LawforAll

advocatemmmohan

My photo
since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

Just for legal information but not form as legal opinion

WELCOME TO MY LEGAL WORLD - SHARE THE KNOWLEDGE

Tuesday, July 10, 2012

Admission to the medical courses (MBBS and BDS) has been consistently a subject of judicial scrutiny and review for more than three decades. While this Court has enunciated the law and put to rest the controversy arising in relation to one facet of the admission and selection process to the medical courses, because of ingenuity of the authorities involved in this process, even more complex and sophisticated set of questions have come up for consideration of the Court with the passage of time. One can hardly find any infirmities, inaccuracies or impracticalities in the prescribed scheme and notifications in regard to the process of selection and grant of admission. It is the arbitrary and colourable use of power and manipulation in implementation of the schedule as well as the apparently perverse handling of the process by the concerned persons or the authorities involved, in collusion with the students or otherwise, that have rendered the entire admission process faulty and questionable before the courts. It is the admissions granted arbitrarily, discriminately or in a manner repugnant to the regulations dealing with the subject that have invited judicial catechism. With the passage of time, the quantum of this litigation has increased manifold. The law requires adherence to a settled protocol in the process of selection and grant of admission. None should be able to circumvene or trounce this process, with or without an ulterior motive. The courts are duty bound to ensure that litigation relating to academic courses, particularly, professional courses should not be generated for want of will on the part of the stake holders to follow the process of selection and admission fairly, transparently and without exploitation.Keeping in mind the hard reality that there are number of petitions filed in each High Court of the country, on the one hand challenging the admissions on varied grounds while, on the other, praying for grant of admission on merit to the respective professional courses of MBBS/BDS, the Court cannot lose sight of the fact that the career of the meritorious youth is at stake. These are matters relating to adherence to the rule of merit and when its breach is complained of, the judiciary may be expected to deal with the said grievances preferentially and effectively. The diversity of our country and the fact that the larger population lives in rural areas and there being demand for consistent increase in the strength of qualified medical practitioners, we are of the considered view that such cases, at least as of now and particularly for a specific period of the year require higher priority in the heavy business of court cases. We are not oblivious of the fact that the Hon’ble Judges of the High Court are working under great pressure and with some limitations. However, we would still make a request to the Hon’ble Chief Justices of the respective High Courts to direct listing of all medical admission cases before one Bench of the Court as far as possible and in accordance with the Rules of that Court. It would further be highly appreciable if the said Bench is requested to deal with such cases within a definite period, particularly during the period from July to October of a particular year. We express a pious hope that our request would weigh with the Hon’ble Chief Justices of the respective High Courts as it would greatly help in serving the ends of justice as well as the national interest. 39. For the reasons afore-recorded and with the directions as mentioned above, we direct the respondents to grant admission to the appellant to the MBBS course in the current academic year subject to the condition that she will pursue her MBBS course right from its beginning and to the conditions afore-noticed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we award no costs.


                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  5055  OF 2012
                  (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 7440 of 2012)

Asha                                                       … Appellant
                                   Versus
Pt. B.D. Sharma University of Health
Sciences & Ors.                                            …Respondents



                               J U D G M E N T

Swatanter Kumar, J.

1.             Leave granted.

2.             Admission to the medical courses  (MBBS  and  BDS)  has  been
consistently a subject of judicial scrutiny and review for more  than  three
decades.  While this Court has enunciated  the  law  and  put  to  rest  the
controversy arising in relation to one facet of the admission and  selection
process to the medical courses, because  of  ingenuity  of  the  authorities
involved in this  process,  even  more  complex  and  sophisticated  set  of
questions have come up for consideration of the Court with  the  passage  of
time.    One   can   hardly   find   any   infirmities,   inaccuracies    or
impracticalities in the prescribed scheme and  notifications  in  regard  to
the process of selection and grant of admission.  It is  the  arbitrary  and
colourable use of power and manipulation in implementation of  the  schedule
as well as the apparently perverse handling of the process by the  concerned
persons or the authorities involved,  in  collusion  with  the  students  or
otherwise, that have  rendered  the  entire  admission  process  faulty  and
questionable before the courts.  It is the admissions  granted  arbitrarily,
discriminately or in a manner repugnant to the regulations dealing with  the
subject that have invited judicial catechism.   With the  passage  of  time,
the quantum of this litigation has increased manifold.

3.             Thus, it is both the need of  the  hour  and  the  demand  of
justice that this Court clarifies its decision  and  states  the  principles
with greater precision so as to ensure elimination of colourable  abuse  and
arbitrary exercise of power in the process of  selection  and  admission  to
these professional courses by all concerned.

4.             Therefore, in our view,  though  the  present  appeal  arises
from very simple facts, yet it raises questions of  considerable  importance
and application.    These questions are bound to arise repeatedly  not  only
before this Court, but even before  the  High  Courts.    Therefore,  it  is
imperative for us to formulate the questions and answer them  in  accordance
with law.

5.             The questions are :-

     a) Is there any exception to the principle of strict adherence to  the
        Rule of Merit for preference  of  courses  and  colleges  regarding
        admission to such courses?

     b) Whether the cut-off date of 30th September of the relevant academic
        year is a date which admits any exception?

     c) What relief the courts can grant and to what extent they can  mould
        it while ensuring adherence to the  rule  of  merit,  fairness  and
        transparency in admission in terms of rules and regulations?

     d) What issues need to be dealt with and finding returned by the court
        before passing orders which may be more  equitable,  but  still  in
        strict compliance with the framework of regulations  and  judgments
        of this court governing the subject?

6.             The appellant  cleared  her  Secondary  examination  (medical
stream) with  75%  marks  and  was  eligible  for  taking  medical  entrance
examination as she fulfilled the requisite criteria to take that exam.   Pt.
B.D.   Sharma   University   (for   short   ‘the   University’)   issued   a
notification/advertisement for the entrance examination for  MBBS,  BDS  and
BAMS to be held in the first week of May, 2011.  The appellant  applied  for
the same in the Backward Class ‘B’ (for short ‘BCB’) and  dependent  of  Ex-
Serviceman (ESM) category.  Her application was  accepted  and  roll  number
was issued to her.  The date of the examination was  fixed  for  12th  June,
2011 by the University.   The  appellant  was  declared  successful  in  the
entrance examination having secured 832 marks.  The appellant was at  serial
number 13 of the ESM category.  All concerned were informed that  the  first
counseling for allotment of seats was to be held on 14th -15th  July,  2011.
In this counseling, the appellant was not admitted to  MBBS  Course  as  she
was lower in merit. Consequently, she took admission in the  BDS  Course  on
that very day.  Thereafter, a declaration was made by the  respondents  that
the second counseling for allotment of seats in the  MBBS  course  would  be
held on 20th September, 2011.   The  appellant  again  participated  in  the
counseling but her name and roll number was not declared by the  respondents
for the said admissions.  However, when the list of allocation of seats  was
displayed, it came to light that though the appellant had not been  admitted
to the MBBS Course, candidates who ranked  below  her  in  the  merit  list,
including the respondent no.3, Vineeta Yadav, who  had  obtained  821  marks
and was at serial number 14 of the ESM Category, had  been  given  admission
to the MBBS Course.


7.             On the above facts, the learned  Single  Judge  of  the  High
   Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh, observed  that  according  to
   the respondents, the  ‘appellant  left  the  counseling  place’  without
   appearing before the Counseling Board.    Resultantly,  her  candidature
   was not considered for admission  to  the  MBBS  course  under  the  ESM
   category and the candidate next in merit was given the  admission.    It
   was the opinion of the Court that it would be too far fetched to  accept
   that the appellant, though was physically present at the time of  taking
   of attendance, thumb impressions and photography, did not respond to the
   call for counseling at the relevant time.  Further, the  Court  observed
   that no reason whatsoever could be seen for absence of the appellant  at
   the relevant moment from the record before the Court.  In  view  of  the
   fact that the appellant had filed the writ petition within a week of the
   second counseling, the Court accepted the  facts  averred  in  the  writ
   petition and directed the respondents to admit the appellant to the MBBS
   course while further directing that it would be open for the respondents
   to see that admission of other students lower in merit is not cancelled,
   if so permissible and possible under the relevant Rules.


8.             Upon appeal, the Division  Bench  of  that  Court  upset  the
   judgment of the learned Single Judge and held as under:-


           “We find that such directions could not have been issued on  the
           basis of possibilities.   In view the process of counseling,  we
           find that the writ  petitioner  herself  has  failed  to  appear
           before the counseling board at the relevant time.    It  is  not
           that she has not got admission.   She is pursuing BDS course  at
           Rohtak whereas, the other  two  candidates  are  pursuing  their
           courses at PGI Rohtak and  Medical  College  Agroha.    At  this
           stage, to disturb the entire admission process would not in  the
           interest of academics when there is no substantive allegation in
           respect of admission process.”





           3 9.              The Division Bench also noticed the contention
of the respondents that the appellant was a student of the same college  and
other candidates were  even  outstation,  thus  it  was  possible  that  the
appellant was not present when the call for her name was made,  may  be  due
to her negligence or carelessness.


4 10.          The Court also observed that since there  was  no  allegation
     of mala fides against any member of the Counseling Board and there also
being no allegations of misconduct and favouritism, the  conclusion  arrived
     at by the learned Single Judge was not sustainable in law.


5 11.          The moot question  which  falls  for  consideration  of  this
      Court in view of the divergent views taken by the Single Judge and the
Division Bench of the High Court is whether  the  decision  of  the  learned
      Single Judge is based on inferences or assumptions or whether it was a
      reasonable conclusion which the Court could arrive at in view  of  the
      pleadings of the parties and the relevant rules in force.


6 12.          Notification for the second counseling  was  issued  on  26th
      August, 2011.   The second counseling was to be held for admission  to
      MBBS and BDS courses in Government Aided Medical  Dental  Colleges  in
      the State of Haryana on 20th September, 2011  in  the  Office  of  the
      Director, Pandit B.D.  Sharma  University  of  Health  Sciences,  PGI,
      Rohtak, as per the schedule given therein.


13.            The notification inter alia also stated:-


| Date            |Reporting Time   |Category         |Rank            |
|20.09.2011       |8.00 A.M.        |General          |01 to 704       |
|                 |                 |(Common Merit    |                |
|                 |                 |List)            |                |
|                 |                 |SC               |01 to 65        |
|                 |                 |BCA              |01 to 144       |
|                 |                 |BCB              |01 to 150       |
|                 |                 |PH               |01              |
|                 |                 |ESM              |01 to 30        |
|                 |                 |FF               |01              |



14.            In furtherance to this notification, there is no  dispute  to
   the fact that the appellant, who was at Sr. No. 13 of ESM category,  had
   appeared before  the  authorities  and  marked  her  attendance  in  the
   attendance sheet on 20th September, 2011.   It is  interesting  to  note
   that the same sheet had been signed by  the  candidates  to  mark  their
   presence even on 15th July, 2011, when the first  counseling  was  held.
   The appellant had also  signed  on  15th  July,  2011  and,  as  already
   noticed, was given admission to the BDS course.


15.            Another important aspect which needs to be  noticed  at  this
   stage is the original merit list which  has  been  produced  before  us.
   This merit list relates to the date  of  first  counseling,  i.e.,  15th
   July, 2011.   According to the respondents, the appellant had been given
   admission to the BDS course but  in  this  merit  list  the  column  for
   signature in front of her name is empty.   This document does  not  have
   any of the members of the Board or any candidate specifying the date  of
   this counseling.   Therefore, we would take it  that  this  document  is
   dated and relates to the proceedings of 15th July, 2011.    If  that  be
   so, it is difficult to understand as to  how  the  appellant  was  given
   admission to the BDS course on 15th July, 2011 when nothing is noted  in
   front of her name.   It  does  not  even  say,  whether  she  was  given
   admission to MBBS or BDS course.   Interestingly, in the remark  column,
   the members of the Board have noted the candidates who have already been
   given admission to a college or who were not interested in BDS course or
   who had vacated the seat of BDS.    The merit list for  admission  dated
   20th September, 2011 has  not  been  placed  on  record.   There  is  no
   explanation available from the records produced before  us,  as  to  why
   this has not been  done.    It  has  also  not  been  clarified  in  the
   affidavit filed on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 and 2.


