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Sunday, May 20, 2012

Australian Designs Office Design found to be new and distinctive. Examination completed and s. 67 Certificate of Examination to be issued. Colgate-Palmolive Company (“the Owner”) filed design application 13749/2008 , claiming a priority date of 15 February 2008. This resulted in design registration 323015 (“the Registered Design”). The product to which the Registered Design relates is described as "Set of bristles for a toothbrush". The application was accompanied by a request for examination of the design after registration. The representations shown as figures 1, 2 and 5 in the Register of Designs



Colgate-Palmolive Company [2011] ADO 1 (3 February 2011)

Last Updated: 25 February 2011

DESIGNS ACT 2003

DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF DESIGNS,
WITH REASONS

Re: Design Registration Nos. 323015 in the name of Colgate-Palmolive Company Inc.

DELEGATE:T. E. Williams
REPRESENTATION:Owner : written submissions by Tracey Webb of F.B. Rice & Co.
DECISION:2011 ADO 1
Design found to be new and distinctive. Examination completed and s. 67 Certificate of Examination to be issued.

Background
  1. Colgate-Palmolive Company (“the Owner”) filed design application 13749/2008 , claiming a priority date of 15 February 2008. This resulted in design registration 323015 (“the Registered Design”). The product to which the Registered Design relates is described as "Set of bristles for a toothbrush". The application was accompanied by a request for examination of the design after registration. The representations shown as figures 1, 2 and 5 in the Register of Designs show the significant features of the Registered Design to be as follows:
2011_100.png
2011_101.png
2011_102.png
  1. Section 65(2)(a) of the Designs Act 2003 (“the Act”) creates a ground for revocation of a registration if the design is not a registrable design. Section 15(1)states that a design is registrable if it is new and distinctive compared to the prior art base.
  2. A first examination report issued objecting that the Registered Design was not new or distinctive because it was substantially similar in overall impression to a number of designs in the prior art base. The Examiner cited the following prior art, all belonging to the Owner and of earlier priority date:

Reference[1]
D1OHIM-000105655-0018
D2OHIM-000230107-0009
D3OHIM-000230107-0001
  1. In a later report following submissions from the Owner, the examiner maintained that the Registered Design was not new and distinctive over, in particular, D2, which is closest in overall appearance to the Registered Design. Relevantly, D2 shows black-and-white representations of a toothbrush with a handle apparently identical to the Registered Design, and a head with the salient features shown below
2011_103.png
2011_104.png
  1. The Owner thereupon asked to be heard but, in view of that which I will set out below, no hearing has been necessary.
Earlier decision
  1. Hearing Officer Lyons has already dealt with the distinctiveness of two other of Colgate’s registrations, 320882 and 320884 (“the other registrations” or “the Designs”), deciding that a certificate of examination should issue. The other registrations are simply halftone renditions, with some portions shown in dotted lines, of a toothbrush with a head that would potentially constitute the head of the toothbrush shown, in colour, in the Registered Design. Mr Lyons found that the Designs were distinctive in the face of cited OHIM designs that included D2.
  2. In the present matter, the Registered Design includes the handle of the toothbrush where, in the matters with which Mr Lyons was concerned, the handles were shown by dotted representation only. His reasoning is not binding upon me, but I find his approach is, with the necessary modification, applicable to the present matter.
  3. Having noted the legislative framework, Hearing Officer Lyons made the following observations.
A significant visual feature of the Designs is that either the bristles, or a large proportion of the bristles, are shown in two-tone or two-colour, however you wish to perceive them - the tip portion being a different tone or colour to the remainder of the bristle.
Each of the prior art citations illustrates a toothbrush having a head supporting tooth cleaning elements. I note that there is nothing in the prior art showing 2-tone bristles, albeit that there are toothbrushes with differently coloured sets, or tufts, of bristles.
As expressed in the Reckitt Benckiser case:
“the scope of the design is properly ascertained by considering the causative relationship between ‘one or more visual features’ and the overall appearance of the product. Where the visual features of the design are present in a citation, I think the question to be asked is the effect of those visual features on the overall appearance of the product in the citation. If the features of the design are clearly evident in the overall appearance of that product, the presence of other visual features in the citation does not detract from the fact that the design exists in the citation.”
I have made that assessment for myself, adopting so far as possible the mindset of the informed user (see Apple Computer Inc [2007] ADO 5 (20 September 2007)). Whilst the attorney for the Owner posited that the informed user in this instance might be an oral hygienist or an oral health educator involved in the provision of oral health services/education and whilst the primary examiner reasoned that the informed user was essentially a member of the public, I am satisfied that the relevant person is not a toothbrush designer nor is it a person who is unaware of what is available in toothbrush design, but would probably include both professionals and consumers who had (in either case) made it their business to be particularly aware of options available by way of the layout of toothbrush bristles.
I am not satisfied that a ground of revocation has been made out. On my assessment of the standard, an informed user at the priority date would regard the Designs as distinctive in overall impression compared to the prior art base.

