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since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

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Friday, August 10, 2012

Unlike natural calamities that are beyond human control, avoidable disasters resulting from human error/negligence prove more tragic and completely imbalance the inter-generational equity and cause irretrievable damage to the health and environment for generations to come. Such tragedy may occur from pure negligence, contributory negligence or even failure to take necessary precautions in carrying on certain industrial activities. More often than not, the affected parties have to face avoidable damage and adversity that results from such disasters. The magnitude and extent of adverse impact on the financial soundness, social health and upbringing of younger generation, including progenies, may have been beyond human expectations. In such situations and where the laws are silent or are inadequate, the courts have unexceptionally stepped in to bridge the gaps, to provide for appropriate directions and guidelines to ensure that fundamentals of Article 21 of the Constitution of India (for short “the Constitution”) are not violated.


                                                                  REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


                         CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION


                       WRIT PETITION (C) NO.50 OF 1998




Bhopal Gas Peedith Mahila Udyog
Sangathan & Ors.                             ... Petitioners

                                   Versus


Union of India & Ors.                        ... Respondents

                                    WITH


                            IA NOS. 62-63 OF 2011


                                     IN


                    CIVIL APPEAL NOS.3187 – 3188 OF 1988




                                  O R D E R


Swatanter Kumar, J.



1.    Unlike natural calamities that are  beyond  human  control,  avoidable
disasters resulting  from  human  error/negligence  prove  more  tragic  and
completely imbalance the inter-generational equity and  cause  irretrievable
damage to the health and environment for generations to come.  Such  tragedy
may occur from pure negligence, contributory negligence or even  failure  to
take necessary precautions in carrying  on  certain  industrial  activities.
More often than not, the affected parties have to face avoidable damage  and
adversity that results from such disasters.  The  magnitude  and  extent  of
adverse impact on the financial soundness, social health and  upbringing  of
younger  generation,  including  progenies,  may  have  been  beyond   human
expectations.  In such situations and where  the  laws  are  silent  or  are
inadequate, the courts have unexceptionally stepped in to bridge  the  gaps,
to  provide  for  appropriate  directions  and  guidelines  to  ensure  that
fundamentals of Article 21 of the Constitution  of  India  (for  short  “the
Constitution”) are not violated.

2.    The Bhopal Gas Tragedy is a glaring example  of  such  imbalances  and
adverse impacts, where by court’s  intervention,  poor  and  destitute  have
been provided relief and rehabilitation.

3.    The Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster occurred on the intervening night of  the
2nd/3rd of December, 1984.  Data reflecting the  exact  number  of  affected
persons was not available initially.  Earlier,  it  was  felt  that  only  a
small number of persons were  adversely  affected  in  terms  of  health  or
otherwise by the leakage of toxic gases  from  the  Union  Carbide  Unit  at
Bhopal.  However,  the  Scientific  Commission  for  Continuing  Studies  on
Effects of Bhopal Gas Leakage on Life Systems  (for  short  the  ‘Scientific
Commission’)  released a Report titled ‘The Bhopal Gas Disaster: Effects  on
Life Systems’ in July, 1987 which suggested otherwise.  This  Report  stated
that for the estimated population of 2,00,000 exposed to the toxic gases  in
the severely and moderately affected areas of  Bhopal  and  the  variety  of
long-term problems anticipated in the crisis period, the number of  exposees
covered so far by the Indian Council of  Medical  Research  (for  short  the
‘ICMR’) through the epidemiological surveys  constitute  less  than  20  per
cent of the population.  With the  passage  of  time,  this  figure  of  the
affected population has swollen to nearly 5,00,000.  By the same  Scientific
Commission,  it  was  also  found  that  in  general,  the  output  of   the
epidemiological project so far had not equalled the magnitude of  the  tasks
assigned to them, presumably due to lack  of  resources,  trained  staff  as
well as physical inputs.  An opportunity for mounting such a  massive  long-
term longitudinal  study  on  a  population  exposed  to  a  one-time  acute
chemical stress may not present itself again and hence it would  be  a  pity
if that opportunity was missed.   Various  steps  were  recommended  by  the
Scientific Commission, from time to time, to tackle the two main aspects  of
this disaster.  Firstly, health care of the affected victims  and  secondly,
research work with the object to deal with the acute problems  arising  from
this disaster on the one hand and to suggest preventive steps on the  other.


4.    Writ Petition (Civil) No. 50 of 1998  was  filed  by  the  Bhopal  Gas
Peedith Mahila Udyog  Sanghathan  as  a  public  interest  litigation  under
Article 32 of the Constitution.  This petition was  founded  on  the  rights
available to the victims of the Bhopal Gas Disaster under Article 21 of  the
Constitution and it was prayed that they were entitled to receive  free  and
proper medical assistance from the respondents, the Union of India  and  the
State of Madhya Pradesh.   It  was  also  prayed  that  the  respondents  be
directed to take effective steps in that regard which  inter  alia  included
providing of free  medicines  and  preparing  a  detailed  plan  of  medical
rehabilitation that ensured the availability of basic medical facilities  to
the gas victims.  Lastly, it was also prayed that the ICMR  be  directed  to
resume  and  conduct  research  studies  and  to  make  public  the  reports
published by  it  so  as  to  provide  the  basic  ground  for  issuance  of
appropriate directions by this Court.

5.    This Court has been passing various directions right from  the  filing
of this petition and has directed certain effective and  positive  steps  to
be taken by the Union of India as well as the State  of  Madhya  Pradesh  to
ensure providing of appropriate medical treatment to the  gas  victims.   It
is no use referring to the different orders passed by this Court  from  time
to time in detail.  However, we will be referring to some of  the  important
orders in brief which have a bearing on the issue now  pending  before  this
Court and for passing of the final directions.

6.    To  begin  with,  the  ICMR  had  undertaken  certain  research  works
immediately after the Bhopal Disaster and appropriate steps had been  taken,
as claimed by the State  and  the  Central  Government,  to  deal  with  the
medical problems of the gas victims.  However, it appears  from  the  record
and has been averred before us that after 1994, the ICMR allegedly  took  an
irrational decision to disband  all  Bhopal  Gas  Disaster  related  medical
research.  This abandoning of research work has  been  seriously  criticised
in the present petition.  Certain appeals had been filed against  the  order
of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh which came to  be  registered  as  Civil
Appeal Nos. 3187-3188 of 1988, which were  subsequently  clubbed  with  Writ
Petition (Civil) No. 50 of 1998.   I.A. Nos. 32-35, 36-37  in  Civil  Appeal
Nos. 3187-3188 of 1988 titled “Union Carbide Corporation Ltd.  v.  Union  of
India” were filed for seeking different  directions,  upon  which  and  vide
order dated 15th May, 1988, this  Court  directed  creation  of  the  Bhopal
Memorial Hospital and Research Centre (for short  ‘BMHRC’)  and  the  Bhopal
Memorial Hospital Trust (for short ‘BMHT/the Trust’) which  was  constituted
for the purposes of healthcare of the affected gas victims.   This  hospital
initially was to run for a period of eight years  which  term  was  extended
from time to time and then finally, vide order  dated  2nd  May,  2006,  the
term was extended till completion of its object. Further, vide  order  dated
17th July, 2007, this Court also sought report  from  the  ICMR  on  various
toxic effects of the leaked gas.

7.    This Court also, by order dated 17th September, 2004  passed  in  Writ
Petition (Civil) No. 50 of 1998, ordered  the  constitution  of  two  expert
committees being the ‘Monitoring Committee’ and  the  ‘Advisory  Committee’.
The latter was formed by ICMR under the Chairmanship of Director General  of
ICMR and its terms of reference were as follows:
           “(i)  To examine the treatment practices currently  followed  by
                  medical personnel in  the  hospitals/clinics  run  by  the
                  Government for the Bhopal  Gas  victims  for  the  various
                  ailments suffered by them.
           (ii)  To recommend/advise on the appropriate line  of  treatment
                  to be offered to the Bhopal gas victims.
           (iii) To recommend/advise on the structure and  content  of  the
                  research to be undertaken in order to improve the  quality
                  of the treatment being offered to the Bhopal Gas victims.”




8.    The Advisory Committee has been submitting its reports  from  time  to
time and it was assured by the State  Government  that  the  said  Committee
will be provided with all facilities and technical inputs.  Then,  the  ICMR
conducted its research investigation  in  the  form  of  24  major  research
projects ranging from epidemiology to molecular biology  implemented  by  15
National Institutes.  Vide  letter  dated  17th  February,  2004,  from  the
Director General of  ICMR  to  the  Government  of  Madhya  Pradesh  it  was
indicated that with  respect  to  future  needs  for  research,  ICMR  would
facilitate the Madhya Pradesh State Government by constituting  a  Committee
of experts which would look into the work carried out between 1985  to  1994
as well as the subsequent research by the Centre for Rehabilitation  Studies
under the Bhopal Gas  Tragedy  Relief  and  Rehabilitation  Department  (for
short, the  ‘BGTRRD’),  Bhopal  from  1995  till  date,  so  as  to  provide
guidelines for future research.  On  24th  June,  2010,  the  Union  Cabinet
passed a  resolution  directing  the  ICMR  to  establish  a  new  permanent
research centre at Bhopal which was done on 11th October, 2010, namely,  the
National  Institute  of  Research  in  Environment  Health  (for  short  the
‘NIREH’).  The research work is  being  continued  by  the  ICMR,  while  it
submits its report to this Court from time to  time.   The  vision  document
was duly prepared by the NIREH.

9.    In the background of this vision document, it  is  stated  that  after
the  Methyl  Isocyanate  (MIC)  gas  episode  at  Bhopal,  various  research
programmes were conducted by the ICMR to monitor the research programme  and
also to undertake long term epidemiological studies to record the  morbidity
and mortality of the cohort of gas exposed and control population.

10.   In order to ensure smooth running of  the  BMHT,  a  corpus  had  been
created which was provided with funds and contributions that  were  invested
from time to time and the total corpus, as of now,  constitutes  Rs.  436.47
crores.  Out of this amount, Rs.226.61  crores  has  been  invested  in  RBI
Bonds in Banks, Rs. 196.54 crores in FDRs in Banks, Rs.11.65 crores  in  the
short term deposits in Flexi/Quantum in Banks  and  Rs.1.67  crores  is  the
bank balance.

11.   During the pendency of this  petition,  various  directions  had  been
passed by this Court to ensure smooth working  of  the  Trust  in  both  the
fields of health care and research work.  We may refer to  some  significant
orders passed by this Court.

12.   The surveys conducted  by  the  ICMR,  including  the  epidemiological
survey in 1994, showed multi-organ symptoms amongst the persons exposed  and
there  was  tremendous  increase  in  symptoms  exhibited  by  the  affected
persons.  There was even shortage of medicines and  various  representations
were made requesting improvement thereof.           Vide  order  dated  17th
September, 2004, the Court had spelt out the terms and  conditions  for  the
Monitoring Committee and the Advisory Committee.  It related  to  procedural
matters, functioning and terms of reference of  the  respective  Committees.
The  paramount  functions  of  the  Monitoring  Committee  were  to  monitor
suitability, availability and maintenance of medical equipments,  deployment
of  adequate  and  competent  medical  personnel,  more   specifically   the
treatment offered at the hospitals and the functioning  of  these  hospitals
run by the Government for the Bhopal Gas victims, purchase and  availability
of  medicines  to  the  affected  persons  etc.   Similarly,  the   Advisory
Committee, while determining its own rules of procedure, was to examine  the
treatment practices currently followed  by  the  medical  personnel  in  the
hospitals run by the Government for these victims  in  relation  to  various
ailments suffered by them.  Further, this Committee  was  to  recommend  and
advice on the appropriate line of treatment to be offered to the Bhopal  gas
victims.  It was further to recommend and advise  on  the  kind  of  medical
equipments and medicines required to be procured to improve the  quality  of
treatment being offered to the victims as well as to initiate and  recommend
community   health   initiatives   in   health   education   and   community
participation for prevention and care.

13.   Then vide order dated 17th July, 2007, the Court  directed  the  State
of Madhya Pradesh to take necessary steps for computerising the  records  of
the hospital so that the details of the patients and/or their ailments  were
made permanent record to ensure their proper treatment in  future.   One  of
the factors which invited the attention of the Court at that time  was  that
the patients who were not the victims of the gas tragedy  had  also  started
coming to the hospital, which led to passing of an order wherein  the  Court
required the Monitoring Committee  to  submit  a  report  if  the  treatment
facilities afforded to such patients were adversely affecting the  treatment
of the gas victims.

14.   Various reports were submitted by the two  Committees  afore-mentioned
which were considered from time to time by this  Court.   Vide  order  dated
15th November, 2007, the Court had called upon the State of  Madhya  Pradesh
to provide answers to the questions which  were  raised  by  the  Monitoring
Committee which was  overseeing  the  functions  of  the  hospital  and  the
research work.  Report was also  sought  from  the  ICMR  on  various  toxic
effects of the gas.

15.   Thereafter, because of certain events, the Chairman of BMHT  resigned.
 The co-ordination and smooth functioning of these units  was  found  to  be
lacking and many applications in this regard were filed  before  the  Court.
As already noticed, the Court had directed setting  up  of  a  hospital  for
treatment of Bhopal Gas victims vide its  order  dated  15th  May,  1988  in
furtherance to which the hospital was established and  even  the  Trust  was
registered  on  11th  August,  1988.    There  existed  uncertainty  in  the
decision making process.  The Attorney General for India  made  a  statement
that the Union of India had decided to  take  over  the  BMHRC  and  run  it
through Department of Biotechnology and Department of Automic  Energy.    In
furtherance to this statement, the Court disposed of I.A. No. 58-59 of  2009
and vide its order dated 19th July, 2010, the  Court  directed  the  Central
Government to take steps for winding  up  the  Trust  and  taking  over  the
management of the hospital.