11 16.         We may notice that in  the  writ  petition  before  the  High
     Court the appellant had specifically averred that she  was  present  in
     the second counseling at the time of  attendance  and  even  subsequent
     thereto.  However, despite such presence, her name and roll number were
not declared by the respondents for the purpose of  admission  to  the  MBBS
     course.  However, the  list  of  successful  candidates  revealed  that
     candidates of merit lower to her had been admitted to the MBBS  course.
     According to her, she instantly raised her claim and even  submitted  a
     representation upon the respondents but to no avail.  Paragraphs 7 to 9
     of the writ petition read as follows :


           “7. That the respondents have decided to take second  counseling
               and the date for second counseling was fixed for  20.09.2011.
                The petitioner again participated in the  second  counseling
               but her name and roll number was again not  declared  by  the
               respondents for the said admission in the MBBS course.


           8.   That after the date of second  counseling,  the  petitioner
           was shocked to know that one Vinita Yadav daughter of Sh. Arvind
           Kumar Yadav Roll No. 126038 having the same category  i.e.  BCB-
           ESM and having 821 marks which is lower then the  marks  secured
           by the petitioner got admission in MBBS Course conducted by  the
           respondents.   The petitioner has  visited  the  office  of  the
           respondent just after getting the information that  a  candidate
           who is lower in merit/marks got admission  in  MBBS  Course  and
           requested the respondents  that  this  is  totally  illegal  and
           discriminatory  on  the  part  of  them  that  they  are  giving
           admission to a candidate who is having  lesser  marks  than  the
           petitioner but the respondents have not considered  her  genuine
           claim and legal rights and willfully ignored the request of  the
           petitioner.


           9.  That the petitioner has not continuously visited the  office
           of the respondents and raised her voice for  her  genuine  claim
           for the admission  in  MBBS  Course  and  she  has  specifically
           mentioned that a candidate having lesser marks  as  compared  to
           the petitioner has got admission in MBBS  course  but  in  vain.
           The petitioner submitted a representation before the respondents
           mentioning everything about the  incident  but  the  respondents
           have not considered her request.   A  true  typed  copy  of  the
           representation is attached herewith as ANNEXURE P-3.”




17.            In the reply  filed  on  merits  by  the  respondents,  these
   paragraphs were dealt with in a  most  casual  manner  and  no  specific
   denial was made.   Paragraphs 7 to 9 of the reply read as under:-


           “7. That in reply to Para No. 7 of the petition  averments  made
           in  Para  No.  3  and  4  of  the  preliminary  submissions  are
           reiterated here.


           8.  That in reply to Para No. 8 of the petition it is  submitted
           that since the Petitioner  left  the  counseling  place  without
           appearing before the counseling board her  candidature  was  not
           considered for admission to MBBS course under ESM  category  and
           the Respondent No. 3 who was next in merit than  the  Petitioner
           got the admission in MBBS course under ESM category.   Averments
           made in Para No. 3 and 4 of the preliminary submissions are also
           reiterated here.


           9.  That Para No. 9 of the writ petition is  wrong  and  denied.
           The Petitioner has never approached to the answering Respondents
           with regard to her admission in MBBS course after 2nd counseling
           as claimed in this para.   However,  in  any  case  she  is  not
           entitled for admission to MBBS  Course  under  ESM  category  in
           present circumstances in view of facts mentioned in Para No.  2,
           3 & 4 of the preliminary submissions.”



18.            From a bare reading of the reply filed  by  the  respondents,
it is clear that there is no specific denial of  the  above-noted  averments
made by the appellant. It is a settled principle of  the  law  of  pleadings
that an averment made by  the  appellant  is  expected  to  be  specifically
denied by the replying party.   If there is no specific  denial,  then  such
averment is deemed to have been admitted by the respondent.  In the  present
case, it is evident that the above-noted  averments  in  the  writ  petition
were relevant and material to the case.  In fact, the  entire  case  of  the
appellant hinged on these three paragraphs of  the  writ  petition.  It  was
thus, expected of the respondents to reply these averments specifically,  in
fact  to  make  a  proper  reference  to  the  records  relevant  to   these
paragraphs.  In view of the omission on part of the respondents to refer  to
any relevant records and failure to specifically deny the averments made  by
the appellant, we are of the considered view that  the  appellant  has  been
able to make out a case for interference.

19.            Not only this, if the  averments  made  in  paragraph  9  are
correct and the appellant had instantaneously raised her  claim  before  the
respondents, followed by making of the representation, we see no reason  why
the claim of the appellant could not be settled at that time or in any  case
in the subsequent  counseling  held  on  30th  September,  2011,  where  the
appellant was admittedly present.   The attendance sheet produced before  us
shows that the appellant was present on  all  the  three  days.    Even  the
records produced by the respondents before the Court  support  the  case  of
the appellant.

20.            The appellant filed the writ petition before the  High  Court
without any undue delay and on 4th  November,  2011,  the  judgment  by  the
court was passed in her favour.  The cumulative effect of the above  factual
matrix, the pleadings of the parties and the  expeditious  manner  in  which
the appellant had taken action before the authorities and  then  before  the
court and pursued her remedies, persuade the Court to believe that the  case
of the appellant is truthful.   The  cases  of  the  present  kind  are  not
required to be tested by us on the touchstone  of  stringent  principles  of
burden  of  proof  applicable  to  criminal  jurisprudence.     As   already
mentioned, it was the obligation of the  respondents  to  specifically  deny
the averments made by the appellant and to produce the relevant  records  to
show that the stand taken by them is worthy of credence.  Having  failed  to
do so, they cannot shift the burden  upon  the  appellant  and  expect  this
Court to believe that a student of the same college, would disappear at  the
relevant time  of  counseling  after  having  marked  her  presence  at  the
counseling.

21.            It is not necessary for the  appellant  to  plead  and  prove
   mala fides, misconduct or favouritism and nepotism on the  part  of  the
   parties  concerned.   Failure  to  do  the  same  could  be  an   error,
   intentional or otherwise, but in either event, we see no reason why  the
   appellant should be made to suffer despite being a candidate  of  higher
   merit.


22.            At this stage, we may  refer  to  certain  judgments  of  the
   Court where it has clearly spelt out that the criteria for selection has
   to be merit alone.   In fact, merit, fairness and transparency  are  the
   ethos of the process  for  admission  to  such  courses.    It  will  be
   travesty of the scheme formulated by this Court and duly notified by the
   states, if the Rule of Merit is defeated by inefficiency, inaccuracy  or
   improper methods of admission.  There cannot be any  circumstance  where
   the Rule of merit can be compromised.   From the facts  of  the  present
   case, it is evident that merit has been a casuality.   It will be useful
   to refer to the view consistently taken by this Court that  merit  alone
   is the criteria for such admissions and circumvention of  merit  is  not
   only impermissible but is also abuse of the process of law. Ref.   Priya
   Gupta Vs. State of Chhatisgarh & Anr. [CA @ SLP(C) No.  27089  of  2011,
   decided on 8th May, 2012], Harshali v. State of Maharashtra  and  Others
   [(2005) 13 SCC 464], Pradeep Jain v. UOI [1984  (3)  SCC  654],  Sharwan
   Kumar and Others v. Director of Health Services and Another  [1993  Supp
   (1) SCC 632], Preeti Srivastava v. State of MP [(1999) 7 SCC 120],  Guru
   Nanak Dev University v. Saumil Garg and  Others  [2005  (13)  SCC  749],
   AIIMS Students’ Union v. AIIMS and Others [(2002) 1 SCC 428].


16 23.         It is true that the notification dated 26th August, 2011  had
clearly  stated  that  the  candidate  should  appear  before   the   second
Counseling Board well in time along with  all  the  original  documents  and
that the photograph and thumb impression of the candidate would be taken  at
the time of the counseling.   The notification stated the reporting time  as
8.00 a.m.  The  exact  time  when  the  candidates  of  each  category  i.e.
General, SC, PH (MS), EMS and FF were to be present was nowhere stated.   In
other words all candidates were required to be present  at  8.00  a.m..   It
cannot be  disputed  that  the  appellant  was  present  at  that  time  and
undisputedly she had marked her presence in the attendance  register.    She
admittedly participated in the photography and taking of  thumb  impressions
held by the concerned authority.   However, her absence at the crucial  time
of counseling is the essence of dispute in the present case.


17  24.          Adherence  to  the  schedule  is  the  obligation  of   the
authorities and the students  both.    The  prescribed  schedule  is  to  be
maintained stricto sensu by  all  the  stakeholders  because  if  one  party
adheres to the schedule and others do not or there is some kind of  lack  of
communication or omission to make proper announcements and  maintain  proper
records for such counseling, disastrous results can  follow,  of  which  the
present case is an apt example.


18 25.    The Court cannot ignore the fact that these admissions  relate  to
professional courses and the entire life  of  a  student  depends  upon  his
admission to a particular course. Every  candidate  of  higher  merit  would
always  aspire  admission  to  the   course   which   is   more   promising.
Undoubtedly, any candidate would prefer course of MBBS over  BDS  given  the
high-competitiveness in the present times, where on a fraction  of  a  mark,
the admission to course could vary.  Higher the competition, greater is  the
duty on the part of the concerned authorities to act with utmost caution  to
ensure transparency and fairness.  It is one of  their  primary  obligations
to see that  a  candidate  of  higher  merit  is  not  denied  seat  to  the
appropriate course  and  college,  as  per  his  preference.    We  are  not
oblivious of the fact that the process of admissions is  a  cumbersome  task
for the authorities but that per se cannot  be  a  ground  for  compromising
merit.   The  concerned  authorities  are  expected   to   perform   certain
functions, which must  be  performed  in  a  fair  and  proper  manner  i.e.
strictly in consonance with the relevant rules and regulations.


26.            Strict adherence to  the  time  schedule  has  again  been  a
   matter of controversy before the courts.   The courts have  consistently
   taken the view that the schedule is sacrosanct like the  rule  of  merit
   and all the stakeholders  including  the  concerned  authorities  should
   adhere to it and should in no circumstances permit its violation.  This,
   in our opinion, gives rise to dual problem.    Firstly,  it  jeopardizes
   the interest and future  of  the  students.   Secondly,  which  is  more
   serious, is that such action would be ex-  facie  in  violation  of  the
   orders of the court, and therefore, would invite  wrath  of  the  courts
   under the provisions of the Contempt  of  Courts  Act,  1971.   In  this
   regard, we may appropriately refer to the judgments of this Court in the
   cases of Priya Gupta (supra),  State of Bihar v. Sanjay  Kumar  Sinha  &
   Ors. [(1990) 4 SCC 624], Medical Council of India v. Madhu Singh &  Ors.
   [(2002)  7  SCC  258],  GSF  Medical  and  Paramedical  Association   v.
   Association of Management of Self  Financing  Technical  Institutes  and
   Anr. [2003 (12) SCC 414], Christian Medical College v. State  of  Punjab
   and Others [(2010) 12 SCC 167].


27.   The judgments of this Court constitute the law of the  land  in  terms
   of Article 141 of the Constitution and the  regulations  framed  by  the
   Medical Council of India are statutorily having the force of law and are
   binding  on  all  the  concerned  parties.     Various  aspects  of  the
   admission process as  of  now  are  covered  either  by  the  respective
   notifications issued by the State Governments, prospectus issued by  the
   colleges and, in any case, by the  regulations  framed  by  the  Medical
   Council of India.  There is no reason why every act of  the  authorities
   be not done as per the procedure prescribed under the Rules and why  due
   records thereof be not maintained.


