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since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

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Wednesday, May 30, 2012

the complainant is not a consumer = In fact, from the complaint itself, it is abundantly clear that the petitioner/complainant was a professional contractor engaged in large scale commercial activities relating to timber/firewood for which he bid and received the order/contract in question from the respondents for the sum of Rs.8,55,000/-. There is thus no question of the respondents/OPs providing any type of “service” to the petitioner/complainant though he alleged “deficiency” in “service” on the part of the respondents/OPs in his complaint – that would indeed be turning the definitions of “service”, service provider and “consumer” on their heads. Likewise, as he had “purchased” the “goods” in the shape of timber/firewood from the respondents/OPs clearly for resale/commercial purpose, he could also not be a consumer under the provisions of section 2(1)(d)(i) of the Act. There was, incidentally, neither any pleading nor any evidence that the petitioner/complainant did his activities for earning his “livelihood” through “self employment”.


NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION
NEW DELHI

REVISION PETITION No. 1937 OF 2011
(From the order dated 08.04.2011 in First Appeal No.788 of 2008 of the Tamil Nadu State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Chennai)

S. P. Rajan
Son of V. S. Subramanian
Prop. Mount Hermon Estate, Kamarajapuram                         Petitioner
Opp. Uzhavar Market
Coonoor – 643 1010
versus

1. CSI Diocesan Council
256, Race Course Road
Chennai

2. Rev. M. Dorai
Bishop – Chairman
CSI Diocesan Council
256, Race Course Road
Chennai

3. Rev. Andrew Moduram
Vice President
CSI Diocesan Council
256, Race Course Road                                                           Respondents
Chennai

4. Rev. W. Samuel, Hony. Secretary
All Saints Church (English Church)
Post Office - Upper Coonoor

5. P.S. Swamidass, Hony. Treasurer
CSI Diocesan Council
256, Race Course Road
Chennai
6. Rev. H. Chella Rajan, Addis Pastorate
Amman Kulam
Coimbatore - 45

7. Prof. T. Manson
CSI Diocesan Council
256, Race Course Road
Coimbatore - 18

8. David Mangaldass, Treasury Officer
CSI Diocesan Council
256, Race Course Road
Coimbatore – 18  or
District Treasury
Ootacamund, Nilgiris

9. J.D. Shekar, Correspondent
Battery Point, Trichy Road
Coimbatore

10. Dr. S. J. Jayapalan, Principal
CSI Engineering College
Ketti


BEFORE:

HON'BLE MR.ANUPAM DASGUPTA                      PRESIDING MEMBER


For the Petitioner                                   Mr. S. K. Giri Gowda, Advocate

 

Pronounced on  28th May, 2012


ORDER

ANUPAM DASGUPTA

                This revision petition challenges the order dated 08.04.2011 of Tamil Nadu State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Chennai (in short, ‘the State Commission’) in First Appeal no. 788 of 2008 in which too, the petitioner was the appellant. By this order, the State Commission dismissed the petitioner’s appeal and confirmed the order dated 23.09.2008 of the Nilgiris District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Udhagamandalam (in short, ‘the District Forum’).

2.     The petitioner, the complainant before the District Forum, stated in his complaint that he was a professional contractor engaged in felling of trees and trading of timber. He was engaged by the opposite parties (OPs) for felling/cutting, removing and clearing the timber and firewood from 1200 Eucalyptus trees over an area of 5 acres of the OPs after the latter had obtained necessary Government permission and accepted his bid price of Rs.8,75,000/- for the 1200 trees in response to their tender notice. He alleged that the OPs, however, allowed him to cut only 1048 trees against the contracted number of 1200 though he had paid Rs. 7,12,500/-. Alleging “deficiency in service” on the part of the OPs “in illegally retaining the cut logs the value of which on 31.03.2003” was Rs.8,55,000/- because of which “the complainant was not able to do his business (sic of) either selling the timber or selling the firewood”, he prayed for an award of Rs.15,55,000/- with interest @ 18% per annum from 31.03.2003.

3.     The OPs filed their written version and denied all the allegations while stating at the outset that the complainant did not fall in the category of “consumer”.

4.     On appraisal of the pleadings, evidence and documents produced by the parties, the District Forum held the OPs guilty of deficiency in service and unfair trade practice, as a result of which the petitioner/complainant was prevented from performing his part of the contract which caused the him mental agony and suffering. However, against his claim of Rs. 5 lakh on this count, the District Forum awarded only Rs.25,000/- to the complainant as compensation and Rs.2000/- by way of cost.

5.     Aggrieved by this order, the complainant went up in appeal before the State Commission which dismissed the appeal, as already noted above. It is against this order of the State Commission that the complainant has preferred this revision petition.

6.     It is seen from the written version of the OPs/respondents before the District Forum that they had specifically opposed the maintainability of the complainant before a Consumer Forum on account of the ground that the complainant/petitioner was not a “consumer” under the provisions of section 2(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereafter, ‘the Act’). By some long, convoluted and almost incomprehensible arguments put forth in words that defy understanding, the District Forum, however, held that the complainant was a consumer and that there was “deficiency in service” on the part of the OPs.
7.     In its impugned order, the State Commission also did not come to any finding on the status of the complainant as a “consumer” and merely concluded as under:
“………………………………………on perusal of the District Forum’s order and other materials from the records and as well as from the submissions made by the appellant, we feel that the District Forum has leniently considered the claim of the complainant instead of dismissing the complaint in toto and thereby we feel this appeal deserved no merits, in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, as discussed above.”

8.     I have heard Mr. S. K. Giri Gowda, learned counsel for the petitioner at the stage of admission of the revision petition.

9(i).  Learned counsel for the petitioner was unable to explain as to how the OPs/respondents who, in fact, availed of the services of the petitioner/complainant as a contractor for felling of trees and carrying away the timber/firewood on payment of the agreed sum could themselves be “service” provider and how could they be accused of “deficiency in service”. He then argued that this was a case of a “buyer” of “goods” not being delivered the “goods” for which he had paid, inasmuch as the respondents prevented the petitioner from felling the remaining trees and carrying away their timber/firewood to which he was entitled. On a further question whether the “purchase of goods” by the petitioner from the respondents was not, as admitted in the complaint, for “resale” or “commercial purpose”, the learned counsel was again unable to give any answer.

(ii)    In fact, from the complaint itself, it is abundantly clear that the petitioner/complainant was a professional contractor engaged in large scale commercial activities relating to timber/firewood for which he bid and received the order/contract in question from the respondents for the sum of Rs.8,55,000/-. There is thus no question of the respondents/OPs providing any type of “service” to the petitioner/complainant though he alleged “deficiency” in “service” on the part of the respondents/OPs in his complaint – that would indeed be turning the definitions of “service”, service provider and “consumer” on their heads. Likewise, as he had “purchased” the “goods” in the shape of timber/firewood from the respondents/OPs clearly for resale/commercial purpose, he could also not be a consumer under the provisions of section 2(1)(d)(i) of the Act. There was, incidentally, neither any pleading nor any evidence that the petitioner/complainant did his activities for earning his “livelihood” through “self employment”.

10.    Both the Fora below have thus clearly erred in entertaining the complaint/appeal of the petitioner who, by virtue of his own pleadings, cannot be held a “consumer” under the aforesaid provisions of the Act. Accordingly, the revision petition is dismissed in limine after setting aside the impugned order of the State Commission as well as that of the District Forum. The complaint is also dismissed, not being maintainable ab initio. No order as to costs.

