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since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

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Thursday, July 12, 2012

On the point of ‘burglar proof safe’, the say of the complainant is that at the time of obtaining the policy during 1995 he had enclosed along with the proposal form the design and plan of the strong room/safe, which stated that the vault would be embedded into the wall and would be made of a steel structure and only after their approval that the design was adequate to meet the safety requirement, he had got the same fabricated on the spot, which was further inspected by the representative of the opposite party-Insurance Company before accepting the proposal. It is only thereafter that the policy was issued and has been renewed from year to year. We quite agree with the learned counsel for the complainant that it is too late in the day for the opposite party-Insurance Company to now say that the safe was not ‘burglar proof’ having renewed the policy for a period of five years. The denial by the opposite party-Insurance Company that no such approval to the design or inspection of the fault/strong room was ever carried out by their representative would not cut much ice for the simple reason that in the absence of any schedule/design having been given to the complainant to suit their safety requirement, the objection cannot be treated as tenable or valid. -“Insurance Companies in genuine and bonafide claims of insured should not adopt the attitude of avoiding payments on one pretext or the other. This attitude puts a serious question mark on their credibility and trustworthiness. By adopting honest approach and attitude the insurance companies would save enormous litigation costs.” This observation of the Hon’ble Apex is fully applicable to the facts of the present case for the simple reason that if the opposite party-Insurance Company was not satisfied with the report of their surveyor, they ought to have sought further clarification from the surveyor on the points of disagreement and even thereafter if they were not satisfied, they ought to have referred the matter to a second surveyor before finally arriving at a conclusion as to whether or not to repudiate the claim. We further notice that the opposite party-Insurance Company has taken more than eight months to consider the report of the surveyor and only when the complainant pursued his case relentlessly that they have finally repudiated the claim. This was not expected of a service provider like the opposite party-Insurance Company and, therefore, they are liable for the deficiency in service.


NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION

NEW DELHI



ORIGINAL PETITION NO. 5 OF 2003

Champaklal Hansraj Shah
Sole Proprietor of RUSHABH JEWELLERS
2, Super Markets, Monghibhai Road
Vile Parle (East)
Mumbai-400057                                          .....  Complainant (s)

Versus

United India Insurance Co. Ltd.
Divisional Office – Malad
201, Jainson Plaza, 2nd Floor
S.V. Road, Malad (West)
Mumbai-400064                                          ...... Opp. Party (ies)

BEFORE:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE R.C. JAIN, PRESIDING MEMBER
HON’BLE MR. S.K. NAIK, MEMBER

For the Complainant (s)       :  Mr. S.K. Pattjoshi, Advocate with
   Mr. R. K. Dave, Advocate
For the Opposite Party (ies) :  Mr. P.K. Seth, Advocate
                                                         
Pronounced on : 3rd July, 2012

 