  1. I think it is proper to define the informed user as Mr Lyons has done in order to exclude a particular group of ordinary consumers, those who simply want value for money and are not concerned with other differences between one brush and another. Such consumers can be contrasted with informed users who, as Mr Lyons has noted, have gained some knowledge of the range of shapes available[2]. This would probably arise either because the informed users were dental professionals required to advise patients as part of a consultation or because they were consumers with a particular interest in the matter – perhaps because of their own gum or dental sensitivity, or through a particular interest in selecting suitably designed brushes for their children or others.
  2. Mr Lyons went on to direct that a certificate of examination be issued in relation to the Designs.
  3. Both in Mr Lyons’ decision and on the official file for the Designs, there has been clear recognition of the need to define just who the informed user might be. I think it is fair, given what I have said above, to infer that the informed user would be more concerned with the cleaning abilities of the brush, and hence with the shape and arrangement of the actual tufts of bristles, than with the appearance of the brush in terms of colour or tonality.
  4. Under s 19, if the Registrar is required to decide whether a design is substantially similar in overall impression to another design, the Registrar is to give more weight to similarities between the designs than to differences between them. The Registrar must also (in the absence, here, of any statement of newness and distinctiveness):
    • have regard to the state of development of the prior art base for the design;
    • if only part of the design is substantially similar to another design, have regard to the amount, quality and importance of that part in the context of the design as a whole; and
    • have regard to the freedom of the creator of the design to innovate.
  5. As to the last of these, the shape of the head of a toothbrush is clearly somewhat limited by practical issues, since it must ultimately be shaped to easily brush the tops and sides of the teeth within the confines of the mouth. The handle is not so constrained except in so far as it must be comfortable to grip, and have an appropriate length and width, it is reasonable to assume that the visual appearance of the handle, and particularly its shape, is more amenable to innovation.
  6. In the present matter the Registered Design is shown in colour, an aspect of visual appearance which adds impact to the observable physical differences between the respective heads shown in the Registered Design and the prior art. That is not to say that there is not a “family resemblance” between the Registered Design and the prior art[3]. This is particularly obvious in the handles of the Registered Design and of D2, which are, so far as I can tell, identical. However, as I have explained, I think the informed user will be more inclined to focus on the head of the brush than the handle, which, in terms of s 19, would be regarded as less important.
  7. As to the heads, the use of colour both augments the physical differences between the respective brush heads and camouflages the similarities, in a way to which greyscale rendition, the import of which Mr Lyons has already considered, can only allude. The difference in visible impact is striking to the eye. The informed user will, however, go beyond this and note the structure beneath the two-tone treatment. While there is a family resemblance there are equally significant differences in the the tufts of bristles on the brush heads.
  8. The applicant’s patent and trade mark attorneys, FB Rice, have filed written submissions that add detail and emphasis to those previously available to the examiner. Those later submissions carefully dissect the differences between the Registered Design and the cited prior art including D2. Without drawing out this decision by repeating that analysis, it would be apparent to the informed user that, as a result of these differences, the Registered Design is intended to have a more probing or penetrating action along almost the full extent of the side profile (see fig 5 above). Thus, I do not think that it is correct to say, as was said in the examiner’s report, that the similarities are “overwhelming”. Rather, when I define the informed user as Mr Lyons has done, it seems to me that the effect of colour has done much to augment the minor but significant physical differences between brush heads of the Registered Design and the prior art, including D2. When allowance is made for the identical appearance of the handles, I do not believe that the informed user would conclude that the Registered Design and the prior art are substantially similar in overall impression.
Decision
  1. I am not satisfied that a ground of revocation has been made out. On my assessment of the standard, an informed user as at the priority date would regard the design as distinctive in overall impression compared to the prior art base.
  2. I direct that examination of this design be taken as completed. The provisions of section 67(3) now apply. I direct that a certificate of examination be issued in relation to registration 323015.
T E Williams
Hearing Officer
Designs Hearings
3 February 2011


[1] From the database of designs registered with OHIM (The Office of Harmonization for the Internal Market).
[2] See Review 2 Pty Ltd v Redberry Enterprise Pty Ltd[2008] FCA 158879 IPR 214 at [19][21]
[3] As the examiner was aware, relevant designs are applied by the Owner to toothbrushes sold under the trade mark 360º The Registered Design is applied to toothbrushes sold under the trade mark 360º Deep Clean, and D2, relied on by the examiner, is applied to goods sold under the trade mark 360º.



when the letter of the company to owner that their premium cheque was bounced and their policy was cancelled, it cannot be said any accident that took place during that period the company holds no responsibility before the letter reached to the owner . first it has to pay the amount and later it should recover the same form the owner.. Our conclusions are as follows; (a) The accident occurred due to negligence of the driver of the Truck; (b) The claimants are entitled to `493532/- as compensation alongwith 6% per annum from the date of the award by the Tribunal; (c) The National Insurance Company Ltd. is not liable to indemnify the Owners. However, it may pay the amount to the claimants and recover the same from the Owners. 45. In view of our conclusions, the appeal is partly allowed.



HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD 


AFR

Court No. - 9

Case :- FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER No. - 641 of 1998

Petitioner :- National Insurance Co. Ltd.
Respondent :- Smt. Raj Kumari Singh & Others
Petitioner Counsel :- K.S. Amist
Respondent Counsel :- Pramod Kumar Gupta,BB Paul and Sri AP Paul

Hon'ble Yatindra Singh,J.
Hon'ble Mohd. Tahir,J.


1. The main question involved in this appeal, is whether in the circumstances of the case―when cheque was dishonored and information was sent though not served―the insurance company is liable to indemnify the owner.

THE FACTS
2. Late Sri Lalit Kumar Singh (the Deceased) alongwith Sri Ishwar Singh and Shabbir were going on a motor cycle on 20.11.1990 from Meerut to Bagpat. At about 13.30 hours, truck no. RNB-6447 (the Truck) hit the motor cycle from behind. In this accident the Deceased and Sri Ishwar Singh received fatal injuries; Sri Shabbir received some injuries.

3. The widow and children of the Deceased (the Claimants) filed a claim petition No.14/1991.

4. The Owners of the Truck promptly filed their written statement. They denied the accident but in the alternative pleaded that there was no negligence on part of their driver.

5. The National Insurance Company Ltd. (the Company) filed their written statement alleging that:
The Truck was insured from 24.11.90 to 23.11.91;
It was not insured on 20.11.90 namely, the date of the accident;
The Company is not liable to pay compensation; and
In any case the driver of the Truck was not negligent.

6. The Claimants examined the following witnesses:
(i) Smt. Raj Kumari (PW-1) the widow of the Deceased;
(ii) Sri Manoj Kumar Singh (PW-2); an eye witness;
(iii) Sri A.K.Shukla (PW-3); The senior clerk, Fisheries Department, Meerut Division Meerut.

7. Amongst others, the Claimants filed the following documents:
Certified copy of FIR dt.20.11.90 P.S. Baghpat case cr. no326/90 (paper no.22Ga);
Certified copy of spot inspection by IO in case cr. no.326/90, PS Baghpat (paper no.23Ga);
Certified copy of charge sheet u/s 379/337/338/427/304-A IPC, P.S. Baghpat in case cr. no.326/90 (paper no.24Ga);
Certified copy of inspection (technical) of vehicle no. RNB 6447 dt. 23.11.90 (paper no.25Ga);
Certified copy of post mortem report of Deceased Lalit Kishore Singh (paper no.26Ga);
Attested true copy of HS examination certificate of Lalit Kishore Singh (paper no.27Ga);
Attested true copy of intermediate exam. Certificate of Lalit Kishore Singh (paper no.28Ga);
Attested true copy of Bsc. Eams. Degree of Lalit Kishore Singh 1977 (paper no.29Ga)
Attested true copy of Provi. Degree of Msc of Lalit Kishore Singh 1979 (paper no.30Ga);
Pay certificate of Lalit Kishore Singh dt. 27.11.91 (paper no.31Ga).

8. The Owners examined Sri Satya Prakash (DW-1) and filed cover note no.685043 dated 22.10.1990.

9. The Company did not examine any witness but amongst others filed the following documents;
True copy of the original policy No.354002/6302299/90 27.12.90 (paper no. 35Ga);
Certified photo copy of cover note no.0622604 dated 26.11.90(paper no.63Ga);
Certified photo copy of regd. AD. letter dated 24.11.90 (paper no.64Ga );
True photo copy of copy of envelope (paper no. 65Ga);
Certified photocopy of cheque (paper no.66Ga);
Certified photocopy of return memo (paper no. 67 Ga);
Certified photocopy of cheque Collection payment return address (paper no. 68Ga);
Certified photocopy of dishonored cheque register No.90 (paper no. 69Ga);
Certified photocopy of cover note No.0685043 dated 22.10.1990 (paper no. 70Ga);
Certified photocopy of proposal form (paper no. 71Ga) .

10. Some of the aforesaid documents are photo copies but are certified to be true copies by the branch manager of the Company. They were neither denied nor challenged before the Tribunal or before us; they were accepted. It is on this footing that the case was argued before Tribunal as well as before us.

11. The claim petition was allowed by IXth Additional District Judge/Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Meerut (the Tribunal) on 18.4.1998.

12. The Tribunal awarded a sum of `5,84,000/- with 12% interest from the date of filing of the claim petition. It was further provided that in case payment was not made within 60 days then the Claimants would be entitled to 15% interest. Hence, the present appeal by the Company. The owners have also filed an application challenging the finding recorded by the Tribunal.


POINTS FOR DETERMINATION
13. We have heard Sri KS Amist for the Company; Sri Pramod Kumar Gupta, counsel for the Claimants; Sri AP Paul, counsel for the Owners of the Truck. The following points arise for determination in the case:
(i) Whether the accident occurred because of negligence of the driver of the Truck;
(ii) Whether the compensation awarded is proper;
(iii) Whether the Company is liable to indemnify the Owners;
(iv) Whether the Company should be asked to satisfy the award and recover the amount from the Owners.
(v) What should be rate of interest and from what date it should be awarded ?

