company.

21.     In the present case, the adjustment made in the P & L

Account was as per Accounting Standards 6 and 10 read with

Guidance Note issued by Institute of Chartered Accountants of

India which is in conformity with Section 211 of the

Companies Act. The said adjustment was primarily in the

nature of contra adjustment in the P & L Account and not a

case of effective credit in the P & L Account (as contemplated

in clause (i) of explanation). The credit in the P & L Account

implies that the P & L Account per se has been effectively

credited by the said amount. Thus, the amount withdrawn

from any reserve must in effect impact the net profit as shown

in the P & L Account. As per accounting principles, the contra

adjustment does not at all affect any particular account to

which it has been carried. Unless an adjustment has the effect

of increasing the net profit as shown in the P & L Account,

that entry cannot be said to be a credit to the P & L Account

and, therefore, though the amount has been literally credited

to the P & L Account, however, in substance there is no credit
                                                            1


to P & L Account. MAT provisions were introduced as number

of zero tax companies had grown. It was found that companies

had earned substantial book profits and had paid huge

dividends but paid no tax. In the present case, had the

assessee deducted the full depreciation from the profit before

depreciation during the accounting year ending 31.3.2001, it

would have shown a loss and in which event it could not have

paid the dividends and, therefore, the assessee credited the

amount to the extent of the additional depreciation from the

revaluation reserve to present a more healthy balance sheet to

its shareholders enabling the assessee possibly to pay out a

good dividend. It is precisely to tax these kinds of companies

that MAT provisions had been introduced. The object of MAT

provisions is to bring out the real profit of the companies. The

thrust is to find out the real working results of the company.

Thus, the reduction sought by the assessee under clause (i) to

the explanation to Section 115JB(2) in respect of depreciation

has been rightly rejected by the AO.

22.     Take the facts of the present case. As stated above, the

revaluation reserve of Rs.288,58,19,000/- was created during

earlier assessment year 2000-01. During the accounting year
                                                                          1


ending 31.3.2001 (assessment year 2001-02), the profits of

assessee stood at Rs.120,18,97,000/- whereas depreciation

stood at Rs.127,57,06,000/-. Depreciation is a no-cash charge

against    the      profits.    Thus,    company      had      a    loss   of

Rs.7,38,09,000/- (i.e. Rs.127,57,06,000/- of depreciation as

against        profit    of    Rs.120,18,97,000/-).       However,         by

withdrawing         Rs.26,11,74,000/-,        being     the     differential

depreciation,           from     the      revaluation         reserve      of

Rs.288,58,19,000/-(which is only a notional adjustment entry

to balance both sides of the balance sheet) and reducing it

from the depreciation of Rs.127,57,06,000/-, the assessee

artificially      brings       down     the   depreciation         only    to

Rs.101,45,32,000/- which is then deducted from the profits

before depreciation amounting to Rs.120,18,97,000/- so that

there is a profit of Rs.18,73,65,000/-. This is how the loss of

Rs.7,38,09,000 got converted to profit of Rs.18,73,65,000/-.

Thus, the financial statement for the year ending 31.3.2001 is

made to look healthy.

23.       The reasons given hereinabove are in addition to the

reasons given by the Authorities below while rejecting the

claim of the assessee.
                                                                  1


24.        The matter could be examined from another angle. To

recapitulate the facts, the fixed assets of the assessee were

revalued in the earlier assessment year 2000-01 (i.e. financial

year ending 31.3.2000) and amount of enhancement in

valuation was Rs.288,58,19,000/- which was credited to the

revaluation reserve. In other words, at the time of revaluation

of assets, the said figure of Rs.288,58,19,000/- was added to

the historical cost of assets on the asset side of the balance

sheet and in order to equalize both sides of the balance sheet

the revaluation reserve to that extent was created on the

liability side. Thus, the figure of profit remained untouched so

far   as     the   revaluation   of   assets   to   the    tune    of

Rs.288,58,19,000/- is concerned.          The profits were not

increased by the said amount when the asset was revalued.

During the assessment year in question, i.e., assessment year

2001-02,      an   amount   of   Rs.26,11,74,000/-,       being   the

differential depreciation, was transferred out of the said

revaluation reserve of Rs.288,58,19,000/- and credited to the

P & L Account which the A.O. disallowed by placing reliance

on the proviso to clause (i) of the explanation to Section

115JB(2).      Consequently, the A.O. added back the said
                                                                 1


amount of Rs.26,11,74,000/- to the net profits. We agree with

the A.O. Under the provisions, as they then existed, certain

adjustments were required to be made to the net profit as

shown in the P & L Account. One such adjustment stipulated

that the net profit shall be reduced by the amount(s)

withdrawn from any reserves, if any such amount is credited

to the P & L Account. Thus, if the reserves created had gone

to increase the book profits in any year when the provisions of

Section 115JB were applicable, the assessee became entitled

to reduce the amount withdrawn from such reserves if such

withdrawal is credited to P & L Account. Now, from the above

facts,   it   is   clear   that   neither   the   said   amount   of

Rs.288,58,19,000/- nor Rs.26,11,74,000/- had ever gone to

increase the book profits in the said year ending 31.3.2000

(being the financial year). Thus, when such amount(s) has not

gone to increase the book value at the time of creation of

reserve(s), there is no question of reducing the amount

transferred from such revaluation reserves to the P & L

Account. Thus, the proviso to clause (i) of the explanation to

Section 115JB(2) comes in the way of the claim for reduction

made by the assessee. In our view, the reduction under clause
                                                                         2