ORDER


PER S.K. NAIK, MEMBER

1.     This complaint is directed against the repudiation of the complainant’s claim by the United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the opposite party-Insurance Company) for the loss incurred by him due to the theft of gold jewellery and cash in an incident of burglary.  It is the say of the complainant that he deals in sale, purchase and trading in gold and silver ornaments.  In order to cover risk in his business, he used to purchase a Jewellers’Block Policy from the opposite party-Insurance Company from the year 1995 onwards.  Originally the policy was for a sum of Rs.35.00 Lakhs, which, however, was enhanced to Rs.70.00 Lakhs as his business prospered.  When the policy, effective from 13th of November, 1999 to 11th of November, 2000, was in vogue and the shop was closed at about 9.00 pm on Sunday, the 23rd of January, 2000 for the weekly off on the next day and the shop was reopened thereafter at about 10.00 am on Tuesday, the 25th of January, 2000, the complainant, to his horror, discovered that there was a theft in which some gold and silver ornaments and certain amount of cash had been stolen.  The police was immediately informed.  On detailed examination, the complainant found that gold ornaments weighing 6810.030 grams were robbed by the thieves leaving 7338.005 grams intact.  Similarly, out of Rs.1,80,241/- cash kept in different places in the safe, they had removed only Rs.45,000/-.  The opposite party-Insurance Company being informed about the incident appointed M/s Sunil J. Vora & Associates as surveyors, who submitted their final report dated 10th of July, 2001 assessing the loss of gold ornaments at Rs.28,04,778.95 ps. and the loss of cash at Rs.45,000/-.  It, however, disallowed the claim for the loss of silver ornaments, as these were lying outside the strong room at the time of burglary and, therefore, did not fall within the policy.  The complainant thereafter pursued his case with the opposite party-Insurance Company for making good the loss indemnified under the policy but of no avail.  The relentless pursuit of his claim finally resulted in the total repudiation by the opposite party-Insurance Company overruling the report/recommendation of their own surveyor.  Hence, this complaint.
2.     The complaint has been contested by the opposite party-Insurance Company.  They have filed their written version justifying the repudiation.  The complainant has filed rejoinder reiterating the averments and contentions made in the complaint.  The parties have filed their respective evidence.  While on behalf of the complainant the complainant has filed his own affidavit, on behalf of opposite party-Insurance Company Shri E.S.N. Moorthi, Manager of United India Insurance Company Ltd. and Shri Sunil J. Vora, Surveyor have filed their affidavits.  On the direction of this Commission, the complainant has filed the original purchase memo, case memo, order memo, issue note, receipt vouchers, purchase bill, gold registers no. 11 & 12 and consent letters of customers.
3.     Referring to the letter of repudiation, learned counsel for the complainant has contended that even though the independent surveyor appointed by the opposite party-Insurance Company themselves has found that the burglary indeed has taken place and after a thorough scrutiny and verification of the voluminous records assessed the loss, the opposite party-Insurance Company arbitrarily ignoring the report of the surveyor have repudiated the claim only holding that the stocks were not held under any ‘burglar proof safe’ at the time of the incident, as warranted under Schedule-B, Section 1 of the Policy.  The other ground stated is that the shop was not occupied at night, as undertaken by the complainant in his answer to the question no. 3(b) of the proposal in his declaration.  The third ground advanced is that the account books were not backed up by purchase registers and sales registers.
4.     Learned counsel for the complainant contends that all the three objections have been raised just to defeat the legitimate claim of the complainant. Insofar objection with regard to ‘burglar proof safe’ is concerned, the opposite party-Insurance Company has scrutinized the proposal form, which contained the plan/design of the safe and the complainant having got the safe fabricated as per the approved plan in site and the policy being renewed from year to year without any objection/observation, they are debarred from raising this issue at this belated stage.  That apart, he contends that there is no definition as to what constitutes ‘burglar proof safe’ and the complainant having built the safe in the wall with steel doors cannot be said that it was not ‘burglar proof safe’.  It is only a pervert interpretation of the words ‘burglar proof’ and has been resorted to as an afterthought.  In that respect, he has relied upon the order passed by this Commission in the case of Orient Treasures Pvt. Ltd. V. United India Insurance Company Ltd. [IV (2007) CPJ 146 (NC)], in which it has been held as under :-
“25. Further, it is to be stated that the insistence by the Insurance Company that the goods should be kept in a burglar proof safe, is apparently a vague condition. It is difficult to find out any safe which could be said to be burglar proof. Up-till now it is not invented.”                               (emphasisadded)