28.            This proposition of law or this issue is no more res  integra
   and has been firmly stated by this Court in its various judgments  which
   may usefully be referred at this stage.  Ref. State of M.P. v. Gopal  D.
   Tirthani and Others [(2003) 7 SCC  83],  State  of  Punjab  v.  Dayanand
   Medical College  &  Hospital  and  Ors.  [AIR  2001  SC  3006],  Bharati
   Vidyapeeth v. State of Maharashtra and  Another  [(2004)  11  SCC  755],
   Chowdhury Navin Hemabhai and Others  v.  State  of  Gujarat  and  Others
   [(2011) 3 SCC 617], Harish Verma  and  Others  v.  Ajay  Srivastava  and
   Another [(2003) 8 SCC 69].


29.            In the prospectus issued by the respondents, Chapter 9  dealt
   with the method of selection and admission.   Clause 3.1 stated that  it
   was  mandatory  for  the  qualified  candidates  to  appear  before  the
   Counseling Board in person.  No  relaxation  was  to  be  given  to  the
   candidates who were unable to appear before the Counseling Board on  the
   fixed dates.  Further, it was stated in the prospectus that at the  time
   of the counseling, the candidates would be required  to  exercise  their
   choice for the institution and the course.   The allotment of the  seats
   would be made according to the merit and  preference  exercised  by  the
   candidates at the time of counseling. During the  subsequent  counseling
   the Course/Institution would  be  allotted  as  per  the  merit  of  the
   candidates depending on the availability of seats.


30.            All these clauses are  in  accordance  with  the  regulations
   framed by the Medical Council of India or the  notifications  issued  by
   the concerned State Government. Relaxation of  the  Rule  of  Merit  for
   reason of non-appearance is not  permissible.    In  the  present  case,
   there is no dispute that the appellant was present at the place  and  on
   the date of the second counseling but the dispute relates to her absence
   at the particular time when her name was called out for the  purpose  of
   counseling.   As far  as  this  issue  is  concerned,  we  have  already
   expressed the opinion that there is no substance in the defence taken by
   the respondents and the appellant  should  be  entitled  to  the  relief
   prayed for.  However, the question that immediately follows  is  whether
   any mid-term admission can  be  granted  after  30th  September  of  the
   concerned academic year, that  being the last date for admissions.   The
   respondents before us have argued  with  some  vehemence  that  it  will
   amount to a mid-term admission which is impermissible,  will  result  in
   indiscipline and will cause prejudice to other candidates.  Reliance has
   been placed upon the judgments of this Court in Medical Council of India
   v. Madhu Singh and Others [(2002)  7  SCC  258],  Ms.  Neelu  Arora  and
   Another v. Union of India and Others  [(2003)  3  SCC  366],  Aman  Deep
   Jaswal v. State of Punjab and Others [(2006) 9 SCC 597], Medical Council
   of India v. Naina Verma and Others [(2005) 12 SCC 626], Mridul Dhar  and
   Another v Union of India and Others [(2005) 2 SCC 65],  Medical  Council
   of India v Madhu Singh and Others [(2002) 7 SCC 258].


31.            There is no doubt that 30th September is  the  cut-off  date.
   The authorities cannot grant admission beyond the cut-off date which  is
   specifically postulated.    But where no  fault  is  attributable  to  a
   candidate and she is denied admission for arbitrary reasons, should  the
   cut-off date be permitted to operate as  a  bar  to  admission  to  such
   students particularly when it would result in complete  ruining  of  the
   professional career of a meritorious candidate, is the question we  have
   to answer.  Having recorded that the appellant is not at fault  and  she
   pursued her rights and remedies as expeditiously as possible, we are  of
   the considered view that the cut-off date cannot be used as a  technical
   instrument or tool to deny admission to a  meritorious  students.    The
   rule of merit stands completely defeated in the  facts  of  the  present
   case.  The appellant was a candidate placed higher in  the  merit  list.
   It cannot be disputed that candidates having merit  much  lower  to  her
   have already been given admission in the MBBS course.  The appellant had
   attained 832 marks while the students who had attained  821,  792,  752,
   740 and 731 marks have already been given admission in the ESM  category
   in the MBBS course.   It is not only unfortunate but  apparently  unfair
   that the appellant be denied admission.  Though there can be  rarest  of
   rare cases or exceptional circumstances where the  courts  may  have  to
   mould the relief  and  make  exception  to  the  cut-off  date  of  30th
   September, but in those cases, the Court must  first  return  a  finding
   that no fault is  attributable  to  the  candidate,  the  candidate  has
   pursued her rights and legal remedies expeditiously  without  any  delay
   and that there is fault on the part  of  the  authorities  and  apparent
   breach of some rules, regulations  and  principles  in  the  process  of
   selection and grant of admission.  Where denial  of  admission  violates
   the right to equality and equal treatment of the candidate, it would  be
   completely unjust and unfair to deny  such  exceptional  relief  to  the
   candidate.  [Refer Arti Sapru and Others v. State of J &  K  and  Others
   [(1981) 2 SCC 484]; Chavi Mehrotra v. Director General  Health  Services
   [(1994) 2 SCC 370]; and Aravind Kumar Kankane v. State of UP and  Others
   [(2001) 8 SCC 355].


25 32.         We must hasten to add  at  this  stage  that  even  if  these
conditions are satisfied, still, the court would be called  upon  to  decide
whether the relief should or should not be granted and, if  granted,  should
it be with or without compensation.


33.            This brings us to the last phase of  this  case  as  to  what
   relief, if any, the appellant is entitled to.  Having returned a finding
   on merits in favour of the appellant, the Court has to grant  relief  to
   the appellant even, if necessary, by moulding the  relief  appropriately
   and in accordance with law.  This Court must do complete justice between
   the parties, particularly, where the legitimate right of  the  appellant
   stands frustrated because of inaction or  inappropriate  action  on  the
   part of the concerned respondents.  In fact, normally  keeping  in  view
   the factual matrix of this case, we would have directed the admission of
   the appellant to the MBBS course in  the  academic  year  2011-2012  and
   would further have directed the respondents to pay compensation  to  the
   appellant towards the mental agony and expense  of  litigation  and  the
   valuable period of her life that stands wasted for failure on  the  part
   of the respondents to adhere to the proper procedure  of  selection  and
   admission process.  May be the Court  would  have  granted  this  relief
   subject to some further conditions.  However, we  are  unable  to  grant
   this relief to the appellant in its  totality  for  reason  of  her  own
   doing.  She has completely faulted in pursuing her  academic  course  in
   accordance with the Rules and like a diligent student should do.  In the
   reply filed on behalf of respondent Nos.1 and 2, it has been stated that
   as per the Dental Council of India Norms, minimum required attendance is
   75 per  cent  in  Theory  as  well  as  in  Practical  of  each  subject
   individually  for  issuance  of  roll  numbers  in   the   BDS   course.
   Undoubtedly, the appellant was admitted to the BDS course  and  she  was
   expected to complete her academic course in terms of the Norms of Dental
   Council of India.  It is also not disputed before us and, in  fact,  was
   confirmed to us on behalf of  the  Medical  Council  of  India  and  the
   respondent University that the course for the first year  of  both,  BDS
   and MBBS, is more or less the same.  Except one paper of  Anatomy,  rest
   of the subjects and papers are more or less similar particularly for the
   first six months.  If the appellant had pursued the BDS course to  which
   she was admitted diligently and had attended all the lectures, she might
   have been eligible to pursue her MBBS course  in  continuation  thereto.
   We are not recording any finding in this behalf as, in our opinion,  the
   appellant  is  not  entitled  to  this  particular  relief,  as  already
   indicated, and for the same she has to blame none else but herself.

34.            In the reply, the respondents have specifically explained  by
the figures on record that the appellant had attended only 28  per  cent  to
42 per cent lectures (minimum being 28% and  maximum  42%)  instead  of  the
required 75 per cent and as such she has not even  pursued  her  BDS  course
properly.  The table given in the reply reads as under :



|S.No. |Name of Deptt.     |Practical             |Theory                 |
|      |                   |Lect.  |Lec.   |%age   |Lect.  |Lec.    |%age   |
|      |                   |Deliv. |Attnd. |       |Deliv. |Attnd.  |       |
|1.    |Prosthodontics     |95     |22     |23%    |Nil    |Nil     |Nil    |
|2.    |Dental Anatomy     |93     |31     |33%    |95     |28      |29%    |
|3.    |Dental Material    |Nil    |Nil    |Nil    |35     |13      |37%    |
|4.    |Anatomy            |125    |39     |31%    |86     |25      |29%    |
|5.    |Physiology         |30     |09     |30%    |94     |27      |28%    |
|6.    |Biochemistry       |32     |12     |37%    |59     |25      |42%    |


35.            From the above data, it  is  clear  that  the  appellant  has
miserably failed to pursue her BDS course  in  accordance  with  Rules  and,
thus, she has  not  fulfilled  even  the  pre-requisites  for  MBBS  course,
assuming that the BDS and  MBBS  courses  are  similar  for  the  first  six
months.  In these circumstances and finding that the appellant is  at  fault
to this limited extent, we are of the considered view that the  only  relief
the appellant can be granted in the present appeal is  a  direction  to  the
respondents to give the appellant admission to the MBBS course  not  in  the
academic year 2011-12 but in the current academic year i.e. 2012-2013,  that
too, subject to the condition that she will pursue  her  MBBS  course  right
from the beginning without any advantage of her course in the BDS.   If  any
examinations have been held in the meanwhile, it shall be  deemed  that  she
had not appeared in those examinations  and  be  treated  as  such  for  all
intent and  purpose.   While  giving  her  admission  to  the  MBBS  course,
preferably and if  it  is  permissible,  admission  of  none  of  the  other
candidates to the MBBS course may be disturbed.  If  for  whatever  reasons,
it is not possible to do so, in that event, the candidate last in the  merit
who has been granted admission to the MBBS course shall  be  transferred  to
the BDS course and appellant shall be admitted to the MBBS course.  We  also
direct that such candidate would not be required  to  commence  her/his  BDS
course  from  the  beginning  provided  the  candidate  has  satisfied   the
attendance requirements of the Dental Council of India.

36.            Now, we shall proceed to answer the questions posed by us  in
the opening part of this judgment.

ANSWERS

a)             The rule of merit for  preference  of  courses  and  colleges
       admits no exception.  It is an absolute rule and all stakeholders and
       concerned authorities are required to follow this rule  strictly  and
       without demur.

b)             30th September is undoubtedly the  last  date  by  which  the
       admitted students should report to their respective colleges  without
       fail.  In the normal course, the admissions must close by holding  of
       second counseling by 15th September of the relevant academic year [in
       terms of  the  decision  of  this  Court  in  Priya  Gupta  (supra)].
       Thereafter, only in very rare and exceptional  cases  of  unequivocal
       discrimination or arbitrariness or pressing emergency, admission  may
       be permissible but such power may  preferably  be  exercised  by  the
       courts.  Further, it will be in the rarest of rare  cases  and  where
       the ends of justice would be subverted or the process  of  law  would
       stand frustrated that the courts would exercise their  extra-ordinary
       jurisdiction  of  admitting  candidates  to  the  courses  after  the
       deadline of 30th September  of  the  current  academic  year.   This,
       however, can only be done if the conditions stated by this  Court  in
       the case of Priya Gupta (supra) and this judgment  are  found  to  be
       unexceptionally satisfied and the reasons therefor  are  recorded  by
       the court of competent jurisdiction.

c) & d) Wherever the court finds that action of  the  authorities  has  been
       arbitrary, contrary to the judgments of this Court and  violative  of
       the Rules, regulations and  conditions  of  the  prospectus,  causing
       prejudice to the rights  of  the  students,  the  Court  shall  award
       compensation to  such  students  as  well  as  direct  initiation  of
       disciplinary action against the erring officers/officials.  The court
       shall also ensure that the proceedings under the Contempt  of  Courts
       Act, 1971 are initiated against the erring  authorities  irrespective
       of their stature and empowerment.

               Where the admissions given by the concerned  authorities  are
       found by the courts to be legally unsustainable and where there is no
       reason to permit the students to continue with the course,  the  mere
       fact that such students have put in a year or so  into  the  academic
       course is not by itself a ground to permit them to continue with  the
       course.

