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Friday, May 11, 2012

The cumulative effect of all the injuries was obviously known to each of the accused, i.e., all the injuries inflicted were bound to result in the death of the deceased which, in fact, they intended. Furthermore, the doctor, PW14, had opined that the deceased had died because of multiple injuries and fracture on the vital organs, due to shock and haemorrhage. In other words, even as per the medical evidence, the injuries were caused on the vital parts of the body of the deceased. 23. For these reasons, we are unable to accept the contention raised on behalf of the appellants that this is a case where the Court should exercise its discretion to alter the offence to one under Section 304 Part II or Section 326 IPC from that under Section 302 IPC. We also find the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants to be without merit that accused Gokul alone is liable to be convicted, if at all, under Section 302 IPC and all other accused should be acquitted. We reject this contention in light of the discussion above and the fact that all these accused have been specifically implicated by PW1 and PW2, the Investigating Officer, PW26 and the medical evidence. 24. Having found no substance in the pleas raised by the learned counsel for the appellants, we hereby dismiss the appeal.



                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2003 OF 2008

Atmaram & Ors.                               … Appellants

                                   Versus

State of Madhya Pradesh                      … Respondent







                               J U D G M E N T

Swatanter Kumar, J.


1.    This appeal is directed against the judgment  of  the  High  Court  of
Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Indore dated 23rd January,  2008.   We  may  notice
the necessary facts giving rise to the present appeal.    According  to  the
prosecution, Udayram, PW-1 along with his younger brother namely Gokul  (the
deceased) and  sister  Rajubai,  PW-2  had  gone  to  the  village  Lod  for
pilgrimage.    After they reached the said village, they came to  know  that
the Pujari who was to perform the puja was not available.  Resultantly,  all
the said three persons decided to return back to their  village  Dhuvakhedi,
Tehsil Tarana, District Ujjain.

2.    At about 4-4.30 p.m., when they reached near the said village, all  of
a sudden the accused persons namely Atmaram, Gokul, Vikram, Ramchandran  and
Umrao emerged from the fields having soyabean crop.   They shouted that  the
deceased and his relatives had set their soyabean crop afire and  therefore,
they should be taught a lesson.    The accused Ramachandra  was  armed  with
farsi, Gokul was  carrying  dharia  and  other  three  accused  were  having
lathis.    All  these  accused  persons  started  assaulting  Udayram  (PW1)
causing injury on his head, left hand and legs.   Gokul (the  deceased)  and
PW2 tried to intervene and protect Udayram.   In this  process,  both  these
witnesses sustained a number of injuries caused  by  the  accused  with  the
help of the same  weapons.    The  other  witnesses  present  at  the  site,
Gajrajsingh, Sardarsingh and Gokul did not interfere in the assault  because
of fear and silently slipped away.

3.    Another witness, Pannalal, PW8, was  working  in  the  fields  nearby.
Upon being called by Rajubai, PW2, Pannalal came to the place of  occurrence
and seeing the deceased and witnesses in  injured  condition,  Pannalal  and
one Prem brought the bullock cart of one Kanhaiya Balai.    Thereafter,  one
Umrao Bai also joined them.   They finally found  a  jeep  on  the  road  in
which Pannalal, Prem and Umrao Bai took the injured persons  to  the  Tarana
Hospital where they were admitted.    From  the  hospital,  information  was
sent to the Police Station,  Makdon  on  which  basis,  the  Head  Constable
Chedilal Yadav, PW23,  reached  Tarana  Hospital.    On  the  basis  of  the
statement of Udayram, PW1, Dehati Nalishi  (Ex.P1)  was  recorded  at  about
6.20 p.m. on 6th November, 1993.

4.    A case under Section 307 read with Sections 147, 148 and  149  of  the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘IPC’) was registered.    All  the  three
injured persons were subjected to medical  examination  by  Dr.  Anil  Kumar
Dubey, PW4, who issued their MLC reports, Ex.P2-A to  P.4-A.    Udayram  and
Rajubai were treated by the doctors.   At about 7  p.m.,  the  statement  of
Gokul was also recorded in the presence of the witnesses.   Keeping in  view
the serious condition of Gokul, he  was  required  to  be  transferred  from
Tarana Hospital to Civil Hospital,  Ujjain  for  treatment.     However,  he
died on the way at about 11.30 p.m.  on 6th  November,  1993  and  his  dead
body was kept in the Civil Hospital, Ujjain.  Information was  sent  to  the
Police Station, Makdon, whereafter an  offence  of  Section  302  read  with
Section 149 IPC was added to the charges.

5.    Inquest proceedings were completed.   The dead body  of  the  deceased
was subjected to post mortem and post mortem report Ext.  P30  was  prepared
by Dr. Ajay Nigam (PW14).

6.    After registration of the offence, the  investigating  officer,  PW26,
Sohan Pal Singh Choudhary visited the spot of occurrence  on  7th  November,
1993, from where the blood stained earth, cycle and sandal of  the  deceased
were seized and the spot map was prepared. On 8th November,  1993,  all  the
accused persons were arrested.  Upon their interrogation and in  furtherance
to their statements, the arms involved  in  the  commission  of  crime  were
recovered and seized.   These seized weapons were sent to  forensic  science
laboratory for examination on 3rd December, 1993.   The  examination  report
was received on 8th December, 1993 and in terms  of  the  Report,  no  blood
stain was  found,  either  in  the  soil  or  in  the  sealed  farsi.    The
Investigating Officer submitted the charge sheet to the Court  of  competent
jurisdiction.  Upon committal, the  accused  were  tried  by  the  Court  of
Sessions.

7.    The learned Trial Court vide its detailed judgment dated  13th  April,
1999 held that the prosecution had succeeded in proving the  charges,  while
finding all the  accused  guilty  of  the  offences  with  which  they  were
charged.  It sentenced them as follows:-

           “46.  On the point of punishment, on behalf of accused  evidence
           were not produced  on  conviction.    The  counsel  for  accused
           produced oral  argument  and  prayed  for  least  punishment  to
           accused whereas Assistant  Public  Prosecutor  have  prayed  for
           harder conviction.

           47.    In any opinion from the case, it is clear  that  this  is
           the first offence of accused.   Looking into  the  circumstances
           under which crime is committed and nature of crime, it does  not
           seem proper to convict with life imprisonment under Section  302
           I.P.C.  and  it  seems  proper  to  convict  accused  for   life
           imprisonment and fine.   Therefore, all the five  accused  shall
           be convicted under Section 148 I.P.C. with rigorous imprisonment
           of two years.     Accused Ramchandra No. 4 is held guilty  under
           Section 307 I.P.C. and  Section  307/149  I.P.C.  for  both  the
           offences prescribed punished is same, therefore, it is proper to
           convict accused Ramchandra only under Section 307/149 I.P.C. and
           accused Atmaram No. 1 for charges under Section 307  I.P.C.  and
           accused Gokul No. 2, Vikram No. 3, Ramchandra No. 4, Umrao No. 5
           for  Section  307  read  with  149  I.P.C.  shall  be  convicted
           respectively with rigorous imprisonment for 5 year each and fine
           of Rs. 500/- (Rs. five hundred ) each.   In default  of  payment
           of fine accused shall be imprisoned for another term of 2  month
           each.

           48.   Similarly, accused Gokul No. 2 charged under  Section  302
           I.P.C. and Section 302/149 I.P.C. and accused Vikram No.  3  was
           held guilty under Section 302 or Section 302 read  with  Section
           149 I.P.C., whereas punishment prescribed for both the  offences
           is same, both the accused are held guilty under Section  307/149
           I.P.C. and accused Atmaram No. 1 is  found  guilty  for  charges
           under Section 302, I.P.C.  and  accused  No.  2,  Gokul,  No.  3
           Vikram, No. 4 Ramchandra, No. 5 Umrao  are  found  guilty  under
           Section  302  read  with  Section  149  I.P.C.   and   convicted
           accordingly, and all the accused for such charges are  convicted
           with life imprisonment and in addition all the accused are  also
           punished with fine of Rs. 2000 (Two Thousand Rupees) each.    In
           default of payment of fine all the accused shall  be  imprisoned
           for another term of 4 month each.   Similarly,  accused  No.  5,
           Umrao, is charged under Section 323 I.P.C. and  accused  Atmaram
           No. 1 Gokul No. 2, Vikram No. 3, and Ramchandra No. 4 are  found
           guilty under Section 323 read with Section 149  I.P.C.  and  all
           the accused are convicted with 6 month rigorous imprisonment and
           fine of Rs. 200 each  (Two  Hundred  Rupees).    In  default  of
           payment of fine all the accused shall be imprisoned for  another
           term  of  1  month  rigorous  imprisonment  each.      All   the
           punishment shall run concurrently.

           49.   During prosecution, accused No. 1 Atmaram from 8.11.93  to
           3.3.94, accused No. 2 Gokul from 8.11.93 to 24.6.94, accused No.
           3 Vikram from 8.11.93 to 3.3.94 and  accused  No.  4  Ramchandra
           from 11.1.93 to 6.1.94 and accused No. 5 Umrao from 11.11.93  to
           6.1.94, were in  judicial  custody.    Such  duration  shall  be
           adjusted towards punishment.