(i) to the explanation could have been availed only if such

revaluation reserve had gone to increase the book profits. As

the amount of revaluation reserves had not gone to increase

the book profits at the time it was created, the benefit of

reduction cannot be allowed.        One more fact needs to be

highlighted.    In this case, as indicated above, the revaluation

reserve stood created during the earlier assessment year

2000-01.       It has been vehemently argued on behalf of the

assessee that creation of such reserve did not impact the

profits of that year. The facts enumerated hereinabove shows

that though the profit was not impacted, depreciation as the

head of A/c. was impacted. By inter play of the balance sheet

items with Profit & Loss A/c. items the assessee, as stated

above, has sought to project the loss of Rs.7,38,09,000/- as

profit of Rs.18,73,65,000/-.

Conclusion

25.     For above reasons, we see no reason to interfere,

hence, the civil appeal filed by the assessee shall stand

dismissed with no order as to costs.



                                 .......................................CJI
                                                           2


                  (S. H. Kapadia)


                  ...........................................J.
                  (K.S. Panicker Radhakrishnan)


                  ...........................................J.
                  (Swatanter Kumar)

New Delhi;
January 5, 2011

Sunday, August 19, 2012

the Court would not normally interfere with the policy decision and in matters challenging the award of contract by the State or public authorities. In view of the above, the appellant has failed to establish that the same was contrary to public interest and beyond the pale of discrimination or unreasonable. We are satisfied that to have the best of the equipment for the vehicles, which ply on road carrying passengers, the 2nd respondent thought it fit that the criteria for applying for tender for procuring tyres should be at a high standard and thought it fit that only those manufacturers who satisfy the eligibility criteria should be permitted to participate in the tender. As noted in various decisions, the Government and their undertakings must have a free hand in setting terms of the tender and only if it is arbitrary, discriminatory, mala fide or actuated by bias, the Courts would interfere. The Courts cannot interfere with the terms of the tender prescribed by the Government because it feels that some other terms in the tender would have been fair, wiser or logical. In the case on hand, we have already noted that taking into account various aspects including the safety of the passengers and public interest, the CMG consisting of experienced persons, revised the tender conditions. We are satisfied that the said Committee had discussed the subject in detail and for specifying these two conditions regarding pre-qualification criteria and the evaluation criteria. On perusal of all the materials, we are satisfied that the impugned conditions do not, in any way, could be classified as arbitrary, discriminatory or mala fide.


                                                                  REPORTABLE

                         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                      1


                 2 CIVIL APPEAL NO.   5898           OF 2012


                 3 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 25802 of 2008




M/s Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd.                 .... Appellant (s)

            Versus

The State of Karnataka & Ors.                          .... Respondent(s)


                               J U D G M E N T

P. Sathasivam, J.
1)    Leave granted.
2)    This appeal is directed against the final  judgment  and  order  dated
02.07.2008 passed by the High  Court  of  Karnataka  at  Bangalore  in  Writ
Appeal No. 1928 of 2007 whereby the High Court dismissed  the  appeal  filed
by the appellant-Company  herein.
3)    Brief facts:
(a)   On 04.08.2005, the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation  (KSRTC)
- Respondent No.2 herein floated a Tender being No.  G30-05  for  supply  of
Tyres, Tubes and Flaps specifying certain pre-qualification criteria.
(b)    Challenging  the  said  pre-qualification  criteria,  the  appellant-
Company, which is engaged in the manufacture and supply of tyres, tubes  and
flaps filed a Writ Petition being No. 20543 of 2005 before the  High  Court.
After filing of the writ petition, the said criterion was withdrawn  by  the
KSRTC.  Thereafter, the KSRTC modified the  pre-qualification  criteria  and
issued a Tender being No. G-23-07  dated  05.07.2007  wherein,  a  new  pre-
qualification criterion was specified.
(c)   Being aggrieved by the said pre-qualification criteria, the appellant-
Company preferred a Writ Petition being No. 11951 of 2007  before  the  High
Court.  By judgment dated 13.09.2007, the learned Single Judge of  the  High
Court dismissed their writ petition.
(d)   Challenging the said judgment,  the  appellant  filed  a  Writ  Appeal
being No. 1928 of 2007 before the Division Bench  of  the  High  Court.   By
impugned judgment dated 02.07.2008, the Division Bench  of  the  High  Court
dismissed the same.
(e)   Being aggrieved  by  the  said  judgment,  the  appellant-Company  has
preferred this appeal by way of special leave before this Court.
4)    Heard Ms. Madhurima Tatia, learned counsel for  the  appellant-Company
and Mr. S.N. Bhat, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 2 & 3  and  Mr.  V.N.
Raghupathy, learned counsel for the State.
5)    Ms. Madhurima Tatia, learned counsel for the appellant-Company,  after
taking  us  through  the  tender  pre-qualification   criteria   and   their
performance, raised the following submissions:
(i)   The pre-qualification criteria as specified  in  Condition  Nos.  2(a)
and 2(b) (amended Condition Nos. 4(a) and 4(b)) of the Tender  in  question,
viz., G-23-07 dated 05.07.2007 is  unreasonable,  arbitrary,  discriminatory
and opposed to public interest in general.
(ii)  The said  conditions  were  incorporated  to  exclude  the  appellant-
Company and other similarly situated companies from the  tender  process  on
wholly extraneous grounds which are unsustainable in law.
(iii) The appellant-Company was successful in previous three  contracts  and
supplied their products to the KSRTC.  There was no complaint pertaining  to
short supply and quality.  The financial capacity of  the  appellant-Company
was never doubted by the KSRTC at any point of  time,  hence,  the  impugned
pre-qualification criteria was included  to  exclude  the  appellant-Company
from the tender bidding process with an ulterior motive.
6)    Per contra, Mr. S.N. Bhat and Mr.  V.N.  Raghupathy,  learned  counsel
for  the  respondents,  after  taking  us  through  the  relevant  materials
including the constitution of high level Committee i.e. Contract  Management
Group (CMG), its deliberations and decisions etc., submitted that:
(i)   To have the best of the equipment for the vehicles, which ply on  road
carrying passengers, the respondents, in the circumstances, thought  it  fit
that the criteria for applying for tender for procuring tyres should  be  at
a high  standard  and  hence  only  those  manufacturers,  who  satisfy  the
eligibility criteria, should be permitted to participate in the tender.
(ii)  The said two conditions were imposed in order to ensure the supply  of
good quality tyres.
(iii) The two conditions were incorporated in the tender notice pursuant  to
the decision of the Contract Management  Group  (CMG)  of  the  KSRTC  which
consists of higher level officials having technical knowledge.
(iv)  The corrigendum was issued to  minimize  the  confusion,  which  might
have occurred due to condition No. 2(a).
Discussion:
7)    We have carefully considered the rival  submissions  and  perused  all
the materials placed before us.  It is not in dispute  that  the  KSRTC  has
issued tender No. G-23-07 dated 05.07.2007.  The pre-qualification  criteria
as specified in Condition No.2 of  the  tender  dated  05.07.2007  reads  as
under:-
      “2  Pre-qualification criteria for procurement of TTF Sets:


      (a)   Only the tyre manufacturers who have supplied a minimum  average
           of 5000 sets of Tyres, Tubes and Flaps  set  per  annum,  in  the
           preceding three years out of 2003-04, 2004-05, 2005-06 and  2006-
           07 to any one of the OE chassis manufacturer, i.e. Ashok Leyland,
           Tata Motors, Eicher, Swaraj  Mazda  and  Volvo  are  eligible  to
           participate, for supply of  respective size/type of Tyres,  Tubes
           and Flaps set.  They should produce  purchase  order  copies  and
           invoice supplies in support of the same.
      (b)   The firm should have minimum average annual turnover  of  Rs.500
           crores in the preceding three years out of 2003-04, 2004-05, 2005-
           06 and 2006-07 from the sale of tyres, Tubes and Flaps.”

8)    Being aggrieved by the  above-mentioned  conditions,  viz.,  2(a)  and
2(b) of the tender dated 05.07.2007,  the  appellant-Company  preferred  W.P
No. 11951 of 2007 before the High Court.  After  filing  of  the  said  writ
petition, before opening of the tender bids, the KSRTC  amended  the  tender
conditions as were incorporated in the  earlier  tender  document  replacing
Condition Nos. 2(a) and 2(b) with Condition Nos. 4(a) and  4(b).   Condition
Nos. 4(a) and 4(b) read as under:
      “4.  Pre-qualification criteria for procurement of TTF sets:


        a) Only the tyre manufacturers who have supplied a  minimum  average
           of 5000 sets of Tyres, Tubes and Flaps  set  per  annum,  in  the
           preceding three years out of 2003-04, 2004-05, 2005-06 and  2006-
           07   to               any   of    the    heavy    goods/passenger
           vehicles/chassis manufacturers in the  country  are  eligible  to
           participate.  They  should  produce  purchase  order  copies  and
           invoice supplies in support of the same.


        b) The firm should have minimum average annual  turnover  of  Rs.500
           crores in the preceding three years out of 2003-04, 2004-05, 2005-
           06 and 2006-07 from the sale of Tyres, Tubes and Flaps.”


Under the said amendment, only Condition No. 2(a) was replaced by  Condition
No 4(a).  In Condition No. 4(a), the  classification  of  the  vehicles  was
maintained but the names of the  manufacturers  were  deleted.   It  is  the
grievance of the appellant-Company that the  pre-qualification  criteria  as
specified in Condition Nos. 2(a) and 2(b) (amended Condition Nos.  4(a)  and
4(b)) of the tender in question is unreasonable,  arbitrary,  discriminatory
and opposed to public interest in general.  It is also their grievance  that
the said conditions were incorporated to exclude the  appellant-Company  and
other similarly  situated  companies  from  the  tender  process  on  wholly
extraneous  grounds  which  is  unsustainable  in  law.   In  other   words,
according  to  the  appellant-Company,  the  decision  of   the   KSRTC   in
restricting  their  participation  in  the  tender  to  Original   Equipment
Manufacturer (OEM) suppliers is totally unfair and discriminatory.
9)    This Court, in a series of decisions,  considered  similar  conditions
incorporated in the tender documents and also the scope and judicial  review
of administrative actions.  The scope and the approach to be adopted in  the
process of such review have been settled by a  long  line  of  decisions  of
this Court.  Since the principle of law is settled and  well  recognized  by
now, we may refer some of the decisions only to  recapitulate  the  relevant
tests applicable and approach of this Court in such matters.
10) In Tata Cellular vs. Union of  India,  (1994)  6  SCC  651,  this  Court
emphasised  the  need  to  find  a  right  balance  between   administrative
discretion to decide the matters on the one hand, and  the  need  to  remedy
any unfairness on the other, and observed:

      “94.  (1)  The  modern  trend  points   to   judicial   restraint   in
      administrative action.




