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since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

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Wednesday, July 4, 2012

“When a land is acquired which has the potentiality of being developed into an urban land, merely because some portion of it abuts the main road, higher rate of compensation should be paid while in respect of the lands on the interior side it should be at lower rate may not stand to reason because when sites are formed those abutting the main road may have its advantages as well as disadvantages. Many a discerning customer may prefer to stay in the interior and far away from the main road and may be willing to pay a reasonably higher price for that site. One cannot rely on the mere possibility so as to indulge in a meticulous exercise of classification of the land as was done by the Land Acquisition Officer when the entire land was acquired in one block and therefore classification of the same into different categories does not stand to reason.”


                                                              NON-REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3590 OF 2012




      Sabhia Mohammed Yusuf Abdul Hamid Mulla (D) by
      L.Rs. and others                                   … Appellants
                                   versus
      Special Land Acquisition Officer and others              … Respondents
                                    with




                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  3591 OF 2012


                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  3670 OF 2012


                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3671 OF 2012




                               J U D G M E N T

      G. S. Singhvi, J.

      1.    With a view to implement the New Bombay Project, the  Government
      of Maharashtra acquired large tracts of land in different villages  of
      the State. The appellants’ land measuring 3,86,790  square  meters  in
      Roadpali (Kolekhar) Village, Panvel Taluka, Raigad District  was  also
      acquired for the project.  Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land
      Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, ‘the Act’) was  issued  on  3.2.1970
      and declaration under  Section  6(1)  was  issued  on  24.8.1972.  The
      Special Land Acquisition Officer passed different awards for different
      parcels of land and fixed market value of the  acquired  land  in  the
      range of Rs.1.75 per square meter to Rs. 2.50 per square meter.


      2.    The appellants did not file application under Section 18 of  the
      Act  for  determination  of  compensation  by  the  Court,  but  after
      amendment of the Act with effect from 24.9.1984 and  disposal  of  the
      references made at the instance of other  landowners,  they  filed  an
      application under Section 28A(1) for redetermination of market   value
      of the acquired land.  The Special Land Acquisition Officer held  that
      the landowners are entitled to compensation at the rate of Rs.1.20 per
      square meter to Rs.2/- per square meter. The appellants then filed  an
      application under Section 28A(3) for award of compensation at the rate
      of Rs.100/- per square meter.  They pleaded that the acquired land was
      very close to Sion-Panvel Highway and had tremendous  non-agricultural
      potential, nearby area had been  industrialized  and  District  Judge,
      Raigad-Alibag had awarded  higher  compensation  to  other  landowners
      whose lands situated at Village Ambetarkhar (Roadpali), Taluka  Panvel
      had been acquired for  the  New  Bombay  Project.   The  Special  Land
      Acquisition Officer controverted  the  claim  of  the  appellants  and
      pleaded that on the date of Section 4(1) notification, i.e., 3.2.1970,
      the appellants’ land was undeveloped and was being used only  for  the
      purpose of agriculture, which depended on monsoon.


      3.    On the pleadings of the parties, Civil Judge,  Senior  Division,
      Alibag (hereinafter described as ‘the  Reference  Court’)  framed  the
      following issues:
           “1.   Whether the claimants prove that the  compensation  amount
           awarded by the opponent is insufficient and inadequate  in  view
           of  the  situation,   location,   sale   statistics   and   N.A.
           potentiality of the acquired land.


           2.     Whether  the  claimants  are  entitled  to  get  enhanced
           compensation?  If yes, what quantum?


           3.    What order or award?”




      4.    In support of their claim, the appellants  examined  Shri  Abdul
      Majid Mulla (one of the landowners) and Shri Vikrant  Manohar  Vaidya,
      who had prepared valuation report (Ext.24)  and  map  (Ext.25).   They
      also relied upon certified copies of the judgment of the High Court in
      F.A. No.544/90 –  Chandar Krishan Gayakwad v. Special Land Acquisition
      Officer, Panvel (Ext.29), F.A. No.423/96 –  State  of  Maharashtra  v.
      Chandrakant  Bhiva  Patil  (Ext.30),  F.A.  No.1074/89  –   State   of
      Maharashtra v. Laxman Bhiva Patil (Ext.31), F.A. No.457/93 – State  of
      Maharashtra v. Ramachandra Damodar Koli and others  (Ext.16)  as  also
      the awards passed by the Reference Court in L.A.R. No.168/86 (Ext.13),
      L.A.R. No.172/86  (Ext.14)  and  L.A.R.  No.1334/2000  (Ext.15).    On
      behalf of the  Special  Land  Acquisition  Officer,  no  evidence  was
      produced in support of  the  assertion  that  the  acquired  land  was
      undeveloped and it did not have non-agricultural potential.


        5. The Reference Court considered  the  evidence  produced  by  the
           appellants and held that the acquired land had  non-agricultural
           potential and the Special  Land  Acquisition  Officer  committed
           grave error by fixing market value on the premise that it was an
           undeveloped land and was being used  for  agricultural  purposes
           only.  The detailed reasons recorded by the Reference Court  for
           arriving at this conclusion are reproduced below:

           “It is an admitted fact that civic amenities were  available  to
           Panvel Town prior to 1970. Construction of  Thane  Creek  bridge
           brought various villages including village Roadpali  (Kolhekhar)
           close to Bombay. The proximity of National Highway No.4, Panvel-
           Sion Highway, Diva-Panvel-Apta railway line, vicinity of Jawahar
           Industrial Estate, MI  D.C.  Industrial  Estate  Taloja,  Panvel
           Industrial Estate, shows that even in the year  1970  the  lands
           under  reference  were  enjoying  transport  and   communication
           facility. Thus, the lands under reference  were  ready-made  for
           N.A. use and only obstacle was absence of conversion. Therefore,
           though the lands under reference were  under  paddy  cultivation
           it’s non-agricultural potentiality cannot be  disputed  and  the
           lands will have to be assessed as non-agricultural  land.  While
           dealing with the land Reference Appeal No. 92 and 94 of 1985  in
           respect of the lands situated at Panvel acquired on 3.2.1970 the
           Hon’ble High Court Bombay has taken  judicial  note  about  non-
           agricultural potentiality of the nearby area of Bombay city.  In
           the case of  Shashikant  Krishanji  (kandpile)  Mali  V/s.  SLAO
           Panvel, Raigad, reported in 1993 B.C.J. 27 it is observed by the
           Hon’ble Division Bench of Bombay High Court that-

                 “the aforementioned towns, are, what they  are  because  of
                 their closeness to the Metropolitan centre of Bombay. It is
                 also evident that the scope for growth in the direction  of
                 Pune and Nashik has been  virtually  exhausted,  and  that,
                 growth now lies in the direction of the districts of Raigad
                 and Ratnagir. Judicial notice has to be taken of  the  fact
                 that almost all the areas in the proximity of  Bombay  have
                 been growing at a phenomenal rate and  that  Panvel  is  no
                 exception to this feature of rapid growth.”

           In a case of Nama Padu Huddar Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported
           in 1994 B.C.J. 316 the Hon’ble High Court Bombay observed that-

                 “Judicial note can be taken of the fact that the industrial
                 growth in and around Bombay has started with  rapid  stride
                 from the year 1965 onwards. In fact, the growth is by leaps
                 and bounds in the magnitude of industries as well as number
                 of industries and virtually all the industry of the country
                 are represented on the industrial estates scattered on this
                 highway. It is also  an  admitted  position  that  on  this
                 highway on all sides the facility  of  electric  supply  is
                 available as also of abundant water supply. In the area  in
                 question it is also an admitted position that all the lands
                 have suitable access roads  of  Zilla  Parishad  and  State
                 Highway including lands which are  the  farthest  from  the
                 highway.”

           The Learned D.G.P. Shri P.S. Patil, for the Opponent argued that
           the lands under endurance were  paddy  yielding  land  depending
           upon mansoon, yielding once in a year, and therefore, the  lands
           under reference were not having N.A. potentiality on the date of
           notification. However, in view of the observation of the Hon’ble
           Bombay High Court in the above cited ruling argument advanced by
           learned D.G.P. is devoid of substance. In view of Section 56  of
           the Indian Evidence Act a fact judicially noticed  need  not  be
           proved. The effect of taking judicial note  of  any  fact  means
           recognition of the fact without formal  proof  and  no  one  can
           question  it.  Even  court  can’t  insist  of  formal  proof  by
           evidence. Judicial note take place of proof. Nearness of  Bombay
           City which is economic capital of our country and  magnitude  of
           industrial development  around  the  lands  under  reference  is
           sufficient to say that the lands  under  reference  were  having
           tremendous N.A. potentiality on the date of notification.”

                                                         (emphasis supplied)



        6. The Reference Court referred to the judgments of District Judge,
           Raigad-Alibag in LAR Nos.168/86 and 172/86 by which compensation
           at the rate of Rs.90/- per square meter was awarded for the land
           situated at Ambetarkhar (Roadpali),  Taluka  Panvel,  which  was
           also acquired for the New Bombay Project, but held that the same
           are of no help to the appellants because in  those  cases,  this
           Court had issued a direction to  the  Special  Land  Acquisition
           Officer to pay compensation at the market rate prevailing as  on
           1.1.1977.


        7. The Reference Court then noticed the judgments of the High Court
           in Shashikant Krishanji v.  Special  Land  Acquisition  Officer,
           Panvel, Raigad (1993) BCJ 27,  Nama  Padu  Huddar  v.  State  of
           Maharashtra (1994) BCJ 316 and observed:

           “The certified copy of the judgment in First Appeal  No.  544/90
           Chandrakant Gaikwad V/s. S.L.A.O. Panvel is at  Exh.  29.  After
           its perusal it transpires that the  Hon'ble  High  Court  Bombay
           granted compensation @  Rs.  25/-  per  sq.  mtr.  to  the  land
           situated  at  village  Taloja  acquired  vide  notification  dt.
           3.2.1970. It seems from the certified copy of  the  judgment  in
           First Appeal No. 423/96 Chandrakant  Bhiva  Patil  Vs.  S.L.A.O.
           Panvel Exh. 30  that  the  Hon'ble  High  Court  Bombay  awarded
           compensation @ Rs. 25/- per sq. mtr. To  the  land  situated  at
           village Nawada acquired  on  3.2.1970.  Certified  copy  of  the
           judgment in First Appeal No. 1074/89 state  of  Maharashtra  Vs.
           Laxman Bhiva Patil Exh. 31 shows that  the  Hon'ble  High  Court
           Bombay granted compensation @ Rs. 25/- per sq. mtr. To the  land
           of Village Pendhar, Taluka Panvel,  acquired  vide  notification
           dt. 3.2.1970.