37.            With all humility, we reiterate  the  request  that  we  have
made to all the High Courts in Priya Gupta’s case (supra)  that  the  courts
should avoid giving interim  orders  where  admissions  are  the  matter  of
dispute before the Court.  Even in case where the candidates  are  permitted
to continue with the courses, they should normally be not permitted to  take
further examinations of the professional courses.  The students  who  pursue
the courses under the orders of the Court would not  be  entitled  to  claim
any equity at the final decision of the case nor should it  weigh  with  the
courts of competent jurisdiction.



38.            Besides providing the above  answers  to  the  questions,  we
also issue the following directions  to  put  the  matters  to  rest  beyond
ambiguity and to ensure that the authorities act in accordance with law :


(a)            From  the  records  of  this  case,  it  is  clear  that  two
       different records are being maintained at  the  time  of  counseling.
       Firstly, the attendance register and thereafter photography and thumb
       impressions are taken and, secondly, the Committee maintains a record
       of the counseling where the students are actually  given  a  specific
       college/course of his/her preference.  We direct that the second  set
       of records shall be maintained more accurately.  It  shall  not  only
       contain the signatures of the candidate and the Committee members but
       also the date and time when the candidate is  given  a  seat  and  it
       shall also be signed by the candidate with the course clearly written
       by the Committee and signed by the candidate in the remarks column.


(b)            The essence of all the judgments dealing with this  issue  is
       to nurture discipline, fairness and transparency in the selection and
       admission process and avoid prejudice to any  of  the  stake-holders.
       Thus, while we  expect  the  authorities  to  be  perfect,  fair  and
       transparent in the discharge of their duties, we make it  clear  that
       the students who adopt malpractices in collusion with the authorities
       or otherwise for seeking admissions and if their admissions are found
       to be irregular or faulty in law by the courts, they  shall  normally
       be held responsible for paying compensation to such other  candidates
       who have been denied admission as a result of admission of the  wrong
       candidates.


(c)            The law requires adherence  to  a  settled  protocol  in  the
       process of selection and grant of admission.  None should be able  to
       circumvene or trounce this  process,  with  or  without  an  ulterior
       motive.  The courts are duty bound to ensure that litigation relating
       to academic courses, particularly, professional courses should not be
       generated for want of will on the part of the stake holders to follow
       the process of selection  and  admission  fairly,  transparently  and
       without exploitation.


(d)            Keeping in mind the hard reality that  there  are  number  of
       petitions filed in each High Court of the country, on  the  one  hand
       challenging the admissions on varied grounds  while,  on  the  other,
       praying  for  grant  of  admission  on  merit   to   the   respective
       professional courses of MBBS/BDS, the Court cannot lose sight of  the
       fact that the career of the meritorious youth is at stake.  These are
       matters relating to adherence to the  rule  of  merit  and  when  its
       breach is complained of, the judiciary may be expected to  deal  with
       the said grievances preferentially and effectively.  The diversity of
       our country and the fact that the larger population  lives  in  rural
       areas and there being demand for consistent increase in the  strength
       of qualified medical practitioners, we are  of  the  considered  view
       that such cases, at least as of now and particularly for  a  specific
       period of the year require higher priority in the heavy  business  of
       court cases.  We are not oblivious  of  the  fact  that  the  Hon’ble
       Judges of the High Court are working under great  pressure  and  with
       some limitations.  However, we would still  make  a  request  to  the
       Hon’ble Chief Justices  of  the  respective  High  Courts  to  direct
       listing of all medical admission cases before one Bench of the  Court
       as far as possible and in accordance with the Rules  of  that  Court.
       It would further be highly appreciable if the said Bench is requested
       to deal with such cases within a definite period, particularly during
       the period from July to October of a particular year.  We  express  a
       pious hope that our  request  would  weigh  with  the  Hon’ble  Chief
       Justices of the respective High Courts as it would  greatly  help  in
       serving the ends of justice as well as the national interest.


39.            For the reasons afore-recorded and  with  the  directions  as
mentioned above, we  direct  the  respondents  to  grant  admission  to  the
appellant to the MBBS course in the current academic  year  subject  to  the
condition that she will pursue her MBBS course right from its beginning  and
to the conditions afore-noticed.  However, in the  facts  and  circumstances
of the case, we award no costs.


               Appeal is disposed of accordingly.



                                        .…................................J.
                                                           [Swatanter Kumar]



                                        .…................................J.
                                                              [Ranjan Gogoi]
New Delhi;
July 10, 2012

A-1 was sitting in a Contessa car which was in the front of the procession and as the killing of the deceased took place in the middle of the procession, the evidence of the eye-witnesses should be discarded as not probable. The prosecution has been able to adduce evidence through its witnesses that at the time of shooting of the deceased, A-1 was at the spot and was exhorting Bhutkun Shukla to shoot at the deceased. If A-1 wanted the Court to believe that at the time of the incident he was in the Contessa car in the front of the procession and not at the spot, he should have taken this defence in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and also produced reliable evidence in support of this defence. Section 103 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 provides that the burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the Court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person. The prosecution by leading evidence through its several witnesses has established that A-1 was at the place of occurrence and had exhorted Bhutkun Shukla to shoot at the deceased. If A- 1 wanted the Court to reject this prosecution version as not probable, burden was on him to lead evidence that he was not at the spot and did not exhort Bhutkun Shukla to shoot at the deceased. Since he has not discharged this burden, the High Court was right in holding that A-1 was guilty of the offence under Section 302/109 IPC. 39. Regarding the sentence, the High Court has held that though the deceased was a District Magistrate, he was killed in another district as an occupant of a car by chance on account of mob fury and exhortation by A- 1 and firing by Bhutkun Shukla and as A-1 was not the assailant himself, rigorous imprisonment for life and death sentence would not be the appropriate sentence. We agree with this view of the High Court and we are of the view that this was not one of those rarest of rare cases where the High Court should have confirmed the death sentence on A-1. In our considered opinion, A-1 was liable for rigorous imprisonment for life. 40. In the result, we do not find any merit in either the appeal of A-1 or the appeals of the State and we accordingly dismiss all the criminal appeals.


                                                                  Reportable

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                   CRIMINAL APPEAL NOs. 1804-1805 OF 2009

Anand Mohan                                        …… Appellant

                                   Versus

State of Bihar                                           …… Respondent

                                    WITH

                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1536 OF 2009,
                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1537 OF 2009,
                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1538 OF 2009,
                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1539 OF 2009,
                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1540 OF 2009,
                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1541 OF 2009,
                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1542 OF 2009

                                     AND

                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1806 OF 2009



                               J U D G M E N T

A. K. PATNAIK, J.

      These are all appeals by way of special leave under Article  136  of
the Constitution against the common judgment of the Patna  High  Court  in
Death Reference No.12/2007 and Criminal  Appeals  (DB)  Nos.  1282,  1308,
1318, 1327, 1345, 1354 of 2007.

FACTS

2.    The facts are that a typed report was lodged by Mohan Rajak,  Deputy
Superintendent of Police (East), Muzaffarpur (for short  ‘the  informant’)
on  05.12.1994  at  22.10  hours  (10.10  p.m.)  at  PS  Sadar,   District
Muzaffarpur (East), which was treated as FIR.  The prosecution case in the
FIR briefly was as follows: On the night of  04.12.1994,  certain  unknown
criminals had murdered Shri Kaushlendra Kumar Shukla @ Chhotan Shukla  and
his associates at NH-28 and the post mortem  on  Chhotan  Shukla  and  the
other deceased persons was done on 05.12.1994 at the SKM College Hospital.
 The supporters of Chhotan Shukla belonging to  the  Bihar  Peoples  Party
gathered in large numbers at the hospital.  Considering the possibility of
breakdown of  law  and  order,  the  officers  of  the  civil  and  police
administration remained present with armed force and lathi  force  at  the
hospital.  After the  post  mortem,  the  dead  bodies  were  taken  in  a
procession to the house of Chhotan Shukla.  The procession was led by Arun
Kumar Singh,  Ramesh  Thakur,  Shashi  Shekhar  Thakur,  Ram  Babu  Singh,
Harendra Kumar, Vijay Kumar Shukla @  Munna  Shukla  and  others  and  was
escorted by the officers of the civil and police administration.  When the
procession reached the house of Chhotan  Shukla,  Anand  Mohan,  MLA,  and
Lovely Anand, M.P., and others who were present there, offered flowers  to
the dead body of Chhotan Shukla.  At about 3.30 p.m.,  the  dead  body  of
Chottan Shukla was taken in a procession to his ancestral house in village
Jalalpur under Lalganj Thana in Vaishali district where about 5000  people
gathered.  Thereafter, the procession  was  led  by  Anand  Mohan,  Lovely
Anand, Professor Arun Kumar Singh, Akhlak Ahmad, Harender Kumar, Rameshwar
Wiplavi and others and they were all in different vehicles.   Anand  Mohan
and Lovely Anand were sitting in their Contessa car.   An  Ambassador  car
and a white coloured Gypsy were moving in front of the  procession.   When
the procession reached the Bhagwanpur Chowk,  the  dead  body  of  Chottan
Shukla was kept for a while and Anand Mohan, Lovely  Anand  and  Professor
Arun Kumar Singh gave speeches instigating the crowd to  take  revenge  of
the murder of Chhotan Shukla  and  others  by  murder  and  to  teach  the
administration a lesson if it created any hurdle.  After listening to  the
speeches, the people became aggressive.  The procession  then  moved  from
Bhagwanpur Chowk towards Ram Dayal Nagar through the National Highway.  At
about 4.15 p.m. when the  procession  came  near  Khabra  Village  on  the
National Highway, the shouts “Maro Maro” were heard from the midst of  the
procession.  When the informant along  with  other  officers  reached  the
place from where the shouts were being heard, they found that on the right
hand side of the road the  Ambassador  car  of  the  District  Magistrate,
Gopalganj,  G. Krishnaiyyah  (coming  from  the  opposite  direction)  had
turned turtle and the District Magistrate was lying on the  ground.   They
also saw Anand Mohan, Lovely Anand, Professor Arun Kumar  Singh  and  some
others were loudly provoking  Bhutkun Shukla (brother of  Chhotan  Shukla)
to kill the District Magistrate and  take  revenge.   Thereafter,  Bhutkun
Shukla drew out a revolver from his waist and fired three shots  and  then
escaped into the crowd.  The District Magistrate got wounded.  Looking  at
the gravity of the situation, the Sub-Divisional  Officer  (East)  ordered
lathi charge and the police and other officers  present  started  charging
lathi at the crowd.  The District Magistrate, Gopalganj,  was  sent  in  a
Gypsy to the SKM College Hospital for  treatment.   Information  was  sent
through wireless to the District Headquarters of Vaishali  District  about
the incident.  In the meantime, the assailants fled  to  Hajipur  and  the
informant and the Sub-Divisional Officer (East) chased the assailants  and
reached Hajipur where they found 15  persons  including  Anand  Mohan  and
Lovely Anand caught by the  Hajipur  police.   All  the  15  persons  were
arrested and their vehicles were seized.  After the informant came back to
Muzaffarpur, he got information that the District  Magistrate,  Gopalganj,
died at the SKM College Hospital.


3.    Pursuant to the FIR, investigation was carried out by the police and
a charge-sheet was filed against 36 accused persons.   The  learned  Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Muzaffarpur,  committed  the  case  to  the  Sessions
Court.  The Sessions Court framed charge under Section  147  and  Sections
302/149 of the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘the IPC’) against all the  36
accused persons (A-1 to A-36) for being members of unlawful assembly  with
the common object of committing the murder  of  the  District  Magistrate,
Gopalganj, G. Krishnaiyyah, (for short ‘the  deceased’)  as  well  as  the
charge under Section 307/149 IPC  for  being  a  member  of  the  unlawful
assembly with the common object of attempting  to  commit  murder  of  the
photographer, the bodyguard and the driver of the deceased.   All  the  36
accused persons were also charged for the offence under  Sections  302/109
for abetting the commission of the murder of the deceased.   Anand  Mohan,
Lovely  Anand  and  Professor  Arun  Kumar  Singh  (A-1,   A-2   and   A-3
respectively) were further charged under Sections 302/114 IPC.

