the Entrance Examination for Post-Graduate (Medical) Selection 2012, Odisha are challenging the validity of Clause 11.2 of the Prospectus for selection of candidates for Post- Graduate (Medical) Courses in the Government Medical Colleges of Odisha for the Academic Year, 2012, as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. -they are undergoing studies from May 2012 onwards and, at this distance of time, if they are displaced, that will cause serious injustice to them since they have already left the government service/public sector undertakings for joining the post graduate course. In view of the stand taken by the Medical Council -of India that seats for post-graduate courses cannot be increased, we are inclined to give a direction to the State of Odisha or their undertakings to take back the in-service candidates into their service and permit them to serve in the rural/tribal areas so that they can compete through the category of in-service candidates in the 50% seats earmarked for them for admission to the post-graduate course.We are, therefore, inclined to allow this appeal and set aside the judgment of the Division Bench as well as learned Single Judge by quashing the proviso to clause 9(2)(d) of the MCI regulations to the extend indicated above as well as clause 11.2 of the prospectus issued for admission to the Post Graduate Medical Examination 2012 in the State of Odisha. The State of Odisha, the Medical Council of India and respondents 1 to 4 are directed to take urgent steps to re-arrange the merit list and to fill up the seats of the direct category, excluding in-service candidates who got admission in the open category on the strength of weightage, within a period of one week from today and give admission to the open category candidates strictly on the basis of merit. - 36. Appeals are allowed and the judgments of the High Court are set aside accordingly.

                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                    CIVIL APPEAL NO.  5705-5706  OF 2012
            [Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos. 16201-16202 of 2012]


Satyaprata Sahoo & Ors.                                 . Appellants

                                   Versus


State of Orissa & Ors.                            . Respondents
                               J U D G M E N T
K. S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.


1.    Leave granted.

2.    The appellants, who have appeared  in  the  Entrance  Examination  for
Post-Graduate (Medical) Selection 2012, Odisha are challenging the  validity
of Clause 11.2 of the Prospectus  for  selection  of  candidates  for  Post-
Graduate (Medical) Courses in the Government Medical Colleges of Odisha  for
the Academic Year, 2012, as violative of Article 14 of the  Constitution  of
India.
-
3.    The  appellants  appeared  in  the  entrance  examination  as  ‘direct
candidates’  (Open  Category)  and  have  qualified  purely  on  merit   for
admission to Post Graduate (Medical) Courses 2012 in the Government  Medical
Colleges in Odisha.   The  Prospectus  issued  for  Post-Graduate  (Medical)
Selection, 2012, Odisha deals with the availability of  the  seats  both  in
the category of direct as well as in-service.  Clause 4  of  the  Prospectus
gives the category-wise details of the seats for P.G. (Medical)  Courses  in
three Government Medical Colleges in Odisha  for  the  Academic  Year  2012.
For the category MD/MS Course, in-service category, 87 seats  are  available
and for direct  category,  86  seats  are  available,  totaling  173  seats.
Appellants, who fall under the category of  direct  candidates,  as  already
indicated, are aggrieved by Clause 11.2 of the Prospectus  which  stipulates
an additional weightage for candidates who are in employment  of  Government
of Odisha/Government of Odisha undertaking  /  Government  of  India  Public
Undertaking located in Odisha and had worked in Rural/Tribal/Backward  areas
while applying  through  the  category  of  direct  candidates.   Additional
weightage of 10% of marks secured in the P.G. Entrance Examination per  year
of completion of service in -Rural/Tribal/Backward  areas,  subject  to  the
maximum of 30% of marks secured in the entrance examination, in  service  to
be given to those candidates who apply through direct category.


4.     Appellants  submit  that  the  above  clause  is  wholly   arbitrary,
discriminatory and goes contrary to the ratio laid down  by  this  Court  in
State of M.P. & Ors. V. Gopal D. Tirthani & Ors. (2003) 7  SCC  83  and  Dr.
Snehelata Patnaik & Ors. V.  State  of  Orissa  &  Ors.  (1992)  2  SCC  26.
Appellants have also prayed for quashing the Medical Council  of  India  (in
short ‘MCI’) Notification No. 51210 of 17.11.2009 providing weightage  marks
to  in-service  candidates  applying  through  the  direct  category,  which
according to the appellants, is a clear encroachment  and  appropriation  of
seats earmarked for the direct category candidates which has  to  be  filled
up purely on merit, subject to rule of reservation.   Appellants’  challenge
was repelled by the learned single Judge of the Orissa High  Court  as  well
as the Division Bench.  Hence, these  appeals.


5.    Shri Shyam Diwan, learned senior counsel appearing for the  appellants
submits that providing additional weightage marks to  in-service  candidates
who had rendered service in -
Rural/Tribal/Backward  areas  while  considering  their   applications   for
admission through  the  direct  candidate  category  amounts  to  making  an
artificial  differentiation  between  a   homogenous   class   i.e.   direct
candidates and in-service candidates.  Learned senior  counsel  pointed  out
that on account of additional weightage benefit given  to  the  doctors  who
have rendered less than  five  years  of  service  in  Rural/Tribal/Backward
areas both in Government of Odisha or Public Sector  Undertakings  owned  by
the State Government, will  be  an  advantageous  position  and  that  would
amount to drawing an artificial differentiation between a homogeneous  class
i.e. direct candidates and in-service candidates and  also  within  the  in-
service candidates,  which  action  would  be  hit  by  Article  14  of  the
Constitution of India.


6.    Learned senior counsel also pointed out that the same further  amounts
to providing horizontal reservation within the seats  meant  for  in-service
candidates.  Learned senior counsel pointed out that the  admission  through
direct candidates route be made purely on merit on the basis of  the  common
entrance examination and not  on  the  basis  of  the  additional  weightage
granted  to  a  few  doctors  who  -had  the   advantage   of   serving   in
Rural/Tribal/Backward areas while in employment  in  Government  of  Orissa,
Public Sector Undertakings owned by the State Government.


7.    Mrs. Indu Malhotra, learned senior counsel, also submitted  that  such
candidates can always come through the in-service category, a  normal  route
for admission to PG (Medical) Course.  Learned senior  counsel  pointed  out
that additional weightage  is  always  available  to  them  when  they  come
through the in-service category route, however, the same cannot be  extended
to them while applying for admission as  direct  category  candidates,  lest
they may make an inroad  into  the  direct  category,  which  is  arbitrary,
discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of  the  Constitution  of  India.



8.    Shri Krishnan Venugopal, learned senior counsel contesting  on  behalf
of  the  respondents,  on  the  other  hand,  submitted  that  there  is  no
illegality  in  Clause  11.2  of  the  Prospectus  which  gives   additional
weightage to in-service candidates who  fall  under  the  direct  candidates
route, as well as third proviso added  after  clause  9(2)(d)  of  the  Post
Graduate Medical Education (Amendment) -Regulations 2000 as amended by  Post
Graduate Medical  Education  (Amendment)  Regulation  2009  (Part  II)  vide
Notification dated 17.11.2009.  Learned  senior  counsel  pointed  out  that
classification of candidates as  per  Clause  6  and  sub-clauses  providing
weightage marks to such in-service candidates as  per  Clause  11.2  of  the
Prospectus, cannot be  termed  as  discrimination  between  direct  and  in-
service candidates and amongst the in-service  candidates.   Learned  senior
counsel also pointed out  that  the  weightage  marks  given  to  in-service
candidates who have rendered  service  in  Rural/Tribal/Backward  areas  and
qualified in the entrance  examination,  cannot  be  termed  as  “horizontal
reservation” as it is only  the  weightage  of  marks  given  for  rendering
service to the people in Rural/Tribal/Backward areas, in  view  of  the  law
laid down by this Court in Gopal D. Tirthani (supra).


9.    Shri Kirti R. Mishra, learned senior counsel appearing  on  behalf  of
the 4th respondent, submitted that the prospectus has been  issued  strictly
in accordance with the Notification No. 51210  dated  17.11.2009  issued  by
the Medical Council of India, whereby additional weightage  marks  given  as
an incentive for determining -the merit in the entrance  examination  passed
for P.G. admission.  Learned senior counsel submitted that the weightage  in
marks is given as an incentive at the rate of 10% of the marks  obtained  up
to maximum of 30% of the marks obtained for each year  of  service  rendered
in remote or difficult areas.  It was also pointed out that  the  additional
benefit is an incentive only and by awarding such an incentive, there is  no
violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.


10.   Learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  MCI  referred  to  the  counter
affidavit filed on its behalf  and  submitted  that  the  third  proviso  to
Regulation 9(2)(d) of the Post  Graduation  Regulation,  2000  (as  amended)
does not provide for or contemplate any separate channel  of  entry  for  in
service candidates in admission to P.G. Degree Courses  like  that  provided
for P.G. Diploma Courses.  The proviso only provides that  a  weightage  may
be given at the rate of 10% of the marks obtained for each year  in  service
in remote or difficult areas upto the maximum of 30% of the  marks  obtained
in the entrance examination and has secured minimum required -percentage  of
marks for government service rendered in remote/difficult areas.


      We heard counsels on either side at length.


11.   Medical Council of India, in  exercise  of  its  powers  conferred  by
Section 33 read with Section 20 of the Indian  Medical  Council  Act,  1956,
framed the Postgraduate Medical Education Regulations, 2000.   Clause  9  of
the Regulations 2000 deals with the selection of the postgraduate  students.
 Clause 9(1) was substituted in  terms  of  Notification  published  in  the
Gazette of India on 20.10.2008 and the same now reads as follows:
           “9(1)(a)   Students for Post Graduate medical courses  shall  be
      selected strictly on the basis of their Inter-se Academic Merit.