           50.   On payment of fine from accused and after  the  expiration
           of the period of limitation Rs. 8000/- from the amount  of  fine
           shall be paid to widowed mother of Gokul, Umraobai w/o Lalji r/o
           village Dhaukhedi, Thana Makdone, as compensation and  from  the
           said fine Rs. 5000 (Five  Thousand  Rupees)  shall  be  paid  to
           applicant  Udairam  s/o  Lalji  r/o  Village  Dhaukhedi,   Thana
           Makdone.

           51.   After the expiration of  period  of  appeal,  blood  mixed
           soil, simple soil, Sandel, cloths of Gokul, cloths  of  Udairam,
           and Farsi, Dharia, Lathi, seized from accused shall be discarded
           being available.”



8.    The Trial Court also punished them on other counts.

9.    Being aggrieved from the judgment of conviction and order of  sentence
passed by the Trial Court, the accused preferred an appeal before  the  High
Court, which by  its  judgment  dated  23rd  January,  2008,  confirmed  the
judgment of the Trial Court and also did not interfere  with  the  order  of
sentence.


10.   Feeling aggrieved therefrom, all the five accused have  preferred  the
present appeal before this Court.

11.   While raising a  challenge  to  the  impugned  judgment,  the  learned
counsel  appearing  for  the  appellants  argued  that  there  are   serious
contradictions between the statements of PW1 and PW2.  These  two  witnesses
being the eye-witnesses, such serious  contradictions  in  their  statements
make the conviction of the  appellants  unsustainable  on  that  basis.   To
substantiate his plea, the learned counsel for  the  appellants  has  relied
upon the paragraph 2 of the deposition of PW2, Rajubai and  paragraph  3  of
the statement of PW1, Udayram.  In order to properly  appreciate  the  merit
or otherwise of this contention, it would be appropriate  to  refer  to  the
relevant  paragraphs  of  deposition  of   these   two   witnesses.    They,
respectively, read as under :

           “2.   Ramchandra hit Udairam with Farsi which hit  on  his  head
           and both hands.  My brother Gokul was hit by accused Gokul  with
           Dhariya due to which he got injuries on his  head,  both  hands,
           above the eye and on the waist.  Umrao hit  me  with  two  ladhi
           blows which hit me on my hand and foot.  The accused hit a lot.

                    XXX              XXX              XXX

           3.    Accused Ramchand had hit farsi on my head, Atmaram had hit
           lathi which hit me  near  the  joint  of  my  left  hand  thumb.
           Accused Gokul hit my brother Gokul  on  the  head  with  Dharia.
           Ramchand had hit after me, my brother Gokul with  farsi  on  his
           head.  The other accused started hitting my brother  with  lathi
           due to which my brother fell down and I was also  attached  with
           lathi.  My sister Rajubai was also hit  with  lathi  by  accused
           Umrao.  She had received injury on her  hand  and  Rajubai  also
           received injury on her foot.”



12.   From a bare reading of the statements of these witnesses, it is  clear
that according to PW1, not only Gokul, the accused,  had  caused  injury  on
the head of the deceased by  farsi  but  accused  persons  had  also  caused
injuries to him with lathis etc.  However,  according  to  PW2,  Gokul,  the
accused, had caused injuries on the head of the deceased, both hands,  above
the eyes and on the wrist while  other  accused  hit  her.  This  cannot  be
termed  as  a  material  contradiction  in  the  statements  of  these   two
witnesses.  These are two eye-witnesses who themselves were injured  by  the
accused.  Every  variation  is  incapable  of  being  termed  as  a  serious
contradiction that may prove fatal to the case  of  prosecution.   It  is  a
settled cannon  of  criminal  jurisprudence  that  every  statement  of  the
witness must be examined in its entirety and  the  Court  may  not  rely  or
reject the entire statement of a witness  merely  by  reading  one  sentence
from the deposition in isolation and out of context.  In the  present  case,
it has been completely established that both PW1 and PW2  are  injured  eye-
witnesses and their presence at the place of occurrence cannot  be  doubted.
If one reads the statements of PW1 and PW2 in their  entirety,  it  will  be
difficult to trace any element of serious contradiction in their  statements
which may prove fatal to the case of the  prosecution.   PW2,  even  in  the
paragraph extracted above has said that accused ‘hit a lot’.   However,  the
language in which her statement was recorded  states  ‘abhiyukton  ne  khoob
mara’ which obviously means that all the accused had hit  the  deceased  and
other victims including herself, because this sentence immediately  precedes
the part of the statement  where  she  gives  details  of  all  the  accused
persons as well as the injuries inflicted on the  deceased  and  herself  by
each of the accused.  The very first  paragraph  of  her  statement  clearly
indicates the essence of her statement.  She has categorically  stated  that
all the accused persons had come to the site, abused her brother  Gokul  and
clearly claimed that he had burnt their soyabean crop and  that  they  shall
kill him. Whereafter, they started hitting her brothers, Gokul and  Udayram.
 In face of this specific statement and the  medical  evidence  which  shows
presence of as many as ten injuries on the body of the  deceased  Gokul,  it
is difficult to believe that in the given situation, one accused could  have
caused so many injuries  on  the  body  of  deceased,  especially  when  all
accused persons are stated to have caused injuries to the deceased  as  well
as to the witnesses.   It  seems  appropriate  her  to  refer  to  a  recent
judgment of this Court in the case  of  Ashok  Kumar  v.  State  of  Haryana
[(2010)  12  SCC  350]  wherein  this  Court,   while   dealing   with   the
discrepancies in the statement of the witnesses, held as under :


           “41. The above statement  of  this  witness  (DW  3)  in  cross-
           examination, in fact, is clinching evidence and the accused  can
           hardly get out of this statement. The defence would be bound  by
           the statement of the witness,  who  has  been  produced  by  the
           accused, whatever be its worth. In the present case,  DW  3  has
           clearly stated that there was cruelty and  harassment  inflicted
           upon the deceased by her husband and in-laws and also that a sum
           of Rs. 5000 was demanded. The statement of this witness  has  to
           be read in conjunction with the statement of PW 1  to  PW  3  to
           establish  the  case  of  the  prosecution.  There  are  certain
           variations or improvements in the statements of PWs but  all  of
           them are of minor nature. Even if, for  the  sake  of  argument,
           they are taken to be as some  contradictions  or  variations  in
           substance, they are so insignificant and mild that they would in
           no way be fatal to the case of the prosecution.

           42. This Court has to keep in mind the fact  that  the  incident
           had occurred on 16-5-1988  while  the  witnesses  were  examined
           after some time. Thus, it may not be possible for the  witnesses
           to make statements which would be absolute reproduction of their
           earlier statement or line to line or minute  to  minute  correct
           reproduction of the occurrence/events. The Court has to adopt  a
           reasonable and practicable approach and it is only the  material
           or  serious  contradictions/variations  which  can  be  of  some
           consequence to create a dent in the  case  of  the  prosecution.
           Another aspect is that the statements of the witnesses  have  to
           be read in their entirety to examine their truthfulness and  the
           veracity or otherwise. It will neither be just nor fair to  pick
           up just a line from the entire  statement  and  appreciate  that
           evidence out of context and without reference to  the  preceding
           lines and lines appearing after that particular sentence. It  is
           always better and in the interest of both the parties  that  the
           statements of the witnesses are appreciated and  dealt  with  by
           the Court upon their cumulative reading.”




13.   In light of the above judgment, it is clear that  every  variation  or
discrepancy in the statement of a witness  cannot  belie  the  case  of  the
prosecution per se.  It is  true  that  in  the  present  case,  some  other
witnesses have turned hostile and have not fully supported the case  of  the
prosecution, but that by itself would not be a circumstance  for  the  Court
to reject the statements of PW1 and PW2, who  are  reliable  and  worthy  of
credence and  more  particularly,  when  their  presence  at  the  place  of
occurrence has been established beyond reasonable doubt.

14.    The  other  contention  which  has  been  raised  on  behalf  of  the
appellants is that the medical evidence does not support the  statements  of
PW1 and PW2.  This is equally devoid of any merit.  As per the statement  of
PW14, who had prepared the post mortem report, Ext. P30, there were as  many
as ten injuries on the body of the deceased and they were as follows :

           “Similarly on the  said  date  itself,  Gokul  S/o.  Laljiram  @
           Lalchand was brought by Head Constable Chedilal for which he had
           brought Ex.P-3 letter.  I examined him at 6.35  p.m.  and  found
           the following injuries :

           (i)   Incised wound 5½ x scalp thick on left central region.

           (ii)  Incised superficial (skin deep) 1 x ¼ cm. on right  temple
                  near eye.  Both these injuries appear to have been  caused
                  by sharp edged seapon.  It was not possible to  understand
                  injury No.1 therefore, X-ray advice was written and injury
                  No.2 was simple and caused within 0-6 hrs.

           (iii) One contusion 12 x 8 cm on right forearm.

           (iv)  Swelling on left forearm  ½  lower  portion  and  ½  right
                  portion on left side.


            The aforesaid injuries appeared to have been caused  with  hard
           and blunt object and X-ray was advised to ascertain seriousness.


           (v)   One lacerated wound with fracture 2 x 1 x ½ on  right  leg
                  in front on middle  portion  which  appear  to  have  been
                  caused with hard and blunt weapon and was serious within 0-
                  6 hrs. and X-ray was advised for the same.