5.     With regard to the objection that premises/shop was not occupied by the owners at night, the learned counsel for the complainant contends that this ground is neither proper nor valid as the word ‘occupation’ is not synonymous with the word ‘sleeping’.  The opposite party-Insurance Company ought to have appreciated that the shop was located in a business complex and being a jewellery shop, it had no windows and, therefore, it could not even be thought of that anyone could sleep inside the closed shop during the night.  The word ‘occupation’ in this context does not imply that it has to be physically guarded. Sleeping inside the premises is, therefore, out of question.  The opposite party-Insurance Company has been misinterpreting the meaning of ‘occupation’ to their advantage illegally especially when it has been explained to the opposite party-Insurance Company that in such business premises/complex there is a common watchman deployed by the shopkeepers to keep a watch on the premises during night.
6.     Insofar as the observation of the opposite party-Insurance Company that the books of accounts were not reliable, the opposite party-Insurance Company has taken this objection from a cursory observation of the surveyor in his report, which is rather vague and has been made in the nature of a general statement.  It was stated as a pretext for the delay in submitting the report as the subsequent report of the surveyor in emphatic terms states that the insured’s last purchase bill, purchase memo, issue notices, receipt vouchers etc. were available and were duly scrutinized and verified.  Thus, even this ground has no legs to stand.
7.     Finally, referring to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. VsKokilaben Chandravadan & Ors. [(1987) 2 SCC 654], learned counsel for the complainant contends that under the ‘main purpose’, principle and the objective of an insurance cover being to protect the consumer from any unforeseen eventuality, the attempt of the opposite party-Insurance Company to snipe at the main purpose of the policy should be guarded and a view should be taken to relieve the distress and miseries of victims of incidents.  Learned counsel for the opposite party-Insurance Company on the other hand has again referred to the letter of repudiation, in which the grounds on which the claim has been repudiated along with the justification have been reiterated.  He contends that the surveyor in categorical terms has said that the insured’s accounts were not reliable, which was sufficient for the opposite party-Insurance Company to repudiate the claim.
8.     We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the voluminous records. 
9.     The short point for adjudication is as to whether even after the report of M/s Sunil J. Vora & Associates, an independent surveyor appointed by the opposite party-Insurance Company, who after a thorough scrutiny and verification of books of accounts, bills and vouchers etc. had justified the loss only with regard to the gold jewellery and part of cash, ignoring the value of the silver jewellery which was outside the safe/vault/strong room which was not covered under the policy; the opposite party-Insurance Company is justified in repudiating the claim.
10.    Learned counsel for the opposite party-Insurance Company in support of the stand of repudiation by the opposite party-Insurance Company has advanced three main grounds, namely :-
(i)     The complainant had failed to store the stock of jewellery in a ‘burglar proof safe’;
(ii)    The shop was not guarded during the night; and
(iii)    The stock statement, books of accounts, which had to be reconstructed, were not reliable.
11.    On the point of ‘burglar proof safe’, the say of the complainant is that at the time of obtaining the policy during 1995 he had enclosed along with the proposal form the design and plan of the strong room/safe, which stated that the vault would be embedded into the wall and would be made of a steel structure and only after their approval that the design was adequate to meet the safety requirement, he had got the same fabricated on the spot, which was further inspected by the representative of the opposite party-Insurance Company before accepting the proposal.  It is only thereafter that the policy was issued and has been renewed from year to year.  We quite agree with the learned counsel for the complainant that it is too late in the day for the opposite party-Insurance Company to now say that the safe was not ‘burglar proof’ having renewed the policy for a period of five years.  The denial by the opposite party-Insurance Company that no such approval to the design or inspection of the fault/strong room was ever carried out by their representative would not cut much ice for the simple reason that in the absence of any schedule/design having been given to the complainant to suit their safety requirement, the objection cannot be treated as tenable or valid.  In the case of Orient Treasurers Pvt. Ltd. (supra) this Commission, as has been relied upon by the counsel for the complainant, has opined that “It is difficult to find out any safe which could be said to be burglar proof.  Up-till now it is not invented.”
12.    Insofar as the alleged breach of condition that the shop was not occupied during the night, we are of the view that strictly speaking the said requirement has been treated to be an undertaking provided as an answer to a question/query of the opposite party-Insurance Company, which was only a declaration but did not constitute part of the cover note, which was to be subsequently converted into terms and conditions of the contract.  Be that as it may, the explanation offered by the learned counsel for the complainant that the jewellery shop being in the nature of a protected enclosure without any windows and with only a door/opening in the front, it could not even be conceived of that anyone could stay inside during the night.  The word ‘occupation’ has been misinterpreted by the opposite party-Insurance Company to mean the physical presence of the complainant, which amounts to stretching the meaning of the word ‘occupation’ to a ridiculous limit.  As per the Black’s Law Dictionary, ‘occupy’ means to take or enter upon possession or hold possession.  Therefore, there is no violation of the condition even if it is treated to be a condition.  Further, the deployment of a common watchman engaged by the shopkeepers, including the complainant, to patrol the premises can be said to meet the safety requirement expected from the word ‘occupation’.  The interpretation resorted to by the opposite party-Insurance Company, in our view, appears too far-fetched if not artificial. 
13.    Insofar as the doubts cast on the reliability of the books of accounts are concerned, it would be relevant to refer to the report of surveyor, which is the basis for arriving at such a presumption.  The relevant part of the report is as under :-
“18.7         The Insured’s last purchase bills, purchase memos, issue notes, receipt vouchers, etc. were available.  These were verified and endorsed.  Their books of account and inventory registers were not immediately available.  However, the proprietor’s personal record detailing the inventory of gold ornaments by piece count by tags was available.  This record was written in pencil and was endorsed, verified and noted.

18.8          The Insured’s cash book was endorsed.

18.13        The Insured’s accounts were not reliable.

18.14        In the circumstances, the Insured’s subsidiary records were scrutinized.  The entire movements of gold/gold ornaments for the period between April 1, 1996 to the date of loss were drawn up from these records.  The purchases were verified from bills and purchase memos and co-related with the payments.  The gold deposits received under the “New for Old” scheme were verified from order memos.  The sales were verified from cash memos.  All issues to karigars and goldsmiths were verified from issue notes and corresponding receipts were verified from receipt vouchers. Gold ornaments returned to depositors under the scheme were verified from cash memos.

