IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL -.“Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Assessing Officer was right in adding the amount of liabilities being reflected in the negative net worth ascertained by the auditors of the assessee to the sale consideration for determining the capital gains on account of slump sale?” - From the above discussion it clearly emerges that if a subsequent Bench of the Tribunal is disinclined to follow the view taken by an earlier Bench on a particular issue, the only course open before it is to make a reference to the Hon’ble President for the constitution of Special bench so that the issue may be finally decided by a Larger Bench. Notwithstanding the fact that the substantial question of law raised in the order of the earlier Bench has been admitted by the Hon’ble High Court, there are no fetters on the Tribunal in hearing the case in Special Bench and rendering the ITA No.4977 /Mum/2009 (SB) M/s.Summit Securities Limited. 19 decision which would prevail upon and become a binding precedent for the other Benches of the Tribunal. The learned Counsel for the assessee could not point out even a single judgment in which the Hon’ble High Court abstained the Tribunal from deciding the issue through Special bench during the pendency of appeal before it. With utmost humility there cannot be such a decision for the manifest reason that the justice delivery system has to take its own course and cannot wait in eternity for a higher judicial body to decide the issue first. Here it is important to mention that we are dealing with a situation in which only a substantial question of law has been admitted by the Hon’ble High Court. It is not as if the said question of law has been finally decided. Situation may be different where the said substantial question of law receives consideration by the Hon’ble High Court and a final verdict is given. In such a case the parties before the Tribunal may apply for the withdrawal of the reference before the Special Bench provided the facts and circumstances of such case are similar to the one decided by the Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court. Such withdrawal may sound justified as proceeding with the matter would be an exercise in futility in the face of the judgment of the Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court. But where only a substantial question of law has been admitted by the Hon’ble High Court and the case is yet to come up for hearing, which may take several years, there is no reason whatsoever for any party to approach the Tribunal for the withdrawal of the reference to the Special Bench on the point. We, therefore, hold that the reference to the Special Bench cannot be withdrawn merely for the reason that the Hon’ble High Court has admitted the identical question of law in another case. 30. Before parting, we want to make it absolutely clear that the above discussion has been made in view of the Hon’ble President placing for our consideration and decision the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the assessee for the withdrawal of reference to the Special Bench. We have not touched upon, nor we have jurisdiction to call in question the powers of President to constitute or deconstitute any Special Bench. He has abundant powers in the matter of constituting or withdrawing reference to the Special Bench in the facts and circumstances of each case. Our observations in ITA No.4977 /Mum/2009 (SB) M/s.Summit Securities Limited. 20 this order should not be construed in any manner as eclipsing his powers in this regard. 31. In the result the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the assessee is jettisoned. Ex consequenti the Registry is directed to fix the case for hearing by Special Bench on merits.

IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL 
MUMBAI SPECIAL BENCH “I”, MUMBAI
Before Shri D Manmohan (V.P.), Shri R.S.Syal (A.M.),
and Shri N.V.Vasudevan (J.M.)
ITA No.4977/Mum/2009 : Asst.Year 2006-2007
The Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax
Circle 8(2)
Mumbai.
M/s.Summit Securities Limited
(Formerly known as KEC Infrastructure
Limited), Transasia House, 3
rd
 Floor
Chandivali Studio Road, Andheri (East)
Mumbai – 400 072.
PAN : AAACK4279J.
(Appellant)
Vs.
(Respondent)
Appellant by : Shri Sanjiv Dutt
Respondent by : S/Shri S.E.Dastur & Niraj Seth
Date of Hearing : 28.07.2011  Date of Pronouncement : 10.08.2011
                 
                                             
O R D E R
Per  R.S.Syal (AM) :
 The Hon’ble President of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, on a reference
made by the Division Bench, has constituted this Special Bench by posting the
following question for our consideration and decision:-
“Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Assessing
Officer was right in adding the amount of liabilities being reflected in the
negative net worth ascertained by the auditors of the assessee to the sale
consideration for determining the capital gains on  account of slump
sale?”
2. The factual matrix of the case leading to the recommendation for the
constitution of this Special Bench by the Division Bench is as follows :-
The assessee transferred its power transmission business to KEC International Limited
(formerly known as KEC Infrastructure Limited) at an agreed consideration of Rs.143
crore and offered the equal amount as capital gain arising out of sale of slump sale.
The Auditors determined negative net worth of the business transferred at Rs.157.19 ITA No.4977 /Mum/2009 (SB)
M/s.Summit Securities Limited.
2
crore. The Assessing Officer held that the sale consideration should have been taken at
Rs.300 crore (declared sale consideration of Rs.143 crore + additional liabilities taken
over amounting to Rs.157 crore) and as such the entire amount was liable to be treated
as long term capital gain on slump sale. Before the first appellate authority the
assessee relied on two decisions of the Tribunal in Zuari Industries Ltd. Vs. ACIT
[(2007) 105 ITD 569 (Mum.)]  and Paperbase Co. Ltd. Vs. CIT [(2008) 19 SOT 163
(Del.)] in which it has been held that the negative net worth has to be treated as zero in
the context of the provisions of section 50B. The learned CIT(A), following the said
decisions,  came to hold that the action of the Assessing Officer in determining the
sale consideration as well as long term capital gain u/s.50B at Rs.300 crore was not
sustainable. He reversed the assessment order on this point.
