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Friday, May 11, 2012

Samaj Parivartan Samuday, a registered society, filed petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India stating that the illegal mining in the States of Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka was still going on in full swing. Such illegal mining and transportation of illegally mined minerals were being done in connivance with the officials, politicians and even Ministers of State. There was a complete lack of action on the part of the Ministry of Environment and Forests on the one hand and the States of Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, on the other. . Wherever and whenever the State fails to perform its duties, the Court shall step in to ensure that Rule of Law prevails over the abuse of process of law. Such abuse may result from inaction or even arbitrary action of protecting the true offenders or failure by different authorities in discharging statutory or legal obligations in consonance with the procedural and penal statutes. This Court expressed its concern about the rampant pilferage and illegal extraction of natural wealth and resources, particularly, iron ore, as also the environmental degradation and disaster that may result from unchecked intrusion into the forest areas. This Court, vide its order dated 29th July, 2011 invoked the precautionary principle, which is the essence of Article 21 of the Constitution of India as per the dictum of this Court in the case of M.C. Mehta v. Union of India [(2009) 6 SCC 142], and had consequently issued a ban on illegal mining. The Court also directed Relief and Rehabilitation Programmes to be carried out in contiguous stages to promote inter- generational equity and the regeneration of the forest reserves. This is the ethos of the approach consistently taken by this Court, but this aspect primarily deals with the future concerns. In respect of the past actions, the only option is to examine in depth the huge monetary transactions which were effected at the cost of national wealth, natural resources, and to punish the offenders for their illegal, irregular activities. The protection of these resources was, and is the constitutional duty of the State and its instrumentalities and thus, the Court should adopt a holistic approach and direct comprehensive and specialized investigation into such events of the past. 45. Compelled by the above circumstances and keeping in mind the clear position of law supra, we thus direct; a) The issues specified at point 1(a) and 1(b) of the CEC Report dated 20th April, 2012 are hereby referred for investigation by the Central Bureau of Investigation. b) All the proceedings in relation to these items, if pending before any Court, shall remain stayed till further orders of this Court. The CBI shall complete its investigation and submit a Report to the Court of competent jurisdiction with a copy of the Report to be placed on the file of this Court within three months. c) The Report submitted by the CEC and the documents annexed thereto shall be treated as ‘informant’s information to the investigating agency’ by the CBI. d) The CBI shall undertake investigation in a most fair, proper and unbiased manner uninfluenced by the stature of the persons and the political or corporate clout, involved in the present case. It will be open to the CBI to examine and inspect the records of any connected matter pending before any investigating agency or any court. e) The competent authority shall constitute the special investigating team, headed by an officer not below the rank of Additional Director General of Police/Additional Commissioner forthwith. f) Any investigation being conducted by any agency other than CBI shall also not progress any further, restricted to the items stated in clause (a) above, except with the leave of the Court. The CBI shall complete its investigation uninfluenced by any order, inquiry or investigation that is pending on the date of passing of this order. g) This order is being passed without prejudice to the rights and contentions of any of the parties to the lis, as well as in any other proceedings pending before courts of competent jurisdiction and the investigating agencies. h) All pleas raised on merits are kept open. i) We direct all the parties, the Government of the States of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and all other government departments of that and/or any other State, to fully cooperate and provide required information to CBI. 46. With the above directions, we accept the recommendation of the CEC to the extent as afore-stated. 47. Let the matter stand over to 3rd August, 2012 for consideration of the Report dated 27th April, 2012 filed by the CEC.


                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                         CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
                       IA NO.                  OF 2012
                                     IN

                    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 562 OF 2009




Samaj Parivartan Samudaya & Ors.         … Petitioners

                                   Versus


State of Karnataka     & Ors.                      … Respondents








                                  O R D E R


Swatanter Kumar, J.

1.    By this order we will deal with and dispose  of,  the  recommendations
made by the Central Empowered Committee (for short,  ‘CEC’)  in  its  report
dated 20th April, 2012.  Since we  have  heard  the  affected  parties,  the
petitioners  and  the  learned  Amicus  Curiae,  we  shall   summarize   the
contentions of the learned counsel for the respective parties.  The  learned
counsel appearing for the affected parties contended:

a. CEC has submitted its report without providing  them  an  opportunity  of
   being heard.

b. CEC has exceeded its jurisdiction and enlarged the scope of  the  enquiry
   beyond the reference made by the  Court.   Thus,  the  Court  should  not
   accept any of the recommendations made by the CEC.


c. In relation to the alleged irregularities and  illegalities  pointed  out
   in the report of the CEC, even where criminality is involved or  criminal
   offences are suspected, the matters are sub judice before  the  Court  of
   competent jurisdiction.  Thus, this Court should not pass any orders  for
   transferring the investigation of such offences to the Central Bureau  of
   Investigation (for short ‘CBI’) as it  would  seriously  prejudice  their
   interests.

2.    In order to deal with these contentions,  it  is  necessary  for  this
Court to briefly refer to the background of these cases, which has  resulted
in the filing of the unnumbered IA in Writ Petition  No.  562/2009  and  the
peculiar  facts  and  circumstances  in  which  the   CEC   has   made   its
recommendations.

3.    Concerned  with  the  rampant  pilferage  and  illegal  extraction  of
natural wealth and resources, particularly iron ore, and  the  environmental
degradation and disaster that may result from unchecked intrusion  into  the
forest areas, this Court felt compelled to intervene. Vide its  order  dated
9th September, 2002 in T.N. Godavarman Thirumalpad v. Union of India &  Ors.
[W.P.(C) No. 202 of 1995], this Court constituted the  CEC  to  examine  and
monitor  the  various  activities  infringing  the   laws   protecting   the
environment and also the preventive or punitive steps that may  be  required
to be taken to  protect  the  environment.   In  addition  to  this  general
concern for the environment, the order of this Court  dated  9th  September,
2002, this Court noted violations of its Orders and directed  that  the  CEC
shall monitor implementation of all orders of  the  Court  and  shall  place
before it any unresolved cases of non-compliance, including  in  respect  of
the encroachments, removals, implementations of working plans,  compensatory
afforestation, plantations and other conservation issues.    In  furtherance
to the said order, the Government framed a notification in terms of  Section
33 of the Environment Protection Act, 1996.  The  CEC  constituted  by  this
Court was proposed to be converted into a Statutory  Committee.   The  draft
notification for  the  same  was  also  placed  before  this  Court  on  9th
September,  2002.   After  approval,  the  Court  directed  that  a   formal
notification  will  be  issued  within  a  week  and   the   functions   and
responsibilities given  to  the  CEC  were  to  be  exercised  by  the  said
Statutory Committee.    In  fact,  this  Notification  was  issued  on  17th
September, 2002.

4.    It may be noticed here that, it was in furtherance  to  the  order  of
the Government of Andhra Pradesh vide G.O.M No. 467, Home (SCA) Dept.  dated
17th November, 2009, supplemented  by  Notification  No.  228/61/2009-AVD-11
dated 1st December, 2009 issued by the Central Government, that the CBI  was
directed to register a case against the  Obulapuram  Mining  Company  (OMC).
Earlier the CBI had registered a case against the OMC on 7th December,  2009
and started the probe.  This probably came to be stayed by  the  High  Court
vide its order dated 12th December, 2009 which stay was vacated  by  another
order of that Court on 16th December,  2010  paving  the  way  for  a  full-
fledged probe.  As a result of vacation of the stay, the CBI  continued  its
investigation.

5.    The CBI also filed a charge-sheet in a special court against the  OMC,
in an illegal mining case falling within the State of  Karnataka,   charging
the accused under Sections 120B, 409,  420,  468  and  Section  471  of  the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘IPC’) read with the  provisions  of  the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.  The case against the  OMC  for  illegal
mining was under investigation in respect of the  areas  of  Obulapuram  and
Malangapudi villages of Anantpur district in the  State  of  Andhra  Pradesh
and in the rest of the State of Andhra Pradesh.

6.    Further, the State of Andhra Pradesh vide its G.O. Rt. No.  723  dated
25th November, 2009, issued by the  Industrial  and  Commercial  Department,
suspended the mining operations  and  also  the  transportation  of  mineral
material by OMC and even other implicated companies, on  the  basis  of  the
findings  of  a  High  Level  Committee,  headed  by  the  Principal   Chief
Conservator of Forests, Hyderabad and the Report of  the  CEC  submitted  to
this Court in I.A. No. 2/2009 in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 201  of  2009,  a
copy of which was forwarded to the State Government.   This  was  challenged
before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh  which,  vide  judgment  dated  26th
February, 2010, set aside the notification and allowed the  writ  petitions,
while holding that the  G.O.  issued  by  the  Government  suffered  from  a
jurisdictional error and was in  violation  of  the  principles  of  natural
justice.   Against the said judgment of the High Court,  the  Government  of
Andhra Pradesh filed a Special Leave Petition, SLP(C) No. 7366-7367 of  2010
on different grounds.

7.    Samaj Parivartan Samuday, a registered society, filed  petition  under
Article 32 of the Constitution of India stating that the illegal  mining  in
the States of Andhra Pradesh and  Karnataka  was  still  going  on  in  full
swing.  Such illegal mining and transportation of illegally  mined  minerals
were being done in connivance  with  the  officials,  politicians  and  even
Ministers of State.  There was a complete lack of action on the part of  the
Ministry of Environment and Forests on  the  one  hand  and  the  States  of
Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, on the other.   It was averred that there  was
complete breakdown of the official machinery, thereby allowing such  blatant
illegalities to take place.  This inaction and callousness on  the  part  of
the Central and the State Governments and failure on their part  to  control
the illegal mining has allowed large-scale destruction, both of  forest  and
non-forest lands and has adversely affected the livelihood  of  the  people.
It thus, has filed WP (C) 562 of 2009 and has prayed for issuance of a  writ
of mandamus or any  other  appropriate  writ,  order  or  direction  to  the
respective State Governments and to the Union of India, to stop  all  mining
and related activities in the forest areas of these two States.  It  further
sought that the orders passed by this Court in the W.P.(C) No. 202  of  1995
be carried out and the provisions of the Forest Conservation  Act,  1980  be
implemented.  It also prayed for cancelling of the  ‘raising  contracts’  or
sub-lease executed by the Government of Karnataka in favour of  the  various
private individuals and allowing back-door entry into  the  mining  activity
in those areas.  The most significant  prayer  in  this  petition  was  that
after stopping of the mining activity,  a  systematic  survey  of  both  the
inter-state border between the States of Andhra Pradesh  and  Karnataka  and
mine lease areas along  the  border  be  conducted  and  proper  Relief  and
Rehabilitation Programmes (for short ‘RR Programmes’) be implemented.

8.    All the above cases, i.e., W.P.(C) No. 202/1995, 562/2009  and  SLP(C)
No. 7366-7367/2010, relate  to  protection  of  environment,  forest  areas,
stoppage of illegal mining  and  cancellation  of  illegal  sub-leasing  and
contracts executed by any State Government in favour of the  third  parties,
to the extent such contracts are invalid and improper.   The  latter  cases,
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 562 of 2009 and  SLP(C)  Nos.  7366-7367  of  2010
concern  the  Bellary  Forest  Reserve.    Further,   there   were   serious
allegations raised in these petitions as to how and the manner in which  the
leases were  executed  and  mining  permits  were  granted  or  renewed  for
carrying out the mining activities stated in the petition.

9.    The CEC was required to submit quarterly reports, which  it  has  been
submitting  and  with  the  passage  of  time,  large   irregularities   and
illegalities coupled with criminality were brought to  the  notice  of  this
Court.  The CEC, in discharge of its  functions  and  responsibilities,  was
examining the matters, in both the States of Andhra Pradesh  and  Karnataka.
These violations  have  come  to  the  surface  as  a  result  of  enquiries
conducted by the CEC, regarding  illegal  mining  and  mining  beyond  their
leased areas by these companies.  It was pointed by the  CEC  with  specific
reference to these companies that there was not only illegal  extraction  of
iron ore but the minerals was being also extracted  beyond the  leased  area
specified in the lease deeds.  Further, there was unchecked export  of  iron
ore from the border areas of the two States, Andhra Pradesh  and  Karnataka.
This related to the quantum, quality and transportation of ore as well.

10.   While passing an order of complete ban on  mining  activity  in  these
areas vide order dated 29th July, 2011 this Court sought submissions on  the
market requirement for mined ore and  vide  order  dated  5th  August,  2011
permitted only M/s. National  Minerals  Development  Corporation  Ltd.  (for
short “NMDC”) to carry  out  very  limited  mining  activity,  so  that  the
economic interest  of  the  country  and  of  the  states  does  not  suffer
irretrievably.     This Court has also  directed  the  CEC  to  examine  all
aspects of the mining activity and  report  on  various  measures  that  are
required to be taken for RR Programmes.    Limited  mining  activity,  thus,
was permitted to be carried on in the area with  the  clear  direction  that
the RR Programmes shall be simultaneously commenced and  it  is  only  after
such RR Programmes are satisfactorily put into motion and the  CEC  makes  a
suggestion in this regard, that the  mining  activity  would  be  permitted.
Vide  order  dated  23rd  September,  2011,  this  Court  accepted   various
recommendations of the CEC and noticed that prima facie it appears  that  at
the relevant time, there existed linkage between the alleged illegal  mining
in the Bellary Reserve Forest, falling in the District  Anantpur  in  Andhra
Pradesh and the illegalities in respect of grant/renewal  of  mining  leases
and deviations from sanctioned  mine  sketch  in  the  Bellary  District  in
Karnataka.    The  Court  also  noted  that  illegally  extracted  iron  ore
belonging to one M/s.  Associated  Mining  Company  (for  short  “AMC”)  was
apparently routed  through  the  nearest  Port  in  Vishakhapatnam,  through
district Anantpur in Andhra Pradesh.   Thus, the Court  felt  that  the  CBI
should examine the alleged illegalities.   Vide the same order,  this  Court
required the CBI to additionally present a status report  of  investigations
which the CBI had undertaken in respect of OMC in Andhra Pradesh  under  FIR
No. 17A/2009-CBI(Hyderabad).   It was also reported that there  was  massive
illegal mining by third parties in the mining lease No.  1111  of  one  M/s.
National Minerals Development Corporation (NMDC).   It  was  suspected  that
one M/s. Deccan Mining Syndicate (for short  “DMS”)  was  involved  in  such
activities and no action had been taken on the complaints  of  NMDC.    Some
other directions were also issued including directions for  further  inquiry
by the CEC and the CEC was required to put up a comprehensive report  before
this Court.