18.15        The Insured’s Trading in gold ornaments and the inventory position for the relevant period were reconstructed as follows :

March 31, 1998
Gms
March 31, 1999

Gms
January 23, 2000
Gms
Opening Stocks
1,538.540
2,410.125
2,072.205
Add: Purchases
7,397.095
8,935.635
4,185.650
6,595.775
1,377.290
3,449.445
Less : Sales
6,525.510
4,523.570
2,503.280
Closing Stock
2,410.125
2,072.205
946.115

18.16        The position of the ornaments in the Insured’s custody, received under the New for Old Deposit Scheme for the respective years was reconstructed as follows :


March 31, 1998
Gms
March 31, 1999

Gms
January 23, 2000
Gms
Opening Stocks
11,548.380
16,578.760
19,228.590
Add: Fresh Deposits
14,254.570
25,802.950
6,719.100
23,297.860
6,169.170
25,397.760
Less : Returns of Deposits
9,224.190
4,069.270
12,195.840
Closing Stock
16,578.760
19,228.590
13,201.920

18.17        The aforesaid position with respect to gold ornament deposits were cross verified by appropriate confirmations from the concerned depositors. After the incident, the Insured endeavoured to settle the outstandings due to several of the depositors as and when they matured and/or to those depositors who called back for the depositors.
(Refer list of Depositors, order memos etc. under Annexure “K” attached)

18.22        We also examined the Insured’s latest purchases with respect to gold ornaments.  The cost of purchase of gold ornaments and the labour charges for conversion were worked out accordingly.  The gold deposits in the Insured’s custody was also valued accordingly.

18.23        The Insured reported loss of cash of Rs.45,000.00.  The Insured’s cash book was verified and co-related with receipts under cash memos.  The cash book was maintained under the Indian single entry system and was regularly written up.  The cash balances reflected were relatively high. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this assessment, the cash receipts against sales for the last week prior loss were considered.  Day to day petty expenses likely to arise during normal working days were deducted and accounted for to arrive at the possible cash balance at the showroom.  The Insured’s loss was within this balance and was thus substantiated.

14.    While the opposite party-Insurance Company has picked up the thread from the isolated observation of the surveyor in para 18.13 of the report that the insured’s accounts were not reliable, a combined reading of the report as a whole clearly brings out that the said observation was based on the haphazard manner in which the complainant maintained and kept his records, which necessitated the reconstruction of the records, which was only a tabulation of the relevant data on the basis of the original records.  This would be clear from clause 5.8 of the report where it is mentioned that “The Insured’s purchase memos, cash memos, order memos, receipt and issue vouchers were serially numbered”  and the clause 5.11 where it mentioned that “The Insured were regularly filing their Sales Tax returns as well as their Income Tax returns”
14.    Since learned counsel for opposite party-Insurance Company, Shri P.K. Seth, during his arguments has laid lot of stress on the complainant operating a scheme of “New Ornaments for Old”, which according to him was not transparent in terms of its book keeping and account, we had called for the original records to satisfy ourselves as to whether the surveyor had undertaken proper verification of the various business transactions.  We have perused these documents.  The surveyor in para 19.10 of his report has stated that he had examined the inventory level with the insured’s sales and recovery towards labourand on a comparative analysis for the years 1998, 1999 and upto 2000 had opined that the high level of gold deposits allowed him to earn higher labourcharges which added to the complainant’s overall profitability.  In para 19.12, it has been stated that the complainant made the repayment obligations to old depositors from available stocks by attracting sufficient deposits.  Apparently, high volume of stocking primarily by way of gold deposits was satisfactorily explained.  The surveyor further goes on to say that the gold deposits with the complainant were confirmed by the depositors.  This goes to show that the surveyor had gone deep into the matter of “New Ornaments for Old” scheme and found that there was no dubious element to suspect any suppression or wrongdoing on part of the complainant.  We have also perused the records produced before us and from a cursory glance of the records we do not find that there is room for any suspicion. 
16.    In view of the above, we do not find substance in any of the three grounds of repudiation.  The opposite party-Insurance Company was not justified in repudiating the claim especially when the surveyor had assessed the loss and had disallowed the claim for the loss of silver jewellery which did not fall within the parameters of the policy conditions.  The Supreme Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. V. Ozma Shipping Company & Anr. (Civil Appeal No. 6289 of 2001 decided on 25.08.2009) where the surveyor’s report had been similarly ignored by the Insurance Company, has held that when valuation has been carried out by a surveyor, the Insurance Company should not hesitate to pay the amount.  The Apex Court has further gone on to observe that “Insurance Companies in genuine and bonafide claims of insured should not adopt the attitude of avoiding payments on one pretext or the other.  This attitude puts a serious question mark on their credibility and trustworthiness.  By adopting honest approach and attitude the insurance companies would save enormous litigation costs.”  This observation of the Hon’ble Apex is fully applicable to the facts of the present case for the simple reason that if the opposite party-Insurance Company was not satisfied with the report of their surveyor, they ought to have sought further clarification from the surveyor on the points of disagreement and even thereafter if they were not satisfied, they ought to have referred the matter to a second surveyor before finally arriving at a conclusion as to whether or not to repudiate the claim.  We further notice that the opposite party-Insurance Company has taken more than eight months to consider the report of the surveyor and only when the complainant pursued his case relentlessly that they have finally repudiated the claim.  This was not expected of a service provider like the opposite party-Insurance Company and, therefore, they are liable for the deficiency in service.
17.    On the quantum of compensation, the assessment made by the surveyor is quite in detail and the figure of Rs.28,49,778.95 ps. (i.e. Rs.28,04,778.95 towards assessment of gold ornaments and Rs.45,000/- towards loss of cash) appears appropriate.
18.    We, accordingly, allow the complaint and direct the opposite party-Insurance Company to pay the sum of Rs.28,49,778.95 ps. along with interest @ 7% per annum to the complainant within a period of six weeks from the date of filing of the complaint till its realization, failing which the rate of interest will stand enhanced to 9% for the period of default.

