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Wednesday, May 2, 2012

On 3rd May, 2007, the appellant company 1 A Pharma – GMGH, Germany filed an application for the registration of the trade mark “1(A) – Pharma ” in Class 5 in respect of pharmaceutical, veterinary and sanitary preparations as also other goods falling in the said class. The mark on the date of filing was ‘proposed to be used'. The examination report issued had raised objection on relative grounds under Section 11. The applicant responded to the examination report but the objection was nevertheless maintained and a hearing was offered. Thereafter, the application was refused by the Senior Examiner of trade marks. whether the reasoning that ‘1A-Pharma’ and A1-Pharma’ means one and the same thing and convey the same meaning is correct. Clearly, the Senior Examiner has erred in this and come to a totally wrong conclusion. The expression ‘1A’ is an alpha numeral combination and the only thing that it readily reminds one of the seat number in a plane or train journey. It is devoid of any meaning as such and can be regarded to purely fanciful and arbitrary, numeral/letter combination and is proof enough of an IP creation in adopting and coining a random alpha – numeral combination to depict the trade mark of the applicant. The hearing officer has totally misapplied the law in attributing a meaning to 1A and inversing it to read as A1 and then taken a stand that it has highly descriptive meaning. Such a process of reasoning is irrational, defies logic and completely misconceived. The passage of Dr. Venkateshwaran quoted by the Learned Senior Examiner is sound law but has been mis-applied to the instant case. In our view a combination word like ‘1A-Pharma’ is a lexical invention bestowing distinctive power on the mark so formed and qualifies for registration. The impugned mark would trigger in the mind of the relevant public origin specific source and the mark applied for is sufficiently striking to function as an indication of trade origin. The inference that the mark applied for is barred under section 9 is unwarranted. No other trader or manufacturer would reasonably require the expression ‘1A-Pharma’ for use as a trade mark for the relevant goods. The well – settled principle is the mark is to be assessed as a whole having regard to the realities of the market place. The end user who will be dealing with the impugned mark are most unlikely to read meaning between the line when used under normal and fair trading conditions. The impugned mark is syntactically unusually juxtaposed and is not a familiar expression in English language. The combination work ‘1A-Pharma’ cannot be regarded as a wholly descriptive although the addition of the suffix ‘Pharma’ is suggestive of the goods to which the mark relates. Law does not condemn adoption and use of suggestive expression and under the Act, the trade mark needs only ‘capacity to distinguish’ the goods. The assessment whether a trade mark is distinctive or not is a complex exercise which involves a combination of objective and subjective elements. The impugned mark is not applied for mass consumption products. Sale of pharmaceutical goods are regulated by other laws and intermediaries as also and user are unlikely to be influenced by any subliminal message, if any, contained in the mark. We have taken into account the presumed expectation of the average consumer who are reasonably well informed, reasonably observant and circumspect. The conclusion of the Senior Examiner that the impugned mark ‘1A Pharma’ does not qualify for registration is erroneous. We therefore, set aside the order dated 18.08.2008 and direct the impugned trade mark to be published in the forthcoming trade marks journal within two months hereof and the matter dealt with further in accordance with law.


                     INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPELLATE BOARD
                     Guna Complex Annexe-I, 2nd Floor, 443 Anna Salai,
                  Teynampet, Chennai-600018
********

                    (CIRCUIT BENCH SITTING AT KOLKATA)
  
                 M.P.No. 183 of 2010   IN

                  OA/38/2010/TM/KOL
            &
                  OA/38/2010/TM/ KOL

      FRIDAY  THIS  THE   20th DAY  OF APRIL,  2012
           

            HON’BLE SMT. JUSTICE PRABHA SRIDEVAN           …  CHAIRMAN
            HON’BLE SHRI  V. RAVI                                                     …  TECHNICAL MEMBER

            1A  PHARMA GMBH,
          A German Company of Keltenring 1 + 3,
          82041 Oberhacing, Germany.                       …    Appellant

                                      (Represented by Mr. S. Majumdar)
                                                        
Versus

          1. The Joint Registrar Trade Marks,
              Trademarks Registry, CP-II,
              Boudhik Sampada Bhawan, I.P.Bhawan,
              5th floor, Sector V, Salt Lake,
              Kolkata – 700 091

          2. The Registrar of Trademarks,
              Trade Marks Registry, CP-II,
              Boudhik Sampada Bhawan, I.P.Bhawan,
               5th floor, Sector V, Salt Lake,
               Kolkata – 700 091

          3. Senior Examiner of Trade Marks,
              Kolkata.                                                      …   Respondents   
                

ORDER No. (97/2012)

HON’BLE MEMBER  SHRI  V. RAVI, TECHNICAL MEMBER:

            This appeal arises out of the order of refusal by the Senior Examiner of Trade Marks refusing the Application No. 1554913 in class 5.  The said trade mark was refused at the pre-advertisement stage itself. The mark in question is ‘1A-Pharma’.  Being aggrieved, the matter was carried in appeal and the counsel for the appellant submitted detailed arguments why the impugned order of the Senior Examiner of trade mark is perverse, and bad both in law and facts, and it suffers from bais and is contrary to the principle of natural justice.  

2.      The facts of this case  briefly is as follow:-
          On 3rd May, 2007, the appellant company 1 A Pharma – GMGH, Germany  filed an application for the registration of the trade mark “1(A) – Pharma ” in Class 5 in respect of pharmaceutical, veterinary and sanitary preparations as also other  goods falling in the said class.  The mark on the date of filing was ‘proposed to be used'.  The examination report issued had raised objection on relative grounds under Section 11.  The applicant responded to the examination report but the objection was nevertheless   maintained   and   a   hearing  was offered.   Thereafter, the application was refused by the Senior Examiner of trade marks.  Being dissatisfied with the grounds for refusal issued in Rule 40(1) of the Trade Marks Rules, 2002, the impugned order has been challenged before us.  The reasoning given by the Senior Examiner for refusal is that the word “1A-Pharma” is a combination of two words “1A” and  “Pharma” which has no difference from the expression “A1 –Pharma” which is the same as “A one Pharma”.  The hearing officer further made reference to the Random House dictionary amplifying the meaning of the work “A one” described as “ first class, excellent, superior, etc” and the word “Pharma”  being an abbreviation of “pharmaceutical pharmology and pharmaceutical company”.   According to him, both the expression of “A one pharma “ and “1A-Pharma” are one and the same and therefore, the mark applied for was purely,  descriptive of the character and quality of the goods and objectionable under Section 9(1)(b ) of the Act.  The hearing officer then goes on to cite a passage from Dr. S. Venkateswaras’ book on Trade Marks & Passing Off from page 92 and infers that the mark applied for is per se and inherently unregistrable.  He,  further observes that there is no doubt in his mind that the word  “1A - Pharma” is an ordinary dictionary word which is apt for normal description of goods and does  not  qualify  for registration under  Section 9 of the Act and should not be allowed to be monopolised by any one.   He further reasons that the impugned mark  “1A-Pharma” would definitely interfere with the legitimate rights of the other traders to the bona fide use  of the word 1A-Pharma in relation to the relevant goods.  Therefore, according to him it is not in public interest to permit the registration of this word as a trade mark giving exclusive right to the applicant in respect to the goods applied for.  The hearing officer thereafter exercised his discretion under Section 18(4) against the applicant on the reasoning that the mark applied for will interfere with the legitimate right of the public and other traders.  The hearing officer specifically commented “For this goods, particularly, the objection under Section 9 was not raised earlier, which was an error”.  On these ground, the impugned mark was refused by the Senior Examiner by his order dated 18.08.2008.