4.    At the trial, the prosecution examined as many as 25 witnesses.  PW-
1 to PW-14 were police officials who claimed to  be  with  or  behind  the
procession till the incident occurred. PW-15, PW-16 and PW-23 were doctors
who proved the injury reports and the post mortem report.  PW-17 and PW-21
are the driver and the bodyguard of the deceased.  PW-18 and PW-19 are the
Director and employee of  the  Forensic  Science  Laboratory,  Patna,  who
collected the blood-stained earth and broken  pieces  of  glass  from  the
place of occurrence.  PW-20 is the Executive  Magistrate  who  accompanied
the  procession.   PW-22  is  the  Assistant  Sub-Inspector,   Muzaffarpur
District, who investigated the case from 14.12.1994 to 16.12.1994.   PW-25
is the Additional S.P. Muzaffarpur who investigated the  case  for  a  few
hours and PW-24 is the second investigating  officer.   The  defence  also
examined twelve witnesses at the trial.

5.    The Additional Sessions Judge-I, Patna (for short ‘the trial court’)
found Anand Mohan,  Lovely  Anand,  Professor  Arun  Kumar  Singh,  Akhlak
Ahamad, Vijay Kumar Shukla @ Munna Shukla, Harendra Kumar @  Harendra  Pd.
Sahi and Shashi Shekhar Thakur (A-1, A-2,  A-3,  A-4,  A-5,  A-6  and  A-7
respectively) guilty of the offences under Sections 147, 302/149,  307/149
and 427/149 of the IPC.  The trial court also  held  Anand  Mohan,  Lovely
Anand, Professor Arun Kumar Singh and Akhlak Ahamad (A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-4
respectively) guilty of the offence of abetment  to  commit  murder  under
Sections 302/109 IPC.  The trial court  acquitted  the  remaining  accused
persons A-8 to A-36 of all the charges.  After hearing on the question  of
sentence, the trial court sentenced A-1, A-3 and  A-4  to  death  for  the
offence under  Sections  302/149  and  302/109  of  the  IPC  and  further
sentenced them for one year R.I. for the offence under Section 147 IPC,  5
years R.I. for the offence under Section 307/147 IPC and one year R.I. for
the offence under Section 427/149 IPC and all the sentences  were  to  run
concurrently.   The  trial  court,  however,   sentenced   A-2   to   life
imprisonment for the offences under Sections 302/149 and 302/109 IPC and a
fine of Rs.25,000/-, for one year R.I. for the offence under  Section  147
IPC, 5 years R.I. for the offence under Section 307/149 IPC and  one  year
R.I. for the offence under Section 427/149 IPC and all the sentences  were
to run concurrently and in default of payment of fine she was  to  undergo
simple imprisonment for a period of two years.  The trial court  sentenced
A-5, A-6 and A-7 for life  imprisonment  for  the  offence  under  Section
302/149 IPC and to pay fine of Rs.25,000/- each, R.I. for five  years  for
the offence under Section 307/149 IPC, R.I. for one year for  the  offence
under Section 147 IPC and R.I. for one year for the offence under  Section
427/149  IPC  and  in  default  of  payment  of  fine  to  undergo  simple
imprisonment for two years and all the sentences were to run concurrently.

6.    The sentence of death on A-1, A-3 and A-4 were referred to the  High
Court.  Criminal appeals were also filed by the convicts before  the  High
Court.  The High Court held in  the  impugned  common  judgment  that  the
prosecution has not been able to establish a  case  of  unlawful  assembly
with common object of causing death of the deceased, or any  other  person
and thus there could be no conviction under Sections 147 and 302/149  IPC.
The High Court, however, held on the basis of evidence of PW-1, PW-3,  PW-
4, PW-9, PW-10 and PW-14 that A-1 had exhorted the lone  shooter  to  kill
the deceased and hence he alone was guilty of the offence of  abetment  of
murder under Section 302/109 IPC.  Accordingly, the High Court acquitted A-
2 to A-7 of all the charges  and  sustained  the  conviction  of  A-1  but
converted the sentence of death on A-1 to one of rigorous imprisonment for
life.

7.    Aggrieved, A-1  has  filed  Criminal  Appeal  No.1804-1805  of  2009
challenging the impugned judgment of the  High  Court  in  so  far  as  it
sustained his  conviction  under  Section  302/109  IPC  and  imposed  the
punishment of rigorous imprisonment for life.   The  State  of  Bihar  has
filed Criminal Appeal Nos. 1536, 1537, 1538, 1539, 1540,  1541,  1542  and
1806 of 2009 challenging the impugned judgment of the High  Court  insofar
as it acquitted A-2 to A-7 and insofar as it converted the death  sentence
on A-1 to life imprisonment.

CONTENTIONS

8.    Mr.  Ram  Jethmalani,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  A-1
submitted that the occurrence took place at 4.15 P.M.  on  05.12.1994  and
soon thereafter information was sent  through  wireless  to  the  District
Headquarter,  Vaishali  District  about  the  incident  and   hence   this
information was the real FIR and would disclose the first account  of  the
occurrence.  He vehemently argued that this  wireless  message  sent  soon
after the incident to  the  District  Headquarters  of  District  Vaishali
clearly stated that the people who got mixed with the  funeral  procession
of the cremation of Chhotan Shukla have injured the deceased  by  shooting
him with a revolver and fled towards Hajipur  by  different  vehicles  and
this was the real FIR of the case but the High Court has not even  applied
its mind to this real FIR of the case.

9.    He submitted that instead of this wireless message, a  typed  report
of the informant PW-14 has been treated as the FIR.  He argued  that  this
typed report of PW-14 treated as FIR is stated to have been lodged in  the
Sadar P.S. at 22:10 hrs. (10.10 P.M.) on 05.12.1994, but the  evidence  of
PW-11 would show that the informant PW-14  returned  to  Muzaffarpur  only
after 2.00 A.M. on 06.12.1994. He submitted that the High Court  has  also
noticed in the impugned judgment  that  the  FIR  mentioned  the  name  of
Dy.S.P.-Dhiraj Kumar as the Investigating Officer who joined  after  leave
on duty on 06.12.2004 and took up investigation  at  8.15  A.M.  from  the
first I.O. PW-25  He argued that all these facts  clearly  establish  that
not only the FIR was ante-dated and ante-timed as 05.12.1994,  10.10  P.M.
but also fabricated by PW-14 making  false  allegations  against  A-1  and
against the  members  of  his  political  party  on  the  instructions  of
political superiors.  He contended that the High Court  having  held  that
there was evidence to suspect that the FIR was ante-dated  and  ante-timed
should have also come to the conclusion that the entire  prosecution  case
as stated in the FIR by PW-14 was false.

10.   Mr. Jethmalani next  submitted  that  the  High  Court  has  rightly
rejected the prosecution version that there was an unlawful assembly  with
the object of murdering the deceased and, therefore,  the  offences  under
Section 147 and 302/149 were not made  out  against  any  of  the  accused
persons.  He contended that having come to this finding,  the  High  Court
could not have held A-1 guilty of the offence of abetting the murder under
Section 302/109 IPC on the ground that A-1 had incited Bhutkun  Shukla  to
commit the murder.  He submitted that almost all the prosecution witnesses
have stated that the deceased was shot by Bhutkun Shukla when he was lying
injured on the ground, but the medical evidence establishes  that  he  was
shot when he was in a standing position and thus the prosecution witnesses
have not actually seen the incident nor heard any exhortation  by  A-1  to
Bhutkun to kill the deceased.   He  argued  that  the  High  Court  having
recorded the finding that  PW-11  was  a  false  witness  could  not  have
believed the other witnesses supporting the case that was put  forward  by
PW-11 in his evidence.  He relied on the station Diary entry Nos. 92,  94,
97 and 102 of the Police Station of PW-11 to show that PW-11 was not  even
there in the procession accompanying the dead body of Chhotan  Shukla  but
had gone for some investigation at the University where he  was  stationed
as a police officer.

11.   He argued that the High Court failed to realize that A-1  along with
his wife A-2 were in a white Contessa Car which was almost at the front of
the procession behind the police car and the Tata Maxi carrying  the  dead
bodies of Chhotan Shukla and another, whereas the shouts of   “maro  maro”
came from the rear of the procession and the witnesses  have  all  deposed
that when they reached there they found that the Car was  over-turned  and
the deceased was lying injured on  the  ground.   He  submitted  that  the
deceased was, therefore, dead before A-1 Anand Mohan could come  from  his
Contessa car to the place of occurrence and the entire  prosecution  story
that Bhutkun was incited by A-1 to kill the deceased must  necessarily  be
false.

12.   Mr. Jethmalani submitted that the High Court  failed  to  appreciate
the following circumstances:


       (i)  There is no evidence that A-1 knew the deceased and, therefore,
       when the car of the deceased came from the  opposite  direction  and
       crossed the Contessa Car in which A-1 was sitting he  did  not  know
       that it was the deceased who was sitting in the car and there was no
       reason for him to incite any one to kill him;




       (ii)  There is no evidence that A-1 got  out  of  his  Contessa  Car
       which was in front of the procession and went towards  the  rear  of
       the procession to incite the killing of the deceased;


       (iii)        The provocative speech  attributed  to    A-1  were  at
       Bhagwanpur Chowk and the police officers are the only witnesses  who
       have deposed with regard to such provocative speech by A-1 and their
       deposition that the speech was provocative was the  opinion  of  the
       police officers and hence the High Court rightly did not rely on the
       provocative speech of A-1 to convict him;


       (iv)   There were discrepancies in the evidence  of  witnesses  with
       regard to the exhortation by the accused persons to Bhutkun to shoot
       and thus the High Court  should  have  rejected  the  story  of  the
       prosecution that A-1 incited Bhutkun to shoot the deceased;


       (v)   The prosecution story  that  the  procession  wanted  to  seek
       vengeance on the  administration  is  falsified  by  an  independent
       witness PW-12 (Tara Razak), the SDO who accompanied the procession;


       (vi)   The High Court did not take into consideration  the  evidence
       of PW-17 and 21, the driver and the body guard of the deceased,  who
       did not support the prosecution case.

He submitted that had the High Court considered  these  circumstances,  it
would have acquitted A-1 of all the charges.

13.     Mr. Ranjeet Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing for the  State
of Bihar, submitted that the court must appreciate the  facts  which  have
led to the occurrence in this case.  He submitted that Chhotan Shukla  was
a candidate in the ensuing State Assembly elections on behalf of the Bihar
Peoples Party of which A-1 and A-2 were leaders and on 04.12.1994  Chhotan
Shukla and his four associates were killed  by  some  unknown  persons  in
Muzaffarpur.  He submitted that the gathering on  05.12.1994  at  the  SKM
College Hospital where the bodies of Chhotan Shukla and others were  taken
for post mortem was of people belonging to the Bihar Peoples Party and the
procession which accompanied the dead bodies of Chhotan Shukla and  others
was a show of  political  strength  displayed  by  A-1  and  A-2  and  his
political  associates.   He  submitted  that  the   provocative   speeches
delivered by A-1, A-2 and  others  of  the  Bihar  Peoples  Party  at  the
Bhagwanpur Chowk aroused the emotions in the crowd of almost  5000  people
to take revenge by bloodshed and this was the cause for  the  violence  on
the car of the deceased which was coming from the opposite direction  when
the procession reached Village Khabra.   He  submitted  that  the  violent
crowd pulled out the occupants of the car, beat them, overturned  the  car
and finally Bhutkun Shukla shot the deceased on the exhortation of A-1  to
A-4  because  the  deceased  represented  the  State  administration.   He
submitted that the High Court has not appreciated these  background  facts
which led to the murder of the deceased and has acquitted A-2 to  A-7  and
has sustained only the conviction of A-1 under Section 302/109 IPC.