Sd/-
…………………………………………..
[Anupam Dasgupta]

satish

Before parting with the case, we may note that the appellant has created a situation by which a nine year old girl who believed in him as a co-villager and went with him in total innocence breathed her last before she could get into her blossom of adolescence. Rape or an attempt to rape is a crime not against an individual but a crime which destroys the basic equilibrium of the social atmosphere. The consequential death is more horrendous. It is to be kept in mind that an offence against the body of a woman lowers her dignity and mars her reputation. It is said that one’s physical frame is his or her temple. No one has any right of encroachment. An attempt for the momentary pleasure of the accused has caused the death of a child and had a devastating effect on her family and, in the ultimate eventuate, on the collective at large. When a family suffers in such a manner, the society as a whole is compelled to suffer as it creates an incurable dent in the fabric of the social milieu. The cry of the collective has to be answered and respected and that is what exactly the High Court has done by converting the decision of acquittal to that of conviction and imposed the sentence as per law. 40. Consequently, the appeal, being sans merit, stands dismissed.


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 82 OF 2008



Jugendra Singh                                  .....……..Appellant

                                   Versus

STATE OF U. P.                               ………Respondent







                               j u d g m e n t



Dipak Misra, J.



      From the days of yore, every civilised society has  developed  various
kinds of marriages to save the man  from  the  tyranny  of  sex,  for  human
nature in certain circumstances has the enormous potentiality of  exhibiting
intrigue, intricacy and complexity, in a way,  a  labyrinth.   Instances  do
take place where a man becomes a slave to this tyrant and exposes  unbridled
appetite and lowers himself to an unimaginable extent for  gratification  of
his carnal desire.  The  case  at  hand  graphically  exposes  the  inferior
endowments of nature in the appellant who failed to husband his passion  and
made an attempt to commit rape on a nine year old girl and the tears of  the
child failed to have  any  impact  on  his  emotion  and  even  an  iota  of
compassion did not surface as if it had been  atrophied  and  eventually  he
pressed her neck which caused instant death of the nervous young girl.

2.    Presently,  we  shall  proceed  with  the  narration.   The  facts  as
unfolded by the prosecution, in brief, are that  on  24.06.1994,  Vineshwari
along with her brother, Dharam Veer, aged about five  years,  was  having  a
bath in the water that  had  accumulated  in  front  of  the  house  of  the
informant, Pitambar, their father, due to  a  crack  in  the  nearby  canal.
Kali Charan and Ganeshi, PW 2,  were  grazing  their  cattle  in  the  field
situate at a short distance.   The  accused-appellant,  a  resident  of  the
village, cajoled Vineshwari to accompany him to the nearby  field  belonging
to one Layak Singh. The younger brother, Dharam  Veer,  innocently  followed
them.  At that juncture, the appellant took off her  undergarment  and  with
the intention to have intercourse flung her on the ground.  The  young  girl
cried aloud and her brother, the five  year  old  child,  raised  an  alarm.
Kali Charan and Ganeshi who had seen the accused taking  the  girl  followed
by the brother to the field of Layak Singh rushed to the place  and  shouted
for Pitambar, PW-1.  Hearing the shout, Pitambar with his elder  son  Harpal
rushed to the spot and witnessed that the accused was pressing the  neck  of
Vineshwari.   By the time they could reach the spot,  the  accused  made  an
effort to run away but he was apprehended.  However, unfortunately  by  that
time, the girl had already breathed her last.   Leaving the accused  in  the
custody of the villagers, Pitambar went to the police station and lodged  an
FIR.

3.    After the criminal law was set in motion,  the  accused  was  arrested
and the investigating officer, Balvir Singh, PW  7,  reached  the  spot  and
carried out the investigation.  The dead body of the deceased was  sent  for
post mortem.  The Investigating Officer seized the garment of the  deceased,
the clothes of the accused and  certain  other  articles  and  prepared  the
seizure memo.   After  recording  the  statements  of  the  witnesses  under
Section 161 of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  and  completing  further
investigation, the prosecution submitted the chargesheet under Sections  302
and 376 read with 511 of  the  Indian  Penal  Code  (for  short  “the  IPC”)
before the competent court which in turn committed the matter to  the  Court
of Session wherein it was registered as S.T. No. 1098 of 94.

4.    The plea of the defence was one of denial and false implication.

5.    The accused chose not to adduce any evidence.

6.    In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined eight  witnesses,
namely, Pitamber @ Pita, PW-1  (father  of  the  deceased),  Ganeshi,  PW-2,
Dharam Veer, PW-3, Dr. S.K. Sharma, PW-4, Head Constable Mahfooj  Khan,  PW-
5, Dr. S.R.P. Mishra, PW-6, Balvir Singh, S.I.,  PW-7  and  Constable  Vinod
Kumar, PW-8.

7.    Pitamber @ Pita PW-1 stated on oath that the  accused  influenced  his
daughter Vineshwari, who was taking bath in the  canal  water  to  accompany
him to the nearby field.  He has further stated that the  accused  attempted
to commit rape on his daughter and ultimately strangulated her  throat  that
caused her death.  Ganeshi, PW-2 deposed that he along with Kali Charan  was
there.  On hearing the cry of the girl, he  and  Kali  Charan  went  to  the
field of Layak Singh and found that the accused was trying  to  commit  rape
on Vineshwari and tied a shirt on her neck.  Dharam Veer,  PW-3,  could  not
be examined because he was unable to grasp the questions.

8.    Dr. S.K. Sharma, PW-4 conducted the  post  mortem  of  Vineshwari  and
found the following anti-mortem injuries:-

      (1)   Abrasion 5 cm. X 1 cm. over Rt.  Ramus  of  jaw  extending  neck
      region.

      (2)   Abrasion 3 cm. X 1 cm. over left Supra Clovicular region.

      No injury was found on the private parts and/or thighs  nor  on  chest
and buttocks.  However, two  vaginal  smears  were  prepared  and  sent  for
pathological examination.

      Over eternal pericardium larynxes and both the lungs of the  deceased,
deposits of blood were found.  Except this, the liver, pancreas, spleen  and
both kidneys were filled  with  blood.   On  interior  examination,  Larynx,
Trachea, Bronchi and Lungs were found  congested.   According  to  Dr.  S.K.
Sharma, the death of the deceased took place due to asphyxia as a result  of
throttling.

9.    Dr. S.R.P. Mishra,  PW-6  examined  the  accused  Jugendra  and  found
certain contusions, abrasions and superfluous injuries on his body.

10.   Balvir Singh, S.I., PW-7  proved  the  site  plan,  recovery  memo  of
underwear of Vineshwari, panchnama, report to C.M.O. and chargesheet.

11.   The learned trial Judge appreciating  the  evidence  on  record  found
that there were discrepancies and contradictions in  the  testimony  of  the
witnesses;  that it was difficult to believe that  the  accused  was  laying
upon the deceased in the presence of  Kali  Charan  and  Ganeshi;  that  the
deposition of witnesses that they had  found  blood  on  the  spot  had  not
received corroboration from the examination of Dr. S. K. Sharma,  P.  W.  4,
who had deposed that the blood had not  oozed  out  from  the  body  of  the
deceased girl; that the colour of the under garment of the  girl  as  stated
by her father did not tally with the colour described in the recovery  memo;
that as per the medical report there was no injury on the private  parts  of
the deceased; that there  was  difference  in  the  time  mentioned  by  the
witnesses as regards the lodging of the FIR inasmuch  as  the  investigating
officer arrived at the spot between 1.30 to 2.00 p.m. whereas  the  FIR  was
lodged at 2.45 p.m.; and  that the colour of  the  shirt  was  not  properly
stated by the witnesses.  Because  of  the  aforesaid  findings,  the  trial
court came to the conclusion that the prosecution had failed  to  prove  its
case beyond reasonable doubt and accordingly acquitted the  accused  of  the
charge.