11.   In the meanwhile, an application was filed by the petitioners of  writ
petition No.562 of 2011 which remained  un-numbered.   The  prayer  in  this
application was to extend the scope of investigation by the CBI relating  to
illegal mining and other allied activities which the politicians  and  major
corporate groups including M/s. Jindal Group and M/s. Adanis were  indulging
in, within the State of Karnataka.  They also prayed that  both  the  States
should also be directed demarcate the inter-state boundaries,  particularly,
in the mining area.

12.   After examining the issues raised in the IA,  the  earlier  orders  of
this Court and based on the meetings held by the CEC  on  20th  March,  2012
and 11th April,  2012,  respectively,  the  CEC  identified  the  issues  as
follows:-

           i)    The alleged serious illegalities/ irregularities and undue
                 favour in respect of (a) the land purchased  by  the  close
                 relatives of the then Chief Minister,  Karnataka  for  0.40
                 crore in the year 2006 and subsequently sold to  M/s  South
                 West Mining Limited in the year 2010  for  Rs.20.00  crores
                 and (b) donation  of  Rs.20.00  crore  received  by  Prerna
                 Education Society from M/s South West Mining Limited.

           ii)   the alleged illegal export of iron ore from Belekeri  Port
                 and associated issues;

           iii)  alleged export from Krishapatnam and  Chennai  Port  after
                 exports were banned by the State of Karnataka; and

           iv)   transfer  of  senior  police  officers  on  deputation  to
                 Lokayukta, Karnataka.”



13.   The CEC filed two comprehensive reports before this Court,  one  dated
20th April, 2012 and other dated 27th April, 2012,  both  in  Writ  Petition
(Civil) No. 562 of 2011.

14.   Out of the above issues indicated, the CEC dealt with issue No.  1  in
the Report dated 20th April, 2012, while issue Nos. 2 to 4 were  dealt  with
in the Report dated 27th April, 2012.   On issue No.  1,  after  summarizing
the facts and its observations during  its  enquiry,  the  CEC  pointed  out
illegalities, irregularities  and  instances  of  misuse  of  public  office
committed for  the  benefit  of  the  close  relatives  of  the  then  Chief
Minister, State of Karnataka.   It made the following recommendations :-

           “15.  Keeping in view the above facts and circumstances the  CEC
           is of the considered view that the purchase of  the  above  said
           land notified  for  acquisition  for  public  purpose,  its  de-
           notification from acquisition, permission granted for conversion
           from agriculture to non-agricultural (residential)  purpose  and
           subsequent sale to M/s South West  Mining  Limited  prima  facie
           involves serious violations of the relevant Acts and  procedural
           lapses and prima facie  misuse  of  office  by  the  then  Chief
           Minister, Karnataka thereby enabling his close relatives to make
           windfall profits and  raises  grave  issues  relating  to  undue
           favour, ethics and morality.  Considering the above  and  taking
           into consideration the massive illegalities and  illegal  mining
           which have been found to have taken place in Karnataka  and  the
           allegations made against the Jindal Group as being receipient of
           large quantities of illegally mined material  and  undue  favour
           being shown to them in respect of the mining lease of M/s MML it
           is RECOMMENDED that a detailed investigation may be directed  to
           be carried out in the matter  by  an  independent  investigating
           agency such as the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and  to
           take follow up action.  This agency may be asked to  delve  into
           the matter in depth and in a time bound manner.  This agency may
           also be directed to investigate into  other  similar  cases,  if
           any, of lands de-notified  from  acquisition  by  the  Bangalore
           Development Authority and the illegalities  /  irregularities  /
           procedural lapses, if any, and to take follow up action.

           16.   The Prerna Education Society set up by the close relatives
           of the then Chief Minister, Karnataka  has  during  March,  2010
           vide two cheques of Rs.5.0 crores each received  a  donation  of
           Rs.10 crores from M/s South West Mining Limited, a Jindal  Group
           Company.  In this context, it is of interest to note that during
           the year 2009-2010 the  net  profit  (after  tax)  of  the  said
           Company was only Rs.5,73 crores.  Looking into  the  details  of
           the other donations made by the said Company  or  by  the  other
           Jindal Group Companies to any other Trust / Society  not  owned,
           managed or controlled by the Jindal  Group.   After  considering
           that a number of allegations, with  supporting  documents,  have
           been made in the Report  dated  27th  July,  2011  of  Karnataka
           Lokayukta regarding the M/s. JSW Steel Limited  having  received
           large quantities of illegal mineral  and  alleged  undue  favour
           shown to it in respect of the extraction / supply of iron ore by
           / to it from the mining lease of M/s MML, it is RECOMMENDED that
           this Hon’ble Court  may  consider  directing  the  investigating
           agency such as CBI to also  look  into  the  linkages,  if  any,
           between the above said donation of  Rs.10  crores  made  by  M/s
           South West Mining Limited and the  alleged  receipt  of  illegal
           mineral by M/s JSW Steel Limited and the  alleged  undue  favour
           shown to it in respect of the mining lease of M/s MML.

           17.   The CEC has  filed  its  Report  dated  28th  March,  2012
           wherein the representation filed by the petitioner  against  Mr.
           R. Parveen Chandra (ML 2661) has been  dealt  with  (refer  para
           6(ii), page 11-13 of the CEC Report dated 28th March, 2012).  In
           the said representation it has been  alleged  that  Mr.  Parveen
           Chandra the lessee of ML No.2661 has made two payments,  one  of
           Rs.2.50 crores to M/s Bhagat Homes Private Limited and the other
           of Rs.3.5 crores to M/s Dhavalagir Property  Developers  Private
           Limited as a quid pro quo  for  allotment  of  the  said  mining
           lease.  It is RECOMMENDED that this Hon’ble Court  may  consider
           directing the investigating agency such as  CBI  to  investigate
           the payments  made  by  the  above  said  lessee  to  these  two
           companies  whose  Directions  /  shareholders  are   the   close
           relatives of the then  Chief  Minister,  Karnataka  and  whether
           there was any link between such payments  and  grant  of  mining
           lease to Mr. Parveen Chandra.”




15.   When we heard the parties to the lis and even permitted  the  affected
parties as interveners, the hearing had been restricted  to  the  Report  of
the CEC dated 20th  April,  2012.   Therefore,  presently,  we  are  passing
directions only in relation to that Report, while postponing the hearing  of
the second Report which is dated 27th April, 2012.

16.   In the backdrop of the above events of the case, reference to  certain
relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (Cr.P.C.)  can  now
be appropriately made, before we proceed to  deal  with  the  above  noticed
contentions.

17.   The machinery of criminal investigation is  set  into  motion  by  the
registration of a First Information Report (FIR), by  the  specified  police
officer of a jurisdictional police station  or  otherwise.     The  CBI,  in
terms of its manual has adopted  a  procedure  of  conducting  limited  pre-
investigation inquiry as well.   In both the cases, the registration of  the
FIR is essential.   A police investigation may start with  the  registration
of the FIR while in other cases (CBI, etc.), an  inquiry  may  lead  to  the
registration of an FIR and thereafter regular  investigation  may  begin  in
accordance with the provisions of the  CrPC.     Section  154  of  the  CrPC
places an obligation upon  the  authorities  to  register  the  FIR  of  the
information received,  relating  to  commission  of  a  cognizable  offence,
whether such information is received orally or in writing by the officer in-
charge  of  a  police  station.     A  police  officer  is   authorised   to
investigate such cases without order of a Magistrate, though,  in  terms  of
Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.  the  Magistrate  empowered  under  Section  190  may
direct the registration of a  case  and  order  the  police  authorities  to
conduct investigation, in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  CrPC.
Such an order of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC is in  the  nature
of a pre-emptory  reminder  or  intimation  to  police,  to  exercise  their
plenary power of investigation under that Section.   This would result in  a
police report under Section 173, whereafter the Magistrate may  or  may  not
take cognizance of the offence and proceed under  Chapter  XVI  CrPC.    The
Magistrate has judicial discretion, upon receipt  of  a  complaint  to  take
cognizance  directly  under  Section  200  CrPC,  or  to  adopt  the   above
procedure. [Ref. Gopal Das Sindhi & Ors. v. State of Assam & Anr. [AIR  1961
SC 986]; Mohd. Yusuf v. Smt. Afaq Jahan & Anr. [AIR 2006 SC 705];  and  Mona
Panwar v. High Court of Judicature of  Allahabad  Through  its  Registrar  &
Ors. [(2011) 3 SCC 496].

18.   Once the investigation is conducted in accordance with the  provisions
of the CrPC, a police officer is bound to file a report before the Court  of
competent jurisdiction, as contemplated under Section 173 CrPC,  upon  which
the Magistrate can proceed to try the offence, if the same were  triable  by
such Court or commit the case to the Court of Sessions.   It is  significant
to note that the provisions of Section 173(8) CrPC  open  with  non-obstante
language that nothing in the provisions of Section 173(1)  to  173(7)  shall
be deemed to preclude further investigation in respect of an  offence  after
a report under sub-Section (2) has been forwarded to the  Magistrate.  Thus,
under Section 173(8), where charge-sheet has been  filed,  that  Court  also
enjoys the jurisdiction to direct further investigation  into  the  offence.
{Ref., Hemant Dhasmana v. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr.  [(2001)  7
SCC 536]}. This power cannot have any inhibition including such  requirement
as being obliged to hear the accused before  any  such  direction  is  made.
It has  been  held  in  Shri  Bhagwan  Samardha  Sreepada  Vallabha  Venkata
Vishwandha Maharaj v. State of Andhra Pradesh and  Ors.   [JT  1999  (4)  SC
537] that the casting of any such obligation on the Court would only  result
in encumbering the Court with the burden  of  searching  for  all  potential
accused to be afforded with the opportunity of being heard.

19.   While the trial Court does not have inherent powers like those of  the
High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC or the Supreme Court under  Article
136 of the Constitution of India,  such  that  it  may  order  for  complete
reinvestigation or fresh investigation of a case before it, however, it  has
substantial powers in exercise of discretionary jurisdiction under  Sections
311 and 391 of CrPC.   In cases where cognizance has been taken and where  a
substantial portion of investigation/trial have already been  completed  and
where a direction for further examination would have the effect of  delaying
the trial, if the trial court is of the opinion that the case has been  made
out for alteration of charge etc.,  it  may  exercise  such  powers  without
directing further investigation.   {Ref.    Sasi  Thomas  v.  State  &  Ors.
[(2006) 12 SCC 421]}.   Still  in  another  case,  taking  the  aid  of  the
doctrine of implied power, this Court has also stated that an express  grant
of statutory power carries with it, by necessary implication, the  authority
to use  all  reasonable  means  to  make  such  statutory  power  effective.
Therefore, absence of statutory provision empowering  Magistrate  to  direct
registration of an FIR would not be of any consequence  and  the  Magistrate
would nevertheless be competent to direct  registration  of  an  FIR.  {Ref.
Sakiri Vasu v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. [(2008) 2 SCC 409]}.

20.   Thus, the CrPC leaves clear scope for conducting  of  further  inquiry
and filing  of  a  supplementary  charge  sheet,  if  necessary,  with  such
additional facts and evidence as  may  be  collected  by  the  investigating
officer in terms of sub-Sections (2) to (6)  of  Section  173  CrPC  to  the
Court.

21.   To put it aptly, further investigation by  the  investigating  agency,
after presentation of a challan (charge sheet in terms of Section 173  CrPC)
is permissible in any case impliedly but in no event is impermissible.

22.   A person who complains of commission of a cognizable offence has  been
provided with two options under Indian  Criminal  jurisprudence.    Firstly,
he can lodge the police report which  would  be  proceeded  upon  as  afore-
noticed and secondly, he could file a  complaint  under  Section  200  CrPC,
whereupon the Magistrate shall follow the procedure provided under  Sections
200 to 203 or 204 to 210 under Chapter XV and XVI of the  CrPC.

23.   In the former case, it is upon  the  police  report  that  the  entire
investigation is conducted by the  investigating  agency  and  the  onus  to
establish commission of the  alleged  offence  beyond  reasonable  doubt  is
entirely on the prosecution.   In  a  complaint  case,  the  complainant  is
burdened with the onus of establishing  the  offence  and  he  has  to  lead
evidence before the Court to establish the guilt of the accused.   The  rule
of establishing the charges beyond  reasonable  doubt  is  applicable  to  a
complaint case as well.

24.   The important feature that we must  notice  for  the  purpose  of  the
present case is that even on a complaint case, in terms of Section 202,  the
Magistrate can refer the complaint to investigation by the police  and  call
for the report first, deferring the hearing  of  the  complaint  till  then.
Section 210 CrPC is another significant provision with regard to the  powers
of the Court where investigation on the same subject matter is pending.   It
provides that in a complaint case where any  enquiry  or  trial  is  pending
before the Court and in relation to same offence and  investigation  by  the
Police is in progress which is the subject matter of the  enquiry  or  trial
before the Court, the Magistrate shall stay the proceedings  and  await  the
report of the investigating agency.  Upon presentation of the  report,  both
the cases on a Police report and case instituted on  a  complaint  shall  be
tried as if both were instituted on  a  Police  report  and  if  the  report
relates to none of the accused in the complaint it shall  proceed  with  the
enquiry/trial which had been stayed by it.   The  section  proceeds  on  the
basis that a complaint case and case instituted on a police report  for  the
commission of the same offence can  proceed  simultaneously  and  the  Court
would await the Police report before it proceeds with the complaint in  such
cases.  The purpose again is to try these cases together,  if  they  are  in
relation to the  same  offence  with  the  intent  to  provide  a  fair  and
effective trial.  The powers of the  trial  court  are  very  wide  and  the
legislative intent of providing a fair trial and  presumption  of  innocence
in favour of the accused is the essence of the criminal justice system.

25.   The Court is vested with  very  wide  powers  in  order  to  equip  it
adequately to be able to do complete  justice.     Where  the  investigating
agency has  submitted  the  charge  sheet  before  the  court  of  competent
jurisdiction, but it has failed to bring  all  the  culprits  to  book,  the
Court is empowered under  Section  319  Cr.P.C.  to  proceed  against  other
persons who are not arrayed as  accused  in  the  chargesheet  itself.   The
Court can summon such suspected persons and  try  them  as  accused  in  the
case, provided the Court is satisfied of  involvement  of  such  persons  in
commission of the crime from the record and evidence before it.