16.   Thereafter, certain IAs came to be filed before this Court.  In  these
IAs, different parties had prayed for issuance of  different  directions  in
relation to the working, management and control of BMHRC.  IA  Nos.62-63  of
2011 in Civil Appeal Nos.3167-3188 of 1988 have been filed with  the  prayer
that the Union of India be directed to take charge of the  corpus  funds  of
the erstwhile BMHT through its Department of  Biotechnology  and  Department
of Atomic Energy and transfer the accounts of BMHT to  the  new  management.
It was also prayed that the management of the erstwhile BMHT be relieved  of
all its responsibilities pertaining to management  of  the  corpus  and  new
authorised  signatories  be  appointed  for  its  accounts.   One   of   the
petitioners in the main petition filed an application being  IA  No.  14  of
2012, primarily relying upon the letter written by Dr. Sathyamala,  (Member,
Advisory Committee) to Dr. P.M. Bhargava, (Member,  Advisory  Committee  and
Chairperson of the Task Force).  It was prayed that the  same  be  taken  on
record and the Advisory Committee be  directed  to  submit  minutes  of  its
meetings dated 13th August, 2009, 22nd September, 2010  and  10th  December,
2011.  Petitioner Nos.1 and 3 have filed IA No.16 of 2012 wherein they  have
prayed for issuance of certain directions.   In  this  application,  it  has
been stated that the Monitoring Committee in its reports  dated  10th  June,
2005, 31st October, 2005, 12th July, 2006, 20th December 2006,  7th  August,
2007 and 27th May, 2008 have  consistently  recommended  computerization  of
the hospital records and issuance of ‘health booklets’ to the  gas  victims.
It is averred that recommendations of the Advisory Committee have  not  been
complied with by the State Government,  the  ICMR  and  even  the  Union  of
India.  They have also made a suggestion for issuance of  ‘smart  cards’  to
the gas affected victims besides issuance of proper  health  booklets.   The
NIREH, as established by the ICMR, though was a welcome step,  according  to
these  applicants  much  is  desired  of  the  functioning  of  NIREH.   The
allegation is that the decision makers at the ICMR are doing  everything  on
their part to ensure that the crucial issues affecting the life  and  health
of  the  gas  victims  remain  unaddressed  at  a  macro  level.   All   the
concentration presently is on building the  infrastructure  for  the  NIREH.
On this premise, the applicants have prayed that the  orders  of  the  Court
should be complied with by the State of Madhya Pradesh as well as  the  ICMR
for issuance  of  ‘health  booklets’  and  ‘smart  cards’  to  the  affected
persons.  They also prayed for adoption of a common  referral  system  among
various medical units under BMHRC and under  the  BGTRRD  so  that  the  gas
victims are referred  to  the  appropriate  centres  for  proper  diagnosis,
investigation and treatment in terms of the  nature  and  degree  of  injury
suffered by each one of them and also in terms of therapeutic  requirements.
  They also prayed that NIREH be directed to set up completely  computerized
and  centrally  networked  Central  Registry,  to  maintain  proper  medical
records of all gas victims,  to  streamline  and  intensify  epidemiological
studies among the gas-affected population and to prepare treatment  protocol
for treating each category of ailment that the gas  victims  are  suffering,
such  as  respiratory  diseases,  eye-related  diseases,   gastro-intestinal
diseases,  neurological  diseases,  renal  failure,   urological   problems,
gynaecological problems, mental disorders, etc.

17.   In other IAs/ replies filed on behalf of  different  parties,  it  has
been pointed out that the Monitoring Committee should have the  jurisdiction
over all hospitals, including  non-governmental  hospitals  and  clinics  in
Bhopal.  They should also  be  vested  with  powers  of  recommending  penal
action against the persons who are found to be defaulting  in  carrying  out
the appropriate treatment or following  the  directions  of  the  Monitoring
Committee from time to time.  It has also  been  prayed  that  the  research
work could be carried out by private laboratories or private research  units
besides  the  research  work  being  carried  on  by  the  ICMR  and/or  its
established unit.  It was also brought out from the record before the  Court
that there is no co-ordination between  the  various  functionaries  dealing
with this tragedy and, in fact, the views of the Advisory Committee are  not
given due weightage by the implementing agencies,  thereby  adding   to  the
suffering and agony of the affected parties.

18.   No doubt, the BMHT was established  for  providing  medical  treatment
and care to  the  gas  victims.   Both  the  Monitoring  Committee  and  the
Advisory Committee, appointed by this Court, had different  earmarked  areas
of their respective operation, though their aim was  common.   The  Advisory
Committee was required to advise as per its expertise on matters  which  the
implementing agencies, i.e., the Trust as  well  as  the  State  Government,
were expected to perform.  On the other hand, the Monitoring  Committee  was
required to oversee the functioning of the research  work  as  well  as  the
timely providing of medical care and treatment to the gas affected  victims.
 Functions of each of  these  bodies  were  sufficiently  and  unambiguously
spelt out in different orders  of  this  Court.   After  submission  of  the
reports by the respective Committees, this Court  had  also  passed  various
directions for the better and improved performance of these units, so as  to
ensure better medical care and requisite treatment to the gas victims.

19.   As we have already noticed, with the passage  of  time  this  disaster
has attained wider dimensions and greater concerns, which require  discharge
of higher responsibilities by all the agencies.  In terms of Article  21  of
the Constitution, all the gas victims are  entitled  to  greater  extent  of
multi-dimensional health care, as their sufferings are in no  way,  directly
or indirectly, attributable to them.  It  was,  primarily  and  undoubtedly,
the negligence on the part of  the  Union  Carbide  Ltd.  that  resulted  in
leakage of the MIC gas, causing irreversible damage to  the  health  of  not
only the persons affected but even the children who were still to be born.

20.   The first and foremost question that arises for consideration of  this
Court is as to whether this matter should be kept pending before this  Court
or should it be transferred to an  appropriate  forum,  including  the  High
Court, for a more effective and purposeful management of these  institutions
and to ensure that they satisfactorily serve the purpose of ‘public  service
and benefit’ for which they have  been  constituted.   Various  applications
filed before this Court and reports submitted by the Committees,  as  afore-
referred, are to provide requisite help to the gas victims,  as  it  is  not
possible for the poor  victims  to  approach  this  Court  for  issuance  of
appropriate directions from time to time.  This Court  has  already  ordered
providing of basic requirements and constitution of Advisory  Committee  and
the Monitoring Committee.  While the management of BMHT was  taken  over  by
the Union of India, through Ministry  of  Health  and  Family  Welfare,  the
hospital was  to  run  under  the  direct  control  of  Department  of  Bio-
Technology and Department of Atomic Energy and  subsequently,  the  hospital
was also placed under the control of the Ministry.

21.   In our considered opinion, it  will  be  appropriate  that  day-to-day
directions are passed by a jurisdictional High Court.  Such Court  would  be
in a better position to appreciate the  requirements  of  the  gas  affected
victims as well as to exercise better control over the  functioning  of  the
said Committees and organizations.  Such direct control  would  improve  the
functioning  of  these  units  and  their  inter  and  intra   co-ordination
resulting in better mutual performance.  Therefore, we consider it not  only
desirable but also in the interest of all concerned that this matter  should
henceforth be dealt with by the High  Court  of  Madhya  Pradesh,  Bench  at
Jabalpur.

22.   In addition to the directions issued by this Court from time to  time,
it is also necessary for this Court  to  pass  some  further  directions  to
provide clarity and precision and also to  ensure  effective  implementation
of the various orders which shall remain  an  integral  part  of  this  wide
scheme sought to be enforced for the betterment of the gas victims.  As  far
as the argument that there should be privatization of the research work  and
the Monitoring Committee should  be  empowered  to  have  control  over  all
hospitals where the gas victims may  go  for  treatment,  including  private
hospitals and clinics of Bhopal  is  concerned,  the  same  is  without  any
substance.  We are of the considered opinion that  it  would  neither  serve
the ends of justice nor the interest of the gas victims.  On  the  contrary,
there would be multi-differential research without any  substantive  result.
Furthermore, the Monitoring Committee has been  constituted  by  this  Court
vide its order dated 17th  September,  2004,  with  a  definite  object  and
specifically assigned  functions  and  terms  of  reference.   There  is  no
justification,  much  less  any  need,  for  expanding  the  scope  of   its
functioning  or  bringing   the   private   hospitals/clinics   within   the
jurisdiction of this Empowered Monitoring Committee.   Both  these  prayers,
thus, need to be declined, which we do hereby decline.

23.   Certainly, there are certain other matters which require attention  of
this Court.   Matters  in  relation  to  better  co-ordination  between  the
functioning of the authorities, issuance of  ‘Health  Booklets’  and  ‘Smart
Cards’ to the  gas  victims,  computerization  of  medical  records  of  the
hospitals, taking over of corpus of the BMHT, management of  the  Trust  and
certain matters where the State of Madhya Pradesh has failed to  effectively
accept the recommendations of the Committees, are some of the matters  where
we would have to issue certain further directions.  From the  record  before
us, it appears that the meeting of the  Monitoring  Committee  was  held  on
29th March, 2011. In this  meeting,  the  Committee  proposed  that  further
powers be vested in it for improving the quality of medical  care  available
to the Bhopal gas victims.  The proposal of the Committee reads as under :

           “The Monitoring Committee for Medical Rehabilitation  of  Bhopal
           Gas Victims proposes to have the following powers to  be  vested
           upon it by the Hon’ble Supreme Court for improving  the  quality
           of medical care available to the Bhopal Gas Victims.


           1.    Powers to take up matters on the basis of complaints  made
                  by  any  individual  gas  victim  or  representatives   of
                  organization of  gas  victims.   Such  complaints  may  be
                  against any  individual  official  of  the  department  of
                  Bhopal  Gas  Tragedy  Relief  and  Rehabilitation  or  any
                  employee in the hospital and  other  health  care  centers
                  meant for medical care of gas victims or employed  by  any
                  agency that is working under the Department of Bhopal  Gas
                  Tragedy Relief and Rehabilitation.


           2.    Powers to direct the concerned  department  of  the  State
                  government to ensure facilities such as sufficient  office
                  space  with  furniture  and  furnishings,   office   staff
                  including  one  secretary  and  one  doctor  to   act   as
                  coordinating officer and one each  of  Hindi  and  English
                  stenographer-cum-typist   and    one    peon    and    for
                  transportation  of  members  one  vehicle   with   seating
                  capacity for at least five persons.


           3.    There should be provision  of  payment  of  honorarium  to
                  members of the committee and also to other persons who are
                  assigned some  specific  job  by  the  Committee.   It  is
                  proposed  that  Rs.1,000/-   per   meeting   or   hospital
                  inspection may be granted.


           4.    Powers in respect of the following matters namely :-
                  (i)  Requisitioning any official document or  inspect  any
                        official  records  that  the  Monitoring  Committee
                        finds relevant.
                  (ii) To ask concern institutions and/or officers for their
                        examination and record their view.
                  (iii)      This Committee should have  the  facilities  of
                        collection of sample of  medicine  etc  as  may  be
                        required from time to time for detailed examination
                        for this  drug  controller  may  be  requested  for
                        these.  Collection samples of medicines,  food  and
                        other items that may be necessary for assessment of
                        quality of medical care provided at the health care
                        facility.  Drug  controller  may  be  requested  to
                        depute drug inspector for collecting sample etc. to
                        complete the process of inquiry wherever it may  be
                        necessary.


           5.    Powers to recommend penal action against any  officer  who
                  without any reasonable cause has failed to  implement  the
                  recommendations of the  Monitoring  Committee  within  the
                  time limit prescribed.


           6.    Powers to award studies to selected agencies  (that  could
                  include non-government agencies) is may be  required  from
                  time to time for proper assessment of the quality of  care
                  provided at different health care  facilities  within  the
                  jurisdiction of the Monitoring Committee.


           7.    Powers to engage the  services  of  experts  in  different
                  fields   for   assessment   of   quality   of   care   for
                  implementations of recommendations made by the  Monitoring
                  Committee.


           8.    Powers to  call  for  public  hearing  for  recording  and
                  redress of grievances and  creating  awareness  about  the
                  activities of the Monitoring Committee  among  the  Bhopal
                  Victims.


           The Monitoring Committee for Medical  Rehabilitation  of  Bhopal
           Gas Victims shall have  jurisdiction  over  all  the  hospitals,
           clinic, day care centres and other health care units and centers
           meant for the medical rehabilitation of the Bhopal  Gas  Victims
           including those run by the  Department  of  Bhopal  Gas  Tragedy
           Relief and Rehabilitation.


           The foregoing power and functions  of  the  Authority  shall  be
           subject to the supervision and control of  the  Hon’ble  Supreme
           Court.
           The direction of the  Hon’ble  Supreme  Court  dated  10.01.2011
           would be taken into consideration by the Monitoring Committee.”