12.   The aforesaid judgment of acquittal came to be challenged  before  the
High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 2644of 1998 on the ground  that  the  view
expressed by the learned  trial  Judge  was  totally  perverse  since  minor
discrepancies and contradictions had been magnified and  the  real  evidence
had been ignored.  It was also put forth that  the  trial  court  failed  to
appreciate the fact that  the  accused  was  apprehended  at  the  spot  and
nothing had been brought on record to dislodge the same.  It was also  urged
that the view expressed by the trial  court  was  totally  unreasonable  and
defied logic in the primary sense.

13.   The High  Court  perused  the  evidence  on  record  and  opined  that
unnecessary emphasis had been laid  on  minor  discrepancies  by  the  trial
court and the view expressed by it was absolutely perverse and remotely  not
a plausible one.  Being  of  this  view,  it  over-turned  the  judgment  of
acquittal to that conviction and  sentenced  the  accused  to  undergo  life
imprisonment for the offence under Section 302 IPC and to  undergo  rigorous
imprisonment for ten years for the offence under Section 376 read  with  511
of IPC with the stipulation that both the sentences shall run  concurrently.


14.   We  have  heard  Mr.  Lav  Kumar  Agrawal,  learned  counsel  for  the
appellant, and Mr. R. K. Dash, learned counsel for the State.

15.   It is contended by Mr. Agrawal that the High Court  has  not  kept  in
view the parameters on which the judgment of acquittal is to  be  interfered
with and has converted one of acquittal  to  conviction  solely  by  stating
that the judgment is perverse.   It is urged by him that  the  discrepancies
and contradictions have been discussed in detail by the trial court  and  he
has expressed a well reasoned opinion that the  prosecution  has  failed  to
bring home the charge, but the said conclusion has  been  unsettled  by  the
High Court by stating that the said discrepancies are minor in  nature.   It
is his further submission that the ocular  evidence  has  not  received  any
corroboration  from  the  medical  evidence   and   further   the   material
particulars  have  been  totally  overlooked  and  hence,  the  judgment  of
conviction is sensitively vulnerable.

16.   Mr.  Dash,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  respondent,  has
canvassed  that  the  learned  trial  judge   had   treated   the   ordinary
discrepancies which are bound to  occur  when  rustic  witnesses  have  been
accentuated as if they are in the realm of high degree of contradiction  and
inconsistency.  It is submitted by him that when the judgment of  the  trial
court suffers from perversity of approach  especially  in  relation  to  the
appreciation of evidence and the view cannot be treated  to  be  a  possible
one, no flaw can be found with the judgment of reversal by the  High  Court.


17.   To appreciate the submissions raised at the bar and  to  evaluate  the
correctness of the impugned judgment, we think it appropriate  to  refer  to
certain authorities  in  the  field  which  deal  with  the  parameters  for
reversing a judgment of acquittal to that of  conviction  by  the  appellate
court.

18.   In Jadunath Singh and Others v. State of U.P.[1], a three Judge  Bench
of this Court has held thus:-

      “This Court has consistently taken the view  that  an  appeal  against
           acquittal the High Court has full power to review at  large  all
           the evidence and to reach the conclusion that upon that evidence
           the order of acquittal should be reversed.  This  power  of  the
           appellate court in an appeal against acquittal was formulated by
           the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in  Sheo  Swarup  v.
           King Emperor,[2] and Nur  Mohammad  v.  Emperor[3].   These  two
           decisions have been consistently referred  to  in  judgments  of
           this Court as laying down the true scope  of  the  power  of  an
           appellate court in hearing criminal appeals:  see Surajpal Singh
           v. State[4] and Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan[5]. ”




 19.   In  Damodar  Prasad  Chandrika  Prasad  and  Others   v.   State   of
Maharashtra[6] it has been held that once the Appellate Court comes  to  the
conclusion that the view of the trial court  is  unreasonable,  that  itself
provides a reason for interference.  The two-Judge  Bench  referred  to  the
decision in State of Bombay v. Rusy Mistry,[7] to hold that if  the  finding
shocks the conscience of the Court or has disregarded  the  norms  of  legal
process or substantial and grave injustice has been done, the  same  can  be
interfered with.

 20.  In Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade and another v. State of Maharashtra[8], the
three-Judge Bench opined that there are no fetters on the plenary  power  of
the Appellate Court to review the whole  evidence  on  which  the  order  of
acquittal is founded and, indeed, it has a duty to scrutinise the  probative
material de novo,  informed,  however,  by  the  weighty  thought  that  the
rebuttable innocence attributed to the accused having  been  converted  into
an acquittal the homage of our  jurisprudence  owes  to  individual  liberty
constrains  the  higher  court  not  to  upset  the  finding  without   very
convincing reasons  and  comprehensive  consideration.  This  Court  further
proceeded to state that the cherished principles of golden thread  to  prove
beyond reasonable doubt which runs through the wave of our  law  should  not
be stretched morbidly to  embrace  every  hunch,  hesitancy  and  degree  of
doubt.  Emphasis was laid on the aspect that a  balance  has  to  be  struck
between chasing chance possibilities as good enough to  set  the  delinquent
free and chopping the  logic  of  preponderant  probability  to  punish  the
marginal innocents.

 21.  In State of Karnataka v. K. Gopala Krishna[9], it has been  held  that
where the findings of the Court below are  fully  unreasonable  or  perverse
and not based on the evidence on record or suffer  from  serious  illegality
and include ignorance and misreading of record, the Appellate Court will  be
justified in setting aside such an order of acquittal.   If  two  views  are
reasonably possible and the view favouring the accused has been accepted  by
the courts below, that is sufficient for upholding the order  of  acquittal.
 Similar view was  reiterated  in  Ayodhya  Singh  v.  State  of  Bihar  and
others.[10]

 22.  In  Anil  Kumar  v.  State  of  U.P.[11],  it  has  been  stated  that
interference with  an  order  of  acquittal  is  called  for  if  there  are
compelling and substantial reasons such as where the  impugned  judgment  is
clearly  unreasonable  and  relevant  and  convincing  materials  have  been
unjustifiably eliminated.

 23.  In Girija Prasad (dead) by LRs. v. State of M.  P.[12],  it  has  been
observed that in an appeal against acquittal, the Appellate Court has  every
power to re-appreciate, review  and  reconsider  the  evidence  as  a  whole
before it.  It is, no doubt, true that there is a presumption  of  innocence
in favour of the accused and that presumption is reinforced by an  order  of
acquittal recorded by the trial court, but  that  is  not  the  end  of  the
matter.  It is for Appellate Court to keep in view the  relevant  principles
of law to re-appreciate and reweigh as a  whole  and  to  come  to  its  own
conclusion in accord with the principle of criminal jurisprudence.

 24.  In State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran[13], it has been reiterated that the
Appellate Court can peruse the evidence and  interfere  with  the  order  of
acquittal only if the approach of  the  lower  court  is  vitiated  by  some
manifest illegality or the decision is perverse.

 25.  In State of U. P. v. Ajai Kumar[14], the principles stated in State of
Rajasthan v. Sohan lal[15] were reiterated.  It is worth noting that in  the
case of Sohan Lal, it has been stated thus:-

           “This Court has repeatedly laid down that as the first appellate
           court the High Court, even while dealing with an appeal  against
           acquittal, was also entitled,  and  obliged  as  well,  to  scan
           through and if need be reappreciate the entire evidence,  though
           while choosing to  interfere  only  the  court  should  find  an
           absolute assurance of the guilt on the basis of the evidence  on
           record and not merely because the High Court could take one more
           possible or a different view only.  Except the above, where  the
           matter of the extent and depth of consideration of the appeal is
           concerned,  no  distinctions  or  differences  in  approach  are
           envisaged in dealing with an appeal as such merely  because  one
           was against conviction or the other against an acquittal.”