26.   We have referred to these provisions and the scope  of  the  power  of
the criminal court, in view of the argument extended that there are  certain
complaints filed by private persons or that the matters are  pending  before
the court and resultantly this Court  would  be  not  competent  in  law  to
direct the CBI to conduct investigation of those  aspects.   We  may  notice
that the investigation of a case or filing chargesheet in a  case  does  not
by itself bring the absolute end to exercise of power by  the  investigating
agency or by the Court.   Sometimes and particularly in the matters  of  the
present kind, the investigating agency has  to  keep  its  options  open  to
continue  with  the  investigation,  as  certain   other   relevant   facts,
incriminating materials and even persons, other than the persons  stated  in
the FIR as accused, might be involved in the commission of  the  crime.  The
basic purpose of an investigation is to bring out the  truth  by  conducting
fair and proper investigation, in accordance with law and  ensure  that  the
guilty are punished.   At this stage, we  may  appropriately  refer  to  the
judgment of this Court in the case  of  Nirmal  Singh  Kahlon  v.  State  of
Punjab & Ors.  [(2009)  1  SCC  441]  wherein  an  investigation  was  being
conducted into wrongful appointments to Panchayat and  other  posts  by  the
Police Department of the State.   However, later on,  these  were  converted
into a public interest litigation regarding larger corruption  charges.  The
matter was sought to be referred for investigation to a  specialised  agency
like CBI.  The plea taken was that the Special Judge was already  seized  of
the case as charge sheet had been filed before that Court, and the  question
of referring the matter for investigation did not arise.    The  High  Court
in directing investigation by the CBI  had  exceeded  its  jurisdiction  and
assumed the jurisdiction of the Special Judge.   The plea of  prejudice  was
also raised.   While rejecting these arguments, the appeals  were  dismissed
and this Court issued a direction to the CBI to  investigate  and  file  the
charge sheet before the  Court  having  appropriate  jurisdiction  over  the
investigation. The reasoning of the Court can be examined from paragraph  63
to 65 of the said judgment, which reads as under:-


           “63. The  High  Court  in  this  case  was  not  monitoring  any
           investigation. It only desired that the investigation should  be
           carried out by an independent agency. Its anxiety, as is evident
           from the order dated 3-4-2002, was to see that the  officers  of
           the State do not get away. If that be so, the submission  of  Mr
           Rao that the monitoring of an  investigation  comes  to  an  end
           after the charge-sheet is filed, as has been held by this  Court
           in Vineet Narain and M.C. Mehta (Taj Corridor Scam) v. Union  of
           India, loses all significance.


           64. Moreover, it was not a case where the High Court had assumed
           a jurisdiction in regard to the same offence in respect  whereof
           the Special Judge had taken cognizance pursuant to  the  charge-
           sheet filed. The charge-sheet was not filed in the FIR which was
           lodged on the intervention of the High Court.


           65. As the offences were distinct and different, the High  Court
           never assumed the jurisdiction of the Special  Judge  to  direct
           reinvestigation as was urged or otherwise.”





27.   Now, we shall proceed to examine the merit of the  contentions  raised
before us.  We may deal with the submissions (a) and (b), together, as  they
are intrinsically inter-related.

28.   The CEC had submitted the Report dated 20th April,  2012  and  it  has
been stated in the Report that opportunity of being heard had  been  granted
to the affected parties.   However, the contention before us is  that  while
the CEC heard other parties, it had not heard various  companies  like  M/s.
South West Mining Ltd. and M/s. JSW Steel Ltd.   Firstly,  the  CEC  is  not
vested with any investigative powers under the  orders  of  this  Court,  or
under the relevant notifications, in the  manner  as  understood  under  the
CrPC.   The CEC is not conducting a regular inquiry  or  investigation  with
the object of filing chargesheet as contemplated  under  Section  173  CrPC.
Their primary function and responsibility is  to  report  to  the  Court  on
various matters relating to collusion in illegal  and  irregular  activities
that are  being  carried  on  by  various  persons  affecting  the  ecology,
environment and reserved forests of the relevant areas.    While  submitting
such reports in accordance with the directions of this  Court,  the  CEC  is
required to collect such facts.   In other words, it has acted like  a  fact
finding inquiry.    The  CEC  is  not  discharging  quasi-judicial  or  even
administrative functions, with  a  view  to  determine  any  rights  of  the
parties.   It was not expected of the CEC to give notice  to  the  companies
involved in such illegalities or irregularities, as it was  not  determining
any of their rights.   It was simpliciter reporting matters to the Court  as
per the ground realities primarily with regard to  environment  and  illegal
mining for appropriate directions.  It had  made  different  recommendations
with regard to prevention and prosecution  of  environmentally  harmful  and
illegal activities carried on  in  collusion  with  government  officers  or
otherwise.   We are of the  considered  view  that  no  prejudice  has  been
caused to the intervenor/affected parties by  non-grant  of  opportunity  of
hearing by the CEC.   In  any  case,  this  Court  has  heard  them  and  is
considering the issues independently.

29.   As far as the challenge to the enlargement of jurisdiction by the  CEC
beyond the reference made by the Court, is concerned,  the  said  contention
is again without any substance.   We have referred to the various orders  of
this Court.   The ambit and scope of proceedings before this Court,  pending
in the above writ petition and civil appeal, clearly show that the Court  is
exercising a very wide jurisdiction in  the  national  interest,  to  ensure
that there is no further degradation of the environment  or  damage  to  the
forests and so that illegal mining and exports are  stopped.     The  orders
are comprehensive enough to not only give leverage to  the  CEC  to  examine
any ancillary matters, but in fact,  place  an  obligation  on  the  CEC  to
report to this Court without exception and correctly, all matters  that  can
have a bearing on the issues involved in all these  petitions  in  both  the
States of Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh.   Thus, we  reject  this  contention
also.

30.   Contention (c) is advanced on the premise that all matters  stated  by
the  CEC  are  sub-judice  before  one  or  the  other  competent  Court  or
investigating agency and, thus, this Court has  no  jurisdiction  to  direct
investigation by the CBI.  In any case, it is argued  that  such  directions
would cause them serious prejudice.

31.   This argument is misplaced  in  law  and  is  misconceived  on  facts.
Firstly, all the facts that had been brought on record by the  CEC  are  not
directly  sub-judice,  in  their  entirety,  before  a  competent  forum  or
investigating agency.

32.   In relation to issue 1(a) raised by the CEC which also  but  partially
is the subject matter of PCR No. 2 of 2011  pending  before  the  Additional
City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bangalore under the Prevention of  Corruption
Act.  The Court took cognizance and summoned the accused to face the  trial,
writ against the same is pending in the High Court.   It  primarily  relates
to  the  improper  de-notification  of  the  land,  which  had  been   under
acquisition but possession whereof was not taken.  This land  was  purchased
by the family members of the then Chief  Minister  for  a  consideration  of
Rs.40 lacs and was sold after de-notification for a sum of Rs.20  crores  to
South West Mining Ltd. after de-notification.  For this purpose,  office  of
the Chief Minister and other higher Government Officials were  used.   While
the earlier part of above-noted violations is covered under  PCR  No.  2  of
2011, the transactions of purchase sale and  other  attendant  circumstances
are beyond the scope of the said pending  case  which  refers  only  to  the
decision of de-notification.  It  appears  that  the  entire  gamut  or  the
complete facts stated by the CEC and supported  by  documents  are  not  the
matter sub-judice before the Trial Court.  Similarly, issue  1  (b)  relates
to the donation of Rs.20 crores received by Prerna  Education  Society  from
M/s. South West Mining Ltd.  The society is stated to be  belonging  to  the
members of the family of the Chief Minister Shri Yeddyurappa.   The  written
submissions filed on behalf of M/s. South West Mining Ltd., do  not  reflect
that issue 1(a) and (b) of the CEC report under consideration  are  directly
and in their entirety are  the  subject  matter  of  any  investigations  in
progress and proceedings pending before  any  competent  forum.   These  are
merely informatory facts, supported by  relevant  and  authentic  documents,
highlighted by the CEC in its report for  consideration  of  the  Court.   A
suspect has no indefeasible right of being heard prior to initiation of  the
investigation, particularly by the investigating  agency.   Even,  in  fact,
the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not admit of grant of  any
such opportunity.  There is no provision in the CrPC where an  investigating
agency must provide a hearing to the affected party  before  registering  an
FIR or even before carrying on investigation prior to registration  of  case
against the suspect.  The CBI, as already noticed,  may  even  conduct  pre-
registration  inquiry  for  which  notice  is  not  contemplated  under  the
provisions of the Code, the Police Manual or  even  as  per  the  precedents
laid down by this Court.  It is only in those cases where the Court  directs
initiation  of  investigation  by   a   specialized   agency   or   transfer
investigation to such agency from another agency that the Court may, in  its
discretion, grant hearing to the  suspect  or  affected  parties.   However,
that also is not an absolute rule of law and is primarily a  matter  in  the
judicial discretion of the Court.  This question is of no relevance  to  the
present case as we have already heard the interveners.

33.   In the case of Narmada Bai v. State of Gujarat & Ors.  [(2011)  5  SCC
79], this Court was concerned with a case where  the  State  Government  had
objected to the transfer of investigation to CBI of the case of a murder  of
a witness to a fake encounter.  The CBI had already  investigated  the  case
of  fake  encounter  and  submitted  a  charge  sheet  against  high  police
officials.  This Court analyzed the entire law  on  the  subject  and  cited
with approval the judgment of the Court in the case  of  Rubabbuddin  Sheikh
v. State of Gujarat [(2010) 2  SCC  200].   In  that  case,  the  Court  had
declared the law that in appropriate cases, the Court is empowered  to  hand
over investigation to an independent agency like CBI even when  the  charge-
sheet had been submitted.  In  the  case  of  Narmada  Bai,  the  Court  had
observed that there was a situation which upon analysis of  the  allegations
it  appeared  that  abduction  of  Sohrabuddin  and  Kausarbi   thei   their
subsequent murder as well as the murder of the witnesses are one  series  of
facts and was connected together as  to  form  the  same  transaction  under
Section 220 of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  and  it  was  considered
appropriate to transfer the investigation of the  subsequent  case  also  to
CBI.

34.   If we analyse the abovestated principles of law and apply the same  to
the facts  of  the  present  case,  then  the  Court  cannot  rule  out  the
possibility that all these acts and transactions may be  so  inter-connected
that  they  would  ultimately  form  one  composite  transaction  making  it
imperative for the Court to direct complete and comprehensive  investigation
by a single investigating agency.  The need to so  direct  is,  inter  alia,
for the following considerations:

(a)   The report of the CEC has brought new  facts,  subsequent  events  and
       unquestionable   documents   on   record    to    substantiate    its
       recommendations.

(b)   The subsequent facts, inquiry and resultant suspicion, therefore,  are
       the   circumstances   for   directing   further    and    specialized
       investigation.

(c)   The scope and ambit of present investigation is much  wider  than  the
       investigations/proceedings  pending  before  the  Court/investigating
       agencies.

(d)   Various acts and transactions prima facie appear to be part of a  same
       comprehensive transaction.

(e)   The requirement of just, fair and proper  investigation  would  demand
       investigation by a specialized agency keeping in view the  dimensions
       of the transactions, the extent of money involved  and  manipulations
       alleged.

35.   To give an example to emphasize that this is a case requiring  further
investigation and is fit to be transferred to the specialized  investigating
agency, we may mention that the South West Mining Ltd. was  initially  found
to be a front company of JSW Steels Ltd.  Thereafter all  transactions  were
examined and the improper purchase of land and donations made by  them  came
to light.  These facts appear to be inherently  interlinked.   Despite  that
and intentionally, we are not dealing with the factual matrix  of  the  case
or the documents on record, in any detail or even discussing the  merits  of
the case in relation to the controversies raised before us so  as  to  avoid
any prejudice to the rights of the affected parties  before  the  courts  in
various proceedings and investigation including the proposed investigation.

36.   Now, we  shall  proceed  on  the  assumption  that  the  illegalities,
irregularities and offences alleged to have been committed by  the  affected
parties are  the  subject  matter,  even  in  their  entirety,  of  previous
investigation cases, sub-judice before various  Courts  including  the  writ
jurisdiction of the High Court.  It is a settled position  of  law  that  an
investigating agency is empowered to  conduct  further  investigation  after
institution of a charge-sheet before the Court  of  competent  jurisdiction.
A magistrate is competent  to  direct  further  investigation  in  terms  of
Section  173(8)  Cr.P.C.  in  the  case  instituted  on  a  police   report.
Similarly, the Magistrate has powers under Section  202  Cr.P.C.  to  direct
police investigation while keeping the trial pending before  him  instituted
on the basis  of  a  private  complaint  in  terms  of  that  Section.   The
provisions of Section 210 Cr.P.C. use the expression ‘shall’  requiring  the
Magistrate to stay the proceedings of inquiry and trial before  him  in  the
event in a similar subject matter,  an  investigation  is  found  to  be  in
progress.  All these provisions  clearly  indicate  the  legislative  scheme
under the Cr.P.C. that initiation  of  an  investigation  and  filing  of  a
chargesheet do not completely debar further or wider  investigation  by  the
investigating agency or police,  or  even  by  a  specialized  investigation
agency.  Significantly, it requires to be noticed that when the court is  to
ensure fair and proper investigation in an adversarial  system  of  criminal
administration, the jurisdiction of the Court is of  a  much  higher  degree
than it is in an inquisitorial system.  It  is  clearly  contemplated  under
the Indian Criminal Jurisprudence that an investigation should be  fair,  in
accordance with law and should not be tainted.  But, at the same  time,  the
Court has to take precaution that interested or influential persons are  not
able to misdirect or hijack the investigation  so  as  to  throttle  a  fair
investigation resulting in the offenders escaping  the  punitive  course  of
law.  It is the inherent duty of the Court and  any  lapse  in  this  regard
would tantamount to error of jurisdiction.