           Thus, from the judgments on record it is quite obvious that  the
           Hon'ble High Court Bombay has awarded compensation  @  Rs.  25/-
           per sq. mtr. In respect of the lands of village Taloja,  Pendhar
           and Nawade acquired vide Notification dt. 3.2.1970.  So  far  as
           lands under reference are  concerned,  in  a  case  reported  in
           1997(2) Mh. L.R. 325  State  of  Maharashtra  ..  Appellant  Vs.
           Ramchand Damodar Koli and others.. Respondents, the Hon'ble High
           Court Bombay has allowed  the  claimants'  cross  objection  and
           ordered that the claimants shall be entitled for compensation  @
           Rs. 25/- per sq. mtr.  On  their  paying  additional  court-fees
           within two weeks. The land involved  in  the  abovecited  ruling
           belongs  to  Village  Roadpali  (Ambetarkhar).  Ambetarkhar  and
           Kolhekhar are the parts of Village Roadpali. The  land  involved
           in the reference in hand and the land involved in the abovecited
           ruling acquired  for  the  same  purpose  i.e.  for  New  Bombay
           Project, vide Notification dt. 3.2.1970. It reveals  from  xerox
           copy of from the letter No. Civil/Reg. No.  28.01.2002  dt.  3rd
           July,  2003  addressed   to   the   Secretary,   Government   of
           Maharashtra, L & J Department Mantralya Mumbai,  by  the  Asstt.
           Govt. Pleader, High Court, Mumbai, produced on record  with  the
           list Exh. 33/1 by the  Ld.D.G.P.,  that,  in  First  Appeal  No.
           560/91 arising out of LAR No.  350/89  the  Hon'ble  High  Court
           Bombay awarded compensation @ Rs. 25/- per sq. mtr. To the  land
           from village Roadpali, and the Asstt. Govt. Pleader, High  Court
           Mumbai, opined that the said case is not  fit  for  appeal.  The
           land involved in the reference in hand and the land involved  in
           the  case  reported  in  1997(2)  Mh.  L.R.  325  are  virtually
           identical  situated   in   the   same   area   bearing   similar
           topographical and physical characteristics covered by  the  same
           notification dt.3.2.1970. When the nearby land of the land under
           reference fetch market value @ Rs. 25/- per  sq.  mtr.   On  the
           date of notification, certainly the land under  reference  fetch
           the same market value.”
                                            (as contained in the paper book)




      8.    The State Government questioned the determination  made  by  the
      Reference Court by filing an appeal under Section 54 of  the  Act  and
      prayed for reduction in the amount of compensation on the ground  that
      the acquired land was undeveloped and was being used for  agricultural
      purposes. Another plea taken by the  State  Government  was  that  the
      Reference Court had  erroneously  overlooked  the  distance  criteria,
      which was followed by the High Court in other cases for  determination
      of  the  amount  of  compensation.  The  appellants  also  filed  F.A.
      No.1118/2005 and prayed that the amount of  compensation  be  enhanced
      keeping in view the judgment in LAR  Nos.  168/86  and  172/86.   They
      pleaded that the Reference Court had not paid  adequate  attention  to
      the fact that the acquired land was in the vicinity of the  industrial
      estates developed at Taloja and Panvel and a number of highways.


      9.    The Division Bench of the High  Court  took  cognizance  of  the
      earlier judgments in which the compensation was determined keeping  in
      view the distance of the acquired land from  Bombay-Pune  Highway  and
      held that the appellants are not entitled to compensation in excess of
      what was awarded to the other landowners.  The Division Bench accepted
      the State’s plea for reduction in the amount of compensation and  also
      held that 15% of  market  value  is  liable  to  be  deducted  towards
      development charges.


      10.   The review petition filed by the appellants was  partly  allowed
      by the High Court vide order dated 7.6.2007 and it was held that those
      having land upto a distance of 500  meters  from  Bombay-Pune  Highway
      shall be entitled to compensation at the rate of Rs. 20/-  per  square
      meter and those having land beyond 500 meters  shall  be  entitled  to
      compensation at the rate of Rs.18/- per square meter.


      11.   Shri Jayant Bhushan, learned  senior  counsel  argued  that  the
      Reference Court and the High Court  committed  serious  error  by  not
      awarding  compensation  to  the  appellants  at  par  with  the  other
      landowners whose claim for higher compensation was decided by District
      Judge, Raigad-Alibag in LAR  Nos.168/86  and  172/86.  Learned  senior
      counsel emphasized that the appellants’ land and the land situated  in
      Village Ambetarkhar was acquired for implementation of the New  Bombay
      Project  and  argued  that  there  could  be  no   valid   ground   or
      justification to discriminate similarly  situated  landowners  in  the
      matter of award of compensation. He pointed out that the acquired land
      is in the vicinity of fully developed industrial area  as  also  Sion-
      Panvel Highway, Mumabi-Goa  Highway  (NH-17)  apart  from  Bombay-Pune
      Highway (NH-4)  and  argued  that  the  compensation  awarded  to  the
      appellants should be enhanced because the Reference Court and the High
      Court committed an error by not considering the geography of the  land
      and its potential use  for  non-agricultural  purposes.  Shri  Bhushan
      submitted that while preparing valuation report (Ext.24), Shri Vikrant
      Manohar Vaidya had taken note of the fact that the acquired  land  was
      very close to the industrial estate developed at Panvel and Taloja and
      railway line had been laid, but the Reference Court and the High Court
      did not give due weightage to the expert report  for  the  purpose  of
      determination of the  amount  of  compensation  and  this  has  caused
      serious injustice to the appellants.  Learned  senior  counsel  relied
      upon the judgment in  Land  Acquisition  Officer,  Revenue  Divisional
      Officer v. L. Kamalamma (1998) 2 SCC 385 and argued that the  distance
      from the highway cannot be made the sole benchmark for  fixing  market
      value of the acquired land which is in the vicinity of fully developed
      area. Shri Bhushan  also  invited  our  attention  to  judgment  dated
      21.6.2009 of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court  whereby  the
      appeals filed by the State of Maharashtra and the  landowners  against
      the judgment of District Judge, Raigad in LAR No.  172  of  1986  were
      disposed of by assessing market value of the land situated at  Village
      Ambetarkhar at Rs.60/-  per square meter as on 1.1.1977.


      12.   Learned counsel  for  the  respondents  supported  the  impugned
      judgment and order and argued that the High Court did not  commit  any
      error by determining the amount of compensation keeping  in  view  the
      distance criteria, which was applied in all  other  cases  for  fixing
      market value of the land acquired for the New Bombay Project.  Learned
      counsel also submitted that the judgment of the Division Bench  in  FA
      Nos. 219-220 of 1989 and FA Nos. 568-569 of 1989 cannot be relied upon
      for awarding higher compensation to the appellants because in  respect
      of the land situated in Village Ambetarkhar, Taluka  Panvel,  District
      Raigad, this Court had  issued  direction  in  the  earlier  round  of
      litigation that the compensation be determined on the basis of  market
      value prevailing on 1.1.1977.


      13.   We  have  considered  the  respective  arguments  and  carefully
      perused the record.  It is settled law that while fixing market  value
      of the acquired land, the Land Acquisition Collector  is  required  to
      keep in mind the following factors:
           (i)   Existing geographical situation of the land.
           (ii)  Existing use of the land.
           (iii) Already available advantages, like proximity  to  National
                 or State High Way or road and/or developed area.
           (iv)   Market  value  of  other  land  situated  in   the   same
                 locality/village/area or adjacent or very near the acquired
                 land.


      14.   In Viluben Jhalejar Contractor v. State of Gujarat (2005) 4  SCC
      577, this Court laid down the following principles  for  determination
      of market value of the acquired land:
           “Section 23 of the Act specifies  the  matters  required  to  be
           considered in determining the compensation; the principal  among
           which is the determination of the market value of  the  land  on
           the date of the  publication  of  the  notification  under  sub-
           section (1) of Section 4.
           One of  the  principles  for  determination  of  the  amount  of
           compensation for acquisition of land would be the willingness of
           an informed buyer to offer the price therefor. It is beyond  any
           cavil that the price of the land which a  willing  and  informed
           buyer would offer would be different  in  the  cases  where  the
           owner is in possession and enjoyment of the property and in  the
           cases where he is not.
           Market value is ordinarily the price the property may  fetch  in
           the open market if sold by a willing seller  unaffected  by  the
           special needs of a particular purchase. Where definite  material
           is not forthcoming either in the shape of sales of similar lands
           in the neighbourhood at or about the date of notification  under
           Section 4(1) or otherwise, other sale instances as well as other
           evidences have to be considered.
           The  amount  of  compensation   cannot   be   ascertained   with
           mathematical  accuracy.  A  comparable  instance   has   to   be
           identified having regard to the proximity  from  time  angle  as
           well as proximity from  situation  angle.  For  determining  the
           market value of the land under acquisition, suitable  adjustment
           has to be made having regard to various  positive  and  negative
           factors vis-à-vis the land under acquisition by placing the  two
           in juxtaposition. The  positive  and  negative  factors  are  as
           under:

|Positive factors           |Negative factors            |
|                           |                            |
|(i) smallness of size      |(i) largeness of area       |
|(ii) proximity to a road   |(ii) situation in the       |
|                           |interior at a distance from |
|                           |the road                    |
|(iii) frontage on a road   |(iii) narrow strip of land  |
|                           |with very small frontage    |
|                           |compared to depth           |
|(iv) nearness to developed |(iv) lower level requiring  |
|area                       |the depressed portion to be |
|                           |filled up                   |
|(v) regular shape          |(v) remoteness from         |
|                           |developed locality          |
|(vi) level vis-à-vis land  |(vi) some special           |
|under acquisition          |disadvantageous factors     |
|                           |which would deter a         |
|                           |purchaser                   |
|(vii) special value for an |                            |
|owner of an adjoining      |                            |
|property to whom it may    |                            |
|have some very special     |                            |
|advantage                  |                            |





           Whereas a smaller plot may be within the reach of many, a  large
           block of land will have to be developed preparing a layout plan,
           carving out roads, leaving open  spaces,  plotting  out  smaller
           plots,  waiting  for  purchasers   and   the   hazards   of   an
           entrepreneur. Such development charges may range between 20% and
           50% of the total price.”



      15.   In Atma Singh v. State of Haryana (2008) 2 SCC 568,  the  Court
      held:
           “In order to determine the compensation which the tenure-holders
           are entitled to get for their land which has been acquired,  the
           main question to be considered is what is the  market  value  of
           the land. Section 23(1) of the Act lays down what the court  has
           to take into consideration while Section 24 lays down  what  the
           court  shall  not  take  into  consideration  and  have  to   be
           neglected. The main object of the enquiry before the court is to
           determine the market value of the land acquired. The  expression
           “market value” has been the subject-matter of  consideration  by
           this Court in several cases. The market value is the price  that
           a willing purchaser would  pay  to  a  willing  seller  for  the
           property having due regard to its existing  condition  with  all
           its existing advantages and its potential possibilities when led
           out in most advantageous manner excluding any advantage  due  to
           carrying  out  of  the  scheme  for  which   the   property   is
           compulsorily   acquired.    In    considering    market    value
           disinclination of the vendor to  part  with  his  land  and  the
           urgent necessity of the purchaser to buy should be  disregarded.
           The guiding star would be the conduct  of  hypothetical  willing
           vendor who would offer the land and a purchaser in normal  human
           conduct would be willing to buy  as  a  prudent  man  in  normal
           market conditions but not an anxious dealing at arm's length nor
           facade of sale  nor  fictitious  sale  brought  about  in  quick
           succession  or  otherwise  to  inflate  the  market  value.  The
           determination of market value is the prediction of  an  economic
           event viz. a price outcome of  hypothetical  sale  expressed  in
           terms of probabilities. See  Kamta  Prasad  Singh  v.  State  of
           Bihar, Prithvi  Raj  Taneja  v.  State  of  M.P.,  Administrator
           General of W.B. v. Collector, Varanasi  and  Periyar  Pareekanni
           Rubbers Ltd. v. State of Kerala.