24.   These recommendations of the Monitoring Committee have been  answered
by the State by filing an independent reply.  In this reply,  it  has  been
stated that  the  recommendation  with  regard  to  jurisdiction  over  all
hospitals and clinics is contrary to the terms of the order of  this  Court
dated 17th September, 2004.  The  power  to  receive  complaints  from  the
affected parties has already been permitted.  The Monitoring  Committee  is
also empowered to conduct hearing and collect evidence by requisitioning of
the records and examination of the officers from  various  departments  and
the hospital.  The State also has no objection to the Committee  collecting
the samples of medicines in accordance with the provisions of the Drug  and
Cosmetics Act, 1940 and the Drug and Cosmetics Rules, 1945.  It is also the
stand of the State Government  that  they  have  implemented  most  of  the
directions issued by the Monitoring Committee.

25.   Another aspect that has been brought to the notice of this  Court  is
that  adequate  space  for  office  of  the  Monitoring  Committee  is  not
available. This makes it difficult for the public to gain accessibility  to
the small space that has been provided by the State to the said  Committee.
This is hampering its functioning in accordance with  the  orders  of  this
Court.

26.   It is commonly conceded  before  us  that  the  corpus  money  stands
completely transferred to  the  Ministry  of  Health  and  Family  Welfare,
Department of Health Research (for short ‘DHR’) and they  have  also  taken
over the management of BMHRC.

27.   Thus, it is necessary for us to deal with the various prayers made in
the above application and the background leading  to  the  filing  of  such
application in its correct  perspective.    We  have  to  take  a  balanced
approach which would further the cause  of  accurate  research  and  better
medical care in favour of the  gas  victims.     The  Union  of  India  has
already passed a resolution directing the ICMR  to  establish  a  permanent
research centre at Bhopal which,  as  already  noticed,  has  already  been
established in the name of NIREH. This itself is sufficiently indicative of
the intent of the Government of India  to  provide  and  procure  necessary
machinery for research related works as well as to further the  process  of
getting much needed scientific manpower and research, which can  contribute
in research activities relating to gas affected persons.

28.    The  Advisory  Committee  is  performing   its   advisory   function
continuously.  Definite replies had been filed on behalf of  the  State  of
Madhya Pradesh and the Government of India ensuring their full  cooperation
and complete implementation of the recommendations of these Committees,  so
as to provide adequate medical facilities to the affected persons  and  the
completion of the research work.

29.   As already noticed, suggestions made by the Monitoring  Committee  in
its Report dated 29th March, 2011 have been broadly accepted by  the  State
of Madhya Pradesh, except for two of such proposals.   The  reservation  of
the State  Government  on  the  issue  of  assistance  of  non-governmental
organisation and experts from outside in assessing the quality of care  and
research work, appears to be for valid and good reasons.  We wish  to  make
it clear that the recommendations of the Empowered Monitoring Committee, as
afore-mentioned, shall not be deemed to have been accepted by  this  Court,
except where directions in that behalf have  been  specifically  passed  by
this Court in the operative part of this order.

30.   Vide letter dated 12th April, 2012, the ICMR while making a reference
to the order of this Court dated 19th July,  2010  had  informed  that  the
administrative control of  BMHRC,  after  winding  up  of  BMHT,  had  been
transferred to the DHR, Ministry of Health and Family  Welfare,  Government
of India and all other matters,  including  administrative,  financial  and
legal, pertaining to BMHRC would be dealt with by the  DHR.  All  documents
were also admitted to have been  transferred,  except  the  corpus  of  the
Trust.   It was suggested that the Corpus of BMHT with accumulated interest
along with original documents/receipts be transferred to the Secretary, DHR-
cum-DG, ICMR and it was also stated that BMHT had been wound up as per  the
directions of this Court with effect from 19th July, 2010.

31.   The BMHT had been constituted under the  Deed  of  Trust  dated  11th
August, 1998.   Since then, it had carried  on  its  activities  under  the
guidance of the Monitoring Committee, the Advisory Committee and as per the
orders of this Court.   The BMHT was to remain irrevocable  for  all  times
and the Trust Deed was to be construed and have effect in  accordance  with
the Indian laws as per the terms and conditions of the Trust.

32.   In terms of the clauses of this Deed,  initially  the  Trust  was  to
stand possessed of the Trust property and income thereof.  This  possession
was to remain both during and after termination of the said period of eight
years for the purposes and objects stated  therein,  which  primarily  were
related to providing for  infrastructure  of  the  hospital  and  grant  of
medical aid to the poor, without distinction of race, caste or creed to the
gas affected victims.

33.   The accounts  of  the  Trust  had  been  audited  and  the  chartered
accountants submitted their Report dated 15th July, 2011  pointing  out  no
irregularity or objections  to  the  accounts  of  BMHT.  This  Report  was
submitted to the Members of the Governing Body of the BMHT.  In the opinion
of the Chartered Accountants, the balance sheet of the state of affairs  of
BMHT  upto  19th  July,  2010  along  with  accounts  giving  the  required
information, gave the true and fair view and  was  in  complete  conformity
with the  accounting  principles  generally  accepted  in  India.   Similar
remarks have been made in regard to  the  Income  and  Expenditure  Account
wherein an excess of income over expenditure  can  be  seen  for  the  said
period.

34.   It would still be in the interest of BMHT itself,  particularly  when
the management and the corpus of the BMHT  have  been  transferred  to  the
Union of India that the Government agency, besides regularly inspecting the
accounts of the BMHT, also gave their final report for  the  period  ending
July 2010.  The Auditor General of the State of Madhya Pradesh would be the
appropriate authority to inspect the accounts of the  BMHT  regularly  even
when the management and corpus thereof  is  transferred  to  the  Union  of
India.

35.   Having noticed in  detail  the  factual  aspect  of  this  case,  the
suggestions made by  various  applicants,  recommendations  of  the  expert
bodies and keeping in mind the very object for  which  the  present  Public
Interest Litigation was instituted, we are  of  the  considered  view  that
issuance of certain specific directions are inevitably  called  for.  These
orders would be to ensure proper progress and implementation of the ‘Relief
and Rehabilitation programme’ for the penurious gas victims as well  as  to
ensure that  the  research  work  is  result-oriented  and  continued  with
exactitude.  We make it clear that these directions shall be in aid of  the
various orders passed by this Court  from  time  to  time  in  the  present
petition and not in derogation thereto.  In other words, all orders  passed
by this Court with specific reference to the orders mentioned above,  shall
be read mutatis mutandis to these directions and  shall  remain  in  force.
The orders-cum-directions are :

1)    This Public Interest Litigation (Writ Petition (Civil) No.50 of 1998)
       shall stand  transferred  to  the  jurisdictional  Bench  of  Madhya
       Pradesh High Court for better and effective control  in  this  case.
       All applications filed henceforth shall be dealt with  and  disposed
       of by the concerned Bench of  the  High  Court,  in  line  with  the
       various orders  passed  by  this  Court,  so  as  to  ensure  proper
       functioning of the ‘Relief and Rehabilitation Programme’, working of
       the expert bodies and utmost medical care and treatment to  the  gas
       victims.

2)    We request the Chief Justice of the  Madhya  Pradesh  High  Court  to
       ensure that the case is dealt with by a Bench presided over  by  the
       Chief Justice himself or a Bench presided over by  the  senior  most
       Judge of that Court or any other  appropriate  Bench  in  accordance
       with the High Court Rules of that Court or any  special  legislation
       governing the subject in that behalf.

3)    Since the space already provided  appears  to  be  insufficient,  the
       State of Madhya Pradesh is hereby directed to  ensure  provision  of
       proper and adequate office space for the  Monitoring  Committee  and
       the Advisory Committee, to perform their functions effectively.  The
       space so provided should be accessible to public  so  that  the  gas
       victims can  conveniently  approach  the  Monitoring  Committee  for
       redressal of their grievances and difficulties.
4)    We also direct the State Government to provide proper  infrastructure
       to the Committees in the independent office space  provided  to  it.
       The members would also be entitled to receive Rs.1,000/-  honorarium
       for each effective meeting.  However, no honorarium shall be payable
       on a day when the meeting is adjourned or no effective  business  is
       performed in the meeting of the Committee.

5)    The Monitoring Committee has already been authorised and it is hereby
       clarified that it would hear the complaints and, if  necessary,  can
       even call for the records from the concerned hospital or department,
       record the statements of Government servants  or  employees  of  the
       hospital and make its recommendations to the Government  for  taking
       appropriate steps.  If no action is taken by  the  State  Government
       even upon a reminder thereof, the Committee would be well within its
       jurisdiction to approach the High Court for appropriate  directions.
       We make it clear that the Empowered Monitoring Committee shall  have
       no penal jurisdiction.  It shall discharge  its  functions  strictly
       within the framework of the powers vested and functions  awarded  to
       it  under  the  orders  of  this  Court.  Such  suggestions  of  the
       Monitoring  Committee  shall   be   primarily   recommendatory   and
       reformative in their nature and content.

6)    The Empowered Monitoring Committee shall have  complete  jurisdiction
       to oversee the proper functioning of the hospital,  i.e.,  BMHRC  as
       well as other Government hospitals dealing  with  the  gas  victims.
       This jurisdiction shall be limited to the problems relateable to the
       gas victims and/or the problems arising directly from  the  incident
       or even the problems allied thereto.  We  make  it  clear  that  the
       Empowered Monitoring Committee shall have no jurisdiction  over  the
       private hospitals, nursing homes and clinics in Bhopal.  However, it
       does not absolve the State of Madhya Pradesh and the Medical Council
       of India from  discharging  its  responsibilities  towards  the  gas
       victims who are being treated in private hospitals, nursing homes or
       clinics.  We do expect these authorities to hear the  grievances  of
       the complainants as well as to ensure maintenance of  due  standards
       of treatment in these hospitals, nursing homes or clinics.

7)    We direct the ICMR as well as NIREH to ensure that the research  work
       is carried on with exactitude and  expeditiousness  and  further  to
       ensure disbursement of its complete benefit to the gas victims.   We
       do not permit the research work to be carried out by any private/non-
       governmental institution, except the ICMR and NIREH.

8)    The Government of India has already resolved to establish  the  NIREH
       and carry on the research work, for which it has been  provided  due
       infrastructure. Thus, we see no reason why the research work  should
       not progress at the requisite pace in  all  fields  while  providing
       benefits for proper care and treatment of patients  in  the  various
       hospitals in Bhopal.  We further issue  a  clear  direction  to  the
       Union of India and  the  State  of  Madhya  Pradesh  to  render  all
       assistance, financial or otherwise,  to  ensure  that  there  is  no
       impediment  in  the  carrying  on  of  the  research  work  by   the
       specialized institutions.

9)    The Monitoring Committee must  operationalize  medical  surveillance,
       computerization  of  medical  information,  publication  of  ‘health
       booklets’ etc.  The Monitoring Committee shall also ensure that  the
       ‘health booklets’ and ‘smart cards’ are provided to each gas  victim
       irrespective of where such victim is being treated.  This  direction
       shall apply to all the hospitals run by the Government or otherwise,
       in Bhopal.  We direct the State Government to provide assistance  in
       all  respects  to  the  Empowered  Monitoring  Committee  and   take
       appropriate action against the erring officer/officials in the event
       of default.

             We  also  direct  complete  computerization  of  the   medical
       information  in   the   Government   as   well   as   non-government
       hospital/clinics, which should be completed within a period of three
       months from today.

10)   We are informed that there are large number of vacancies  of  doctors
       and supporting staff in the hospitals and  allied  departments.   In
       the BGTRRD, 80 per cent posts of specialists  and  30  per  cent  of
       doctors are lying vacant.  Some posts are also lying vacant  in  the
       Fourth Grade staff.  Thus, we direct the  concerned  authorities  to
       take appropriate steps in all respects not only  to  fill  up  these
       vacancies but also to provide  such  infrastructure  and  facilities
       that the doctors are not compelled to or prefer to resign from BMHRC
       employment  and  its  various   departments,   due   to   inadequate
       facilities.

11)   The Union of India, the State Government and  the  ICMR  should  even
       consider the proposal for providing autonomy to BMHRC and even  make
       it a teaching institution so as to provide attractive terms, studies
       and job satisfaction therein.  This will not only help in  providing
       better opportunities  of  employment  but  would  better  serve  the
       purpose of providing care and treatment of high quality to  the  gas
       victims.

12)   It is indisputable that huge toxic materials/waste is still lying  in
       and around the factory of Union Carbide Corp. (I)  Ltd.  in  Bhopal.
       Its very existence is hazardous to health.  It needs to be  disposed
       of at the earliest and in a scientific manner.  Thus, we direct  the
       Union of India and the State of Madhya  Pradesh  to  take  immediate
       steps for disposal of this toxic waste lying in and around the Union
       Carbide factory, Bhopal, on the  recommendations  of  the  Empowered
       Monitoring Committee, Advisory Committee and the  NIREH  within  six
       months from today.  The disposal should be strictly in a  scientific
       manner which may  cause  no  further  damage  to  human  health  and
       environment in Bhopal.  We direct  a  collective  meeting  of  these
       organizations to be held along with the Secretary to the  Government
       of India and the Chief Secretary of  the  State  of  Madhya  Pradesh
       within one month  from  today  to  finalize  the  entire  scheme  of
       disposal of the  toxic  wastes.   The  above  direction  is  without
       prejudice to the appropriate orders or directions  being  issued  by
       the court of competent jurisdiction.

13)   The Advisory Committee, the Monitoring and the NIREH  shall  continue
       to file their respective quarterly reports before the High Court  of
       Madhya Pradesh.  These reports shall be dealt with  and  appropriate
       directions be passed by the High Court in accordance with law.