           (b)   50% of the seats in Post Graduate Diploma Courses shall be
      reserved for Medical Officers in  the  Government  service,  who  have
      served at least three years in  remote  and  difficult  areas.   After
      acquiring the PG Diploma, the Medical Officers  shall  serve  for  two
      more years in remote and/or difficult areas.”


12.   Clauses 9(1)(a) and  9(1)(b) when read together  would  indicate  that
50% seats are earmarked for direct category candidates and  -50%  seats  are
earmarked for in service  category.   Clause  9(1)(a)  clearly  states  that
students for post graduate medical courses shall  be  selected  strictly  on
the basis of their inter-se academic merit and Rule 9(1)(b) states that  50%
of the seats stand reserved for in service  candidates  who  have  at  least
three years service in remote and difficult areas.


13.   The methodology to  be  adopted  for  determining  academic  merit  is
provided in Clause 9(2),  which  is  relevant  for  our  purpose  and  hence
extracted hereunder:
           “9(2)   For    determining    the    ‘Academic    Merit’,    the
      University/Institution may adopt the following methodology:-


           a. On the basis of merit as determined by a  ‘competitive  test’
              conducted  by  the  state  government  or  by  the  competent
              authority  appointed  by  the  state  government  or  by  the
              university/group of universities in the same state; or


           a. On  the  basis  of  merit  as  determined  by  a  centralized
              competitive test held at the national level; or



           a. On the basis of the individual cumulative performance at  the
              first, second and third MBBS examinations provided admissions
              are University wise.  Or



           a. Combination of (a) and (c)



           Provided  that  wherever  ‘Entrance  Test’   for   postgraduates
      admission is held by a state government or a university or  any  other
      authorized  examining  body,  the  minimum  percentage  of  marks  for
      eligibility for admission to postgraduate medical course shall  be  50
      percent for  general  category  candidates  and  40  percent  for  the
      candidates belonging to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes  and  Other
      Backward Classes.


           Provided further that  in  Non-Governmental  institutions  fifty
      percent of the total seats shall be filled by the competent  authority
      notified by the State Government and the remaining  fifty  percent  by
      the management(s) of the institution on the basis of Inter-se Academic
      Merit.”


14.   However, the following proviso  was  added  after  clause  9(2)(d)  in
terms of Gazette Notification published on 17.11.2009 and the same reads  as
follows:
           “Further provided that in determining the merit and the entrance
      test for postgraduate admission weightage in the marks may be given as
      an incentive at the rate of 10% of the marks obtained for each year in
      service in remote or difficult areas upto the maximum of  30%  of  the
      marks obtained.”


-
15.   Above Clause 9, therefore, stipulates the methodology  to  be  adopted
for determining the inter-se academic merit of  candidates  who  fall  under
direct category and of those candidates who ultimately fall under 50%  seats
reserved for in-service candidates.  Clause 9(1)(a) clearly stipulates  that
students for postgraduate medical courses shall be selected strictly on  the
basis of “inter-se academic merit”.   The main controversy in this  case  is
whether the candidates from direct admission category  has  to  be  selected
strictly on the basis of their inter-se academic  merit  or  whether  it  is
legal to dilute the merit to the extent as indicated in  the  third  Proviso
to Clause 9(2)(d). Candidates who fall in the  direct  candidates  category,
whether they are fresh from the college  or  serving  elsewhere,  either  on
Government  service  or  under  public-sector   undertakings,   working   in
rural/Tribal area or  otherwise  or  doctors  who  are  serving  in  private
hospitals or nursing homes etc. situate in remote  or  difficult  area,  all
fall in that direct category and all of them have to take a common  entrance
examination and admission criteria is  only  comparative  merit.   When  the
comparative merit is the only criteria in the open  category,  the  question
is whether a weightage can be given exclusively to those candidates who  are
in -service of State of Odisha/Government  of  Odisha  undertaking,  whether
contractual/temporary/ad-hoc/regular on the ground that they had  worked  in
rural/tribal/backward areas.  It may be noted that 50%  seats  have  already
been earmarked for such category of candidates which they can  always  claim
depending upon the inter-se merit after  complying  with  other  eligibility
criteria.  Question is whether those in-service candidates  can  appropriate
seats from the open category where seats are only few.

16.   Clause 11.2 in the Prospectus issued by the P.G.  (Medical)  Selection
Committee 2012, giving additional weightage to those in-service  candidates,
reads as follows:
           “11.2 Those in-service candidates  who  have  qualified  in  the
      Entrance Examination and worked in Rural/Tribal/Backward  areas  shall
      be awarded an additional weightage of 10% of the marks secured in  the
      P.G.  Entrance  Examination  per  year  of  completion   service   (in
      Rural/Tribal/Backward areas), subject  to  maximum  of  30%  of  marks
      secured in  entrance  examination,  vide  MCI  Notification  No.51210/
      dt.17.11.2009 (In Form No.Appendix-III(A)).”




      Candidates fall under the Direct Category is provided under  Clause  6
of the Prospectus, which reads as follows:
      “6.   CATEGORY OF CANDIDATES:


      6.1.  A Direct Candidate is one who at the time of application:


      6.1.1  Is son/daughter/spouse of a person who has  served  in  Defence
      Service for minimum of 5 years by 31st December, 2011.


      6.1.2   Is either unemployed or in the  employment  of  Government  of
      Odisha, but not completed five years of  service  which  includes  all
      categories of employment like contractual/temporary/ad-hoc/regular  by
      31st December, 2011


      6.1.3    in  the  employment  of  Govt.  of   Orissa   Public   Sector
      Undertaking/Govt.  of  India  Public  Sector  Undertaking  located  in
      Odisha.  The employer has to sponsor the candidates for entire  period
      & must submit the sponsorship certificate as in Appendix III.”




      Clause 6.2 deals with In-service candidate which reads as follows:
      “6.2   An In-service candidate is one who at the time of application:


      6.2.1   Is in the employment of Government of Odisha and has completed
      a length of 5 years  of  service  which  includes  all  categories  of
      employment  like  contractual/temporary/  ad-hoc/  regular   by   31st
      December, 2011, excluding at-a-stretch leave of any kind, of  30  days
      or more.  However, the maternity leave is exempted from this exclusion
      and shall be counted towards the length of five years of service.


      Note:  In-service and Direct candidates in employment under Government
      of Odisha at the time of application -
      are advised to submit  their  applications  along  with  the  required
      documents directly to the Convenor, P.G. (Medical) Selection Committee
      – 2012, under intimation to their Employer.  Copy of  such  intimation
      is to be attached.”




17.   Clauses 6.1,  6.2  and  11.2,  quoted  above,  clearly  recognize  two
categories of candidates i.e. “direct”  and  “in-service”.   “Direct”  is  a
very wide category (open category) where students for P.G.  Medical  Courses
shall be selected strictly on the  basis  of  inter-se  academic  merit,  as
determined by a competitive test and in-service is a restricted category  of
candidates  who  are  in  service  of  the  State   Government/State   owned
undertakings. The details of the  availability  of  seats  are  provided  in
Clause 4 of the prospectus which is as follows:
                    “Category-wise Distribution of Seats
|Category |Unreserved |        |       |       |            |          |Total |
|MD/MS    |           |        |       |       |            |          |      |
|Course   |           |        |       |       |            |          |      |
|         |           |ST(12%) |SC(8%) |PH(3%) |Defence(3%) |Greencard |      |
|         |           |        |       |       |            |(5%)      |      |
|In-servic|62         |10      |7      |3      |0           |5         |87    |
|e        |           |        |       |       |            |          |      |
|Direct   |59         |11      |7      |2      |3           |4         |86    |
|Total    |121        |21      |14     |5      |3           |9         |173   |

-
18.   Seats in the direct category are also reserved for  members  of  SC/ST
communities and also to those SC/ST candidates migrated from their state  of
origin subject  to  certain  conditions.   Clause  6.4  reserves  seats  for
children or spouse of service/Ex-service personnel  (Defence).   Clause  6.5
states that seats are reserved for physically  handicapped  candidates  also
subject  to  rules  governing  them.   In  other  words,  several   reserved
candidates have also to be accommodated  in  the  50%  Open  Category.   50%
seats ear marked for the in-service candidates is kept intact, for which in-
service candidates can always aspire and if they satisfy  the  condition  of
rural/Tribal service, they will definitely get weightage.


19.   Now by virtue of third proviso to Clause 9(2)(d) and  clause  11.2  of
the Prospectus candidates who fall under the in-service category  are  given
a weightage  through  which  they  can  make  an  in-road  into  the  direct
candidates category while retaining their rights to get admission  for  P.G.
Course through in-service category.   Appellants  lament  that  already  66%
reservation is there  in  the  State  for  P.G.  Admissions,  including  all
reservations  and  only  34%  seats  are  available  for  direct  unreserved
category on merit and if third -proviso to  Clause  9(2)(d)  of  the  M.C.I.
Regulation and Clause 11.2 of the  Prospectus  are  given  effect  to   then
those seats would be occupied by the in-service candidates large  in  number
and candidates who  comes  strictly  on  the  basis  of  merit  through  the
competitive examination will have to stand out.