14.   In reply to the submissions of  Mr.  Jethmalani  that  the  wireless
message sent to the District Headquarters, Vaishali  district  soon  after
the incident on 5.12.1994 was the real FIR, Mr.  Ranjeet  Kumar  submitted
that the wireless message was very cryptic and could not be treated as  an
FIR.  He cited the decision of this Court in Binay Kumar Singh and  others
v. State of Bihar [(1997) 1 SCC 283] in which it has been  held  that  the
officer in-charge of the police station is not obliged to  accept  as  FIR
any nebulous information received from somebody which  does  not  disclose
any authentic cognizable offence and it is open to the  officer  in-charge
to collect more information  containing  details  of  the  occurrence,  if
available, so that he can consider whether a cognizable offence  has  been
committed warranting investigation.

15.   On the delay in lodging the FIR, he referred to the evidence of  the
informant, PW-14, to show that he had to first send the  deceased  in  the
Gypsy car for treatment to the SKM College Hospital and he had  to  go  to
Hajipur to arrest the accused persons and only after the  accused  persons
were taken to custody at Hajipur, he came back to Muzaffarpur and prepared
the typed report and lodged the same as FIR in the  Sadar  P.S.  at  about
10.00 P.M. in the night.  He submitted  that  there  was  thus  sufficient
explanation for the delay in lodging the  FIR.   He  cited  Erram  Santosh
Reddy and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh [(1991) 3 SCC  206]  in  which
there was a delay of six hours in lodging  the  FIR  and  the  prosecution
explained that the police had to raid, effect  recoveries  and  thereafter
submit a report in the concerned police station and on  these  facts  this
Court held that no adverse inference could be drawn because of  the  delay
in lodging the FIR.  He submitted that in Amar Singh v. Balwinder Singh  &
Ors. [(2003) 2 SCC 518] this Court has held that a delay of  26  hours  in
lodging the FIR from the time of the incident was fully explained from the
evidence on record and, therefore, no adverse  inference  could  be  drawn
against the prosecution.

16.   Mr. Ranjeet Kumar  submitted  that  the  medical  evidence  did  not
altogether make the ocular evidence improbable.  He argued that the ocular
evidence of different witnesses categorically states that  Bhutkun  Shukla
came out from the crowd and fired 3 shots and  PW-16,  who  conducted  the
post mortem, has stated that there were three bullet injuries in the  body
of the deceased.  He submitted that no one can predict how  a  human  body
would respond to the first bullet shot and therefore from  the  nature  of
the bullet injuries in the body of the deceased who was shot from  a  very
close range, one cannot conclude that the deceased  could  not  have  been
shot after he fell on the ground as contended by Mr. Jethmalani.  He cited
the decision of this Court in Abdul Sayeed  v.  State  of  Madhya  Pradesh
[(2010) 10 SCC 259] for the proposition that ocular testimony has  greater
evidentiary value vis-à-vis medical evidence.  He submitted  that  in  the
present case the medical evidence does not go so far as to  rule  out  the
truth of the ocular evidence.

17.   He submitted that the oral evidence in this case is consistent  that
A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-4 not only delivered provocative speeches against  the
administration and  aroused  the  emotions  of  the  crowd  to  resort  to
bloodshed but also exhorted Bhutkun Shukla to shoot at  the  deceased  who
represented the State administration.  He referred to the evidence of  PWs
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 who  have  deposed  about
the provocative speeches and exhortation of A-1 to A-4.  He cited  Masalti
v. State of U.P. [1964(8) SCR 133] wherein this Court has held that  where
a criminal  court  has  to  deal  with  the  evidence  pertaining  to  the
commission of offence involving large number of offenders and large number
of victims, it is usual to adopt a  test  that  the  conviction  could  be
sustained only if it is supported by two or three or  more  witnesses  who
give a consistent account of  the  incident.   He  also  referred  to  the
decisions of this Court in Binay Kumar Singh and others v. State of  Bihar
(supra) and Abdul Sayeed v. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra) in  which  the
test laid down in Masalti v. State of U.P. (supra)  has  been  reiterated.
He submitted that unfortunately the  High  Court  disbelieved  the  police
witnesses and preferred to rely on  the  evidence  of  only  the  civilian
officials and acquitted A-2 to A-7 of all the charges and  sustained  only
the conviction of A-1 although there was sufficient evidence  against  A-2
to A-7.  He cited Girja Prasad v. State of M.P. [(2007) SCC  625]  wherein
it has been held by this Court that it is not the law that police  witness
should not be relied upon and their evidence cannot be accepted unless  it
is corroborated in material particulars by other independent evidence.

18.      He submitted that the High Court also acquitted A-1 to A-7 of the
charges under Sections 147 and 302/149 IPC on the ground that there was no
unlawful assembly with common object to commit the murder of the  deceased
or any other person.  He cited the decisions of  this  Court  in  Sikandar
Singh and others v. State of Bihar [(2010) 7 SCC 477] and  Virendra  Singh
v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(2010) 8 SCC 407] to contend that the A-1 to A-
7 had formed an unlawful assembly with the common object of murdering  the
deceased and the other occupants of the car at the spur of the moment.

19.      He relied on the decision of this Court in Rizan and  Another  v.
State  of  Chhattisgarh  [(2003)  2  SCC  661]  to   argue   that   normal
discrepancies in evidence are likely to occur  due  to  normal  errors  of
observations, normal errors of memory due to lapse  of  time  and  due  to
mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence  but
these discrepancies do not make the evidence of a witness untrue and it is
only the material discrepancy which affect the credibility  of  a  party’s
case.  He submitted that had the  High  Court  overlooked  the  minor  and
normal discrepancies in the evidence of different witnesses who had  given
their account of the incident as observed by them from different places at
the spot at the time of occurrence it would have come  to  the  conclusion
that the witnesses gave a consistent account of the involvement of A-1  to
A-7 in committing the offence under Sections 302/149 and 302/109 IPC.   He
submitted that High  Court,  therefore,  could  not  have  set  aside  the
findings of the trial court and  should  have  sustained  also  the  death
sentence on A-1, A-3 and A-4.

20.         Mr. Surinder Singh, learned senior counsel appearing  for  the
respondents in Criminal Appeals Nos. 1536, 1537, 1538, 1540, 1541 and 1542
of 2009, submitted in reply that the fact that the FIR was not lodged soon
after the incident at 4.15 P.M. on 05.12.1994 indicates that the informant
and  all  other  officers  accompanying  the  procession  had  no  inkling
whatsoever as to who committed the murder of the deceased.  He  cited  the
decision of this Court in Bhagaloo Lodh and Another   v.  State  of  Uttar
Pradesh  [(2011) 13 SCC 206] in which it has been  held  that  prompt  and
early reporting of the occurrence by the informant  with  all   its  vivid
details gives an assurance regarding the truth of its  version  and  where
there is a delay in lodging the FIR without any explanation a  presumption
can be raised that the allegations in the  FIR  were  false  and  that  it
contains a coloured version of the events that had taken place.   He  also
relied on Awadesh  v.  State of M.P.  [AIR 1988 SC 1158],  in  which  this
Court found that the FIR was lodged belatedly because  the  names  of  the
assailants were not known and a lot  of  deliberation  took  place  before
lodging the FIR and this Court held that the  prosecution  has  failed  to
prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.  He also cited Ganesh Bhavan Patel
v.  State of Maharashtra [(1978) 4 SCC 371] in which this Court  has  held
that the inordinate delay in the registration of the FIR and further delay
in recording the  statement  of  material  witnesses  caused  a  cloud  of
suspicion  on  the  credibility  of  the  entire  warp  and  woof  of  the
prosecution story.  He submitted that in Marudanal Augusti  v.   State  of
Kerala [(1980) 4 SCC 425] this Court gave the  benefit  of  doubt  to  the
accused and acquitted him after it found that the FIR was  fabricated  and
brought into existence long after the occurrence.

21.    He submitted that the  High  Court  was  right  in  coming  to  the
conclusion that no case of unlawful assembly was established  against  A-1
to A-7.  He argued that the speeches made at  Bhagwanpur  Chowk  were  not
provocative but rhetorical and in any case since an  Executive  Magistrate
was also present all through along with the procession the Court could not
come to the conclusion that the accused persons  constituted  an  unlawful
assembly either at Bhagwanpur Chowk where the speeches were  delivered  or
at Khabra where the incident took place.

22.   He referred to the evidence of PW-12 & PW-13 who were sub-divisional
officers and to the evidence  of  PW-21  who  was  the  bodyguard  of  the
deceased to show that these independent witnesses have not  said  anything
about the exhortation by A-1 to A-7 to Bhutkun to kill the  deceased.   He
also submitted that the evidence of  the  prosecution  witnesses  are  not
consistent on the point as to who exhorted Bhutkun to  kill  the  deceased
and, therefore, the decision of this Court in  Masalti  v.  State  of  U.P
(supra) does not apply to the facts of the  present  case.   He  submitted
that in Jainul Haque v. State of Bihar  [AIR 1974 SC 45]  this  Court  has
held that evidence of exhortation is in the very nature of things  a  weak
piece of evidence and there is often quite a tendency  to  implicate  some
person in addition to the actual assailant by attributing to  that  person
an exhortation to the assailant to  assault  the  victim  and  unless  the
evidence in this respect is clear, cogent and reliable, no conviction  for
abetment can be recorded against the person alleged to have  exhorted  the
actual assailant.  He submitted that considering the  proposition  of  law
laid down in this decision,  and  considering  the  fact  that  there  are
discrepancies with  regard  to  who  exhorted  Bhutkun  to  shoot  at  the
deceased, the conviction of A1-A7 would not be unsafe.

23.   He submitted  that  if  as  has  been  deposed  by  the  prosecution
witnesses the deceased was lying on the ground when Bhutkun shot  at  him,
then the first injury on the deceased could not have at all been caused by
shooting and, therefore, the witnesses were lying.  He cited  Awadesh   v.
State of M.P. (supra) in which this Court did not believe the  prosecution
witnesses because of the opinion of the doctor that  the  person  who  had
caused the injuries on the  deceased  was  at  a  higher  level  than  the
deceased and this opinion was wholly inconsistent with  the  testimony  of
the eye-witnesses and the  medical  expert’s  opinion  corroborated  other
circumstances which indicated that the  eye-witnesses  had  not  seen  the
actual occurrence.  He also relied on Budh Singh  v.  State of  U.P.  [AIR
2006 SC 2500] in which this Court has held that from the medical  evidence
it appeared that the direction of the injury was from upwards to downwards
and this belies the statements of prosecution witnesses that  the  accused
and the deceased were in a standing position  and  were  quarrelling  with
each other.

24.   He finally submitted that the High Court lost sight of the fact that
although the procession started from Muzaffarpur  and  the  speeches  were
delivered at Bhagwanpur Chowk the incident took place  at  Khabra  Village
and the car could have been overturned and deceased could have  been  shot
not by any person coming in the procession but by a  person  from  amongst
the crowd of Khabra Village who had gathered to see the procession.

25.         Mr. Nagendra Rai, learned senior  counsel  appearing  for  the
respondent  in  Criminal  Appeal  No.1539  of  2009  (A-4  Akhlak  Ahmad),
submitted that it has come in evidence that the Chief  Minister  of  Bihar
was present at the SKM College and Hospital, Muzaffarpur.   He  cited  the
decision of this Court in Om Prakash v.  State of Haryana  [(2006)  2  SCC
250], in which this Court considered the presence of Dy. S.P. at the place
of occurrence for about three hours and  also  considered  the  fact  that
there was no explanation for the long delay in lodging the  FIR  and  gave
the benefit of doubt to the accused persons.  He  also  relied  on  Ganesh
Bhavan Patel v. State of Maharashtra (supra) wherein this Court took  into
consideration the delay in registration of the FIR as a  circumstance  for
acquitting the accused of the charges.