14)   We have already noticed that the management of BMHT has already  been
       vested in the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare,  Government  of
       India and the working of BMHT has come to an end. We,  thus,  direct
       that the Union of India and the State of Madhya Pradesh  shall  take
       appropriate  steps  to  ensure  the  dissolution  of  the  Trust  in
       accordance with law. The BMHT was initially formed for a  period  of
       eight years and then was constituted for an indefinite period  under
       the orders of this Court.  In the facts  and  circumstances  of  the
       case and the subsequent events, we  direct  that  BMHT  shall  stand
       dissolved.  All concerned to take  steps  in  accordance  with  law,
       under which it was created and/or registered.

15)   The corpus of BMHT has already been ordered to be transferred to  the
       Government of India and  would  remain  under  the  control  of  the
       Ministry of Health and Family  Welfare.   If  any  other  steps  are
       required to be  taken,  they  shall  immediately  be  taken  by  the
       concerned Ministry.  We further issue a clear direction that all the
       Fixed Deposit Receipts, RBI Bonds, Short Term Deposits and the  bank
       balance of the BMHT, Bhopal, shall stand transferred  and  be  under
       the control of the said Ministry.  If any steps even in this  regard
       are  required  to  be  taken,  we  direct  all  concerned  to   take
       appropriate steps.

16)   Accounts of BMHRC and the allied departments,  as  far  as  they  are
       subject matter of the present writ petition, shall be audited by the
       Principal Accountant General (Audit), Madhya Pradesh.  It shall also
       examine the accounts and the audit  report  dated  15th  July,  2011
       submitted by M/s. V.K. Verma and Company within  three  months  from
       today.

17)   We also direct the State Government and the Monitoring  Committee  to
       evolve a methodology of common referral system amongst  the  various
       medical units under the erstwhile BMHRC and BGTRRD  to  ensure  that
       the gas victims are  referred  to  appropriate  centres  for  proper
       diagnosis and treatment in terms of the nature and degree of  injury
       suffered by each one of them.

18)   We also direct that the Monitoring Committee, with  the  aid  of  the
       Advisory Committee, NIREH and  the  specialized  doctors  of  BMHRC,
       issues a standardised protocol for treating each category of ailment
       that the gas victims may be suffering  from.   This  shall  be  done
       expeditiously.  It will be highly appreciated if the Committee  also
       prescribes scientific categorization of patients and injuries.

19)   Lastly, we direct all concerned in  the  Union  of  India,  State  of
       Madhya Pradesh, Empowered Monitoring Committee, Advisory  Committee,
       ICMR, NIREH,  BMHRC  and  all  other  Government  or  non-government
       departments/ agencies involved in the implementation of  Relief  and
       Rehabilitation Programme and research activity,  to  carry  out  the
       above directions expeditiously and without demur  and  default.   We
       grant liberty to the applicants and/or the petitioners or any  other
       affected person to move the High Court of Madhya Pradesh,  Bench  at
       Jabalpur, in the event of violation, non-compliance  or  default  of
       any of the above directions or  any  other  orders  passed  by  this
       Court.

36.   Before we part with this matter, we consider it our duty to place  on
record our appreciation for the able assistance  rendered  by  the  learned
counsel appearing for the respective parties and the functions performed by
the various Chairpersons and Committees constituted under the orders of the
Court, including the Bhopal Memorial Hospital Trust.

37.   This writ petition is transferred to the High Court of Madhya Pradesh
in the above terms.  All applications are disposed of accordingly.

38.   Keeping in view the provisions  and  scheme  of  the  National  Green
Tribunal Act, 2010 (for short the ‘NGT Act’) particularly Sections 14,  29,
30 and 38(5), it can safely be concluded that the environmental issues  and
matters covered under the NGT Act, Schedule  1  should  be  instituted  and
litigated before the National  Green  Tribunal  (for  short  ‘NGT’).   Such
approach may be necessary to avoid likelihood of conflict of orders between
the High Courts and the NGT.  Thus, in unambiguous terms,  we  direct  that
all the matters instituted after coming into force of the NGT Act and which
are covered under the provisions of the NGT Act and/or in Schedule I to the
NGT Act shall stand transferred and can be instituted only before the  NGT.
 This will help in rendering expeditious and  specialized  justice  in  the
field of environment to all concerned.

39.   We find it imperative to place on record a caution for  consideration
of the courts of competent jurisdiction that the cases  filed  and  pending
prior to  coming  into  force  of  the  NGT  Act,  involving  questions  of
environmental laws and/or relating to any of the seven  statutes  specified
in Schedule I of the NGT Act, should also be dealt with by the  specialized
tribunal, that is the NGT, created under the provisions  of  the  NGT  Act.
The Courts may be well advised to direct transfer of such cases to the  NGT
in its discretion, as it will  be  in  the  fitness  of  administration  of
justice.

40.   Normally, we would have even transferred this case to NGT.   However,
as it does not involve  any  complex  or  other  environmental  issues  and
primarily requires administrative supervision for proper execution  of  the
orders of the Courts, we have considered it appropriate  to  transfer  this
case to the  High  Court  of  Madhya  Pradesh.   We  may  notice  that  the
supervisory work concerns itself with regard to the proper  functioning  of
the various Committees, which were constituted  under  the  orders  of  the
Court, to  ensure  proper  running  of  the  hospital  established  by  the
government and health care facilities available to the Bhopal Gas  victims.
Thus, the matter should be heard and supervisory jurisdiction be  exercised
by the High Court to better serve the ends of justice.

41.   The Registry is directed to transmit the records of the Writ Petition
No. 50/1998 to the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Bench at Jabalpur,  forthwith
and also send copies of this order to all concerned quarters of  the  Union
of India, the State  of  Madhya  Pradesh,  the  Monitoring  Committee,  the
Advisory Committee, ICMR, BMHRC and  the  NIREH  for  compliance  of  these
directions without delay and default.
                                            ….…………......................CJI.
                                                              (S.H. Kapadia)


                                             …….…………......................J.
                                                      (A.K. Patnaik)


                                           ...….…………......................J.
                                                      (Swatanter Kumar)

New Delhi
August 09, 2012

Thursday, August 9, 2012

service matter - On 13.09.2004, the appellant, who was working on the post of District and Sessions Judge, Punna was compulsorily retired from the service in the public interest by the Government of Madhya Pradesh (for short, ‘the Government’) on the request of the Madhya Pradesh High Court (for short, ‘High Court’). The order of compulsory retirement was issued by the Government in exercise of its power under amended Rule 56(2)(a) of the Fundamental Rules, as made applicable in the State of Madhya Pradesh, Rule 14 of the Madhya Pradesh Higher Judicial Service (Recruitment and Service Conditions) Rules, 1994 (for short, ‘1994 Rules’), Rule 42(1)(b) of the Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1976 (for short, ‘1976 Rules’) and Rule 1-A of Madhya Pradesh District and Sessions Judges (Death- cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1964 (for short, ‘1964 Rules’). In lieu of notice of three months, it was directed in the order that the appellant shall be entitled to three months’ salary and allowances which he was receiving prior to his retirement. The conduct of the appellant in involving an M.P. and the Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, in a matter of the High Court concerning an administrative review petition filed by him for expunging adverse remarks in ACRs of 1993 and 1994 is most reprehensible and highly unbecoming of a judicial officer. His conduct has tarnished the image of the judiciary and he disentitled himself from continuation in judicial service on that count alone. A Judge is expected not to be influenced by any external pressure and he is also supposed not to exert any influence on others in any administrative or judicial matter. Secondly and still worst, the appellant had an audacity to set up a plea in the rejoinder that he never made any representation to Shri R.K. Malaviya, M.P. for any purpose whatsoever. But for the appellant’s approaching Shri R.K. Malaviya and his request for help, Shri R.K. Malaviya would have never written the letter quoted above to the then Minister of State for Law, Justice and Company Affairs. On this ground also his writ petition was liable to be dismissed. In view of the above, we are satisfied that the recommendation made by the High Court to the Government for compulsory retirement of the appellant and the order of compulsory retirement issued by the Government do not suffer from any legal flaw. The order of compulsory retirement is neither arbitrary nor irrational justifying any interference in judicial review. The impugned judgment of the Division Bench is not legally unsustainable warranting any interference by this Court in an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. 44. Civil Appeal is, accordingly, dismissed with no order as to costs.



                                                                  REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                    CIVIL  APPEAL NO.  5790      OF 2012
                  (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 1884 of 2007)



R.C. Chandel                                                      ……
Appellant

                   Vs.

High Court of M.P. & Anr.
……  Respondents




                                  JUDGMENT


R.M. LODHA, J.


            Leave granted.
2.          On 13.09.2004, the appellant, who was working  on  the  post  of
District and  Sessions  Judge,  Punna  was  compulsorily  retired  from  the
service in the public interest by the  Government  of  Madhya  Pradesh  (for
short, ‘the Government’)  on the request of the Madhya  Pradesh  High  Court
(for short, ‘High Court’). The order of compulsory   retirement  was  issued
by the Government in exercise of its power under amended  Rule  56(2)(a)  of
the Fundamental Rules, as made applicable in the State  of  Madhya  Pradesh,
Rule 14 of the Madhya  Pradesh  Higher  Judicial  Service  (Recruitment  and
Service Conditions) Rules, 1994 (for short, ‘1994 Rules’), Rule 42(1)(b)  of
the Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1976  (for  short,  ‘1976
Rules’) and Rule 1-A of Madhya Pradesh District and Sessions Judges  (Death-
cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules, 1964 (for short, ‘1964 Rules’). In  lieu  of
notice of three months, it was directed in  the  order  that  the  appellant
shall be entitled to three  months’  salary  and  allowances  which  he  was
receiving prior to his retirement.
3.           The  appellant  challenged  the  above  order   of   compulsory
retirement by filing a writ petition  before  the  High  Court.  The  Single
Judge of that Court   by  his  order  dated  20.04.2006,  allowed  the  writ
petition; quashed the order of compulsory retirement  dated  13.09.2004  and
directed that he be reinstated with all consequential benefits.
4.          The High Court on the administrative side challenged  the  order
of Single Judge in  writ  appeal.  The  Division  Bench  of  that  Court  on
consideration of the entire matter held that the challenge to the  order  of
compulsory retirement was ill-founded and, accordingly, set aside the  order
of the Single Judge vide its judgment dated  23.11.2006.  It  is  from  this
order that the appellant has preferred this appeal by special leave.
5.          The appellant was selected in the  higher  judicial  service  of
Madhya Pradesh by direct recruitment. He joined the judicial service  as  an
Additional District Judge on 17.10.1979. On 26.06.1985, he was confirmed  as
a District Judge.  The  appellant  was  awarded  lower  selection  grade  on
07.09.1990 with effect from 24.03.1989.  He was  awarded  super  time  scale
in May, 1999 and above super time scale in 2002.   As noted  above,  by  the
order dated 13.09.2004, the appellant was  compulsorily  retired  in  public
interest.
6.          We have heard Mr. Rohit Arya, learned  senior  counsel  for  the
appellant and Mr. Ravindra Shrivastava, learned senior counsel for the  High
Court  on the administrative side.
7.          Mr.  Rohit  Arya,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the  appellant
vehemently contended that the Division Bench was not  at  all  justified  in
setting aside the judgment and order of the Single Judge.  The  observations
made by the Division Bench in the impugned order and the  findings  recorded
therein are founded on incorrect and misleading facts. The  service   record
of the appellant speaks otherwise.The appellant has  been  largely  assessed
in his ACRs ‘Good’ or ‘Very Good’. He highlighted  that  the  appellant  was
confirmed as District Judge in 1985, he was awarded  lower  selection  grade
in  1990, he was given  super time scale in 1999 and above super time  scale
in 2002 on merits and, on the  basis  of  his  judicial  work  he  was  also
recommended  for  elevation  as  a  High  Court  Judge  by  the  High  Court
collegium in March, 2004.
8.           Learned  senior  counsel  for  the  appellant  submitted   that
compulsory retirement of the appellant on the  basis  of  an  adverse  entry
recorded in  1989 and two subsequent adverse entries  for 1993 and 1994  was
wholly unjustified. As regards 1989 adverse entry,  learned  senior  counsel
submitted that the appellant was awarded lower selection grade in 1990  and,
therefore, the said entry had lost its  efficacy.   In  respect  of  entries
recorded in 1993 and 1994, learned senior counsel submitted  that  the  said
entries also lost their significance since the appellant was  awarded  super
time scale in 1999 and above super time scale in 2002. In between  in  2001,
he was allowed to continue in  service.  Moreover,  learned  senior  counsel
would submit that the  adverse  remarks  recorded  in  1993  and  1994  were
challenged by the appellant on the judicial side  of  the  High  Court.  The
Single Judge of that Court accepted the appellant’s challenge  and  expunged
these remarks. The High Court on administrative side  challenged  the  order
of the Single Judge in writ appeal. The Division Bench  of  the  High  Court
although set aside the order of the Single Judge but observed that 1993  and
1994 entries shall not be read adverse to the appellant  for  all  times  to
come.
9.         Learned  senior  counsel  referred  to   the   guidelines   dated
22.08.2000 issued by the  Government and submitted that in view  thereof  no
order of compulsory retirement could be passed on the  basis  of  incapacity
if the officer was promoted within the  last  five  years  and  during  that
period his performance remained satisfactory.  He submitted that  throughout
his work, the appellant achieved the norms for disposal of  cases  fixed  by
the High Court and his reputation and  integrity as  well  as  the  judicial
performance was found to be good and it is  because  of  that  that  he  got
lower selection grade and super  time  scale  from  time  to  time.  Learned
senior counsel, thus, submitted that the Single Judge of the High Court  was
fully justified in interfering  with  the  order  of  compulsory  retirement
after dealing with each and every complaint made against the  appellant  and
none  of  these  complaints  was  found  meritorious  justifying  compulsory
retirement of the appellant. Learned senior counsel for  the  appellant,  in
support of his arguments, heavily relied  upon a  recent  decision  of  this
Court in Nand Kumar Verma v. State of Jharkhand and others[1].
10.         On the other hand,  Mr.  Ravindra  Shrivastava,  learned  senior
counsel for the High Court on administrative side (respondent no.1)  stoutly
defended  the  impugned  judgment.  He  submitted  that   the   High   Court
recommended the compulsory retirement of the appellant to the Government  as
he was not  found  fit  for  continuation  in  judicial  service  in  public
interest. While making such recommendation the  Full  Court  considered  the
entire service record of the appellant. Mr.  Ravindra  Shrivastava,  learned
senior counsel referred to ACRs of the  appellant  recorded  for  the  years
1982, 1989, 1993, 1994, 1997 and 1998 and submitted that  the   decision  of
the Full Court  to compulsorily  retire the appellant cannot be said  to  be
unjustified.
11.         Learned senior counsel for the respondent no. 1 placed  reliance
upon a decision of this Court in Rajendra Singh Verma  (Dead)  Through  LRs.
and others v. Lieutenant Governor (NCT of Delhi) and others[2].
12.         Rule 56(2) of the Fundamental Rules  provides that a  government
servant (read judicial officer) may, in the public interest, be  retired  at
any time after he has completed 20 years’  qualifying  service,  or  on  his
attaining  the age of 50 years, whichever is earlier without  assigning  any
reason by giving him a notice  in  writing.  The   notice  period  is  three
months.  However,  he may be retired forthwith and on such retirement he  is
entitled to claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus  allowances
for the period of notice at the same rates at  which  he  was  drawing  them
immediately before retirement or, as the case may  be,  for  the  period  by
which such notice falls short of three months.  Sub-rule 1-A  added to  1964
Rules provides  that with regard  to  age  of  compulsory  retirement,   the
permanent District and Sessions Judge shall be governed  by  the  provisions
of Fundamental Rule 56.   Rule 42(1)(b) of the  1976  Rules   provides  that
the appointing authority may in the public  interest  require  a  government
servant (read judicial officer) to retire from service at any time after  he
has completed 20 years’ qualifying service or on his attaining  the  age  of
50 years whichever is earlier by giving three  months’  notice  in  Form  29
provided that he  may be retired forthwith and on such retirement  he  shall
 be entitled to claim a sum  equivalent  to  the  amount  of  his  pay  plus
allowances for the period of the notice at the same rate  at  which  he  was
drawing immediately before his retirement or, for the period by  which  such
notice falls short of three months, as the case may be.  Rule 14(1)  of  the
1994 Rules  provides that the age of  superannuation  of  a  member  of  the
Madhya Pradesh  Higher  Judicial  Service  shall  ordinarily  be  60  years,
provided he is found fit and suitable to continue after 58 years in  service
of the High Court. Sub-rule (2) makes a provision that without prejudice  to
the provisions contained in Rule 56(3)   of the Fundamental Rules  and  Rule
42(1)(b) of the 1976 Rules,  a member of  the  service  not  found  fit  and
suitable shall be compulsorily retired  on  his  attaining  the  age  of  58
years.
13.         Article 235 of the Constitution vests  in  the  High  Court  the
control over the  subordinate  judiciary  within  the  State.  It  reads  as
follows :