37.   In the case of Rama Chaudhary v. State of Bihar [(2009)  6  SCC  346],
this Court was considering the scope of Sections 173(8), 173(2) and  319  of
the CrPC in  relation  to  directing  further  investigation.   The  accused
raised a contention that in that case, report had been  filed,  charges  had
been framed and nearly 21 witnesses had been examined and at that stage,  in
furtherance to investigation taken thereafter, if  a  supplementary  charge-
sheet is filed and witnesses are permitted to be  summoned,  it  will  cause
serious prejudice to the rights of the accused.  It was contended  that  the
Court has no jurisdiction to do so.  The  Trial  Court  permitted  summoning
and  examination  of  the  summoned  witnesses   in   furtherance   to   the
supplementary report.  The order of the Trial Court was upheld by  the  High
Court.  While dismissing the special leave petition, a Bench of  this  Court
observed :

           “14. Sub-section (1) of Section 173 CrPC  makes  it  clear  that
           every  investigation  shall  be  completed  without  unnecessary
           delay.  Sub-section  (2)  mandates   that   as   soon   as   the
           investigation is completed, the officer in charge of the  police
           station  shall  forward  to  a  Magistrate  empowered  to   take
           cognizance of the offence on a police report, a  report  in  the
           form prescribed by the State Government mentioning the  name  of
           the parties, nature of information,  name  of  the  persons  who
           appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the  case  and
           further particulars such as the name of the offences  that  have
           been committed, arrest of the  accused  and  details  about  his
           release with or without sureties.

           15. Among the other sub-sections, we  are  very  much  concerned
           about sub-section (8) of Section 173 which reads as under:

           “173. (8) Nothing in this section shall  be  deemed  to  preclude
                  further investigation in respect of  an  offence  after  a
                  report under sub-section (2) has  been  forwarded  to  the
                  Magistrate and, where upon such investigation, the officer
                  in charge of the police station obtains further  evidence,
                  oral or documentary, he shall forward to the Magistrate  a
                  further report or reports regarding such evidence  in  the
                  form prescribed; and the provisions of sub-sections (2) to
                  (6) shall, as far as may be, apply  in  relation  to  such
                  report or reports as they apply in relation  to  a  report
                  forwarded under sub-section (2).”

           A mere reading of  the  above  provision  makes  it  clear  that
           irrespective of the report under sub-section  (2)  forwarded  to
           the Magistrate, if the officer in charge of the  police  station
           obtains further evidence, it is incumbent on his part to forward
           the same to the Magistrate with a further report with regard  to
           such evidence in the form prescribed.  The  abovesaid  provision
           also makes it clear that further investigation  is  permissible,
           however, reinvestigation is prohibited.

           16. The law does not mandate taking of prior permission from the
           Magistrate for further investigation.  Carrying  out  a  further
           investigation  even  after  filing  of  the  charge-sheet  is  a
           statutory right of the  police.  Reinvestigation  without  prior
           permission  is  prohibited.   On   the   other   hand,   further
           investigation is permissible.


           18. Sub-section (8) of Section 173  clearly  envisages  that  on
           completion of further investigation,  the  investigating  agency
           has to forward to the Magistrate a “further” report  and  not  a
           fresh report regarding the “further”  evidence  obtained  during
           such investigation.

           19. As observed  in  Hasanbhai  Valibhai  Qureshi  v.  State  of
           Gujarat the prime consideration for further investigation is  to
           arrive at the truth and do real  and  substantial  justice.  The
           hands of the  investigating  agency  for  further  investigation
           should not be tied down on the ground of mere  delay.  In  other
           words

                 “[t]he mere  fact  that  there  may  be  further  delay  in
                 concluding the trial should not stand in the way of further
                 investigation if that would help the court in  arriving  at
                 the truth and do real and substantial as well as  effective
                 justice.”


38.   Reference can also be made to the judgment of this Court in  the  case
of National Human Rights Commission v. State of Gujarat  &  Ors.  [(2009)  6
SCC 342], wherein the Court was dealing  with  different  cases  pending  in
relation to the communal riots in the State of Gujarat and the trial in  one
of the cases was at the concluding stage.  In the meanwhile, in another  FIR
filed in relation to a similar occurrence, further investigation  was  being
conducted and was bound to have a bearing even on the  pending  cases.   The
Court,   while   permitting   inquiry/investigation,    including    further
investigation, completed stayed the proceedings in the Trial Court  as  well
and held as under :

           “10. We make it clear that SIT shall be free  to  work  out  the
           modalities and the norms required to be followed for the purpose
           of  inquiry/investigation   including   further   investigation.
           Needless to say the sole object of the criminal  justice  system
           is to ensure that a person  who  is  guilty  of  an  offence  is
           punished.

           11. Mr K.T.S. Tulsi, learned Senior Counsel had  submitted  that
           in some cases the alleged  victims  themselves  say  that  wrong
           persons have been included by the police  officials  as  accused
           and the real culprits are sheltered.  He,  therefore,  suggested
           that  trial  should  go   on,   notwithstanding   the   inquiry/
           investigation including further investigation as directed by us.
           We find that the course would not be appropriate because if  the
           trial continues and fresh evidence/materials surface,  it  would
           require almost a de novo trial which would be not desirable.”




39.   We do not find any  necessity  to  multiply  the  precedents  on  this
issue.  It  is  a  settled  principle  of  law  that  the  object  of  every
investigation is to arrive at the truth by conducting a fair,  unbiased  and
proper investigation.

40.   Referring to the plea of prejudice taken up by  the  affected  parties
before us, we are unable to see any element of  prejudice  being  caused  to
the affected parties if the CBI  is  permitted  to  investigate  the  entire
matter.  The plea taken by the  interveners  before  us  is  that  M/s.  JSW
Steels Ltd. is a bona fide purchaser of iron ore from the  open  market  and
they have been affected  by  the  unilateral  actions  of  one  M/s.  Mysore
Minerals Ltd.  They state that they have no  statutory  liability  to  check
origin of iron ore or to maintain Form 27.  According  to  M/s.  JSW  Steels
Ltd., they are already  co-operating  with  the  CBI  in  the  investigation
directed by the Supreme Court.  As far as M/s. South  West  Mining  Ltd.  is
concerned, it has stated that it is the purchaser of the land for bona  fide
consideration  and  genuine  purpose.   The  land  has  been  converted   to
commercial use and that is why Rs.20  crores  were  paid  as  consideration.
They further claimed that they had Rs.23.96 crores of  pre-tax  profit  and,
therefore, they were in a position to  make  the  donation  which  they  had
made.  Not only they, but other companies affiliated to  Jindal  Group  have
also made similar contributions.  It is not for us to  examine  whether  the
stand taken by the intervener companies is correct or not.  It  requires  to
be investigated and an investigation per se would help them to  clear  their
position, rather than subjecting  them  to  face  multifarious  litigations,
investigations and economic burden.  Having heard them,  we  are  unable  to
find any prejudice to parties if further or wider investigation is  directed
by this Court.   The  direction  of  further  investigation  is  based  upon
documents and facts brought to light by the CEC as a result  of  examination
conducted in the course of its primary function  relating  to  inquiry  into
environmental violations and illegal mining activity.   If  the  proceedings
are permitted to continue and finally  investigations  reveal  that  a  case
which requires  to  be  tried  in  accordance  with  law  exists,  then  the
interveners would have to face proceedings all over again.   So,  it  is  in
their own interest that the specialized agency is permitted  to  investigate
and bring out the true facts before the Court of competent jurisdiction.

41.   We must notice that  the  criminal  offences  are  primarily  offences
against the State and secondarily against the victim.  In this case, if  the
investigation by specialized agency finds  that  the  suspect  persons  have
committed offences with or without involvement of persons  in  power,  still
such  violation  undoubtedly  would  have  been  a   great   loss   to   the
environmental and natural resources  and  would  hurt  both  the  State  and
national economy.  We cannot expect an ordinary  complainant  to  carry  the
burden of proving such  complex  offences  before  the  Court  of  competent
jurisdiction by himself and at his own cost.   Doing so would be a  travesty
of the criminal justice system.

42.   It was ever and shall always remain the statutory  the  obligation  of
the State to prove offences against the  violators  of  law.  If  a  private
citizen has initiated the proceedings before the competent  court,  it  will
not absolve the State of discharging its obligation under the provisions  of
the CrPC and the obligations of Rule of Law. The  Court  cannot  countenance
an approach of this kind where the State can  be  permitted  to  escape  its
liability only on the ground that multifarious complaints or  investigations
have been initiated by private persons or bodies other than the  State.   In
our considered view, it enhances the primary and legal duty of the State  to
ensure proper, fair and unbiased investigation.

43.   The facts of the present case reveal an unfortunate state  of  affairs
which has prevailed for a considerable time in the  mentioned  districts  of
both the States of Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka.   The CEC has  recommended,
and the complainant  and  petitioners  have  also  highlighted,  a  complete
failure of the State machinery in relation  to  controlling  and  protecting
the environment,  forests  and  minerals  from  being  illegally  mined  and
exploited.

44.   Wherever and whenever the State  fails  to  perform  its  duties,  the
Court shall step in to ensure that Rule of Law prevails over  the  abuse  of
process of law.  Such abuse may  result  from  inaction  or  even  arbitrary
action of protecting the true offenders or failure by different  authorities
in discharging  statutory  or  legal  obligations  in  consonance  with  the
procedural and penal statutes.    This Court  expressed  its  concern  about
the  rampant  pilferage  and  illegal  extraction  of  natural  wealth   and
resources, particularly, iron ore, as  also  the  environmental  degradation
and disaster that may  result  from  unchecked  intrusion  into  the  forest
areas.  This Court, vide  its  order  dated  29th  July,  2011  invoked  the
precautionary  principle,  which  is  the  essence  of  Article  21  of  the
Constitution of India as per the dictum of this Court in the  case  of  M.C.
Mehta v. Union of India [(2009) 6 SCC 142], and had  consequently  issued  a
ban on illegal mining.  The Court also directed  Relief  and  Rehabilitation
Programmes to  be  carried  out  in  contiguous  stages  to  promote  inter-
generational equity and the regeneration of the forest  reserves.   This  is
the ethos of the approach consistently taken by this Court, but this  aspect
primarily deals with the future concerns.  In respect of the  past  actions,
the only option is to examine in depth the huge monetary transactions  which
were effected at the cost of national  wealth,  natural  resources,  and  to
punish  the  offenders  for  their  illegal,   irregular   activities.   The
protection of these resources was, and is the  constitutional  duty  of  the
State and its instrumentalities and thus, the Court should adopt a  holistic
approach and direct comprehensive and specialized  investigation  into  such
events of the past.

45.   Compelled by the above circumstances and keeping  in  mind  the  clear
position of law supra, we thus direct;

a) The issues specified at point 1(a) and 1(b) of the CEC Report dated  20th
   April, 2012 are hereby referred for investigation by the  Central  Bureau
   of Investigation.

b) All the proceedings in relation to these items,  if  pending  before  any
   Court, shall remain stayed till further orders of this Court.    The  CBI
   shall complete its investigation and submit a  Report  to  the  Court  of
   competent jurisdiction with a copy of the Report to be placed on the file
   of this Court within three months.

c) The Report submitted by the CEC and the documents annexed  thereto  shall
   be treated as ‘informant’s information to the  investigating  agency’  by
   the CBI.

d) The CBI  shall  undertake  investigation  in  a  most  fair,  proper  and
   unbiased manner uninfluenced by  the  stature  of  the  persons  and  the
   political or corporate clout, involved in the present case.  It  will  be
   open to the CBI to examine and  inspect  the  records  of  any  connected
   matter pending before any investigating agency or any court.

e) The competent authority shall constitute the special investigating  team,
   headed by an officer not below the rank of Additional Director General of
   Police/Additional Commissioner forthwith.

f) Any investigation being conducted by any  agency  other  than  CBI  shall
   also not progress any further, restricted to the items stated  in  clause
   (a) above, except with the leave of the Court. The CBI shall complete its
   investigation uninfluenced by any order, inquiry or investigation that is
   pending on the date of passing of this order.

g)  This  order  is  being  passed  without  prejudice  to  the  rights  and
   contentions of any of the parties to the lis, as well  as  in  any  other
   proceedings pending before  courts  of  competent  jurisdiction  and  the
   investigating agencies.

h) All pleas raised on merits are kept open.

i) We direct all the  parties,  the  Government  of  the  States  of  Andhra
   Pradesh, Karnataka and all other government departments  of  that  and/or
   any other State, to fully cooperate and provide required  information  to
   CBI.

46.   With the above directions, we accept the recommendation of the CEC  to
the extent as afore-stated.

47.   Let the matter stand over to 3rd August,  2012  for  consideration  of
the Report dated 27th April, 2012 filed by the CEC.

                                            ….…………......................CJI.
                                                              (S.H. Kapadia)




                                             …….…………......................J.
                                                                (Aftab Alam)




                                           ...….…………......................J.
                                                           (Swatanter Kumar)

New Delhi
May 11, 2012


The concept of doctrine of proportionality and eventually opined that the imposition of punishment is subject to judicial intervention if the same is exercised in a manner which is out of proportion to the fault. If the award of punishment is grossly in excess of the allegations made, it cannot claim immunity and makes itself amenable for interference under the limited scope of judicial review. The test to be applied while dealing with the question is whether a reasonable employer would have imposed such punishment in like circumstances. The question that has to be studiedly addressed is whether the punishment imposed is really arbitrary or an outrageous defiance of logic so as to be called irrational and perverse warranting interference in exercise of the power of judicial review. The appellant was initially cashiered from the Army and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years. The period of sentence was reduced by the confirming authority. The appellant was a Major in the Army and all the charges levelled against him fundamentally pertain to commission of illegal acts in fiscal sphere. The acts done by him were intended to gain pecuniary advantage. The primary obligation of a member of Armed Forces is to maintain discipline in all aspects. Discipline in fiscal matters has to be given top priority as that mirrors the image of any institution. That apart, the appellant was a Major in the Army. Irreproachable conduct, restrained attitude, understanding of responsibility and adherence to discipline in an apple pie order were expected of him. The proven charges luminously project that the said aspects have been given a total go by. In this backdrop, it is well nigh impossible to hold that the punishment was harsh or arbitrary. Regard being had to the nature of rank held by the appellant and the disciplined conduct expected of him, we find that the doctrine of proportionality is uninvocable and, accordingly, we are compelled to repel the said preponement advanced by the learned senior counsel without any hesitation and we do so. 33. Consequently, the appeal, being devoid of merit, stands dismissed.


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 665 OF 2002



Chandra Kumar Chopra                       .....……..Appellant

                                   Versus

Union of India and others                      ………Respondents






                               J U D G M E N T


DIPAK MISRA, J.