           (vi)  Lacerated wound 1 x ½ x ¼ on lower portion of left leg.

           (vii) Swelling on left hand in full back portion.

           (viii)      Swelling and contusion 13 x 4 cm.  on  left  forearm
                  out and front portions.  Injuries Nos.6, 7 and 8 appear to
                  have been caused with hard and  blunt  weapon  and  simple
                  caused within 0-6 hrs.

           (ix)  One contusion with parallel margin on left  forearm  which
                  appear to have been caused with hard and blunt weapon like
                  lathi and X-ray was advised for this injury.

           (x)   One contusion of parallel margin of 28 x 1  cm.  in  front
                  portion of the chest laterally.  It appeared to have  been
                  caused with hard and blunt weapon  like  lathi  which  was
                  simple caused within 6 hrs.”




15.   All that PW1 and PW2 have stated is that  the  accused  had  inflicted
the injury on the head of the deceased with a farsi and even on other  parts
of the body of the deceased.  According to  them,  even  other  accused  had
inflicted injuries upon the body of the deceased with lathis.   The  accused
were carrying farsi, dharia and lathis,  as  per  the  statements  of  these
witnesses.  The medical evidence  clearly  shows  that  there  were  incised
wounds, contusions, lacerated wounds  and  swelling  found  in  the  various
injuries on the body of the deceased.  The Investigating Officer, PW26,  has
clearly proved the case of  the  prosecution  with  the  assistance  of  the
corroborating evidence.  We see no reason to accept this  contention  raised
on behalf of the appellants.

16.   Before dealing with the  last  contention  raised  on  behalf  of  the
appellants, we may usefully refer to some pertinent aspects of the  case  of
the prosecution.  In this case, the incident  had  occurred  at  about  4.30
p.m. on 6th November, 1993 and the FIR itself was registered  at  6.30  p.m.
on the statement of PW1 recorded in the hospital.  In the  hospital  itself,
the doctor  had  also  recorded  the  dying  declaration  Ext.  P-6  of  the
deceased.  The relevant part of the declaration reads as under :

           “My First question was : What is your name?

           Ans : Gokulsingh S/o Laljiram Lalsingh.

           Q: Where do you live?

           Ans: Dhuankheri.

           I again asked what happened to you when he replied that the well
           of Kanhaiya, myself, my brother Udayram and sister were hit by 5
           brothers Ramchand, Umrao, Vikram,  Gokul  and  Atmaram  sons  of
           Devaji of Balai caste.  He stated so.  Thereafter I asked  where
           all have you received injuries  whereupon  he  replied  that  on
           head, hands and legs.  Thereafter I  again  asked  who  saw  you
           being beaten up then he replied that we were seen by  Udaysingh,
           Gokulsingh, Gajrajsingh, Ramchandra etc.  I again asked what did
           you do thereupon he replied, what could we do, we were un-armed,
           we kept shouting.  Our sister had tried to rescue us.”




17.   After recording of the FIR, Ext. P-37 the  investigation  was  started
immediately and on the second day, the  accused  were  taken  into  custody.
Names of all the accused were duly shown in Column No.7  of  the  FIR.   Two
witnesses,  PW1  and  PW2,  have  given  the  eye  witness  version  of  the
occurrence.  All the accused persons were hiding  themselves  in  the  field
and had a clear intention to kill the deceased.  The motive  for  commission
of the offence which, of course, is not  an  essential  but  is  a  relevant
consideration, has also been brought out in  the  case  of  the  prosecution
that the deceased had allegedly burnt their soyabean crops  and,  therefore,
the accused wanted to do away with  the  deceased  Gokul  and  his  brother.
These factors have been clearly brought out in  the  statement  of  PW1  and
PW2.  The fact that these injuries were inflicted by  a  collective  offence
upon the deceased and the injured witnesses is duly  demonstrated  not  only
by the medical report, but also by the statements of the  doctors,  PW4  and
PW14.  Thus, the prosecution has been able to establish its case.

18.   The contention lastly raised on behalf of the appellants  is  that  no
single injury has been found to be sufficient  in  the  ordinary  course  of
nature to cause death as per the medical evidence.  There was  no  intention
on the part of the accused to cause death of the deceased.   At  best,  they
have only caused an injury which was likely to cause death.   Therefore,  no
case for an offence under Section 302 IPC is  made  out  and,  at  best,  it
could be a case under Section 304 Part  II  and/or  even  Section  326  IPC.
Reliance has been placed upon the judgments of this Court  in  the  case  of
Molu & Ors. v. State of Haryana [(1976) 4 SCC 362] and Rattan Singh  &  Ors.
v. State  of  Punjab  [1988  Supp.  SCC  456].   In  any  case  and  in  the
alternative, it is also contended that as per the statement of PW2,  accused
Gokul alone had caused injuries to  the  deceased  and  therefore,  all  the
other accused persons are entitled to acquittal or at best,  are  liable  to
be convicted under  Section  326  IPC  for  causing  injuries  to  the  eye-
witnesses, PW1 and PW2 or even to  the  deceased.   This  argument,  at  the
first blush, appears to be have substance, but when examined in  its  proper
perspective and in light of the settled law, we find it untenable,  for  the
reason that even in the case of Molu (supra), this Court  had  noticed  that
none of the injuries was on  any  vital  part  of  the  bodies  of  the  two
deceased persons and even injuries  upon  the  skull  appeared  to  be  very
superficial.  There was nothing to show that the accused intended  to  cause
murder of the deceased persons deliberately and there  was  no  evidence  to
show that any of the accused ordered the killing of the deceased persons  or
indicated or in any way expressed a desire to kill the deceased  persons  on
the spot.  It was upon returning this finding on  appreciation  of  evidence
that the Court found that there was only a common intention to  assault  the
deceased, with the knowledge that the injuries caused to  them  were  likely
to  cause  death  of  the  deceased  and,  therefore,  the  Court  permitted
alteration of the offence from that under Section 302 to one  under  Section
304 Part II, IPC.  Also in the case of Rattan Singh (supra), this Court  had
found that as per the case of the prosecution, the injuries  on  the  person
of the deceased which could be attributed to the accused were either on  the
hands or feet and at best could have resulted in  fractures.   None  of  the
appellants could be convicted for causing such injuries  individually  which
could make out an offence under Section 302 and,  thus,  the  Court  altered
the offence.

19.   We are unable to see as to what  assistance  the  appellants  seek  to
derive from these two judgments.  They were judgments  on  their  own  facts
and in the case of Molu (supra), as discussed above, the Court  had  clearly
returned a finding that the accused had no intention to  kill  the  accused,
which is not the  circumstance  in  the  case  at  hand.   If  there  is  an
intention  to  kill  and  with  that  intent,  injury  is  caused  which  is
sufficient to cause death  in  the  ordinary  course  of  nature,  then  the
offence would clearly fall within the ambit of para Thirdly of  Section  300
IPC and, therefore, would be culpable homicide amounting to murder.  In  the
present case, the intention on the part  of  the  accused  persons  to  kill
Gokul was manifest as is evident from the statements of PW1  and  PW2.   The
cause for having such an intent is  also  proved  by  the  prosecution  that
according to the accused, Gokul and PW1  had  burnt  their  soyabean  crops.
The manner in which all the accused assaulted the  deceased  even  after  he
fell to the ground and the act of   continuously  inflicting  blows  on  the
body of the deceased, clearly shows that they had a pre-determined  mind  to
kill the deceased at any cost, which they did.  In  the  case  of  State  of
Haryana  v.  Shakuntala & Ors. [2012 (4) SCALE 526], this Court held :

           “…Reverting back to the present case, it is clear that,  as  per
           the case of the prosecution, there were more than  five  persons
           assembled at the incident.  All these  nine  persons  were  also
           convicted by the Trial Court and the conviction and sentence  of
           six of them has been affirmed by the High Court.    The  members
           of this assembly had acted in furtherance to the  common  object
           and the same object was made absolutely clear by  the  words  of
           accused Matadin, when he exhorted all the others to ‘finish’ the
           deceased persons.

           27.   In other words, the intention and object on  the  part  of
           this group was clear.  They had come with the express object  of
           killing Manohar Lal and his family members.   It might have been
           possible for one to say that they had come there  not  with  the
           intention to commit murder, but only with the object of  beating
           and abusing Manohar Lal and others, but in view of the manner in
           which Matadin exhorted all the others and the  manner  in  which
           they acted thereafter, clearly establishes that their  intention
           was  not  to  inflict   injuries   simplicitor.   Manohar   Lal,
           admittedly, had fallen on the  ground.    However,  the  accused
           still continued inflicting heavy blows on him and kept on  doing
           so till he breathed his last.  They did not even spare his  wife
           Sushila and inflicted as many as 33 injuries on her body.  Where
           a person has the intention  to  cause  injuries  simplicitor  to
           another, he/she would certainly not inflict  30/33  injuries  on
           the different parts of the body of  the  victim,  including  the
           spine.    The spine is a very delicate and  vital  part  of  the
           human body.   It, along with the ribs  protects  all  the  vital
           organs of the body, the heart and lungs, etc.    Powerful  blows
           on these parts of the body can, in normal course, result in  the
           death of a person, as has happened in the case before  us.   The
           way in which the crime has been committed reflects  nothing  but
           sheer brutality.   The members of the assembly, therefore,  were
           aware that their acts were going to result in the death  of  the
           deceased.    Therefore, we find no merit in this  contention  of
           the accused also.”