Sd/-
( R. C. JAIN, J. )
PRESIDING MEMBER


Sd/-
     (S.K. NAIK)
(MEMBER)

Mukesh       

The complainant does not qualify to be a ‘consumer’ as defined in Section 2(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. We say so because as per his own admission the complainant is a resident of Delhi and he intends to purchase some permanent accommodation at Mumbai for his stay during his business visits to save on the expenditure incurred in hotels. For that purpose, he has booked not one but two flats. Clearly, the transaction is relatable to his business activity and, therefore, it will fall in the category of commercial purpose, which has been taken out of the purview of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 vide Amendment Act No. 62 of 2002 effective from 15th of March, 2003.


NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION
NEW DELHI

CONSUMER COMPLAINT NO. 296 OF 2011  

Satish Kumar Gajanand Gupta
S/o Late Shri Gajanand Gupta
R/o F-4, Nice Apartment
17/41, West Punjabi Bagh
New Delhi-110026                                            …      Complainant
Versus
1.      M/s Srushti Sangam Enterprises (India) Ltd.
          Through its Chairman & Managing Director
          Flat No. 5, Kalpana Srushti
          Plot No. 99, 13th Road, Tilak Nagar
          Chembur, Mumbai-400089

2.      Chinnaiash E.V. Gowada
          National Paradise, D-615
          Plot No. 290/1, Panvel
          Navi Mumbai                                             …      Opposite Parties

BEFORE :
          HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE R.C. JAIN, PRESIDING MEMBER
          HON’BLE MR. S.K. NAIK, MEMBER