26.   In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka[16], this Court held as under: -

           “42   From the above decisions,  in  our  considered  view,  the
           following general principles regarding powers of  the  appellate
           court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal
           emerge:

                  (1)  An  appellate  court  has  full  power  to   review,
           reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of
           acquittal is founded.

                  (2)  The  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973  puts   no
           limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of  such  power
           and an appellate court on the evidence before it may  reach  its
           own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.

                  (3)  Various  expressions,  such  as,  “substantial   and
           compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong
           circumstances”,  “distorted  conclusions”,  “glaring  mistakes”,
           etc.  are  not  intended  to  curtail  extensive  powers  of  an
           appellate  court  in  an   appeal   against   acquittal.    Such
           phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language”
           to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court  to  interfere
           with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to  review
           the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.

                 (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in
           case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of  the
           accused.  Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available  to
           him under the fundamental principle  of  criminal  jurisprudence
           that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he  is
           proved guilty by  a  competent  court  of  law.   Secondly,  the
           accused having secured his acquittal,  the  presumption  of  his
           innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened  by
           the trial court.

                 (5) If two reasonable  conclusions  are  possible  on  the
           basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should  not
           disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”



27.   In S. Ganesan v. Rama Raghuraman and others[17], one of us  (Dr.  B.S.
Chauhan,J.), after referring to the  decision  in  Sunil  Kumar  Sambhudayal
Gupta (Dr.) v. State  of  Maharashtra[18],  considered  various  aspects  of
dealing with a case of acquittal and after  placing  reliance  upon  earlier
judgments of this Court, particularly in Balak Ram  v.  State  of  U.P.[19],
Budh Singh v. State of U.P.[20], Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy[21],  Aruvelu
v. State[22] and Babu v. State of Kerala[23], held  that  unless  there  are
substantial and compelling circumstances, the  order  of  acquittal  is  not
required to be reversed in appeal.  Similar  view  has  been  reiterated  in
Ranjitham v. Basvaraj & Ors.[24] and State  of  Rajasthan  v.  Shera  Ram  @
Vishnu Dutta[25].

28.    Keeping  in  view  the  aforesaid  well-settled  principles,  we  are
required to scrutinize whether the judgment of  the  High  Court  withstands
the close scrutiny or conviction has been recorded because a different  view
can be taken.  First we shall refer to the ante mortem injuries  which  were
found on the deceased – (i) abrasion 5 cm x 1 cm over  right  ramus  of  jaw
extending to the neck and (ii)  abrasion  3  cm  x  1  cm  over  left  supra
clavicular region.  On internal examination,  larynx,  trachea  and  bronchi
were found congested.  Both the lungs were congested. Brain  was  congested.
Partially  digested  food  was  found  in  the  stomach.   Small  and  large
intestine were half full.  The doctor who  conducted  the  post  mortem  has
opined that the  cause  of  death  was  due  to  asphyxia  as  a  result  of
throttling.

29.   PW-6 Dr. S.R.P. Mishra had examined the accused  and  had  found  four
contusions and two abrasions on his forehead,  left  ear,  neck,  left  side
chest and right shoulder.  The learned trial Judge has given  some  emphasis
on these injuries but the High Court has expressed the view  that  when  the
accused was apprehended at the spot by the witnesses, he had  been  given  a
beating  for  the  criminal  act  and  hence,  the  minor  injuries  had  no
significance.

30.   The question is whether the trial court was  justified  in  coming  to
hold that there were discrepancies and contradictions  in  the  evidence  of
the witnesses and, therefore, the case of the prosecution  did  not  deserve
acceptance.  The discrepancies that have  been  found  have  been  described
while we have dealt with the  trial  court  judgment.   The  medical  report
clearly says that the death was caused  due  to  asphyxia  as  a  result  of
throttling. PW-4, the surgeon, who has conducted the  autopsy,  stated  that
the deceased was wearing a shirt.  PW-1, the father,  has  stated  that  she
was strangulated by a bush shirt.  The learned trial Judge  has  given  much
emphasis by drawing a distinction between a shirt and  a  bush  shirt.   The
High Court has treated that it is not  a  material  contradiction.   In  the
FIR, it was clearly mentioned that the  accused  strangulated  the  deceased
with the help of her shirt.  The  medical  report  supports  the  same  and,
therefore, the nature of the shirt which has been given  importance  by  the
learned trial Judge,  in  our  considered  opinion,  has  been  rightly  not
accepted.  The learned trial Judge has doubted the testimony of Ganeshi, PW-
2, that he had not seen the children taking the  bath  and  further  he  has
also opined that it would not have been possible  for  the  accused  to  lay
upon the deceased in their presence.  In this regard, the distance has  been
taken into consideration to discard  the  testimony.   The  High  Court  has
perused the testimony or deposition of PW-2 wherefrom it is  evincible  that
the spot was at the distance of 100 paces where he was grazing  the  cattle.
The Investigating Officer has deposed that there was  water  in  about  half
kilometre area as there was a crack in the canal as a consequence  of  which
water was flowing in front of the house of the informant.   Thus,  the  High
Court has opined that the variance with regard to the  details  of  distance
cannot be made the edifice to discard their testimony.  The High  Court  has
treated Ganeshi as a natural and neutral witness and it  has  also  observed
that his evidence could not have been thrown  overboard  on  the  ground  of
absence of precise description of distance and the  fact  that  he  had  not
seen the children bathing in the water.  That apart, the  inference  by  the
trial court is that when they had arrived on the scene,  the  accused  could
not have been laying on the deceased in their presence.   On  a  perusal  of
his deposition as well as analysis made by the learned trial  Judge,  it  is
evident that there was some time gap and distance.  The accused  was  laying
on the deceased and throttled her neck with the shirt.  The other  witnesses
had arrived after five to ten minutes.  The High Court  has  taken  note  of
the distance, time and the age of  the  deceased  and  has  found  that  the
reasoning ascribed by the trial court to disbelieve the version of  PW-2  is
unacceptable.

31.   The learned trial Judge has noticed that  both  Pitambar  and  Ganeshi
had deposed that they had seen blood on the spot, though the medical  report
clearly showed that there was no oozing of blood from any part of  the  body
of the deceased and further that there was no injury on  the  private  parts
of the girl.  It is apt to note here  that  there  was  some  frothy  liquid
coming out from the nose of the deceased.  The High Court,  while  analysing
the said evidence, has observed that the  witnesses  though  had  stated  to
have seen blood on the spot in their cross-examination, yet that  would  not
really destroy the version of the prosecution regard being had to  the  many
other facts which have been proven and  further  there  was  no  justifiable
reason to discard the testimony of  the  father  and  others  who  were  eye
witnesses to the occurrence.

32.   The learned trial Judge has taken note  of  the  fact  that  PW-1  had
stated in his cross-examination that  the  underwear  of  the  deceased  was
printed green in colour while  PW-2  had  stated  that  the  colour  of  the
underwear was red in colour and according to the recovery memo,  the  colour
was red, white and yellow.  The High Court has perused the memo,  Ext.  Ka2,
prepared by the Investigating Officer wherein it  has  been  described  that
the printed underwear was of red, white,  yellow  and  black  colour.   That
apart, when the witnesses were deposing almost after a span of three  years,
it was not expected of them to remember the  exact  colour  of  the  printed
underwear.  In  any  case,  the  High  Court  has  observed  that  the  said
discrepancy,  by  no  stretch  of  imagination,  could  be  treated   as   a
discrepancy of any significance.

33.   Another aspect which has weighed with  the  learned  trial  Judge  was
about the time of the lodging of the FIR.  The said timing  has  no  bearing
on the case of the prosecution inasmuch as rustic and  uneducated  villagers
could not have been precise on the time concept.