      (2) The court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews the
      manner in which the decision was made.




      (3)  The  court  does  not  have  the   expertise   to   correct   the
      administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is
      permitted it will  be  substituting  its  own  decision,  without  the
      necessary expertise, which itself may be fallible.




      (4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open  to  judicial
      scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract.
      …


      (5) The Government must have freedom of contract. In  other  words,  a
      fair  play  in  the  joints  is  a  necessary   concomitant   for   an
      administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or  quasi-
      administrative sphere. However, the decision must not only  be  tested
      by  the  application  of  Wednesbury   principle   of   reasonableness
      (including its other facts pointed out above) but must  be  free  from
      arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides.


      (6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative burden  on  the
      administration and lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure.”


11) In Raunaq International Ltd. vs. I.V.R. Construction Ltd. & Ors.  (1999)
1 SCC 492, this Court reiterated the  principle  governing  the  process  of
judicial review and held that the writ  court  would  not  be  justified  in
interfering with commercial transactions in which the State is  one  of  the
parties except where there is substantial public interest  involved  and  in
cases where the transaction is mala fide.

12)   In Union of India &  Anr.  vs.  International  Trading   Co.  &  Anr.,
(2003) 5 SCC 437, this Court, in similar circumstances, held as under:

      “15. While the discretion to change the  policy  in  exercise  of  the
      executive power, when not trammelled by any statute or  rule  is  wide
      enough, what is imperative and implicit in terms of Article 14 is that
      a change in policy must  be  made  fairly  and  should  not  give  the
      impression that  it  was  so  done  arbitrarily  or  by  any  ulterior
      criteria. The wide sweep of Article 14 and the  requirement  of  every
      State  action  qualifying  for  its  validity   on   this   touchstone
      irrespective of the field of activity of  the  State  is  an  accepted
      tenet. The basic requirement of Article 14 is fairness  in  action  by
      the State, and non-arbitrariness  in  essence  and  substance  is  the
      heartbeat of fair play. Actions  are  amenable,  in  the  panorama  of
      judicial review only to the extent that the State must act validly for
      a discernible reason, not whimsically for any  ulterior  purpose.  The
      meaning and true import and concept of arbitrariness  is  more  easily
      visualized than precisely defined. A  question  whether  the  impugned
      action is arbitrary or not is to be ultimately answered on  the  facts
      and circumstances of a given case. A basic and obvious test  to  apply
      in such cases is to see whether there  is  any  discernible  principle
      emerging from the impugned action and if so, does  it  really  satisfy
      the test of reasonableness.


      16. Where a particular mode is prescribed for doing an act  and  there
      is no impediment in adopting the procedure, the deviation to act in  a
      different manner which does not  disclose  any  discernible  principle
      which is reasonable itself shall be labelled as arbitrary. Every State
      action must  be  informed  by  reason  and  it  follows  that  an  act
      uninformed by reason is per se arbitrary.


      22. If the State acts within the bounds of reasonableness, it would be
      legitimate to take into  consideration  the  national  priorities  and
      adopt trade policies. As noted above, the ultimate test is whether  on
      the  touchstone  of  reasonableness  the  policy  decision  comes  out
      unscathed.


      23. Reasonableness of restriction is to be determined in an  objective
      manner and from the standpoint of interests of the general public  and
      not from the standpoint of the interests  of  persons  upon  whom  the
      restrictions have been  imposed  or  upon  abstract  consideration.  A
      restriction cannot be said to be  unreasonable  merely  because  in  a
      given case, it operates harshly. In determining whether there  is  any
      unfairness involved; the nature of the  right  alleged  to  have  been
      infringed, the underlying purpose  of  the  restriction  imposed,  the
      extent and urgency of the evil sought  to  be  remedied  thereby,  the
      disproportion of the  imposition,  the  prevailing  condition  at  the
      relevant time, enter into judicial verdict. The reasonableness of  the
      legitimate expectation has  to  be  determined  with  respect  to  the
      circumstances  relating  to  the  trade  or  business   in   question.
      Canalisation of a particular business in favour of  even  a  specified
      individual is reasonable  where  the  interests  of  the  country  are
      concerned or where the business affects the economy  of  the  country.
      (See Parbhani Transport  Coop.  Society  Ltd.  v.  Regional  Transport
      Authority, Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Union of  India,  Hari  Chand
      Sarda v. Mizo District Council  and  Krishnan  Kakkanth  v.  Govt.  of
      Kerala.)”