      “Control over subordinate courts.—The control over district    courts
      and courts subordinate thereto including the  posting  and  promotion
      of, and the grant of leave to,  persons  belonging  to  the  judicial
      service of a State and holding any  post  inferior  to  the  post  of
      district judge shall be vested in the High Court, but nothing in this
      article shall be construed as taking away from any  such  person  any
      right of appeal which he  may  have  under  the  law  regulating  the
      conditions of his service or as authorizing the High  Court  to  deal
      with him otherwise than in accordance  with  the  conditions  of  his
      service prescribed under such law.”


14.         In Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab  and  another[3],  a  seven-
Judge Bench of this Court  considered  the  ambit  and  scope  of  the  word
“control” and while elaborating  the powers  included  in  the  High  Courts
with regard to control over  subordinate  judiciary  within  its  respective
state, inter alia, exposited the position  that  such  power  included  pre-
mature or compulsory retirement of Judges of  the  district  courts  and  of
subordinate courts.
15.          In  Chandra  Singh  and  others  v.  State  of  Rajasthan   and
another[4], the above position laid down by this Court in  Samsher  Singh  3
has been reiterated.
16.         The above position laid down by  this  Court  in  the  cases  of
Samsher Singh3 and Chandra Singh4  has been reiterated in a recent  decision
of this Court in Rajendra Singh Verma2 . In paragraph 82 (Pg.   43)  of  the
Report, this Court in Rajendra Singh Verma2  stated as follows :

         “82. As explained by this  Court  in  Chandra  Singh  v.  State  of
         Rajasthan [(2003) 6 SCC 545], the power  of  compulsory  retirement
         can be exercised at any time and that the power under  Article  235
         in this regard is not in any manner circumscribed by  any  rule  or
         order. What is explained in the said decision by this Court is that
         Article 235 of the Constitution of India enables the High Court  to
         assess the performance of any judicial officer at any time  with  a
         view to discipline the black sheep or weed out the dead  wood,  and
         this constitutional power of the High Court cannot be circumscribed
         by any rule or order.”


17.         Following a decision of this Court in High Court  of  Judicature
at  Bombay  Through  Its  Registrar  v.  Shirishkumar  Rangrao  Patil    and
another[5] , this Court in Rajendra Singh Verma2  reiterated that  the  High
Court had to maintain constant vigil on its subordinate judiciary.
18.          A  three-Judge  Bench  of  this  Court  in  All  India  Judges’
Association (2) and others v. Union of India and  others[6]  has  emphasized
that the benefit of increase of retirement  age to 60  years  shall  not  be
available automatically to all judicial officers irrespective of their  past
record of service and evidence of their continued utility  to  the  judicial
system. The benefit is available to only those who, in the  opinion  of  the
respective High Courts, have a potential for continued useful  service.  The
Bench said, “It is not intended as a windfall for the indolent,  the  infirm
and those of doubtful integrity, reputation and utility”.
19.         That power of the High Court to  recommend  to  the   Government
to compulsorily retire a judicial officer on attaining the  required  length
of service or requisite age and consequent action by the Government on  such
recommendation are beyond any doubt.
20.         The appellant, as noted above, was selected  in  Madhya  Pradesh
Higher Judicial Service in 1979 by way of direct recruitment.  At  the  time
of issuance of the order of  compulsory  retirement  on  13.09.2004  he  had
completed 25 years or so in judicial service. The available  materials  show
 that for the period from 01.04.1981 to 31.03.1982, the appellant was  given
grade ‘D’ (Average).
21.         In 1988-89, the appellant was assessed “D”.  ACR for  that  year
also records that  he  never  enjoyed  clean  reputation  although  no  such
complaint was received in writing. It  also  records  that  his  quality  of
judgments and orders was  not satisfactory.
22.         For the period ending 31.03.1991, the appellant was graded   “C”
(Good) but it records, “the descriptive report of  the  then  Chief  Justice
dated 28.06.1991 is that no inspection of Betul  District  Judge  was  made,
however, the appellant was reported to be an average judicial officer”.
23.         For the period ending 31.03.1992, the appellant has  been  given
grade “D” (Average).
24.         For the  period  ending  31.03.1993,   the  appellant  has  been
graded “E”  (Poor).  Inter alia, the remarks read,  “Inspection  note  shows
that the quality of his performance  is  poor.   His  disposals  were  below
average, his reputation was not good”.
25.         For the  period  ending  31.03.1994,   the  appellant  has  been
graded “E” (Poor).   The entry reads,  “His  performance  qualitatively  and
quantitatively has been poor. The officer does not enjoy good reputation”.
26.         The questions that  fall  for  consideration  are:  whether  the
recommendation made by the High Court on the basis of unanimous  opinion  to
the Government for compulsory retirement of the appellant and the  order  of
compulsory retirement issued by the Government  suffer from any legal  flaw?
Is the order of  compulsory  retirement  so  arbitrary  or  irrational  that
justifies interference in judicial review?  Is  the  view  of  the  Division
Bench upholding the order of appellant’s compulsory retirement so  erroneous
warranting interference by this Court in an appeal under Article 136 of  the
Constitution of India?
27.         In Rajendra Singh Verma2 , this Court restated   what  has  been
stated in earlier decisions  that  compulsory  retirement  from  service  is
neither dismissal nor removal; it differs from both of them, in that  it  is
not a form of punishment prescribed by  the  rules  and  involves  no  penal
consequences inasmuch as the person  retired  is  entitled  to  pension  and
other retiral benefits proportionate to the period of  service  standing  to
his credit. An order of compulsory retirement being not an order of  adverse
consequence, principles of natural justice have no application.  This  Court
 took into consideration a long line of cases including State  of  U.P.  and
another v. Bihari Lal[7], Union  of  India  v.  V.P.  Seth  and  another[8],
Baikuntha Nath  Das  and  another     v.  Chief  District  Medical  Officer,
Baripada and  another[9],  Baidyanath  Mahapatra  v.  State  of  Orissa  and
another[10], Union of India v. Col. J.N. Sinha and another[11],  All   India
Judges’  Association (1) v.
Union of India and others[12] and All India Judges’  Association  (2)6   and
culled out the legal position in paragraph 183 (Pg. no. 75)  of  the  Report
as follows :

        “183. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that
        while considering the case of an officer as to whether he should  be
        continued in service or compulsorily  retired,  his  entire  service
        record up to that date on which consideration  is  made  has  to  be
        taken into account.  What  weight  should  be  attached  to  earlier
        entries as compared to recent entries is a matter of evaluation, but
        there is no manner of doubt that consideration  has  to  be  of  the
        entire service record. The fact that an officer,  after  an  earlier
        adverse entry, was promoted does not wipe out earlier adverse  entry
        at all. It would be wrong to contend that merely for the reason that
        after an earlier adverse entry  an  officer  was  promoted  that  by
        itself would preclude the authority  from  considering  the  earlier
        adverse entry. When the law says that the entire service record  has
        to be taken into consideration, the  earlier  adverse  entry,  which
        forms  a  part  of  the  service  record,  would  also  be  relevant
        irrespective of the fact whether the officer concerned was  promoted
        to higher position or whether he was granted certain  benefits  like
        increments, etc.”


28.         Few other features based on  service  record  of  the  appellant
highlighted in  the counter filed by the respondent no. 1 in  opposition  to
the writ petition as well as in  response  to  the  special  leave  petition
before this Court may be noticed. The appellant was informed of  his  having
been assessed in grade “D”  for  the  period  01.04.1981  to  31.03.1982  by
communication dated 15.09.1982. The said adverse grading  was  not  assailed
by the appellant and it remained on the record as it is. The  appellant  was
also intimated on 06.11.1989 about the adverse remarks recorded in  his  ACR
for the period 1988-89 that he never enjoyed clean reputation and  that  his
quality of judgments and orders was not  satisfactory.  The  appellant  made
representation against the above remarks but the same was rejected and  they
hold the field as it is.  For the period ending  31.03.1992,  the  appellant
was graded “D” and that grading remains as it is.

29.         The adverse remarks recorded in the ACR for  the  period  ending
on 31.03.1993 and 31.03.1994, were communicated to the  appellant.  He  made
two separate representations for expunging the adverse remarks recorded  for
these years.  His representations were rejected by the  then  Chief  Justice
on 27.08.1994 and the appellant  was  informed  of  the  said  rejection  on
30.08.1994. Despite  rejection  of  the  two  representations  made  by  the
appellant, he again made  two  representations  to  the  Chief  Justice  for
expunction of these  adverse  remarks.    These  representations  were  also
rejected and the appellant was communicated of the same on  05.01.1995.  The
representations made by the appellant having  been  rejected  twice  by  the
Chief Justice, the appellant yet again  made  representation  on  02.08.1995
for expunction of  these  remarks.  This  representation  also  came  to  be
rejected by the Chief Justice on 21.08.1995 by observing  that  the  remarks
in the ACR for the above period  do  not  call  for  any  modification.  The
appellant sought administrative review of the decision taken  by  the  Chief
Justice  and the  administrative review  was  also  rejected  by  the  Chief
Justice on 06.01.1996. The appellant then filed a writ petition (No. 413  of
1996) on the judicial side of the High  Court.  The  Single  Judge  of  that
Court allowed the appellant’s writ petition  vide  his  judgment  and  order
dated 18.10.1996 and quashed the adverse remarks in the appellant’s ACR  for
the  years  ending  on  31.03.1993  and  31.03.1994.  The  High   Court   on
administrative  side  filed  LPA  against  the  judgment  and  order   dated
18.10.1996. The Division Bench of that Court allowed the LPA and  set  aside
the judgment and order of the Single Judge dated  18.10.1996.   While  doing
so the Division Bench in its judgment and order  dated  25.02.1997  observed
in para 69 as follows :

        “69.      Before parting with this case in all fairness, we consider
        it necessary to observe that the adverse remarks on  the  reputation
        of respondent conveyed to him in the relevant years should not haunt
        him all through his judicial career and hamper his prospects for all
        times. The above remarks cannot be read to his prejudice  in  future
        if he shows improvement in his work and performance and is  able  to
        achieve the requisite grade for being admitted to  higher  Selection
        Grade. The very purpose of communicating adverse remarks is  not  to
        condemn an officer but to caution him at the right  time  so  as  to
        give chance of improvement.”