26.   He submitted that the High Court has rightly held that there was  no
unlawful assembly with the object of murdering the deceased or  any  other
person.  He submitted that the accused persons could not have  shared  the
object of Bhutkun to kill  the  deceased  and,  therefore,  there  was  no
“common object” which is a necessary ingredient of  an  unlawful  assembly
and hence the offences under Section 147 and 302/149  IPC  have  not  been
made out against the accused persons.

27.   He also referred to the evidence of PWs 12, 13 and 20 to  show  they
have not supported the prosecution case that the killing of  the  deceased
took place before them and they have stated in their  evidence  that  when
they reached the spot, the shooting incident had already taken place.   He
submitted that even PW-1 has stated that no police personnel  had  reached
the spot where the  shooting  took  place.   He  argued  that  PW-21,  the
bodyguard of the deceased  who  is  the  most  material  witness  had  not
supported the case of the prosecution that  A-1,  A-2,  A-3  and  A-4  had
exhorted Bhutkun to shoot at  the  deceased.   He  submitted  that  it  is
difficult to believe that the police personnel would  not  have  prevented
the killing of the deceased if the killing was  about  to  take  place  in
their  presence.   He  finally  submitted  that  the   photographer,   who
accompanied the deceased, though a material witness, has not been examined
in Court and an adverse inference should be drawn against the  prosecution
for withholding the photographer from giving evidence in Court.

FINDINGS

28.     The first question that we have to decide is whether the  wireless
message sent soon after the incident on 05.12.1994  is  the  real  FIR  as
contended  on  behalf  of  the  defence  or  whether  the   typed   report
subsequently lodged by PW-14 in the Muzaffarpur Sadar  Police  Station  is
the FIR as contended on behalf of the  prosecution.   Sub-section  (1)  of
Section 154 Cr.P.c. which provides for the  First  Information  Report  is
quoted hereinbelow:

        “(1) Every information relating to the commission of  a  cognizable
        offence, if given orally to  an  officer  in  charge  of  a  police
        station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction,
        and be read over to the  informant;  and  every  such  information,
        whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid,  shall
        be signed by the person giving it, and the substance thereof  shall
        be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the
        State Government may prescribe in this behalf.”



It will be clear from the language  of  sub-section  (1)  of  Section  154
Cr.P.C. that every information relating to the commission of a  cognizable
offence whether given in writing or reduced to writing shall be signed  by
the person giving it.  Hence, the person who gives the information and who
has to sign the information has to  choose  which  particular  information
relating to the commission of a cognizable offence is to be treated as  an
FIR.  In the present case, PW-14, the informant has chosen  not  to  treat
the wireless message but the subsequent typed information as the  FIR  and
the police has also not treated the wireless message  but  the  subsequent
typed information as the FIR.  Moreover, the wireless  message  sent  soon
after the incident on 05.12.1994 stated only that the  people  mixed  with
the crowd of funeral procession for the cremation of Chottan  Shukla  have
injured the deceased by shooting him with revolver and have  fled  towards
Hajipur by different vehicles.  This wireless message was cryptic and  did
not sufficiently disclose the nature of the offence  committed  much  less
the identity of the persons who committed the offence.  Unless  and  until
more information was collected on how exactly the deceased was killed,  it
was not mandatory for either PW-14 to lodge the same as  FIR  or  for  the
Officer Incharge of a police station to treat the same as  an  FIR.   Such
cryptic information has been held by this Court not  to  be  FIR  in  some
cases.  In Sheikh Ishaque and Others v. State of Bihar [(1995) 3 SCC  392]
Gulabi Paswan gave a cryptic information at  the  police  station  to  the
effect that there was a commotion at  the  village  as  firing  and  brick
batting was going on and this Court held that this cryptic information did
not even disclose the commission  of  a  cognizable  offence  nor  did  it
disclose who were the assailants and such a cryptic  statement  of  Gulabi
Paswan cannot be treated to be an FIR within the meaning  of  Section  154
Cr.P.C.  Similarly, in Binay Kumar Singh and others  v .  State  of  Bihar
(supra) information was furnished to the police  in  Ex.10/3  by  Rabindra
Bhagat that the sons of late Ram Niranjan Sharma along with  large  number
of persons in his village have set fire to the houses and piles of  straws
and have also resorted  to  firing.   This  Court  held  that  Ex.10/3  is
evidently a cryptic information and is hardly sufficient  to  discern  the
commission  of  any  cognizable  offence  therefrom.   In  our  considered
opinion, therefore, the trial  court  and  the  High  Court  have  rightly
treated the subsequent typed written information lodged by PW-14  and  not
the wireless message as the FIR.

29.   The second question that we are called upon to decide is whether the
typed report of PW-14 which has been treated as  the  FIR  was  lodged  at
10.10 p.m. on 05.12.1994 as claimed by prosecution or was actually  lodged
at the Muzaffarpur Sadar Police Station in the morning  of  16.12.1994  as
contended by the defence.  We have perused  the  evidence  of  PW-14,  the
informant.  He has stated that after the deceased was injured by a  person
with his revolver at about 4.15  p.m.  on  05.12.1994,  the  mob  starting
escaping from the main road to Lalganj and some people ran towards Hajipur
and he along with others followed the mob and  reached  Hajipur  at  6  O’
Clock and went to the Circuit House and stayed there for one hour and then
left for Muzaffarpur at 7 O’ Clock.  In the impugned  judgment,  the  High
Court did not accept this evidence of  PW-14  that  he  left  Hajipur  for
Muzaffarpur at 7.00 P.M. as it found that most of the other witnesses  had
admitted that they left Hajipur at 9.00 P.M. and PW-11 had  admitted  that
he left Hajipur at 12.00 in the midnight so as  to  reach  Muzaffarpur  at
2.00 A.M. in the night along with others.  Though PW-11 has stated in  his
evidence that all the people returned from Hajipur Circuit House at  7  O’
Clock, he has also stated in his evidence that he was with the SDO till 12
in the midnight and he went to Garoul, Hajipur, and after apprehending the
accused he returned to Muzaffarpur.  PW-11  has  further  stated  that  he
returned to the Sadar Police Station at Muzaffarpur at 2 O’ Clock at night
and the DM, SP, SDO, DSP (PW-14) and other  officers  also  returned  with
him.  Hence, the High Court has held that PW-14 along with other  officers
including PW-11 reached Muzaffarpur  at  2.00  pm  in  the  night.   After
reaching the Sadar Police Station at Muzaffarpur,  PW-14  has  taken  some
more time to lodge the lengthy typed written FIR.  PW-14 has  stated  that
for lodging the FIR at the Muzaffarpur Sadar Police Station he  took  help
from all the officers present and in  fact  took  the  statements  of  4-5
officers.  He has stated that he made a typed FIR and he took half an hour
to complete the statement and it took one hour to lodge the FIR.   On  the
basis of all these evidence on record, the High Court did not  accept  the
version of the prosecution that the FIR was lodged  with  the  Muzaffarpur
Sadar Police Station at 10.10 p.m. on 05.12.1994 and has instead held that
the evidence creates a reasonable suspicion about the FIR being ante dated
and ante timed.  We do not find any error in  this  finding  of  the  High
Court.

30.   We now come to the main contention on behalf of the defence that the
High Court should have totally discarded the  prosecution  story  once  it
held that the evidence creates a reasonable suspicion about the FIR  being
ante-dated and ante-timed.   In none of the cases cited by the defence, we
find that this Court has discarded the entire prosecution  story  only  on
the ground that the FIR was ante dated and ante timed.  In  Ganesh  Bhavan
Patel  v. State of Maharashtra (supra) relied on by the defence this Court
considered the inordinate delay in recording the statements  of  witnesses
under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and other circumstances along with the fact that
the FIR was lodged belatedly without proper explanation and then held that
the prosecution case was not reliable.  Again, in  Marudanal  Augusti   v.
State of Kerala (supra) cited by the defence, this Court  disbelieved  the
prosecution story not because of unexplained delay in the dispatch of  the
FIR to the Magistrate only  but  also  because  the  FIR  which  contained
graphic details of the  occurrence  with  the  minutest  details  did  not
mention the names of the witnesses and there  were  other  infirmities  to
throw serious doubt on the prosecution story.  In Awadesh   v.   State  of
M.P. (supra) relied on by the defence, besides finding that the  delay  in
lodging the FIR was suspicious, this  Court  also  found  that  the  empty
cartridges were recovered from the place of occurrence one day  after  the
incident and the medical evidence established that the witnesses  had  not
actually seen the incident and considering all  these  circumstances  this
Court held that the prosecution had not proved the case beyond  reasonable
doubt.  This Court has, on the other  hand,  held  in  State  of  M.P.  v.
Mansingh and others [(2003) 10 SCC 414] that if the date and time  of  the
FIR is suspicious, the prosecution version is not rendered vulnerable  but
the court is required to make  a  careful  analysis  of  the  evidence  in
support of the prosecution case.  Thus, we will have  to  make  a  careful
analysis of the evidence in this case to find out how far the  prosecution
case as alleged in the FIR is true.

31.     In the present case, the fact remains that soon after the incident
at about 4.15 P.M. on 05.12.1994 information was sent from  the  place  of
the incident to the District Headquarters of Vaishali  district  that  the
people mixed with the funeral procession  for  the  cremation  of  Chottan
Shukla have injured the deceased by a revolver and fled towards Hajipur by
different vehicles.  At least this part  of  the  prosecution  case  which
finds place in the subsequent typed FIR lodged by PW-14 in the early hours
of 06.12.1994 cannot be discarded to be false and the court will  have  to
decide on the basis of evidence as  to  who  amongst  the  people  in  the
funeral procession for cremation of Chottan Shukla are responsible for the
injury caused to the deceased.

32.     In fact, the High Court also has not accepted the  entire  version
of the FIR lodged by PW-14 and has rejected the case of the prosecution in
the FIR that there was an unlawful assembly and that A-1 to A-7 were  part
of that unlawful assembly with the object of killing  the  deceased.   The
High Court has held in the impugned judgment that the mob which surrounded
the car of the deceased caused damage to the car by throwing brickbats and
caused injuries to its occupants after pulling them  out  and  had  turned
into an unlawful  assembly  but  from  the  evidence  on  record  and  the
circumstances it is not established that even  the  members  of  such  mob
shared the common object of killing the  deceased.   The  High  Court  has
further held that some of the processionists  who  were  in  the  vehicles
close to the place of occurrence could have come out from  their  vehicles
to find out the reasons for the commotion but when nobody was  even  aware
that the deceased would be passing through the place such  persons  cannot
be held to be members of unlawful assembly actuated by the  common  object
of killing the deceased.  The High Court has also held that there were  no
allegations that the processionists were carrying any arms and  there  was
insufficient evidence about the exact behaviour of  the  assembly  at  the
scene of the occurrence.  The High Court has further held that the  driver
and the bodyguard of the deceased have stated in their evidence  that  the
car could not pass on the left side of the road because of presence  of  a
mob on the flank of the road while the funeral procession was  moving  and
this shows that the attack on the car of the deceased  and  its  occupants
was a sudden act of the mob  which  had  gathered  to  watch  the  funeral
procession near Khabra Village.  The High Court has found that the  driver
and the bodyguard of the deceased have not said anything in their evidence
on what led to the anger of the mob and instead they had been  anxious  to
show that they had committed no mistake due  to  which  the  deceased  was
killed.  The High Court has thus held that the  processionists,  who  were
going with the dead body on motor vehicle, did not have any common  object
and therefore did not constitute an unlawful assembly and hence A-1 to A-7
could not be held liable for the offence under Section 302/149 IPC on  the
ground that they were members of an unlawful assembly which had the object
of killing the deceased or any other person.  In our  considered  opinion,
the High Court rightly rejected the contention of the prosecution that A-1
to A-7 were liable for conviction under Section 302/149 IPC.