      The present appeal by special leave  is  directed  against  the  order
dated July 23, 1991 passed by the High Court of Judicature of Delhi in  Writ
Petition (Criminal) No. 590 of 1991 wherein the  learned  Single  Judge  has
declined to interfere with  the  order  dated  July  20,  1990  whereby  the
confirming authority under Section 164 of the  Army  Act,  1950  (for  short
‘the Act’) had passed an order of confirmation as regards  the  sentence  of
cashiering but reduced the rigorous imprisonment  from  five  years  to  six
months as imposed by the Competent Authority of General Court  Martial  vide
order dated June 4, 1990.


2.    The appellant after joining the Army was  confirmed  in  the  rank  of
Second Lieutenant and eventually became a Major in due course of  time.   In
the month of August, 1988 while serving at Bangalore he was  transferred  to
Udhampur at Jammu.  While he was functioning at  Udhampur  in  the  rank  of
Major a General Court Martial proceeding was convened  against  him  on  the
following charges: -

      “First Charge     SUCH  AN  OFFENCE  AS  IS  MENTIONED       Army  Act
      IN CLAUSE (f) OF SECTION 52 OF  THE  Section  52(f)    ARMY  ACT  WITH
      INTENT TO DEFRAUD,

                                   In that he,
                       at field, on 30th Jan. 89,  with  intent  to  defraud
                       submitted  a  claim  of  Rs.35,270/-  in  respect  of
                       transportation of his household luggage  and  car  in
                       civil truck No. JKQ 3285 and JKR 0587 respectively on
                       permanent posting from  Bangalore  to  Udhampur  well
                       knowing that his such luggage and car had not been so
                       transported.

      Second Charge    SUCH AN OFFENCE AS IS MENTIONED     Army Act       IN
      CLAUSE (D) OF SECTION 52 OF  THE  Section  52(D)       ARMY  ACT  WITH
      INTENT TO DEFRAUD,

                                   In that he,
                       at field, on 18th Jan. 89,  with  intent  to  defraud
                       submitted Leave Travel  Concession  (LTC)  claim  for
                       year 1988 to CDA (O) Pune, well knowing that  he  had
                       already availed the LTC for the year 1988.

      Third  Charge      “  AN  ACT  PREJUDICIAL  TO  GOOD         Army  Act
      ORDER AND MILITARY DISCIPLINE. Section 63
                                   In that he,
                       at field, on 17th Nov. 1988, improperly utilised  for
                       himself IAFT-1752-PA/53-869651 dated 15th Nov.  1988,
                       single/ return journey railway warrant from Jammu  to
                       New Delhi and back.”



3.    In pursuance of the charge-sheet, General Court Martial  commenced  on
March 12, 1990 which consisted of five Members, namely, Co. Choudhary  Sohan
Lal, Lt. Col. Harpal Singh, Lt. Col. Shiv Kumar Singh, Maj. Saigal  Rajinder
Nath and Maj. Manhas Rajender Singh.


4.    At the commencement of trial in Court Martial, the appellant  objected
to some of the officers being members of the composition  of  Court  Martial
on the foundation that he had lodged a statutory complaint under Section  27
of the Act before the Central Government  regarding  certain  irregularities
against the Commander of the Sub Area and as all the presiding officers  had
worked under the Convening Officer, namely, Brig. Phoolka,  the  composition
of Court Martial was vitiated. The Presiding Officer and  other  Members  of
Court Martial adverted to Section 130 of the Act and Rule  44  of  the  Army
Rules, 1954 (for short ‘the Rules’) and eventually repelled  the  objections
and proceeded with the trial.


5.    After a full length trial, Court Martial found that  all  the  charges
levelled against the appellant had been  proved  and  accordingly  sentenced
him as has been indicated hereinbefore.


6.    After recording of guilt and imposition  of  sentence,  the  appellant
submitted an application under Section 164(1)  of  the  Act  stating,  inter
alia, that the Members of Court Martial were disqualified  as  there  was  a
statutory complaint against the Convening Officer under whom the Members  of
Court  Martial  were  functioning;  that  he  was  not   afforded   adequate
opportunity to prepare his defence inasmuch as the officer  whose  name  had
been given by him to  defend  his  case  was  not  provided;  and  that  the
principles of natural justice had been flagrantly violated.  As far  as  the
first charge was concerned, it was stated that  the  household  luggage  and
car were transported from Bangalore to Udhampur  in  the  hired  vehicle  of
Karnataka Transport Corporation (for short ‘the Corporation’) and  documents
were  produced  to  that  effect  but  the  same   were   not   taken   into
consideration; that no officer from the Corporation  was  examined  to  find
out the veracity of the said receipts; that the bill alleged  to  have  been
submitted by the appellant had been interpolated; that the evidence  brought
on record was inadmissible as evidence being hearsay;  that  he  had  handed
over his personal luggage and car  to  the  Corporation  for  transportation
and,  therefore,  the  reliance  on  the  evidence  of  DW-6   was   totally
misconceived; and that there was no  material  on  record  to  disprove  the
factum that the Corporation had transported the luggage  from  Bangalore  to
Udhampur as claimed by the appellant.  In this backdrop,  it  was  contended
that the first charge was not proved against the appellant.


7.    As far as the second charge was concerned, it was put forth  that  the
appellant had not obtained Leave Travel Concession twice as he  had  availed
LTC once while he was posted at Bangalore and again  at  Udhampur;  that  as
per Regulation 177(A) and other  provisions  relating  to  availing  of  LTC
while serving in field area as defined in Travel Regulation 177(C),  he  had
availed two LTCs one while being  posted  at  Bangalore  and  the  other  at
Udhampur and, therefore,  his  claim  for  the  LTC  twice  in  a  year  was
reasonable and acceptable though it may suggest an erroneous  interpretation
of Travel Regulations 177(A) and  177(C)  but  there  was  no  intention  to
defraud.  That apart, after the said mistake was detected, the appellant  on
18.2.1989 had explained his perception in his reply and at the  instance  of
the Commanding Officer of the Unit,  recovery  for  the  excess  amount  was
effectuated in the month of February, 1989 itself; and that once the  matter
was closed by taking recourse to recovery, it is to  be  presumed  that  the
charge levelled against the appellant  stood  closed  and  condoned  by  the
competent authority and hence, there was  no  justification  or  warrant  to
proceed again in that regard in Court Martial.


8.    As regards the third charge, it  was  urged  that  the  appellant  had
neither collected the alleged railway warrant nor did  he  exchange  it  for
the ticket.  As a matter of fact, he had purchased the ticket for AC-2  Tier
on cash payment for the journey from Jammu to Delhi and back.  It  was  also
propounded that there was no evidence on record to prove that  the  relevant
railway warrant was utilized as no witness from the  railways  was  examined
during the course of Court Martial.


9.     The  confirming  authority,  as  stated  earlier,  only  reduced  the
rigorous imprisonment from five years to six months.


10.   Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid orders, the  appellant  assailed
the same before the High Court.  Before the High  Court,  it  was  contended
that when the appellant had expressed lack of confidence in the  composition
of Court Martial, it was  incumbent  upon  the  convening  officer  to  have
attached  him  to  another  unit;  that  there  was  inherent  bias  in  the
functioning of Court Martial and the same got manifested by  denial  of  any
engagement of proper officer; that  the  finding  recorded  as  regards  the
claim of transportation charges without transporting the goods was  contrary
to the material on record and, in fact, perverse since no officer  from  the
Corporation was examined; and that when the amount of LTC was  recovered,  a
charge of similar nature could not have been framed as the same  did  amount
to double jeopardy.  The learned single Judge negatived all the  contentions
and dismissed the writ petition.


11.   Ms. Indu Malhotra, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf  of  the
appellant,  questioning  the  pregnability  of  the  order  passed  by   the
authorities under the Act and the  writ  court,  has  raised  the  following
contentions: -


(i)   When lack of faith and  confidence  was  expressed  in  the  competent
      authority who had convened the proceeding and the composition of Court
      Martial in view of the statutory complaint filed by the appellant, the
      whole proceeding is vitiated as the ultimate conclusion is the  result
      of a biased forum.  The fundamental principle that ‘justice should not
      be done but should appear to have been done’ has been  guillotined  by
      rejecting the objection raised by the appellant in Court  Martial  and
      the concurrence thereof by the confirming authority and  the  eventual
      affirmance of the same by the High Court.


(ii)  There has been violation of the principles of natural justice  as  the
      appellant was not provided with a  proper  defending  officer  and  an
      officer was imposed on him who was reluctant to canvass his case.


(iii) The first charge levelled against the  appellant  cannot  be  said  to
      have been proven inasmuch as  no  officer  from  the  Corporation  was
      examined to deny the receipts given by it to the appellant  pertaining
      to transportation of goods from Bangalore to  Udhampur.   That  apart,
      the stand and stance put forth by the appellant is that the bill  that
      has been submitted for transportation was interpolated  to  show  that
      goods had been transported in truck Nos. JKQ 3285 and JKR  9587  by  a
      different transporter.  Undue emphasis has been placed on the evidence
      of DW-6 who had stated that goods were, in fact, not transported.   As
      far as the second charge is concerned, it was imperative on  the  part
      of Court Martial to examine an official from  the  railways  to  prove
      that he had availed the warrant and exchanged the same for  a  ticket.
      As regards the third charge,  the  same  is  absolutely  unsustainable
      inasmuch as after  the  misconception  was  cleared,  the  amount  was
      recovered which amounts to condonation of the act.


(iv)  The appellant had served with  dedication  and  devotion  in  the  war
      field and at difficult stations for a period of 21 years  and  had  an
      unblemished career  and  hence,  the  punishment  imposed  is  totally
      disproportionate and it is a fit case which  undoubtedly  invites  the
      invocation of the doctrine of proportionality.


12.   Mr. R. Balasubramanian, learned counsel appearing  on  behalf  of  the
respondents, per contra, has submitted as follows: -


(i)   The statutory complaint alleged to have been  made  by  the  appellant
      was against Commander 71, Sub Area and at the time of lodging  of  the
      complaint, the concerned authority was one Brig.  I.S.  Sahni  whereas
      the convening officer of Court Martial was  Brig.  J.S.  Phoolka  and,
      therefore, the convening of the  proceeding  cannot  be  flawed.   The
      objections raised with regard to certain officers who had formed Court
      Martial were absolutely vague and, in fact, the plea  of  bias  was  a
      figment of imagination of the appellant and the authorities as well as
      the High Court have appositely repelled the said stand.


(ii)  The appellant was duly defended  by  the  officer  concerned  who  was
      engaged to defend him and, therefore, there had been no  violation  of
      the doctrine of audi alteram partem and, in any case, no prejudice was
      caused to him.


(iii) The allegation of interpolation of  the  bill  is  farthest  from  the
      truth inasmuch as the document to the naked eye would  clearly  reveal
      the signature of the appellant and he was holding the post of Major in
      the Army and the person in  his  position  very  well  knew  what  was
      written over there  and  there  is  no  interpolation.   The  plea  of
      interpolation is an afterthought and  the  same  does  not  merit  any
      consideration.  The charges have been duly proven and the findings are
      based on evidence, both oral and documentary, brought on record.


(iv)  Keeping in  view  the  post  that  was  held  by  the  appellant,  the
      submission that the principle of proportionality should be invoked and
      a lesser punishment be imposed, does not stand  to  reason  since  the
      charges are grave in the backdrop of a disciplined force like Army.


13.   First, we shall deal with the issue of bias.   On  a  perusal  of  the
record, it is graphically clear that it  was  Brig.  J.S.  Phoolka  who  had
convened Court  Martial  under  Section  109  of  the  Act.   The  statutory
complaint submitted by the appellant  pertained  to  certain  irregularities
committed by Commander 71, Sub Area.  Be it  noted,  in  Court  Martial,  as
soon as the court assembled,  it  read  over  the  names  of  the  presiding
officer and other members  to  the  accused  and  enquired  if  he  had  any
objection to any of the members being party to the tribunal.  The  appellant
objected to the composition of the  tribunal  basically  on  the  ground  of
lodging  of  the  statutory  complaint.   The  question  that   arises   for
consideration is whether a complaint made pertaining  to  irregularities  by
the commanding  officer  of  the  relevant  Sub  Area  would  tantamount  to
composition of the tribunal as a biased forum solely on the foundation  that
all members worked in the said Sub Area.


14.   In this regard, we may profitably refer to the decision in  Manak  Lal
v. Dr. Prem Chand[1] where it  has  been  opined  that  every  member  of  a
tribunal  who  proceeds  to  try  issues  in  judicial   or   quasi-judicial
proceeding must be able to act judicially.  It is the  essence  of  judicial
administration that judges should be able to  act  impartially,  objectively
and without any bias.  In such cases, the test is not whether,  in  fact,  a
bias has affected the judgment, the test always is and  must  be  whether  a
litigant could reasonably apprehend that a bias attributable to a member  of
the tribunal might have operated against him in the final  decision  of  the
tribunal.


15.       In Gullapalli Nageswara Rao and others  v.  Andhra  Pradesh  State
Road Transport Corporation  and  Another[2],  it  has  been  held  that  the
principles governing the “doctrine of  bias”  vis-à-vis  judicial  tribunals
are well-settled and they are: (i) no man  shall  be  a  judge  in  his  own
cause; (ii) justice should not only be done but manifestly  and  undoubtedly
seem to be done.  The two maxims yield the result that  if  a  member  of  a
judicial body is subject to a bias (whether financial or  other)  in  favour
of, or against, any party to a dispute, or is in  such  a  position  that  a
bias must be assumed to exist, he ought not take part  in  the  decision  or
sit on the tribunal.


16.   In A.K. Kraipak and others v.  Union  of  India  and  others[3],  this
Court was dealing with the constitution of a Selection Board.   One  of  the
members was to be  considered  for  selection.   In  that  context,  it  was
observed that it was against all canons of justice to make a  man  judge  in
his own cause.  It was further  observed  that  the  real  question  is  not
whether he was biased, for it is difficult to prove the state of mind  of  a
person.  What is required to be seen is whether there is  reasonable  ground
for believing that  a  person  is  likely  to  have  been  biased.   A  mere
suspicion of bias is not sufficient.  There has to be reasonable  likelihood
of bias.  It was emphasised that while deciding the question  of  bias,  the
Court is  required  to  take  into  consideration  human  probabilities  and
ordinary course of human conduct.


17.   In Dr. S.P. Kapoor v. State of Himachal Pradesh and others[4], a  two-
Judge Bench did not appreciate the Annual Confidential  Reports  which  were
initiated by an officer junior to the appellant and  also  an  aspirant  for
promotion to the higher post along with other candidates, should  have  been
taken into consideration.  It was observed therein that it was not  fair  on
the part of the Departmental Promotion Committee to take into  consideration
the Annual Confidential Reports made by junior  officer  though  they  might
have been revised by the higher  authorities.   Emphasis  was  laid  on  the
fairness of action.