For the Complainant             :         Mr. Shailendra Bhardwaj, Advocate

Pronounced on : 3rd July, 2012

                                                  O R D E R

PER S.K. NAIK, MEMBER
1.      Shri Shailendra Bhardwaj, Advocate, learned counsel for the complainant, has been heard on admission of this original complaint.
2.      Admittedly, the complainant, a resident of Delhi, is a businessman.  His business, apart from Delhi, extends to Mumbai.  It is his own case that in order to save on the expenditure incurred by him on his stay in hotels at Mumbai during his business trips, he was interested in buying some flats in Mumbai.  He booked two flats with the opposite party-builder and paid Rs.33,86,400/- for Flat No. 104 on 1st floor, B-Wing, Building No. 92, Srushti Parivar, 13th Road, Tilak Nagar, Chembur, Mumbai and further paid Rs.30,00,000/- for Flat No. 105 in the same building on 29th of August, 2008.  The parties entered into sale agreement as well, according to which the possession was to be handed over by December, 2010.  However, despite repeated visits to Mumbai and personally approaching the opposite party-builder, they have failed to deliver the possession of the flats.  Contending that this amounts to gross deficiency in service and unfair trade practice, the counsel submits that it is a fit case for notice being issued to the opposite parties. 
3.      We have considered the contention raised by the learned counsel but we do not quite agree with his plea as the complainant, in our view, does not qualify to be a ‘consumer’ as defined in Section 2(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.  We say so because as per his own admission the complainant is a resident of Delhi and he intends to purchase some permanent accommodation at Mumbai for his stay during his business visits to save on the expenditure incurred in hotels.  For that purpose, he has booked not one but two flats.  Clearly, the transaction is relatable to his business activity and, therefore, it will fall in the category of commercial purpose, which has been taken out of the purview of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 vide Amendment Act No. 62 of 2002 effective from 15th of March, 2003.  This Commission in the case of Jag Mohan Chhabra & Anr. V. DLF Universal Ltd. [IV (2007) CPJ 199 (NC)] in a somewhat similar case had held that the complaint was not maintainable under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.  It had, therefore, disposed of the complaint with liberty to the complainant to approach Civil Court.  The said order has since been upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, as Civil Appeal No.6030-5031 of 2008 filed before the Supreme Court stands dismissed vide the Apex Court’s order dated 29.09.2008.  In the facts of the present case, we maintain the same view and while dismissing the complaint as not maintainable reserve the right of the complainant to approach the appropriate Civil Court to seek his remedy, if so advised.  He may take advantage of the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Laxmi Engineering Works v. P.S.G. Industrial Institute [II (1995) CPJ 1 (SC)] to seek exclusion of the time spent in prosecuting this complaint before this Commission.
4.      The complaint, accordingly, is dismissed in limine. 


                                                                                                              Sd/-
     (JUSTICE R.C. JAIN)
PRESIDING MEMBER


Sd/-
     (S.K. NAIK)
MEMBER
Mukesh   

Not granted - in her application of 18.06.2001to the LIC, the complainant had categorically stated that her husband had committed suicide by drowning on 04.05.2001. In the inquest memorandum drawn up by the Police on the same day after recovery of the dead body, it was also stated that it appeared to be a case of suicide. In the form of requisition for autopsy of the body of the deceased, a similar remark was made. However, for the first time on 16.07.2001, the petitioner/complainant made a belated statement in her letter addressed to the LIC that her husband had died of accident and it was not a case of suicide.


NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION
NEW DELHI
REVISION PETITION NO. 636 OF 2007
(From the order dated 21.11.2006 of Madhya Pradesh State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Bhopal in First Appeal No.2252/2004)

Smt. Kamalesh Bansal
W/o Late Dinesh Chand Bansal                                             Petitioner
R/o Donaoli, Lashkar, Gwalior

versus

1. Senior Zonal Manager
Life Insurance Corporation of India
City Centre, Gwalior                                                        Respondents
2. Branch Manager
Life Insurance Corporation of India
Moti Mahal Road, Gwalior

BEFORE:
HON’BLE MR. ANUPAM DASGUPTA                     PRESIDING MEMBER
HON’BLE MR. SURESH CHANDRA                       MEMBER

For the Petitioner                                         Mr. P.K. Chugh, Advocate
For the Respondents                                    Mr. S.P. Mittal, Advocate

PRONOUNCED ON 3rd JULY,  2012


ORDER

ANUPAM DASGUPTA

        This revision petition challenges the order dated 21.11.2006 of the Madhya Pradesh State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Bhopal (hereafter, ‘the State Commission’). By this order, the State Commission dismissed the appeal (No. 2252/2004) filed by the petitioner against the order dated 20.10.2004 of the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Gwalior (in short, ‘the District Forum’) in complaint case No.413/2003. By its order, the District Forum had dismissed the complaint filed by the petitioner.

2.     The petitioner/complainant was the wife and nominee of Dinesh Chand Bansal who had insured himself with the Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC) under three polices of Rs.40,000/-, Rs.1,00,000/- and Rs.2,00,000/- respectively, each with accident benefit of equal amounts. The life assured died on account of drowning on 04.05.2001. Admittedly, the respondent LIC paid up the sum assured under each of the three policies. The dispute was about admissibility of the accident benefits under these policies which the LIC declined on the ground that the life assured had committed suicide and hence, accident benefit was not payable under the terms & conditions of the policies.

3.     On the petitioner filing a complaint before the District Forum alleging deficiency in service on its part, the LIC contested the allegation that the life assured had died of accidental drowning. It pointed out that in her application of 18.06.2001to the LIC, the complainant had categorically stated that her husband had committed suicide by drowning on 04.05.2001. In the inquest memorandum drawn up by the Police on the same day after recovery of the dead body, it was also stated that it appeared to be a case of suicide. In the form of requisition for autopsy of the body of the deceased, a similar remark was made. However, for the first time on 16.07.2001, the petitioner/complainant made a belated statement in her letter addressed to the LIC that her husband had died of accident and it was not a case of suicide.