Ist POINT: TRUCK DRIVER WAS NEGLIGENT.
14. The Claimants have examined Manoj Kumar Singh (PW-2) to prove the negligence of the driver of the Truck. He stated that:
He was present on the spot at the time of the accident and had witnessed the accident;
The accident took place due to negligence of the driver of the Truck.

15. The Owners of the Truck have examined Sri Satya Prakash (DW-2) who was not present on the spot.

16. There is nothing in the cross examination of Sri Mnoj Kumar Singh (PW-2) to disbelieve his statement that he was present on the spot at the time of accident and the accident took place due to negligence of the Driver of the Truck.

17. The counsel for Company and the Owners of the Truck submits that;
Three persons were riding on the motor cycle;
The Tribunal has committed illegality in holding that the total negligence was of the Truck driver;
The negligence of the the motor cycle driver was at least to the extent of 25%.

18. Sri Manoj Kumar Singh (PW-2) has stated that;
At the time of the accident, the motor cycle was on the left side of the road and on the 'Kachcha patri';
The Truck was being driven very fast and no horn was blown.
There is nothing to contradict the statement of PW-2.

19. In view of above, it cannot be said that there was any negligence on the part of the motor cycle driver merely for the reason that three persons were riding on the motor cycle. This finding of the Tribunal is upheld.

2nd POINT: COMPENSATION SHOULD BE REDUCED
20. In order to prove the income of the Deceased, his widow (PW-1) and Sri AK Shukla (PW-3) have been examined. The Claimants have also filed pay slip of the Deceased.

21. The Deceased was working as a Senior Fisheries Inspector in the Fisheries Department. Sri AK Shukla (PW-3) is a senior clerk in the Fisheries Department. He has given his statement regarding the salary of the Deceased.

22. The Tribunal on the basis of pay slip and testimony of Sri AK Shukla has held the salary of the Deceased to be `2,521 per month. There is no illegality in the same

23. The Tribunal in consideration of future promotion prospects has doubled the salary of the Deceased to `5,042 and has calculated the compensation. This is not correct.

24. The question as to how compensation may be calculated considering the future promotion prospects has been decided by the Supreme Court in Smt. Sarla Verma Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation, JT 2009 (6) SC (495) (The Sarla-Verma case). It has held that in case the Deceased had a permanent job and was less then 40 years then compensation may be calculated after adding 50% to the actual salary.

25. The Deceased was a permanent employee; he was less then 40 years of age and as such considering future promotion, compensation should be calculated taking his salary to be `3,781.5 rather than `5,042.

26. The Deceased was aged about 35 years. In view of the Sarla-Verma case, the multiplier for calculating compensation should be 16. One third from the salary should be deducted for personal expenses of the Deceased. Thus, the Claimants are entitled to `3781.5 x 2 x 12 x 16/3 or `4,84,032. Apart from this, the the Claimants are entitled to `2500 for loss of the estate and `2,000/- for funeral expenses. The widow is further entitled to `5,000/ for loss of consortium; Thus, the Claimants are entitled `4,93,532 as compensation.

3rd POINT: COMPANY IS NOT LIABLE
27. The owners had given a cheque No.64502 dated 20.10.1990 for `6334 to the agent of the Company for the insurance of the Truck. A cover note No.0685043 dated 22.10.1990 was issued by the Company. A receipt was also issued on 24.11.1990.

28. The cheque was dishonored by the Bank on 29.10.1990 as there was insufficient amount in the account. In this regard, a registered letter dated 6.11.1990 was sent to the Owners by the Company. This is clear from the dishonored cheque registered (paper no.69 Ga) and envelope (paper no.65 Ga. However, the letter was not served but came back unserved with the note that there was no one of that name in the village.

29. The accident took place on 20.11.1990 thereafter the Owners deposited the cash with the Company on 24.11.1990 and a new policy no. 0622604 wef 24.11.1990 to 23.11.1990 was issued

30. Sri Satya Prakash (DW-1) was examined on behalf of the Owners. He admitted that:
On the date when the cheque was given, the Bank account did not have `6334 but had only `1700;
The remaining amount was deposited in the Bank on 3.11.1990;
The cheque was dishonored by the Bank; and
A new cover note was issued on 24.11.1990 (after the accident) and at that time money for premium was given in cash.

31. An earlier cover note was issued on 22.10.1990 in lieu of payment of premium by cheque. However, the cheque was dishonored: it became void. The information of dishonor of the cheque was also sent by a registered letter. Thereafter, a fresh cover note was issued in lieu of cash payment on 24.11.1990 for the period 24.11.1990 to 23.11.1991. Thus, there was no insurance on 20.11.1990, the date of the accident.

32. The counsel for the Owners, relying upon a division bench of Madras High Court in CMA 1930 of 2006, Vaduguchetty Vs. S.P. Munusamy decided on 16.3.2011 (the Vaduguchetty case) and submits that:
The Owners never received the letter of the Company for cancelling their policy;
Unless information of cancellation is received by them, the insurance cannot be treated to be cancelled;
The Company is liable to indemnify them.