3.      We have heard the detailed arguments of the Learned Counsel for the appellant and gone through the records of the case. 

4. The Learned Counsel for the appellant relied on a decision of the Kolkata High Court in “Prem N. Mayor & Others versus Registrar of Trade Marks & others”  and drew our attention to the observation  of Justice P.B. Mukharji in para 9 that “   
          “ A mark should therefore be considered as a whole on its total impression and as a general rule attempts to dissect a mark in order to destroy distinctiveness have been disapproved in such cases as Re, hawthorn & Co., Ltd. (1934) 52 RPC 15 and Re, William Bailey (Birmingham) Ltd. Re., Gilbert & Co. (1935) 52 RPC 136..  In fact, the general principle of trade mark law in determining the question of identity of deceptive similarity is that the marks, names or get-up concerned must always be considered as a whole as the true test.  See the observation of the Supreme Court hi Corn Products Refining Co. v. Shangris Food Products MANU/SC/0115/1959 : [1960] ISCR 968 where it says “It is well recognized that in deciding a question of similarity between two marks, the marks have to be considered as a whole”.  It is the totality of the impression, phonetically and visually, which is the test.  If that totality of impression is likely to cause deception or confusion, then the identity is established.   If not, then they are dissimilar.      

5.      The only issue for determination is whether the reasoning that ‘1A-Pharma’ and A1-Pharma’ means one and the same thing and convey the same meaning is correct.    Clearly, the Senior Examiner has erred in this and come to a totally wrong conclusion.  The expression ‘1A’ is an alpha numeral combination and the only thing that it readily reminds one of the seat number in a plane or train journey.  It is devoid of any meaning as such and can be regarded to purely fanciful and arbitrary, numeral/letter combination and is proof enough of an IP creation in adopting and  coining a random alpha – numeral combination to depict the trade mark of the applicant.  The hearing officer has totally misapplied the law in attributing a meaning to 1A and inversing it to read as A1 and then taken a stand that it has highly descriptive meaning. Such a process of reasoning is irrational, defies logic and completely  misconceived.  The passage of Dr. Venkateshwaran quoted by the Learned Senior Examiner is sound law but has been mis-applied to the instant case.  In our view a combination word like ‘1A-Pharma’ is a lexical invention bestowing distinctive power on the mark so formed and qualifies for registration.  The impugned mark would trigger in the mind of the relevant public origin specific source and the mark applied for is sufficiently striking to function as an indication of trade origin.  The inference that the mark applied for is barred under section 9 is unwarranted.  No other trader or manufacturer would reasonably require the expression ‘1A-Pharma’ for use as a trade mark for the relevant goods. The well – settled principle is the mark is to be assessed as a whole having regard to the realities of the market place.  The end user who will be dealing with the impugned mark are most unlikely to read meaning between the line when used under normal and fair trading conditions.  The impugned mark is syntactically unusually juxtaposed and is not a familiar expression in English language.   The combination work ‘1A-Pharma’ cannot be regarded as a wholly descriptive although the addition of the suffix ‘Pharma’ is suggestive of the goods to which the mark relates.  Law does not condemn  adoption and use of suggestive expression and under the Act, the trade mark needs only ‘capacity to distinguish’ the goods.  The assessment whether a trade mark is distinctive or not is a complex exercise which involves a combination of objective and subjective elements. The impugned mark is not applied for mass consumption products.  Sale of pharmaceutical goods are regulated by other laws and intermediaries as also and user are unlikely to be influenced by any subliminal message, if any, contained in the mark.  We have taken into account the presumed expectation of the average consumer who are reasonably well informed, reasonably observant and circumspect.  The conclusion of the Senior Examiner that the impugned mark ‘1A Pharma’ does not qualify for registration is erroneous.  We therefore, set aside the order dated  18.08.2008  and direct the impugned trade mark to be published in the forthcoming trade marks journal within two months hereof and the matter dealt with further in accordance with law.        


(V. Ravi)                                                                                  (Justice Prabha Sridevan)
Technical Member                                                                Chairman




(Disclaimer: This order is being published for present information and should not be taken as a certified copy issued by the Board.)




      

ORA/105/2006/TM/CH has been filed for removal of the mark “RALLY” registered under No.1213190 in Class 11, ORA/90/2007/TM/MUM has been filed for the removal of the mark “RALLIFAN” No. 306508 in class 11. Both the marks relate to electric fans manufactured by the respective owners. So goods are the same, the trade channels are consequently the same. We do not see any phonetic difference between, “I want a Rallifan” and “I want a Rally fan”. They sound identical. So the decision will depend on other facts like priority of user and honesty of adoption and so on. The owners of Rally fan have also raised a point of law with regards to S.44 of the Trade Marks Act 1999 ( Act in short). We will refer to the parties as Rallifan and Visesh, which will include Visesh’s alleged assignee Mahavir Home Appliances. A person whose adoption is not free from doubt cannot seek the removal of the mark which it has tried to imitate. So the rectification of the mark Rallifan is rejected. The applicant in ORA/105/2006/TM/CH has filed M.P.No.01/2008 for filing additional evidence. Similarly, the applicants in ORA/90/2007/TM/MUM have filed M.P.No.130/2011 for filing additional evidence. We have considered the additional evidences filed by the applicants in the respective rectification applications. In view of this M.P.No.01/2008 and M.P.No.130/2011 are allowed. 19. In view of the above ORA/105/2006/TM/CH filed by M/s Rallifan Limited is allowed. The Registrar of Trade Marks is directed to remove the trade mark “RALLY” registered under No.1213190 in Class 11 in the name of the respondent No.2. ORA/90/2007/TM/MUM filed by Mr. Rajesh Kumar Naredi is dismissed. No order as to costs.


INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPELLATE BOARD
Guna Complex, Annexe-l, 2nd floor, 443, Anna  Salai, Teynampet,  Chennai 600 018


M.P.No.01/2008 in ORA/105/2006/TM/CH
M.P.No.130/2011 in ORA/90/2007/TM/MUM
AND
ORA/105/2006/TM/CH and ORA/90/ 2007/TM/MUM
FRIDAY, THIS THE 20th DAY OF APRIL, 2012

HON'BLE Smt. JUSTICE PRABHA SRIDEVAN                    ...  CHAIRMAN
HON’BLE Shri V. RAVI                                                             …  TECHNICAL MEMBER

ORA/105/2006/TM/CH

Rallifan Limited,
No.4, Fairlie Place,
Kolkata – 700 007.                                                              …. Applicant

Vs.
1.      The Registrar of Trademarks,
      IP Building,
      GST Road,
      Chennai – 600 032.

2.      Rajesh Kumar Naredi,
      Vishesh Applicances,
      F-11/C, IDA, Gandhi Nagar,
      Kukatpally,
      Hyderabad – 500 037.

3.   M/s Mahavir Home Appliances,
      No.134, Tulsi Complex, Sultanpet,
      Bangalore – 560 053.                                                   … Respondents


ORA/90/2007/TM/MUM

1.   Rajesh Mumar Naredi,
      Trading as Vishesh Appliances,
      F-11/C, I.D.S. Gandhi Nagar,
      Kukatpally,
      Hyderabad – 500 037.

2.   M/s Mahavir Home Appliances,
      represented by its Partner S. Jain,
      No.134, Tulsi Complex, Sultanpet,
      Bangalore – 560 053                                                    … Applicants


Vs.

1.   Rallifan Limited,
      No.4, Fairlie Place,
      Kolkata – 700 007.

2.   The Registrar of Trade Marks,
      I.P.Building, Mumbai - 400037.                                              … Respondents


Shri R. Krishnamurthy, Senior Counsel assisted by Shri Arun C. Mohan, Shri L. Ramprasad for the applicant in ORA/105/2007/TM/CH and respondent No.1 in ORA/90/2007/TM/MUM

Shri P.S. Raman, Senior Counsel assisted by Smt. P.V. Rajeswari, Shri Sivaraman Vaidyanathan for R3 in ORA/105/2007/TM/CH and applicant No.2 in ORA/90/2007/TM/MUM

None appeared for R2 in ORA/105/06/TM/CH and applicant No.1 in ORA/90/07/TM/MUM


ORDER (No.102/2012)

Hon’ble Justice Prabha Sridevan, Chairman:

ORA/105/2006/TM/CH has been filed for removal of the mark “RALLY” registered under No.1213190 in Class 11, ORA/90/2007/TM/MUM has been filed for the removal of the mark “RALLIFAN” No. 306508 in class 11. Both the marks relate to electric fans manufactured by the respective owners. So goods are the same, the trade channels are consequently the same. We do not see any phonetic difference between, “I want a Rallifan” and “I want a Rally fan”. They sound identical. So the decision will depend on other facts like priority of user and honesty of adoption and so on. The owners of Rally fan have also raised a  point of law with regards to S.44 of the Trade Marks Act 1999 ( Act in short). We will refer to the parties as Rallifan and Visesh, which will include Visesh’s alleged assignee Mahavir Home Appliances.

2.         The case of Rallifan is that they are the registered proprietor of the mark Rallifan since 26-6-1975 in respect of electric fans. They had used the mark Rallis since 1950s and Rallifan since 1965. Ralli is an important feature of the mark. The registration in favour of Visesh of the mark is contrary to law. It was applied for on 9-7-2003 and the certificate was granted on 26-9-2005. The Mark cannot remain on the register because it is identical phonetically to Rallifan’s mark. It is identical when written in Indian languages. The products are identical. There would be deception and if it remains it will not be in public interest. The devolution of interest in the mark in favour of Rallifan is clear. There are also MOUs in favour of dealers.  The user by Visesh is much later. Their adoption is not bonafide. The assignment in favour of Mahavir Home Appliances  is made with an ulterior motive and is not genuine. C.S.293 of 2006 was  filed before the Calcutta High Court for injunction against infringement of the marks 195299,195300, and 306508. But it was withdrawn. Presently O.S.111/2008 has been filed before the Principal District Judge, Coimbatore in respect of the mark Rally. The mark “Rally” must be rectified and in the proceedings filed by Visesh on almost the same pleadings Rallifan prayed that their mark should remain.

3.         The case of Visesh is that they have been in the business since 1999. Rallifan is not a person aggrieved as they are not the owner of the mark of Rallifan. Rallifan has acquiesced in the use of the mark by Visesh. There is no evidence of use of the Rallifan mark. The assignment of the mark is not valid because the associated marks have not been assigned. Rallis is a personal name. Visesh has used the mark substantially and in any event the sales is restricted to the South. There are statistics sufficient to prove user. The adoption is bonafide. Rallifan has not shown any proof of injury or  confusion. Visesh prayed that their mark should remain and on basically the same pleadings prayed that the mark Rallifan shall be removed.

4.         Both sides filed the evidence in support of their case which will be referred to later. MPs have also been filed for reception of additional evidence.

5.         The learned Senior counsel appearing for Rallifan submitted that the devolution of interest is clearly shown in the history sheet. The Associated marks were not renewed and have been removed in ORA/91 and 92/2007/TM/MUM. This mark Rallifan has been validly assigned. A comparison of the sales of Rallifans and Rally fans will prove the case of Rallifan. The affidavits of consumers prove confusion. Rallifan’s use of the mark is long prior to the use by Visesh. The learned Senior Counsel relied on several decisions.

6.         The learned Senior Counsel appearing for Visesh submitted that the mark Rallifan was associated with two other marks. When that is so , there can not be any assignment of one mark without the marks with which it was associated. He submitted that they adopted the mark Rally for its connotation with speed etc as in a motor rally. He submitted that they had even engaged a graphics expert to devise the logo. Their logo was not at all identical to the Rallifan. The various documents to show transmission of use can not be believed. He referred to S.44 of the Act.  He showed that the user of Rallifan stop with 2002. When there is no user by Rallifan it cannot traffick in the mark. He too relied on several decisions.