18.   In Ranjit Thakur v. Union of  India  and  others[5],  this  Court  was
dealing with Court Martial proceeding.  Venkatachaliah, J. (as his  Lordship
then was) emphasised on the procedural safeguards contemplated  in  the  Act
regard being had to the plenitude of summary jurisdiction of  Court  Martial
and the severity of the consequences that visit the person subject  to  that
jurisdiction.  It was observed that  the  procedural  safeguards  should  be
commensurate with the sweep of the power.  A  contention  was  canvassed  in
the said case that the proceedings of Court Martial  were  vitiated  as  the
fourth respondent who was biased against the appellant  was  member  of  the
tribunal.  In that regard, it was held that the test of real  likelihood  of
bias is whether a reasonable man, in  possession  of  relevant  information,
would  have  thought  that  bias  was  likely  and  whether  the   concerned
respondent was likely to  be  disposed  to  decide  the  matter  only  in  a
particular way.  The appellant in that case had  sent  a  written  complaint
complaining of ill-treatment at the hands of respondent No.  4  directly  to
the higher officers as a result of which  he  was  punished  with  28  days’
rigorous imprisonment by the said respondent.   Keeping  the  said  fact  in
view, the Bench held that the participation  of  the  respondent  No.  4  in
Court Martial rendered the proceeding coram non-judice.


19.   In M/s. Crawford Bayley & Co. & Ors. v.  Union  of  India  &  Ors.[6],
this Court referred to the circumstances under which the doctrine  of  bias,
i.e., no man can be judge in his own cause, can be  applied.   It  has  been
held therein that for the said doctrine to come into play, it must be  shown
that the officer concerned has a personal bias or connection or  a  personal
interest or was personally connected in the matter concerned or has  already
taken a decision one way  or  the  other  which  he  may  be  interested  in
supporting.


20.    In S. Parthasarathi v. State  of  Andhra  Pradesh[7],  while  dealing
with the test of likelihood of bias,  it  has  been  opined  that  if  right
minded persons would think there is a real likelihood of bias  on  the  part
of an officer, he must not conduct the inquiry.  It has been  observed  that
surmises or conjectures would not be enough, there must exist  circumstances
from which reasonable man would think that it is  probable  or  likely  that
the inquiring officer will be prejudiced  against  the  delinquent  officer.
Be it noted, the issue before the Court was enquiry by  an  inquiry  officer
against whom bias was pleaded and established.


21.   At  this  juncture,  we  may  usefully  reproduce   a   passage   from
Metropolitan Properties  Co.  (F.G.C.)  Ltd.  v.  Lannon[8]    wherein  Lord
Denning M.R. observed thus: -


           “……in considering whether there was a real likelihood  of  bias,
           the court does not look at the mind of the justice himself or at
           the mind of the chairman of the tribunal, or whoever it may  be,
           who sits in a judicial capacity.  It does not  look  to  see  if
           there was a real likelihood that  he  would,  or  did,  in  fact
           favour one side at the expense of the other.  The court looks at
           the impression which would be given to other people.  Even if he
           was as impartial  as  could  be,  nevertheless  if  right-minded
           persons would think that, in the circumstances, there was a real
           likelihood of bias on his part, then he should not sit.”






22.  From the aforesaid pronouncement of law, it is  discernible  that  mere
suspicion or apprehension is not good enough to entertain a  plea  of  bias.
It cannot be a facet of one’s imagination.  It must be in  accord  with  the
prudence of a reasonable man.  The circumstances  brought  on  record  would
show that it can create an impression in the mind of a reasonable  man  that
there is real likelihood of bias.  It is not  to  be  forgotten  that  in  a
democratic polity,  justice  in  its  conceptual  eventuality  and  inherent
quintessentiality forms the bedrock of good  governance.   In  a  democratic
system that is governed by Rule  of  Law,  fairness  of  action,  propriety,
reasonability, institutional impeccability and non-biased  justice  delivery
system constitute the pillars on which its survival remains in continuum.


23.   It is worth noting that despite the sanctity  attached  to  non-biased
attitude of a member of a tribunal or a court and in spite of the  principle
that justice must not only be done but must seen to have been  done,  it  is
to be scrutinized on  the  basis  of  material  brought  on  record  whether
someone makes wild, irrelevant and  imaginary  allegations  to  frustrate  a
trial or it is in consonance with the thinking of  a  reasonable  man  which
can meet the test of real likelihood  of  bias.   The  principle  cannot  be
attracted in vacuum.  In the case at hand, the convening officer had  ceased
to  be  the  Commander.   There  was  a  general   complaint   against   the
irregularities about the Commander, the convening  officer.   The  objection
that was put forth by the appellant in Court Martial was that his  complaint
was pending with the Central Government.   Nothing  was  brought  on  record
that there was anything personal against any of the members who  constituted
Court Martial.  Thus, in the  obtaining  factual  matrix,  it  is  extremely
difficult to hold that  there  was  real  likelihood  of  bias  because  the
prudence of a reasonable man cannot so  conceive  and  a  right  minded  man
would  discard  it  without  any  hesitation.   Hence,  we  repel  the  said
submission raised by the learned senior counsel for the appellant.


24.   The next contention  pertains  to  compliance  of  the  principles  of
natural justice.  The only ground raised  is  that  the  appellant  was  not
provided a defending officer of his choice.  It is not a case where  he  was
not provided with the  assistance  of  a  defending  officer.   On  a  close
scrutiny of Court Martial proceeding, we find  that  the  defending  officer
had acted with due sincerity and put forth the  case  of  the  appellant  in
proper perspective.  There can be no shadow of doubt  that  there  has  been
compliance of the principle of natural justice and  no  prejudice  has  been
caused to the appellant because of any kind of non assistance.  That  apart,
there is nothing in the Act or the Rules which  lay  down  that  an  accused
shall be given a defending officer of his own choice.   Thus,  there  is  no
violation of any mandatory provision and, therefore, it cannot be said  that
the proceeding is vitiated because of violation of the principle of  natural
justice.


25.   The third plank of submission of both  the  learned  counsel  for  the
parties relates to the  issue  whether  the  charges  levelled  against  the
appellant  have  been  really  proven  or  not.   We  have  enumerated   the
submissions relating to charges  and  it  is  apposite  to  deal  with  them
together.  Ms. Indu Malhotra, learned senior counsel, would submit that  the
first charge has not been proven at all  as  the  appellant  had  given  the
responsibility to the Corporation to transport the goods from  Bangalore  to
Udhampur.  There is no dispute  over  the  factum  that  the  appellant  had
produced the receipts from the Corporation.  To satisfy ourselves,  we  have
carefully perused the original file which was produced before us.  The  bill
submitted by the appellant clearly reflects that the  truck  Nos.  JKQ  3285
and JKR 9587 are alleged  to  have  carried  the  goods  of  the  appellant.
Nothing has been mentioned therein that the transportation was made  by  the
Corporation.  To substantiate the claim in respect of  the  said  bill,  the
receipts of the Corporation were filed.  On a perusal of  the  receipts,  it
is perceptible that they neither reflect the name of the truck owner nor  do
they mention the truck numbers.  What is ultimately  argued  is  that  there
had been interpolation in the bill.   On a bare look  at  the  bill,  it  is
luculent that there is no interpolation.   That  apart,  DW-6  Satinder  Pal
Singh  s/o  Janak  Singh,  who  has  been  cited  as  defence   witness   to
substantiate that he had transported  the  goods,  has  specifically  stated
that only a receipt for transporting the goods was given but no goods  were,
in fact, transported.  Apart  from  that,  PW-13,  the  toll  incharge,  has
categorically asserted that the  trucks  namely,  JKQ  3285  and  JKR  9587,
alleged to have carried the goods of the appellant did not cross the  check-
post barrier.  The cumulative effect of all  this  clearly  establishes  the
first charge beyond any trace of doubt.  Thus, the first charge is proved.


26.   As far as the second charge is concerned, it relates  to  availing  of
LTC.  There is no doubt that the LTC was  availed  of  twice  to  which  the
appellant was not entitled to.  What is contended is that once the  recovery
was done, it could not have  been  the  subject  matter  of  Court  Martial.
Needless  to  say,  recovery  of  excess  amount  stands  in   a   different
compartment  altogether  and  Court  Martial  pertains  to  good  order  and
military discipline.  That apart, recovery ipso facto does not create a  bar
for the matter to be tried in Court Martial. In this context, we  may  refer
with profit to Rule 53 of the Rules that deals with plea in bar.   The  said
Rule is reproduced hereinbelow: -


           “53.  Plea in bar. – (1) The accused, at the time of his general
           plea of “Guilty” or “Not Guilty” to a charge for an offence, may
           offer a plea in bar of trial on the ground that –


           (a)   he has been  previously  convicted  or  acquitted  of  the
                 offence by a  competent  criminal  court  or  by  a  court-
                 martial, or has been dealt with  summarily  under  sections
                 80, 83, 84 and 85, as the case may be, for the offence,  or
                 that a charge in respect of the offence has been  dismissed
                 as provided in sub-rule (2) of rule 22; or


           (b)   the offence has been pardoned  or  condoned  by  competent
                 military authority;


           (c)   the period of limitation for trial as laid down in section
                 122 has expired.


           (2)   If he offers such plea in bar, the court shall  record  it
           as well as his general plea, and if it considers that  any  fact
           or facts stated by him are sufficient to  support  the  plea  in
           bar, it shall receive any evidence offered, and hear any address
           made by or on behalf  of  the  accused  and  the  prosecutor  in
           reference to the plea.


           (3)   If the court finds that the plea  in  bar  is  proved,  it
           shall record  its  finding  and  notify  it  to  the  confirming
           authority, and shall either adjourn, or if there  is  any  other
           charge against  the  accused,  whether  in  the  same  or  in  a
           different charge-sheet, which is not affected  by  the  plea  in
           bar, may proceed to the trial of the accused on that charge.


           (4)   If the finding that the plea  in  bar  is  proved  is  not
           confirmed, the court  may  be  re-assembled  by  the  confirming
           authority, and proceed as if the plea has been found not proved.


           (5)   If the court finds that the plea in bar is not proved,  it
           shall proceed with the trial, and the  said  findings  shall  be
           subject to confirmation like any other finding or the court.”





On a bare reading of the aforesaid Rule, it is vivid that recovery  of  the
amount does not come under any of the clauses mentioned in the Rule because
there has neither been any previous conviction or acquittal nor  has  there
been any kind of pardon or condonation by any competent military authority.
Thus, the submission leaves us unimpressed and we unhesitatingly decline to
accept the same.

27.   As far as the third  charge  is  concerned,  it  relates  to  improper
utilisation of the railway warrant from Jammu to New Delhi.  The only  point
urged is that an officer from the railway should  have  been  examined.   On
perusal of the record, it  is  perceivable  that  the  appellant  put  up  a
requisition for obtaining the railway warrant and the same was collected  by
the  representative  on  his  instructions.   He  forwarded  a  letter   for
reservation and thereafter necessary  reservation  was  made.   Exchange  of
warrant for tickets has been duly proven.  Under  these  circumstances,  the
plea that he had not collected the railway warrant  and  there  should  have
been an examination of a competent witness from  railway  administration  is
bound to collapse and, accordingly, we reject the said submission.


28.   The last submission of Ms.  Indu  Malhotra,  learned  senior  counsel,
pertains to the proportionality of punishment.  It is submitted by her  that
the appellant has rendered dedicated and disciplined service for a  span  of
21 years and fought in the front and regard  being  had  to  the  nature  of
charges, the punishment defies logic  and  totally  buries  the  concept  of
proportionality.


29. To appreciate the submission, we may advert to  certain  authorities  in
the field. In the case of Ranjit Thakur (supra), it has been held thus:-


           “The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is  within
           the jurisdiction and discretion of the court-martial.   But  the
           sentence has to suit the offence and the  offender.   It  should
           not be  vindictive  or  unduly  harsh.   It  should  not  be  so
           disproportionate to the offence as to shock the  conscience  and
           amount if itself to conclusive evidence of bias.   The  doctrine
           of proportionality, as part of the concept of  judicial  review,
           would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise,  within
           the exclusive province of the court-martial, if the decision  of
           the court even as to  sentence  is  an  outrageous  defiance  of
           logic, then the sentence would not be  immune  from  correction.
           Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of  judicial
           review.”






 30.   In Ex-Naik Sardar Singh v. Union of India and others[9], a  two-Judge
Bench of this Court adverted to Sections 71,  72  and  73  which  deal  with
punishment awardable by Court Martial, alternative punishment  awardable  by
court-martial and combination of punishments respectively.  The  Bench  also
referred to Section  63  which  deals  with  violation  of  good  order  and
discipline.  In the said case, the appellant had  purchased  11  bottles  of
sealed rum and one bottle of brandy from his Unit  Canteen  as  he  required
the same to celebrate the marriage of one of  his  close  relations  at  his
home town.  He was entitled to carry four bottles of rum and one  bottle  of
brandy  as  per  the  Unit  Regulations/leave  certificate  while   he   was
proceeding on leave.  There was confiscation of bottles  of  liquor  by  the
police while he was proceeding to his home town.  He was handed over to  the
Unit authorities  and  eventually,  in  a  summary  court  martial,  he  was
sentenced to three months rigorous imprisonment and dismissed from  service.
 The plea of the  appellant  before  the  court  martial  was  that  he  had
purchased the liquor for the marriage of his brother-in-law on the basis  of
permit that was issued to him.   The  said  plea  was  not  accepted.   This
Court, after referring to the language used  in  Section  72,  which  states
that any punishment lower in the scale set out in Section 71 can be  imposed
regard being had to the nature and degree of the offence, and  the  decision
in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister  for  the  Civil  Service[10]
and other authorities in the field, expressed the view  that  there  was  an
element  of  arbitrariness  in  awarding  the  severe  punishment   to   the
appellant.  The Bench opined that the punishment was excessively severe  and
violative of the language employed in Section 72 of the Act.


31.  In Bhagat Ram v. State of H.P.[11],  it  has  been  held  that  penalty
imposed must be commensurate with the gravity  of  the  misconduct  and  any
penalty  disproportionate  to  the  gravity  of  the  misconduct  would   be
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.