20.   This Court in Gopal D. Tirthani (supra) upheld the allocation  of  20%
seats for in-service candidates and held that weightage can be given to  in-
service candidates for their having rendered specified number  of  years  of
service in rural/tribal areas  which  is  not  hit  by  Article  14  of  the
Constitution of India.  This Court held that allocation of 20% of  seats  in
Post  Graduation  in  the  University  of  Madhya  Pradesh  for   in-service
candidate is not a reservation, it is a separate and  exclusive  channel  of
entry or source of admission, validity thereof cannot be determined  on  the
constitutional principles applicable to communal  reservations.   Having  so
said, the Court held as follows:
           “33.  ………Firstly, it is a case  of  post-graduation  within  the
      State and not an All-India quota.  Secondly,  it  is  not  a  case  of
      reservation, but one of only assigning weightage for service  rendered
      in rural/tribal areas. Thirdly, on the view of the law we  have  taken
      hereinabove, the assigning of weightage for service -
           rendered in rural/tribal area does not  at  all  affect  in  any
      manner the candidates in open category. …………..”


21.   Therefore, in Tirthani case, it has been categorically  held  that  it
is permissible to assign a reasonable  weightage  to  services  rendered  in
rural/tribal  areas  by  the  in-service  candidates  for  the  purpose   of
determining inter se merit within the class  of  in-service  candidates  who
have qualified in the pre-PG test by securing the minimum  qualifying  marks
as prescribed by the Medical Council of India.  Regulation 9 framed  by  the
Medical Council of India  was  also  noticed  by  this  Court  so  also  the
existence of two categories: (1) direct category (open category)  candidates
and (2) in-service  category  candidates.   Weightage  given  for  rendering
service in rural/tribal areas, so far as in-service candidates,  was  upheld
noticing  that  the  assigning  of  weightage  for   service   rendered   in
rural/tribal areas would not affect in any manner  the  candidates  in  open
category.


22.   We may, in this connection, refer to  few  earlier  judgments  in  the
matter  of  giving  weightage  to  in-service  candidates   although   those
decisions were also considered in Tirthani case.   In  State  of  -U.P.  and
Others. v. Pradip Tandon and  Others.  (1975)  1  SCC  267,  reservation  in
favour  of  people  in  “hill  areas”  and  Uttarakhand  was  held   to   be
constitutionally valid as they  were  socially  and  educationally  backward
classes of citizens.  Reservation in  favour  of  “rural  areas”  was  found
difficult to accept as it was sought to be justified on the test of  poverty
as the determining factor of social  backwardness.   This  Court  held  that
rural element did not make a  class  by  itself  because  it  could  not  be
accepted that the  rural  people  were  necessarily  poor  or  socially  and
educationally backward just as the urban people were not  necessarily  rich.
What was being dealt with in Pradip Tandon case was a reservation and not  a
weightage.  Later in Dinesh  Kumar  (Dr.)  (II)  v.  Motilal  Nehru  Medical
College (1986) 3  SCC  727,  the  two-Judges  Bench  examined  a  scheme  of
examination  for  admission  to  postgraduate  courses  suggested   by   the
Government of India stipulating a weightage equivalent to  15  per  cent  of
the  total  marks  obtained  by  a  student  at   the   All-India   Entrance
Examination, being given if he had put in a minimum  of  3  years  of  rural
service.  In  that  case,  of  course,  this  Court  observed  that  it  was
eminently desirable that some incentive should be given to  the  doctors  to
go to the rural -areas because there was concentration  of  doctors  in  the
urban areas and the rural areas appeared to be neglected.   The  observation
made in Dinesh Kumar case was  considered  by  three-Judges  Bench  of  this
Court in Dr. Snehelata Patnaik  (supra)  and  this  Court  opined  that  the
authorities might well consider giving weightage upto maximum of 5 per  cent
of marks in favour of in-service candidates who had done rural  service  for
five years or more, the determination of  which  have  to  be  made  by  the
authorities.


23.   We have referred to the above mentioned  judgments  only  to  indicate
the fact that this Court in various  judgments  has  acknowledged  the  fact
that weightage could be given for  doctors  who  have  rendered  service  in
rural/tribal areas but  that  weightage  is  available  only  in  in-service
category, to which 50% seats for PG admission has  already  been  earmarked.
The question is whether,  on  the  strength  of  that  weightage,  can  they
encroach upon the open category, i.e direct admission category.  We  are  of
the view  that  such  encroachment  or  inroad  or  appropriation  of  seats
earmarked for open category candidates  (direct  admission  category)  would
-definitely affect the candidates who compete strictly on the basis  of  the
merit.

24.   The purpose and object for giving weightage to  in-service  candidates
who have rendered rural/tribal service is laudable and  their  interest  has
been taken care  of  by  the  Medical  Council  of  India  as  well  as  the
prospectus issued for admission to the various medical colleges in State  of
Odisha but they have to come through the proper  channel  i.e.  the  channel
exclusively earmarked for in-service candidates and not through the  channel
earmarked for candidates in the open category.   The  in-service  candidates
are also free to compete through the open category just like any  other  who
fall under that category.  Further, it is also relevant to  note  those  who
get admission in post graduate courses through the  open  category  have  to
execute a bond stating  that  they  would  serve  rural/tribal  areas  after
completion of their post-graduation.   In fact, weightage is given to  those
candidates who  have  rendered  service  in  rural/tribal  areas  when  they
compete for admission to PG (Medical) Courses  in  in-service  category  for
whom 50% seats are earmarked.


25.   We also find another fallacy in Clause 11.2 read with Clause 6.2.1  of
the prospectus.  Clause 6.2.1 of the prospectus  says  in-service  candidate
is one who at the time of application is in the employment in Government  of
Odisha and has completed a length of 5 years of service  which  include  all
categories of employment like contractual/temporary/ad-hoc/regular  by  31st
December 2011.  Therefore, a doctor who is doing rural service  on  contract
or on temporary basis or on ad hoc basis by 31st  December  2011  will  also
get the benefit.  At the same time, the candidates who pass out MBBS  either
in regular service or in contractual  /  temporary/  ad  hoc  in  a  private
hospital even though serving in a remote/tribal areas  would  not  get  that
benefit even though those doctors  are  also  rendering  the  same  service.
Every doctor who goes out of medical college after MBBS  would  not  get  an
opportunity   to   serve   in   a   rural/   tribal   area   by    way    of
contractual/temporary/ad-hoc or regular service  offered  by  the  State  of
Odisha or a public sector.   Few may  fall  in  that  category  for  various
reasons and they get an advantage  and  those  who  get  that  advantage  of
course can, claim weightage when  they  are  being  considered  in  the  in-
service category.


26.    We notice that the seats earmarked for the open category  by  way  of
merit are few in number and encroachment by the in-service  candidates  into
that open category would violate clause  9(1)(a)  of  the  MCI  regulations,
which says students for PG medical courses shall  be  selected  strictly  on
the basis of the inter se academic merit i.e. on  the  basis  of  the  merit
determined by the competent test.  Direct category or  open  category  is  a
homogeneous class which consists of all categories  of  candidates  who  are
fresh from college, who have rendered service after MBBS  in  Government  or
private hospitals in remote and difficult areas  like  hilly  areas,  tribal
and rural areas and so on.   All of them have to complete on merit being  in
the  direct  candidate  category,  subject  to  rules  of  reservation   and
eligibility.  But  there  can  be  no  encroachment  from  one  category  to
another.  Candidates of in-service category cannot encroach  upon  the  open
category, so also vice-versa.


27.   We find, except State of Odisha and, to some extent,  State  of  Tamil
Nadu, none of the other States in India, has incorporated such a  clause  in
any of their prospectus for admission to the graduate  medical  courses  and
students who fall under the open -category in those States  are,  therefore,
not affected by such weightage.


28.   Medical  Council  of  India  in  the  counter  affidavit  raised  some
objections for giving admissions beyond the sanctioned  admission  capacity.
Reference was made to Section  10A  of  the  MCI  Act  which  provides  that
admissions can be made by Medical Colleges only within  sanctioned  capacity
for which permission under Section 10A/recognition under Section  11(2)  has
been granted.  This Court in State of Punjab and  Others  v.  Renuka  Singla
and Others (1994) 1 SCC 175 held that the High Court or  the  Supreme  Court
cannot be generous or liberal in issuing such directions which in  substance
amount  to  directing  the  authorities  concerned  to  violate  their   own
statutory rules and regulations,  in  respect  of  admissions  of  students.
Technical education, including medical  education,  requires  infrastructure
to cope with the requirement of giving proper  education  to  the  students,
who  are  admitted.   Taking   into   consideration,   the   infrastructure,
equipment, staff, the limit of the number of admissions is fixed  either  by
the Medical council of India.


29.   Further, in Medical Council of India v. State of  Karnataka  (1998)  6
SCC 131, this Court held the number of students admitted cannot be over  and
above that fixed by the Medical Council as  per  the  Regulations  and  that
seats in medical  colleges  cannot  be  increased  indiscriminately  without
regard to proper infrastructure  as  per  the  Regulations  of  the  Medical
Council.


30.   In Mriduldhar (Minor) and another v. Union of Indiaand  Others  (2005)
2 SCC 65, this Court held as follows:
           “Having regard to the professional courses  into  consideration,
      it deserves to be emphasized that all concerned including Governments,
      State and Central both,  MCI/DCI,  colleges,  new  or  old,  students,
      Boards, universities,  examining  authorities  etc.  are  required  to
      strictly adhere to time schedule wherever provided for;  there  should
      not be mid-stream admission; admission should  not  be  in  excess  of
      sanctioned intake capacity or in excess of quota of any  one,  whether
      Stare or Management. The carrying forward of any unfilled seats of one
      academic year to next academic year is also not permissible.”