3. When the matter came up before the Tribunal in an appeal filed by the Revenue,
the Division Bench was not convinced with the view taken by the co-ordinate bench in
the case of Zuari Industries Ltd. (supra)  as in its opinion the judgment of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of CIT Vs. Attili N. Rao [(2001) 252 ITR 880 (SC)] was
useful for the determination of the issue which the earlier Division Bench in  Zuari
Industries Ltd. (supra)  found to be distinguishable. When the Bench put across its
tentative view, it was submitted on behalf of the assessee that if the Bench was not in
agreement with the earlier decision in the case of Zuari Industries Ltd. (supra), then
the issue may be referred to the Special Bench. This contention has been recorded in
para 5 of the reference. The Division Bench, not finding itself in respectful agreement
with the view taken by the co-ordinate Bench in  Zuari Industries Ltd. (supra),
requested the Hon’ble President to constitute a Special Bench on the point. Pursuant to
such recommendation, the Hon’ble President constituted this Special Bench for giving
opinion on the question extracted above.
4. The hearing of the Special bench was fixed for 27.07.2011 with notice to the
parties.  On receipt of notice, the assessee vide its application dated 20
th
 July, 2011
addressed to the Hon’ble President submitted that the Goa Bench of the Hon’ble ITA No.4977 /Mum/2009 (SB)
M/s.Summit Securities Limited.
3
Bombay High Court has admitted an appeal involving same issue in the case of Zuari
Industries Ltd. (supra).  It was requested that the reference made to the Special Bench
be withdrawn as in certain other cases in the past the reference to the Special bench
was withdrawn when the Hon’ble High Court had taken steps to decide the issue. The
said application of the assessee was disposed off by the Hon’ble President with the
remarks : “Place before the Special Bench for consideration”.  
5. At the time of hearing, Shri S.E.Dastur, the learned Senior Counsel for the
assessee raised the same preliminary objection to the effect that the reference to the
Special Bench be withdrawn as the Hon’ble Bombay High Court has admitted
identical question of law in the case of Zuari Industries Ltd. (supra).  It was submitted
that in past the references to the Special bench were withdrawn in the case of  Star
Limited and Tivoli Investments & Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd. when it came to the notice of
the President that the Hon’ble High Court had admitted questions of law similar to
those before the Special Bench. Taking us through the orders of the President in these
two cases withdrawing reference to the Special bench in view of the Hon’ble High
Court initiating the process of deciding the similar questions, the learned Senior A.R.
pleaded that the instant reference be also withdrawn. He also referred to the order of
the Division Bench in the case of Harsha Achyut Bhogle Vs. ITO [(2008) 114 TTJ
(Mum.) 266] in which the earlier year was decided by the Tribunal against the assessee
and when the subsequent year came up for hearing, the assessee relying on a contrary
order in some other case, contended that the matter be referred to the Hon’ble
President for the constitution of Special Bench to resolve the diametrically opposite
views expressed by different Benches on the issue.  The Tribunal rejected the
assessee’s prayer for constitution of Special Bench on the ground that the assessee’s
own appeal against the earlier order of the Tribunal was pending before the Hon’ble
High Court. In this backdrop of the facts,  the learned Senior A.R. requested that the
reference to the Special Bench in the instant case be withdrawn as the Hon’ble High
Court is already seized of the matter on identical question of law in the case of Zuari
Industries Ltd. (supra) ITA No.4977 /Mum/2009 (SB)
M/s.Summit Securities Limited.
4
6. The learned Departmental Representative strongly objected to the preliminary
objection raised on behalf of the assessee by arguing that it was only at the instance of
the assessee during the course of hearing before the Division Bench that the reference
was made for the constitution of Special Bench as the Members expressed reservations
in following the order in the case of Zuari Industries Ltd. (supra).  It was, therefore,
argued that the assessee was not entitled to take a contrary stand at this stage of the
case. He applauded the course of action adopted by the Division Bench in making a
reference for the constitution of Special Bench in  the light of the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Anr. Vs. Paras Laminates (P)
Ltd. [(1990) 186 ITR 722 (SC)]  in which it was held that the President of the tribunal
has ample power to refer a case to Larger Bench when the Members of the Bench
doubt an earlier decision of another Bench. For the same proposition he relied on the
judgment of the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in the case of Affection Investments Ltd.
Vs. ACIT [(2010) 326 ITR 255 (Guj.)] in which it has been held that a subsequent
Bench has no right or jurisdiction to record a decision entirely contrary to one reached
by another co-ordinate Bench on the same set of facts and circumstances. The only
course open to the co-ordinate Bench in such circumstances,  as per the Hon’ble High
Court,  is to make reference to the President of the Tribunal as provided in section
255(3) to constitute a Special Bench to resolve the controversy. It was also argued that
the act of the President of the Tribunal constituting a Special Bench is an
administrative act and if any party is aggrieved against such administrative decision,
then the proper way out is to approach some higher judicial forum. It was, therefore,
requested that the preliminary objection raised by the assessee be rejected.
7. We have heard the rival submissions  in extenso and perused the relevant
material on record in the light of precedents cited before us. It is noticed that the
Division Bench hearing the appeal of the Revenue in the present case was not
convinced with the earlier view taken by the co-ordinate Bench in the case of Zuari
Industries Ltd.  (supra). At the request of the assessee, the reference was made to the ITA No.4977 /Mum/2009 (SB)
M/s.Summit Securities Limited.