13)   In Jespar I. Slong vs. State of Meghalaya & Ors., (2004) 11  SCC  485,
this Court, in paragraph 17, held as under:
      “17……fixation of a value of the tender is entirely within the  purview
      of the executive and courts hardly have  any  role  to  play  in  this
      process except for striking down such action of the  executive  as  is
      proved to be arbitrary or unreasonable……”


14)   In Association of Registration  Plates  vs  Union  of  India  &  Ors.,
(2005) 1 SCC 679, similar issue was considered by a bench of  three  Judges.
In that case, the dispute was about the  terms  and  conditions  of  notices
inviting tenders (NITs) for supply of high security registration plates  for
motor vehicles.  The tenders have been issued by various  State  Governments
on the guidelines circulated by the Central Government for implementing  the
provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and  the  newly  amended  Central
Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989.  The main grievance  of  the  appellant  therein
was that all notices inviting tenders (NITs) which were  issued  by  various
State Governments, contained       conditions which were tailored to  favour
companies having foreign collaboration. Their  further  grievance  was  that
the  tender  conditions  were  discriminatory  as  per  Article  14  of  the
Constitution and were being  aimed  at  excluding  indigenous  manufacturers
from the tender process.  It was also contended that in all the  cases,  the
work of supply  of  high  security  registration  plates  for  all  existing
vehicles and new vehicles was being entrusted to  a  single  licence  plates
manufacturer in a State or a region and for a long period of 15  years  thus
creating monopoly in favour of selected bidders to  the  complete  exclusion
of all others in the field.  The further  contention  advanced  therein  was
that creation of monopoly in favour of a few parties having connection  with
foreign concerns is violative  of  the  fundamental  right  of  trade  under
Article 19(1)(g) and discriminatory under Article 14  of  the  Constitution.
It was also pointed out that in the name of implementing  the  amended  Rule
50 of the Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, the States are imposing conditions  in
the tender that would take away the existing rights of the manufacturers  of
plates in India.  On the condition laid  down  for       prescribed  minimum
turnover of business, the  challenge  made  on  behalf  of  the  petitioners
therein was that fixing such high turnover for such a new business  is  only
for the purpose of advancing the business interests of a group of  companies
having foreign links and support.   It  is  impossible  for  any  indigenous
manufacturer of security plates to have a  turnover  of  approximately  12.5
crores from the high security registration plates which were  sought  to  be
introduced in India for  the  first  time  and  the  implementation  of  the
project has not yet started in any of the States.  On behalf  of  the  Union
of India, the State authorities and counsel  appearing  for  the  contesting
manufacturers, in their replies,  have  tried  to  justify  the  manner  and
implementation of the policy contained in Rule  50  of  the  Motor  Vehicles
Rules.  On behalf of the Union of India, learned ASG submitted that Rule  50
read with Statutory Order of 2001 issued under Section 109(3) of  the  Motor
Vehicles Act, the State Governments are legally competent  to  formulate  an
appropriate policy for choosing a sole or more  manufacturers  in  order  to
fulfil the object of affixation of security plates.   The  Scheme  contained
in Rule 50  read  with  the  Statutory  Order  of  2001  leaves  it  to  the
discretion of the State concerned to even choose a single  manufacturer  for
the entire State or more than one manufacturer regionwise.  It  was  pointed
out that such a selection cannot be said to confer  any  monopoly  right  by
the State on any private individual or  concern.   He  further  pointed  out
that the tender conditions were formulated taking into  account  the  public
interest consideration and aspects of high security.
15)   While considering the above submissions, the three- Judge  Bench  held
as under:


      “38. In the matter of formulating conditions of a tender document  and
      awarding a contract of the nature of ensuring supply of high  security
      registration plates, greater latitude is required to  be  conceded  to
      the State authorities. Unless the action  of  tendering  authority  is
      found to be malicious and a misuse of  its  statutory  powers,  tender
      conditions  are  unassailable.  On  intensive  examination  of  tender
      conditions, we do not find that they violate the equality clause under
      Article 14 or encroach on fundamental rights of the class of intending
      tenderers under Article 19 of the Constitution. On the  basis  of  the
      submissions made on behalf of the Union and State authorities and  the
      justification shown for the terms of the impugned  tender  conditions,
      we do not find that the clauses requiring experience in the  field  of
      supplying registration plates in foreign countries and the quantum  of
      business turnover are intended only to keep  indigenous  manufacturers
      out of the field. It is explained that on the date of  formulation  of
      scheme in Rule 50 and issuance of guidelines thereunder by the Central
      Government, there were not many indigenous manufacturers in India with
      technical and financial capability to undertake the job of  supply  of
      such high dimension, on a long-term basis and in a  manner  to  ensure
      safety and security which is the prime object to be  achieved  by  the
      introduction of new sophisticated registration plates.
      39. The notice inviting tender is open to response by all and even  if
      one single manufacturer is ultimately selected for a region or  State,
      it cannot be said that the State has created a monopoly of business in
      favour of  a  private  party.  Rule  50  permits  the  RTOs  concerned
      themselves to implement the policy or to get it implemented through  a
      selected approved manufacturer.


      40. Selecting one manufacturer through a process of  open  competition
      is not creation of any monopoly, as contended, in violation of Article
      19(1)(g) of the Constitution read with clause (6) of the said article.
      As is sought to be pointed  out,  the  implementation  involves  large
      network  of  operations  of  highly   sophisticated   materials.   The
      manufacturer has to have embossing stations within the premises of the
      RTO. He has to maintain the data of  each  plate  which  he  would  be
      getting from his main unit. It has to  be  cross-checked  by  the  RTO
      data. There has to be a server in the RTO's  office  which  is  linked
      with all RTOs in each State and thereon linked to  the  whole  nation.
      Maintenance of the record by one and  supervision  over  its  activity
      would be simpler for the State if there is one manufacturer instead of
      multi-manufacturers as suppliers. The actual operation of  the  scheme
      through the RTOs in their premises would get complicated and  confused
      if multi-manufacturers are involved. That would also seriously  impair
      the high security concept in affixation of new plates on the vehicles.
      If there is a single manufacturer he can be forced  to  go  and  serve
      rural  areas  with  thin  vehicular  population  and  less  volume  of
      business. Multi-manufacturers might concentrate only  on  urban  areas
      with higher vehicular population.