           For ascertaining the market value of the land, the  potentiality
           of the acquired land should also be  taken  into  consideration.
           Potentiality means  capacity  or  possibility  for  changing  or
           developing into state of actuality.  It  is  well  settled  that
           market value of a property  has  to  be  determined  having  due
           regard  to  its  existing  condition  with  all   its   existing
           advantages and its potential possibility when  led  out  in  its
           most advantageous  manner.  The  question  whether  a  land  has
           potential value or not, is primarily one of fact depending  upon
           its condition,  situation,  user  to  which  it  is  put  or  is
           reasonably capable of being put and  proximity  to  residential,
           commercial or industrial areas  or  institutions.  The  existing
           amenities like water, electricity, possibility of their  further
           extension, whether near about town is developing or has prospect
           of  development  have  to  be  taken  into  consideration.   See
           Collector v. Dr. Harisingh Thakur,  Raghubans  Narain  Singh  v.
           U.P.  Govt.  and  Administrator  General,  W.B.   v.   Collector
           Varanasi. It has been  held  in  Kausalya  Devi  Bogra  v.  Land
           Acquisition Officer and Suresh Kumar v. Town  Improvement  Trust
           that failing to consider potential value of the acquired land is
           an error of principle.”

      16.    In  fixing  market  value  of  the  acquired  land,  which   is
      undeveloped or under-developed, the  Courts  have  generally  approved
      deduction of 1/3rd of the market value towards development cost except
      when no development is required to be made for implementation  of  the
      public purpose for which land is acquired.  In  Kasturi  v.  State  of
      Haryana (2003) 1 SCC 354, the Court held:


           “............It is well settled that in respect of  agricultural
           land or undeveloped land which has potential value  for  housing
           or commercial purposes, normally 1/3rd  amount  of  compensation
           has to be deducted out of the amount of compensation payable  on
           the acquired land subject to certain variations depending on its
           nature, location, extent of expenditure involved for development
           and the area required for roads and  other  civic  amenities  to
           develop the land so as to make  the  plots  for  residential  or
           commercial purposes. A land may be plain or uneven, the soil  of
           the land may be soft or hard bearing on the foundation  for  the
           purpose of making construction; may be the land is  situated  in
           the midst of a developed area all around but that land may  have
           a hillock or may be low-lying or may be having deep ditches.  So
           the amount of expenses that may be incurred  in  developing  the
           area also varies. A claimant who claims that his land  is  fully
           developed  and  nothing  more  is  required  to  be   done   for
           developmental purposes, must show on the basis of evidence  that
           it is such a land and it is so located. In the absence  of  such
           evidence, merely saying that the area adjoining his  land  is  a
           developed area, is not enough particularly when  the  extent  of
           the acquired land is large and even if a small  portion  of  the
           land is abutting the main road in the developed area,  does  not
           give the land the character of a developed area. In 84 acres  of
           land acquired even if one portion on one  side  abuts  the  main
           road, the remaining large  area  where  planned  development  is
           required, needs  laying  of  internal  roads,  drainage,  sewer,
           water,  electricity  lines,  providing  civic  amenities,   etc.
           However,  in  cases  of  some  land  where  there  are   certain
           advantages by virtue of the developed area around, it  may  help
           in reducing  the  percentage  of  cut  to  be  applied,  as  the
           developmental charges required may  be  less  on  that  account.
           There may be various factual factors which may have to be  taken
           into  consideration  while  applying  the  cut  in  payment   of
           compensation towards developmental charges, may be in some cases
           it is more than 1/3rd and in some cases less than 1/3rd. It must
           be remembered that there is difference between a developed  area
           and  an  area  having  potential  value,  which  is  yet  to  be
           developed. The fact that an area is developed or adjacent  to  a
           developed area will not ipso facto make every land  situated  in
           the area also developed to be valued as a building site or plot,
           particularly when vast tracts are acquired, as in this case, for
           development purpose.”
                                                         (emphasis supplied)

      17.   The rule of 1/3rd deduction was reiterated in  Tejumal  Bhojwani
      v. State of U.P. (2003) 10  SCC  525,  V.  Hanumantha  Reddy  v.  Land
      Acquisition Officer & Mandal Revenue Officer (2003) 12 SCC  642,  H.P.
      Housing Board v. Bharat S. Negi (2004) 2 SCC 184 and Kiran  Tandon  v.
      Allahabad Development Authority (2004) 10 SCC 745.  In  Lal  Chand  v.
      Union of India (2009) 15 SCC 769, the Court indicated that  percentage
      of deduction for development to be made for arriving at  market  value
      of large tracts of undeveloped agricultural land  with  potential  for
      development can vary between 20 and  75  per  cent  of  the  price  of
      developed plots and observed:
           “The ‘deduction for development’ consists of two components. The
           first is with reference to the area required to be utilised  for
           developmental  works  and  the  second  is  the  cost   of   the
           development works. …


           Therefore the deduction for the ‘development factor’ to be  made
           with reference to the price of  a  small  plot  in  a  developed
           layout, to arrive at the cost of undeveloped land, will  be  for
           more than the deduction with reference to the price of  a  small
           plot in an unauthorised private layout or an industrial  layout.
           It is also well known that  the  development  cost  incurred  by
           statutory agencies is much higher  than  the  cost  incurred  by
           private  developers,  having  regard  to  higher  overheads  and
           expenditure.”

      18.   In A.P. Housing Board v. K. Manohar Reddy (2010) 12 SCC 707, the
      rule of 1/3rd deduction towards development  cost  was  invoked  while
      determining market value of the acquired land. In Subh Ram v. State of
      Haryana (2010) 1 SCC 444, this Court held as under:
           “Deduction of “development cost” is the concept used  to  derive
           the “wholesale price” of a large undeveloped land with reference
           to the “retail price” of a small developed plot. The  difference
           between the value of a small developed plot and the value  of  a
           large undeveloped land is the “development  cost”.  Two  factors
           have a bearing on the quantum (or percentage)  of  deduction  in
           the “retail price” as development cost. Firstly, the  percentage
           of deduction is decided with reference to the extent and  nature
           of development of the area/layout in which the  small  developed
           plot is situated. Secondly, the condition of the  acquired  land
           as on the date  of  preliminary  notification,  whether  it  was
           undeveloped, or partly developed, is considered and  appropriate
           adjustment is made in the percentage of deduction to  take  note
           of the developed status of the acquired land.


           The percentage of deduction (development cost  factor)  will  be
           applied fully where the acquired land has  no  development.  But
           where the acquired land can be considered to be partly developed
           (say for example, having good road access or having the  amenity
           of electricity, water, etc.) then the development cost (that is,
           percentage of deduction) will be modulated with reference to the
           extent of development of the acquired land as  on  the  date  of
           acquisition. But under no circumstances, will the future use  or
           purpose of acquisition play a role in determining the percentage
           of deduction towards development cost.”
                                                         (emphasis supplied)


      19.   In Land Acquisition Officer, Revenue Divisional  Officer  v.  L.
      Kamalamma (supra), this Court held as under:
           “When a land is acquired which has  the  potentiality  of  being
           developed into an urban land, merely because some portion of  it
           abuts the main road, higher rate of compensation should be  paid
           while in respect of the lands on the interior side it should  be
           at lower rate may not stand to reason  because  when  sites  are
           formed those abutting the main road may have its  advantages  as
           well as disadvantages. Many a discerning customer may prefer  to
           stay in the interior and far away from the main road and may  be
           willing to pay a reasonably higher  price  for  that  site.  One
           cannot rely on the mere  possibility  so  as  to  indulge  in  a
           meticulous exercise of classification of the land as was done by
           the Land Acquisition Officer when the entire land  was  acquired
           in one block and  therefore  classification  of  the  same  into
           different categories does not stand to reason.”


      20.   In these appeals, we find that while determining the  amount  of
      compensation at the rate of Rs.25/- per square meter ,  the  Reference
      Court had taken notice of the fact that  the acquired land was in  the
      proximity of  National  Highway  No.4,  Panvel-Sion  Highway  and  the
      construction of Thane Creek  Bridge  which  brought  various  villages
      including village Roadpali (Kolhekhar) close to Bombay.  The Reference
      Court also noted that civic amenities were available  to  Panvel  town
      prior to 1970 and industrial estates had been developed at Taloja  and
      Panvel and concluded that the acquired land  was  available  for  non-
      agricultural  use  and  the  only  obstruction  was  the  absence   of
      conversion. The High Court did not advert to the factors noted by  the
      Reference Court and reduced the amount of compensation by mechanically
      applying the distance criteria, i.e., distance of  the  acquired  land
      from Bombay-Pune Highway adopted in the earlier judgments.  Therefore,
      the impugned judgment and order cannot be sustained.


      21.   Although, the appeals filed by  the  State  Government  and  the
      landowner against the  judgment  of  District  Judge,  Raigad  in  LAR
      No.172/86 were decided after six months of the impugned  judgment,  we
      find that compensation for the land situated  at  Village  Ambetarkhar
      had been awarded at the rate of Rs.60/- per square meter primarily  on
      the ground that in the earlier round of  litigation,  this  Court  had
      issued  a  direction  to  the  Special  Land  Acquisition  Officer  to
      determine market value as on 1.1.1977.


      22.   In the light of the subsequent judgment, we  may  have  remitted
      the case to the High Court for fresh adjudication of the appeals,  but
      keeping in view the fact that a period of 42 years has elapsed, we  do
      not consider it proper to adopt that course  and  feel  that  ends  of
      justice will be adequately  met  by  restoring  the  determination  of
      compensation made by the Reference Court.


      23.   In the result, the appeals are allowed.  The  impugned  judgment
      and order are set aside and the one passed by the Reference Court  for
      payment of compensation to the appellants at the rate of  Rs.25/-  per
      square meter is restored.  The respondents are  directed  to  pay  the
      balance amount to the appellants with all other statutory benefits and
      interest within three months from today.