7.         We have considered the two applications carefully.

8.         In ORA/91 and 92 /2007 the marks 195300 and 195299 were rectified on the ground of non-renewal, by order dated 4-9-2009. So it is clear that Rallifan could not have assigned the lapsed marks, but only the live one. We do not see any irregularity in this.

9.         Exhibit B filed by Rallifan is the certified copy of the history of the mark 306508. It shows that it has been renewed till 26-6-2010. The registration date is 26-06-1975 as an associated mark with two marks mentioned above in the name of RALLIS INDIA Ltd. It was renewed, in 1982 and 1989. On a TM-24 H.M.P. Engineers were recognised as subsequent proprietors as from 3-12-92. It was renewed from 1996. On another TM24 Unique Global Ltd was recognised as subsequent proprietors as from 11-9-1997. It was renewed from 2003. On form TM-33 the proprietor’s name was altered to Ralllifan Ltd.

10.       Ex C (colly) are invoices from 1991 till 2002. Almost all the invoices carry the wave like logo Rallifan. Ex D Colly are licence agreements in respect of the mark Rallifan in favour of other parties in 2002 namely Rallifan Power Appliances. Ex E Colly are advertisements from 1993 to 2004. These have been made in newspapers circulated in Kerala, Kolkata, Tamilnadu, Karnataka, Orissa, Rajasthan, Chandigarh, Pondicherry, A.P. Ex.F (colly)  are evidence to show that the advertisements were telecast in TV channels. Ex G Colly are letters from dealers of Rallifan in 2006 and 2007. These documents have been proved by the affidavit of S.K. Gadia.

11.       The above evidence clearly shows the proprietorship and user of  Rallifan till the date of petition. The fact that the sales invoices stop with 2002, does not affect the case of Rallifan. The wide spread advertisement all over the country clearly shows use. So Rallifan has shown use which is clearly prior to the use of Rally by Visesh which is admittedly from 2000.

12.       Now we will look at the evidence filed by Visesh. R1 is the Central and Sales Tax registration which do not refer to the mark Rally. We only know that Visesh manufactures electric fans. R2 is the letter dated 26/12/2006 certifying that Global Art had created the Rally Logo for Visesh in or about 1999. R3 is the chartered accountant certificate relating to Visesh. This does not specify that the sales are of Rally fans. R4 are photographs of shops where Rally fans are sold.R5 is the copy of papers filed before the Calcutta High Court. R6 is the search report dated 30-Nov-2006 . This does not show the mark Rallifan.

13.       In addition Rallifan has filed additional evidence Ex H series. These are affidavits of the year 2007 of Sri A.K.Bothra Calcutta, Mukesh Agarwal Jaipur, Nagendra kumar, Vishakapatnam, and other dealers from Coimbatore and Chennai. They are mostly dealers of Rallifan and they testify that they know about the existence of Rallifan and that they came to know about Rally fan recently and that it will definitely cause confusion.

14.       The following judgments were cited:
1)                 1998 PTC (18) 142 Westinn Hospitality Services Vs Ceasar Park Hotels. In this case it was held that there was no likelihood of confusion since the company in USA had no intention to commence business here.
2)                 2006 8 SCC 726 Ramdev Food Products vs. Arvindbhai Rambhai Patel and others. In this the common feature was ”Ramdev”.  It was held that the right to use the trademark was exclusive and there can be only one mark, one source, one proprietor and that a proprietor of a registered mark has a statutory right, thereto.
3)                 1991 (110) PTC 122 (Mad) Madras fertilizers vs Chaitra Fertilizers. In this it was held that the marks need not be identical without any differences. It is enough to show that the consumer is likely to be deceived.
4)                 AIR 1970  1649 Ruston and Hornby vs Zamindara Engineering. In this it was held that where the trademarks are identical, the Court in an action for infringement will not inquire whether the mark is likely to deceive. But where the mark is somewhat similar the test for infringement action and passing off is the same.
5)                 1996 16 PTC 537 SC: Cycle corporation of India vs T.I. Raleigh Industries. This dealt with the benefit of S. 46 and the legal effect of a licence agreement.
6)                  AIR 1951 Bombay 147:James Chadwick vs The National Sewing Thread. In this case it was held that the marks and the mental association formed on an average man of ordinary intelligence must be borne in mind.
7)                 2006 32 PTC 705 IPAB Rajive Paul vs Princeson Jose. In this case the marks were identical and the Board rejected the plea of honest concurrent user.
8)                 AIR 1998 Guj 247 Rupa & co vs Dawn Mills. In this case it was held DON primafacie infringes DAWN, and that though the visual background was not similar, since the goods were same and the test of a man of ordinary intelligence was applied.
9)                 PTC (Supp) (1) 13 (SC) Corn Products Refining Co., vs. Shangrila Food Products.  In this case it was held that the mark GLUVITA for biscuits was held similar to the mark GLUCOVITA for glucose food. It was further held that the two rival marks have to be considered as a whole and that in deciding the question of similarity between the two marks, the Courts have to approach it from the point of view of a man of average intelligence and of imperfect recollection.
10)             2007 34 PTC 557 Alkem Laboratories vs Mega International. In this case both the marks were GEMCAL. The Court held that there was honest concurrent user, on facts both parties had started use around the same time and there was no evidence of confusion.
11)             AIR 1963 SC 449 Amrithdhara Pharmacy vs Satya Deo Gupta. In this case the Supreme court considered the effect on an unwary purchase with imperfect recollection
12)             1978 RPC 245 Phantom Trade mark-Supreme Court of Judicatute – Court of Appeal, England. In this case the mark Phantom was at all times associated with two other marks, and at no time was any action to dissociate it from them. Therefore a partial assignment of associated marks was held to be a nullity.
13)             In Corn Products Refining /Co., case (supra) it was held that a person seeking protection of his mark on the basis of existence of similar marks has to prove that his mark has acquired a reputation by actual user in the market.
14)             2000 CLC 183 – M/s Indian Shaving products Ltd., an anr., vs Gift Pack and another. Here it was held that others using the mark is not a defense. Since the court is called upon to decide the dispute between the parties before it. The court cannot be expected to adjudicate upon a dispute which is not before it.
15)             2011 (4) CTC 417 – Blue Hill Logistics P. Ltd., vs. Ashok Leyland Ltd., and another. It was held that a person claiming exclusive right over a mark cannot claim it is a generic expression.
16)             Several other judgments were also cited where in respect of marks a) WITCO and NITCO 2010 (43) PTC 240 (Mad) (DB) – WITCO (India) Pv. Ltd., - vs – NITCO; b) Gangotree and Shree Gangotree 2005 (31) PTC 502 (Mad) – Gangotree Sweets and Snacks P. Ltd vs. Shree Gangotree Sweet, Snacks & Savories; c) Goldage and Godrej PTC (Supp) (2) 631 (Del) – Mohindra Traders vs. Godrej Boyce Mfg. Pv. Ltd.; d) LVL  2007 (34) PTC 731 (IPAB) – Jain Doors Pvt. Ltd., vs. Suresh Kumar Jain; e) Nandhini and Nandhini Deluxe 2011 (48) PTC 359 (IPAB) – Karnataka Co-operatie Milk Producers Federation Ltd., vs. N. Anand & A. Narsimha Rupesh Anand, trading as M/s Nandhini Deluxe & Ors.; f) Eenadu for newspapers and agarbathies (2011) 4 SCC 85 T.V. Venugopal vs. Ushodaya Enterprises Limited the prior users right was upheld.
15.       In the present case the assignment was of the only mark that was alive, the registered proprietor had not renewed the other two marks and had allowed them to lapse. So the assignment was of the only mark that was alive. A partial assignment is frowned upon because it would run counter to the principle, one source, one mark, and would injure public interest. But in this case the other marks had been expunged, this mark alone had been renewed and kept alive. So the S.44 objection that assignment of associated marks can only be as a whole and not separately is rejected.
16.       The marks are the same. There is no beating around the bush. Neither the logo nor the spelling can improve Visesh’s case. Both the goods will sound similar since they will be referred to as Rallifan and Rally fan.  Visesh fails the test laid down by the Supreme Court. We cannot believe that when Rallifan has been in the market for so long, a new entrant in 2000 in relation to the same goods i.e. electric fans was unaware of it. The adoption is not free from doubt and cannot be allowed. The evidence of the chartered accountant’s certificate does not show sales of Rally fans alone but all electric appliances that Visesh is dealing in.  On the other hand Rallifan has shown that it is using the mark through the invoices and the advertisements. The affidavits to prove confusion cannot be rejected. In fact in this case where the marks are identical we do not need anything more. Rallifan had long been in the market when Rally fan entered. The reason given that they had chosen Rally for the speed etc associated with motor rally is not at all convincing.
17.       The Registrar has not applied the provisions relating to grounds for registration correctly. We must interfere with the decision. Rally cannot remain in the register. It is removed.
18.       A person whose adoption is not free from doubt cannot seek the removal of the mark which it has tried to imitate. So the rectification of the mark Rallifan is rejected. The applicant in ORA/105/2006/TM/CH has filed M.P.No.01/2008 for filing additional evidence. Similarly, the applicants in ORA/90/2007/TM/MUM have filed M.P.No.130/2011 for filing additional evidence. We have considered the additional evidences filed by the applicants in the respective rectification applications. In view of this M.P.No.01/2008 and M.P.No.130/2011 are allowed.
19.       In view of the above ORA/105/2006/TM/CH filed by M/s Rallifan Limited is allowed. The Registrar of Trade Marks is directed to remove the trade mark “RALLY” registered under No.1213190 in Class 11 in the name of the respondent No.2. ORA/90/2007/TM/MUM filed by Mr. Rajesh Kumar Naredi is dismissed. No order as to costs.