30.         Against the judgment and order dated 25.02.1997  passed  by  the
Division Bench, the appellant filed a special  leave  petition  before  this
Court but that was dismissed on 28.04.1997.    Thus,  advance  remarks   for
the period ending 31.03.1993 and 31.03.1994 remain as it is.

31.         From the counter affidavit filed by  the  respondent  no.  1  it
also transpires that the benefit of super time scale was not  given  to  the
appellant as soon as it became due.   Rather, the  administrative  committee
in its meeting held on 25.03.1995, on  consideration  of  the  case  of  the
appellant for grant of benefit of super time scale, deferred his  case  with
remarks, “his work performance and conduct will be kept  under  watch”.  The
view of the administrative committee was accepted by the Full Court  in  its
meeting held on 29.04.1995. The appellant’s case for  grant  of  super  time
scale was again considered by the Full Court in  the  subsequent  year  1996
and the Full Court in its meeting  held  on  20/21.04.1996  found  that  the
appellant was not suitable for grant of super time scale.  It  was  only  in
1999 that the appellant was given super time scale  and  2002  that  he  was
granted above super time scale.
32.         In 2002, the appellant was warned for claiming false units.  His
explanation that there was typing mistake was not found to be credible.
33.         From the  above, it is clear that the  appellant  did  not  have
unblemished service record all  along.  He  has  been  graded  “Average”  on
quite a few occasions.  He was assessed   “Poor”  in   1993  and  1994.  His
quality of judgments and orders was not found satisfactory on more than  one
occasion. His reputation was observed  to be tainted on  few  occasions  and
his integrity was not always found  to  be  above  board.  In  1988-89,  the
remark reads, “never enjoyed clean reputation”. In 1993,  the   remark  “his
reputation was not good” and in 1994 the  remark  “officer  does  not  enjoy
good reputation”, were  recorded.  His  representations  for  expunction  of
these remarks failed. The challenge to these remarks on  judicial  side  was
unsuccessful right upto this Court. In  1993,  it  was  also  recorded  that
quality of performance of the appellant was  poor  and  his  disposals  were
below average. In 1994, the remark in the service  record  states  that  the
performance of the  appellant  qualitatively  and  quantitatively  has  been
poor. With this service record,  can  it  be  said  that  there  existed  no
material for an  order  of  compulsory  retirement  of  the  appellant  from
service?   We think not.  The above material amply shows that  the  material
germane for  taking decision by the Full Court whether  the appellant  could
be continued in judicial service or deserved to be retired compulsorily  did
 exist. It is not the scope of  judicial  review  to  go  into  adequacy  or
sufficiency of such materials.
34.         It is true that the appellant was confirmed  as  District  Judge
in 1985; he got lower selection grade with effect from  24.03.1989;  he  was
awarded super time scale in May, 1999 and he  was  also  given  above  super
time scale in 2002 but the confirmation  as  District  Judge  and  grant  of
selection grade and super time scale do not wipe  out  the  earlier  adverse
entries which have remained on record and continued to hold the  field.  The
criterion for  promotion or grant of increment or higher scale is  different
 from an exercise which  is  undertaken  by  the  High  Court  to  assess  a
judicial officer’s  continued utility to the judicial system.  In  assessing
potential for continued useful service of a judicial officer in the  system,
the High Court is required to take into account the entire  service  record.
Overall profile of a judicial  officer  is  the  guiding  factor.  Those  of
doubtful integrity, questionable reputation and wanting in utility  are  not
entitled to benefit of service after  attaining   the  requisite  length  of
service or age.
35.         That the appellant’s challenge to  1993  and  1994  entries  was
unsuccessful right upto this Court is not  in  dispute.    However,  learned
senior counsel  for  the  appellant  has  placed  heavy  reliance  upon  the
observations made by the Division Bench in  its  judgment  and  order  dated
25.02.1997, particularly, paragraph 69 thereof wherein  the  Division  Bench
held that adverse remarks on the reputation in  the  relevant  years  should
not haunt him all through his judicial career and hamper his  prospects  for
all times. We are afraid the above observations by the Division Bench  while
upholding the remarks in no manner restricted the power of  the  Full  Court
in taking into consideration these adverse remarks in its exercise  to  find
out whether or not the appellant should be retained in service after he  has
attained  the  required  length  of  service.  The  consideration   of   the
appellant’s case for grant of selection grade and super time scale stood  on
different footing.  The entire service  record  and  overall  profile  of  a
judicial officer guide the High Court in  reaching  its  satisfaction  about
the continuance or otherwise after the judicial  officer  has  attained  the
required length of service or age.  When the  entire  service  record  of  a
judicial officer is under consideration, obviously the High Court  is  alive
to such judicial officer’s having got promotion/s, increments,  etc.  during
the service.

36.         It was argued by the learned senior counsel  for  the  appellant
that  the  administrative  committee-1  had  recommended   the   appellant’s
continuation in service and there was no justification for  the  Full  Court
to take a contrary view. The view of the  administrative  committee  is  not
final.  It is recommendatory in nature.  It is open to  the  Full  Court  to
accept the committee’s report or take  a  different  view.  In  the  present
case, the Full Court on the basis  of  the  entire  service  record  of  the
appellant  formed   a  unanimous  opinion  that  the   appellant   must   be
compulsorily retired and recommended to  the  Government,  accordingly.   On
the basis of the material which  existed  and  which  we  have  referred  to
above, it can hardly be said that the recommendation by the  Full  Court  to
the Government for compulsory retirement of the appellant was  arbitrary  or
based on material not germane for such recommendation.

37.         Judicial service is not an ordinary government service  and  the
Judges are not employees as such. Judges hold  the   public  office;   their
function is one of the essential functions of the State.   In  discharge  of
their functions and duties, the Judges represent the State. The office  that
a Judge holds is an office of public trust.  A Judge must  be  a  person  of
impeccable integrity  and unimpeachable independence.  He must be honest  to
the core  with high moral values. When a  litigant  enters  the   courtroom,
he must feel secured  that the Judge before whom his matter has come,  would
deliver  justice impartially and  uninfluenced  by  any  consideration.  The
standard of conduct expected of a Judge is  much  higher  than  an  ordinary
man.  This is no excuse  that  since  the  standards  in  the  society  have
fallen, the Judges who are  drawn from the society  cannot  be  expected  to
have high standards and ethical firmness required  of  a  Judge.   A  Judge,
like Caesar’s wife,  must  be  above  suspicion.   The  credibility  of  the
judicial system is dependent upon the Judges who man it.   For  a  democracy
to thrive and rule of law  to  survive,  justice  system  and  the  judicial
process have to be strong and  every  Judge  must   discharge  his  judicial
functions with integrity, impartiality and  intellectual honesty.
38.         The most  shocking  and  unbecoming  conduct  of  the  appellant
highlighted by the respondent no. 1 before the High Court in  opposition  to
the writ petition and in response to  the  present  appeal  is  his  act  to
overreach  the administrative decision on the review petition filed  by  him
before the  Chief  Justice  after  his  representations  for  expunction  of
adverse remarks for the period ending on 31.03.1993 and 31.03.1994 had  been
thrice earlier rejected. The  appellant  approached  Shri  R.  K.  Malaviya,
Member of Parliament and Chairman, House Committee  (Rajya  Sabha)  for  his
grievance concerning rejection of  his  representations  for  expunction  of
remarks for 1993 and 1994.   Though the appellant has denied  that  he  ever
approached Shri R.K. Malaviya    but  to  falsify  his  claim,  the  learned
senior counsel for the respondent no. 1 placed before us xerox copy  of  the
letter  dated  14.02.1996  written  by  Shri  R.K.  Malaviya  to  Shri  H.R.
Bhardwaj,   Minister  of  State  for  Law,  Justice  and  Company   Affairs,
Government of India, New Delhi and the copy of the letter  dated  08.03.1996
sent by the Ministry of Law, Justice  and  Company  Affairs  (Department  of
Justice), Government of India  addressed  to  the  Chief  Secretary  to  the
Government of Madhya Pradesh, Bhopal and  the  Registrar,  High  Court.  The
letter dated 14.02.1996  addressed  by  Shri  R.K.  Malaviya  to  Shri  H.R.
Bhardwaj, the then Minister of State for Law, Justice  and  Company  Affairs
reads as follows :
            “R.K. Malaviya              Off. : 66, PARLIAMENT HOUSE
            MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT        NEW DELHI – 110001.
                         CHAIRMAN             TEL.:      3017048, 3034699
            HOUSE COMMITTEE
                 (RAJYA SABHA)                RES.:      30, CANNING LANE
                                              KASTURBA GANDHI MARG
                                              NEW DELHI -110001
                                        TEL. :     3782895
                                        RES. :      19,  TILAK  NAGAR,  MAIN
       ROAD
                                              INDORE (M.P.)
                                        TEL. :     492412, 492588, 495054
                                        14 February 1996
       Dear Shri Bhardwaj Ji
            Enclosed is a representation of Shri R.C.  Chandel,  District  &
       Sessions Judge, Rewa [MP], which is self-explanatory.
            I shall be grateful if you kindly get it examined and do the
       needful.
                                                   Yours sincerely,
                                                   [R.K. MALVIYA]
       Shri H.R. Bhardwaj,
        Minister of State for Law, Justice &
        Company Affairs, Government of India,
        NEW DELHI.”


39.         The forwarding letter sent by the Government of India,  Ministry
of Law, Justice and Company Affairs (Department of Justice)  dated  8.3.1996
reads as follows :
                 “No. L-19015/3/96-Jus
                 Government of India
            Ministry of Law, Justice and C.A.
                 (Department of Justice)
                                  Jaisalmer House, Mansingh Road
                                  New Delhi, the 8/3/96.
      1)    The Chief Secretary
            to the Government of
            Madhya Pradesh,
            BHOPAL.
      2)    The Registrar,
            Madhya Pradesh High Court,
            JABALPUR.
      Subject :  Reference from Sh. R.K. Malaviya, Member of Parliament and
                Chairman, House Committee, Rajya Sabha on representation  of
                Sh. R.C. Chandel District and Sessions Judge, Rewa (M.P.)


        Sir,
                 I am directed to forward herewith a copy of  letter  dated
        14.2.1996  alongwith  its  enclosure,  received  from   Shri   R.K.
        Malaviya, Member of Parliament and Chairman House Committee,  Rajya
        Saba on the  above  subject  for  taking  such  action  as  may  be
        considered appropriate.
                                             Yours faithfully,
                                             (P.N. SINGH)
                                   Under  Secretary  to  the  Government  of
India”

40.         The conduct of the  appellant  in  involving  an  M.P.  and  the
Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, in a matter of the High  Court
concerning an administrative review petition filed  by  him   for  expunging
adverse remarks in ACRs of 1993 and 1994 is most reprehensible  and   highly
unbecoming of a judicial officer. His conduct has  tarnished  the  image  of
the judiciary and  he disentitled  himself  from  continuation  in  judicial
service on that count alone.  A Judge is expected not to  be  influenced  by
any external pressure  and he is also supposed  not to exert any   influence
 on others in any administrative or  judicial  matter.  Secondly  and  still
worst, the appellant had an audacity to  set up  a  plea  in  the  rejoinder
that he never made any representation to Shri R.K. Malaviya,  M.P.  for  any
purpose whatsoever.  But for the appellant’s approaching Shri R.K.  Malaviya
and his request for help, Shri R.K. Malaviya would have  never  written  the
letter quoted above to the then Minister  of  State  for  Law,  Justice  and
Company Affairs. On this ground also his writ  petition  was  liable  to  be
dismissed.
41.         The learned Single Judge examined  the  administrative  decision
of the Full Court to recommend to the Government to  compulsory  retire  the
appellant as if he was sitting as an  appellate authority  to  consider  the
correctness of such recommendation by going into sufficiency  and   adequacy
of the materials which led  the Full Court  in  reaching  its  satisfaction.
The whole approach of the Single Judge in consideration of  the  matter  was
flawed and not legally proper.    The  learned  Single  Judge  proceeded  to
examine the  materials  by  observing,  “The  entire  record  pertaining  to
complaints against the petitioner has also been produced  before  me  during
the course of argument by learned  senior  counsel  for  respondent  no.  1.
Thus, I am dealing each and every complaint one by one”. We are afraid,  the
learned Single Judge did not keep the  scope  of  judicial  review  in  view
while examining the validity of the  order  of  compulsory  retirement.  The
Division Bench of the High Court in the intra-court appeal was, thus,  fully
justified in setting aside the impugned order.
42.         Learned senior counsel for the appellant placed  heavy  reliance
on a  decision  of  this  Court  in  Nand  Kumar  Verma1.  Having  carefully
considered Nand Kumar Verma1, we find that the decision  of  this  Court  in
Nand Kumar Verma1 has no application on the facts of the present case.  This
is clear from para 36 (Pg. 591) of the Report which reads as follows:
           “36.  The material on  which  the  decision  of  the  compulsory
           retirement was based, as extracted by  the  High  Court  in  the
           impugned judgment, and material furnished by the appellant would
           reflect that totality of relevant materials were not  considered
           or completely ignored by the High Court. This leads to only  one
           conclusion that the subjective satisfaction of  the  High  Court
           was not based on the sufficient or relevant  material.  In  this
           view of the matter, we cannot say that the service record of the
           appellant  was  unsatisfactory  which  would  warrant  premature
           retirement from service. Therefore, there was  no  justification
           to retire the appellant compulsorily from service.”