20.   They even caused injuries to the  vital  parts  of  the  body  of  the
deceased, i.e., the skull.  As per the medical evidence, there  was  incised
wound of 5½”x skull thick on left skull region, which  shows  the  brutality
with which the said head injury was caused to the deceased.

21.   We may usefully refer to the judgment of this Court  in  the  case  of
State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya & Anr.  [(1976)  4  SCC  382]
wherein the Court was concerned with somewhat similar  circumstances,  where
a number of accused had caused multiple bodily injuries to the deceased  and
it was contended that since none of the injuries was caused upon  any  vital
part of the body of the deceased, the offence was, therefore, at best to  be
altered to an offence under Section 304, Part II.  This  contention  of  the
accused had  been  accepted  by  the  High  Court.   While  disturbing  this
finding, this Court held as under :

           “38. Question arose whether in such a case when  no  significant
           injury had been inflicted on a vital part of the body,  and  the
           weapons used were ordinary lathis, and the accused could not  be
           said to have the intention of causing death, the  offence  would
           be “murder”  or  merely  “culpable  homicide  not  amounting  to
           murder”. This Court, speaking through Hidayatullah,  J.  (as  he
           then was) after explaining the  comparative  scope  of  and  the
           distinction between Sections 299 and 300, answered the  question
           in these terms:

                 “The injuries were not on a vital part of the body  and  no
                 weapon  was  used  which  can  be  described  as  specially
                 dangerous. Only lathis were used. It cannot, therefore,  be
                 said safely that there was an intention to cause the  death
                 of Bherun within the first clause of Section  300.  At  the
                 same time, it is obvious  that  his  hands  and  legs  were
                 smashed and numerous  bruises  and  lacerated  wounds  were
                 caused. The number of injuries shows that  everyone  joined
                 in beating him. It is also clear that the assailants  aimed
                 at breaking his arms and  legs.  Looking  at  the  injuries
                 caused to Bherun in furtherance of the common intention  of
                 all it is clear that the injuries  intended  to  be  caused
                 were sufficient to cause death in the  ordinary  course  of
                 nature even if  it  cannot  be  said  that  his  death  was
                 intended. This is  sufficient  to  bring  the  case  within
                 thirdly of Section 300.”

           39. The ratio of Anda v. State  of  Rajasthan  applies  in  full
           force to the facts of the present case. Here,  a  direct  causal
           connection between the act of the  accused  and  the  death  was
           established. The injuries were the direct cause of the death. No
           secondary factor such as  gangrene,  tetanus  etc.,  supervened.
           There was no doubt whatever that the  beating  was  premeditated
           and calculated. Just as in Anda case, here also, the aim of  the
           assailants was to smash the arms and legs of the  deceased,  and
           they succeeded in that design, causing no less than 19 injuries,
           including fractures of most of the bones of  the  legs  and  the
           arms While in Anda case, the sticks used by the assailants  were
           not specially dangerous, in the instant case they were unusually
           heavy, lethal weapons.  All  these  acts  of  the  accused  were
           preplanned and intentional, which, considered objectively in the
           light of the medical evidence, were sufficient in  the  ordinary
           course of nature to cause death. The mere fact that the  beating
           was designedly confined by the assailants to the legs and  arms,
           or that none of the multiple injuries inflicted was individually
           sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, will
           not exclude the application of clause thirdly  of  Section  300.
           The expression “bodily injury” in clause thirdly  includes  also
           its plural, so that the clause would cover a case where all  the
           injuries intentionally caused by the  accused  are  cumulatively
           sufficient to cause the death in the ordinary course of  nature,
           even if none of those injuries individually measures  upto  such
           sufficiency. The  sufficiency  spoken  of  in  this  clause,  as
           already noticed,  is  the  high  probability  of  death  in  the
           ordinary course of nature, and if such  sufficiency  exists  and
           death is caused and the injury causing it  is  intentional,  the
           case would fall under clause thirdly of  Section  300.  All  the
           conditions which are a prerequisite  for  the  applicability  of
           this clause have been established and the offence  committed  by
           the accused, in the instant case was “murder”.

           40. For all the foregoing reasons, we are of  opinion  that  the
           High Court was in  error  in  altering  the  conviction  of  the
           accused-respondent from one under Sections 302, 302/34, to  that
           under  Section  304,  Part  II  of  the  of  the   Penal   Code.
           Accordingly, we allow this appeal and restore the order  of  the
           trial court convicting the accused (Respondent 2 herein) for the
           offence of murder, with a sentence  of  imprisonment  for  life.
           Respondent 2, if he is not already in jail,  shall  be  arrested
           and committed to prison to serve out the sentence  inflicted  on
           him.”




      Reference can also be made to Anda & Ors. v. State of  Rajasthan  [AIR
1996 SC 148].

22.   The case before  us  is  quite  similar  to  the  case  of  Rayavarapu
Punnayya (supra).  The cumulative effect of all the injuries  was  obviously
known to each of the accused, i.e., all the injuries  inflicted  were  bound
to result in the death of  the  deceased  which,  in  fact,  they  intended.
Furthermore, the doctor,  PW14,  had  opined  that  the  deceased  had  died
because of multiple injuries and fracture on the vital organs, due to  shock
and haemorrhage.  In other words, even as  per  the  medical  evidence,  the
injuries were caused on the vital parts of the body of the deceased.

23.   For these reasons, we are unable to accept the  contention  raised  on
behalf of the appellants  that  this  is  a  case  where  the  Court  should
exercise its discretion to alter the offence to one under Section  304  Part
II or Section 326 IPC from that under Section 302 IPC.   We  also  find  the
submission of the learned counsel for the appellants  to  be  without  merit
that accused Gokul alone is  liable  to  be  convicted,  if  at  all,  under
Section 302 IPC and all other accused should be acquitted.   We reject  this
contention in light of the discussion above and  the  fact  that  all  these
accused have been specifically implicated by PW1 and PW2, the  Investigating
Officer, PW26 and the medical evidence.

24.   Having found no substance in the pleas raised by the  learned  counsel
for the appellants, we hereby dismiss the appeal.



                                        .…................................J.
                                                           [Swatanter Kumar]



                                        .…................................J.
                                                  [Ranjan Gogoi]
New Delhi
May 10, 2012

BT. BRINJAL ETC., Genetically Modified Organisms (for short ‘GMOs’) (1) There shall be the Technical Expert Committee, the constitution whereof shall be as follows: a. Prof. V.L. Chopra Specialization/Work Focus:Plant Biotechnology Genetics and Agricultural Science. Former Member, Planning Commission and Former Member, Science & Advisory Committee to the PMO, Recepient of several awards including the Padma Bhushan. b. Dr. Imran Siddiqui Specialization/Work Focus : Plant Development Biology Scientist & Group Leader, Centre for Cellular & Molecular Biology (CCMB) c. Prof. P.S. Ramakrishnan Emeritus Prof. JNU Work Focus : Environmental Sciences and Biodiversity. d. Dr. P.C. Chauhan, D.Phil (Sci) Work Focus : Genetics toxicology and food safety e. Prof. P.C. Kesavan Distinguished Fellow, MS SRF (Research Foundation), Emeritus Professor, CSD, IGNOU, New Delhi. Work Focus : Genetics Toxicology, Radiation Biology and Sustainable Science. f. Dr. B. Sivakumar Former Director, National Institute of Nutrition (NIN), Hyderabad. (2) The terms of reference of the said Committee shall be as follows: a. To review and recommend the nature of sequencing of risk assessment (environment and health safety) studies that need to be done for all GM crops before they are released into the environment. b. To recommend the sequencing of these tests in order to specify the point at which environmental release though Open Field Trials can be permitted. c. To advise on whether a proper evaluation of the genetically engineered crop/plants is scientifically tenable in the green house conditions and whether it is possible to replicate the conditions for testing under different agro ecological regions and seasons in greenhouse? d. To advise on whether specific conditions imposed by the regulatory agencies for Open Field Trials are adequate. If not, recommend what additional measures/safeguards are required to prevent potential risks to the environment. e. Examine the feasibility of prescribing validated protocols and active testing for contamination at a level that would preclude any escaped material from causing an adverse effect on the environment. f. To advise on whether institutions/laboratories in India have the state-of-art testing facilities and professional expertise to conduct various biosafety tests and recommend mechanism to strengthen the same. If no such institutions are available in India, recommend setting up an independent testing laboratory/institution. g. The Expert Committee would be free to review reports or studies authored by national and international scientists if it was felt necessary. The petitioners opined that they would like to formally propose three Expert Reports from Prof. David Andow, Prof. Jack Heinemann and Dr. Doug Gurian Sherman to be a formal part of the Committee’s deliberations. The MoEF may similarly nominate which experts they choose in this exercise. 3. The Court will highly appreciate if the said Committee submits its final report to the Court within three months from today. 4. The Committee may hear the Government, petitioners and any other intervenor in this petition, who, in the opinion of the Committee, shall help the cause of expeditious and accurate finalization of its report. 5. In the event and for any reason whatsoever, the Committee is unable to submit its final report to the Court within the time stipulated in this order, we direct that the Committee should instead submit its interim report within the same period to the Court on the following issue: “Whether there should or should not be any ban, partial or otherwise, upon conducting of open field tests of the GMOs? In the event open field trials are permitted, what protocol should be followed and conditions, if any, that may be imposed by the Court for implementation of open field trials.” 7. Let the matter stand over to 6th August, 2012.