 (V. RAVI)                                                                           (JUSTICE PRABHA SRIDEVAN)
TECHNICAL MEMBER                                               CHAIRMAN






(Disclaimer: This order is being published for present information and should not be taken as a certified copy issued by the Board.)

Once PW-1 stated that she did not sign the plaint or affidavit in lieu of chief-examination, the very foundation for the suit becomes shaky. It is true that the evidence of PW-1 was not consistent and in several places, she made contradictory statements. However, that was also the case vis--vis Ex.A-2 a gift deed in favour of the 1st plaintiff. To be precise, she deposed: "I do not know what is the document executed by me in favour of the 1st plaintiff for the said land. I do not know the contents of the documents. I signed the documents at the instance of the 1st plaintiff without knowing the contents. ...... ......... I executed that document when I was in hospital bed." Similar statements were made as regards her terms with the defendant. 20. When such is the condition or version of PW-1 i.e. the 2nd plaintiff, it is difficult to imagine that she gave specific instructions to any counsel to file a suit on her behalf. Further, it is not as if the parties are helpless, if PW-1 was not in a position to take independent decisions. Appointment of a next friend, as provided for under Order - XXXII CPC could have been resorted to. Once, the 2nd plaintiff stated that she did not sign the plaint and the affidavit in lieu of chief-examination, the trial Court ought not to have treated the suit as properly instituted. Even if a doubt in this regard did not arise when the suit was numbered, at least when such facts came to light at a later stage, there was no basis or justification for the Court to proceed with the suit. The plaint insofar as it related tEo the 2nd plaintiff ought to have been returned, for presentation in accordance with law. Therefore, the first substantial question of law is found to be existing in this case, and it is answered in favour of the defendant.


THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE L. NARASIMHA REDDY        

SECOND APPEAL No.1238 of 2010    

05-01-2012.

Between:

Duddumpudi Venkatarayudu  

Duddumpudi Rajagopal alias Tatabbai and another

Counsel for the Appellant: Mr. T.S. Venkata Ramana

Counsel for the Respondents:Mr. M.V.S. Suresh Kumar  


?Cases referred                 :       AIR (15) 1928 P.C. 38      
                                                AIR (37) 1950 MADRAS 239  
                                                AIR (36) MADRAS 775  
                                                AIR (11) 1924 MADRAS 810  
FB
                                                AIR 1954 PATNA 556  

ORDER:
       
         The sole defendant in O.S.No.108 of 2002 is the appellant in this
second appeal.  For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to, as
arrayed in the suit.

        2.  The 2nd plaintiff is the mother of the 1st plaintiff and the
defendant.  The suit was filed for the relief of declaration of title in respect
of the suit schedule property and for recovery of possession by evicting the
defendant therefrom.  Alternatively, it was pleaded that if any construction in
the schedule property is found to have been removed, then, a sum of Rs.50,000/-
be awarded towards value of the removed construction in addition to the recovery
of possession. Prohibitory injunction to restrain the defendant from making any
construction thereon or from interfering in any manner over the plaint schedule
property after possession thereof is delivered to the 1st plaintiff and
mandatory injunction directing him to remove new constructions if any made; were
also claimed.