      24.   With a view to ensure that the landowners are not fleeced by the
      middleman,  we  deem  it  proper  to  issue  the   following   further
      directions:
      (i)   Within one  month  from  today,  the  Special  Land  Acquisition
           Officer shall depute an officer subordinate to him not below the
           rank of Naib Tehsildar or an equivalent rank, to  get  in  touch
           with the  landowners  and/or  their  legal  representatives  and
           inform them about  their  entitlement  to  receive  the  balance
           amount of compensation.
      (ii)  The concerned officers  shall  instruct  the  landowners  and/or
           their legal representatives to open savings bank  account  in  a
           nationalized or scheduled bank, in case they already do not have
           such account.
      (iii) The  account  numbers  of  the  landowners  and/or  their  legal
           representatives should be furnished by the concerned officer  to
           the Land Acquisition Officer within a period of one month.
      (iv)  Within next one month,  the  Special  Land  Acquisition  Officer
           shall deposit  the  amount  of  compensation  along  with  other
           statutory benefits in the bank accounts of the landowners and/or
           their  legal  representatives  in  the  form  of  account  payee
           cheques.




                                                          ……………….………………….…J.
                                             [G.S. Singhvi]



                                                   …….. ……..…..…..………………..J.
                                             [Sudhansu  Jyoti  Mukhopadhaya]

New Delhi;
July 02, 2012.
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19


whether, having rejected its prayer for issue of a mandamus to Lucknow Development Authority (LDA) to accept the total amount of sale consideration with regard to plot No.92A/C (Khasra No. 754), Mahanagar, Lucknow, the High Court could have relied upon the provisions of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (for short, ‘the 2009 Act’) and granted relief to City Montessori School (respondent No.1 in Civil Appeal No.10181 of 2011 and the appellant in Civil Appeal No.10180 of 2011) in substantially similar terms. An ancillary question which needs determination is whether the High Court had rightly quashed the action taken by LDA and Nazul Officer, Lucknow in compliance of order dated 4.5.2009 passed in Writ Petition No.4085/2009. whether the appellants are entitled to plot No.92 A/C and the High Court committed an error by quashing the action taken by the LDA and the Nazul Officer in furtherance of order dated 4.5.2009 passed in Writ Petition No.4085/2009. It is not in dispute that the term of the garden lease had ended on 31.7.1968 and the same was not extended by the competent authority. Therefore, in view of the stipulations contained in lease deed dated 29.1.1964, he was bound to hand over the plot to the Government. However, Shri Banerjee continued to unauthorisedly occupy the plot till its disposal by LDA in 1994 by inviting bids. Although, respondent No.1 also failed to abide by the terms of agreement dated 12.1.1996, Shri Banerjee was not entitled to take benefit of order dated 17.2.1996 and seek conversion of leasehold rights into freehold because LDA had already accepted the bid given by respondent No.1 and delivered possession of the plot to Shri Jagdish Gandhi. The appellants who claim to be beneficiaries of the Will executed by Shri Banerjee cannot claim a better right. Writ Petition No.4085/2009 filed by them was nothing but an abuse of the process of law. Unfortunately, the Division Bench of the High Court, which disposed of the writ petition vide order dated 4.5.2009 did not even bother to call upon the respondents to admit or controvert the averments contained in the writ petition filed by the appellants and directed the Nazul Officer to decide their representation for grant of freehold rights in respect of plot No.92A/C. The error committed by the High Court in entertaining the writ petition of the appellants was compounded by the Nazul Officer who ordered conversion of leasehold rights into freehold rights in respect of 4433 sq. ft. and gave an opportunity to the appellants to grab a valuable piece of land by depositing a paltry amount of Rs. 1,95,939/- as against the market price of Rs.2 crores. It is a different thing that the appellants did not succeed in their design and the High Court quashed the action taken by the Nazul Officer for conversion of the plot. 12. In the result, Civil Appeal No. 10181 of 2011 is partly allowed and the direction given by the High Court for handing over possession of plot No. 92 A/C to respondent No.1 on payment of the current market price is set aside. However, the decision of the High Court to quash the action taken by LDA and the Nazul Officer in furtherance of order dated 4.5.2009 passed in Writ Petition No. 4085 of 2009 is upheld. Civil Appeal No. 10180 of 2011 is dismissed. For filing frivolous and unwarranted litigation, which has consumed substantial time of various Courts including this Court, the appellants and respondent No.1 are saddled with cost of Rs. 10 lakhs each. They are directed to deposit the amount of cost with the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee within a period of two months from today. 13. Respondent No.1 is directed to hand over possession of plot No.92A/C to the Vice-Chairman, LDA within a period of 15 days. If the appellants have managed to take possession of the plot then they shall surrender the plot to the Vice-Chairman, LDA with 15 days. Thereafter, LDA shall dispose of the plot by public auction keeping in view the propositions laid down by this Court in Akhil Bhartiya Upbhokta Congress v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2011) 5 SCC 29 (paragraphs 65 and 66). It is needless to say that respondent No.1 shall be free to participate in the auction which may be conducted by LDA in compliance of this order. The appellants shall be free to withdraw the amount deposited for conversion of plot No.92 A/C.



                                                              NON REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.10181 OF 2011
                 (arising out of  SLP (C) No.13585 of 2011)


Smt. Khela Banerjee and another                                            …
Appellants
                                   versus
City Montessori School and others                        … Respondents
                                    with


                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10180 OF 2011
                 (arising out of  SLP (C) No.22369 of 2011)



                               J U D G M E N T
G. S. Singhvi, J.

1.    The main question which arises for consideration in these  appeals  is
   whether, having rejected its prayer for issue of a  mandamus  to  Lucknow
   Development  Authority  (LDA)  to  accept  the  total  amount   of   sale
   consideration with regard to plot No.92A/C (Khasra No.  754),  Mahanagar,
   Lucknow, the High Court could have relied  upon  the  provisions  of  the
   Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (for  short,
   ‘the 2009 Act’) and granted relief to City Montessori School  (respondent
   No.1 in Civil Appeal No.10181 of 2011 and the appellant in  Civil  Appeal
   No.10180 of 2011) in substantially similar terms.   An ancillary question
   which needs determination is whether the High Court had  rightly  quashed
   the action taken by LDA and Nazul Officer, Lucknow in compliance of order
   dated 4.5.2009 passed in Writ Petition No.4085/2009.

2.    For  the  sake  of  convenience,  the  parties  shall  hereinafter  be
   referred to as the appellants and respondent No.1.

Background facts and details of the cases filed by the parties

3.1.  The Nazul Officer leased out plot No.92A,  Mahanagar,  Faizabad  Road,
Lucknow  to  Shri  Moni  Mohan  Banerjee  (hereinafter  described  as  ‘Shri
Banerjee’) in 1958 for a period of  30  years  with  a  right  to  seek  two
renewals of 30 years each. The terms of the lease were incorporated  in  the
registered deed executed on 14.2.1959.

3.2.  After about 3 years, the Nazul Officer granted lease of the  adjoining
plot bearing No. 92 A/C to Shri Banerjee for a period of 7 years  commencing
from  1.8.1961  for  garden  purposes.   The  registered  lease  deed  dated
29.1.1964 executed between the Governor of Uttar Pradesh through  the  Nazul
Officer and Shri Banerjee contained a stipulation  that  at  the  end  of  7
years period, the lessee shall hand over  possession  of  the  plot  to  the
Government.  However, Shri Banerjee did not surrender the plot on  or  after
31.7.1968 and continued to occupy the same till January, 1996.

3.3.  In 1992, the Government of Uttar Pradesh took a  policy  decision  for
conversion of leasehold Nazul lands  into  freehold  and  disposal  thereof.
This policy was circulated vide G.O. dated 23.5.1992  and  was  subsequently
modified vide G.O. dated 2.12.1992 and G.O. dated  3.10.1994,   paragraph  4
whereof postulated conversion of open Nazul land declared surplus under  the
Ceiling Act  and  horticulture/agriculture  lease  land  into  freehold  and
disposal thereof by auction or by inviting tenders.

3.4.  In furtherance of the policy contained in G.O.  dated  3.10.1994,  LDA
issued tender notice dated 24.11.1994  and  invited  bids  for  disposal  of
plots (open Nazul land which had been converted  into  freehold).   However,
before the bids received  pursuant  to  notice  dated  24.11.1994  could  be
accepted, the State Government changed the nature of some of the plots  from
residential to commercial. Therefore,  LDA  cancelled  tender  notice  dated
24.11.1994 and invited fresh bids for eight plots including  plot  No.92A/C.


3.5.  Shri Banerjee, who was illegally occupying plot No.92-A/C  filed  Suit
No.285 of 1994 in the Court of Civil Judge, Lucknow  with  the  prayer  that
G.Os. dated 2.12.1992 and 3.10.1994 may be quashed  and  LDA  be  restrained
from dispossessing him pursuant to tender notice dated 24.11.1994.

3.6.  Respondent No.1 filed Writ Petition No.11 of 1995 for quashing  tender
notice dated 20.12.1994 on the ground that the  same  was  contrary  to  the
Zonal  Development  Plan  prepared  under  the  U.P.  Urban   Planning   and
Development Act, 1973 and prayed that a mandamus be issued to  the  official
respondents to  accept  the  tenders  submitted  pursuant  to  notice  dated
24.11.1994 and complete the formalities for the execution of the sale  deed.
 Respondent No.1 also applied for stay  but  could  not  convince  the  High
Court to entertain its prayer.

3.7.  Faced with the possibility of losing an opportunity to get  the  plots
in respect of which tenders  were  invited  vide  notice  dated  20.12.1994,
respondent No.1 submitted bids for four  plots  including  plot  No.92  A/C.
The competent authority accepted the bids of  respondent  No.1.  The  latter
deposited 25% of the bid money, i.e., Rs.7,40,700/-  but  did  not  pay  the
balance amount within the stipulated period despite notices dated  21.2.1995
and 8.3.1995 issued by  LDA.   Instead,  Shri  Jagdish  Gandhi,  Manager  of
respondent No.1 made representation for early delivery of possession of  the
plots and grant of permission to pay  3/4th  of  the  price  in  six-monthly
installments in accordance with G.O. dated 3.10.1994.  LDA  did  not  accept
the request of Shri Jagdish Gandhi by observing that the facility of  paying
the price of plots in six-monthly  installments  is  not  available  in  the
cases involving disposal  of  open  Nazul  land  and  garden  leases.   Shri
Jagdish Gandhi then approached the Principal Secretary to the  Governor  and
succeeded in persuading him to send  letter  dated  3.4.1995  to  the  State
Government to instruct the officers of LDA to hand over  possession  of  the
plots and accept  the  balance  amount  in  easy  installments.   The  State
Government forwarded that letter  to  LDA,  which  declined  to  accept  the
request made by Shri Jagdish Gandhi on the  ground  that  the  advertisement
did not contain any such stipulation. Simultaneously, a decision  was  taken
to cancel the bids and this was conveyed  to  respondent  No.1  vide  letter
dated 14.6.1995.

3.8.  Respondent No.1 did not challenge cancellation  of  the  bids  because
its Manager was sure that he will be able  to  pull  strings  in  the  power
corridors and get the desired relief. This is evinced  from  the  fact  that
the representation made by him was accepted by none else than  the  Governor
of  the  State,  who  passed  order  dated  17.12.1995  and  directed   that
possession of the plots be handed over to the management of respondent  No.1
and the balance amount be accepted  in  ten  six-monthly  installments  with
interest which may be fixed keeping  in  view  the  rates  charged  for  the
schemes framed by the Development Authority.