4.     On consideration of the pleadings, evidence and documents brought on record, the District Forum dismissed the complaint and, likewise, the State Commission dismissed the appeal of the petitioner.

5.     We have heard Mr. P.K. Chugh, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. S.P. Mittal, learned counsel for the respondent LIC and considered the documents on record.

6.     No material/evidence has been brought to our notice by the petitioner in her revision petition to warrant a conclusion different from that arrived at by the District Forum and the State Commission which was based on an admitted statement of the petitioner herself. As a result, there is no ground for us to interfere with the well-reasoned order of the State Commission under the provisions of section 21 (b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Accordingly, the revision petition is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.

Sd/-
............…………………………..
(ANUPAM DASGUPTA)

Sd/-
............…………………………..
(SURESH CHANDRA)

Raj/

Despite execution of the discharge voucher, the consumer may be in a position to satisfy the Tribunal or the Commission under the Act that such discharge voucher or receipt had been obtained from him under the circumstances which can be termed as fraudulent or exercise of undue influence or bymis-representation or the like. If in a given case the consumer satisfies the authority under the Act that the discharge voucher was obtained by fraud, mis-representation, under influence or the like, coercive bargaining compelled by circumstances, the authority before whom the complaint is made would be justified in granting appropriate relief.


NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION
NEW DELHI
REVISION PETITION NO. 329 OF 2011
 (From the order dated 13.10.2010 in First Appeal No. 3342 of 2007 of the Haryana State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Panchkula)

M/s Bhukker Electricals
Through proprietor Baldev Singh
IsranaPanipat, Haryana                                                 Petitioner

versus

The Oriental Insurance Company
G.T. Road, LIC Building
Near Bus Stand, Panipat                                                  Respondent
District Panipat, Haryana

BEFORE:

HON’BLE MR. ANUPAM DASGUPTA                   PRESIDING MEMBER

                HON’BLE MR. SURESH CHANDRA                               MEMBER
For the Petitioner :                                         Mr. R. S. Malik, Advocate
Pronounced on  3rd July, 2012