3.  It was pleaded that the suit schedule property was purchased by the 2nd
plaintiff through a sale deed, dated 16-11-1981 (marked as Ex.A1) and that with
her permission, her elder son, the defendant, was living therein.  The 2nd
plaintiff is stated to have executed through her GPA, a gift deed on 06-03-2000
(marked as Ex.A-2) in respect of the suit schedule property, in favour of the
1st plaintiff and that through another document, dated 18-03-1998, she gifted
the vacant site of 121 sq.yds., to the defendant.  During the lifetime of their
father, the 1st plaintiff and the defendants are said to have partitioned all
the joint family properties, except the family house and a site and that they
were said to have been partitioned under a partition deed.
       
4.  It was pleaded that the 2nd plaintiff, who was residing with the 1st
plaintiff, an employee of the Central Government, went to Samalkot in the recent
past, when the 1st plaintiff proceeded to Newzealand.  It was alleged that when
the defendant was proclaiming rights of ownership over the suit schedule
property, the wife of the 1st plaintiff found from the Registrar's office that a
deed of revocation was executed by the 2nd plaintiff on 21-08-2000 (marked as
Ex.A-3) cancelling the gift executed in favour of the
1st plaintiff on 06-03-2000, and that another gift deed, dated
13-10-2000 (marked as Ex.A-4) was executed in favour of the defendant in respect
of the same property.  Alleging that the defendant played fraud upon the 2nd
plaintiff in procuring the documents Exs.A-3 and A-4, the plaintiff filed the
suit for the reliefs mentioned above.

5.  The defendant filed a written statement denying the allegations.  He stated
that the 2nd plaintiff never executed any gift deed in favour of the 1st
plaintiff.  He alleged that the 1st plaintiff got the GPA in favour of one of
his employees from the 2nd plaintiff and Ex.A-2 was brought into existence
through the said G.P.A.  He pleaded that the 2nd plaintiff realised the fraud
played upon her and on her own accord and free will executed a deed of
cancellation (Ex.A-3) and a gift deed (Ex.A-4), in his favour.  He further
stated that the 1st plaintiff was never in possession of the property.  He
further pleaded that the 2nd plaintiff did not instruct any one to file a suit
on her behalf and her signatures were forged at various documents, including the
plaint.  He raised an objection as to the maintainability of the suit.

6.  The plaintiff filed a rejoinder, explaining certain facts stated in the
written statement.

7.  The trial Court decreed the suit through judgment, dated 07-02-1956.  The
defendant filed A.S.No.1 of 2006 in the court of the VII Additional District
Munsif, Kakinada.  The appeal was dismissed on 26-07-2000.  Hence, this second
appeal.

8.  Sri T.S.Venkata Ramana, learned counsel for the defendant submits that
alleged gift deed (Ex.A-2) in favour of the 1st plaintiff was not proved as
required under law, particularly when the 2nd plaintiff (PW-1) the executant
thereof, stated that she did not sign upon it.  He contends that the very
registration of Ex.A-2 is shrouded in mystery since PW-1 disputed her signatures
thereon and the document has said to be presented for registration by a power of
attorney.  He further submits that Ex.A-3 the revocation deed and Ex.A-4 gift
deed in favour of the defendant were not challenged in the suit and in that view
of the matter, there was no basis for granting relief to the plaintiffs.  It is
urged that at no point of time, the 1st plaintiff was in possession of the
property and assuming that Ex.A-2 was proved, there was no delivery of the
possession of the property.  Learned counsel submits that the judgment rendered
by the trial Court and the lower appellate Court are contrary to the settled
principles of law.

9.  Sri M.V.S. Suresh Kumar, learned counsel for the
plaintiffs submits that the very fact that the 2nd plaintiff is said to have
executed Exs.A-3 and A-4 are sufficient to hold that Ex.A2 is proved.  He
submits that the possession of the defendant over the schedule property was
permissive and that he does not derive any right in respect thereof.  Learned
counsel submits that the minor discrepancies in the deposition of PW-1 are
referable to her old age and ill health and that the lower appellate Court has
taken the correct view of the matter and, granted appropriate relief.
       
10.  The pleadings before the trial Court comprised of plaint, written statement
and rejoinder.

11.  The following issues were framed by the trial Court:
1. Whether the 2nd plaintiff executed gift deed in favour of the 1st plaintiff?

2. Whether the 2nd plaintiff executed revocation deed, dated 21.08.2000?

3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the declaration prayed for?

4. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to possession?
5. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the alternative relief of recovery of
possession and recovery of Rs.50,000/-?
12.  On behalf of the plaintiff, PWs-1 to 7 were examined and Exs.A-1 to A-9
were filed.  On behalf of the defendant, DWs.1 to 4 were examined.  The trial
Court appointed a commissioner and the reports were taken on record as Exs.C-1
and C-2.  Exs.X-1 to X-4 were also taken on record and on the suit being
decreed, the defendant filed A.S.No.41 of 2006.

13.  The following points were framed for consideration by the lower appellate
Court:
1. Whether the 2nd plaintiff executed Ex.A-2 gift deed, dated 06-03-2000
bequeathing the suit schedule property to the 1st plaintiff, as such, it is
valid and binding on the defendant?

2. Whether the 2nd plaintiff cancelled the gift deed, Ex.A-2, dated 06-03-2000
by executing Ex.X-1 (Equivalent to Ex.A-3) and executed Ex.X-2 (Equivalent to
Ex.A-4) deed, dated 13-10-2000 in favour of defendant?

3. If the 2nd plaintiff cancelled Ex.A-2, dated
06-03-2000 by executing Exs.X-1 and X-2 whether the act of 2nd plaintiff is
valid under the eye of law?

4. Whether the 1st plaintiff is entitled for declaration of title over the suit
schedule property with consequential recovery of possession by ejecting the
defendant with damages of RS.50,000/-?

5. Whether the 1st plaintiff is entitled for permanent injunction, prohibitory
injunction and mandatory injunction as prayed for?

6. Whether the trial court erroneously appreciated the evidence on record and
decreed the suit of the plaintiff, as such the judgment and decree of the trial
court warranted any interference of this court or not?

The appeal was dismissed.

14.  The second appeal was admitted on finding that the following substantial
questions of law arise for consideration:
1) The lower court and appellate court failed to see that PW.1 admitted in her
evidence that she did not sign on the plaint and she denied signature on the
chief affidavit Ex.A-2 and the plaint?