                                                                  REPORTABLE




                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                         CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION


                    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.260 OF 2005


      ARUNA RODRIGUES & ORS.                    … Petitioners





                                   Versus




      UNION OF INDIA & ORS.                         … Respondents


                                    WITH

                    WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 115 OF 2004


                                     AND

                  CONTEMPT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 295 OF 2007


                           IN W.P.(C) NO.260/2005







                                  O R D E R


      Swatanter Kumar, J.
      1.    The petitioners, who claim to  be  public  spirited  individuals
      possessing requisite expertise and with  the  access  to  information,
      stated that a  grave  and  hazardous  situation,  raising  bio  safety
      concerns, is developing in our country due to release  of  Genetically
      Modified Organisms (for short ‘GMOs’).  The GMOs  are  allowed  to  be
      released in the environment without proper scientific  examination  of
      bio safety concerns and  affecting  both  the  environment  and  human
      health.  Thus, the petitioners in  this  Public  Interest  Litigation,
      under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, submit that the  intent
      and substance of the petition is to put in place a protocol that shall
      maintain scientific examination of all relevant aspects of bio  safety
      before such release, if release were to be  at  all  permissible.   On
      this premise, their prayer in  the  main  writ  petition  is  for  the
      issuance of a direction or order to the Union of India, not  to  allow
      any  release  of  GMOs  into  the  environment  by  way   of   import,
      manufacture, use or any other  manner.   The  ancillary  prayers  seek
      prescribing a protocol, to which all GMOs released would be  subjected
      and that the Union of India should frame relevant rules in this regard
      and ensure its implementation.
      2.    This Court, vide its order dated 1st May,  2006,  directed  that
      till further orders, field trials of GMOs shall be conducted only with
      the approval of the Genetic Engineering Approval Committee  (for short
      ‘GEAC’).  I.A. No. 4 was filed, in which the prayer was  for  issuance
      of directions to stop all field trials for  all  genetically  modified
      products anywhere and everywhere.  The  Court,  however,  declined  to
      direct stoppage of field trials and instead,  vide  order  dated  22nd
      September, 2009 directed the GEAC to withhold approvals  till  further
      directions are issued  by  this  Court,  after  hearing  all  parties.
      Except permitting field trials in certain specific cases,  the  orders
      dated 1st May, 2006 and 22nd September, 2009  were  not  substantially
      modified by the Court.  As of 2007, nearly  91  varieties  of  plants,
      i.e., GMOs, were being subjected to open field tests, though in  terms
      of the orders  of  this  Court,  no  further  open  field  tests  were
      permitted nor had the GEAC granted any such approval except  with  the
      authorization  of  this  Court.   This  has  given  rise  to   serious
      controversies before this Court as to whether or not the  field  tests
      of GMOs should be banned, wholly or partially, in the entire  country.
      It is obvious that such technical matters can hardly  be  the  subject
      matter of judicial review.  The Court has no  expertise  to  determine
      such an issue, which, besides being a scientific question, would  have
      very serious and far-reaching consequences.
      3.    Nevertheless, this Court, vide its order dated  8th  May,  2007,
      lifted the moratorium on open field trials, subject to the  conditions
      stated  in  that  order,  including  a  directive  in  regard  to  the
      maintenance of 200 metres isolation distance  while  performing  field
      tests of GMOs.  A further clarification was introduced vide  order  of
      this Court dated 8th April, 2008, whereby all concerned were  directed
      to comply with the specific protocol of Level Of Detection of 0.01 per
      cent.
      4.    The  controversy  afore-referred  still  persisted  and  further
      applications were filed.  Amongst others, I.A. No. 32 of 2011 was also
      filed.  The prayers, in all the  aforesaid  applications,  related  to
      imposition of an absolute ban on GMOs in the country  and  appointment
      of an Expert Committee whose advice might be sought on  these  issues.
      Due to non-adherence to specified protocol and in face of  the  report
      of one  of  the  independent  Experts,  Dr.  P.M.  Bhargava,  who  was
      appointed to meet with the GEAC by the orders of this Court dated 30th
      April, 2009, the Government, on its own, imposed a complete ban on  Bt
      Brinjal.
      5.    In I.A. No. 32 of 2011, besides making prayers as noticed above,
      the Minutes of the meeting of the Ministry of Environment and Forests,
      Union of India dated 15th March, 2011 where even the  petitioners  had
      participated was also annexed.  In these Minutes, the  composition  of
      the Expert Committee as well as the terms of reference was  suggested.
      The learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for  the  Union  of
      India had initially taken time  to  seek  instructions,  if  any,  for
      further modifications, as suggested by the learned  counsel  appearing
      for the petitioner, to be made to the constitution of  the  Committee.
      Later, it was stated before us that the  Government  prayed  only  for
      constitution of the Committee as  well  as  the  terms  of  reference,
      exactly as proposed in its Minutes dated 15th March, 2011, without any
      amendments.
      6.    We heard the learned counsel appearing for the different parties
      at some length.  They all were ad idem  on  the  constitution  of  the
      Expert Committee and the  terms  of  reference  as  suggested  in  the
      Minutes of the Ministry’s meeting dated 15th March, 2011  and  jointly
      prayed for its implementation.  However,  then  it  was  submitted  on
      behalf of the petitioner, respondent and other intervenors that before
      taking a final view and submitting  its  Report  to  this  Court,  the
      Committee may hear them.  In view of the above, we pass the  following
      consented order, primarily and substantially  with  reference  to  the
      Minutes dated 15th March, 2011: -
        (1) There   shall   be   the   Technical     Expert      Committee,
         the
               constitution whereof shall be as follows:
                 a.  Prof. V.L. Chopra
         Specialization/Work   Focus:Plant   Biotechnology   Genetics    and
           Agricultural Science.  Former Member,  Planning  Commission  and
           Former  Member,  Science  &  Advisory  Committee  to  the   PMO,
           Recepient of several awards including the Padma Bhushan.


                 b. Dr. Imran Siddiqui
       Specialization/Work Focus : Plant Development Biology
       Scientist & Group Leader, Centre for  Cellular  &  Molecular  Biology
           (CCMB)


                 c. Prof. P.S. Ramakrishnan
       Emeritus Prof. JNU
       Work Focus : Environmental Sciences and Biodiversity.


                 d. Dr. P.C. Chauhan, D.Phil (Sci)
       Work Focus : Genetics toxicology and food safety


                 e. Prof. P.C. Kesavan
        Distinguished  Fellow,  MS  SRF  (Research   Foundation),   Emeritus
           Professor, CSD, IGNOU, New Delhi.
       Work Focus : Genetics Toxicology, Radiation Biology  and  Sustainable
           Science.




                 f. Dr. B. Sivakumar
       Former Director, National Institute of Nutrition (NIN), Hyderabad.


      (2)   The terms of  reference  of  the  said  Committee  shall  be  as
            follows:
     a. To review and recommend the nature of sequencing of risk assessment
        (environment and health safety) studies that need to  be  done  for
        all GM crops before they are released into the environment.

     b. To recommend the sequencing of these tests in order to specify  the
        point at which environmental release though Open Field  Trials  can
        be permitted.

     c. To advise  on  whether  a  proper  evaluation  of  the  genetically
        engineered crop/plants is scientifically tenable in the green house
        conditions and whether it is possible to replicate  the  conditions
        for testing under different agro ecological regions and seasons  in
        greenhouse?

     d. To advise on whether specific conditions imposed by the  regulatory
        agencies for Open Field Trials are  adequate.   If  not,  recommend
        what  additional  measures/safeguards  are  required   to   prevent
        potential risks to the environment.

     e. Examine the feasibility of prescribing validated protocols and
        active testing for contamination at a level that would preclude any
        escaped material from causing an adverse effect on the environment.

     f. To advise on whether institutions/laboratories in  India  have  the
        state-of-art  testing  facilities  and  professional  expertise  to
        conduct  various  biosafety  tests  and  recommend   mechanism   to
        strengthen the same.  If no  such  institutions  are  available  in
        India,   recommend    setting    up    an    independent    testing
        laboratory/institution.





     g. The Expert Committee would be free to  review  reports  or  studies
        authored by national and international scientists if  it  was  felt
        necessary.  The petitioners opined that they would like to formally
        propose three Expert Reports from Prof.  David  Andow,  Prof.  Jack
        Heinemann and Dr. Doug Gurian Sherman to be a formal  part  of  the
        Committee’s deliberations.  The MoEF may similarly  nominate  which
        experts they choose in this exercise.



      3.    The Court will highly appreciate if the said  Committee  submits
      its final report to the Court within three months from today.

      4.    The Committee may hear the Government, petitioners and any other
      intervenor in this petition, who, in the  opinion  of  the  Committee,
      shall help the cause of expeditious and accurate finalization  of  its
      report.
      5.    In the event and for any reason  whatsoever,  the  Committee  is
      unable to submit its  final  report  to  the  Court  within  the  time
      stipulated in this order, we direct that the Committee should  instead
      submit its interim report within the same period to the Court  on  the
      following issue: “Whether there should  or  should  not  be  any  ban,
      partial or otherwise, upon conducting of open field tests of the GMOs?
       In the event open field trials are permitted, what protocol should be
      followed and conditions, if any, that may be imposed by the Court  for
      implementation of open field trials.”
      7.    Let the matter stand over to 6th August, 2012.