32.   In Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal India Ltd.  &  Anr.  v.  Mukul
Kumar Choudhury & Ors.[12], this Court adverted to the concept  of  doctrine
of proportionality and eventually opined that the imposition  of  punishment
is subject to judicial intervention if the same is  exercised  in  a  manner
which is out of proportion to the fault.  If  the  award  of  punishment  is
grossly in excess of the allegations made,  it  cannot  claim  immunity  and
makes itself amenable for interference under the limited scope  of  judicial
review.  The test to be applied while dealing with the question  is  whether
a  reasonable  employer  would  have  imposed  such   punishment   in   like
circumstances.  The question that has to be studiedly addressed  is  whether
the punishment imposed is really arbitrary  or  an  outrageous  defiance  of
logic so as to be called irrational and perverse warranting interference  in
exercise of the power of  judicial  review.   The  appellant  was  initially
cashiered from the Army and was sentenced to undergo  rigorous  imprisonment
for five years.    The period of sentence  was  reduced  by  the  confirming
authority.  The appellant was a Major  in  the  Army  and  all  the  charges
levelled against him fundamentally pertain to commission of illegal acts  in
fiscal sphere.   The acts done  by  him  were  intended  to  gain  pecuniary
advantage.  The primary obligation  of  a  member  of  Armed  Forces  is  to
maintain discipline in all aspects.  Discipline in fiscal matters has to  be
given top priority as that mirrors  the  image  of  any  institution.   That
apart, the appellant was a  Major  in  the  Army.   Irreproachable  conduct,
restrained  attitude,  understanding  of  responsibility  and  adherence  to
discipline in an apple pie order were expected of him.   The proven  charges
luminously project that the said aspects have been given a total go by.   In
this backdrop, it is well nigh impossible to hold that  the  punishment  was
harsh or arbitrary.   Regard being had to the nature of  rank  held  by  the
appellant and the disciplined conduct expected of  him,  we  find  that  the
doctrine  of  proportionality  is  uninvocable  and,  accordingly,  we   are
compelled to repel the said  preponement  advanced  by  the  learned  senior
counsel without any hesitation and we do so.

33.   Consequently, the appeal, being devoid  of  merit,  stands  dismissed.





                                               ...........................J.
                                                             [P. Sathasivam]






                                                ..........................J.
                                  [Dipak Misra]

New Delhi;
May 11, 2012
-----------------------
[1]    AIR 1957 SC 425
[2]    (1959) Supp.1 SCR.319
[3]    AIR 1970 SC 150
[4]    (1981) 4 SCC 716
[5]    (1987) 4 SCC 611
[6]    AIR 2006 SC 2544
[7]    (1974) 3 SCC 459
[8]    (1969) 1 QB 577, 599
[9]   [10] (1991) 3 SCC 213
[11]   (1984) 3 ALL ER 935
[12]   (1983) 2 SCC 442
[13]   AIR 2010 SC 75


There is a vast difference between Muslim Wakfs and Trusts created by Muslims. The basic difference is that Wakf properties are dedicated to God and the “Wakif” or dedicator, does not retain any title over the Wakf properties. As far as Trusts are concerned, the properties are not vested in God. Some of the objects of such Trusts are for running charitable organisations such as hospitals, shelter homes, orphanages and charitable dispensaries, which acts, though recognized as pious, do not divest the author of the Trust from the title of the properties in the Trust, unless he relinquishes such title in favour of the Trust or the Trustees. At times, the dividing line between Public Trusts and Wakfs may be thin, but the main factor always is that while Wakf properties vest in God Almighty, the Trust properties do not vest in God and the trustees in terms of Deed of Trust are entitled to deal with the same for the benefit of the Trust and its beneficiaries. 29. In the present case, the difference between Trusts and Wakfs appear to have been overlooked and the High Court has passed orders without taking into consideration the fact that the Charity Commissioner would not ordinarily have any jurisdiction to manage the Wakf properties. 30. In these circumstances, in our view, it would be in the interest of all concerned to maintain the status quo and to restrain all those in management of the Wakf properties from alienating and/or encumbering the Wakf properties during the pendency of the proceedings before this Court. The order of the High Court staying the operation of its judgment has led to the revival of interim orders which have rendered such stay otiose. The said order of stay cannot also be continued during the pendency of these proceedings in its present form. 31. Accordingly, at this stage, we direct that in relation to Wakf properties, as distinct from Trusts created by Muslims, all concerned, including the Charity Commissioner, Mumbai, shall not permit any of the persons in management of such Wakf properties to either encumber or alienate any of the properties under their management, till a decision is rendered in the pending Special Leave Petitions.


                               REPORTABLE | |

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

             SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) Nos.31288-31290 of 2011





Maharashtra State Board of Wakfs     … Petitioner


           Vs.



Shaikh Yusuf Bhai Chawla & Ors.      … Respondents



                                    WITH


 SLP(C) Nos.32129-32131 of 2011, SLP(C) No.32636 of 2011, SLP(C) No.35196 of
                      2011 AND SLP(C) No.35198 of 2011



                                  O R D E R



ALTAMAS KABIR, J.


1.    These several Special Leave Petitions have been filed by the State  of
Maharashtra and other parties. While Special Leave Petition  (C)  Nos.31288-
31290,  Special  Leave  Petition  (C)  Nos.32129-32131  and  Special   Leave
Petition (C) No.32636, all of 2011, have been fled by the Maharashtra  State
Board of Wakfs, Special Leave Petition (C) Nos.35196 and 35198 of 2011  have
been filed by the Jamait Educational and Welfare Muslim  Minority  Education
Society and Maharashtra Muslim Lawyers’ Forum.

2.    The Special Leave Petitions are  directed  against  the  judgment  and
final order dated 21st September, 2011, passed by the Bombay High  Court  in
Writ Petition No.2906 of  2004,  Writ  Petition  No.357  of  2011  and  Writ
Petition (L) No.899 of 2011.  The impugned judgment of  the  High  Court  in
the aforesaid Writ  Petitions  is  the  outcome  of  the  challenge  to  the
formation of the Maharashtra State Board of Wakfs. As noticed  by  the  High
Court, the subject matter of all the Writ  Petitions,  and  thereby  of  the
Special Leave Petitions, relates to the challenge to  the  incorporation  of
the Maharashtra State Board of Wakfs and its impact upon the  Wakfs  created
by persons professing Islam, but belonging to different sects.

3.     The  Petitioners  in  Writ  Petition  No.2906  of  2004  are  Muslims
belonging to the Shia Fatemi Ismaili Tyebia  Sect  of  Islam  and  are  Shia
Muslims.  The Petitioner Nos.1 to 3 in the said Writ Petition  are  trustees
of “Sir Adamji Peerbhoy Sanatorium” established by a Scheme settled  by  the
Bombay High Court by an order dated 16th  June,  1931  in  Suit  No.1560  of
1927. The said Trust is registered  as  a  Public  Trust  under  the  Bombay
Public Trusts Act. The Petitioner Nos.4 and 5 are trustees of the  “Anjuman-
i-Null-Bazaar Chhabdi Bazar Niaz Hussein Charitable Trust”,  which  is  also
registered as a Public Trust under the Bombay Trusts  Act.  The  Petitioners
in Writ Petition No.899 of 2011 are Dawoodi Bohra Muslims and  claim  to  be
Trustees of Noorbhoy Jeewanji Morishwalla Charity  Trusts  registered  under
the Bombay Public Trusts Act. The Petitioners in Writ  Petition  (L)  No.357
of 2011 are Muslims belonging to the Shia Fatemi  Ismaili  Tyebia  sect  and
are  also  trustees  of  Sir  Adamji  Peerbhoy   Sanatorium,   referred   to
hereinabove. The Petitioner in  SLP  (C)  No.35196  of  2011  is  a  society
registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. All  the  members  of
the Trust profess Islam and are persons interested in  the  affairs  of  the
Wakf set in question by virtue of the provisions  of  Section  3(k)  of  the
Wakf Act, 1995.  Similarly, the Petitioners in SLP(C) No.35198 of  2011  are
a group of Muslim lawyers who have formed  a  Forum  and  are  also  persons
interested in the management of Wakf properties in terms of Section 3(k)  of
the Wakf Act, 1995.

4.    The grievance of the Writ Petitioners in these five Writ Petitions  is
the same. The Petitioners in Writ Petition No.2906 of 2004  have  challenged
the notification dated 4th  January,  2002,  issued  by  the  Government  of
Maharashtra and have also sought for a direction to the State Government  to
conduct a fresh survey of  Wakfs in the State of Maharashtra. Their  further
challenge is to notification  dated  13th  November,  2003,  issued  by  the
Maharashtra State Board of Wakfs publishing the list of Wakfs in  the  State
of Maharashtra.

5.    In Writ Petition No.899 of 2001, the Petitioners have  challenged  the
Circular dated 24th July, 2002, issued by the Charity  Commissioner  of  the
State of Maharashtra stating therein that  in  view  of  the  provisions  of
Section 43 of the Wakf Act, 1995, the Wakfs which were registered as  Public
Trusts would cease to be governed by the  provisions  of  the  Public  Trust
Act. It is the case of the Writ Petitioners that because  the  establishment
of the Maharashtra State Board  of  Wakfs  by  the  notification  dated  4th
January, 2002, was itself invalid, they continued  to  be  governed  by  the
provisions of the Bombay Public Trusts Act.

6.    The Petitioners in Writ Petition No.357 of 2011, have  challenged  the
notification issued by the State of Maharashtra on 20th October,  2010,  for
re-survey of the Wakfs in the State of  Maharashtra.   They  also  sought  a
direction that the Charity Commissioner should  continue  to  supervise  the
working of the Trusts of which they are trustees.

7.    After the Wakf Act, 1995, which came into force on 1st January,  1996,
was enacted, the State Government issued a  notification  on  1st  December,
1997, in exercise of its powers under Sub-Section (1) of Section  4  of  the
Wakf Act, 1995, whereby the State Government appointed :-

     a) Settlement Commissioner and Director of Land  Records,  Maharashtra
        State, Pune, to be  Survey Commissioner of Wakfs; and


     b) Additional Commissioners of Konkan, Nashik, Pune, Nagpur,  Amravati
        and  Aurangabad  Revenue  Divisions   to   be   Additional   Survey
        Commissioners, for the purpose of making a survey of Wakfs existing
        on the 1st day of January, 1996 in the State of Maharashtra.

8.     On  4th  January,  2002,  the  Government  of   Maharashtra,   by   a
notification of even date, in exercise of powers conferred by Section 14  of
the Wakf Act, 1995, established a Board by  the  name  of  “The  Maharashtra
State Board of Wakfs” with its headquarters at  Aurangabad.  The  Government
nominated four persons to be members of the State Board, namely :-

     a) Shri Khan Yusuf Sarwar, Member of Parliament (Rajya Sabha);


     b) Smt. Shabana Azmi, Member of Parliament (Rajya Sabha);


     c) Shri Harun Aadam Solkar, Muslim Ex-member of the Bar Council of the
        State; and


     d) Shri Chand Pasha Inamdar, Member of Muslim Organisation;

Thus, by the aforesaid Notification, a Wakf Board was  established  for  the
entire State of Maharashtra with its headquarters  at  Aurangabad  and  four
persons were named in the Notification as members of the said Board.

9.    Pursuant to the notification dated 1st December,  1997,  the  officers
appointed to conduct the survey, submitted a report to the State  Government
on 31st January, 2002. Thereafter, other members were appointed to the  Wakf
Board  by  different  notifications.   On  24th  July,  2003,  the   Charity
Commissioner of the State of Maharashtra issued  a  circular  directing  his
office not to exercise powers under the Bombay  Public   Trusts  Act  or  to
deal with any of the Muslim Public Trusts. The said circular mentioned  that
according to Section 43 of the Wakf  Act,  1995,  a  Wakf  registered  as  a
Public Trust should not be administered or governed under the Bombay  Public
Trusts  Act.   Several   Writ   Petitions   were   filed   challenging   the
establishment of  the  Board  and  also  challenging  its  constitution  and
appointment of various persons as its members. Objections  were  also  filed
in Court challenging the circular issued by  the  Charity  Commissioner.  On
13th November, 2003, the Wakf Board  published  a  list  of  Wakfs  treating
Muslim Public Trusts in Maharashtra and Suburban  districts  of  Maharashtra
as Wakfs.

10.   Several Writ Petitions  were  filed  challenging  the  list  of  Wakfs
prepared by the Wakf Board which came to be heard by the Bombay High  Court,
which set aside the notification dated 4th January, 2002, as also  the  list
of Wakfs prepared and published by the Maharashtra State Wakf Board on  13th
November, 2003. The Survey Officers appointed  by  notification  dated  20th
October, 2010, were directed to take into consideration representations,  if
any, made by the Petitioners and other similarly situated persons  connected
with the  Muslim  Wakfs,  including  the  list  prepared  by  the  Committee
constituted by the State Government under the chairmanship  of  the  Charity
Commissioner.  The Survey Officers were also given the option to  take  into
consideration any list of Wakfs, if prepared under  the  Act  of  1954.  The
crucial direction which appears  to  have  adversely  affected  the  special
leave petitioners is the direction that until a  new  Board  or  Boards  was
incorporated under the Wakf Act, 1995, and the Board started functioning  in
accordance with the provisions of  the  Wakf  Act,  the  provisions  of  the
Bombay Public Trusts Act would apply to such Muslim  Public  Trusts  as  are
registered under the Bombay Public Trusts Act. The High Court made it  clear
that although the notification dated 4th January, 2002, had been set  aside,
none of the actions taken or orders passed by the Wakf Board constituted  by
the notification dated 4th January, 2002, had been challenged or  set  aside
by  virtue  of  the  said  order.  By  the  impugned  order,  the  State  of
Maharashtra was given the  liberty  to  take  steps  to  make  such  interim
arrangements,  as  may  be  advised,  to  monitor  and  supervise  the  Wakf
properties and other related  aspects  under  the  Wakf  Act.  It  was  also
stipulated that the decision and/or  action  already  taken,  including  the
pending disputes and litigations would be governed by the Wakf Act, 1995.

11.   As far as Writ Petition (L) No.357 of 2011 is concerned, the  Division
Bench clarified that by the judgment in question it had not  considered  the
reliefs claimed with regard to the list of Wakfs dated 13th December,  2004.
Accordingly, the Petitioners were given the liberty either to file  a  fresh
petition claiming such relief, or to claim the said relief in other  pending
matters.

12.   It is these directions issued by the  Division  Bench  of  the  Bombay
High Court which have led  to  the  filing  of  the  present  Special  Leave
Petitions.