34.   At this juncture, we may remind ourselves that it is the duty  of  the
court to shift the chaff from the grain and find  out  the  truth  from  the
testimony of the witnesses.  A testimony  of  the  witness  is  required  to
inspire confidence.  It must be creditworthy.  In  State  of  U.P.  v.  M.K.
Anthony[26], this Court has observed that in case of minor discrepancies  on
trivial matters not touching the core of the case,  hypertechnical  approach
by taking the  sentences  torn  out  of  context  here  or  there  from  the
evidence, attaching importance to some  technical  error  committed  by  the
investigating officer and not going to the root  of  the  matter  would  not
ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole.

35.   In Rammi alias Rameshwar v. State of Madhya  Pradesh[27],  this  Court
has held as follows: -

           “24.  When  eye-witness  is  examined  at  length  it  is  quite
           possible for him to make some discrepancies.   No  true  witness
           can  possibly  escape  from  making  some  discrepant   details.
           Perhaps an untrue witness who is well tutored  can  successfully
           make his testimony totally non-discrepant.   But  Courts  should
           bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the  evidence
           of a witness are so incompatible with  the  credibility  of  his
           version that the Court is justified in jettisoning his evidence.
            But too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling
           in the narration of an incident (either as between the  evidence
           of two witnesses or  as  between  two  statements  of  the  same
           witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny.”



36.   In Appabhai and another v. State of Gujarat[28], this Court has  ruled
thus: -

           “The Court while appreciating the evidence must not attach undue
           importance to minor discrepancies.  The discrepancies  which  do
           not shake the basic version  of  the  prosecution  case  may  be
           discarded.  The discrepancies which are due to normal errors  of
           perception or observation should not be given  importance.   The
           errors due to lapse of memory may be given due  allowance.   The
           Court by calling into aid its vast experience of men and matters
           in different cases must evaluate the entire material  on  record
           by excluding the exaggerated version given by any witness.  When
           a doubt arises in respect  of  certain  facts  alleged  by  such
           witness, the proper course is to ignore that fact only unless it
           goes into the root of the matter so as to  demolish  the  entire
           prosecution  story.   The  witnesses  nowadays  go   on   adding
           embellishments to their version perhaps for the  fear  of  their
           testimony being rejected by the  Court.   The  courts,  however,
           should not disbelieve the evidence of such witnesses  altogether
           if they are otherwise trustworthy.”



37.   Judged on the aforesaid principles of law, we are  of  the  considered
opinion that the learned trial Judge had  given  unnecessary  importance  on
absolutely minor discrepancies which do not go to the  root  of  the  matter
and the High Court has  correctly  treated  the  analysis  to  be  perverse.
Quite apart from that, it is noticeable  from  the  judgment  of  the  trial
court that the learned trial Judge has  proceeded  on  a  wrong  footing  by
saying that the case of the prosecution was that the accused  had  committed
rape on the deceased whereas on a perusal of the  FIR,  it  is  quite  clear
that the allegation was that the accused has pulled  the  underwear  of  the
girl with the intention  to  commit  rape.   Similar  is  the  testimony  of
Ganeshi (PW-1) who has stated that the accused was laying on the  girl.   It
is difficult to understand how the learned trial Judge  has  conceived  that
the case of the prosecution was that the accused had committed rape.

38.   Thus, from the aforesaid analysis, there can  be  no  trace  of  doubt
that the view taken by the learned trial Judge was absolutely  unreasonable,
perverse and on total erroneous appreciation of  evidence  contrary  to  the
settled principles of law.  It can never be treated  as  a  plausible  view.
In our considered opinion,  only  a  singular  view  is  possible  that  the
accused had made an attempt to commit rape and he  was  witnessed  while  he
was strangulating the child with a shirt.  The result was that a  nine  year
old child breathed her last.  The reasoning ascribed by  the  learned  trial
Judge that she did not die because of any injury  makes  the  decision  more
perverse rather than reasonable.  That apart, nothing has  been  brought  on
record to show that there was any kind of enmity between the family  of  the
deceased and that of the accused appellant.  There  is  no  reason  why  the
father and the other witnesses would implicate the accused appellant in  the
crime and would spare the real culprit.  Quite apart from the above, he  was
apprehended on the spot.  The accused had taken the plea that  the  deceased
had died as  she  had  drowned  in  the  water.   The  medical  report  runs
absolutely contrary inasmuch there was no water in her  stomach  or  in  any
internal part of the body.  There was no motive on the part of  any  of  the
witnesses to falsely involve the accused in  the  crime.   In  view  of  our
aforesaid analysis, we entirely agree with the view expressed  by  the  High
Court.

39.   Before parting with the case, we  may  note  that  the  appellant  has
created a situation by which a nine year old girl who believed in him  as  a
co-villager and went with him in total innocence breathed  her  last  before
she could get into her blossom of adolescence.  Rape or an attempt  to  rape
is a crime not against an individual but a crime which  destroys  the  basic
equilibrium of the social atmosphere.    The  consequential  death  is  more
horrendous.  It is to be kept in mind that an offence against the body of  a
woman lowers her dignity and mars her reputation.  It  is  said  that  one’s
physical frame is his or her temple.  No one has any right of  encroachment.
 An attempt for the momentary pleasure of the accused has caused  the  death
of a child and had a devastating effect on her family and, in  the  ultimate
eventuate, on the collective at large.  When a  family  suffers  in  such  a
manner, the society as a whole is compelled  to  suffer  as  it  creates  an
incurable dent in  the  fabric  of  the  social  milieu.   The  cry  of  the
collective has to be answered and respected and that  is  what  exactly  the
High Court has done by converting the  decision  of  acquittal  to  that  of
conviction and imposed the sentence as per law.

40.   Consequently, the appeal, being sans merit, stands dismissed.




                            ..............................................J.
                                                         [Dr. B. S. Chauhan]






                            ..............................................J.
                                                               [Dipak Misra]

New Delhi;
May 29, 2012



                                                     -----------------------
[1]    AIR 1972 SC 116
[2]    61 Ind App 398  =   AIR 1934 PC 227
[3]    AIR 1945 PC 151
[4]    1952 SCR 193 = AIR 1952 SC 52
[5]    (1961) 3 SCR 120  = AIR 1961 SC 715
[6]    AIR 1972 SC 622
[7]    AIR 1960 SC 391
[8]    AIR 1973 SC 2622
[9]    AIR 2005 SC 1014
[10]    2005 9 SCC 584
[11]   2004 13 SCC 257
[12]    2007 7 SCC 625
[13]    2007 3 SCC 755
[14]    AIR 2008 SC 1269
[15]    (2004) 5 SCC 573
[16]   (2007) 4 SCC 415
[17]   (2011) 2 SCC 83
[18]   (2010) 13 SCC 657
[19]   (1975) 3 SCC 219
[20]   (2006) 9 SCC 731
[21]   (2008) 5 SCC 535
[22]   (2009) 10 SCC 206
[23]   (2010) 9 SCC 189
[24]   (2012) 1 SCC 414
[25]   (2012) 1 SCC 602
[26]   AIR 1985 SC 48
[27]   AIR 1999 SC 3544
[28]   AIR 1988 SC 696


corruption case sentence not reduced “Article 142 being in the nature of a residuary power based on equitable principles, the Courts have thought it advisable to leave the powers under the article undefined. The power under Article 142 of the Constitution is a constitutional power and hence, not restricted by statutory enactments. Though the Supreme Court would not pass any order under Article 142 of the Constitution which would amount to supplanting substantive law applicable or ignoring express statutory provisions dealing with the subject, at the same time these constitutional powers cannot in any way, be controlled by any statutory provisions. However, it is to be made clear that this power cannot be used to supplant the law applicable to the case. This means that acting under Article 142, the Supreme Court cannot pass an order or grant relief which is totally inconsistent or goes against the substantive or statutory enactments pertaining to the case.” 23. In view of the aforesaid pronouncement of law, where the minimum sentence is provided, we think it would not be at all appropriate to exercise jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to reduce the sentence on the ground of the so-called mitigating factors as that would tantamount to supplanting statutory mandate and further it would amount to ignoring the substantive statutory provision that prescribes minimum sentence for a criminal act relating to demand and acceptance of bribe. The amount may be small but to curb and repress this kind of proclivity the legislature has prescribed the minimum sentence. It should be paramountly borne in mind that corruption at any level does not deserve either sympathy or leniency. In fact, reduction of the sentence would be adding a premium. The law does not so countenance and, rightly so, because corruption corrodes the spine of a nation and in the ultimate eventuality makes the economy sterile. 24. The appeals, being sans substratum, stand dismissed.