3.9.  In furtherance of the direction  given  by  the  Governor,  the  State
Government sent letter dated 12.1.1996 to the Vice-Chairman  of  LDA,  which
reads as under:

                                                     “No.48/9-Aa-4-96-39N/91
           From:


           Shri Rakesh Kumar Goyal,
           Joint Secretary,
           Government of Uttar Pradesh




           To


           The Vice Chairman,
           Lucknow Development Authority,
           Lucknow


           Govt. Section-4      Lucknow dated 12Ih January, 1996

      Subject: Regarding handing over possession of Nazul Land comprised in
           Khasra no.91-A-B-754, 92-A-C-754, 10-A-758, 90-A-A-754  allotted
           to the City Montessori School, Lucknow through tender




           Sir,
                 Please refer to your Letter No.425/NS  dated  9th  January,
           1996 on the above subject.


                 In this regard I have been directed to state  to  you  that
           all the above four plots of land which  have  been  approved  in
           favour of Manager, Shri Jagdish Gandhi, City  Montessori  School
           and which was cancelled vide Government Order dated  14lh  June,
           1995, after careful consideration in the matter  the  Government
           has decided that with reference to all the above four  plots  of
           land if Shri Jagdish Gandhi has  deposited  25%  amount  and  if
           there is no stay order against him,  its  possession  be  handed
           over to Shri Jagdish Gandhi and balance 75% amount  be  realised
           in future  10  six  monthly  instalments  and  interest  payable
           thereon shall be informed subsequently.
                                                                        Sd/-
                                                         (Rakesh Kumar Goel)

                                                            Joint Secretary”



  3.10.  On the same day,  an  agreement  was  executed  between  the  Vice-
  Chairman of LDA acting on behalf of the  Governor  of  Uttar  Pradesh  and
  respondent No.1 through its Manager  Shri  Jagdish  Gandhi.  The  relevant
  portions of the agreement (as contained in the paper book of Civil  Appeal
  No.10180 of 2011) are reproduced below:

                             “DEED OF AGREEMENT

           This Deed of Agreement is executed  between  the  Vice-Chairman,
           Lucknow Development Authority, on behalf of H.E. the Governor of
           the State of Uttar  Pradesh,  hereinafter  referred  to  as  the
           Vendor, meaning thereby its representatives, assigns  and  legal
           representatives (The First Party)

           AND

           City  Montessori  School,  Station  Road,  Lucknow  through  its
           Manager, Shri Jagdish Gandhi, aged about 60 years  son  of  late
           Sh. Phoolchand Agrawal resident of 12, Station Road, hereinafter
           referred to as the Purchaser, meaning thereby the Purchaser, its
           heirs, legal heirs and assigns (The Second Party).

           Whereas as per the directions contained in the Government  Order
           No. 48/9-Aa-4-96-39N/91, dated 12.1.1996, issued with regard  to
           management and disposal of Nazul land, a Nazul Land  Khasra  No.
           92-A/C 754, area 7305 sq. ft.  situated  at  Mahanagar  Faizabad
           Road, Lucknow was disposed of for commercial purpose by  way  of
           free-hold tender/auction. In response to the above  auction,  by
           this office letter No. 71  N.S.,  dated  20.5.96  an  amount  of
           Rs.22,21,300.00 was required  to  be  deposited.  You  deposited
           Rs.7,40,000.00 by bank drafts in Nazul Fund,  details  of  which
           are given below. Challan No.  BDN-8070443  dated  7.1.95  -  Rs.
           25,000.00, BDN-8070445 dated 7.1.95  Rs.2,71,200.00  BDN-8069790
           dated   13.12.95   Rs.1,80,000.00,   BDN-136509   dated   2.2.95
           Rs.2,64,500.00 - Total Rs.7,40,700.00, which means that  25%  of
           the total auction amount has been deposited.  The  Second  Party
           sought permission to deposit rest 75%  amount  in  installments,
           which the Government has granted by Government Order No. 48/9-Aa-
           4-96-39L/91 dated 12.1.1996 to deposit 75% amount in further ten
           half  yearly  installments  from  the  date   of   delivery   of
           possession. Information of rate of interest  on  the  above  75%
           amount will be conveyed, to the  Second  Party  after  receiving
           instructions from the Government in this regard.

           Thus, the Agreement between the aforesaid two parties will be as
           under:-

           1.    Whereas The  Second  Party  has  paid  25%  of  the  total
           tender/auction  amount  according  to  the  demand  letter   and
           remaining  75%  amount  will  be  deposited  together  with  the
           interest, as fixed by the Government, by the Second Party in  10
           half yearly installments without any default from  the  date  of
           execution of the Agreement;

           2.    Whereas the payment of the installments as indicated above
           will be paid by the Second Party compulsorily by the  prescribed
           time limit, failing which or in case of failure to  deposit  two
           consecutive installments, this Deed  of  Agreement  will  become
           void  and  the  First  Party  shall  be  free  to  exercise  its
           discretionary power to forfeit 1/4th of the  total  deposit  and
           refund the remaining amount and the First Party, if desired  so,
           shall be free to enter the land in question and shall have right
           to sell it in favour of any third party;

           3.    Whereas 25% of the total tender amount has  been  paid  by
           the Second Party and for rest of the 75% amount an agreement has
           been reached at between the parties. Possession of the  land  in
           question is being delivered by way  of  the  instant  Agreement.
           Therefore,  according   to   the   prevailing   Greater   Scheme
           (Mahayojana) of 2001, if the Second Party produces building map,
           it will be considered for approval,  holding  thereby  that  the
           possession of the land is with the Second Party, that the  Nazul
           Land  in  question  or  building  constructed  on  it   can   be
           transferred only when the entire tender/auction amount  and  the
           total expenditure payable by that time are cleared to the  First
           Party. Sale Deed in respect of the Nazul Land will  be  executed
           on the stamp paper by paying required stamp fees. Stamp fee  and
           other expenses will be borne by the Second Party;

           4.    Whereas the  Second  Party  shall  deposit  the  remaining
           aforementioned tender amount  in  10  half  yearly  installments
           under relevant accounts titled "0075 legal general  services-105
           Sale of Land & Property -03 lump¬sum amount on converting  Nazul
           land into freehold property" by the prescribed date by  treasury
           challan/ bank draft in main branch of the State Bank at Lucknow;



           5.    xxx              xxx                   xxx

           6.    xxx              xxx                   xxx

           7.    xxx              xxx                   xxx

           Witness:

           1.
           2.                           V K Gupta
                            Special Nazul Officer/Joint Secretary
                                        LDA, Lucknow”


                                                       (underlining is ours)



  3.11.  Simultaneously, Certificate  dated  12.1.1996  was  issued  by  LDA
  showing delivery of possession of plot No.92A/C to  Shri  Jagdish  Gandhi.
  The same reads as under:

                “Office of the Lucknow Development Authority
                         (Nazul Department) Lucknow


                           Possession Certificate


                 Possession of Nazul land Khasra No. 92-A/C(754), area 7305
           sq. ft., situated at Mahanagar, Faizabad Road, Lucknow is handed
           over to Sh. Jagdish Gandhi,  Manager,  City  Montessori  School,
           Lucknow today 12.1.1996.

                 Boundary of the above mentioned land is as under:-

           East        -    Road Mount Carmel School

           West        -    Land of City Montessori School

           North       -    Sh. M M Banerjee’s house

           South       -    Faizabad Road

           Signature of the person to whom    Signature of the person who
           possession is delivered               delivered the possession


           (Jagdish Gandhi)                      (P K Mishra)
                                                 Ameen, L.D.A.”



3.12.  Although the management of respondent  No.1  knew  that  the  balance
price  is  required  to  be  paid  in  ten  six-monthly   installments,   it
deliberately omitted to do so  and  performed  the  ritual  of  sending  one
letter every year to the functionaries of LDA on the issues  of  demarcation
of land and fixation of installments to show that the balance  amount  could
not be paid due to LDA’s failure to  indicate  the  amount  required  to  be
deposited along with interest.

3.13.  After 13 years of the execution of agreement  and  taking  possession
of the plot, respondent No.1  filed  Writ  Petition  No.8514/2009  with  the
following substantive prayers:

           “(i) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of  mandamus
           directing the respondents to accept forthwith the  total  amount
           of sale consideration with regard to plot no. 92-A/C  754  along
           with interest whatsoever may be fixed either by this Court or by
           the respondents;

           (ii) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature
           of certiorari to quash the entire proceedings of conferring free-
           hold rights on the respondents no. 4 & 5 on the said plot no. 92-
           A/C 754 Mahanagar Lucknow which has already  been  purchased  by
           the petitioner in auction as hold on 09.01.05 and the  agreement
           dt. 12.01.96 been executed by the respondent no. 3 in favour  of
           the petitioner and  possession  has  also  been  delivered  vide
           possession certificate dt.12.01.96 after, summoning  the  record
           of the proceedings from the office of the opp. Party no. 2 &  3”



3.14.  In the meanwhile, Shri Banerjee filed Writ Petition  No.446/1996  and
prayed that  the  State  Government,  LDA  and  the  Nazul  Officer  may  be
restrained  from  taking  any  action  in  violation  of  lease  deed  dated
14.2.1959 or give strip of garden lease to any other person  without  taking
proceedings in accordance with  law  or  convert  the  same  for  any  other
purpose.  The same was disposed of  by  the  High  Court  vide  order  dated
30.8.2005 with an observation that if any  action  is  taken  by  respondent
Nos.3 and 4 in violation of the terms of  lease  then  the  writ  petitioner
shall be free to approach an appropriate forum.

3.15.   During  the  pendency  of  Writ  Petition  No.446/1996,  the   State
Government issued another order dated  17.2.1996  for  conversion  of  Nazul
land from leasehold to freehold and made the same applicable  to  the  cases
in which the lease had already expired but  the  lessee  was  continuing  in
possession.  The  primary  object  of  this  order  was  to  legitimize  the
continued illegal occupation of land by the erstwhile lessees.

3.16.  With a view to take advantage of the policy contained in order  dated
17.2.1996, Shri Banerjee submitted application dated 23.3.1996 to the  Vice-
Chairman, LDA for conversion of plot No.A-92, Faizabad Road, Mahanagar  into
freehold.  He submitted another application dated 29.3.1996 to  the  Special
Nazul Officer, LDA with similar prayer by stating that  the  plot  had  been
allotted to him  for  the  purpose  of  gardening.   Along  with  the  first
application, Shri Banerjee     annexed photostat copy of  lease  deed  dated
29.1.1964, which related to plot No.92 A/C.  The application  made  by  Shri
Banerjee was not entertained by LDA on that ground that after the expiry  of
lease period, the plot was auctioned and the bid given  by  respondent  No.1
had been accepted.