Nand Kumar Verma1 , thus, turned on its own facts.

43.         In view of the above, we are satisfied that  the  recommendation
made by the High Court to the Government for compulsory  retirement  of  the
appellant and the order  of compulsory retirement issued by  the  Government
do not suffer from any legal flaw. The order  of  compulsory  retirement  is
neither arbitrary nor irrational justifying  any  interference  in  judicial
review.  The  impugned  judgment  of  the  Division  Bench  is  not  legally
unsustainable warranting any interference by this Court in an  appeal  under
Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
44.         Civil Appeal is, accordingly, dismissed  with  no  order  as  to
costs.


                                                        …………………….. J.
                                                                       (R.M.
Lodha)



                                 ………………………J.
                                                           (Anil R. Dave)
NEW DELHI.
AUGUST 8, 2012.





-----------------------
[1]     (2012) 3 SCC 580
[2]     (2011) 10 SCC 1
[3]     (1974) 2 SCC 831
[4]     (2003) 6 SCC 545
[5]    (1997) 6 SCC 339
[6]     (1993) 4 SCC 288
[7]     1994 (Suppl) 3 SCC 593
[8]     (1994) SCC (L&S) 1052
[9]     (1992) 2 SCC 299
[10]    (1989) 4 SCC 664
[11]    (1970) 2 SCC 458
[12]    (1992) 1 SCC 119

That if the Seller applies for sale permission within the time stipulated in clause 8 above, but does not get it within 6 months, the Seller may determine this Agreement and the Seller shall refund to the Purchaser the earnest money received by him without any damages or interest, within a period of 15 days from the date of determination of the Agreement.”This, however, brings us face to face with a rather difficult situation having regard to the fact that the Agreement to Sell was executed 34 years ago on 8th September, 1978, in respect of the suit property. We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that during this period the price of real estate has escalated sharply. In addition to the above, the Appellant has not suffered any material loss, since only the earnest money of Rs.50,000/- had been paid by him to the Respondents and the balance consideration was yet to be paid when the agreement came to be terminated. Even the said sum of Rs.50,000/- was returned to the Appellant immediately upon termination of the Agreement and the said amount was duly accepted by the Appellant, though by recording his objections subsequently. The Appellant, therefore, has not suffered any monetary loss, and, on the other hand, the value of the property must have sky-rocketed during the period between the execution of the Agreement till date. In fact, that is why there is no prayer in the alternative for return of any sums advanced, which is one of the usual prayers in suits for specific performance.


|REPORTABLE           |


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.5787 OF 2012
                   (Arising out of SLP(C)No.13490 of 2009)



1 Rattan Lal (since deceased)


2 Through His Legal Representatives        … Appellant



           Vs.





           2 S.N. Bhalla & Anr.                       … Respondents





                               J U D G M E N T



ALTAMAS KABIR, J.


1.    Leave granted.

2.    The Respondents are perpetual Sub-lessees of  Plot  No.C-2/13,  Vasant
Vihar, New Delhi, measuring 600 sq. yards,  allotted  to  them  through  the
Government  Servants  Co-operative  House  Building  Society  Limited.  They
erected a single-storeyed structure on the  said  land  and  vide  Agreement
dated 8th September, 1978, they agreed to sell  the  said  property  to  the
Appellant together with the building erected thereon for a consideration  of
Rs.5,90,000/-. The Appellant paid a sum of Rs.50,000/-  to  the  Respondents
in advance to enable them to apply for  necessary  permission  for  transfer
and to obtain Clearance Certificate from the Tax authorities. The  Agreement
stipulated that on receipt of the said Clearance, the  Respondents  were  to
inform the Appellant of its receipt,  and,  thereafter,  the  Appellant  was
required to  complete  the  sale  within  60  days  by  paying  the  balance
consideration agreed to between the parties. In case the Respondents  failed
to apply for permission to  sell  within  15  days  from  the  date  of  the
Agreement,  the  Appellant  had  the  option  to  determine  the   Agreement
whereupon the Respondents were required to refund the earnest money  and  to
pay damages to the Appellant assessed at Rs.50,000/-.

3.    The provision in the Agreement which is  crucial  for  a  decision  in
this Appeal is Clause 9, which is extracted hereinbelow :

      “9.   That if the Seller applies for sale permission within  the  time
           stipulated in clause 8 above, but  does  not  get  it  within  6
           months, the Seller may determine this Agreement and  the  Seller
           shall refund to the Purchaser the earnest money received by  him
           without any damages or interest, within a period of 15 days from
           the date of determination of the Agreement.”

4.    Inasmuch as, the sale was not being completed by the Respondents,  the
Appellant filed Suit No.278 of 2003, in the  Court  of  Additional  District
Judge, Delhi, for specific performance of the contract.

5.    Clause 2 of the Agreement to Sell stipulates that  upon  execution  of
the  Agreement,  the  Respondents  would  immediately  apply  to  the  Delhi
Development Authority (DDA) and the  Competent  Authority  under  the  Urban
Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976,  for  permission  to  transfer  the
said property to the Purchaser/Appellant free from all  encumbrances,  after
obtaining requisite permissions  from  any  other  Body  or  Authority.   In
Clause 3 of the Agreement, the Respondents  also  undertook  to  obtain  the
Income  Tax  Clearance  Certificate  immediately  on  obtaining   the   sale
permission   from   the   concerned   authorities   and   to   inform    the
Purchaser/Appellant by Registered Post with Acknowledgment Due  accordingly.
 As indicated hereinabove, Clause 4 of  the  Agreement  stipulates  that  on
being  informed  of  the  receipt  of  the  requisite  permission  from  the
Respondents, the Appellant would have to complete the sale within  a  period
of 60 days from the  date  of  receipt  of  such  intimation  and  on  being
furnished with the copies of the permission and  the  Income  Tax  Clearance
Certificate.

6.    Clause 8 of the Agreement to Sell is of special  significance  to  the
facts of this case and is, accordingly, extracted hereinbelow :

      “8.   That if for any reason the Seller fails to apply for  permission
           to sell the said property to the Purchaser within a period of 15
           days from the date of  signing  this  Agreement,  the  Purchaser
           shall have the option to determine this Agreement  and  in  that
           event the Seller shall refund the earnest money  of  Rs.50,000/-
           (Rupees Fifty Thousand only) as received by him and pay  to  the
           Purchaser damages which are assessed as the sum  of  Rs.50,000/-
           (Rupees Fifty Thousand only).”

7.    As will be evident from the aforesaid Clause, the Purchaser was  given
the option to exit from the Agreement in case the  Seller  failed  to  apply
for permission for sale of the property within a period of 15 days from  the
date of signing of the Agreement.   Clause  9  of  the  Agreement  which  is
crucial for a decision in this appeal, contains the right of the  Seller  to
determine the Agreement and is extracted hereinbelow :

      “9.   That if the Seller applies for sale permission within  the  time
           stipulated in clause 8 above, but  does  not  get  it  within  6
           months, the Seller may determine this Agreement and  the  Seller
           shall refund to the Purchaser the earnest money received by  him
           without any damages or interest, within a period of 15 days from
           the date of determination of the Agreement.”

8.    In terms of Clause 9  of  the  Agreement  extracted  hereinabove,  the
Respondents submitted a request application in terms  of  Clause  2  of  the
said Agreement dated 12th September, 1978, i.e., well-within the  period  of
15  days  contemplated  in  the  said  Clause.   In  response  to  the  said
application made to the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) for grant of  sale
permission, a letter dated 23rd/27th November, 1978, was  addressed  by  DDA
to  the  Respondents   asking   for   certain   documents   to   be   filed.
Interestingly, although, the said letter was addressed to  the  Respondents,
it was responded  to  by  the  Appellant.   The  said  letter  sent  by  the
Appellant has been marked  as  Ex.PW-1/3.   On  7th  March,  1979,  the  DDA
informed the Respondents of the decision not to  grant  sale  permission  on
the ground that the affidavit filed by Shri S.N.  Bhalla,  one  of  the  two
vendors was defective.  On receiving the said intimation from the  DDA,  the
Respondents  sent  a  telegram  to  the  Appellant  on  8th   March,   1979,
determining the Agreement to Sell in terms of Clause 9 of the Agreement,  on
the expiry of the 6 months’ period for completion of the sale on 7th  March,
1979.  The Appellant was also informed that the earnest money  paid  by  him
would be refunded within 15 days.  Pursuant  to  such  intimation,  on  12th
March, 1979, the Respondents  sent  a  Bank  Draft  of  Rs.50,000/-  to  the
Appellant, being the earnest money received in terms  of  Clause  9  of  the
Agreement to Sell dated 8th September, 1978.

9.     Coincidentally,  on  8th  March,  1979  itself,  the  Appellant  also
addressed a letter to the Respondents stating that the Lieutenant  Governor,
Delhi, had granted permission for sale of  House  No.C-2/13,  Vasant  Vihar,
New Delhi (the property in question), in favour of the Appellant.   However,
the same could not be communicated since the affidavit filed  by  Shri  S.N.
Bhalla, the Respondent No.1 herein, was  found  to  be  defective  and  such
permission could be conveyed only on production of the correct affidavit  as
required by the DDA.  The Respondents were,  accordingly  requested  by  the
Appellant to file a proper affidavit in the Department and to file  all  the
necessary documents with the DDA to enable them to convey the required  sale
permission.  It was also mentioned that the failure to do so would make  the
Respondents  responsible  for  all  costs  and  consequences  thereof.   The
original letter No. F.H.(199)78-CS/DDA dated 7th March, 1979,  was  attached
with the notice sent on behalf  of  the  Appellant.   The  said  letter  was
followed up by a telegram sent by the Appellant  indicating  that  time  was
not the essence of the Agreement and that he was prepared  to  purchase  the
house of  the  Respondents  even  beyond  the  period  of  6  months  since,
although, DDA was ready to give permission, the  Respondents  had  defaulted
in filing the correct affidavit to enable DDA to grant permission.

10.   Inasmuch as, no positive response was received by the  Appellant  from
the Respondents to his  communications,  he  sent  a  legal  notice  to  the
Respondents informing them that he was ready and  willing  to  complete  the
transaction and to have the  Sale  Deed  executed  in  his  favour  for  the
property in question by paying  the  balance  price.  The  Respondents  were
asked to inform the Appellant as to how the transaction could  be  completed
so that he could tender the sale consideration by Bank Draft.  It  was  also
indicated in the  notice  that  the  Bank  Draft  sent  by  the  Respondents
refunding the earnest money, had been encashed under  protest,  but  it  did
not mean that the  contract  was  repudiated.   The  contract  continued  to
subsist and the Appellant was always ready and willing to perform  his  part
of the contract.

11.   In the absence  of  a  positive  response  to  the  said  notice,  the
Appellant filed Suit No.278 of  2003,  on  8th  March,  1982,  for  specific
performance of the Agreement to Sell dated  8th  September,  1978.   On  the
pleadings of the parties, the following issues were settled by orders  dated
1st November, 1983 and 19th February, 1991 :

      “1)   Whether the Plaintiff has been ready and willing to perform  his
           part of agreement dated 08.09.1978?


      2)     Whether  the  Defendant  has  committed  breach  of  the   said
           Agreement?


      3)    Whether the agreement  dated  08.09.1978  stands  terminated  or
           frustrated  as  alleged  by  the  defendant  and  there  is   no
           subsisting agreement to sell?


      4)    Whether the plaintiff  is  to  be  granted  relief  of  specific
           performance in the facts and circumstances of the present case?


      5)    Whether the agreement dated 08.09.1978 is void for  uncertainty?




      6)    Whether the time was the essence of the contract and whether the
           agreement dated 08.09.1978 was rightly terminated?”

      The last issue was an additional issue settled vide order  dated  19th
February, 1991.

12.   Considering Clauses 2, 8 and 9 of the  Agreement  to  Sell  dated  8th
September, 1978, the Trial  Court  dismissed  the  suit,  inter  alia,  upon
holding that the Appellant had  intentionally  and  without  demur  accepted
refund of the earnest money sent to him by Bank Draft  and,  thereafter,  he
sent the lawyer’s notice on 26th April, 1979, stating that  the  said  Draft
was encashed without prejudice to his rights and contentions  in  the  Suit.
The learned Trial Court held that  encashing  the  Bank  Draft  amounted  to
acceptance of the contract being determined.  The learned Trial  Court  also
was of the view that in view of his conduct  it  would  be  clear  that  the
Appellant had abandoned his claim under the contract and he  was  no  longer
ready and willing to pursue his remedies  under  the  contract.   The  Trial
Court also took note of the fact that although  the  Agreement  contemplated
that  the  Respondents  would  take  steps  to  obtain  the  necessary  sale
permission and the Income Tax Clearance Certificate, the  same  was  pursued
by the Appellant and that it  was  the  Appellant  who  was  in  default  in
complying with the requests made by DDA, which  had  resulted  in  the  sale
permission not being granted. The Trial Court categorically held that  there
was deficiency in respect  of  the  documents  to  be  filed.  Even  on  the
question of the Suit being filed on the last date of  limitation,  the  same
was construed to mean that the  Appellant  was  not  ready  and  willing  to
complete the sale transaction.