31.   It is unnecessary to multiply the judgment rendered by this Court,  on
this point, the question is how to mould the  reliefs,  especially  when  we
cannot, in the facts and circumstance of the  -case,  direct  the  State  of
Odisha and the Medical Council of India to  increase  the  seats  so  as  to
accommodate the  appellants.   Seats  which  are  legitimately  due  to  the
appellants are being occupied by the candidates from in-service category.


32.   Contention was raised by learned counsel, appearing for  some  of  the
in-service candidates who got admission that they  shall  not  be  displaced
since they have already left their jobs from the  State  Government  service
or the  State  owned  undertakings  after  having  got  admission  for  P.G.
(Medical) Course.  But, going by the stand taken by MCI and on the basis  of
the decided cases of this Court, it would not be possible  to  increase  the
seats, however, candidates who are meritorious should get admission.


33.   Contention was raised that all the affected candidates were  not  made
parties to the writ  petition  and,  therefore,  without  hearing  them,  no
orders shall be passed against them thereby depriving them of  their  seats.
Learned counsel for the appellants has stated that they had  approached  the
High Court of Orissa on 13.01.2012 i.e soon after the prospectus was  issued
and the declaration of the provisional merit list took place  on  10.04.2012
subsequent to the -filing  of  the  writ  petition.   Learned  Single  Judge
rendered the judgment before the results were  declared  on  23.03.2012  and
the  Division  Bench  dismissed  the  appeal  on  09.04.2012.    The   first
counseling was  conducted  between  21.04.2012  to  23.04.2012.   Since  the
appellants had approached the court on 13.01.2012 and  the  matter  was  sub
judice before a court of law and this proceeding is only a  continuation  of
the writ petition filed by them on 13.01.2012, we are,  of  the  view,  that
the admissions given to  the  in-service  candidates  necessarily  would  be
subject to the outcome of the petitions pending before  the  court  of  law.
Therefore, in our view, non-impleadment of few of those candidates in  these
proceedings would not affect the legitimate claim raised by the  appellants.


34.   Learned counsel appearing for  the  contesting  respondents  submitted
that they are  undergoing  studies  from  May  2012  onwards  and,  at  this
distance of time, if they are displaced, that will cause  serious  injustice
to them since they have already left the  government  service/public  sector
undertakings for joining the post graduate course.  In  view  of  the  stand
taken by the Medical Council -of India that seats for post-graduate  courses
cannot be increased, we are inclined to give a direction  to  the  State  of
Odisha or their undertakings to take back  the  in-service  candidates  into
their service and permit them to serve in the  rural/tribal  areas  so  that
they can compete through the category of in-service candidates  in  the  50%
seats earmarked for them for admission to the post-graduate course.

35.   We are, therefore, inclined to allow this appeal  and  set  aside  the
judgment of the Division Bench as well as learned Single Judge  by  quashing
the proviso  to  clause  9(2)(d)  of  the  MCI  regulations  to  the  extend
indicated above as  well  as  clause  11.2  of  the  prospectus  issued  for
admission to the Post Graduate Medical Examination  2012  in  the  State  of
Odisha. The State of Odisha, the Medical Council of India and respondents  1
to 4 are directed to take urgent steps to re-arrange the merit list  and  to
fill up the seats of the direct category,  excluding  in-service  candidates
who got admission in the open category on the strength of weightage,  within
a period of one week from today and give  admission  to  the  open  category
candidates strictly on the basis of merit.
-
36.   Appeals are allowed and the judgments of the High Court are set  aside
accordingly.
                                        ………………………………..J
                                        (K.S. Radhakrishnan)






                                                            ………………………………..J.
                                        (Dipak Misra)
New Delhi,
August 3, 2012

Bar Council of India by means of this writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India has raised challenge to the vires of Sections 22-A, 22-B, 22-C, 22-D and 22-E of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (for short, ‘1987 Act’) as inserted by the Legal Services Authorities (Amendment) Act, 2002 (for short, ‘2002 Amendment Act’).The challenge is principally on the ground that Sections 22-A, 22-B, 22-C, 22-D and 22-E are arbitrary per se; violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and are contrary to the rule of law as they deny fair, unbiased and even-handed justice to all. We do emphasis that the persons who are appointed on the Permanent Lok Adalats should be person of integrity and adequate experience. Appropriate rules, inter alia in this regard, no doubt will have to be framed, if not already in place. We upheld the validity of the said Act and hope the Permanent Lok Adalats will be set up at an early date. The Lok Adalats are enacted to Primarily bring about settlement amongst the parties. The parties are normally required to be present in person and since the impugned provisions are in the interest of the litigating public, the Lok Adalats shall perform their duties and will function; even if members of the Bar choose not to appear.” we find no merit in the challenge to the impugned provisions of Chapter VI-A brought in the 1987 Act by 2002 Amendment Act. 38. We, accordingly, dismiss the writ petition with no order as to costs.

                                          REPORTABLE




                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


                            ORIGINAL JURISDICTION


                    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 666 OF 2002




Bar Council of India                             ……  Petitioner

                   Vs.

Union of India                                        ……  Respondent



                                  JUDGMENT


R.M. LODHA, J.