5
Hon’ble President for the constitution of Special Bench. On the fixation of hearing of
the case by the Special Bench,  the assessee approached the Hon’ble President through
his letter dated 20.07.2001 urging him to withdraw the reference to the Special Bench
as the question of law in the case of Zuari Industries Ltd.  (supra) has been admitted
by the Hon’ble Bombay High Court. The Hon’ble President has placed the assessee’s
request before us for consideration and decision.  As such the short question before us,
at this stage is : Whether the reference to the Special Bench be withdrawn in the wake
of the Hon’ble High Court admitting the identical question of law in the case of Zuari
Industries Ltd.  (supra).
8.    Before we venture to delve into this question, it will be imperative to go through
the judgments relied on by the parties, which are germane to the issue in question. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Paras Laminates (P) Ltd. (supra) observed that
a Bench of two Members must not lightly disregard the decision of another Bench of
the Tribunal on an identical question. It is particularly true when the earlier decision is
rendered by a Larger Bench. The rationale of this rule is the need for continuity,
certainty and predictability in the administration  of justice. Persons affected by
decisions of the Tribunals have a right to expect that those exercising judicial
functions will follow the reason or ground of the judicial decision in the earlier case on
identical matters. It was further observed that : “It is, however, equally true that it is
vital to the administration of justice that those exercising judicial power must have the
necessary freedom to doubt the correctness of an earlier decision if and when
subsequent proceedings bring to light what is perceived by them as an erroneous
decision in the earlier case. In such circumstances, it is but natural and reasonable and
indeed efficacious that the case is referred to a larger Bench.”
9.     On the same lines is the judgment of the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in Affection
Investments Ltd. (supra). In this case the Tribunal recorded that the facts before it
were identical to another case. Thereafter the Tribunal took a different view for
various reasons stated in the order. The Hon’ble High Court held that : “Once the ITA No.4977 /Mum/2009 (SB)
M/s.Summit Securities Limited.
6
Tribunal had come to the conclusion that the fact situation was identical to the one
obtaining in a decided matter, no co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal has any right or
jurisdiction to record a contrary decision, entirely contrary to the one reached by
another co-ordinate Bench of the same Tribunal on same set of facts and
circumstances.” The Hon’ble High Court further observed that the only course open to
the subsequent co-ordinate Bench would be to make a reference to the President of the
Tribunal as provided in section 255(3) of the Income tax Act, 1961 to constitute a
Special Bench to resolve the controversy.
10.    The Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court in the case of CIT Vs. Goodlass Nerolac
Paints Ltd. [(1991) 188 ITR 1 (Bom.)] has also held that a subsequent Bench of the
Tribunal should not come to a conclusion totally contradictory to the one reached by
the earlier Bench of the Tribunal in the same case for an earlier year on a similar set of
facts. Their Lordships held that it is desirable that in case a subsequent Bench of the
Tribunal is of the view that the finding given by the Tribunal in an earlier year
requires reappraisal either because the appreciation in its view was not quite correct or
inequitable or some new facts came to light justifying reappraisal or reappreciation of
the evidence on record, it should have the matter placed before the President of the
Tribunal so that the case could  be referred to a Larger Bench of the Tribunal for
adjudication.
11.   A survey of the above judgments divulges that there should be consistency in
the approach of various Benches of the tribunal. Once a case has been decided by an
earlier Bench, the subsequent Bench should respect  such decision and should not
endeavor to make departure there from unless the facts are different or the legal
position appreciated by the earlier Bench has undergone change because of some
statutory amendment or enunciation of law by the Hon’ble Supreme Court or the
Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court.  Consistency in the judicial approach removes the
sword of uncertainty hanging over the heads of litigants. The Income-tax Appellate
Tribunal is an all India Body working through its Benches across the country. The ITA No.4977 /Mum/2009 (SB)
M/s.Summit Securities Limited.
7
judicial discipline requires that the view taken by one Bench should be respected and
ordinarily followed by the others.  This type of approach results into consistency in the
administration of justice as the parties can reasonably predict the decision of a
subsequent bench when the same issue has been decided by an earlier bench.
12.     It is however not the end of the road. As the Tribunal is quasi judicial body, its
Members cannot work mechanically by following the view taken by the earlier coordinate Bench when they strongly believe that the earlier decision was not rendered
by appreciating the legal position in correct perspective.  Naturally there cannot be any
fetters on the powers of the subsequent Bench of the tribunal to dispute the correctness
of the earlier order in justifiable cases. To presume that  a subsequent bench, despite
having strongly entertained the doubt about the accuracy of the earlier decision should
follow the same,  would make a mockery of the judicial system and act as a speed
breaker on the thinking process and flow of thoughts. The Members have freedom to
doubt the correctness of an earlier decision in deserving cases from their own point of
view. If after due application of mind the subsequent Bench comes to the conclusion
that it cannot agree with the earlier view, it should not straight away proceed to record
a conflicting decision. In such a situation the subsequent Bench is empowered or
rather duty bound to make a reference to the President on the point they perceive to be
an error of law in the earlier decision. The Larger Bench is then made up to consider
the correctness of the earlier decision on the facts and circumstances of the case before
it. The decision thus arrived at by the larger wisdom becomes a binding precedent for
all other Benches across the country unless there is a contrary judgment of the Hon’ble
jurisdictional High Court on the point. After such  order, no Division Bench can or
should question the correctness of view taken by the Special Bench.