                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 97 OF 2012


NARENDRA CHAMPAKLAL TRIVEDI                        …..Appellant

                                   Versus

STATE OF GUJARAT                                  ….Respondent

                                    WITH

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 98 OF 2012

HARJIBHAI DEVJIBHAI CHAUHAN                  … Appellant

                                   Versus

STATE OF GUJARAT                                        ….Respondent


                               j u d g m e n t

Dipak Misra, J.


      The present appeals are directed against the  judgment  of  conviction
and order of sentence dated 14.10.2011 passed by the  learned  Single  Judge
of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad     in Criminal Appeal No.  31  of
1999 whereby the appellate court      has confirmed the judgment  and  order
of conviction and       sentence dated 1st of December, 1998 passed  by  the
learned Additional Special  Judge,  Bhavnagar  in  Special  Case  No.  6  of
1994, wherein  the  learned  Additional  Special  Judge  had  convicted  the
appellants for the offence punishable under Section 7 of the  Prevention  of
Corruption Act, 1988 (for brevity `the Act’) and sentenced them  to  undergo
rigorous imprisonment of  six  months  with  fine  of  Rs.5,000/-  each,  in
default of payment of fine, to suffer simple imprisonment for  a  period  of
one month and further convicted them under Section  13(2)  of  the  Act  and
sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a  period  of  one  year
with a fine of Rs.5,000/- each, in default, to  suffer  simple  imprisonment
for a period of one month with  the  stipulation  that  both  the  sentences
would be concurrent.

2.    The broad essential  facts  of  the  prosecution  case  are  that  the
complainant, Gajendra Jagatsinh Jadeja,  was  residing  in  Plot  No.  1  in
Virbhadranagar Society.  As in the City Survey Office record,  the  name  of
his grandfather stood recorded in respect of the premises in  question,  the
complainant in order to obtain the property  card  and  the  sketch  of  the
same,  went to the office of the  City  Survey  Office,  Bhavnagar  on  11th
March, 1994, to submit an application for the aforesaid purpose and  he  was
asked by Mr. Jagani, Clerk in the said office to  come  on  15th  of  March,
1994.  On the said date, the complainant at about  1.30  p.m.  went  to  the
City Survey Office and gave the application to Mr. Jagani, who asked him  to
hand over the application to Narendra Champaklal Trivedi, the  appellant  in
Criminal Appeal No. 97 of 2012, sitting in the opposite room  who  told  him
that it  would  take  a  week’s  time  to  prepare  the  said  copies.   The
complainant made a request to Shri Jagani to expedite the matter as  he  had
to go to meet his father with the copies and  Mr.  Jagani  replied  that  it
would cost him Rs.50/- to get the copies immediately.   As  the  complainant
had no money at that time he  was  asked  by  Jagani  to  meet  Trivedi  and
Harjibhai Devjibhai Chauhan, the appellant in Criminal  Appeal  No.  98/2012
who told him that the copies would be given to him on payment and  he  could
receive the copies between 4.30 to  4.50  p.m.   As  the  appellant  had  no
intention to make  the  payment,  he  approached  the  office  of  the  Anti
Corruption Bureau which was situate on the ground floor of his premises  and
gave a complaint to the Police Inspector.  The  concerned  inspector  sought
assistance of two panch witnesses who were made to understand the  case  and
thereafter experiment of  U.V.  Lamp  was  carried  out  with  the  help  of
anthrecene powder.  Thereafter, the complainant produced the currency  notes
and necessary instructions were given to the complainant as well as  to  the
witnesses.  A preliminary part of the panchnama was drawn and signatures  of
the panchas were taken and thereafter, the complainant, the panchas and  the
members of the raiding party proceeded to the City Survey Office.

3.    As the narration of the prosecution case proceeds,  Jagani  asked  the
complainant to meet said Chauhan and pay the money.  Being instructed,  they
went to the room of said Chauhan and he was directed to pay Rs.  7.10  paise
as  fees  to  said  Trivedi  and  obtain  the  property  card  and   sketch.
Thereafter, said Chauhan demanded money from the complaint  as  decided  and
on being asked whom to hand over the amount, Chauhan  said  to  give  it  to
Trivedi and Trivedi  was  asked  to  accept  the  amount.   Thereafter,  the
complainant took out the money from his left pocket of the shirt and  handed
over to Trivedi which was  accepted  by  Trivedi  by  his  right  hand.   He
counted the money by both hands and put the same in the left side pocket  of
his shirt.  As pre-decided, the signal was given to the raiding party  which
rushed to the place of the incident.  Thereafter,  the  experiment  of  U.V.
Lamp was carried out on the fingers of both the hands and palms  of  Trivedi
and pocket also and thereon light blue fluorescent marks were found.   Panch
witness No. 1 took out the currency notes from Trivedi.  There were two  ten
rupee notes and one five rupee note.  On those currency  notes,  light  blue
fluorescent marks were found with the numbers mentioned on  the  first  part
of the panchnama.  On being asked about the rest of the money,  Trivedi  had
said that he had given it to Chauhan.  Experiment of U.V. Lamp was  made  on
the hands and pockets of Trivedi and  Chauhan  and  light  blue  fluorescent
marks of anthrecene powder was found.  The currency notes were tallied  with
the numbers mentioned on the first part of the  panchnama.   From  both  the
accused-appellants, currency  notes  were  recovered,  marks  of  anthrecene
powder were found and the second part of the panchnama  was  prepared.   The
Investigating  Officer  carried  out  further  investigation,  recorded  the
panchnama and after obtaining requisite sanction, he  laid  the  chargesheet
before the Competent Court on 25th of August 1994.

4.    The learned trial Judge framed charges  in  respect  of  the  offences
that have been mentioned hereinbefore.  The appellants  pleaded  not  guilty
and sought to be tried.

5.    In order to bring home the charges levelled  against  the  appellants,
the prosecution  examined  number  of  witnesses  and  produced  documentary
evidence in support of the case.

6.    The accused-appellants in their statements under Section  313  of  the
Code of Criminal Procedure disputed the charges that they had  demanded  the
amount towards  illegal  gratification  but  did  not  want  to  adduce  any
evidence in their defence.

7.    The learned  trial  Judge,  appreciating  the  oral  as  well  as  the
documentary evidence and taking into consideration the submissions  advanced
by the parties, found the appellants guilty and convicted them as  has  been
stated hereinabove.