3.17.  When the  management  of  respondent  No.1  started  construction  of
boundary wall on plot No.92A/C, Shri Banerjee raised objection  by  claiming
that he was in lawful possession of the  plot.  Thereupon,  respondent  No.1
filed Suit No.58/1996 for  permanent  injunction.   The  trial  Court  prima
facie felt convinced that respondent No.1 was having possession of the  plot
and  passed  injunction  order  dated  22.2.1996,  which  was  confirmed  on
13.5.2002.

3.18.   Shri  Banerjee  died  on  10.5.1996.  After  about  two  years,  the
appellants submitted application  dated  17.3.2008  for  mutation  of  their
names in respect of plot No.92A.  They claimed that by virtue of Will  dated
14.7.2005 executed by the deceased, they had  become  owners  of  the  plot.
After some time, they filed Writ Petition No.5049/2008  with  the  grievance
that the application made by them was not being  decided  by  the  competent
authority and prayed for issue of   direction to LDA  to  sanction  mutation
in their favour. The Division Bench of the  High  Court  passed  an  interim
order dated 6.6.2008 and directed the Nazul  Officer,  Lucknow  to  consider
and decide the application made by the appellants.  Thereafter,  LDA  passed
order dated  25.3.2009  and  sanctioned  conversion  of  plot  No.92/A  from
leasehold to freehold.  Thereafter, the appellants  deposited  Rs.4,97,692/-
as conversion charges.

3.19. During the pendency of Writ Petition No.5049/2008,  appellant  No.2  –
Chandak Banerjee filed Suit No.538/2008 for a declaration that auction  held
pursuant to advertisement dated 20.12.1994 was illegal and  inoperative.  He
also prayed that the respondents be restrained  from  interfering  with  his
possession over plot No.92A/C.  The  appellants  also  filed  Writ  Petition
No.4085/2009 for issue of a mandamus to  LDA  to  convert  leasehold  rights
into freehold in respect of plot No.92A/C.  The same was disposed of by  the
High  Court  vide  order  dated   4.5.2009,   which   reads   as   under   :

           “Heard Sri Pratish Kumar, learned counsel for  the  petitioners,
           learned Standing Counsel for opposite party no.l  and  Sri  D.K.
           Upadhyay, learned counsel for opposite parties no.2 and 3.


           The petitioner has alleged that  a  lease  of  appurtenant  land
           bearing Plot  No.92  A/C  measuring  6  Biswas  5  Biswansis  13
           Kachwansis (7188 sq.ft.) situated at Mahanagar  was  granted  in
           favour of Sri M.M. Banerji by the  Nazul  Officer,  Lucknow  for
           gardening purpose for a period of seven years.


           Learned counsel  for  the  petitioners  submits  that  Sri  M.M.
           Banerji, predecessor in interest of the petitioners in pursuance
           of the Government Order dated 17.02.1996 had  applied  for  free
           hold rights of  the  property  after  depositing  the  requisite
           amount but till date no decision has been  taken  by  the  Nazul
           Officer, Lucknow with respect to the free  hold  rights  to  the
           petitioner who are successors of late Sri M.M. Banerji, who  was
           the original lease holder.


           In view of the aforesaid facts, we dispose of the writ  petition
           with a direction to the opposite party  no.2  to  take  a  final
           decision with respect to the free  hold  rights  of  Nazul  Plot
           No.92 A/C, situated at Mahanagar Lucknow within two months  from
           the date a certified copy of this order is produced."



3.20.  In compliance of the direction given by the  High  Court,  the  Nazul
Officer passed order dated 3.8.2009 and converted 4433 sq. feet of land  out
of the total area of 7188 sq. feet  of  plot  No.92A/C  into  freehold.  The
remaining area was retained  for  widening  the  road.   On  next  day,  the
appellants deposited conversion charges amounting to Rs.1,95,939/-.



3.21.  In the writ petitions filed by them, the appellants did  not  implead
respondent No.1 as a party, but the  latter  impleaded  them  as  respondent
Nos.4 and 5 in Writ Petition No.8514(M/B) of  2009.   Respondent  No.1  also
gave details of the cases filed by the parties and  annexed  copies  of  the
orders passed by the Civil  Courts  and  the  High  Court.   The  appellants
contested Writ Petition No.8514/2009 and pleaded that the  State  Government
did not have the power to ordain delivery  of  possession  of  the  plot  to
respondent No.1 because the bid given by it had been  cancelled  by  LDA  on
account of non  payment  of  the  balance  price.  They  also  pleaded  that
agreement dated 12.1.1996 was nullity and was not binding on them.

3.22. After noting the factual matrix of the case,  the  Division  Bench  of
the High Court considered the question whether respondent No.1 could seek  a
mandamus for enforcement of agreement dated 12.1.1996 and answered the  same
in negative by making the following observations :

                                             “Though we accept and hold  in
           terms of the legal submissions, as above, urged by  Shri  Shanti
           Bhushan, Learned Senior Counsel,  yet  looking  to  the  factual
           background of “Though we accept and hold in terms of  the  legal
           submissions, as above, urged by  Shri  Shanti  Bhushan,  Learned
           Senior Counsel, yet looking to the factual  background  of  this
           case, we are of the considered view that the impugned  agreement
           entered into between the petitioner and the official respondents
           on 12.01.1996 would not be enforceable in law after the lapse of
           a period of 13 years only  on  the  strength  of  depositing  an
           amount of Rs.7,40,700/-, said to be the one-fourth of the  total
           consideration amount. It appears  that  the  petitioner  engaged
           itself only in correspondence with the official respondents  and
           in litigation, in stead of paying  the  rest  of  the  principal
           amount, leaving aside the interest amount, which could have been
           determined later by the Authority  concerned.  Even  no  efforts
           were made to seek  direction  from  the  Courts  to  accept  the
           deposit of principal amount  before  the  filing  of  this  writ
           petition.  It  also  appears  that  the  initial  agreement  was
           cancelled on 14.06.1995 for default in depositing the rest, say,
           3/4th of the consideration amount which had been  demanded  vide
           the letters dated 21.02.1995 and 08.03.1995. However,  taking  a
           considerate view, on a written request made  by  the  petitioner
           school, the payment schedule was rearranged vide  the  agreement
           dated 12.01.1996 but again no amount was deposited  towards  the
           payment of any of the instalments. Thus, the  petitioner  school
           was not ready and willing to perform its  obligation  under  the
           agreement and in Law.”



3.23.  The Division Bench then adverted to the  appellants’  plea  that  the
direction in Writ Petition  No.4085  (M/B)  /2009  cannot  be  nullified  by
entertaining a petition filed under Article  226  of  the  Constitution  and
held that they are not entitled to get the plot in  dispute  by  paying  the
paltry  amount  of  Rs.1,95,939/-.   This  is  evinced  from  the  following
extracts of the impugned order :
           “Here, in the instant case, the garden lease in respect  of  the
           property in question was granted for a brief period of  7  years
           in favour of  Shri  Moni  Mohan  Banerjee,  the  predecessor  in
           interest of private respondent nos.4 and  5,  which  expired  in
           1968. As per the condition of garden lease agreement,  the  plot
           in question was to stand surrendered  to  the  State  after  the
           expiry of lease deed. Moreover, after the  garden  lease  period
           was over, no effort was made by Shri Moni Banerjee for a renewal
           and perhaps, it was also not renewable under the  terms  of  the
           lease  deed.   Thereafter,  the  land  was  converted   into   a
           commercial property, and it  was  advertised  for  auction  sale
           wherein the tender of the petitioner school  being  the  highest
           bidder was accepted and a lease agreement was  executed  between
           the petitioner and the  official  respondents.   Simultaneously,
           the possession  of  the  property  was  also  delivered  to  the
           petitioner school. It is also noticeable that  Shri  Moni  Mohan
           Banerjee did not participate in the auction sale despite  having
           knowledge   about   the   status   of   property   through   the
           advertisement. It is only when the petitioner school  wanted  to
           construct a boundary wall that Shri Moni Mohan  Banerjee  put  a
           resistance and went in litigation but in none of the litigations
           any title in respect of the property was settled  in  favour  of
           Shri Banerjee or his successors in  interest.  Shri  Moni  Mohan
           Banerjee had no sanction of any lease  agreement  or  Government
           order to continue with possession of the property and as noticed
           above, even  some  attempts  were  also  made  by  the  official
           respondents to take back the possession of  property  from  Shri
           Moni Mohan Banerjee  and  his  successors.  Thus,  the  official
           respondents had a clear intention that the impugned property was
           in illegal possession of Shri  Moni  Mohan  Banerjee.  Moreover,
           with  the  efflux  of  time  between  1968  and  1996  when  the
           Government Notification dated 17.02.1996 was issued  to  provide
           for conversion of lease  hold  right  into  freehold  right,  in
           respect of Nazul lands in occupation of people,  the  nature  of
           land had been changed to commercial property and it was  put  to
           auction. Thus the claim of private respondents had become  stale
           which could not have been revived by a direction of  this  Court
           to consider or take a  final  decision  on  the  application  of
           respondent nos.4 and 5 in view of the ratio of  Judgment  in  C.
           Jacob's case (supra)  and  the  property  could  not  have  been
           settled for a paltry amount of Rs.1,95,939/-  whereas  the  same
           property was sold in auction for an amount of over Rs.29 lacs in
           favour of the petitioner way back in 1995,  and  presently,  its
           market price is over Rs.2 Crore. The direction to  consider  the
           claim of respondent nos.4 and 5  was  passed  in  Writ  Petition
           no.4085 (MB) of 2009 vide the order dated 04.05.2009,  which  on
           reproduction reads as under:


                 xxx              xxx                   xxx


           It is a settled  principle  of  law  that  if  an  authority  is
           directed to consider the case, it should consider judiciously on
           merit and in accordance with law and not arbitrarily  causing  a
           huge loss to public exchequer under the umbrella  of  a  Court's
           order directing to consider or take final decision on the  case.
           Thus, the order of official  respondent  nos.2  and  3,  Lucknow
           Development Authority and Nazul  Officer,  as  also  the  demand
           notice and subsequent proceedings regarding  grant  of  freehold
           right in favour of private respondent nos. 4 and 5 deserve to be
           and is hereby quashed.”