13.   The learned Counsel for the assessee has raised objection to the continuation of
the Special Bench on the ground that similar question of law has been admitted by the
Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of Zuari Industries Ltd.  (supra). The only
reason advanced by the learned A.R. for the un-constitution of the Special Bench is ITA No.4977 /Mum/2009 (SB)
M/s.Summit Securities Limited.
8
the admission of the question of law by the Hon’ble High Court in March 2007. It is
not the case of the parties that any judgment has been delivered on merits by the
Hon’ble Bombay High Court on the point.
14.   We are unable to accede to this request made on behalf of the assessee for the
manifest reason that the Hon’ble High Court has neither decided the point on merits
nor blocked hearing of cases involving identical question of law by the Tribunal till
the disposal of appeal pending before it. The mere fact that a superior authority is
seized of an issue identical to the one before the lower authority, there cannot be any
impediment on the powers of the lower authority in  disposing off the matters
involving such issue as per prevailing law.  The first appellate authorities in all
subsequent cases shall be debarred from hearing the matters involving a question
against which either the Revenue or the assessee have preferred appeal before the
Tribunal and the matter is still undecided. The same consequences will follow if the
Tribunal is    proscribed from hearing the matters  on the admission of identical
question of law by the Hon’ble High Court till a final decision is rendered, which may
take a couple of years. It can be seen that the substantial question of law was admitted
by the Hon’ble High Court in the case of Zuari Industries Ltd.  (supra) in March 2007
and we are running through 2011. More than four years have elapsed and the matter
has still not been taken up for consideration and final disposal. If the argument raised
on behalf of the assessee is accepted and further advanced then all the Hon’ble High
Courts will have to bring to an end the hearing  of appeals before them involving a
question of law on which SLP has been admitted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court,
which may again take a number of years.  
15.   The consequences of such a course of action suggested by the learned A.R. would
lead to a chaotic situation. The entire working of the Tribunal will come to standstill if
a reference to the Special Bench is withdrawn simply on the ground that identical
question of law has been admitted by the Hon’ble High Court. The above discussed
three judgments including that of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and that of the Hon’ble ITA No.4977 /Mum/2009 (SB)
M/s.Summit Securities Limited.
9
jurisdictional High Court do not permit subsequent Bench of the Tribunal to take a
contrary view from the one expressed by an earlier Bench. Contemplate a situation in
which an earlier Bench decides an issue in favour of one party, be it the Revenue or
the assessee and the aggrieved party appeals against the said Tribunal order which is
admitted by the Hon’ble High Court. Suppose similar issue comes up before a
subsequent Bench which finds itself unable to endorse the view taken by the earlier
Bench. The only course open to the subsequent Bench, as per the afore-stated three
judgments,  is to make a reference to the President for the constitution of a Special
Bench instead of recording a contrary decision at its own. On the constitution of the
Special Bench if an argument is taken that since the substantial question of law has
been admitted by the Hon’ble High Court against the earlier order of the Tribunal and
hence such reference be withdrawn, there would be a deadlock. The subsequent Bench
would land itself in a quagmire,  being neither in a position to swallow the earlier view
nor spit it out. Following the earlier decision of  the co-ordinate Bench would be
difficult because of its non-concurrence with it. In the like manner it would find its
hands tied to directly record a contrary conclusion because of the prevalence of the
aforestated  legal position expressed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and other Hon’ble
High Courts prohibiting adopting such a course of action. Disposal of appeal against
the earlier order by the Hon’ble High Court may take several years and during the
currency of these years the Tribunal would become defunct on such issues.
16.        In order to come out of such a tricky situation, the legislature has provided a
solution by enshrining  section 255(3)  empowering the President of the Tribunal to
constitute the special bench, which reads  as under:-
“255(3) The President or any other member of the Appellate Tribunal
…………., and the President may, for the disposal of any particular case,
constitute a Special Bench consisting of three or more members, one of
whom shall necessarily be a judicial member and one an accountant
member. ITA No.4977 /Mum/2009 (SB)
M/s.Summit Securities Limited.
10
17.     A bare perusal of the relevant part of sub-section (3) of section 255 transpires  
that the President may for the disposal of any particular case constitute a Special
Bench consisting of three or more members. The President is empowered to constitute
a Special Bench u/s. 255(3) on his own volition if he considers any issue  of a greater
significance affecting large number of tax payers or due to the importance of the issue
even if it does not affect several assessees or otherwise. The powers of the President in
forming the Special Bench at his own will are plenary, unfettered and unlimited. Apart
from making a Special Bench on the President’s own choice, such a Bench can also be
constituted by the President on a representation made either by the assessee or by the
Revenue. Further if a single member bench of the tribunal or a Division bench hearing
a particular case considers it expedient to have opinion of the Larger Bench on the
issue because of its vital implications or they feel themselves unable to agree with the
view expressed by an earlier Bench on similar point, they can request the President for
the making of a Special Bench on such issue. Besides that there may be certain other
circumstances also in which the President can constitute Special Bench u/s. 255(3)
consisting of three or more members for the disposal of any particular case.