33. The Vaduguchetty case is not applicable and is distinguishable.

34. In the Vaduguchetty case, the vehicle was insured from 21.10.1990 to 20.10.1991. It was on the basis of a cheque that was dishonored. The vehicle met with an accident on 24.11.1990 at 9:00 hours and The information of cancellation of policy was sent on the same date namely 24.11.1990 but during office hours i.e. after the accident. It is for this reason the court held that the insurance was not cancelled at the time of the accident and the insurance company was held liable to indemnify. This is not the case here.

35. In this case, the cheque was dishonored on 29.10.1990 and the letter cancelling the policy was sent on 6.11.1990. It was returned with the endorsement dated 14.11.1990 that there was no one of the name in the village. This was much before the accident.

36. The fact that the letter dated 6.11.1990 was not served upon the Owners is not material. It is not disputed that the letter was sent by registered post at the address provided by the Owners. The Company had done, what it could do. It was not required to do the impossible. In case, there was incomplete address then for that reason, the Company cannot be faulted.

37. The counsel for the Owners submits that:
The letter of cancellation shows that the Company was not under the risk till premium was paid;
As soon as the amount was paid, the period ought to have referred back to 22.10.1990 to 21.10.1991:
The insurance was merely suspended and not cancelled.

38. Be as it may, the amount was deposited on 24.11.1990 and a fresh cover note then policy was insured for the period 24.11.1990 to 23.11.1991. This did not cover the day of the accident, namely 20.11.1990. The Company is not liable to indemnify the Owners.


4th POINT: COMPANY TO PAY--RECOVERY RIGHT GIVEN
39. This appeal was admitted and an interim order was granted on 16.7.1998. By the interim order, the operation of the award was stayed provided the Company deposited a sum of `3,00,000/- with the Tribunal within a period of two months after adjusting `25,000/- deposited before this Court. We are informed that this amount has been lifted by the Claimants.

40. The Claimants are widow and three children. Out of the three, two are daughters. We cannot permit the Company to recover this amount from them. It is appropriate that the Company should recover it from the Owners on whose behalf the payment is deemed to have been made.

41. Considering that―
The claimants are the widow, three children and out these three, two are daughters;
The Company is recovering from the Owners a part of amount that was deposited by it―
It would proper to ask the Company to pay the entire amount and recover it from the Owners of the Truck.

5th POINT: INTEREST AND PERIOD REDUCED
42. The Tribunal has awarded interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of filing the claim petition. In our opinion, this is on the higher side.

43. Considering that―
The normal rate of interest under CPC is 6% per annum;
The widow has also been given compassionate appointment by the department;
The owners had filed their written statement promptly on 2.7.1990 and nothing has been pointed out to show that any delay was caused by them and ultimately award has to be satisfied by them―
It would be appropriate to award the interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of order of the Tribunal.

CONCLUSIONS
44. Our conclusions are as follows;
(a) The accident occurred due to negligence of the driver of the Truck;
(b) The claimants are entitled to `493532/- as compensation alongwith 6% per annum from the date of the award by the Tribunal;
(c) The National Insurance Company Ltd. is not liable to indemnify the Owners. However, it may pay the amount to the claimants and recover the same from the Owners.

45. In view of our conclusions, the appeal is partly allowed.

Order Date :- 27.4.2012
kkg 



Saturday, May 19, 2012

Medical negligence- when the complainant went for abdominal treatment, the doctor while injecting saline through intravenous transfusion, she damaged the vain of the complainant which resulted into septic, and finally removal of her fore arm and as such damage awarded due to the fault of doctor. both forms confirmed and their lord ships dismissed this revision of the doctor=2. Both the fora below have come to the conclusion that her condition was due to the damage to the vain and resultant septicemia caused by negligence in the process of intravenous transfusion of saline and blood administered to the Complainant during her treatment by the revision petitioner. The complaint petition gives details of not only the medical consequences of the alleged negligence, but also resultant financial cost to the Complainant. For this, a total compensation of Rs.3.46 lakhs, was sought against which Rs.2.75 lakhs has been awarded. “Here in the present case, we also find that the chain of incident and circumstances under which the complication took place to the patient started under the care of appellant-doctor, on the basis of which there is only one inference of negligence of the appellant is drawn. Therefore, the respondent do not require to provide any further opinion of expert on the subject. The Complainant has succeeded to make out a case of negligence whereas the appellant failed to prove her innocence.”


NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION
                                               NEW DELHI                                              

REVISION PETITION NO. 4094 OF 2011
(Against the order dated 18.8.2011 in First Appeal No.921/2006
of the State Commission, Bihar)

Dr. Amita Srivastava 
W/o Dr. B.K.Srivastava
MohallaDahiyawan
District Saran at Chapra,
Bihar                                                                                                             ……….Petitioner
                                                                            
Versus

Smt. Poonam Devi
W/o Dev Nath Prasad
Village Rampur,
District Saran at Chapra,
Bihar                                                                                                             .........Respondent

BEFORE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE V.B. GUPTA,
                              PRESIDING MEMBER
HON’BLE MR. VINAY KUMAR, MEMBER

For the Petitioner         :   Mr. Akshit Gadhok,, Advocate and
                                         Dr. Sushil Kumar Gupta, Advocate

PRONOUNCED ON:   15-5-2012    


ORDER

PER MR.VINAY KUMAR, MEMBER

          The revision petitioner Dr. Amita Shrivastava has approached this Commission against the concurrent findings of the District Consumer Forum as well Bihar State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission.  As seen from the records of the case, the Complainant, a young women of 34 years, had gone to the clinic run by the revision petitioner with abdominal complaint for which she was treated between the 9th and 13th of December, 2002.  However, the consumer complaint related to development of gangrene and eventual amputation of her right forearm. 