      43. Certain preconditions or qualifications for  tenders  have  to  be
      laid down to ensure that the  contractor  has  the  capacity  and  the
      resources  to  successfully  execute  the  work.  Article  14  of  the
      Constitution prohibits the  Government  from  arbitrarily  choosing  a
      contractor at its will and pleasure. It has to act reasonably,  fairly
      and in public interest in awarding contract.  At  the  same  time,  no
      person can claim a fundamental right to carry  on  business  with  the
      Government. All that he  can  claim  is  that  in  competing  for  the
      contract, he should not be unfairly treated and discriminated, to  the
      detriment of public interest. Undisputedly, the legal  position  which
      has been firmly established from  various  decisions  of  this  Court,
      cited at the Bar (supra)  is  that  government  contracts  are  highly
      valuable assets and the court should be prepared to enforce  standards
      of fairness on the Government  in  its  dealings  with  tenderers  and
      contractors.


      44. The grievance that the terms of notice  inviting  tenders  in  the
      present case virtually create a monopoly in favour of  parties  having
      foreign collaborations, is without substance. Selection of a competent
      contractor for assigning job of  supply  of  a  sophisticated  article
      through an open-tender procedure, is not an act of creating  monopoly,
      as is sought to be suggested on behalf of the  petitioners.  What  has
      been argued  is  that  the  terms  of  the  notices  inviting  tenders
      deliberately exclude domestic manufacturers and new  entrepreneurs  in
      the field. In the absence of any indication from the record  that  the
      terms and conditions were tailor-made to promote parties with  foreign
      collaborations  and  to  exclude  indigenous  manufacturers,  judicial
      interference is uncalled for.”



After observing so, this Court dismissed all  the  writ  petitions  directly
filed in this Court and transferred to this Court from the High Courts.
16)   In Reliance Airport Developers (P)  Ltd.  vs.  Airports  Authority  of
India & Ors., (2006) 10 SCC 1, this Court held that  while  judicial  review
cannot be denied in contractual matters or matters in which  the  Government
exercises its  contractual  powers,  such  review  is  intended  to  prevent
arbitrariness and must be exercised in larger public interest.
17)   In Jagdish Mandal vs. State of Orissa and Others, (2007) 14  SCC  517,
the following conclusion is relevant:

      “22. Judicial review of administrative action is intended  to  prevent
      arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness, bias and  mala  fides.
      Its purpose is to check whether choice or decision is made  “lawfully”
      and not to check whether choice or decision is “sound”. When the power
      of judicial review is invoked in matters relating to tenders or  award
      of contracts, certain special features should  be  borne  in  mind.  A
      contract is a commercial transaction. Evaluating tenders and  awarding
      contracts are essentially commercial functions. Principles  of  equity
      and natural justice stay at a distance. If the  decision  relating  to
      award of contract is bona fide and is in public interest, courts  will
      not, in exercise of power of judicial  review,  interfere  even  if  a
      procedural aberration  or  error  in  assessment  or  prejudice  to  a
      tenderer, is made out. The  power  of  judicial  review  will  not  be
      permitted to be invoked to protect private interest  at  the  cost  of
      public interest, or to decide contractual disputes.  The  tenderer  or
      contractor with a grievance can always seek damages in a civil  court.
      Attempts by unsuccessful tenderers with imaginary grievances,  wounded
      pride and business rivalry, to make mountains out of molehills of some
      technical/procedural violation or some prejudice to self, and persuade
      courts to interfere by exercising power of judicial review, should  be
      resisted. Such interferences, either interim or  final,  may  hold  up
      public works for years, or delay relief and succour to  thousands  and
      millions and may increase the  project  cost  manifold.  Therefore,  a
      court before interfering in tender or contractual matters in  exercise
      of power of judicial review,  should  pose  to  itself  the  following
      questions:


      (i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the  authority  is
      mala fide or intended to favour someone;
           OR
      Whether the process adopted or  decision  made  is  so  arbitrary  and
      irrational that the court can say:  “the  decision  is  such  that  no
      responsible  authority  acting  reasonably  and  in  accordance   with
      relevant law could have reached”;


      (ii) Whether public interest is affected.

      If the answers are in the negative, there should  be  no  interference
      under Article 226. Cases involving blacklisting or imposition of penal
      consequences  on  a  tenderer/contractor  or  distribution  of   State
      largesse (allotment of sites/shops, grant of licences, dealerships and
      franchises) stand on a different footing as they may require a  higher
      degree of fairness in action.”