18.    Thus it can be noticed that the constitution of the special bench eases the
situation in a case where the subsequent bench finds itself unable to endorse the view
taken by the earlier bench on the point. The order  of the Special Bench helps in
providing consistency  qua different benches of the tribunal until the matter receives
consideration of the higher judicial forums.  It is further pertinent to note that the
practice, similar to the constitution of special bench by the tribunal to resolve a
possible conflict in the views amongst various benches of the tribunal and not waiting
till the matter is finally decided by the High court, is also uniformly followed by the
High Courts as well. Whenever a view is taken on a point by a Bench of a High Court
and the subsequent Bench of the same High Court finds it difficult to accept the same,
the practice is to refer the matter to the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court for
constitution of a Larger Bench. Notwithstanding the fact that SLP against the
judgment of its earlier Bench has been admitted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the ITA No.4977 /Mum/2009 (SB)
M/s.Summit Securities Limited.
11
Hon’ble High Court  does not stop its functioning to wait for the outcome before the
Hon’ble Supreme Court for an indefinite time.  The Larger Bench so constituted hears
the matter and gives its conclusion, which becomes final qua various Benches of that
High Court until the final judgment is rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
19.   The Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of  CIT Vs. Asian Hotels Limited
[(2010) 323 ITR 490 (Del.)] held that notional interest on refundable interest free
deposit received from the tenant is neither taxable as business income u/s.28(iv) nor as
income from house property u/s.23(1)(a). Subsequently similar issue came up before
the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in CIT Vs. Moni Kumar Subba [(2010) 235 CTR (Del.)
132] in which the question was whether notional interest on interest free security
deposit was to be taken in the consideration to arrive at final value of the property. The
Hon’ble Court considered the earlier judgment in the case of  Asian Hotels Limited
(supra)  and on observing that certain relevant aspects were not considered in the
afore-said earlier judgment, the matter was referred to the Hon’ble Chief Justice for
constituting Full Bench. Thereafter the matter came up before the Larger Bench of the
Hon’ble Delhi High Court in CIT Vs. Moni Kumar Subba [(2011) 333 ITR 38 (Del.)].
From the above discussion it can be seen that the subsequent Bench of the Hon’ble
Delhi High Court in  Moni Kumar Subba (supra)  did not find itself in respectful
concurrence with the view taken in the case of Asian Hotels Limited (supra). Instead
of adopting its own view contrary to the one taken earlier, the matter was placed by
the latter Bench for consideration by the Larger Bench for rendering finality to the
issue. The latter Bench did not stop the hearing to wait for the Hon’ble Supreme Court
to decide about the correctness of the earlier judgment in the case of Asian Hotels
Limited (supra). It was right because the disposal by the Hon’ble Supreme Court may
have taken several years. With the advent of the decision by the Larger Bench the
issue has now attained finality insofar as the Hon’ble Delhi High Court is concerned.
20. Similar practice is followed in the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well inasmuch as
where a Bench doubts the correctness of the view expressed by its another Bench of ITA No.4977 /Mum/2009 (SB)
M/s.Summit Securities Limited.
12
same strength, the controversy is referred to a Larger Bench. It can be noticed from the
judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Dharmendra
Textile Processors [(2007) 212 CTR (SC) 432] that when the question of penalty came
up before it, an earlier judgment in the case of Dilip N.Shroff Vs. JCIT & Anr. [(2007)
291 ITR 519 (SC)] was cited in which the view was taken in assessee’s favour.
Finding it difficult to approve the earlier view in Dilip N. Shroff (supra),   the matter
was placed before the Larger Bench to take a final  decision, which has since been
decided in Union of India & Ors. Vs. Dharmendra Textile Processors & Ors. [(2008)
306 ITR 277 (SC)].
21.      In the name of precedents, the ld. Sr. AR in support of  his objection, apart from
relying on certain administrative orders passed  by the Hon’ble President,  has relied
on the solitary case of Harsha A Bhogle (supra). That case rested on the facts in which
the tribunal decided the issue against the assessee in his own case in the earlier year.
When the subsequent year came up for hearing, the assessee came out with a request
that a special bench be formulated on the subject because the tribunal in another case
had taken a different view. The Division Bench dealing with the assessee’s case for
the subsequent year observed that the facts of the other case cited by the assessee were
different.  Following the view taken by the earlier bench in assessee’s own case, the
tribunal refused to accede to the request of the assessee that special bench be
proposed.
22.     At the cost of repetition we reiterate that consistency in the approach of the
tribunal  in the sense of following the earlier view is a rule but doubting its correctness
is an exception.  No fault can be found with the tribunal following the view taken by it
in an earlier case/year  when it is satisfied with its correctness.  So what the tribunal
did in the case of  Harsha V Bhogle (supra) was to follow the rule of consistency.
Obviously no exception can be found in the way in which the tribunal proceeded with
the matter in that case.  When an issue is decided in favour of one party, the aggrieved
party may seek to get it reviewed  through the route of the Special Bench.  Unless the ITA No.4977 /Mum/2009 (SB)
M/s.Summit Securities Limited.
13
Bench really doubts the correctness of the earlier  view, it does not recommend the
making of a Special Bench. Whereas the case of Harsha A Bhogle (supra) fell in the
domain of the rule of consistency, the case of the present assessee has fallen in the
ambit of exception inasmuch as the Division Bench was hesitant to follow the earlier
view in the case of Zuari Industries Ltd. (supra). Thus it is axiomatic that there is a sea
change in the facts and circumstances prevailing in the case of   Harsha A Bhogle
(supra) and those presently under consideration. In that case the Division Bench was
satisfied with the correctness of the view taken by the tribunal in the earlier year and
that  is how it refused to make a reference for the constitution of the Special Bench.