2.      Both the fora below have come to the conclusion that her condition was due to the damage to the vain and resultant septicemia caused by negligence in the process of intravenous transfusion of saline and blood administered to the Complainant during her treatment by the revision petitioner. The complaint petition gives details of not only the medical consequences of the alleged negligence, but also resultant financial cost to the Complainant. For this, a total compensation of Rs.3.46 lakhs, was sought against which Rs.2.75 lakhs has been awarded.

3.      The State Commission has observed in the impugned order that there is no dispute on the fact that the Complainant had undergone abdominal surgery (hysterectomy).   There is no dispute that during the course of the treatment, transfusion of saline and blood had been given to the Complainant in the Clinic of the opposite party.  It is also an admitted fact that swelling and discoloration of the arm was first noticed on 11.12.2002.  It is also admitted that at the time of her admission, Complainant Poonam Devi had no problem with her right arm. 

4.      The State Commission has also referred to the findings of District Forum that the blood flow in the right arm was normal and the problem of discoloration and swelling was noticed only on 11.12.2002 after transfusion of blood and saline in between. The Commission has finally arrived at the following conclusion--
“Here in the present case, we also find that the chain of incident and circumstances under which the complication took place to the patient started under the care of appellant-doctor, on the basis of which there is only one inference of negligence of the appellant is drawn. Therefore, the respondent do not require to provide any further opinion of expert on the subject.  The Complainant has succeeded to make out a case of negligence whereas the appellant failed to prove her innocence.”

The State Commission therefore dismissed the appeal against the order of the District Forum, which had allowed the complaint and awarded a compensation of Rs.2.75 lakhs. 

5.      A perusal of the revision petition and the grounds raised therein clearly shows that it is a mere attempt to challenge the concurrent finding of fact by thefora below.  Therefore, it needs to be pointed out at the very outset that the scope of revisional jurisdiction is a limited one. In terms of the provision in Section 21 (b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 intervention of this Commission is contemplated only when there is case of jurisdictional error material, irregularity or illegality in the impugned order.   While considering the scope of this provision, Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has observed in Rubi (Chandra) Dutta Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (2011) 11 SCC 269 that powers under Section 21 (b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 can be exercised only if there is some prima facie jurisdictional error appearing in the impugned order.  In the matter before the Apex Court, it was observed that there was no jurisdictional error or miscarriage of justice, which could have warranted the National Commission to take a view different from what was taken by the two Forums.  The decision of the National Commission was based not on some legal principle, which was ignored by the Court below, but on different interpretation of the same set of facts.  Therefore, the order of the National Commission was quashed and set aside by the Apex Court.    

6.      During the hearing of the present revision petition, learned counsel for the petitioner has confined himself to the details of the treatment given to the Complainant i.e. the facts.  Neither the petition nor the petitioner counsel have made out any case for exercise of revisional jurisdictional, as contemplated under Section 21 (b) of the Act and as enunciated by the Apex Court in the decision mentioned above.

 7.     The revision petition is therefore, dismissed for want of merit and the impugned order of Bihar State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in FA No. 921 of 2006 confirmed.  No order as to costs.                         
.………………Sd/-…………
(V.B.GUPTA,J.)
PRESIDING MEMBER

……………Sd/-…………….
(VINAY KUMAR)
                                                                                                                                               MEMBER
s./-

Fire accident of the Textile shown room. the company alleged that it was a fraud case by setting fire the complainant claiming excess claim with out producing the records as those were burnt and by producing the stock statement of Allahabad bank. in such cases burden lies on the company to prove it’s allegations of fraud etc., but utterly failed. claim allowed by state commission and the same was confirmed their lord ships= 8. The State Commission has rejected the report of the investigator Mr. S.P. Singh observing that “a mere reading of which proves beyond doubt that the investigator tried his level best to bring the version of such persons with whom the complainants had some enmity and the entire report presented by him is an attempt to prove that the complainant No.1 was a person of doubtful integrity and was under heavy debts etc. We want to mention it pertinently that even before starting with the report while making a sketch of the scene of occurrence Mr. S.P.Singh has mentioned “fire created intentionally” which amply proves that the investigator was grossly biased against the insured and even before starting with the investigation, he had arrived at conclusion against the complainant.” 13. We have referred to the comment of the State Commission on the biased approach of the investigator. Counsel for the respondent/Complainant drew our attention to the fact that the investigator Shri S.P. Singh came into the picture on 27.8.2004 and completed his investigation on 16.9.2004, which was nearly five months after the fire had occurred on 13.3.2004. How could he have come to a conclusion that ‘the fire was caused by spraying inflammable material like kerosene’? On the contrary, the surveyor, who had visited the site on 14.3.2004 i.e. immediately after the fire, had found only ‘foul smell due to burnt cloth and water’. We therefore agree with the opinion of the State Commission on the approach of the investigator.


NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION
                                               NEW DELHI                                              

FIRST APPEAL NO. 243  OF 2006
(Against the order dated 17.4.2006 in Complaint Case No.7 of 2004 of the State Commission, UT Chandigarh)

New India Assurance Company Ltd.
SCO No. 37-38,
Divisional Office,
Sector 17-C,
Chandigarh                                              

AND

Head Office,
New India Assurance Building,
87, Mahatma Gandhi Road,
Fort, Mumbai          

AND

Regional Manager,
New India Assurance Co. Ltd.
SCO No. 36-37,
Sector 17-A,
Chandigarh.

Through:  Deputy Manager
New India Assurance Co. Ltd.
Regional Office-I,
Jeevan Bharti Building,
124, Connaught Circus,
New Delhi- 110 001.                                                                    ……….Appellant
                                                                            
Versus

1. Harinder Paul Singh (Since deceased)

    Through his legal heirs

1 (i)  Tejinder Kaur, W/o. Late Shri Harinder Paul Singh  


1 (ii)  Arshleen Kaur, D/o. Late Shri Harinder Paul Singh

1 (iii) Ishreen Kaur, D/o. Late Shri Harinder Paul Singh     

All Residents of:

H. No. 245,
1st Block- Bhai Randhir Singh Nagar,
Ludhiana (Punjab)

2. M/s. New Paul Textiles,
388/E, 1st Floor,
Bhai Randhir Singh Nagar,
Ludhiana (Punjab)                                                                      ........Respondents



BEFORE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE V.B. GUPTA,
                              PRESIDING MEMBER
HON’BLE MR. VINAY KUMAR, MEMBER



For the Appellant         :   Mr. Kishore Rawat, Advocate

For the Respondents   :  Mr. Aftab Singh Bakshi, Advocate

               

PRONOUNCED ON:    15-5-2012   


ORDER

PER MR.VINAY KUMAR, MEMBER

          The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. has filed this appeal against the order of Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, UT Chandigarh in CC No.7 of 2004. 

2.      During the pendency of this appeal, Complainant Harinder Paul Singh died on 26.11.2007.  Substitution of the following as his legal heirs was requested in MA No. 914 of 2010 –
1)      Tejinder Kaur (Wife)
2)      Arshleen Kaur (daughter)
3)      Ishreen Kaur (daughter)
          The same was permitted by this Commission on 24.9.2010.

3.      The matter arises out of an incident of fire, which took place on 13.4.2004 in the premises of the Complainant New Paul Textiles.  Substantial part of the textiles stocks were allegedly burnt and the remaining were damaged in the effort to extinguish the fire with water hose.  Five and half months after this fire the claim was repudiated by the appellant/Insurance Company.  The letter of 27.9.2004 addressed to the Complainant showed that the repudiation was done as per condition Nos.6 and 8 of the concerned Standard Fire and Specified Perils Policy.  These two conditions, as contained in the letter of repudiation read as follows:-
        “6.    On the happening of any loss or damage the insured shall also at all times at his own expense produce, procure and give to the company all such further particulars, plans, specification books, vouchers, invoices, duplicates or copies thereof, documents, investigation reports (internal/external), proofs and information with respect to the claim and the origin and cause of the loss and the circumstances under which the loss or damage occurred, and any matter touching the liability or the amount of the liability of the company as may be reasonably required by or on behalf of the company together with a declaration on oath or in other legal form of the truth of the claim and of any matters connected therewith.
       
 8.    If the claim be in any respect fraudulent, or if any false declaration be made or used in support thereof or if any fraudulent means or devices are used by the insured or any one acting on his behalf to obtain any benefit under the policy or if the loss or damage by occasioned by the willful set, or with the connivance of the insured all benefits under this policy shall be forfeited.” 

4.      Before the State Commission, the Complainant made allegations of demand of illegal gratification by the Surveyor Shri Vinay Mittal and impleaded him as OP-4, the other three being the New India Assurance Co. Ltd.  In response to the grounds for repudiation, the Complainant claimed that all required documents had been submitted to the insurance company and they were never told precisely what were those other documents which were required but not supplied and thereby attracted the condition of non-compliance. 

5.      On the other hand, the stand of the OPs before the State Commission was that the Complainant No.1 had continued to seek time to prepare detailed list of damaged goods.   He had also tried to delay the verification and assessment of the loss on the pretext of ill health.  The allegation of demand of illegal gratification was denied and called malicious and defamatory.  The case of the OPs was that the investigation report of Mr. S.P. Singh and the assessment of Surveyor Mr. Vinay Mittal made it amply clear that condition Nos.6 and 8 of the policy had been violated.