18)   The same principles have been reiterated in a recent decision of  this
Court in Tejas  Constructions  &  Infrastructure  Pvt.  Ltd.  vs.  Municipal
Council, Sendhwa & Anr., (2012) 6 SCC 464.
19)   From the above decisions, the following principles emerge:
(a)   the basic requirement of Article 14  is  fairness  in  action  by  the
State, and non-arbitrariness in essence and substance is  the  heartbeat  of
fair play.  These actions are amenable to the judicial review  only  to  the
extent that the State must act validly for  a  discernible  reason  and  not
whimsically for any ulterior purpose.  If the State acts within  the  bounds
of reasonableness, it would be legitimate to  take  into  consideration  the
national priorities;
(b)   fixation of a value of the tender is entirely within  the  purview  of
the executive and courts hardly have  any  role  to  play  in  this  process
except for striking down such action of the executive as  is  proved  to  be
arbitrary or unreasonable.   If  the  Government  acts  in  conformity  with
certain healthy standards  and  norms  such  as  awarding  of  contracts  by
inviting tenders, in those circumstances,  the  interference  by  Courts  is
very limited;
(c)   In the matter of formulating  conditions  of  a  tender  document  and
awarding a contract, greater latitude is required  to  be  conceded  to  the
State authorities unless the action of tendering authority is  found  to  be
malicious and a misuse of its statutory powers, interference  by  Courts  is
not warranted;
(d)   Certain preconditions or qualifications for tenders have  to  be  laid
down to ensure that the contractor has the capacity  and  the  resources  to
successfully execute the work; and
(e)   If the State or its instrumentalities act reasonably,  fairly  and  in
public interest in awarding contract, here again, interference by  Court  is
very restrictive since no person can claim fundamental  right  to  carry  on
business with the Government.
20)   Therefore,  a  Court  before  interfering  in  tender  or  contractual
matters, in exercise of power of judicial review, should pose to itself  the
following questions:
(i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the  authority  is  mala
fide or intended to favour  someone;  or  whether  the  process  adopted  or
decision made is so arbitrary and irrational that the court  can  say:  “the
decision is such that no responsible  authority  acting  reasonably  and  in
accordance with relevant law could  have  reached”;  and  (ii)  Whether  the
public interest is affected.  If the answers to the above questions  are  in
negative, then there should be no interference under Article 226.
21)   Respondent No. 1-the State, in their  counter  affidavit,  highlighted
that tyre is very critical and a high  value  item  being  procured  by  the
KSRTC and it procured 900x20 14 Ply Nylon tyres along  with  the  tubes  and
flaps in sets and these types of tyres are being  used  only  by  the  State
Transport  Units  and  not  in  the  domestic  market  extensively.   It  is
highlighted that the quality of the tyre plays a  major  role  in  providing
safe and comfort transportation facility to the commuters.
22)   It is also pointed out  by  the  Respondent-State  that  in  order  to
ensure procurement of tyres, tubes and  flaps  from  reliable  sources,  the
manufacturers of the same with an annual average turnover of Rs. 200  crores
during the preceding three years, were made eligible to participate  in  the
tenders.  In  the  tender  issued  for  procurement  of  these  sets  during
October, 2004, the appellant participated and based on  the  L1  rates,  the
orders for supply for 16,000 sets of tyres were placed on the firm.   It  is
also pointed out that the  appellant  supplied  10,240  sets  of  tyres  and
remaining quantity was cancelled due to quality problems.
23)    Materials  has  also  been  placed  to  show   that   the   appellant
participated in subsequent tenders and orders were released  for  supply  of
900 x 20 14 PR tyres, tubes and flaps from October 2006 to September,  2007.
 It is also explained that after going into various complaints, in order  to
achieve good results, new tyre mileage and safety of the  public  etc.,  and
after noting that vehicle/chassis manufacturers such as M/s  Ashok  Leyland,
M/s Tata Motors etc. have strict quality control system, it was thought  fit
to incorporate similar criteria as a pre-qualification  for  procurement  of
tyres.
24)   It is also highlighted by the State as well as by the KSRTC  that  the
tender conditions were stipulated  by  way  of  policy  decision  after  due
deliberation by the KSRTC.  Both the respondents highlighted that  the  said
conditions were imposed with a view to obtain good  quality  materials  from
reliable and experienced suppliers.  In other words, according to them,  the
conditions were aimed at the sole purpose  of  obtaining  good  quality  and
reliable  supply  of  materials  and  there  was  no  ulterior   motive   in
stipulating the said conditions.
25)    Both the counsel for the respondents have brought to our notice  that
the two impugned conditions were incorporated in the tender notice  pursuant
to a decision of the Contract Management Group (CMG) of the KSRTC, which  is
an institutional mechanism for the purpose of devising proper method in  the
matter, inter alia, of procurement of materials  to  the  KSRTC.   The  said
Group consists  of  various  high  level  officials  representing  different
departments of KSRTC.  The CMG constitutes of the following officials:
      a)    Managing Director,
            Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation
        b) Managing Directors of four sister Corporations
        c) Director, Security & Vigilance
        d) Director, Personnel and Environment
        e) Chief Accounts Officer
        f) Chief Engineer (Production)
        g) Chief Engineer(Maintenance)
        h) Chief Accounts Officer(Internal Audit)
        i) Controller of Stores and Purchase