2) The lower court and the appellate court failed to see that when PW.1 denied
her signature on Ex.a2 it cannot be said that Ex.A-2 gift deed was executed by
the 1st plaintiff with her free will and consent?

3) The lower court and appellate court failed to see that Ex.A-2 gift deed was
not registered by the 1st plaintiff and it was alleged to have been registered
by the power of attorney holder?

15.  Now it needs to be seen as to whether the defendants satisfied this Court
as to the existence of such questions and if so, how the said questions are to
be answered.

16.  The facts in brief, as reflected in the pleadings have already been
mentioned.  The dispute is, mostly between the two sons of the 2nd plaintiff
i.e., 1st plaintiff and defendant.  Both of them are laying claim to the
property held by their mother PW-1, and two separate deeds of gifts i.e. Ex.A-2
and Ex.A-4, respectively.

17.  The defendant raised a plea that PW-1, their mother, did not instruct any
one to file a suit, on her behalf.  If, in fact, she did not instruct anyone to
file the suit, a serious defect would creep into the proceedings.  It is only
the 2nd plaintiff that could have asserted that Exs.A-3 and A-4 were not
executed by her.  In case, she has executed the said documents and did not
disown them, the
1st plaintiff can claim against the relief against the defendant, if necessary,
by impleading their mother as one of the defendants.

18.  The 2nd plaintiff deposed as it PW-1.  In her cross-examination, it was
elicited through her that she did not sign the plaint or the affidavit filed in
lieu of chief-examination.  Her statement reads:
"the signature on plaint is not mine.  The signature on chief affidavit is not
mine. I have not filed any evidence with reference to the document executed in
the name of defendant."

19.  Once PW-1 stated that she did not sign the plaint or affidavit in lieu of
chief-examination, the very foundation for the suit becomes shaky.  It is true
that the evidence of PW-1 was not consistent and in several places, she made
contradictory statements.   However, that was also the case vis--vis Ex.A-2 a
gift deed in favour of the 1st plaintiff.  To be precise, she deposed:

"I do not know what is the document executed by me in favour of the 1st
plaintiff for the said land.  I do not know the contents of the documents.  I
signed the documents at the instance of the
1st plaintiff without knowing the contents. ...... .........
I executed that document when I was in hospital bed."

Similar statements were made as regards her terms with the defendant.

20.  When such is the condition or version of PW-1 i.e. the
2nd plaintiff, it is difficult to imagine that she gave specific instructions to
any counsel to file a suit on her behalf.  Further, it is not as if the parties
are helpless, if PW-1 was not in a position to take independent decisions.
Appointment of a next friend, as provided for under Order - XXXII CPC could have
been resorted to. Once, the 2nd plaintiff stated that she did not sign the
plaint and the affidavit in lieu of chief-examination, the trial Court ought not
to have treated the suit as properly instituted.  Even if a doubt in this regard
did not arise when the suit was numbered, at least when such facts came to light
at a later stage, there was no basis or justification for the Court to proceed
with the suit.  The plaint insofar as it related tEo the 2nd plaintiff ought to
have been returned, for presentation in accordance with law.  Therefore, the
first substantial question of law is found to be existing in this case, and it
is answered in favour of the defendant.

21.  Though Plaintiffs 1 and 2 sought the relief of declaration of title vis--
vis the suit schedule property, in fact the relief is claimed by the 1st
plaintiff alone.  The reason is that throughout the plaint, the emphasis is on
the validity and legality of Ex.A-2 the gift deed in favour of the 1st plaintiff
and invalidity of Exs.A-3 and A-4.  If Ex.A-2 is validly executed and if it is
continues to be valid, there is no question of the 2nd plaintiff holding any
right or title over the property.  In that view of the matter, the further
question as to whether there was a revocation thereof through Ex.A-3 and whether
the subsequent gift through Ex.A-4 in favour of the defendant is valid?, would
arise.  The defendant raised a specific plea that Ex.A-2 was not signed by PW-1
at all.  In the ordinary course of things, if a deed of cancellation is
executed, cancelling the deed of gift, the necessity to verify the proof of the
gift deed may not arise.  The reason is that an act of cancellation presupposed
the existence of what is sought to be cancelled.  Where, however, there is any
amount of uncertainty and a plea is raised to the effect that the gift deed was
not executed at all and cancellation was resorted to as a precautionary measure,
the necessity to prove the gift deed, independently, would subsist.

22.  Further, Section 68 of the Evidence Act mandates that if a document, which
is required by law, to be attested, cannot be used as evidence until one
attesting witness, at least, has been called, for the purpose of proving its
execution. Alternative methods are also indicated.  If the deed is registered,
the necessity to examine the attestors may not arise unless, the executant of
the document denies his signatures on it.  In the instant case, Ex.A-2 is a gift
deed and it is required to be attested under Section 123 of the Transfer of
Property Act (for short 'TP Act').  In the plaint, it was mentioned that though
the document was signed by PW-1, it was presented for registration by her GPA
(PW-6).

23.  The necessity for the plaintiff, to prove a document would arise when the
defendant denies the execution thereof.  An extraordinary situation is noticed
in this case.  PW-1 stated that she did not know the contents of Ex.A-2 and that
she was unwell when it was executed and that she did not sign that document at
all.  Though this was elicited in her cross-examination, no damage control was
done, either by making suggestions in any re-examination or by adducing any
other evidence.  Some of the statements made by her in the cross-examination
vis--vis Ex.A-2 have already been extracted in the previous paragraphs.  She
said that she does not know the contents of the document.  In addition to that,
she said:
"I cannot give particulars of the document.  By that time, I am unwell.  I was
in hospital by that time. I was on saline for three months and intake of food
was not good."

At another place, she stated:
"I do not know who drafted and typed Ex.A-2.  I was seriously ill by the date of
Ex.A-2 and it was being plan to take me to USA for treatment.  My condition was
not good by the date of Ex.A-2."

        24.  Proof of the execution of any document, which is relied upon by a
party to a suit, is one of the most important steps in the proceedings.    The
Evidence Act stipulated the method of proving a document either through primary
or secondary evidence.   What is required to be proved, is the execution of
document than its existence.   The word "execution" is not defined in any
enactment.  More often than not, the proof of signature on a document, is taken,
or treated, as proof of execution thereof.

        25.  A close scrutiny of the process, known as "execution of a document"
brings about several legal aspects or principles to light.  This area is mostly
covered by the Registration Act.  Sections 34 and 35 prescribe the manner in
which the Registrar is required to admit a document to registration.  Sections
77 thereof provides the remedy of filing of a suit, in the event of the
registration being refused.