We are dealing with a case in which the Division Bench is not satisfied with the
correctness of the earlier view in  Zuari Industries Ltd. (supra) and very graciously,
instead of imposing its own contrary view, it made  a reference to the Hon’ble
President  to constitute a Special Bench so that a larger view on the subject may come
on surface.
23.    Thus it can be noticed that the case of  Harsha A Bhogle (supra)  does not
advance the case of the assessee any further. In all circumstances where the
subsequent bench finds it difficult to accept and adopt the view taken by the earlier
bench, the only course open to it is to make a reference for the constitution of the
Special Bench. Our view is fortified by the Special Bench order in the case of Daks
Copy Services Pvt. Ltd. Vs. ITO [(1989) 30 ITD 223 (Bom.) (SB)]. In that case the
point in question was decided against the assessee  in an earlier year. When the
subsequent year of that assessee came up before the next Bench, it was noticed  that a
contrary view was also available. In order to resolve this conflict a Larger Bench of
three Members was formed.  In that case also a preliminary objection was raised on
behalf of the Revenue that since the point in controversy was already decided against
the assessee by the Tribunal in an earlier year and such matter was pending before the
Hon’ble High Court, the same view should be followed in the subsequent assessment
years as well and as such there was no need for a Special Bench. Repelling this
contention, the Special Bench held that when the subsequent Bench was not convinced ITA No.4977 /Mum/2009 (SB)
M/s.Summit Securities Limited.
14
with the earlier view,  the constitution of the Larger Bench for resolving the
conflicting decisions of the benches of the Tribunal was in order.
24.     Adverting to the facts of the instant case we find that situation is identical apart
from the change of parties. Whereas in that case the Revenue raised preliminary
objection for not proceeding with the Special Bench in view of the earlier Bench’s
decision in their favor pending for adjudication before the Hon’ble High Court,  now
is the turn of the assessee to take similar objection in seeking the un-constitution of the
Special bench because the earlier decision given by the Tribunal in its favour is
awaiting adjudication by the Hon’ble High Court. As the facts and circumstances are
similar in the present case, we are not persuaded to accept the assessee’s preliminary
objection for withdrawal of the reference to the Special bench by following the view
taken by the Special bench in the case of Daks Copy Services Pvt. Ltd. (supra).
25. There is one more additional reason for not accepting the assessee’s preliminary
objection. We have noticed from the reference made  by the Division Bench to the
Hon’ble President for the constitution of the Special Bench that when the Division
Bench expressed its disagreement with the earlier decision in the case of  Zuari
Industries Ltd.  (supra),  the assessee took a plea that if the Division bench was not
agreeable with the view taken by the Tribunal in Zuari Industries Ltd.  (supra),  then it
should make a reference to the Hon’ble President for the constitution of Special
Bench. The Bench accepted the assessee’s request and following the judicial discipline
made such reference to the Hon’ble President. It is now that when the Special Bench
has been constituted and the hearing is fixed that the assessee has come up with a plea
that the Special Bench should be deconstituted. We  are reminded of the doctrine of
approbate and reprobate which debars a person from blowing hot and cold in the same
flow. One cannot approve and reject the same thing in the same stream. The assessee
is trying to do the same in the instant case. When during the hearing of its case by the
Division Bench it found the Bench to be not accepting the decision in the case of
Zuari Industries Ltd.  (supra) which was in its favour, the assessee requested the ITA No.4977 /Mum/2009 (SB)
M/s.Summit Securities Limited.
15
Bench to make a reference to the Hon’ble President for constituting a Special bench.
With such a request the assessee found an escape route from the view likely to be
taken against it. Now it is pressing that the reference to the special bench be
withdrawn and the case be heard by the Division Bench so that the earlier view in the
case of Zuari Industries Ltd. (supra) may be pressed in to service once again. We are
unable to find a solution to the likely problem to arise if the assessee’s contention is
accepted and the special bench is deconstituted and again the DB finds itself unable to
agree with the earlier view. Will the assessee in that case again request the DB to
make a reference for the constitution of Special Bench and on such constitution will
again request to dismantle it?  Law does not permit a person to both approbate and
reprobate. When the Special Bench has actually been constituted at the plea of the
assessee, now the assessee can not turn around and  argue that the Special Bench be
deconstituted. We do not approve such a vacillating stand of the assessee.
26.    It is beyond our comprehension as to what difference it makes to the assessee
when his case is heard by the Division Bench or the Special Bench. The hearing by the
special bench  inter alia, is only to regularize the working of the tribunal aimed at
achieving a uniform view by different Benches on the point. The assessee’s interest is
not affected in any manner whether the case is heard by the Division Bench or the
Special Bench.  The assessee’s  logic for withdrawing the reference to the special
bench on the ground that similar issue is pending for adjudication before the Hon’ble
High Court  would apply with full force even to the matters pending before the
Division Bench.  Tomorrow someone will come out with a similar plea requesting the
keeping of the subsequent appeals in the Division Bench also on hold till the earlier
decision of the co-ordinate bench is examined and finally decided by the Hon’ble High
Court. Accepting such logic would mean making the tribunal non-operational. We
cannot accept such a contention.