13.   One of the facets of the dispute,  which  was  thrown  up  during  the
hearing regarding continuance of the interim order in  a  modified  form  is
the creation of Wakfs under the Muslim law and the  creation  of  Trusts  by
persons professing the Muslim faith, which were not in the nature of  Wakfs,
but in the nature of English Trusts.

14.   Prior to the enactment of the Wakf Act, 1995, the  Central  Wakf  Act,
1954, was in force, but did not apply  to  some  of  the  States  which  had
Special Acts of their own, such as Uttar  Pradesh,  West  Bengal,  parts  of
Gujarat and Maharashtra and some of  the  North-Eastern  States.   The  said
States continued to  be  governed  by  their  own  Special  statutes,  which
provided for the administration of Wakfs in their respective States.  To  do
away with the disparity of the law relating to Wakfs  in  different  States,
the Central Government enacted a uniform law to  govern  all  Wakfs  in  the
country, which led to the enactment of  the  Wakf  Act,  1995,  whereby  all
other laws in force in any  stage  corresponding  to  the  said  Act,  stood
repealed.

15.   The judgment and order of the High Court  having  been  challenged  in
these various Special Leave Petitions, on  29th  November,  2011,  when  the
matters were taken up, we had directed notices to  issue  in  the  different
Special Leave Petitions and in the meantime directed that the  stay  granted
by the High Court on 21st September,  2011,  in  respect  of  its  judgment,
would remain operative.

16.   Thereafter, these matters have been taken up to consider whether  such
interim order of stay should be allowed  to  continue,  but  in  a  modified
manner   on account of the fact that by staying the operation of  the  final
judgment, the interim orders passed by the High Court were revived,  thereby
rendering the stay order meaningless.

17.   While considering the three sets of Special Leave  Petitions,  Special
Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.32129-32131  of  2011,  filed  by  the  State  of
Maharashtra, were taken up for consideration first.

18.   Appearing for the  Petitioner  State  of  Maharashtra,  Mr.  Rohington
Nariman, learned Solicitor General for India, submitted that the only  thing
which was required to be  considered  for  a  decision  as  to  whether  the
interim order shall continue, was whether a prima facie case had  been  made
out for grant of interim injunction to preserve the status  quo  ante  which
prevailed before the coming into operation  of  the  Wakf  Act,  1995.   Mr.
Nariman urged that the provisions of the Wakf  Act,  1954,  and  the  Bombay
Public Trusts Act, in relation to Wakf properties, stood repealed by  virtue
of Section 112 of the 1995 Act. Mr. Nariman submitted that  Section  112  of
the 1995 Act, which dealt with repeal and savings,  clearly  indicated  that
if immediately before the commencement of the Act in any  State,  there  was
in force in that State any law which corresponded with the  1995  Act,  that
corresponding law would stand repealed. The learned  A.S.G.  submitted  that
in the instant case, the corresponding law to the Wakf Act,  1995,  when  it
came into force, was the Maharashtra Wakf Act  and  the  provisions  of  the
Bombay Public  Trusts  Act  which  became  ineffective  on  account  of  the
provisions of Section 112(3) of the 1995 Act.  With the repeal of  the  said
two provisions, it was for the Board of Wakfs  established  under  the  1995
Act to continue in management of the Wakf properties  and  the  judgment  of
the High Court setting aside the establishment of Board could not  resurrect
the authority of the Charity Commissioner over  such  properties.  In  fact,
after the promulgation of the  Wakf  Act,  1995,  the  Charity  Commissioner
ceased to have any  control  over  Muslim  Wakfs,  even  if  they  had  been
registered with the Charity Commissioner  as  Public  Trusts.   Mr.  Nariman
submitted that at this interim stage only a  prima  facie  view  has  to  be
taken as to whether the interim  order  passed  by  this  Court  was  to  be
continued, pending the hearing of the Special Leave Petitions.

19.   On the other hand,  Dr.  Rajiv  Dhawan,  Senior  Advocate,  and  other
learned counsel who appeared for some of the  Respondents,  urged  that  the
learned Solicitor General had not made any submission  with  regard  to  the
balance of convenience and inconvenience and only confined  himself  to  the
question of whether a prima facie case has been made out for continuance  of
such interim injunction.  Learned counsel  submitted  that  the  matter  had
already been dealt with earlier and the  order  which  was  passed  on  30th
November, 2011, continuing the stay granted by  the  Bombay  High  Court  on
21st September, 2011, was based on consent. Furthermore, only three  of  the
parties had appeared before this  Court.   It  was  further  submitted  that
although there were several sales transactions involved  which  were  to  be
considered by the Charity Commissioner,  only  three  of  the  parties  were
before the Court and the parties which were also likely to  be  affected  by
any order passed in these matters should also be  given  an  opportunity  of
hearing, particularly because the prayer which had been asked for by way  of
interim relief was in fact the main relief itself. It was  urged  that  till
4th January, 2002, when the Board came into existence under  the  1995  Act,
there was no Wakf Board and even the Board created  at  a  later  stage  was
wholly illegal.

20.   The main thrust of the submissions made on behalf of  the  respondents
was that the circular issued by the Charity Commissioner  relinquishing  its
authority  over  the  Trusts  created  by  Muslims,  did  not  attract   the
provisions of the Wakf Act, 1995, which dealt with Wakf properties only  and
was not, therefore, entrusted with the jurisdiction over such Wakfs. It  was
also submitted that the Bifurcation Committee which  had  been  created  for
the purpose of separating Wakfs from Trusts and Shia and  Sunni  Wakfs,  was
an extra-legal Committee which was not contemplated under the provisions  of
the Wakf Act.  According to Dr.  Dhawan,  the  classification  of  Wakfs  as
“Shia” or “Sunni” or any dispute regarding whether a  Wakf  is  existing  or
not, could only be decided by the Wakf Tribunal under Sections 6  and  7  or
by the Wakf Board under Section 40 of the Wakf Act, 1995.

21.   On 4th September, 2008, the  State  of  Maharashtra  issued  a  notice
appointing 7 members to the Board, but  the  said  notification  was  struck
down by the Bombay High Court and the strength of the  Board  of  Wakfs  was
reduced to four members.  This was followed by a notification issued by  the
Wakf Board on 23rd February, 2008, cancelling its  corrigendum  notification
dated 5th May,  2005,  seeking  to  amend  the  list  of  Wakfs  dated  13th
November, 2003, thereby retaining its control over  the  said  Wakf  estates
indicated in the first list published earlier.  Dr. Dhawan urged  that  once
the order passed was agreed to by the parties, there  could  be  no  further
question of passing any interim order to stay the effect  of  the  order  of
the High Court passed on 21st September, 2011.

22.   Dr. Dhawan urged that since the survey of the Wakfs  and  the  various
denominations in respect thereof, was yet to  be  completed,  and  even  the
Board of  Wakfs  had  not  been  properly  constituted  in  accordance  with
Sections 13 and 14 of the 1995 Act, the provisions  of  Section  22  of  the
Act, which provides that no act or proceeding of the Board shall be  invalid
by reason only of the existence of any vacancy amongst its  members  or  any
defect in  the  constitution  thereof,  would  not  be  attracted.   Learned
counsel submitted that Section 22 of the Act would come into operation  only
after the Board had been duly constituted but not when the Board was yet  to
be constituted.  It was submitted that since the Wakf  Board  had  not  been
constituted fully, the list of Wakfs published by it cannot be  accepted  or
relied upon.  It was submitted that the interim order  passed  by  the  High
Court did not require any interference in  these  proceedings  even  at  the
interim stage.

23.   Mr. Salve, learned senior counsel appearing for the  Respondents  Nos.
1,2 and 3 in SLP (C) No. 31288 of 2011, submitted that during  the  pendency
of the Special Leave Petition in this Court, Wakf properties should  not  be
permitted to be alienated by either  the  Board  of  Wakfs  or  the  Charity
Commissioner, though, as far as Public Trusts  are  concerned,  they  should
not be treated as Wakfs, since the genesis of their existence was not  under
the law relating to Wakfs, but as English Trusts which are governed  by  the
Indian Trusts Act.

24.    Referring  to  paragraph  13  of  the  Special  Leave   Petition   in
SLP(C)Nos.31288-31290 of  2011,  Mr.  Salve  submitted  that  the  power  to
establish a Board of Wakfs was vested in the State Government under  Section
13 of the Wakf Act, 1995 and Sub-Section (2) thereof lays  down  the  manner
in which the power is to be exercised by the State  Government.   Mr.  Salve
pointed out that this provision provided for the appointment of two  Boards,
one, a Sunni Board and the other, a Shia Board, depending on the  number  of
Wakfs belonging to the two denominations. Accordingly,  one  would  have  to
wait till a survey, as contemplated under Section 4 of the Wakf  Act,  1995,
was completed.   Mr. Salve submitted that it would, therefore,  be  best  to
preserve the status quo until a final decision  was  taken  in  the  Special
Leave proceedings.

25.   Mr. Y.H. Muchhala, learned Senior Advocate, who appeared for  Anjuman-
i-Islam, adopted the submissions made by Mr. P.P. Rao, Dr.  Dhawan  and  Mr.
Salve, but submitted that in the absence of a validly constituted  Board  of
Wakfs, the Wakf Act, 1995, could not be said to  have  come  into  force  in
Maharashtra which continued to be governed  by  the  State  Government.  Mr.
Muchhala urged that for the purpose of management of the  Wakfs  within  the
State of Maharashtra, the system  of  management  prevailing  prior  to  the
enactment of the 1995 Act would continue to remain in operation.

26.   Having considered the submissions made on  behalf  of  the  respective
parties, we are restricting ourselves at this interim  stage  to  the  broad
outlines of the case made out by the respective parties and whether, in  the
background of the facts disclosed, the  stay  granted  by  the  Bombay  High
Court on 21st September, 2011 should continue in a modified form.

27.   Broadly speaking, the grievance of the Petitioners  in  these  Special
Leave Petitions is with regard to the vesting of powers  of  management  and
supervision  of  Muslim  Wakf  estates  in  Maharashtra   in   the   Charity
Commissioner  by  virtue  of  the  impugned  order  of   the   High   Court.
Undoubtedly, the Wakf Board was constituted  under  the  provisions  of  the
Wakf Act, 1995, but not at full strength as envisaged in Sections 13 and  14
of the aforesaid Act.  Whatever may be the reason, the factual  position  is
that today there is no properly constituted Board of  Wakfs  functioning  in
the State of Maharashtra. At the same time, the administration of  Wakfs  in
Maharashtra cannot be kept in vacuum.  The Bombay High  Court  did  what  it
thought best to ensure that there was no vacuum  in  the  administration  of
Wakf properties in Maharashtra by directing that till such  time  the  Board
was  properly  constituted,  the  Charity  Commissioner  would  continue  to
administer the Muslim Wakf properties, including English  Trust  properties,
which had already been registered  as  Trust  properties  with  the  Charity
Commissioner under the Bombay Public Trusts Act. As a  corollary,  the  list
of Wakfs published by the truncated Board of Wakfs was  also  set  aside  by
the Bombay High Court. The question is whether the  Bombay  High  Court  had
the  jurisdiction  to  make  such  orders  in  the  writ  jurisdiction   and
particularly to vest the management of all Wakf properties  in  the  Charity
Commissioner in view of the provisions of Section 112 and in particular Sub-
Section (3) thereof of the Wakf Act, 1995.

28.   Section 112 concerns repeal  and  savings.   By  virtue  of  the  said
provision, the 1954  Wakf  Act  and  the  1984  Wakf  (Amendment)  Act  were
repealed. Sub-Section (3) specifically provides as follows :-
      “112.   Repeal and Savings.  ……………………….
      (1)   xxx   xxx  xxx
      (2)   xxx   xxx  xxx
      (3) If immediately before the commencement of this Act, in any  State,
           there is in force in that State, any law  which  corresponds  to
           this Act, that corresponding law shall stand repealed.”

      Although, it cannot be said that the Bombay Public Trusts  Act  was  a
corresponding law and, therefore, stood repealed, it  cannot  also  be  said
that the same would be applicable to Wakf properties which were not  in  the
nature of public charities. There is a vast difference between Muslim  Wakfs
and Trusts created by Muslims. The basic difference is that Wakf  properties
are dedicated to God and the “Wakif”  or  dedicator,  does  not  retain  any
title over the  Wakf  properties.  As  far  as  Trusts  are  concerned,  the
properties are not vested in God.  Some of the objects of  such  Trusts  are
for running charitable  organisations  such  as  hospitals,  shelter  homes,
orphanages and charitable dispensaries, which  acts,  though  recognized  as
pious, do not divest  the  author  of  the  Trust  from  the  title  of  the
properties in the Trust, unless he relinquishes such title in favour of  the
Trust or the Trustees. At times, the dividing  line  between  Public  Trusts
and Wakfs may be thin, but  the  main  factor  always  is  that  while  Wakf
properties vest in God Almighty, the Trust properties do  not  vest  in  God
and the trustees in terms of Deed of Trust are entitled  to  deal  with  the
same for the benefit of the Trust and its beneficiaries.

29.   In the present case, the difference between Trusts  and  Wakfs  appear
to have been overlooked and the High Court has passed orders without  taking
into  consideration  the  fact  that  the  Charity  Commissioner  would  not
ordinarily have any jurisdiction to manage the Wakf properties.

30.   In these circumstances, in our view, it would be in  the  interest  of
all concerned to maintain the status  quo  and  to  restrain  all  those  in
management of the Wakf properties from  alienating  and/or  encumbering  the
Wakf properties during the pendency of the proceedings  before  this  Court.
The order of the High Court staying the operation of its  judgment  has  led
to the revival of interim orders which have rendered such stay otiose.   The
said order of stay cannot also be continued during  the  pendency  of  these
proceedings in its present form.

31.   Accordingly, at this  stage,  we  direct  that  in  relation  to  Wakf
properties, as distinct from  Trusts  created  by  Muslims,  all  concerned,
including the Charity Commissioner, Mumbai, shall  not  permit  any  of  the
persons in  management  of  such  Wakf  properties  to  either  encumber  or
alienate any of the properties under their management, till  a  decision  is
rendered in the pending Special Leave Petitions.



                                                     ………………………………………………………J.
                                     (ALTAMAS KABIR)





                                                     ………………………………………………………J.
                                     (J. CHELAMESWAR)



                                                     ………………………………………………………J.
                                     (RANJAN GOGOI)
New Delhi
Dated : 11.05.2012