3.24   Notwithstanding its finding that a  mandamus  cannot  be  issued  for
enforcing agreement dated 12.1.1996, the High Court  virtually  allowed  the
writ petition of respondent No.1 by relying upon the 2009 Act  and  directed
the official respondents to hand over possession of the plot  No.92  A/C  to
the said respondent and execute the sale deed on payment of market price  at
the current rate. The reasons  recorded  by  the  High  Court  for  granting
relief to respondent No.1 are as under:

            “Needless to say that this Court is not only the court  of  law
           but also a Court of equity and,  therefore,  its  decision  must
           subserve the cause of justice and in an appropriate case it  may
           grant such relief to which the writ petitioner would be entitled
           to in law as well in equity. Equity is not anti-law but a  moral
           dimension of law. Rather it is a grace and conscience of  living
           law, and thus, a Court's discretion  is  to  be  exercised  with
           circumspection within the precincts of justice, equity and  good
           conscience  while  keeping  in  view   the   given   facts   and
           circumstances of the case.
           Thus, taking into consideration the facts  that  the  Parliament
           has passed the Right  to  Education  Act,  that  the  petitioner
           deposited 25% (Rs. 7,40,700/-) of the consideration  amount  way
           back in 1995, and that he is ready to  pay  the  present  market
           price of the plot whereas no such offer has  come  from  private
           respondent nos. 4 and 5 during the course of hearing,  we  think
           it expedient in the interest of justice to direct the settlement
           of property in question in favour of the petitioner school  upon
           making  payment  of  cost  price  at  the  current  market  rate
           prevailing in the locality.
           In the premises set out hereinabove, we partly  allow  the  writ
           petition with direction to official respondents to hand over the
           possession of the plot in question and  execute  the  sale  deed
           after completing necessary procedural formalities on payment  of
           market price at current rate prevailing in  the  locality  where
           the plot is situated within a period of two months from the date
           of receiving a copy of this order. In case, the petitioner fails
           to pay the market price at current rate to be determined by  the
           authority  concerned,  the  official  respondents  would  be  at
           liberty to invite fresh tender for the auction of the same at  a
           price not less than the prevailing  market  price  so  that  the
           public exchequer is not made to suffer in  any  manner  and  the
           property is able to fetch the maximum price.”



4. Learned counsel for the appellants argued that  the  direction  given  by
   the High Court is legally unsustainable and is liable  to  be  set  aside
   because in the writ petition filed by it, respondent No.1 had not claimed
   relief.  He further argued that letter dated 12.1.1996 sent by the  State
   Government to the Vice-Chairman,  LDA  with  a  direction  to  hand  over
   possession of four plots to Shri Jagdish Gandhi and to accept the balance
   price in ten six-monthly installments with interest as also the agreement
   executed between the State Government and respondent  No.1  were  nullity
   and the mere fact that respondent No.1 had paid 25%  of  the  bid  amount
   could not be made basis for indirect revival of the agreement after a gap
   of almost 15 years. Another argument of the learned counsel is  that  the
   writ petition filed by respondent No.1 was highly belated  and  the  High
   Court committed serious error by entertaining the same.

5. Shri Shanti Bhushan, learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  respondent
   No.1 argued that agreement dated 12.1.1996 was binding on the parties and
   the High Court committed serious error by declining to issue  a  mandamus
   for its enforcement only on the ground that respondent No.1 had not  paid
   the balance price. Learned senior counsel relied upon Rules 50,  50A  and
   51 of the Nazul Manual and the provisions of the 2009 Act and argued that
   having accepted the bid of respondent No.1,  LDA  and  its  functionaries
   could not refuse to act in accordance with the agreement. Learned  senior
   counsel submitted that the installments of price could  not  be  paid  by
   respondent No.1 because despite  repeated  representations,  LDA  neither
   gave the schedule of installments nor indicated  the  rate  of  interest.
   Learned senior counsel  laid  considerable  emphasis  on  the  fact  that
   respondent No.1 is a charitable institution and argued that  even  though
   it may have committed default in payment of the balance price,  the  High
   Court was not justified in directing payment of current market price as a
   condition for transfer of the plot in question.

6. Before dealing with the respective arguments, we  consider  it  necessary
   to mention that even though the prayer made in Writ  Petition  No.11/1995
   gives an impression that respondent No.1 was claiming relief  in  respect
   of plots for which tender notice was issued on 24.11.1994,  the  contents
   of paragraphs 15 to 34 thereof clearly  show  that  respondent  No.1  was
   really claiming plot No.92A, Faizabad Road, Mahanagar, Lucknow  of  which
   lease was granted to Smt. Rajrani Srivastava sometime in  1958.   We  may
   also mention that the Will executed by Shri Banerjee  in  favour  of  the
   appellants was only in respect of plot No.92-A.

7. The first question which merits consideration is whether  the  conclusion
   recorded by the High Court on the issue of  enforceability  of  agreement
   dated 12.1.1996 is correct and respondent No.1’s prayer for  issue  of  a
   direction to LDA to accept the balance price was rightly rejected.  It is
   an admitted position that  in response to tender notice dated 20.12.1994,
   respondent No.1 gave bids for four plots including plot No.92A/C and paid
   25% of the price offered by  it  but  did  not  pay  the  balance  amount
   necessitating cancellation of the bid, about which intimation  was  given
   vide letter dated  14.6.1995.  Respondent  No.1  did  not  challenge  the
   cancellation of bids by availing appropriate legal remedy but its Manager
   succeeded in convincing the Governor of the  State  to  pass  an  unusual
   order for handing over possession of the  plots  and  acceptance  of  the
   balance amount in six-monthly installments. The  reasons  which  prompted
   the Governor to act in violation of the  rules  of  business  and  ordain
   restoration of the plots in favour  of  respondent  No.1  albeit  without
   setting aside the decision of LDA to cancel the bids are  not  borne  out
   from the records produced before this Court. Therefore, we hold that  the
   order passed by the Governor and the consequential actions taken  by  the
   State Government and LDA  including  the  execution  of  agreement  dated
   12.1.1996 did not create an enforceable right  in  favour  of  respondent
   No.1 and the High Court rightly declined to issue a mandamus  to  LDA  to
   accept the offer made on its behalf for payment of the balance price.

8. It is significant to note that agreement  dated  12.1.1996  contained  an
   unequivocal  stipulation  that  if  respondent  No.1  fails  to  pay  the
   installments of balance price within the prescribed time limit  then  the
   agreement would become void and LDA will be free to sell the plot to  any
   other person. Admittedly, respondent No.1 did not pay the instalments  of
   balance price. Therefore, the agreement  stood  automatically  terminated
   and LDA became entitled to dispose of the plot by adopting an appropriate
   mechanism consistent with the doctrine of equality enshrined  in  Article
   14  of  the  Constitution.  It  is  rather  intriguing  as  to  why   the
   functionaries of LDA remained silent for more than 13 years and  did  not
   repossess the plot in question. This was  perhaps  due  to  the  pressure
   brought by the  Manager  of  respondent  No.1  from  different  quarters,
   administrative as well as political.

9. The next question which requires consideration is whether the High  Court
   could invoke the provisions of the 2009 Act and direct LDA to  hand  over
   possession of plot No.92A/C to respondent No.1 and execute the sale  deed
   on payment of market price at the current rate.   In  the  writ  petition
   filed on behalf of respondent No.1 it was not claimed that in view of the
   provisions contained in the 2009 Act, LDA is  bound  to  allot  plot  No.
   92A/C or allow respondent No.1 to retain the plot for which its  bid  had
   been  accepted  by  the  competent  authority.   Therefore,  neither  the
   appellants nor the official respondents had the opportunity to controvert
   such claim and show that the provisions of the 2009 Act  do  not  provide
   for allotment/sale of land to the  educational  institutions.   The  High
   Court has made a passing reference to the 2009 Act and granted relief  to
   the respondent No.1 only on the ground that it had already deposited  25%
   of the bid amount way back in 1995 and respondent Nos.4  and  5  had  not
   made an offer to take the plot by paying the  current  market  price.  We
   have carefully gone through the provisions of the 2009 Act and find  that
   they do not even remotely deal with the issue of allotment of land to the
   educational institutions. Therefore, the Division Bench of the High Court
   was not at all justified in ordering transfer of the plot  to  respondent
   No.1 and that too by ignoring its own finding that  the  said  respondent
   was a ranked defaulter and the writ petition was filed after a  time  gap
   of 13 years without any tangible explanation.

10. The Nazul Rules on  which  reliance  has  been  placed  by  Shri  Shanti
   Bhushan do not have any bearing on the issues raised  in  these  appeals.
   Rule 50 of the Nazul Rules lays down that in all cases, whether  of  sale
   or of new leases or of renewal  of  leases  which  have  expired  without
   option of renewal which involves a concession in favour of the vendee  or
   the lessee, e.g., in which it is proposed to fix the sale  price  or  the
   rent at a rate lower than the prevailing market rate or at  which  it  is
   proposed to sell or lease the land without holding a  public  auction  or
   inviting public tenders, prior approval of the State Government shall  be
   obtained before sanction, even though such cases, owing to the  value  of
   the land being within the limits laid down in the rules, could  otherwise
   be sanctioned without reference to the State Government. Rule 50-A  deals
   with lease of small stretches for gardening purposes and lays  down  that
   such lease shall be for a short period  not  exceeding  seven  years  and
   shall be subject to the conditions enumerated  in  that   rule.  Rule  51
   deals with grant of lease or sale of nazul land at concessional rates for
   charitable  purposes  like,  hospitals,  educational   institutions   and
   orphanages. It further lays down that the  concession  shall  not  exceed
   half the annual rental in the case of lease or half of the  total  market
   value in the case of sale. Two provisos to this rule specify  the  limits
   of concession. Rule 52 contains a non-obstante clause  and  empowers  the
   State Government to sanction a lease  or  sale  of  nazul  land  for  the
   particular purpose and at the particular rate keeping in view the special
   circumstances of the case. These rules do not, in any manner, support the
   cause of respondent No.1 because it failed to pay the price  of  land  in
   terms of the bid given pursuant to tender notice dated 20.12.1994 or even
   in terms of agreement dated 12.1.1996 and tried to  concoct  evidence  to
   show that LDA was the defaulter.

11. The issue which remains to be considered is whether the  appellants  are
   entitled to plot No.92 A/C and the  High  Court  committed  an  error  by
   quashing the action taken by the LDA and the Nazul Officer in furtherance
   of order dated 4.5.2009 passed in Writ Petition No.4085/2009.  It is  not
   in dispute that the term of the garden lease had ended on  31.7.1968  and
   the same was not extended by the competent authority.  Therefore, in view
   of the stipulations contained in lease deed dated 29.1.1964, he was bound
   to hand over the plot to the Government. However, Shri Banerjee continued
   to unauthorisedly occupy the plot till its disposal by  LDA  in  1994  by
   inviting bids. Although, respondent No.1 also  failed  to  abide  by  the
   terms of agreement dated 12.1.1996, Shri Banerjee  was  not  entitled  to
   take benefit of order dated 17.2.1996 and seek  conversion  of  leasehold
   rights into freehold because LDA had already accepted the  bid  given  by
   respondent No.1 and delivered possession of  the  plot  to  Shri  Jagdish
   Gandhi. The appellants who claim to be beneficiaries of the Will executed
   by Shri Banerjee cannot claim a better right. Writ Petition  No.4085/2009
   filed  by  them  was  nothing  but  an  abuse  of  the  process  of  law.
   Unfortunately, the Division Bench of the High Court,  which  disposed  of
   the writ petition vide order dated 4.5.2009 did not even bother  to  call
   upon the respondents to admit or controvert the  averments  contained  in
   the writ petition filed by the appellants and directed the Nazul  Officer
   to decide their representation for grant of freehold rights in respect of
   plot No.92A/C. The error committed by the High Court in entertaining  the
   writ petition of the appellants was compounded by the Nazul  Officer  who
   ordered conversion of leasehold rights into freehold rights in respect of
   4433 sq. ft. and gave an opportunity to the appellants to grab a valuable
   piece of land by depositing a paltry amount of Rs. 1,95,939/- as  against
   the market price of Rs.2  crores.  It  is  a  different  thing  that  the
   appellants did not succeed in their design and the High Court quashed the
   action taken by the Nazul Officer for conversion of the plot.