8.    The appellants preferred a singular appeal before the High Court.   It
was contended before the High Court that the learned trial Judge had  failed
to take into consideration the plea of the defence  and  the  inadequacy  of
the material brought on record from which  it  would  be  graphically  clear
that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove its case that  there  was
demand of bribe  and  acceptance  thereof  and  hence,  the  ingredients  of
Sections 7 and 13 of the Act had not been established.  It was  argued  that
neither the FIR nor the  testimony of  the  complainant  remotely  establish
that there was a demand for bribe and  once  the  said  core  fact  was  not
proven, the charges levelled against them were  bound  to  collapse  like  a
pack of cards.  It was urged that as  the  office  of  the  Anti  Corruption
Bureau had been leased out by the complainant,  he  was  able  to  rope  the
accused-appellants in a bogus trap  and  falsely  implicate  them.   It  was
further contended that the complainant and Panch witness No.  1  had  stated
in the cross-examination that Trivedi had not made  any  demand  of  Rs.50/-
from the complainant and the recovery of the trapped  amount  had  also  not
been proven inasmuch as the panchas are not independent witnesses and  their
evidence did not merit any acceptance.  It was  proponed  that  the  learned
trial Judge had failed to consider the fact that Jagani  who  was  the  main
culprit was not  booked  under  law  and,  therefore,  the  prosecution  had
deliberately severed the link to rope in the appellants and hence, it was  a
malafide  prosecution.   It  was  also  submitted  that  there  were   other
witnesses in the  room  but  the  prosecution  chose  to  examine  only  the
interested witnesses and in essence, the  judgment  of  conviction  suffered
from perversity of approach and deserved to be axed.

9.    The learned counsel for the State urged before  the  High  Court  that
the emphasis laid on Jagani not being arrayed  as  an  accused  was  totally
inconsequential as he had never made any demand from  the  complainant.   He
referred to various documents on record and the testimony of  the  witnesses
that the charges levelled against the accused persons  had  been  proven  to
the hilt and there was nothing on record which would remotely  suggest  that
they had been falsely implicated.  The relationship between the  complainant
and the ACB officer could not be taken  into  consideration  to  come  to  a
conclusion that the complaint was false, malafide and  the  accused  persons
had been deliberately roped in.  It was canvassed by  him  that  the  amount
had been recovered from the pocket of Trivedi and the demand had  been  made
by the accused Chauhan to handover the amount of  illegal  gratification  to
Trivedi.  The offence was committed with the consent of both  and  the  same
had been established by the oral  and  documentary  evidence.   The  learned
counsel for the State gave immense emphasis on  the  version  of  the  Panch
witnesses, the scientific proof and the testimony of the  trapping  officer.
The  principle  of  presumption  was  pressed  into  service  and  the  said
contention was edificed by putting forth  the  stance  that  the  cumulative
effect of the evidence  on  record  clearly  satisfied  the  ingredients  of
Sections 7 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the  Act  to  bring  home
the charges levelled against the accused persons.

10.   The learned single Judge  took  note  of  the  facts  as  regards  the
presence of the accused appellants in the  room,  the  demand  made  by  the
appellant No. 2, Chauhan, in the presence of the Panch witness  No.  1,  the
direction by Chauhan to hand  it  over  to  Trivedi  which  established  the
consent, the deposition of PW-2 about the involvement and complicity of  the
appellants in the crime, the absence of enmity between the  complainant  and
the accused persons, the  unreproachable  aspect  of  the  evidence  of  the
witnesses who stood embedded in their stand,  the  acceptance  and  recovery
that inspired total credence  about  the  demand  and  acceptance,  and  the
principle of presumption being attracted, all of which would go a  long  way
to show that the prosecution had proven the  case  beyond  reasonable  doubt
and further considered the inability of the accused-appellants to rebut  the
presumption as envisaged under Section 20 of the  Act,  the  unacceptability
and farfetchedness of the theory of  existence  of  obligation  between  the
informant and the investigating officer to implicate the  accused-appellants
in the crime, the failure of the appellants to explain  how  the  amount  in
question was found from their  possession  and  how  anthrecene  powder  was
found on their hands and eventually opined that  the  cumulative  aspect  of
all the  facts  and  circumstances  clearly  establish  the  charges  framed
against the appellants.  Being of this view, the  High  Court  affirmed  the
judgment of acquittal.

11.   We have heard the learned counsel of both the parties  at  length  and
carefully perused the record.

12.   At the outset, we may state that the recovery part  has  gone  totally
unchallenged.  Though a feeble attempt was made before the  High  Court  and
also before us, yet a perusal of the evidence and the test carried out go  a
long way to show that the amount was recovered from the  possession  of  the
accused-appellants.  It is the settled principle of law that  mere  recovery
of the tainted money is not sufficient to record a conviction  unless  there
is evidence that bribe had been demanded or money was paid voluntarily as  a
bribe.  Thus, the only issue that remains to be addressed is  whether  there
was demand of bribe and acceptance  of  the  same.   Be  it  noted,  in  the
absence of any evidence of demand and acceptance of the  amount  as  illegal
gratification, recovery would not alone be a ground to convict the  accused.
 This has been so stated in T. Subramanian v. The State of Tamil Nadu[1].

13.   The demand and acceptance of the amount as  illegal  gratification  is
the sine qua non for constituting an offence under  the  Act.   It  is  also
settled in law that there is a statutory presumption  under  Section  20  of
the Act which can be dislodged by the accused by  bringing  on  record  some
evidence, either direct or circumstantial, that money was accepted by  other
than the motive or reward as stipulated under Section 7 of the Act.   It  is
obligatory on the part of the court to consider the explanation  offered  by
the accused under Section 20  of  the  Act  and  the  consideration  of  the
explanation has to be on the anvil of preponderance of probability.   It  is
not to be proven beyond all reasonable doubt.   It  is  necessary  to  state
here that the prosecution is bound to establish that there  was  an  illegal
offer of bribe and acceptance thereof.   The  same  has  to  be  founded  on
facts.  In this context, we may refer with profit  to  the  decision  in  M.
Narsinga  Rao v. State of A.P.[2] wherein a three-Judge  Bench  referred  to
Section 20 of the Act and stated that the only  condition  for  drawing  the
legal presumption under Section 20 is that during trial it should be  proved
that the accused has accepted or agreed to accept  any  gratification.   The
section does not say that the said condition  should  be  satisfied  through
direct evidence.  Its only requirement is that it must be  proved  that  the
accused has accepted or agreed to  accept  the  gratification.   Thereafter,
the Bench produced a passage from Madhukar  Bhaskarrao  Joshi  v.  State  of
Maharashtra[3] with approval.  It reads as follows: -

       “The  premise  to  be  established  on  the  facts  for  drawing  the
presumption is that there was payment or acceptance of gratification.   Once
the said premise is established the inference to be drawn is that  the  said
gratification was accepted ‘as motive or reward’ for doing or forbearing  to
do any official act.  So the word ‘gratification’ need not be  stretched  to
mean reward because reward is the  outcome  of  the  presumption  which  the
court has to  draw  on  the  factual  premise  that  there  was  payment  of
gratification.  This will again be fortified by looking at  the  collocation
of two expressions  adjacent  to  each  other  like  ‘gratification  or  any
valuable thing’.  If acceptance of any valuable thing can help to  draw  the
presumption  that  it  was  accepted  as  motive  or  reward  for  doing  or
forbearing to do an official act, the word ‘gratification’ must  be  treated
in the context to mean any payment for giving  satisfaction  to  the  public
servant who received it.”

14.   In Raj Rajendra Singh  Seth  v.  State  of  Jharkhand  &  Anr.[4]  the
principle laid down in Madhukar Bhaskarrao Joshi (supra) was reiterated.

15.   In State of Maharashtra v. Dnyaneshwar Laxman Rao Wankhede[5], it  has
been held that to arrive at the conclusion that there had been a  demand  of
illegal  gratification,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to   take   into
consideration the  facts  and  circumstances  brought  on  record  in  their
entirety and for the said purpose, undisputedly,  the  presumptive  evidence
as  laid  down  in  Section  20  of  the  Act  must  also  be   taken   into
consideration.