13.   Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned  Additional
District Judge on 10th February, 2004, the Appellant filed a  Regular  First
Appeal before the Delhi High Court, being RFA  No.272  of  2004,  which  was
dismissed by the impugned judgment.

14.   The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court  in  effect,  accepted  the
reasoning of the Trial Court and indicated further that  a  contract,  which
is by its nature determinable, is incapable of being  specifically  enforced
under Section 14(1)(c) of the  Specific  Relief  Act,  1963.   The  Division
Bench held that in terms of Clause 9 of the Agreement to Sell, the  contract
was determinable if the sale permission was not forthcoming within a  period
of 6 months from the date of  execution  of  the  Agreement.   The  Division
Bench also referred to Section 20 of the  aforesaid  Act  to  indicate  that
relief of specific performance is discretionary and  in  the  instant  case,
such discretion should not be exercised in favour of the Appellant  who  had
approached the Court on the last date of limitation, i.e.,  within  3  years
from the date when cause of action for the suit had accrued. Observing  that
it was a matter of common knowledge that between 1979 and 1982 the price  of
property had risen very sharply in Delhi, the Division Bench  also  observed
that it could not also be lost sight of that the Appellant had accepted  the
refund of Rs.50,000/-, which had been paid by  him  to  the  Respondents  as
earnest money-cum-part Sale consideration.  It  is  on  the  basis  of  such
reasoning that the appeal was dismissed by the Division Bench of  the  Delhi
High Court.

15.   Mr. Altaf Ahmad, learned Senior Advocate, who appeared in  support  of
the Appeal, contended that in terms of Clause 2 of the  Agreement  to  Sell,
the Sellers were under an obligation to apply to the DDA and  the  Competent
Authority under the Urban  Land  (Ceiling  and  Regulation)  Act,  1976,  to
obtain the requisite permission to transfer the property to  the  Appellant,
free from all encumbrances.  Mr. Ahmad submitted that the liberty  given  to
the Respondents/Sellers under Clause 9 of the Agreement  to  exit  therefrom
could not be taken advantage of by the Sellers in case they were in  default
in obtaining the said permission within the stipulated time, without  making
serious and conscientious efforts to obtain the same.  Mr.  Ahmad  submitted
that in the instant case, the Respondents had been informed by  the  DDA  of
the deficiencies in the affidavit filed by them, but they did not  take  any
step to remove the deficiencies. Mr. Ahmad submitted that  it  is  no  doubt
true that the Appellant/Purchaser had  taken  upon  himself  the  burden  of
acquiring the sale permission and Income Tax Clearance Certificate,  but  it
was only to assist  the  Respondents  and  the  same  did  not  absolve  the
Respondents of their responsibility of performing the tasks that  they  were
required to perform under the Agreement.  Mr. Ahmad contended that the  role
played by the Appellant in  the  entire  episode  was  at  best  that  of  a
facilitator in his own interest.

16.   Mr. Ahmad submitted that both the Trial Court, as  well  as  the  High
Court, had erred in holding that the Appellant was not ready and willing  to
complete the sale transaction and the same would be evident  from  the  fact
that he filed the  suit  for  specific  performance  on  the  last  date  of
limitation.  Mr. Ahmad submitted that the very fact that the Appellant  took
on himself the burden of assisting the Respondents to procure the  necessary
sale  permission  and  Income  Tax  Clearance  Certificate,  indicated   his
willingness  and  anxiety  to  complete  the  transaction.  Learned  counsel
submitted  that  despite  the  Appellant’s  readiness  and  willingness   to
complete the sale transaction, he was unable to do  so  on  account  of  the
deficiencies  on  the  part  of  the  Respondents  in  complying  with   the
instructions of the DDA.  Learned counsel submitted  that  both  the  Courts
below had dealt with the issues in the suit without  properly  understanding
the case made out by the Appellant vis-à-vis the  terms  and  conditions  of
the Agreement to Sell dated  8th  September,  1978,  and  the  judgment  and
decree of the Trial Court as well as the judgment of  the  High  Court  were
liable to be set aside.

17.   On the other hand, appearing for the Respondents, Mr.  Mukul  Rohatgi,
learned Senior Advocate, contended that despite  the  obligation  cast  upon
the Respondents to obtain the  necessary  sale  permission  and  Income  Tax
Clearance  Certificate,  the  Appellant   had   taken   upon   himself   the
responsibility to obtain the same and the  Respondents  could  not  be  made
responsible for the Appellant’s failure to  obtain  the  same.  Mr.  Rohatgi
submitted that the Respondents/Sellers  were  fully  justified  in  invoking
Clause 9 of the Agreement to Sell and to terminate the same.

18.   In order to drive home his  point,  Mr.  Rohatgi  submitted  that  the
letters dated 27th November, 1978  and  7th  March,  1979,  which  had  been
addressed to the Respondents by the Executive Officer, DDA, requesting  that
a proper affidavit be filed in the department to  enable  the  DDA  to  take
further steps in  the  matter,  had  been  received  by  the  Appellant  and
forwarded to the Respondents in original with his letter  dated  8th  March,
1979.

19.   Mr. Rohatgi urged that from his conduct it would  be  clear  that  the
Appellant was not ready and willing  to  complete  the  sale  and  both  the
Courts had rightly dismissed the Appellant’s suit.

20.   Mr. Rohatgi referred  to  various  decisions  on  Section  20  of  the
Specific Relief Act, 1963, to bolster his submissions, but the same are  all
peculiar to the facts of each  case.   Relying  on  the  Constitution  Bench
decision of this  Court  in  Shri  Balwantrai  Chimanlal  Trivedi  Vs.  M.N.
Nagrashna and Others [(1961) 1 SCR 113], Mr. Rohatgi lastly  submitted  that
the Supreme Court is not  bound  to  interfere  under  Article  136  of  the
Constitution when dealing with an  appeal  where  there  is  no  failure  of
justice.

21.   What emerges from the submissions made on  behalf  of  the  respective
parties is that the Appellant’s suit was dismissed by  the  Trial  Court  on
the finding that he had intentionally and without  demand,  accepted  refund
of  the  earnest  money,  though,  without  prejudice  to  his  rights   and
contentions in the  suit.  The  learned  Trial  Court  also  found  that  by
encashing the Bank Draft, the Appellant had clearly indicated  that  he  was
no longer interested in completing the sale transaction.   The  Trial  Court
also took note of the fact that although under the Agreement it was for  the
Respondents  to  obtain  the  sale  permission  and  Income  Tax   Clearance
Certificate, it was the Appellant who had elected to pursue the  matter  and
was, therefore, responsible for the failure to obtain the  same  within  the
stipulated period of six months, which entitled the  Respondents/Sellers  to
terminate the Agreement under Clause 9 thereof.

22.   The High Court approved the view taken by the Trial Court, but  adding
that in view of Section 14(1)(c) of  the  Specific  Relief  Act,  1963,  the
contract, which was by its very nature determinable, was incapable of  being
specifically enforced.  The High Court, for abundant caution, also  referred
to Section 20 of the aforesaid Act to indicate that the relief  of  specific
performance was purely discretionary and dependent  on  the  facts  of  each
case.  The High Court also took note of the steep  rise  in  the  prices  of
real estate while dismissing the Appellant’s suit for specific  performance.


23.   In our view, the reasoning of  both  the  Trial  Court  and  the  High
Court, cannot be supported on several grounds. Firstly,  the  acceptance  of
refund of the earnest money paid by the Appellant  to  the  Respondents  was
not considered by the Trial Court as also  the  High  Court  in  its  proper
perspective, as both the Courts appeared to have ignored the fact that  such
refund had been accepted by the Appellant, without prejudice to  his  rights
and contentions in the suit.   That  the  said  amount  was  received  under
protest has not been considered either by the Trial Court  or  by  the  High
Court, which had relied mainly on the provisions of Clauses 2 and 9  of  the
Agreement  to  Sell  in  dismissing  the  Appellant’s  suit   for   specific
performance.  We  do  not  find  from  the  materials  on  record  that  the
Appellant had ever given up his claim under the Agreement  or  that  he  was
not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract.

24.    Secondly,  the  Trial  Court  also  quite  erroneously  absolved  the
Respondents  of  their  obligation  under  the  Agreement  to  obtain   sale
permission and Income Tax Clearance Certificate,  which  were  required  for
completion of the sale.  We reiterate that the role  of  the  Appellant  was
merely that of a facilitator and the primary  responsibility  for  obtaining
permission and clearance from the Income Tax Authorities remained  with  the
Respondents.  In fact, there is nothing on record to indicate  that  by  his
acts, the Appellant ever agreed  to  play  a  role  other  than  that  of  a
supportive role  and  that  too  in  his  own  interest,  in  obtaining  the
necessary clearances.

25.   The other point raised on behalf  of  the  Respondents  regarding  the
import of Clause 9 of the Agreement to sell is also not of  much  substance.
In our view Clause 9 was never meant to  provide  the  Respondents  with  an
escape route if they themselves failed to discharge their responsibility  of
not only applying for sale permission, but to  also  follow  up  the  matter
with the authorities in order to  obtain  the  same  within  the  stipulated
period of six months.  In the absence of any  material  on  record  to  show
that the Respondents had made positive efforts for procuring  the  necessary
sale permission and  clearance  certificates,  they  were  not  entitled  to
determine the Agreement in terms of Clause 9.

26.   The last point, and, in our view the most substantive  point,  is  the
steep hike in the value of real estate which has been taken note of  by  the
High Court.  However, in the absence of definite evidence to show  that  the
Appellant/purchaser  was  not  ready  and  willing  to  conclude  the   sale
transaction, the Respondents cannot be given the benefit  of  the  delay  in
concluding the same.

27.   Both the Courts below have attached a good deal of importance  to  the
fact that the Appellant filed the suit for specific performance on the  last
day of limitation, which, according to the learned  Judges,  indicated  that
the Appellant was not ready and willing to complete  the  sale  transaction,
as otherwise he would have filed the suit earlier.  We  have  no  hesitation
in rejecting the said contention, since the Appellant filed the suit  within
the period of limitation and his readiness and willingness to  conclude  the
sale transaction was quite obvious from the fact  that  he  had  taken  upon
himself  the  burden  of  pursuing  the  matter  with  the  authorities  for
obtaining sale permission and Income Tax  Clearance  Certificate.  The  role
played by the Appellant in this regard cannot, therefore, be applied to  his
disadvantage.  In our view, the approach of both the  Courts  below  to  the
problem was coloured by the fact that the Appellant  had  actively  involved
himself in the matter of obtaining the sale permission  as  well  as  Income
Tax Clearance Certificate.  The fact that the  Appellant  had  made  several
requests to the Respondents to file a proper affidavit, as requested by  the
DDA, is another indication that the  Appellant  was  ready  and  willing  to
complete the sale transaction.  Both the Courts below dealt  with  the  suit
filed by the Appellant, as though the Respondents had  no  obligation  under
the agreement for completing the sale and this appears  to  have  influenced
their judgment in dismissing the Appellant’s suit for specific  performance.


28.   Issue Nos.1, 3 and 4 as settled by the Trial Court  on  1st  November,
1983 and 19th February, 1991, are, therefore,  answered  in  favour  of  the
Appellant and the remaining issues are answered against the Respondents.  In
the light of what has been indicated hereinabove, we are of  the  view  that
the  Agreement  to  Sell  dated  8th  September,  1978,  has  been   wrongly
terminated.

29.   This, however,  brings  us  face  to  face  with  a  rather  difficult
situation having regard to the fact that the Agreement to Sell was  executed
34 years ago on 8th September, 1978, in respect of the  suit  property.   We
cannot shut our eyes to the fact that during this period the price  of  real
estate has escalated sharply.  In addition to the above, the  Appellant  has
not suffered any material loss, since only the earnest money of  Rs.50,000/-
had been paid by him to the Respondents and the  balance  consideration  was
yet to be paid when the agreement came to be terminated.  Even the said  sum
of Rs.50,000/- was returned to the Appellant  immediately  upon  termination
of the Agreement and the said amount was duly  accepted  by  the  Appellant,
though by recording his objections subsequently.  The Appellant,  therefore,
has not suffered any monetary loss, and, on the other  hand,  the  value  of
the property must have sky-rocketed during the period between the  execution
of the Agreement till date.  In fact, that is why there is no prayer in  the
alternative for return of any sums advanced,  which  is  one  of  the  usual
prayers in suits for specific performance.

30.   However, we are  also  of  the  view  that  the  Appellant  should  be
compensated for the time spent by him in pursuing his remedy in  respect  of
the Agreement to Sell.  Accordingly, we decree  the  suit,  but  instead  of
decreeing the suit for specific performance  of  the  Agreement,  we  direct
that the Respondents shall pay the Appellant costs for the litigation  right
throughout, assessed at Rs.25,00,000/-, to be paid  by  the  Respondents  to
the Appellant within one month from date, without the  Appellant  having  to
proceed  in  execution  for  recovery  of  the  same.  In  the  event,   the
Respondents fail to  pay  the  said  amount  to  the  Appellant  within  the
aforesaid period, the Appellant will be entitled  to  put  this  decree  for
costs into execution before the Trial Court and the said amount  will  carry
simple interest at the rate of 18% per annum from one month after  the  date
of the decree till its realization.

31.   The Appeal is disposed of, accordingly.




                                                     ………………………………………………………J.
                                     (ALTAMAS KABIR)





                                                     ………………………………………………………J.
                                     (J. CHELAMESWAR)
New Delhi
Dated:8.8.2012.
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