 
27. The ld. AR failed to draw our attention towards any provision of the Act which
forbids the tribunal from going ahead with the hearing of the case in the circumstances ITA No.4977 /Mum/2009 (SB)
M/s.Summit Securities Limited.
16
as are presently prevailing, which in other words implies sanction to dispose of the
cases notwithstanding the pendency of the matter before the Hon’be High Court.  This
inference gains strength from the section 158A,  which reads as under:-
“158A. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, where an
assessee claims that any question of law arising in his case for an
assessment year which is pending before the [Assessing] Officer or any
appellate authority (such case being hereafter in this section referred to
as the relevant case) is identical with a question of law arising in his case
for another assessment year which is pending before the High Court on a
reference under section 256 or [before the Supreme Court on a reference
under section 257 or in appeal under section 260A before the High Court
or in appeal under section 261 before the Supreme Court] (such case
being hereafter in this section referred to as the  other case), he may
furnish to the [Assessing] Officer or the appellate authority, as the case
may be, a declaration in the prescribed form and verified in the
prescribed manner, that if the [Assessing] Officer or the appellate
authority, as the case may be, agrees to apply in the relevant case the
final decision on the question of law in the other case, he shall not raise
such question of law in the relevant case in appeal before any appellate
authority or [in appeal before the High Court under section 260A or in
appeal before the Supreme Court under section 261].
 (2) Where a declaration under sub-section (1) is furnished to any
appellate authority, the appellate authority shall  call for a report from
the [Assessing] Officer on the correctness of the claim made by the
assessee and, where the [Assessing] Officer makes a request to the
appellate authority to give him an opportunity of being heard in the
matter, the appellate authority shall allow him such opportunity.
 (3) The [Assessing] Officer or the appellate authority, as the case may
be, may, by order in writing, -
(i) admit the claim of the assessee if he or it is  satisfied that the
question of law arising in the relevant case is identical with the
question of law in the other case; or
 (ii) reject the claim if he or it is not so satisfied.
 (4) Where a claim is admitted under sub-section (3), - ITA No.4977 /Mum/2009 (SB)
M/s.Summit Securities Limited.
17
(a) the [Assessing] Officer or, as the case may be, the appellate
authority may make an order disposing of the relevant case
without awaiting the final decision on the question of law in the
other case; and
(b) the assessee shall not be entitled to raise, in relation to the
relevant case, such question of law in appeal before any appellate
authority or [in appeal before the High Court under section 260A
or the Supreme Court under section 261].
 (5) When the decision on the question of law in the other case becomes
final, it shall be applied to the relevant case and the [Assessing] Officer
or the appellate authority, as the case may be, shall, if necessary, amend
the order referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (4) conformably to such
decision.
 (6) An order under sub-section (3) shall be final  and shall not be
called in question in any proceeding by way of appeal, reference or
revision under this Act.
 Explanation.- In this section, -
(a) “appellate authority” means the [Deputy Commissioner
(Appeals)] the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Appellate Tribunal;
(b) “case”, in relation to an assessee, means any proceeding under
this Act for the assessment of the total income of the assessee or
for the imposition of any penalty or fine on him.
28. A careful  analysis of section 158A, to the extent we are concerned here, makes
it palpable that where an assessee claims that any question of law arising in his case
for an assessment year which is pending before the  Tribunal is identical with the
question of law arising in his case for other earlier case which is pending before the
High Court, he may make an application to the Tribunal giving his consent for
applying the final decision on the question of law in the earlier case to the case under
consideration. If the Tribunal admits the claim of the assessee, on being satisfied that
the question of law arising in the latter case is identical with the question of law in an
earlier case,  it may make an order disposing of the latter case without awaiting the ITA No.4977 /Mum/2009 (SB)
M/s.Summit Securities Limited.
18
final decision on the question of law in the earlier case. Later on when the decision
on the question of law in the earlier case becomes final, the Tribunal shall amend the
order passed in the latter case, if necessary,  in conformity with the final decision in
the earlier case by the High Court. Sub-section (4) of section 158A is unequivocal
empowering the Tribunal to “make an order disposing of the” latter case without
awaiting the final decision on the question of law in the earlier case pending before the
Hon’ble High Court. If we look at the prescription of sub-section (4), it becomes vivid
that the Tribunal is not supposed to stop hearing of subsequent case simply on the
ground that the decision rendered by it in the earlier year involving the same question
of law is awaiting consideration by the Hon’ble High Court.  Albeit section 158A is
activated at the instance of the assessee to circumvent the situation of approaching the
High Court against the order of the tribunal in the subsequent case as well involving
similar question decided adversely  by the tribunal in its own earlier case which is
pending before the Hon’ble High Court, the underlying rationale is discernible that the
functioning of the tribunal should not close down merely on the ground that the
similar question of law is under consideration of the Hon’ble High Court in the same
case or an other case. If the contention raised by the learned A.R. is accepted that the
Tribunal should desist from hearing the matter in special bench on the substantial
question of law which is awaiting adjudication by the Hon’ble High Court, then the
provisions of section 158A shall become redundant. The very presence of this section
in the Act amply demonstrates that the tribunal is not bound to wait for the judgment
of the Hon’ble High Court on the point before applying it to the next cases.  