16.   In C.M. Girish Babu v. C.B.I., Cochin, High Court of Kerala[6],  after
referring  to  the  decisions  in  M.Narsinga  Rao  (supra)   and   Madhukar
Bhaskarrao Joshi (supra), this Court has held thus: -

“19.  It is well settled that the presumption to be drawn under  Section  20
is not an inviolable one.  The accused charged with the offence could  rebut
it either through the cross-examination of the witnesses cited  against  him
or by adducing reliable evidence.  If the  accused  fails  to  disprove  the
presumption the same would stick and then it can be held by the  Court  that
the prosecution has proved that the  accused  received  the  amount  towards
gratification.”

17.   In the case at hand, the money was recovered from the pockets  of  the
accused-appellants.  A presumption under  Section  20  of  the  Act  becomes
obligatory.  It is a presumption of law  and  casts  an  obligation  on  the
court to apply it in every case brought under Section 7  of  the  Act.   The
said presumption is a rebuttable one.  In the present case, the  explanation
offered by the accused-appellants has not  been  accepted  and  rightly  so.
There is no evidence  on  the  base  of  which  it  can  be  said  that  the
presumption has been rebutted.

18.   The learned counsel for  the  appellant  has  submitted  with  immense
force that admittedly there has been no demand or  acceptance.   To  bolster
the said aspect,  he  has  drawn  inspiration  from  the  statement  of  the
complainant in examination-in-chief.  The said statement, in our  considered
opinion, is not to be read out of context.  He has clarified as regards  the
demand and acceptance at various places in his examination  and  the  cross-
examination.  The shadow witness has clearly stated that  there  was  demand
of bribe and giving of the same.  Nothing has  been  brought  on  record  to
doubt the presence of the shadow witness.  He had  given  the  signal  after
which the trapping party arrived at the scene and did the needful.  All  the
witnesses have supported the case of the prosecution.   The  currency  notes
were recovered from the possession of the appellants.  In the lengthy cross-
examination nothing has really been elicited to  doubt  their  presence  and
veracity of the testimony.  The appellants in their statement under  Section
313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure have made an adroit effort to  explain
their stand but we have no hesitation in stating that they miserably  failed
to dislodge  the  presumption.   PW-2  has  categorically  stated  that  the
complainant took out Rs.50/- from his pocket and  gave  it  to  the  accused
appellant as directed.  Thus  analysed  and  understood,  there  remains  no
shadow of doubt that the  accused-appellants  had  demanded  the  bribe  and
accepted the same to provide the survey report.  Therefore,  the  conviction
recorded by the learned trial Judge which has been affirmed by  the  learned
single Judge of the High Court, does not warrant any interference.

19.   The learned counsel for the appellants had, in the course  of  arguing
the appeal, submitted that the appellants have suffered enough as they  have
lost their jobs and  the  amount  is  petty,  the  said  aspects  should  be
considered as mitigating factors for reduction of  the  sentence.   Sympathy
has also been sought to be drawn on the foundation that the  occurrence  had
taken place almost 18 years back and the amount is paltry.  On a perusal  of
Section 7(1) of the Act, it is perceptible that when an  offence  is  proved
under  the  said  section,  the  public  servant  shall  be  punished   with
imprisonment which shall not be less than six months but  which  may  extend
to five years and shall also be liable to fine.  Section 13(2)  of  the  Act
postulates that any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall  be
punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not  be  less  than  one
year but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable  to  fine.
As is demonstrable from the impugned judgment, the learned trial  court  has
imposed the minimum sentence and the High Court has affirmed the same.

20.   The submission of the  learned  counsel  for  the  appellants,  if  we
correctly understand, in essence, is that power under  Article  142  of  the
Constitution should be invoked.  In this context, we may refer  with  profit
to the decision of this Court in Vishweshwaraiah  Iron  and  Steel  Ltd.  V.
Abdul Gani and Ors.[7] wherein it has  been  held  that  the  constitutional
powers under Article  142  of  the  Constitution  cannot,  in  any  way,  be
controlled by any statutory provision but at the  same  time,  these  powers
are not meant to be exercised when  their  exercise  may  come  directly  in
conflict with what has been expressly provided for in  any  statute  dealing
expressly with the subject.  It was also made clear  in  the  said  decision
that this Court cannot altogether ignore the  substantive  provisions  of  a
statute.

21.   In Keshabhai Malabhai Vankar v. State of Gujarat[8], it has been  held
as follows: -

“6.   It is next contended that  this  Court  in  exercise  of  power  under
Article 142 of the Constitution has plenary power to  reduce  the  sentence.
We are afraid that we cannot ignore the  statutory  object  and  reduce  the
minimum sentence prescribed under the Act.  Undoubtedly  under  Article  142
the Supreme Court has the power untrammelled by  any  statutory  limits  but
when  penal  offences  have  been  prescribed  for  violation  of  statutory
regulations for production, equitable supply and distribution  of  essential
commodities at fair prices, it was done in the social  interest  which  this
Court would keep in mind  while  exercising  power  under  Article  142  and
respect the legislative policy to impose  minimum  sentence.   Amendment  to
the Act was made to stamp out the statutory violations with impunity.   Thus
we find that it is not a fit case warranting interference.   The  appeal  is
accordingly dismissed.”

22.   In Laxmidas Morarji (Dead) by LRS. v. Behrose Darab Madan[9],  it  has
been ruled thus: -

“Article 142 being in the nature of a residuary  power  based  on  equitable
principles, the Courts have thought it advisable to leave the  powers  under
the article undefined.  The power under Article 142 of the  Constitution  is
a constitutional power and hence, not restricted  by  statutory  enactments.
Though the Supreme Court would not pass any order under Article 142  of  the
Constitution which would amount to supplanting  substantive  law  applicable
or ignoring express statutory provisions dealing with the  subject,  at  the
same time these constitutional powers cannot in any way,  be  controlled  by
any statutory provisions.  However, it is to be made clear that  this  power
cannot be used to supplant the law applicable to the case.  This means  that
acting under Article 142, the Supreme Court cannot pass an  order  or  grant
relief which is totally inconsistent or  goes  against  the  substantive  or
statutory enactments pertaining to the case.”

23.   In view of the aforesaid  pronouncement  of  law,  where  the  minimum
sentence is provided, we think  it  would  not  be  at  all  appropriate  to
exercise jurisdiction under Article 142 of  the  Constitution  of  India  to
reduce the sentence on the ground of the  so-called  mitigating  factors  as
that would tantamount to supplanting statutory mandate and further it  would
amount to ignoring  the  substantive  statutory  provision  that  prescribes
minimum sentence for a criminal act relating to  demand  and  acceptance  of
bribe.  The amount may be small  but  to  curb  and  repress  this  kind  of
proclivity the legislature has prescribed the minimum sentence.   It  should
be paramountly borne in mind that corruption at any level does  not  deserve
either sympathy or leniency.  In fact, reduction of the  sentence  would  be
adding a premium.   The  law  does  not  so  countenance  and,  rightly  so,
because corruption corrodes the spine  of  a  nation  and  in  the  ultimate
eventuality makes the economy sterile.

24.   The appeals, being sans substratum, stand dismissed.
                              ............................................J.
                                                         [Dr. B. S. Chauhan]



                              ............................................J.
                                                               [Dipak Misra]

New Delhi;
May 29, 2012
-----------------------
[1]    AIR 2006 SC 836
[2]    (2001) 1 SCC 691
[3]    (2000) 8 SCC 571
[4]    AIR 2008 SC 3217
[5]    (2009) 15 SCC 200
[6]    AIR 2009 SC 2022
[7]    AIR 1998 SC 1895
[8]    1995 Supp (3) SCC 704
[9]    (2009) 10 SCC 425