                                            ….…………......................CJI.
                                                              (S.H. Kapadia)








                                             …….…………......................J.
                                                              (A.K. Patnaik)








                                           ...….…………......................J.
                                                           (Swatanter Kumar)


      New Delhi
      May 10, 2012

whether the appellant-company was, in the facts and circumstances of the case, offering any ‘service’ to the respondents within the meaning of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 so as to make it amenable to the jurisdiction of the fora established under the said Act. Relying upon the decision of this Court in Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta (1994) 1 SCC 243, the High Court has answered the question in the affirmative and held that the respondents were ‘consumers’ and the appellant was a ‘service’ provider within the meaning of the Act aforementioned, hence amenable to the jurisdiction of the fora under the said Act.Having regard to the nature of the transaction between the appellant- company and its customers which involved much more than a simple transfer of a piece of immovable property it is clear that the same constituted ‘service’ within the meaning of the Act. the activities of the appellant- company in the present case involving offer of plots for sale to its customers/members with an assurance of development of infrastructure/amenities, lay-out approvals etc. was a ‘service’ within the meaning of clause (o) of Section 2(1) of the Act and would, therefore, be amenable to the jurisdiction of the fora established under the statute. It is a case where a clear cut assurance was made to the purchasers as to the nature and the extent of development that would be carried out by the appellant-company as a part of the package under which sale of fully developed plots with assured facilities was to be made in favour of the purchasers for valuable consideration. To the extent the transfer of the site with developments in the manner and to the extent indicated earlier was a part of the transaction, the appellant-company had indeed undertaken to provide a service. Any deficiency or defect in such service would make it accountable before the competent consumer forum at the instance of consumers like the respondents. This Court in Bangalore Development Authority v. Syndicate Bank (2007) 6 SCC 711, dealt with the nature of the relief that can be claimed by consumers in the event of refusal or delay in the transfer of the title of the property in favour of the allottees/purchasers and observed: “Where full payment is made and possession is delivered, but title deed is not executed without any justifiable cause, the allottee may be awarded compensation, for harassment and mental agony, in addition to appropriate direction for execution and delivery of title deed.” 9. Suffice it to say that the legal position on the subject is fairly well-settled by the pronouncements of this Court and do not require any reiteration. The High Court has correctly noticed the said pronouncements and applied them to the facts of the case at hand leaving no room for us to interfere with the answer given by it to the solitary question raised by the appellant-company.


                                                   REPORTABLE

                         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                   CIVIL APPEAL NOS.    4432-4450  OF 2012
              (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos.3499-3517 of 2011


M/s Narne Construction P. Ltd.
etc. etc.                                          …Appellants



                 Versus

Union of India & Ors. etc.                         …Respondents







                               J U D G M E N T

T.S. THAKUR, J.


1.    The short question that falls for determination in  these  appeals  by
special leave is  whether  the  appellant-company  was,  in  the  facts  and
circumstances of the case, offering any ‘service’ to the respondents  within
the meaning of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 so as to make  it  amenable
to the jurisdiction of the fora established  under  the  said  Act.  Relying
upon the decision of this Court in Lucknow  Development  Authority  v.  M.K.
Gupta (1994) 1 SCC 243, the High Court has  answered  the  question  in  the
affirmative  and  held  that  the  respondents  were  ‘consumers’  and   the
appellant  was  a  ‘service’  provider  within  the  meaning  of   the   Act
aforementioned, hence amenable to the jurisdiction of  the  fora  under  the
said Act.


2.    The undisputed facts in the context of which the question arises  have
been summed up by the High Court in the following words:



         “Indisputable facts are that the opposite party  promoted  ventures
         for development of lands into house-sites and invited the intending
         purchasers through paper  publication  and  brochures  to  join  as
         members. The  complainants  responded  and  joined  as  members  on
         payment of  fees.  It  is  also  indisputable  that  the  sale  and
         allotment of plots were subject to terms and  conditions  extracted
         supra. The sale is not open to any  general  buyer  but  restricted
         only to the persons who have joined as members on  payment  of  the
         stipulated  fee.  The  members  should  abide  by  the  terms   and
         conditions set out by the seller. The sale is  not  on  "as  it  is
         where it is" basis. The terms and conditions stipulated for sale of
         only developed plots and the registration of  the  plots  would  be
         made after the sanction of lay out by  the  concerned  authorities.
         The sale price was  not  for  the  virgin  land  but  included  the
         development of sites and provision of infrastructure. The  opposite
         party has undertaken the  obligations  to  develop  the  plots  and
         obtain permissions/approvals of the lay outs.  The  opposite  party
         itself pleaded in its counters that the  plots  were  developed  by
         spending huge amounts and subsequent to the  amounts  paid  by  the
         complainants also  plots  were  developed.  It  pleaded  that  huge
         amounts were  spent  towards  protection  of  the  plots  from  the
         grabbers  and  developed  roads,  open  drains,   sewerage   lines,
         streetlights etc. It is therefore, manifest  that  the  transaction
         between the parties is not a  sale  simplicitor  but  coupled  with
         obligations  for  development  and  provision  of   infrastructure.
         Inevitably, there is an element of service in the discharge of  the
         said obligations.”


3.    In Lucknow Development  Authority’s  case  (supra)  this  Court  while
dealing with the meaning of the expressions ‘consumer’ and  ‘service’  under
the Consumer Protection Act observed that the provisions of the Act must  be
liberally interpreted in  favour  of  the  consumers  as  the  enactment  in
question was a beneficial piece of legislation. While examining the  meaning
of the term ‘consumer’ this Court observed:



         “……….. The  word  'consumer'  is  a  comprehensive  expression.  It
         extends from a person who buys any commodity to consume  either  as
         eatable or otherwise from  a  shop,  business  house,  corporation,
         store, fair price shop to use of private  or  public  services.  In
         Oxford Dictionary a consumer is defined as, "a purchaser  of  goods
         or services". In Black's Law Dictionary it is  explained  to  mean,
         "one who consumes. Individuals who  purchase,  use,  maintain,  and
         dispose of products and services. A member of that broad  class  of
         people who are affected by pricing policies,  financing  practices,
         quality of goods and services, credit reporting,  debt  collection,
         and other trade practices for  which  state  and  federal  consumer
         protection laws are enacted.”  The  Act  opts  for  no  less  wider
         definition.”



4.    Similarly, this Court while examining the true  purport  of  the  word
‘service’ appearing in the legislation observed:



         “It is in three parts. The  main  part  is  followed  by  inclusive
         clause and ends by exclusionary clause. The main clause  itself  is
         very wide. It applies to any service made  available  to  potential
         users. The words 'any' and 'potential' are significant. Both are of
         wide amplitude. The word 'any' dictionarily means 'one or  some  or
         all'. In Black's Law Dictionary it is explained thus,  "word  'any'
         has a diversity of meaning and may be employed to indicate 'all' or
         'every' as well as 'some' or 'one'  and  its  meaning  in  a  given
         statute depends upon the context  and  the  subject-matter  of  the
         statute". The use of the word 'any' in the context it has been used
         in Clause (o) indicates that  it  has  been  used  in  wider  sense
         extending from one to all. The other word 'potential' is again very
         wide. In Oxford Dictionary it is defined as 'capable of coming into
         being, possibility'. In Black's Law Dictionary  it  is  defined  as
         "existing in possibility but not in  act.  Naturally  and  probably
         expected to come into existence at some future time, though not now
         existing; for example, the future product of grain or trees already
         planted, or the successive future  instalments  or  payments  on  a
         contract or engagement already made." In other words service  which
         is not only extended to actual users but those who are  capable  of
         using it are covered in the definition. The  clause  is  thus  very
         wide and extends to any or all actual or potential users.  But  the
         legislature did not stop there. It expanded the meaning of the word
         further in modern sense by extending it to even such facilities  as
         are available to a consumer in connection with  banking,  financing
         etc. Each of these are wide-ranging activities in day to day  life.
         They are discharged  both  by  statutory  and  private  bodies.  In
         absence of any indication, express or implied there is no reason to
         hold that authorities created by the statute are beyond purview  of
         the Act. When banks advance  loan  or  accept  deposit  or  provide
         facility of locker they undoubtedly render service. A State Bank or
         nationalised bank renders as  much  service  as  private  bank.  No
         distinction can  be  drawn  in  private  and  public  transport  or
         insurance companies. Even the supply of electricity  or  gas  which
         throughout  the  country  is  being  made,  mainly,  by   statutory
         authorities is included in it. The legislative  intention  is  thus
         clear to protect a  consumer  against  services  rendered  even  by
         statutory bodies. The test, therefore, is not if a  person  against
         whom complaint is made is a statutory body but whether  the  nature
         of the duty and  function  performed  by  it  is  service  or  even
         facility.”