12. In the result, Civil Appeal No. 10181 of 2011 is partly allowed and  the
   direction given by the High Court for handing over possession of plot No.
   92 A/C to respondent No.1 on payment of the current market price  is  set
   aside.  However, the decision of the High Court to quash the action taken
   by LDA and the Nazul Officer  in  furtherance  of  order  dated  4.5.2009
   passed in Writ Petition No. 4085 of 2009  is  upheld.  Civil  Appeal  No.
   10180  of  2011  is  dismissed.  For  filing  frivolous  and  unwarranted
   litigation,  which  has  consumed  substantial  time  of  various  Courts
   including this Court, the appellants and respondent No.1 are saddled with
   cost of Rs. 10 lakhs each. They are directed to  deposit  the  amount  of
   cost with the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee within a  period  of
   two months from today.

13. Respondent No.1 is directed to hand over possession of plot No.92A/C  to
   the Vice-Chairman, LDA within a period of 15 days. If the appellants have
   managed to take possession of the plot then they shall surrender the plot
   to the Vice-Chairman, LDA with 15 days.  Thereafter, LDA shall dispose of
   the plot by public auction keeping in view the propositions laid down  by
   this Court in Akhil Bhartiya Upbhokta Congress v. State of Madhya Pradesh
   (2011) 5 SCC 29 (paragraphs 65 and 66).   It  is  needless  to  say  that
   respondent No.1 shall be free to participate in the auction which may  be
   conducted by LDA in compliance of this order.  The  appellants  shall  be
   free to withdraw the amount deposited for conversion of plot No.92 A/C.

                                                …..……….....……..….………………….…J.
                                        [G.S. SINGHVI]



                                                    …………..………..….………………….…J.
                                         [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA]
New Delhi,
July 02, 2012.

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“EXTRAORDINARY Published by Authority No. 243, PORT BLAIR, TUESDAY, OCTOBER 30, 2007 ANDAMAN & NICOBAR ADMINISTRATION Directorate of Tribal Welfare NOTIFICATION Port Blair, dated the 30th October, 2007 No. 234/2007/F.No. 1-752/2007-TW - In exercise of the power conferred by Sub-Section (1) of Section 3 of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (Protection of Aboriginal Tribes), Regulation, 1956 (Regulation No. 3 of 1956), the Lt. Governor, A & N Islands, is pleased to declare the area up to five km. radius around the Jarawa Tribal Reserve notified vide No. 159/2004/F.No. 1-752/2002-TW (PF) dated 15th September, 2004 from the Boundary Line starting from Constance Bay in South Andaman to Lewis Inlet Bay in Middle Andaman, as a Buffer Zone. Any/person other than a member of an aboriginal tribe is prohibited from entering the Buffer Zone for any commercial and/or tourism activities.” In our view, the prohibition contained in the above reproduced notification and order dated 6.11.2007 passed by Tehsildar, Ferrargunj is unconditional. Therefore, till the notification is rescinded or amended, no commercial or tourism related activity can be allowed within the Reserved Area or the Buffer Zone and it is not possible for the Court to approve the suggestions contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 of letter dated 10.5.2012 sent by the Principal Secretary (Tribal Welfare), Andaman and Nicobar Administration. We, therefore, direct that henceforth no commercial and tourism related activities shall be carried out by the administration or any private individual in violation of the prohibition contained in notification dated 30.10.2007 and order dated 6.11.2007. It shall be the duty of the Principal Secretary (Tribal Welfare) and other officers of the Administration of Andaman and Nicobar to ensure total compliance of the prohibition contained in notification dated 30.10.2007 and this order. Any breach of this order will entail punishment under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.



                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

              SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) No. 12125 of 2010

LG, Andaman & Nicobar Islands and others                 … Petitioner(s)
                                   Versus
M/s. Bare Foot Inns and Leisure Pvt. Ltd.                … Respondent

                                  O R D E R

G. S. Singhvi, J.
      On 11.5.2012, arguments were heard in  the  context  of  letter  dated
10.5.2012 sent by the Principal  Secretary  (Tribal  Welfare),  Andaman  and
Nicobar Administration to the Additional Solicitor  General  and  the  order
was reserved.
      In the main petition, the petitioners have questioned the judgment  of
the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, Circuit Bench at  Port  Blair
whereby the appeal preferred by  them  against  the  order  of  the  learned
Single  Judge,  who  quashed  notification  dated  30.10.2007  issued  under
Section 3(1) of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands  (Protection  of  Aboriginal
Tribes), Regulations, 1956 (for short, ‘the 1956 Regulations’) declaring  an
area upto five km. radius around the Jarawa Tribal Reserve  as  Buffer  Zone
and prohibiting entry in the Buffer Zone of any person other than  a  member
of an aboriginal tribe was dismissed.
      Notice in the special  leave  petition  was  issued  on  8.3.2010  and
operation of the judgment impugned therein was stayed.
      On 3.12.2010, this Court expressed the view that the petitioners  have
not taken steps to implement the notification and directed their counsel  to
make a statement on the issue of  closure  of  all  commercial  and  tourist
establishments within the Buffer Zone.  Thereafter, several  interim  orders
were  passed  by  the  Court  for  ensuring  faithful  compliance   of   the
prohibition contained in the notification issued under Section 3(1) of   the
1956 Regulations.
      On 3.2.2012, the Court appointed S/Shri T. S. Doabia, Senior  Advocate
and Sanjay Upadhyay, Advocate, whose names were  suggested  by  the  counsel
for the parties, as Court Commissioners with the direction that  they  shall
visit the Island mentioned  in  the  notification  and  submit  report.   In
compliance of the directions given  by  the  Court,  the  two  Commissioners
visited the Island and submitted their separate reports. On  23.4.2012,  the
Court noted the submission made by learned counsel for the  respondent  that
the Commissioners had not focused on the  issue  mentioned  in  order  dated
4.11.2011  and  directed  the  counsel   for   the   petitioners   to   seek
comprehensive instructions  on  the  question  of  stopping  commercial  and
tourism related activities within the Reserved Area and the Buffer Zone.
        In  compliance  of  the  aforementioned   direction,   the   learned
Additional Solicitor General produced letter dated 10.5.2012,  the  relevant
portions of which are extracted below:
        “This is in continuation to our letter dated 3/5/2012  referred  to
        above and discussion held today with you, the following  brief  may
        kindly be placed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the hearing of
        11/5/2012 as directed by the  Hon'ble  Court  in  its  order  dated
        23/4/2012,

     1. No tourist establishment such as resorts, hotels, restaurants, bars
        and paying guest accommodations except  the  government  run  Guest
        Houses   will   be    permitted    within    the    Buffer    Zone.


     2. No commercial establishment/activities which may employ  more  than
        20 persons or have annual turnover of Rs. One Crore or more will be
        allowed in the Buffer Zone.
     3. Visits of tourists during day time  to  Lime  Stone  Cave  and  Mud
        Volcanoes existing in Baratang Island in the  Buffer  Zone  may  be
        allowed to be continued.




                                                       Yours faithfully,


                                                               (Ajai Saxena)
                                       Principal Secretary (Tribal Welfare)”


      Learned counsel for the parties made their submissions mainly  on  the
issue of continuance of commercial and  tourism  related  activities  within
the Reserved Area and the Buffer Zone.  While Ms.  Indira  Jaising,  learned
Additional Solicitor General submitted that till a decision is taken by  the
competent authority on the issue of allowing commercial and tourism  related
activities within the Buffer Zone,  the  Court  may  permit  the  activities
specified in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the letter of  the  Principal  Secretary,
Shri S. Ganesh vehemently opposed the continuance of any  such  activity  in
the Reserved Area and the Buffer Zone by pointing out that  the  prohibition
contained in Notification dated 30.10.2007 and order dated 6.11.2007  issued
by Tehsildar, Ferrargunj is absolute.   Shri  Ganesh  submitted  that  after
forced closure of the  respondent’s  resort,  the  petitioners  can  neither
undertake  nor  allow  any  commercial  or  tourism  related   activity   in
contravention of Notification dated 30.10.2007.
      We have considered the  respective  submissions.   Notification  dated
30.10.2007 which was challenged before the High Court  and  which  is  under
consideration in the special leave petition reads as under:
                                                              “EXTRAORDINARY
Published by Authority No. 243, PORT BLAIR,
                 TUESDAY, OCTOBER 30, 2007
            ANDAMAN & NICOBAR ADMINISTRATION
                       Directorate of Tribal Welfare
                                NOTIFICATION

                  Port Blair, dated the 30th October, 2007

                 No. 234/2007/F.No. 1-752/2007-TW  -  In  exercise  of  the
        power conferred by Sub-Section (1) of Section 3 of the Andaman  and
        Nicobar Islands (Protection of Aboriginal Tribes), Regulation, 1956
        (Regulation No. 3 of 1956), the Lt. Governor, A  &  N  Islands,  is
        pleased to declare the area up to five km. radius around the Jarawa
        Tribal Reserve notified  vide  No.    159/2004/F.No.  1-752/2002-TW
        (PF) dated 15th September, 2004 from  the  Boundary  Line  starting
        from Constance Bay in South Andaman to Lewis Inlet  Bay  in  Middle
        Andaman, as a Buffer Zone.  Any/person other than a  member  of  an
        aboriginal tribe is prohibited from entering the  Buffer  Zone  for
        any commercial and/or tourism activities.”

      In our  view,  the  prohibition  contained  in  the  above  reproduced
notification and order dated 6.11.2007 passed by  Tehsildar,  Ferrargunj  is
unconditional. Therefore,  till the notification is  rescinded  or  amended,
no commercial  or  tourism  related  activity  can  be  allowed  within  the
Reserved Area or the Buffer Zone and it is not possible  for  the  Court  to
approve the suggestions contained in paragraphs 2  and  3  of  letter  dated
10.5.2012 sent by the Principal  Secretary  (Tribal  Welfare),  Andaman  and
Nicobar  Administration.   We,  therefore,   direct   that   henceforth   no
commercial and tourism related  activities  shall  be  carried  out  by  the
administration or any private individual in  violation  of  the  prohibition
contained in notification dated 30.10.2007 and order dated 6.11.2007.
      It shall be the duty of the Principal Secretary (Tribal  Welfare)  and
other officers of the Administration of Andaman and Nicobar to ensure  total
compliance of the prohibition contained  in  notification  dated  30.10.2007
and this order.   Any breach of this order will entail punishment under  the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

                                                …..……….....……..….………………….…J.
                                     [G.S. SINGHVI]



                                                    …………..………..….………………….…J.
                                     [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA]
New Delhi,
July 02, 2012.
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