        26.  There is a general perception that, once a document is presented
before a Registrar, and the executant thereof, admits his signature, or thumb
impression thereon, the Registrar has no option, but to register the document.
In other words, even if the executant pleads ignorance of the contents, or urges
that his signature was taken on a blank paper and that legal obligations, which
he did not subscribe to, were incorporated therein, the Registrar cannot refuse
registration.  The Privy Council and the High Courts of Madras and Patna made
valuable contribution in this area of law.

27.  In Puranchand Nahatta v. Monmothonath Mukherji1, Their Lordships of the
Privy Council held that the expression "person executing" is not identical with
the expression "person signing".  It was observed, that the words, 'person
executing',

"... mean something more, namely, the person, who by a valid execution enters
into obligation under the instrument."

28.  According to this, "execution" would mean the admission on the part of the
executant, that he subjected himself, to an obligation under the instrument.
This principle was followed by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in
Sayyaparaju Surayya v. Koduri Kondamma2.  That case arose under Section 77 of
the Registration Act.  The Sub-Registrar refused to register a document, when
the signatory thereof denied the execution.  It was alleged that his signatures
were taken on  blank papers and that the document was brought into existence.
The Division Bench discussed the purport of Sections 35 and 77 of the Act with
reference to the decided cases and held :

        "The admission required, therefore, is admission of the execution of the
document. It may be a sale-deed, it may be a mortgage deed. It is not enough for
the person, who is the ostensible executant, to admit his signature on a paper
on which, may be, the document is ultimately engrossed. The identity of the
papers on which the signature occurs is not sufficient. If a man says that he
signed a blank paper on the representation that it was required for presenting a
petition, as in the present case, or if a man signs a completed document on the
representation that his signature or thumb impression is required as an
attesting witness, that admission of the signature or thumb impression in those
circumstances cannot be construed to be an admission of the execution of the
document."
29.  The judgment in Bapanayya v. Bangararaju3, rendered by a learned single
Judge, which held otherwise, was over-ruled.  Reliance was placed upon a
judgment rendered by a Full Bench of Madras High Court in Guruvayya v.
Venkataratnam4  The facts of the case before the Full Bench were: two documents,
have been procured from a person, in respect of two items of property, and later
on, the purchasers erased the contents of the documents, keeping the signature
in tact.  Documents, in respect of a larger extent of property were brought into
existence.  When the documents were presented for registration, the executant
admitted his signature, but denied the contents.  Manipulation of the contents,
was complained of.  It was urged on behalf of the purchaser that the Registrar
has no option, but to register the document, once the signature on the documents
was admitted by the executant.  On refusal of registration, suit was filed under
Section 77 of the Registration Act and the matter landed before the Full Bench.
The view taken by the Registrar, that the document cannot be registered if the
executant disputes the contents was upheld.  The gist of the judgment of the
Full Bench was summarized as under:

        "The mere fact that the signature on the document was admitted is not
treated as execution of the document so as to make it the imperative duty of the
Registrar to register the document. The admission of signature therein cannot be
taken to be conclusive and as constituting admission, of execution of the
document."

        30.  In Rajendra Singh v. Ramganit Singh5, the Patna High Court observed
that execution consists in signing a document written out, read over and
understood; and does not consist in merely signing a name upon a blank sheet of
paper.

        31.  It therefore emerges that the person can be said to have executed the
document, only when he knows the contents thereof and subscribes his signature,
or puts his thumb impression.  Once that is done, the question as to whether the
obligations created under the document are lawful or not would be outside the
scope of the power of a Registrar, or for that matter, of a Court.  That
exercise can be undertaken, if only the transaction covered by the document is
challenged.

        32.  In the instant case, PW.1 stated in unequivocal terms that she was
not aware of the contents of Ex.A.2.  Though her signature upon it was not
disputed, she cannot be said to have executed the document, once she was
ignorant about the contents.  Putting the signature on a document is not an
empty formality.  That act must connote the consent of the signatory, to abide
by the obligations, which arise under the document, or at least, the knowledge
thereof.

33.  Free will and being in a position to take an independent decision of sine
qua non for an individual to bring into existence a valid contract.  Since the
transaction of a gift is the one not suggested by any consideration, the
satisfaction of these two aspects is required to be much more.  When the party
was not in a position to take any decision, and was in a serious distress, any
commitment procured from such person is prone to be treated as tainted with
undue influence, or coercion.  If the witness, after recovering from the
distress, states that she did not know the contents of document when she signed
it, a valid gift cannot be said to have been made even if the other requirements
of law are satisfied.  Therefore, the second substantial question of law is
answered in favour of the defendant.

34.  A serious dispute arises as to whether a valid registration of Ex.A-2 has
taken place at all.  The reason is that the document was presented for
registration by a power of attorney.  Detailed procedure in prescribed under the
Registration Act and the Rules made thereunder, in this regard.  It is not clear
that the procedure was followed.  Another aspect of the matter is about delivery
of possession.

35.  Though it is in respect of a gift made by a Muslim, that delivery of
possession is treated as an independent requirement, the same becomes relevant
as regards gifts governed by Section 123 of the TP Act also in the context of
ascertaining the consent of the party to the transaction.  A transfer through
gift becomes complete, only when it is made by the donar and accepted by the
donee.  If what is gifted is an item of immovable property, acceptance can be
discerned from the act of delivery of possession.  In case, the property is in
possession of a tenant, the delivery can be affected through attornment of
tenancy.  If the donar and donee reside in the gifted premises, no independent
act of delivery possession becomes necessary.  Where, however, the property is
in possession of a different individual and no specific acts of bringing the
possession under the control of donee are taken, the effectiveness of acceptance
of the gift suffers a dent.

36.  The suit schedule property, in the instant case, was in the possession of
the defendant even before the gift was made.  That was accepted by PW-1 and
nothing contrary was indicated.  After Ex.A-1 also, the defendant continued to
be in possession. Though it was stated in the plaint that the defendant remained
in possession of the property with the consent of the 1st plaintiff, who deposed
as PW-2, he did not state the manner in which such consent was given.  For all
practical purposes, Ex.A-2 did not bring about any qualitative change of the
possession of the defendant over the suit schedule property.  Therefore, from
this point of view also, there was no valid gift in favour of the 1st plaintiff.

37.  For the foregoing reasons, the Second Appeal is allowed.  The judgments
rendered by both the Courts below are set aside.  There shall be no order as to
costs.

____________________  
L. NARASIMHA REDDY, J    
January 05, 2012.