            Bar Council of India  by  means  of  this  writ  petition  under
Article 32 of the Constitution of India has raised challenge  to  the  vires
of  Sections  22-A,  22-B,  22-C,  22-D  and  22-E  of  the  Legal  Services
Authorities Act, 1987 (for short, ‘1987  Act’)  as  inserted  by  the  Legal
Services Authorities (Amendment)  Act,  2002  (for  short,  ‘2002  Amendment
Act’).
2.          By 2002 Amendment Act, in Section 22 of the 1987 Act, the  words
“Lok Adalat” were  substituted by “Lok Adalat or Permanent Lok  Adalat”  and
a new Chapter VI-A entitled  “Pre-litigation  Conciliation  and  Settlement”
comprising of Sections 22-A to 22-E came to be inserted.  In Section  23  of
the 1987 Act, the words “members of the Lok  Adalats”  were  substituted  by
the words “members of the Lok Adalats or the persons constituting  Permanent
Lok Adalats”.
3.          The challenge is principally on the ground that  Sections  22-A,
22-B, 22-C, 22-D and 22-E are arbitrary per se; violative of Article  14  of
the Constitution of India and are contrary to the rule of law as  they  deny
fair, unbiased and even-handed justice to all.
4.           We  have  heard  Mr.  Manoj  Goel,  learned  counsel  for   the
petitioner and Mr. T. S. Doabia, learned senior counsel  for  the  Union  of
India.  After oral arguments were over, Mr. Manoj Goel, learned counsel  for
the petitioner has also filed written submissions.  Elaborating the vice  of
arbitrariness in the impugned provisions, in the written submissions, it  is
 submitted that Section 22-C(1) read with Section 22-C(2)  provides  that  a
dispute before Permanent Lok Adalat can be raised by moving  an  application
to it unilaterally by any party  to  the  dispute  (before  the  dispute  is
brought before  any  court  for  settlement).  The  public  utility  service
provider, thus, can play  mischief  by  pre-empting  an  aggrieved  consumer
from   going   to   the   consumer  fora   or    availing   other   judicial
process
 for redressal of his grievance and enforcement  of  his  rights.  Permanent
Lok Adalats have been empowered to decide dispute  on  merits  upon  failure
between the parties to arrive at a settlement under Section  22-C(8).  While
deciding the case on merits, the Permanent Lok Adalat  is  not  required  to
follow the provisions of the Civil  Procedure  Code  or  the  Evidence  Act.
Section 22-C(8) prevents  the courts and the consumer fora  to  examine  the
deficiencies in services such as transport, postal and telegraph, supply  of
power,  light  or  water,  public  conservancy  or  sanitation,  service  in
hospital, etc. and  renders the  provisions under challenge   arbitrary  and
irrational.
5.          It has been submitted on behalf of the  petitioner  that   award
of the Permanent Lok Adalat on merits is made final and binding  and  cannot
be called in question in any forum or court of  law  under  Section  22-E(1)
and (4). No right to appeal has been provided for against the award  in  any
court of law. Since all the public utility services basically relate to  the
fundamental right to life provided under Article  21  of  the  Constitution,
any adverse decision on merits by Permanent  Lok  Adalat  would  immediately
impinge upon fundamental right of an aggrieved citizen and, therefore,  even
absence of one right of appeal makes these  provisions  unconstitutional  as
it is against the fundamental principles of fair procedure. To say  that  an
aggrieved person can approach the High Court under Articles 226/227  of  the
Constitution against awards given by the Permanent  Lok  Adalats  on  merits
and, therefore, absence of right of appeal does not  matter,  is  completely
misplaced.  The  writ  jurisdiction  under  Articles  226/227  is  extremely
limited and is no substitute of the appellate jurisdiction.
6.          An  argument  was  raised  that  though   Permanent  Lok  Adalat
supplants the civil court, consumer court or motor accident claims  tribunal
yet its mechanism and delivery of justice are not as effective as the  above
fora  as  the Permanent Lok Adalat is not required to follow  the  procedure
contemplated in the Code of Civil Procedure and the Evidence Act.   Moreover
an award given on merits by Permanent Lok Adalat has to be by  majority  and
since  Permanent  Lok  Adalat  consists  of  one  judicial  member  and  two
administrative members, there is  preponderance  of  administrative  members
which  is  against  fundamental  principles  of  justice  enshrined  in  the
Constitution.
7.          It was strenuously submitted on behalf of  the  petitioner  that
the jurisdiction conferred upon  Permanent  Lok  Adalat  can  not  oust  the
jurisdiction of the fora created under  specialized  statutes  dealing  with
the services referred to in Section 22-A(b). In this regard, the  provisions
contained in three specialized statutes,  namely,  the  Consumer  Protection
Act, 1986, The Telecom Regulatory Authority  of  India  Act,  1997  and  the
Insurance Act, 1938 were referred.  By  relying  upon  a  decision  of  this
Court in The Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke of  Bombay
and Others[1], in the written arguments  it  has  been  submitted  that  the
consumer fora as well as  specialized  courts/tribunals  under  the  Telecom
Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997 and the  Insurance  Act,  1938  have
exclusive jurisdiction as far as enforcement of rights under these  statutes
are concerned and their jurisdiction can not be taken away by Permanent  Lok
Adalat. Particularly, with reference to  the  provisions  contained  in  the
Consumer  Protection  Act,  it  is  submitted  that  compensatory   remedies
available under this law are in addition to and not  in  derogation  of  any
other law and since Permanent Lok Adalats  have  no  jurisdiction  to  grant
compensatory relief, the jurisdiction of the consumer fora  remains  intact.
 Reliance has been placed on  the  decisions  of  this  Court  in  Fair  Air
Engineers Pvt. Ltd. and another v. N.K. Modi[2],  Skypak  Couriers  Ltd.  v.
Tata Chemicals Ltd.[3], Trans Mediterranean  Airways  v.  Universal  Exports
and another[4] and National Seeds  Corporation  Limited  v.  M.  Madhusudhan
Reddy and another[5].  National  Seeds  Corporation  Limited5      was  also
pressed into service in support of the submission that  consumer  protection
laws were enacted pursuant to the solemn international  obligations  of  our
country  and,  therefore,  the  Permanent  Lok  Adalats  cannot   oust   the
jurisdiction  of  the  consumer  courts.  It  is  also  submitted  that  the
jurisdiction of the consumer courts is  protected  unless  it  is  expressly
barred even in cases where some disputes can  be  adjudicated  in  different
fora. Two decisions  of  this  Court  in  this  regard,  namely,  Secretary,
Thirumurugan Cooperative Agricultural Credit Society v.  M.  Lalitha  (Dead)
through LRs. and Others[6]  and  Kishore Lal v. Chairman,  Employees’  State
Insurance Corpn.[7]  have been relied upon.
8.          Mr. T.S. Doabia, learned senior counsel for the Union of  India,
on the other hand, submitted that the issues raised  in  the  writ  petition
have already been decided by this Court in S.N. Pandey  v.  Union  of  India
(Writ Petition (Civil) No. 543/2002; decided on  28.10.2002)  and  the  writ
petition deserves to be dismissed on this ground alone. He   submitted  that
the impugned provisions are  in conformity with the  objectives  of  Article
39A and intended to provide an affordable, speedy  and  efficient  mechanism
to secure justice.
9.          As regards decision of this Court in S.N. Pandey (supra),    the
counsel for the petitioner in rejoinder would submit that the  dismissal  of
the earlier writ  petition  was  in  limine  and  would  not  be  a  binding
precedent. The  decisions of this Court in B. Prabhakar Rao  and  others  v.
State of Andhra Pradesh and others[8], Union of India and others  v.  Jaipal
Singh[9]  were  relied  upon.   Learned  counsel  for  the  petitioner  also
submitted that in the earlier writ  petition,  there  was  no  law  declared
under Article 141 of the  Constitution  since  points   now  raised  in  the
present writ petition were neither argued nor  discussed.  In  this  regard,
the learned counsel referred to the two   decisions  of  this  Court  in  B.
Shama Rao v. Union Territory of Pondicherry[10],  Municipal  Corporation  of
Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur[11] and State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh[12] .
10.         Article  39-A  came  to  be  inserted  in  the  Constitution  by
Constitution (42nd Amendment)  Act,  1976  with  effect  from  3.1.1977.  It
enjoins upon  the State to  secure that the operation of  the  legal  system
promotes justice on the basis of equal  opportunity  and  in  particular  to
provide free legal aid by suitable legislation or schemes or  in  any  other
way and to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied  to
any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities.  Equal  justice  to
all and  free legal aid  are hallmark of Article  39-A.  Pursuant  to  these
objectives, the 1987 Act was enacted by the Parliament to  constitute  legal
services authorities to provide free and competent  legal  services  to  the
weaker sections of the society to ensure  that  opportunities  for  securing
justice are not denied to  any  citizen  by  reason  of  economic  or  other
disabilities, and to organize Lok Adalats to secure that  the  operation  of
the legal system promotes justice on  a  basis  of  equal  opportunity.  The
statement of objects and reasons that led to enactment of 1987 Act reads  as
follows :
        “Article 39-A of the Constitution  provides  that  the  State  shall
        secure that the operation of the legal system  promotes  justice  on
        the basis of equal opportunity, and shall,  in  particular,  provide
        free legal aid, by suitable legislation or schemes or in  any  other
        way, to ensure that  opportunities  for  securing  justice  are  not
        denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities.


        2.  With the object of providing free legal aid, Government had,  by
        Resolution dated the 26th September, 1980 appointed  the  “Committee
        for Implementing Legal Aid Schemes” (CILAS) under  the  Chairmanship
        of Mr. Justice P.N.  Bhagwati  (as  he  then  was)  to  monitor  and
        implement legal aid programmes on a uniform basis in all the  States
        and Union territories. CILAS evolved a model scheme  for  legal  Aid
        programme applicable throughout the country by which  several  legal
        aid and advice boards have been set  up  in  the  States  and  Union
        territories. CILAS is funded  wholly  by  grants  from  the  Central
        Government.  The  Government  is  accordingly  concerned  with   the
        programme  of  legal  aid  as  it  is  the   implementation   of   a
        constitutional mandate. But on a review of the working of the  CILAS
        certain deficiencies have come to the fore. It is,  therefore,  felt
        that it will be desirable  to  constitute  statutory  legal  service
        authorities at the National, State and  District  levels  so  as  to
        provide for the effective monitoring of legal  aid  programmes.  The
        Bill provides for the composition of such authorities  and  for  the
        funding of these authorities by means of  grants  from  the  Central
        Government and the State Governments.  Power has been also given  to
        the National Committee and the State Committees   to  supervise  the
        effective implementation of legal aid schemes.


        3.  For some time now, Lok Adalats are being constituted at  various
        places in the country for the disposal, in a summary way and through
        the process of arbitration and settlement between the parties, of  a
        large number of cases  expeditiously  and  with  lesser  costs.  The
        institution of Lok Adalats is at present functioning as a  voluntary
        and conciliatory  agency  without  any  statutory  backing  for  its
        decisions. It has proved to be  very  popular  in  providing  for  a
        speedier system of administration of justice. In view of its growing
        popularity, there has  been  a  demand  for  providing  a  statutory
        backing to this institution and the awards given by Lok Adalats.  It
        is felt that such a statutory support  would  not  only  reduce  the
        burden of arrears of work in regular Courts,  but  would  also  take
        justice to the door-steps of the poor and the needy and make justice
        quicker and less expensive.”


11.         For about a decade and half, the operation of the 1987  Act  was
closely watched.  It was felt that the system of  Lok  Adalats  provided  in
the 1987 Act sometimes results in  delaying   the  dispensation  of  justice
where the parties do not arrive at  any  compromise  or  settlement  in  Lok
Adalat and the case is  returned to the court of  law  or  the  parties  are
advised to pursue appropriate  remedy  for  redressal  of  their  grievance.
Accordingly, amendment in the 1987 Act was felt  by  the  Parliament  to  be
necessary. The statement of objects and reasons of the 2002  Amendment  Act,
inter alia, reads as under:
        “The Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 was enacted to  constitute
        legal  services  authorities  for  providing  and  competent   legal
        services to the weaker  sections  of  the  society  to  ensure  that
        opportunities for securing justice were not denied to any citizen by
        reason of economic or other disabilities and to organize Lok Adalats
        to ensure that the operation of the legal system promoted justice on
        a basis of equal opportunity.  The system of Lok Adalat, which is an
        innovative mechanism for alternate dispute  resolution,  has  proved
        effective for resolving disputes in a spirit of conciliation outside
        the Court.


        2.    However,  the  major  drawback  in  the  existing  scheme   of
        organisation of the Lok Adalats under Chapter VI of the said Act  is
        that the system of Lok Adalats is  mainly  based  on  compromise  or
        settlement between the parties. If the parties do not arrive at  any
        compromise or settlement, the case is either returned to  the  Court
        of law or the parties are advised to seek remedy in a Court of  law.
        This causes unnecessary delay in the dispensation of justice. If Lok
        Adalats are given power to  decide  the  cases  on  merits  in  case
        parties fails to  arrive  at  any  compromise  or  settlement,  this
        problem can be tackled to a great extent. Further, the  cases  which
        arise in relation to  public  utility  services  such  as  Mahanagar
        Telephone Nigam Limited,  Delhi  Vidyut  Board,  etc.,  need  to  be
        settled urgently so that  people get justice without delay  even  at
        pre-litigation stage and thus most of the petty  cases  which  ought
        not to go in the  regular  Courts  would  be  settled  at  the  pre-
        litigation stage itself which would result in reducing the  workload
        of the regular Courts to a great extent. It is, therefore,  proposed
        to amend the Legal Service Authorities Act, 1987 to set up Permanent
        Lok Adalats for providing compulsory  pre-litigative  mechanism  for
        conciliation and settlement of  cases  relating  to  public  utility
        services.