6.      The State Commission has noted that on the question of genuineness or otherwise of the claim, income tax returns for years 2001 to 2003 were submitted on behalf of the Complainant showing  turnover of Rs.43.50 lakhs, 54.03 lakhs and 60.35 lakhs respectively. It was argued that since the business was running well, the Complainants themselves could not be expected to set the shop on fire and damage their business, as alleged.  On the allegation of non-submission of documents and non-cooperative attitude of the Complainants, it was pointed out before the State Commission that all documents asked by the OPs vide Annexure C-4 had been handed over vide Annexure-32.

7.      The State Commission, on considering the material before it, came to a conclusion that repudiation of the claim was not justified.  The Commission noted that the Surveryor Mr. Vinay Mittal had stated in his cross-examination that he had visited the insured premises five to six times to assess the loss.  He also agreed to have done physical verification of complete stock during his three hours long visit to the premises on 22.3.2004.  But the insurance company did not rely on his report and appointed an investigator.

 8.     The State Commission has rejected the report of the investigator Mr. S.P. Singh observing that “a mere reading of which proves beyond doubt that the investigator tried his level best to bring the version of such persons with whom the complainants had some enmity and the entire report presented by him is an attempt to prove that the complainant No.1 was a person of doubtful integrity and was under heavy debts etc.  We want to mention it pertinently that even before starting with the report while making a sketch of the scene of occurrence Mr. S.P.Singh has mentioned “fire created intentionally” which amply proves that the investigator was grossly biased against the insured and even before starting with the investigation, he had arrived at conclusion against the complainant.”   

9.      We have examined the records and heard the two counsels; Mr. Kishore Rawat for the appellant/ OP and Mr. Aftab Singh Bakshi for the respondent/complainant.  Learned counsel for the appellant New India Assurance Co. referred to the letter of repudiation and reiterated the claim of the Company that violation of condition Nos.6 and 8 of the policy was the basis for repudiation of the claim.


10.    With reference to the first (condition 6), he referred to the correspondence in letter of 15.3.2004, 13.3.2004 and 6.4.2004 written by the Surveyor to the Complainant.  These letters primarily concern the question of preparation of stock details.  The letter themselves show the effort put in by and on behalf of the Complainant, while recording the lack of complete satisfaction of the Surveyor with the same.  We do not find anything in this correspondence which can amount to lack of reasonable effort required in condition No.6 relied upon by the appellant/OP.                 Significantly, neither the memorandum of appeal nor the counsel for the appellant have challenged the stand of the Complainant before the State Commission that all documents asked for by the OPs vide Annexure C-4 were handed over vide Annexure C-32. 

11.    The second ground for repudiation of the claim by the insurance company was the allegation of fraud, as per condition No.8 cited therein.  Shri KishoreRawat, learned counsel for the New India Assurance Co. argued that there was no justification for high level of stocks, as sale during the year of fire had dipped.  For this learned counsel referred to the observations on stocks in the report of the Surveyor.  It needs to be noted here that the list of stocks prepared by the Surveyor was not produced before the State Commission.  The impugned order therefore observes--
“In the absence of or omission on the part of insurance company to produce the actual list prepared by the surveyor immediately after the fire which he has stated on oath to have been prepared and also mentioned in his report on record raises adverse presumption against the OPs.  To quantify the stock we are left with no option but to be guided by the stock statement given by the Allahabad Bank for the relevant period.”

We therefore find no reason to accept the argument of the learned counsel in this behalf.
      
12.    Further, on the allegation of fraud, it needs to be noted that the written response before the State Commission merely states that the investigation conducted by Shri S. P. Singh (wrongly noted as Jagtar Singh in the written response of OP) as well as assessment made by Shri Vinay Mittal clearly show that condition No.6 and 8 had been violated by the complainant. However, proceedings before the State Commission show that the allegation of fraud was not proved by the appellant/OP.
         
13.    We have referred to the comment of the State Commission on the biased approach of the investigator. Counsel for the respondent/Complainant drew our attention to the fact that the investigator Shri S.P. Singh came into the picture on 27.8.2004 and completed his investigation on 16.9.2004, which was nearly five months after the fire had occurred on 13.3.2004.  How could he have come to a conclusion that ‘the fire was caused by spraying inflammable material like kerosene’?  On the contrary, the surveyor, who had visited the site on 14.3.2004 i.e. immediately after the fire, had found only ‘foul smell due to burnt cloth and water’. We therefore agree with the opinion of the State Commission on the approach of the investigator.

 14.   We are of the view that having repudiated the claim of the Complainant categorically on the grounds of non-submission of relevant documents as well as fraud, as per condition nos.6 and 8 cited therein, it was incumbent upon the insurance company to prove them before the State Commission.  Proceedings before the State Commission show that the appellant had failed on both counts.  The State Commission has therefore rightly allowed the complaint. 

15.    In the result, we do not find any substance in this appeal.  The same is therefore, dismissed and the order of the State Consumer Disputes RedressalCommission, U.T. Chandigarh in CC No.7 of 2004 confirmed.  The parties shall bear their own costs.             
.…………………Sd/-………
(V.B.GUPTA,J.)
PRESIDING MEMBER

…………………Sd/-……….
(VINAY KUMAR)
                                                                                                                                             MEMBER
s./-