Thus it is clear that the said CMG is a widely represented body  within  the
Respondent No. 2-KSRTC.
26)   Further materials placed by KSRTC show that the CMG met on  17.05.2007
and deliberated on the question of conditions  to  be  incorporated  in  the
matter of calling of tenders for supply of tyres, tubes and  flaps.   It  is
pointed out that in view of the experience gained over  the  years,  it  was
felt by the said Group that the impugned two conditions should be  essential
qualifications of any tenderer.  The said policy decision was taken  in  the
best interest of the KSRTC and the members of the traveling public  to  whom
it is committed to provide the best possible  service.   In  the  course  of
hearing, learned counsel for  the  respondents  have  also  brought  to  our
notice the Minutes of Meeting of the  CMG  held  on  17.05.2007.   The  said
recommendation of the CMG was ultimately approved by the  Vice  Chairman  of
KSRTC.   In  the  circumstances,  the  said  impugned  two  conditions  were
incorporated in the tender notice dated 05.07.2007.
27)   It is also brought to our notice that the KSRTC  is  governed  by  the
provisions of the Karnataka Transparency in Public  Procurements  Act,  1999
and the Rules  made  thereunder,  viz.,  Karnataka  Transparency  in  Public
Procurements Rules, 2000.  Though in Condition No 2(a) in the tender  notice
dated  05.07.2007,  the  names  of  certain   vehicle   manufacturers   were
mentioned, after finding that it was inappropriate to mention the  names  of
specific manufacturers in the said  condition,  it  was  decided  to  delete
their names.  Accordingly, a corrigendum was put up before the  CMG  and  by
decision dated 04.08.2007,  CMG  decided  to  revise  the  pre-qualification
criteria by deleting the names of those manufacturers.  Learned counsel  for
the respondents have also placed the Minutes of Meeting of the CMG  held  on
04.08.2007.  It is also brought to our notice that the said corrigendum  was
also approved by the competent authority.
28)   In addition to the same, it was not in  dispute  that  the  appellant-
Company was  well  aware  of  both  the  original  tender  notices  and  the
corrigendum issued.  It is also brought to our  notice  that  the  appellant
wrote a letter making certain queries with regard to the corrigendum  issued
by the KSRTC and the said queries were suitably replied by the letter  dated
11.08.2007.
29)   It is also seen from the records that pursuant to  the  tender  notice
dated 05.07.2007, seven bids were received including that of the  appellant-
Company.  They are:
   i)     M/s Apollo Tyres
   ii)          M/s Birla Tyres
   iii) M/s Ceat Ltd
    iv) M/s Good Year India
     v) M/s JK Industries
    vi) M/s MRF Ltd
   vii) M/s Michigan Rubber (Former Betul Tyres)
It is brought to our notice that successful bidders were CEAT and JK  Tyres.
 Accordingly, contracts were entered into with the  said  two  companies  by
the KSRTC and the purchase orders were placed and they  have  also  effected
supplies and completed the contract and the KSRTC also made payments to  the
said suppliers.
30)   It is pertinent to point out  that  the  second  respondent  has  also
issued  4  (four)  more  tender  notices  after  the  tender  notice   dated
05.07.2007.  The said tender  notices  were  dated  04.03.2008,  22.08.2008,
24.10.2008  and  19.03.2009.   Pursuant  to   the   tender   notices   dated
04.03.2008, 22.08.2008 and 24.10.2008, contracts have been awarded and  have
been substantially performed.  It is also brought to  our  notice  that  all
the said four subsequent tender notices also contained identical  conditions
as that  of  the  impugned  conditions  contained  in  tender  notice  dated
05.07.2007.
31)   As observed earlier, the Court would not normally interfere  with  the
policy decision and in matters challenging the  award  of  contract  by  the
State or public authorities.  In  view  of  the  above,  the  appellant  has
failed to establish that the  same  was  contrary  to  public  interest  and
beyond the pale of discrimination or unreasonable.    We are satisfied  that
to have the best of the equipment  for  the  vehicles,  which  ply  on  road
carrying passengers, the 2nd respondent thought it  fit  that  the  criteria
for applying for tender for procuring tyres should be  at  a  high  standard
and  thought  it  fit  that  only  those  manufacturers  who   satisfy   the
eligibility criteria should be permitted to participate in the  tender.   As
noted in various decisions, the Government and their undertakings must  have
a free hand in setting terms of the tender and  only  if  it  is  arbitrary,
discriminatory, mala fide or actuated by bias, the Courts  would  interfere.
The Courts cannot interfere with the terms of the tender prescribed  by  the
Government because it feels that some other terms in the tender  would  have
been fair, wiser or logical.  In the case on hand,  we  have  already  noted
that taking into  account  various  aspects  including  the  safety  of  the
passengers and public interest, the CMG consisting of  experienced  persons,
revised the tender conditions.  We are satisfied  that  the  said  Committee
had discussed the subject in detail and for specifying these two  conditions
regarding  pre-qualification  criteria  and  the  evaluation  criteria.   On
perusal of all the materials, we are satisfied that the impugned  conditions
do not, in any way, could be  classified  as  arbitrary,  discriminatory  or
mala fide.
32)   The learned single Judge considered all these aspects  in  detail  and
after finding that those two conditions cannot be said to be  discriminatory
and unreasonable refused to interfere exercising jurisdiction under  Article
226 of the Constitution and dismissed the writ petition.  The well  reasoned
judgment of the learned single Judge was affirmed by the Division  Bench  of
the High Court.
33)   In the light of  what  is  stated  above,  we  fully  agree  with  the
reasoning  of  the  High  Court  and  do  not  find  any  valid  ground  for
interference.  Consequently, the appeal fails  and  the  same  is  dismissed
with no order as to costs.
                             ...…………….…………………………J.


                                 (P. SATHASIVAM)






                              .…....…………………………………J.


                              (RANJAN GOGOI)


NEW DELHI;
AUGUST 17, 2012.




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