33.   The High Court after carefully  scrutinizing  the  evidence  of  the
witnesses has also discarded the prosecution story in the FIR lodged by PW-
14 that A-2, A-3 and A-4 had exhorted Bhutkun Shukla to kill the deceased.
 The High Court has held that none of  the  eye-witnesses  of  Category-II
comprising the civil officials, the driver and the bodyguard, namely,  PW-
12, PW-13, PW-17 and PW-21 have supported the allegations  of  exhortation
by A-1 to A-7 and  out  of  the  Category-I  witnesses  comprising  Police
Personnel, PW-5 and PW-9 have not heard anyone exhorting Bhutkun Shukla to
kill the deceased.  The High Court  has  further  held  that  out  of  the
seventeen alleged eye-witnesses, six witnesses do not speak of exhortation
and out of the  remaining  eleven  prosecution  witnesses,  six  witnesses
namely, PW-1, PW-3, PW-4, PW-9, PW-10 and PW-14, have said that  only  A-1
exhorted Bhutkun Shukla to shoot at the deceased.  Accordingly,  the  High
Court has recorded the finding that only A-1 exhorted the lone shooter  to
kill the deceased and was guilty of the offence of abetment under  Section
109 IPC and was liable for punishment under Section 302/109  IPC  for  the
murder of the deceased and A-2, A-3 and A-4 have to be  acquitted  of  the
charges under Section 302/109 IPC.

34.   We have gone through the evidence of the witnesses and we find  that
this finding of the High Court that A-2, A-3 and A-4 cannot be held guilty
of  the  offences  under  Section  302/109  IPC  is  based  on  a  correct
appreciation of evidence of the prosecution witnesses.   Out  of  fourteen
witnesses who accompanied the procession, only four witnesses, namely, PW-
6, PW-7, PW-8 and PW-11 have said that A-2 along with A-1 exhorted Bhutkun
Shukla to shoot at the deceased, whereas the remaining eight  do  not  say
that  A-2  also  exhorted  Bhutkun  Shukla  to  shoot  at  the   deceased.
Similarly, out of the fourteen witnesses who accompanied  the  procession,
only PW-7 and PW-8 have spoken of exhortation by A-3 to Bhutkun Shukla  to
shoot at the deceased and the remaining eleven  witnesses  have  not  said
that A-3 also exhorted Bhutkun Shukla to shoot at the deceased.  Again out
of the fourteen witnesses examined by the prosecution, only PW-7 and PW-11
have said that A-4 also exhorted Bhutkun Shukla to shoot at the  deceased,
but the remaining twelve witnesses have not said that  A-4  also  exhorted
Bhutkun Shukla to shoot at the District Magistrate.  This Court  has  held
in Jainul Haque v. State of Bihar (supra) that evidence of exhortation  is
in the very nature of things a weak piece of evidence and there  is  often
quite a tendency to implicate  some  person  in  addition  to  the  actual
assailant by attributing to that person an exhortation to the assailant to
assault the victim and unless the  evidence  in  this  respect  is  clear,
cogent and reliable, no conviction for abetment can  be  recorded  against
the person alleged to have  exhorted  the  actual  assailant.   Since  the
majority  out  of  the  fourteen  prosecution  witnesses  comprising  both
civilian and police personnel accompanying the procession do  not  support
the prosecution version that A-2, A-3 and A-4 also exhorted Bhutkun Shukla
to shoot at the deceased, it will not be safe to convict A-2, A-3 and  A-4
for the offence of abetment of the murder of the deceased.  In  our  view,
therefore, the High Court was right in acquitting A-2, A-3 and A-4 of  the
charge under Section 302/109 IPC.

35.   In Masalti vs. State of U.P. (supra), this Court has held that where
a criminal  court  has  to  deal  with  the  evidence  pertaining  to  the
commission of offence involving large number of offenders and large number
of victims, it is usual to adopt a  test  that  the  conviction  could  be
sustained only if it is supported by two or three or  more  witnesses  who
give a consistent account of the incident.  In this case, ten out  of  the
fourteen witnesses who were accompanying the procession and were near  the
place of occurrence have given a  consistent  version  that  A-1  exhorted
Bhutkun Shukla to shoot at the deceased.  PW-1, PW-3, PW-4, PW-6, PW-7, PW-
8, PW-9, PW-10, PW-11  and  PW-14,  have  consistently  deposed  that  A-1
exhorted Bhutkun Shukla to shoot at  the  deceased.   The  remaining  four
witnesses may be at the place of occurrence but for  some  reason  or  the
other may not have heard the exhortation by A-1 to Bhutkan to shoot at the
deceased.  Hence, just because four of the  fourteen  witnesses  have  not
deposed regarding the fact of exhortation by A-1, we cannot hold that  the
ten witnesses have falsely deposed that A-1 had exhorted Bhutkun to  shoot
at the deceased.

36.    We have also considered the submission of the  defence  that  these
witnesses have deposed that the deceased was shot by Bhutkun  Shukla  when
he was lying injured on the ground but the  medical  evidence  establishes
that the bullets were fired when the deceased was in the standing position
and on this ground the evidence of these ten witnesses  who  have  deposed
with regard to exhortation by A-1  to  Bhutkun  Shukla  to  shoot  at  the
deceased should be discarded.  We find that PW-16, Dr.  Momtaj  Ahmad  who
carried out the post mortem on the dead body of the deceased on 05.12.1994
at 4.40 P.M. has described in his evidence the following three ante mortem
injuries on the body of the deceased:
        “(1)(a) Due oval wound 1/3” in diameter with  inverted  margin  and
        burning of the area on lateral side of the left eye brow.


        (b) lacerated injury internal cavity deep with inverted margin  was
        found on central part of forehead just above eye  brow  3”  x  1.2”
        into internal cavity from which fractured piece of frontal bone and
        brain material was prodding out.


        On dissection the two wound were found interconnected.


        (ii) One oval wound ¼” in diameter with inverted margin  was  found
        at left cheek.


        On dissection maxilla and mandible were found fractured and  tongue
        and inner part of lower lip was found  lacerated.   The  projectile
        after entering the left cheek and damaging above organs have passed
        away from oval cavity.


        (iii) One oval wound  with  interverted  margin  and  singling  and
        burning of the margin ¼” in diameter was found  on  right  parietal
        region of head;


        (b) One oval wound 1.3”  x  ½’’  into  internal  cavity  deep  with
        everted margin was found on left parietal region of head.


        On dissection two wounds were found interconnected with facture  of
        skull bone into so many pieces and laceration of brain tissue.”



PW-16 has further stated in his evidence that out of  these  3  wounds,  2
were on the left side and one on the right side of the body.  In his cross
examination, PW-16 has stated:
        “34. The projectile may travel in the  body  even  in  standing  or
        sleeping position.


        38. Injury No.II indicates that the patient may be able to move his
        face.  From my postmortem report it appears that only after causing
        injury No.II the other injury No.III was caused.  After  sustaining
        injury No.III the one could not be moved and as  such  injury  No.1
        might not have been inflicted.  On parity of logic  vice  versa  is
        also correct.  Thus injury No.(i) was caused  before  injury  No.II
        (Volunteers that instead of definite was or were, if they should be
        read may and might)”



The evidence of PW-16 is clear that the projectile may travel in the  body
even in standing or sleeping position.  PW-16 has stated that injury  No.I
may have been caused and thereafter injury No.II  may  have  been  caused.
Moreover, injury No.II indicates that the deceased may have been  able  to
move his face.  He has also stated that  from  the  postmortem  report  it
appears that only after causing injury No.II the other injury  No.III  may
have been caused.  Thus, the argument of Mr. Ranjeet Kumar that after  the
injury No.II on his left cheek, the deceased may have turned his face  and
thereafter injury No.III on the left parietal region of his head may  have
been caused cannot be rejected.   We  cannot,  therefore,  hold  that  the
medical evidence is such as to entirely rule out the truth of the evidence
of the prosecution witnesses that the deceased was shot when he was  lying
injured on the ground.

37.    We may now deal with the contention of the defence  that  the  High
Court did not take into consideration the evidence of PW-17 and PW-21, who
were the driver and the bodyguard of the deceased  respectively,  and  who
did not support the prosecution case.  We have gone through  the  evidence
of PW-17 (driver) who has stated that  the  people  participating  in  the
procession surrounded the car of the  deceased  and  were  shouting  ‘maro
maro’ and that they pulled out the deceased and the  bodyguard   and  then
began to assault them, but he escaped and hid behind the vehicle and after
a gap of five to six minutes when he returned he found the procession  was
not there but the police was present there with their vehicles and he  saw
the deceased lying on the road in injured condition and  the  car  of  the
deceased was lying inverted and thereafter the deceased was carried to the
Hospital in the police vehicle and he also went in the same vehicle to the
Hospital and later on he came to know that the deceased was dead.  We have
also gone through the evidence of PW-21 (bodyguard) who has  deposed  that
the crowd was shouting ‘maro maro’ and they beat him, the driver  as  well
as the deceased and turned the vehicle and  they  sustained  injuries  and
after some time the police came over there and the  stampede  started  and
police sent the deceased and him to the Hospital and he came to know  that
the deceased was dead.  Both PW-17 and PW-21, therefore, are  silent  with
regard to exhortation by A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-4 to Bhutkun to shoot at  the
deceased.  It appears that PW-17 and PW-21 were not aware of any  shooting
incident at all and they were under the impression that the  deceased  had
been injured by the assault of the mob after he was pulled  out  from  the
car.  PW-17 and PW-21, in our considered opinion, do not seem to know what
exactly happened after they were pulled out from the car and beaten up  by
the mob.  On the basis of their evidence, the  Court  cannot  discard  the
evidence of ten other witnesses that the deceased was shot by Bhutkun with
the  revolver  on  the  exhortation  of  A-1  when  the  medical  evidence
established that the cause of death of the deceased was on account of  the
bullet injuries on the deceased and not the assault by the mob.  Moreover,
PW-17 and PW-21 may not have supported  the  prosecution  case  but  their
evidence also does not belie the prosecution case that  the  deceased  was
shot by Bhutkun on the exhortation by A-1.

38.   We now come to the submission of Mr.  Jethmalani  that  as  A-1  was
sitting in a Contessa car which was in the front of the procession and  as
the killing of the deceased took place in the middle  of  the  procession,
the evidence of the eye-witnesses should be  discarded  as  not  probable.
The prosecution has been able to adduce  evidence  through  its  witnesses
that at the time of shooting of the deceased, A-1 was at the spot and  was
exhorting Bhutkun Shukla to shoot at the  deceased.   If  A-1  wanted  the
Court to believe that at the time of the incident he was in  the  Contessa
car in the front of the procession and not at the  spot,  he  should  have
taken this defence in his statement under Section  313  Cr.P.C.  and  also
produced reliable evidence in support of this defence.  Section 103 of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 provides that the burden  of  proof  as  to  any
particular fact lies on that person who wishes the Court to believe in its
existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof  of  that  fact
shall lie on any particular person.  The prosecution by  leading  evidence
through its several witnesses has established that A-1 was at the place of
occurrence and had exhorted Bhutkun Shukla to shoot at the deceased.  If A-
1 wanted the Court to reject this prosecution  version  as  not  probable,
burden was on him to lead evidence that he was not at the spot and did not
exhort Bhutkun Shukla  to  shoot  at  the  deceased.   Since  he  has  not
discharged this burden, the High Court was right in holding that  A-1  was
guilty of the offence under Section 302/109 IPC.

39.   Regarding the sentence, the High Court  has  held  that  though  the
deceased was a District Magistrate, he was killed in another  district  as
an occupant of a car by chance on account of mob fury and exhortation by A-
1 and firing by Bhutkun Shukla and as A-1 was not the  assailant  himself,
rigorous imprisonment for  life  and  death  sentence  would  not  be  the
appropriate sentence.  We agree with this view of the High  Court  and  we
are of the view that this was not one of those rarest of rare cases  where
the High Court should have confirmed the death sentence on  A-1.   In  our
considered opinion, A-1 was liable for rigorous imprisonment for life.

40.   In the result, we do not find any merit in either the appeal of  A-1
or the appeals of the State and we accordingly dismiss  all  the  criminal
appeals.
                                                               .……………………….J.
                                                             (A. K.
Patnaik)


                                                               ………………………..J.
 New Delhi,                                             (Swatanter Kumar)
July 10, 2012.