O R D E R


ANUPAM DASGUPTA

          This revision petition is against the order dated 13.10.2010 of the Haryana State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Panchkula (in short, ‘the State Commission’) in First Appeal no. 3342 of 2007. By this order, the State Commission allowed the appeal of the respondent insurance company and set aside the order dated 24.10.2007 of the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Panipat (in short, ‘the District Forum’) by which the District Forum had partly allowed the complaint of the petitioner (complainant before the District Forum) with the following award:
          “For the reasons recorded above, we accept the present complaint and direct the OPs to make payment of Rs.1,81,000/- with 9% interest from the date of earlier payment, i.e., 30.03.2007 till realisation together with Rs.3,300/- as litigation expenses within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of copy of this order”.
2.       The petitioner (through its proprietor) was the complainant before the District Forum with the allegation of deficiency in service against the respondent/opposite party – OP, in that the latter had settled the insurance claim of the complainant/petitioner at Rs.1,58,000/- though its claim for indemnification of the loss of its  insured goods damaged in a fire that occurred in the night of 20.10.2006 was for a much higher amount. The complainant prayed for award of Rs.6 lakh, including Rs.4 lakh towards the insurance claim.
3.       The complaint was opposed by the insurance company mainly on the ground that the duly appointed surveyor had assessed the loss at Rs.1,93,000/- and after deducting the value of salvage (Rs.35,000/-), the net payable amount came to Rs.1,53,000/-. The insured accepted the payment of Rs.1,58,000/- “in full and final settlement” under a signed Discharge Receipt. He was, therefore, not entitled to any higher amount, much less claim compensation for the alleged deficiency in service on the part of the respondent/OP.
4.       The main ground on which the District Forum partly allowed the complaint was that the surveyor had failed to give convincing reasons to disbelieve the value of stocks reflected by the stock statement which was Rs.3,74,929/- and which, in the opinion of the District Forum, was duly supported by purchase bills. Accordingly, the District Forum passed the order as excerpted above.
5.       In appeal, before the State Commission, the OP/respondent insurance company primarily argued that the complainant/insured was not entitled to any claim higher than Rs.1,58,000/- for which he had issued a signed Discharge Receipt in full and final settlement. The insurance company further pointed out that after receiving this amount, the insured did not protest nor did it file any complaint before the Insurance Ombudsman.
6.       After due consideration, the State Commission allowed the appeal relying on the ratio of the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of United India Insurance v Ajmer Singh Cotton and General Mills and Others  and United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v ASA Singh Cotton Factory and Others [(1999) 6 SCC 400].
7.       We have heard Mr. R. S. Malik, learned counsel for the petitioner at the stage of admission of this revision petition and considered the documents produced along with the revision petition.
8.       A photocopy of the Discharge Receipt signed by the proprietor of the firm, according to which he accepted Rs.1,58,000/- as full and final settlement of his insurance claim has been produced before us. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to show that the petitioner produced any document before the District Forum (or, the State Commission)  to demonstrate that he had, soon after signing the Discharge Receipt, protested against the amount of settlement or alleged that he was coerced into signing the said Discharge Receipt. The only statement in the revision petition, totally unsupported by any documents produced before the District Forum, is that the respondent insurance company had played a “game of calculated fraud, misrepresentation and under coercion made the petitioner to receive the cheque of Rs.1,58,000/- without settling the entire claim of the petitioner and the said amount was received by the petitioner under protest and without prejudice and only as part claim amount”.
9.       Learned counsel has also not been able to show us the petitioner’s version, if any, filed before the State Commission in response to the appeal filed by the respondent insurance company.
10.     The law settled by the Supreme Court in the above-mentioned cases is summarised in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Court’s decision which are reproduced below:
“4.      We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. It is true that the award of interest is not specifically authorised under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter called, ’the Act’) but in view of our judgment in Sovintorg (India) Ltd. vs. State Bank of India we are of the opinion that in appropriate cases the forum and the commissions under the Act are authorised to grant reasonable interest under the facts and circumstances of each case. The mere execution of the discharge voucher would not always deprive the consumer from preferring claim with respect to the deficiency in service or consequential benefits arising out of the amount paid in default of the service rendered. Despite execution of the discharge voucher, the consumer may be in a position to satisfy the Tribunal or the Commission under the Act that such discharge voucher or receipt had been obtained from him under the circumstances which can be termed as fraudulent or exercise of undue influence or bymis-representation or the like. If in a given case the consumer satisfies the authority under the Act that the discharge voucher was obtained by fraud, mis-representation, under influence or the like, coercive bargaining compelled by circumstances, the authority before whom the complaint is made would be justified in granting appropriate relief. However, (sic, So) where such discharge voucher is proved to have been obtained under any of the suspicious circumstances noted hereinabove, the tribunal or the commission would be justified in granting the appropriate relief under the circumstances of each case. The mere execution of the discharge voucher and acceptance of the insurance claim would not estop the insured from making further claim from the insurer but only under the circumstances as noticed earlier. The Consumer DisputesRedressal Forums and Commissions constituted under the Act shall also have the power to fasten liability against the insurance companies notwithstanding the issuance of the discharge voucher. Such a claim cannot be termed to be fastening the liability against the insurance companies over and above the liabilities payable under the contract of insurance envisaged in the policy of insurance. The claim preferred regarding the deficiency of service shall be deemed to be based upon the insurance policy, being covered by the provisions of Section 14 of the Act.

         5.       In the instant cases the discharge vouchers were admittedly executed voluntarily and the complainants had not alleged their execution under fraud, undue influence,mis-representation or the like. In the absence of pleadings and evidence the State Commission was justified in dismissing their complaints. The National Commission however granted relief solely on the ground of delay in the settlement of claim under the policies. The mere delay of a couple of months would not have authorised the National Commission to grant relief particularly when the insurer had not complained of such a delay at the time of acceptance of the insurance amount under the policy. We are not satisfied with the reasoning of the National Commission and are of the view that the State Commission was justified in dismissing the complaints though on different reasonings. The observations of the State Commission in Jiyajeerao Cotton Mills Ltd. vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. shall always be construed in the light of our findings in this judgment and the mere receipt of the amount without any protest would not always debar the claimant from filing the complaint”.

[ Emphasis supplied]
11.          In view of the fact that the petitioner/insured failed to produce any material to show that it ever objected to or protested against the settlement of its insurance claim at Rs.1,58,000/-, there is no alternative but to conclude that it did indeed accept, without any demur, the sum of Rs.1,58,000/- as full and final settlement of the insurance claim.
12.     As a result, we find no reason to interfere with the impugned order and dismiss the revision petition in limine.
Sd/-
…………………………………………
Anupam Dasgupta ]
Sd/-
………………………………………….
[ Suresh Chandra ]

satish