                                               (emphasis supplied)


5.    In the context of the housing  construction  and  building  activities
carried on by  a  private  or  statutory  body  and  whether  such  activity
tantamounts to service within the meaning of clause (o) of Section  2(1)  of
the Act, the Court observed:


         “As  pointed  out  earlier  the  entire  purpose  of  widening  the
         definition is to include in it not  only  day  to  day  buying  and
         selling  activity  undertaken  by  a  common  man  but  even   such
         activities which are otherwise not commercial in  nature  yet  they
         partake of a character in which some benefit is  conferred  on  the
         consumer. Construction of a house or flat is  for  the  benefit  of
         person for whom it is constructed. He may do  it  himself  or  hire
         services  of  a  builder  or  contractor.  The  latter  being   for
         consideration is service as defined in the Act.  Similarly  when  a
         statutory authority develops land or allots a site or constructs  a
         house for the benefit of common man it is as much service as  by  a
         builder or contractor. The one is  contractual  service  and  other
         statutory service. If the service is defective or it  is  not  what
         was represented then it would be unfair trade practice  as  defined
         in the Act. Any defect in construction activity would be denial  of
         comfort and service to a consumer. When possession of  property  is
         not delivered within stipulated  period  the  delay  so  caused  is
         denial of service. Such disputes or claims are not  in  respect  of
         Immovable property as argued but deficiency in rendering of service
         of particular standard, quality  or  grade.  Such  deficiencies  or
         omissions are defined in Sub-clause (ii) of Clause (r) of Section 2
         as unfair trade practice. If a builder of a house uses  substandard
         material in construction of a building or makes false or misleading
         representation about the condition of the house then it  is  denial
         of the facility or benefit of which a consumer is entitled to claim
         value under the Act. When the contractor or builder  undertakes  to
         erect a house or flat then it is  inherent  in  it  that  he  shall
         perform his obligation as agreed to. A flat with a leaking roof, or
         cracking wall or substandard floor is denial of service.  Similarly
         when a statutory authority undertakes to  develop  land  and  frame
         housing scheme, it, while performing statutory duty renders service
         to the society in general and individual in particular.”


                                        (emphasis supplied)






6.    This Court further held that when a person applies  for  allotment  of
building site or for a flat constructed by development authority and  enters
into an agreement with the developer or a  contractor,  the  nature  of  the
transaction is covered by the expression ‘service’ of any  description.  The
housing construction or  building  activity  carried  on  by  a  private  or
statutory body was, therefore, held to be ‘service’ within  the  meaning  of
clause (o) of Section 2(1) of the Act as it stood prior to the inclusion  of
the expression ‘housing construction’ in  the  definition  of  ‘service’  by
Ordinance No.24 of 1993.



7.    In the light of the above pronouncement of this Court the  High  Court
was perfectly justified in holding that the  activities  of  the  appellant-
company in the present case  involving  offer  of  plots  for  sale  to  its
customers/members    with     an     assurance     of     development     of
infrastructure/amenities, lay-out approvals etc. was a ‘service’ within  the
meaning of clause (o) of Section 2(1) of the Act and  would,  therefore,  be
amenable to the jurisdiction of the  fora  established  under  the  statute.
Having regard to the  nature  of  the  transaction  between  the  appellant-
company and its customers which involved much more than  a  simple  transfer
of a piece of immovable property it  is  clear  that  the  same  constituted
‘service’ within the meaning of the  Act.  It  was  not  a  case  where  the
appellant-company was selling the given property with all advantages  and/or
disadvantages on “as is where  is”  basis,  as  was  the  position  in  U.T.
Chandigarh Administration and Anr. v. Amarjeet Singh and Ors. (2009)  4  SCC
660.  It is a case where a clear cut assurance was made  to  the  purchasers
as to the nature and the extent of development that would be carried out  by
the appellant-company as a part of the package under  which  sale  of  fully
developed plots with assured facilities was to be  made  in  favour  of  the
purchasers for valuable consideration.  To the extent the  transfer  of  the
site with developments in the manner and to  the  extent  indicated  earlier
was a part of the transaction, the appellant-company had  indeed  undertaken
to provide a service. Any deficiency or defect in such  service  would  make
it accountable before the  competent  consumer  forum  at  the  instance  of
consumers like the respondents.

8.    This Court  in  Bangalore  Development  Authority  v.  Syndicate  Bank
(2007) 6 SCC 711, dealt with the nature of the relief that  can  be  claimed
by consumers in the event of refusal or delay in the transfer of  the  title
of the property in favour of the allottees/purchasers and observed:


         “Where full payment is made and possession is delivered, but  title
         deed is not executed without any justifiable  cause,  the  allottee
         may be awarded compensation, for harassment and  mental  agony,  in
         addition to appropriate direction for  execution  and  delivery  of
         title deed.”


9.    Suffice it to say that the legal position on  the  subject  is  fairly
well-settled by the pronouncements of this Court  and  do  not  require  any
reiteration. The High Court has correctly noticed  the  said  pronouncements
and applied them to the facts of the case at hand leaving no room for us  to
interfere with the answer given by it to the  solitary  question  raised  by
the appellant-company.

10.   In  the  result,  these  appeals  are  hereby  dismissed  but  in  the
circumstances without any order as to cost.




                                                        ……………………..……………..…J.
                                                               (T.S. THAKUR)



                                                          ……………………………….………J.
                                                          (GYAN SUDHA MISRA)
New Delhi
May 10, 2012

transfer of Criminal Case No. 45 of 2008 pending in the Court of Special Judge, CBI Cases, Rohini Courts, New Delhi to the Court of Special Judge, CBI Cases, Court of Sessions at Thane, Maharashtra on the ground of convenience of the parties and the witnesses cited in the charge sheet by the prosecution. In the result, we allow this petition and transfer Criminal Case No.45 of 2008 entitled C.B.I v. Mrudul Milind Damle & Anr. pending in the Court of Special Judge, CBI Cases, Rohini Courts, New Delhi to the Court of Special Judge, CBI Cases, Court of Sessions at Thane, Maharashtra. The record of the case shall be forthwith transferred to the transferee Court which shall take up the matter and dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible.


                                                           REPORTABLE



                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA



                       CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION


                   TRANSFER PETITION (CRL.) NO.17 OF 2012


Mrudul M. Damle & Anr.                       …Petitioners

      Versus

C.B.I. New Delhi                             …Respondent



                               J U D G M E N T

T.S. THAKUR, J.

1.    In this petition under Section 406 of the Code of Criminal  Procedure,
1973, the petitioners pray for transfer of Criminal  Case  No.  45  of  2008
pending in the Court of Special Judge, CBI Cases, Rohini Courts,  New  Delhi
to the Court of Special Judge,  CBI  Cases,  Court  of  Sessions  at  Thane,
Maharashtra on the ground of convenience of the parties  and  the  witnesses
cited in the charge sheet by the prosecution.
2.    Petitioners are husband and wife.  While  petitioner  No.2-husband  is
currently posted as Assistant  Commissioner,  Central  Excise,  Customs  and
Service Tax at Vapi,  Gujarat,  petitioner  No.1-wife  is  practicing  as  a
Chartered Accountant in the State of Maharashtra.  Both the petitioners  are
facing prosecution in Criminal Case No.45 of 2008  for  offences  punishable
under Sections 13(1)(e) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,  1988
read with Section 109 IPC.  The said case was registered on 14th July,  2005
against the petitioner-husband on the basis of recovery of  cash  and  other
property in the course of searches conducted at his houses in New Delhi  and
Thane. The bank locker in the name of  the  petitioner  No.1-wife  was  also
seized in the course of the said search operations.
3.    The prosecution case, it appears, is that the  petitioner  No.2-Milind
Purushottam Damle while posted as Assistant  Commissioner,  Central  Excise,
Customs and Service Tax at New Delhi, has  amassed  assets  disproportionate
to the known sources of his income in his  name  and  in  the  name  of  his
family during the period 1.4.2000  to  2.2.2005.   Upon  completion  of  the
investigation a charge-sheet was filed  against  the  couple  in  which  the
prosecution charged the husband with the commission of  offences  punishable
under Sections 13(1)(e) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,  1988
while the wife was accused of abetment of the said offence punishable  under
Sections 13(1)(e) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,  1988  read
with Section 109 IPC.  The charge-sheet  in  question  was  initially  filed
before  the  Special  Judge,  CBI  cases,  Patiala  House,  New  Delhi   but
subsequently transferred to the Court of Special Judge, CBI  cases,  Rohini,
New Delhi.  The charge-sheet enlists as many as 92 witnesses  to  prove  the
prosecution case. It is not in dispute that 88 out of the said 92  witnesses
are from the State of Maharashtra, most of them  being  either  from  Thane,
Mumbai or  Navi  Mumbai  districts  while  some  are  from  Pune  or  Satara
districts of that State. The remaining 4 witnesses cited at  serial  nos.62,
68, 91 and 92 of the charge-sheet are from  Delhi.  Two  of  the  said  four
witnesses are said to be no longer in Delhi.  The  petitioners  allege  that
they have been regularly attending the Court in Delhi ever since the charge-
sheet was filed but not much progress has been made towards  the  conclusion
of the trial so far.  Petitioner  No.1,  who  happens  to  be  a  practising
Chartered Accountant in Thane, has apart from her professional  commitments,
responsibility towards her mother who is aged 75 years and  who  stays  with
her.  Appearance of the said petitioner in  Delhi  would,  therefore,  cause
inconvenience to her on personal, professional and even  the  family  front.
So also petitioner  No.2  who  is  currently  posted  at  Gujarat  finds  it
extremely inconvenient to travel all the way  to  Delhi  on  every  date  of
hearing. The petitioners assert that transfer of  the  case  from  Delhi  to
Thane would, in the above circumstances, not only be convenient to  the  two
accused persons facing the trial but also to  the  witnesses  cited  by  the
prosecution who shall find it easier  to  appear  for  their  deposition  at
Thane rather than travelling all the way to Delhi.