        3.  The salient features of proposed legislation are as follows :-


             (i) to provide for the establishment of Permanent Lok  Adalats
        which shall consists (sic) of a  Chairman  who  is  or  has  been  a
        District Judge or Additional District Judge  or  has  held  judicial
        officer (sic)  higher in rank than that of the  District  Judge  and
        two other persons  having  adequate  experience  in  public  utility
        services;


             (ii)      the Permanent Lok Adalat shall exercise jurisdiction
        in respect of one or more public utility services such as  transport
        services of passengers of goods by  air,  road  and  water,  postal,
        telegraph or telephone services, supply of power, light or water  to
        the public by any establishment, public conservancy  or  sanitation,
        services in hospitals or dispensaries, and insurance services;


             (iii)     the pecuniary  jurisdiction  of  the  Permanent  Lok
        Adalat shall be  up  to  Rupees  Ten  Lakhs.  However,  the  Central
        Government may increase the said pecuniary jurisdiction from time to
        time. It shall  have  no  jurisdiction  in  respect  of  any  matter
        relating to an offence not compoundable under any law;


             (iv)      it also provides that before the dispute is  brought
        before any Court, any party to the dispute may make  an  application
        to the Permanent Lok Adalat for settlement of the dispute;


             (v) where it appears to the Permanent Lok  Adalat  that  there
        exist elements of a settlement,  which  may  be  acceptable  to  the
        parties, it shall formulate the terms of a possible  settlement  and
        submit them to the parties for their observations and  in  case  the
        parties reach an agreement, the Permanent Lok Adalat shall  pass  an
        award in terms thereof. In case parties to the dispute fail to reach
        an agreement, the Permanent Lok Adalat shall decide the  dispute  on
        merits; and


             (vi)      every award made by the Permanent Lok  Adalat  shall
        be final and binding on all the parties thereto and shall  be  by  a
        majority of the persons constituting the Permanent Lok Adalat.”


12.         With the above objectives, 2002 Amendment  Act  was  enacted  by
the Parliament and  thereby  Chapter  VI-A  (Sections  22-A  to  22-E)   was
brought in with few other consequential amendments elsewhere.
13.         The title of Chapter VI-A is  “Pre-litigation  Conciliation  and
Settlement”. Section 22-A(a)  defines  “Permanent  Lok  Adalat”  to  mean  a
Permanent Lok Adalat established under  sub-section  (1)  of  Section  22-B.
“Public utility service”  is  defined  in  Section  22-A(b).  It  means  (i)
transport service for the carriage of passengers or goods by  air,  road  or
water; or (ii) postal, telegraph or telephone service; or  (iii)  supply  of
power, light or water to the public by any establishment; or (iv) system  of
public conservancy or sanitation; or (v) service in hospital or  dispensary;
or  (vi)  insurance  service.  If  the  Central  Government  or  the   State
Government declares in the public interest,  any  service  to  be  a  public
utility  service  for  the  purposes  of  Chapter  VI-A,  such  service   on
declaration is also included in the definition of ‘public  utility  service’
under Section 22-A(b).
14.         The establishment of Permanent Lok Adalat is done under  Section
22-B. The Central Authority and every State Authority, as the case  may  be,
have been mandated to establish Permanent Lok Adalats  at  such  places  and
for exercising such jurisdiction in respect of one or  more  public  utility
services and  for  such  areas  as  may  be  notified.  The  composition  of
Permanent Lok Adalat is provided in Section  22-B  (2).  Accordingly,  every
Permanent Lok Adalat shall consist of (a) a person who  is  or  has  been  a
District Judge or Additional District Judge  or  has  held  judicial  office
higher in rank than that of a District  Judge  and  (b)  two  other  persons
having adequate experience in public utility service to be nominated by  the
Central Government or by the State Government, as the case  may  be  on  the
recommendation of the Central Authority or by the State  Authority  (as  the
case  may  be).  The  judicial  officer,  namely,  the  District  Judge   or
Additional District Judge or the Judicial Officer higher in rank  than  that
of a District Judge shall be the Chairman of the Permanent Lok Adalat.
15.         Section 22-C provides for  the  procedure  for  raising  dispute
before the Permanent Lok Adalat. Sub-section (1) provides that any party  to
a dispute may make an application  to  the  Permanent  Lok  Adalat  for  the
settlement of dispute before  the  dispute  is  brought  before  any  court.
However, Permanent Lok Adalat has no jurisdiction to deal  with  any  matter
relating to an offence not compoundable under any law.  The  second  proviso
puts a cap on the pecuniary jurisdiction inasmuch as it  provides  that  the
Permanent Lok Adalat shall not have  jurisdiction  in  a  matter  where  the
value of the property in  dispute  exceeds  ten  lakh  rupees.  The  Central
Government,  however,  may  increase  the  limit  of  ten  lakh  rupees   in
consultation with the Central Authority by notification.
16.         Sub-section (2) of Section 22-C puts an embargo on  the  parties
to a dispute after an application has been made by any  one  of  them  under
sub-section (1) in invoking jurisdiction of any court in the same dispute.
16.1.       Sub-section (3) of Section 22-C provides for  the  procedure  to
be followed by the Permanent Lok Adalat once an application is  made  before
it by any party to a dispute under sub-section (1). This procedure  includes
filing of a written statement by  each  party  to  the  application  stating
therein the facts and nature of the dispute and highlighting the  points  or
issues in such dispute and the documents and other evidence  in  support  of
their respective written statement and exchange  of  copy  of  such  written
statement together with copy of documents/other evidence. The Permanent  Lok
Adalat  may  require  any  party  to  the  application  to  file  additional
statement before it at  any  stage  of  the  conciliation  proceedings.  Any
document or statement received by Permanent Lok Adalat  from  any  party  to
the application is given to the other party.  On  completion  of  the  above
procedure, the Permanent Lok Adalat proceeds with  conciliation  proceedings
between the parties to the application under sub-section (4) of Section  22-
C. During conduct of the conciliation proceedings under sub-section  (4)  of
Section 22-C, the Permanent Lok Adalat is obliged to  assist the parties  in
their attempt to  reach  an  amicable  settlement  of  the  dispute   in  an
independent and impartial manner. Every party to the application has a  duty
to cooperate in good faith with the Permanent Lok Adalat in conciliation  of
the dispute relating to the application and to comply with the direction  of
the Permanent Lok Adalat to produce evidence  and  other  related  documents
before it.
16.2.       On satisfaction that there is likelihood of  settlement  in  the
proceedings, the Permanent Lok Adalat may formulate the  terms  of  possible
settlement of the dispute and give to the  parties  for  their  observations
and where the parties reach  at  an  agreement  on  the  settlement  of  the
dispute, they shall sign the settlement/agreement and Permanent  Lok  Adalat
then passes an award in terms thereof and furnishes a copy of  the  same  to
each of the parties concerned.
17.          Upto  the  above  pre-litigation  conciliation  and  settlement
procedure, there is no  problem  or  issue.   The  petitioner  is  seriously
aggrieved by the provision contained in Section 22-C(8) which provides  that
where the parties fail to reach at an agreement under sub-section (7),   the
Permanent Lok Adalat shall, if the dispute does not relate to  any  offence,
decide the dispute. This provision followed by Section  22-D  which,  inter-
alia,   provides that while deciding a dispute on merit  the  Permanent  Lok
Adalat shall not be bound by the Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  1908  and  the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and  Section 22-E which accords  finality  to  the
award of Permanent Lok Adalat under sub-section (1) and the  provision  made
in sub-section (4) that every award made by the Permanent Lok  Adalat  shall
be final and hence shall not be called in question  in  any  original  suit,
application or execution proceedings form mainly bone of  contention.    Are
these provisions violative of Article 14 of the Constitution  of  India  and
contrary to rule  of  law,  fairness  and  even-  handed  justice?  are  the
questions to be considered.
18.         Chapter VI-A inserted by the 2002 Amendment Act in 1987 Act,  as
its title suggests, provides for pre-litigation conciliation and  settlement
procedure. The disputes relating to public utility  service  like  transport
service for carriage of passengers  or  goods  by  air,  road  or  water  or
postal, telegraph or telephone service or supply of power,  light  or  water
or public conservancy  system  or  sanitation  or  service  in  hospital  or
dispensary or insurance service, etc., in the very scheme of things  deserve
to be settled expeditiously.  Prolonged dispute  in  respect  of  the  above
matters between the service provider and an aggrieved party  may  result  in
irretrievable  damage  to  either  party  to  the  dispute.    Today,   with
increasing number of cases, the judicial courts  are not able to  cope  with
the heavy burden of inflow of cases and the matters coming before them.  The
disputes in relation to public utility service need  urgent  attention  with
focus on their  resolution at threshold by conciliation and  settlement  and
if for any reason such effort fails, then to have such disputes  adjudicated
through an appropriate mechanism as early as may  be  possible.  With  large
population in the country and many public utility  services  being  provided
by various service providers, the disputes in  relation  to  these  services
are not infrequent between  the  service  providers  and  common  man.  Slow
motion procedures in the judicial courts are not conducive for  adjudication
of disputes relating to public utility service.
19.         The statement of objects  and  reasons  itself  spells  out  the
salient features of Chapter VI-A. By bringing in this  law,  the  litigation
concerning public utility service is sought to  be  nipped  in  the  bud  by
first affording the parties  to  such   dispute  an  opportunity  to  settle
their dispute through the endeavours of the  Permanent  Lok  Adalat  and  if
such effort fails then to have the dispute between the  parties  adjudicated
through the decision of the Permanent Lok Adalat. The mechanism provided  in
Chapter VI-A enables a  party  to  a  dispute  relating  to  public  utility
service to approach the Permanent Lok Adalat for the settlement  of  dispute
before the dispute is brought before any court.
20.          Parliament  can  definitely  set   up   effective   alternative
institutional mechanisms or make arrangements which may be more  efficacious
than  the  ordinary  mechanism  of  adjudication  of  disputes  through  the
judicial courts.   Such  institutional  mechanisms  or  arrangements  by  no
stretch of imagination can be said to be contrary to  constitutional  scheme
or against the rule of law. The establishment of Permanent Lok  Adalats  and
conferring them jurisdiction upto a specific pecuniary limit in  respect  of
one or more public utility services as defined  in  Section  22-A(b)  before
the dispute is brought before any court by any party to the dispute  is  not
anathema to the rule of law.  Instead of ordinary  civil  courts,  if  other
institutional mechanisms  are  set  up  or  arrangements  are  made  by  the
Parliament with an adjudicatory  power,  in  our  view,  such  institutional
mechanisms or arrangements cannot be faulted on the ground of  arbitrariness
or irrationality.
21.         The Permanent Lok Adalats under the  1987  Act  (as  amended  by
2002 Amendment Act) are in  addition  to  and  not  in  derogation  of  Fora
provided under various statutes.  This position is accepted by  the  Central
Government in their counter affidavit.
22.         It is necessary to bear in mind that the  disputes  relating  to
public utility services have been entrusted to Permanent  Lok  Adalats  only
if the process of conciliation and settlement  fails.  The  emphasis  is  on
settlement  in  respect  of  disputes  concerning  public  utility  services
through the medium of Permanent Lok Adalat.  It is for this reason that sub-
section (1) of Section 22-C states in no unambiguous terms  that  any  party
to a dispute may before the dispute is brought  before  any  court  make  an
application to the Permanent Lok Adalat for  settlement  of  dispute.  Thus,
settlement of dispute between the  parties  in  matters  of  public  utility
services is the main theme.   However,  where  despite  the  endeavours  and
efforts of the Permanent Lok Adalat  the settlement between the  parties  is
not through and the parties are required to have  their  dispute  determined
and adjudicated, to avoid delay in adjudication  of   disputes  relating  to
public utility services, the Parliament has intervened and  conferred  power
of adjudication upon the Permanent Lok Adalat.   Can the power conferred  on
Permanent Lok Adalats  to  adjudicate  the  disputes  between   the  parties
concerning public utility service upto a specific pecuniary limit,  if  they
 do not relate to any offence, as provided under Section  22-C(8),  be  said
to be  unconstitutional and irrational? We think  not.  It  is  settled  law
that an authority empowered to adjudicate the disputes between  the  parties
and act as a tribunal may not necessarily have  all  the  trappings  of  the
court. What is essential is that it  must  be  a  creature  of  statute  and
should adjudicate the dispute between the parties  before  it  after  giving
reasonable opportunity to them consistent with the principles of  fair  play
and natural justice. It is not a constitutional right of any person to  have
the dispute adjudicated by means of a court  only.  Chapter  VI-A  has  been
enacted  to  provide   for   an   institutional   mechanism,   through   the
establishment  of  Permanent  Lok  Adalats  for   settlement   of   disputes
concerning public utility service before the matter is brought to the  court
and in the event  of  failure  to  reach  any  settlement,   empowering  the
Permanent Lok Adalat to adjudicate such dispute if it  does  not  relate  to
any offence.
23.         The difference between “courts” and “tribunals” has come up  for
consideration before this Court on  more  than  one  occasion.  Almost  five
decades back, this Court in M/s. Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam  Sundar
Jhunjhunwala and others[13] stated that by  “courts”  the  courts  of  civil
judicature is  meant  and  by  “tribunals”  those  bodies  of  men  who  are
appointed to decide controversies arising under certain  special  laws.  All
tribunals are not courts though all courts are  tribunals.  It  was  further
observed that in the exercise  of  judicial  power,  a  clear  division  was
noticeable between  courts  and  tribunals,  particularly,  certain  special
matters go before tribunals,  and  the  residue  goes  before  the  ordinary
Courts of Civil Judicature. Their procedures may differ, but  the  functions
are  not  essentially   different.    Both    courts   and   tribunals   act
“judicially”.
24.         In Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P. N. Sharma &  Anr.[14],
the Constitution Bench of this Court observed that under  our  Constitution,
the judicial  functions  and  powers  of  the  State  have  been   primarily
conferred on the ordinary courts; the Constitution  recognises  a  hierarchy
of courts and  they  are  normally  entrusted  to  adjudicate  all  disputes
between citizens and citizens as  well  as  between  the  citizens  and  the
State. The powers  which  the  courts  exercise  are  judicial  powers,  the
functions they discharge are  judicial  functions  and  the  decisions  they
reach and pronounce are judicial decisions.  The  tribunals  decide  special
matters entrusted to them  for  their  decision.  The  procedure  which  the
tribunals have to follow may not always be so strictly  prescribed  but  the
approach adopted by both the  courts  and  tribunals  is  substantially  the
same; it is State’s inherent judicial function which they discharge.
25.         In Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu & Ors.[15], it has  been  stated
by this Court that where the authority is called upon to  decide  a  lis  on
the rights and  obligations  of  the  parties,   there  is  an  exercise  of
judicial power.  The  authority is called a tribunal if  it  does  not  have
all the trappings of a court.
26.         In a comparatively recent decision  in  Union  of  India  v.  R.
Gandhi, President, Madras Bar Association[16] (Civil  Appeal   No.  3067  of
2004); decided on May 11, 2010, a  Constitution  Bench  of  this  Court  was
concerned with the matters wherein the constitutional validity of Parts  I-B
and I-C of the Companies Act, 1956 inserted by Companies (Second  Amendment)
Act, 2002 providing for the Constitution of National  Company  Law  Tribunal
and National Company Law Appellate Tribunal was under challenge.  The  Court
while examining the difference  between  the  courts  and  tribunals,  inter
alia, referred to earlier decisions of this Court, some of which  have  been
noted above. The Court summarized the legal position as follows:

      “(a)  A legislature can enact  a  law  transferring  the  jurisdiction
      exercised by courts in regard to any  specified  subject  (other  than
      those which  are  vested  in  courts  by  express  provisions  of  the
      Constitution) to any tribunal.


      (b)   All courts are tribunals. Any tribunal  to  which  any  existing
      jurisdiction of courts  is  transferred  should  also  be  a  Judicial
      Tribunal. This means  that  such  Tribunal  should  have  as  members,
      persons of a rank, capacity and status as nearly as possible equal  to
      the rank, status and capacity of the court which was till then dealing
      with such matters and the members of  the  Tribunal  should  have  the
      independence  and  security  of  tenure   associated   with   Judicial
      Tribunals.


      (c)   Whenever there is need for ‘Tribunals’, there is no  presumption
      that there should be technical members  in  the  Tribunals.  When  any
      jurisdiction is shifted from courts to Tribunals,  on  the  ground  of
      pendency and delay in courts, and the jurisdiction so transferred does
      not involve any technical aspects requiring the assistance of experts,
      the Tribunals should normally have only judicial members.  Only  where
      the exercise of  jurisdiction  involves  inquiry  and  decisions  into
      technical or special aspects, where presence of technical members will
      be useful and necessary,  Tribunals  should  have  technical  members.
      Indiscriminate appointment of technical members in all tribunals  will
      dilute and adversely affect the independence of the Judiciary.


      (d)   The Legislature can re-organize the  jurisdictions  of  Judicial
      Tribunals. For example, it can provide that a  specified  category  of
      cases tried by a higher court can be tried by a lower  court  or  vice
      versa (A standard example is the variation of pecuniary limits of  the
      courts). Similarly while constituting Tribunals, the  Legislature  can
      prescribe the qualifications/eligibility criteria. The same is however
      subject to Judicial Review. If  the  court  in  exercise  of  judicial
      review is of the view that such tribunalisation would adversely affect
      the independence of the judiciary or the standards of  the  judiciary,
      the court may interfere to preserve the independence and standards  of
      the judiciary. Such an  exercise  will  be  part  of  the  checks  and
      balances measures to maintain the separation of powers and to  prevent
      any  encroachment,  intentional  or  unintentional,  by   either   the
      legislature or by the executive.”