4.    The petition has been opposed  by  the  respondent  who  has  filed  a
counter-affidavit sworn by Sr. Supdt. of Police, ACU-IV, CBI, New Delhi,  in
which the respondent has tried to justify the filing of the  chargesheet  in
Delhi on the ground that petitioner No.2 was during the  check  period  i.e.
1.4.2000 to 2.2.2005 posted  at  Central  Excise,  New  Delhi  as  Assistant
Commissioner w.e.f. 19th December, 2002 till the registration  of  the  FIR.
The counter-affidavit does not however dispute the fact that 88  out  of  92
witnesses cited by the prosecution are from Maharashtra.
5.    We have heard learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. H.P.  Rawal,
Additional Solicitor  General  for  the  respondent.   Section  406  of  the
Cr.P.C. empowers this Court  to  transfer  cases  from  one  High  Court  to
another High Court or from a Criminal Court subordinate to  one  High  Court
to another Criminal Court of equal or superior jurisdiction  subordinate  to
another High Court whenever it is made to  appear  to  this  Court  that  an
order to that effect is expedient for the ends of justice.  The  source  and
the plentitude of the power to transfer are not disputed before  us  by  Mr.
Rawal, counsel appearing for the respondent. Even otherwise as  observed  by
this Court in Dr. Subramaniam Swamy v. Ramakrishna Hegde  (1990)  1  SCC  4,
the question of  expediency  depends  upon  the  facts  of  each  case,  the
paramount consideration being the need to meet the ends of justice.
6.    The material facts relevant to the determination of  the  question  of
expediency are not in dispute inasmuch as  the  respondent  do  not  dispute
that the chargesheet enlists 92 witnesses, 88 out of whom are  from  outside
Delhi and from different places in Maharashtra.  It is also not  in  dispute
that  petitioner  No.1  is  a  Chartered  Accountant  practising  in  Thane,
petitioner No.2 who is the only other accused in the case who  is  currently
posted at Vapi in the State of Gujarat  which  is  in  comparison  to  Delhi
closer to Thane.  It is in the light of those admitted  facts  obvious  that
the trial in Rohini Court at Delhi would be inconvenient  not  only  to  the
accused  persons  but  also  to  almost  all  the  witnesses  cited  by  the
prosecution except 4 who may be in  or  around  Delhi.   The  case  is  even
otherwise not Delhi centric in the true sense inasmuch as  the  only  reason
the FIR was registered in Delhi  was  the  fact  that  petitioner  No.2  was
posted in Delhi during a part of the check period.

7.    Mr. Rawal no doubt argued that a transfer of the  case  outside  Delhi
will cause prejudice to the respondent but  was  unable  to  show  how  that
would be so.  Mr. Rawal had in fact taken time to examine whether  the  list
of witnesses could be suitably pruned to  expedite  the  conclusion  of  the
trial.  But after taking instructions, Mr. Rawal  submitted  that  it  would
not be possible at this stage to make any such statement,  and  rightly  so,
because it is only the public prosecutor who can take a call on that  aspect
after the trial starts, depending upon how the facts  sought  to  be  proved
are seen by him or have been proved.


8.    In Abdul Nazar Madani v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2000) 6 SCC 204,   this
Court while dealing with a prayer for transfer of  the  criminal  case  from
one Court to other emphasized the importance of  fairness  of  a  trial  and
observed that while no universal or hard and fast rules  can  be  prescribed
for deciding a transfer petition which has  always  to  be  decided  on  the
basis of the facts of each case, convenience of the  parties  including  the
witnesses to be produced at the trial  is  a  relevant  consideration.  This
Court observed:

         “7. The purpose of the criminal  trial  is  to  dispense  fair  and
         impartial justice uninfluenced by extraneous  considerations.  When
         it is shown that public confidence in the fairness of a trial would
         be seriously undermined, any party can seek the transfer of a  case
         within the State under Section 407  and  anywhere  in  the  country
         under Section 406 Cr.P.C. The apprehension of not  getting  a  fair
         and impartial inquiry or trial is required to be reasonable and not
         imaginary, based upon conjectures and surmises. If it appears  that
         the dispensation of criminal justice is  not  possible  impartially
         and objectively and without any bias, before any court or  even  at
         any place, the appropriate court may transfer the case  to  another
         court where it feels that holding  of  fair  and  proper  trial  is
         conducive. No universal or hard and fast rules  can  be  prescribed
         for deciding a transfer petition which has always to be decided  on
         the basis of the facts of each case.  Convenience  of  the  parties
         including the witnesses to be produced  at  the  trial  is  also  a
         relevant consideration for  deciding  the  transfer  petition.  The
         convenience  of  the  parties  does  not   necessarily   mean   the
         convenience of the petitioners alone who approached  the  court  on
         misconceived notions of apprehension. Convenience for the  purposes
         of  transfer  means  the  convenience  of  the  prosecution,  other
         accused, the witnesses and the larger interest of the society.”




9.    Similarly, in Shree Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan Pvt. Ltd.  v.  State  of
Punjab and Ors. (2009) 9 SCC 414, this Court held that  the  convenience  of
the parties including the witnesses  to  be  produced  at  the  trial  is  a
relevant consideration while directing transfer of criminal  case  from  one
Court situated in one State to another situated in another State.




10.   In Mrs. Sesamma Phillip  v.  P.  Phillip   (1973)  1  SCC  405,  which
happened to be  a  matrimonial  case,  a  five-Judge  Bench  of  this  Court
transferred a criminal case on the ground of safety of the  women-petitioner
from Delhi to Durg. So also in Captain  Amarinder  Singh  v.  Prakash  Singh
Badal  (2009) 6 SCC 260,  this  Court  held  that  an  impartial  trial  and
convenience of the parties  &  witnesses  are  relevant  considerations  for
deciding a transfer petition.  In Jayendra Saraswathy Swamigal v.  State  of
Tamil Nadu (2005) 8 SCC 771, this Court transferred a case from  Kanchipuram
to Pondicherry having regard to the convenience of  the  prosecuting  agency
and the language in which almost all the witnesses had to depose before  the
Trial Court.

11.   In the light of the above decisions and the fact  that  CBI  is  fully
equipped with an office  at  Bombay  and  a  Court  handling  CBI  cases  is
established at Thane also, we see no reason why the  transfer  of  the  case
would cause any hardship to the prosecution especially when  searches  which
have been relied upon by the prosecution have been  conducted  at  Thane  in
which the prosecution claims  to  have  discovered  a  part  of  the  assets
allegedly acquired by the petitioners.  Reliance placed by  Mr.  Rawal  upon
the decision of this Court in Bhiaru Ram and Ors. v. CBI (2010) 7  SCC  799,
is of no assistance to him. In Bhiaru Ram’s case (supra)  the  main  accused
had not filed for transfer of the case and the  number  of  witnesses  cited
were not so large as in the present case nor  were  bulk  of  the  witnesses
located in the State to which the case was sought to  be  transferred.  This
Court also had noticed the serious apprehensions regarding the  fairness  of
the trial keeping in view the fact  that  the  accused  was  an  influential
person.  So also the decision in Nahar Singh v. Union of India (2011) 1  SCC
307, relied upon by Mr. Rawal was dealing  with  a  totally  different  fact
situation. The prayer for transfer in that case was not  based  so  much  on
the ground of convenience of the accused and the witnesses as it was on  the
independence of the Court before whom the matter  was  pending.  This  Court
felt  that  transfer  on  that  ground  would  be  a  reflection  upon   the
credibility of not only  the  entire  judiciary  but  also  the  prosecuting
agency.  That is not the position or the ground in the case at hand.

12.   There is no gainsaying that a trial at Delhi in  which  witnesses  are
expected to travel from  Maharashtra  is  bound  to  linger  on  for  years.
Expeditious disposal of the trial is also a facet of fairness of  the  trial
and speedy trial is infact a fundamental right as observed by this court  in
Hussainara Khatoon & Ors. v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna (1980)  1
SCC 81. When witnesses from distant places are sought to be summoned,  early
conclusion of the trial becomes so much more difficult apart from  the  fact
that the  prosecution  will  have  to  bear  additional  burden  by  way  of
travelling expenses of the official and non-official witnesses  summoned  to
appear before the Court.




13.   In the result, we allow  this  petition  and  transfer  Criminal  Case
No.45 of 2008 entitled C.B.I  v. Mrudul Milind Damle & Anr. pending  in  the
Court of Special Judge, CBI Cases, Rohini Courts, New Delhi to the Court  of
Special Judge, CBI Cases, Court  of  Sessions  at  Thane,  Maharashtra.  The
record of the case shall be forthwith transferred to  the  transferee  Court
which shall take up the matter and dispose of the same as  expeditiously  as
possible.






                                                          ……………………….……..……J.
                                           (T.S. THAKUR)





                                                          ………………………….…..……J.
                                                          (GYAN SUDHA MISRA)
New Delhi
May 10, 2012