27.         The  competence  of  the  Parliament  to  make  a  law  creating
tribunals to deal with disputes arising under or relating  to  a  particular
statute or statutes or particular disputes is, thus, beyond question.
28.         Sine qua non  of  taking  cognizance  of  a  dispute  concerning
public utility service by the Permanent Lok Adalat is that neither party  to
a dispute has  approached  the  civil  court.  There  is  no  merit  in  the
submission of the petitioner that the  service  provider  may  pre-empt  the
consideration of a dispute by a court or a forum under  special  statute  by
approaching the Permanent Lok Adalat established under Chapter VI-A  of  the
1987 Act and, thus, depriving the user or consumer of  such  public  utility
service of an opportunity to have the dispute adjudicated by a  civil  court
or  a  forum  created  under  special  statute.  In  the  first  place,  the
jurisdiction of fora created under the Special Statutes has not  been  taken
away in any manner whatsoever by the impugned provisions.  As  noted  above,
the Permanent Lok Adalats are in addition to and not in derogation  of  fora
provided under Special Statutes.  Secondly, not a single instance  has  been
cited where a provider of service of public utility in a  dispute  with  its
user has approached the Permanent  Lok  Adalat  first.   The  submission  is
unfounded and misplaced.
29.         The alternative institutional mechanism  in  Chapter  VI-A  with
regard to the disputes concerning public  utility  service  is  intended  to
provide an affordable, speedy and efficient mechanism   to  secure  justice.
By not making applicable  the Code of  Civil  Procedure  and  the  statutory
provisions of the Indian  Evidence  Act,  there  is  no  compromise  on  the
quality of determination of dispute since the Permanent Lok  Adalat  has  to
be objective,  decide the dispute with fairness and  follow  the  principles
of natural justice.  Sense of justice  and  equity  continue  to  guide  the
Permanent Lok Adalat while conducting conciliation proceedings or  when  the
conciliation proceedings fail, in deciding a dispute on merit.
30.         Insofar as composition of Permanent  Lok  Adalat  is  concerned,
Section 22-B(2) provides that every Permanent Lok Adalat shall consist of  a
person who is or has been a District Judge or Additional District  Judge  or
has held judicial office higher in rank than that of a  District  Judge  and
two other persons having adequate experience in public  utility  service  to
be nominated by the Central Government or the State Government, as the  case
may be, on  the  recommendation  of  the  Central  Authority  or  the  State
Authority, as the case may be. Of the three members,  the  judicial  officer
is the Chairman of the Permanent Lok Adalat.  The  Central  Authority  under
Section 3 of the 1987 Act, inter alia, consists  of  the  Chief  Justice  of
India, a serving or retired Judge of the Supreme Court to  be  nominated  by
the President in consultation with the Chief Justice of India and the  other
members to be nominated by the Central Government in consultation  with  the
Chief Justice of India. The Chief Justice of India  is  the  Patron-in-Chief
of the Central Authority while a serving or retired  Judge  of  the  Supreme
Court is the  Executive  Chairman.  Similarly,  the  State  Authority  under
Section 6 consists of the Chief Justice of the  High  Court,  a  serving  or
retired Judge of  the  High  Court  to  be  nominated  by  the  Governor  in
consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court  and  such  number  of
other members to be nominated by the State Government in  consultation  with
the Chief Justice of the High Court. It would be, thus, seen  that  the  two
members other than the judicial officer of a Permanent  Lok  Adalat  can  be
appointed by the Central Government or the State  Government,  as  the  case
may be, on  the  recommendation  of  the  Central  Authority  or  the  State
Authority  only.   The  composition  of  Central  Authority  and  the  State
Authority has been noted above.  In the above view, it  is  misconceived  to
say that the judiciary has  been kept out in the appointment of  members  of
the Permanent Lok Adalats. The independence of Permanent  Lok  Adalats  does
not seem to have been compromised at all as even the  non-judicial   members
of every Permanent Lok Adalat have to be appointed  on  the   recommendation
of a high powered Central or State Authority headed by  none other than  the
Chief Justice of India or a serving or retired Judge of  the  Supreme  Court
where the nomination is made by the  Central  Government  or  by  the  Chief
Justice of the State High Court or a serving or retired Judge  of  the  High
Court where the nomination is made by the State Government.
31.         It is not unusual to have the tribunals comprising  of  judicial
as well as non-judicial members.  The  whole  idea  of  having  non-judicial
members in a tribunal like Permanent Lok Adalat is to  make  sure  that  the
legal technicalities do not get paramountcy in conciliation or  adjudicatory
proceedings. The fact that a Permanent Lok Adalat established under  Section
22-B comprises  of  one  judicial  officer  and  two  other  persons  having
adequate experience in public utility service does not show  any  abhorrence
to the rule of law nor such composition becomes violative of  principles  of
fairness  and  justice  or  is  contrary  to  Articles  14  and  21  of  the
Constitution of India.
32.         It is true that the award  made  by  the  Permanent  Lok  Adalat
under 1987 Act has to  be  by  majority  of  the  persons  constituting  the
Permanent Lok Adalat.  In a given case, it may be that the two  non-judicial
members disagree with the judicial member but that does not mean  that  such
majority decision lacks in  fairness or sense of justice.
33.         There is no  inherent  right  of  appeal.  Appeal  is  always  a
creature of statute and if no appeal is provided to an aggrieved party in  a
particular  statute,  that  by  itself   may   not   render   that   statute
unconstitutional.  Section 22-E(1)  makes every award of the  Permanent  Lok
Adalat under 1987 Act either on merit or in terms  of  a  settlement   final
and binding on all the parties thereto and on persons claiming  under  them.
No appeal is provided from the award passed by the Permanent Lok Adalat  but
that,  in  our  opinion,   does   not   render   the   impugned   provisions
unconstitutional. In the  first  place,  having  regard  to  the  nature  of
dispute upto a specific pecuniary limit relating to public  utility  service
and resolution of such dispute by the procedure provided in Section  22-C(1)
to 22-C(8), it is important that such dispute is brought to an  end  at  the
earliest  and  is  not  prolonged   unnecessarily.    Secondly,   and   more
importantly,  if  at all a  party to the dispute  has  a  grievance  against
the award of Permanent Lok Adalat he can  always  approach  the  High  Court
under its supervisory and extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226  and
227 of the Constitution of India. There is no merit  in  the  submission  of
the learned counsel for the petitioner that in that situation the burden  of
litigation would be brought back on the  High  Courts  after  the  award  is
passed by the Permanent Lok Adalat on merits.
34.         The challenge to the validity of the  impugned  provisions  came
up before this Court in S.N. Pandey (supra).  A  three-Judge Bench  of  this
Court was not persuaded by the challenge and held as under:

      “We have gone  through  the  provisions  of  the  said  Chapter  which
      contemplated the setting up of permanent  Lok  Adalats,  for  deciding
      disputes in which public  utility  services  is  one  of  the  matters
      involved. It is quite obvious that the effort of the legislature is to
      decrease the work load in  the  Courts  by  resorting  to  alternative
      disputes resolution. Lok Adalat is a mode of dispute resolution  which
      has been in vogue since over two decades.  Hundreds  of  thousands  of
      cases have been settled through this mechanism and is  undisputedly  a
      fast means of dispensation of justice. The litigation is brought to  a
      quick end with no further appeals or anguish  to  the  litigants.  The
      constitution of the permanent Lok Adalats  mechanism  contemplate  the
      judicial officer or a retired judicial officer being  there  alongwith
      other  persons  having  adequate  experience  in  the  public  utility
      services.


      We do not find any constitutional infirmity in the  said  legislation.
      The act ensures  that  justice  will  be  available  to  the  litigant
      speedily and impartially. We do emphasis  that  the  persons  who  are
      appointed on the Permanent Lok Adalats should be person  of  integrity
      and adequate experience. Appropriate rules, inter alia in this regard,
      no doubt will have to be framed, if not already in place.
      We upheld the validity of the said Act  and  hope  the  Permanent  Lok
      Adalats will be set up at an early date. The Lok Adalats  are  enacted
      to Primarily bring about settlement amongst the parties.  The  parties
      are normally required to be present in person and since  the  impugned
      provisions are in the interest  of  the  litigating  public,  the  Lok
      Adalats shall perform their duties and will function; even if  members
      of the Bar choose not to appear.”




35.         Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that  the  disposal
of the  writ petition filed by S.N. Pandey was   in  limine  and  the  order
passed therein cannot be construed as  a  binding  precedent.  It  was  also
submitted that the said decision does not declare any law under Article  141
of the Constitution since points now raised  in  the  present  matter,  were
neither argued nor discussed.
36.         We are not persuaded by the submission of  the  learned  counsel
for the petitioner. Although the disposal of writ petition  in  S.N.  Pandey
was in limine and the order is brief but the court has disposed of the  same
on merits. In B. Prabhakar Rao8 , O. Chinnappa Reddy  ,J.   did  observe  in
para 22 that the dismissal in limine of a  writ  petition  cannot   possibly
bar the subsequent writ petitions but at the  same  time  he  also  observed
that such a dismissal in limine may inhibit the discretion of the Court.  V.
Khalid, J. in  his  supplementing  judgment  in  para  27(6)  exposited  the
position that normally this Court would be disinclined to  entertain  or  to
hear petitions raising identical points again where on an earlier  occasion,
the matter was heard and dismissed. Not that this Court had no  jurisdiction
to entertain such  matters,  but  would  normally  exercise  its  discretion
against it. We are in complete agreement with the above view of  V.  Khalid,
J.  It is against public policy and  well  defined  principles  of  judicial
discretion to entertain or hear petitions relating to  same  subject  matter
where the matter was heard   and dismissed on an earlier occasion.
37.         Independent of the view of this Court in S.N. Pandey,   for  the
reasons that we have indicated above, we find no merit in the  challenge  to
the impugned provisions of Chapter VI-A brought in the  1987  Act  by   2002
Amendment Act.
38.         We, accordingly, dismiss the writ petition with no order  as  to
costs.


                                                        …………………….. J.
                                                                (R.M. Lodha)



                                          ………………………J.
                                                          (Anil  R.  Dave)


NEW DELHI.
AUGUST 3, 2012.
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[1]     (1976)  (1) SCC 496
[2]     (1996) 6 SCC 385
[3]     (2000) 5 SCC 294
[4]     (2011) 10 SCC 316
[5]     (2012) 2 SCC 506
[6]     (2004) 1 SCC 305
[7]     (2007) 4 SCC 579
[8]     1985 (Supp) SCC 432
[9]     (2004) 1 SCC 121
[10]    AIR 1967 SC 1480
[11]    (1989) 1 SCC 101
[12]    (1999) 6 SCC 172
[13]   1962 (2) SCR 339
[14]    (1965) 2 SCR 366
[15]    1992 Supp (2) SCC 651
[16]   (2010) 11 SCC 1

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