 
29. From the above discussion it clearly emerges that if a subsequent Bench of the
Tribunal is disinclined to follow the view taken by an earlier Bench on a particular
issue, the only course open before it is to make a reference to the Hon’ble President
for the constitution of Special bench so that the issue may be finally decided by a
Larger Bench. Notwithstanding the fact that the substantial question of law raised in
the order of the earlier Bench has been admitted by the Hon’ble High Court, there are
no fetters on the Tribunal in hearing the case in Special Bench and rendering the ITA No.4977 /Mum/2009 (SB)
M/s.Summit Securities Limited.
19
decision which would prevail upon and become a binding precedent for the other
Benches of the Tribunal. The learned Counsel for the assessee could not point out
even a single judgment in which the Hon’ble High Court abstained the Tribunal from
deciding the issue through Special bench during the pendency of appeal before it.
With utmost humility there cannot be such a decision for the manifest reason that the
justice delivery system has to take its own course  and cannot wait in eternity for a
higher judicial body to decide the issue first. Here it is important to mention that we
are dealing with a situation in which only a substantial question of law has been
admitted by the Hon’ble High Court. It is not as if the said question of law has been
finally decided. Situation may be different where the said substantial question of law
receives consideration by the Hon’ble High Court and a final verdict is given. In such
a case the parties before the Tribunal may apply for the withdrawal of the reference
before the Special Bench provided the facts and circumstances of such case are similar
to the one decided by the Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court. Such withdrawal may
sound justified as proceeding with the matter would be an exercise in futility in the
face of the judgment of the Hon’ble jurisdictional  High Court.  But where only a
substantial question of law has been admitted by the Hon’ble High Court and the case
is yet to come up for hearing, which may take several years, there is no reason
whatsoever for any party to approach the Tribunal for the withdrawal of the reference
to  the Special Bench on the point. We, therefore, hold that the reference to the Special
Bench cannot be withdrawn merely for the reason that the Hon’ble High Court has
admitted the identical question of law in another case.
30.  Before parting, we want to make it absolutely clear that the above discussion has
been made in view of the Hon’ble President placing for our consideration and decision
the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the assessee for the withdrawal of
reference to the Special Bench. We have not touched upon, nor we have jurisdiction to
call in question the powers of President to constitute or deconstitute any Special
Bench. He has abundant powers in the matter of constituting or withdrawing reference
to the Special Bench in the facts and circumstances of each case.  Our observations in ITA No.4977 /Mum/2009 (SB)
M/s.Summit Securities Limited.
20
this order should not be construed in any manner as eclipsing his powers in this
regard.
31.  In the result the preliminary objection raised on behalf of  the assessee is
jettisoned.   Ex consequenti the Registry is directed to fix the case for hearing by
Special Bench on merits.
 
Order pronounced in the open Court on this 10
th
 day of August, 2011.
     Sd/-    Sd/-          Sd/-
  (D.Manmohan)  (N.V.Vasudevan)  (R.S.Syal)
    Vice President          Judicial Member          Accountant Member
 
Mumbai : 10
th
 August, 2011.
Devdas*
     Sd/-    Sd/-          Sd/-
  (D.K.Agarwal)  (N.V.Vasudevan)  (R.S.Syal)
  Judicial Member           Judicial Member Accountant Member
-Nominated Member-
Date : 10
th
 August, 2011
Copy to :
1. The Appellant.
2. The Respondent.
`3. The CIT concerned
4. The CIT(A)- VIII, Mumbai.
5. The DR/ITAT, Mumbai.
6. Guard File.
TRUE COPY.
       By Order
      Assistant Registrar, ITAT, Mumbai. ITA No.4977 /Mum/2009 (SB)
M/s.Summit Securities Limited.
21
   Date Initial
1. Draft dictated on 28.07.2011  Sr.PS
2. Draft placed before author 03.08.2011  Sr.PS
3. Draft proposed and placed before the
Hon’ble V.P.
 
4. Draft proposed and placed before the
Hon’ble J.M.
5. Draft discussed/approved by Hon’ble VP  
6. Draft discussed/approved by Hon’ble JM   JM/AM
7. Approved Draft comes to the Sr.PS/PS   Sr.PS/PS
8. Kept for pronouncement on   Sr.PS
9. File sent to the Bench Clerk   Sr.PS
10. Date on which file goes to the AR  
11. Date on which file goes to the Head Clerk.  
12. Date of dispatch of Order.  
*

IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL “B” BENCH: KOLKATA -That the assessee in the present case has earned income from job work which comprises of repairs and maintenance, it has two limbs that the income from job work is to be allowed as deduction in terms of section 80-IB of the Act but income from repairs and maintenance cannot be equated at par with income from manufacturing and hence not eligible for deduction in terms of section 80-IB of the Act. In the present case, assessee is a manufacturing unit and has claimed deduction u/s. 80-IB of the Act on job work charges including repairs and maintenance. As stated by assessee, it failed to produce details as fire broke out in office premises of Today’s Writing Products Ltd and all records of assessee placed there were destroyed. No books of account were produced except few preliminary details and break up of various expenses and accordingly, Assessing Officer completed assessment u/s. 144 of the Act by disallowing deduction claimed u/s. 80-IB of the Act job work charges including such repairs and maintenance by holding that maintenance of moulds which does not constitute manufacturing activity as it does not manufacture any article or thing and by this process no new article or thing comes into existence. In term of above that income earned from job work will qualify for deduction u/s. 80-IB of the Act but income from repairs and maintenance is not at par with income from manufacturing and will not qualify for deduction u/s. 80-IB of the Act. In view of above facts, the matter should have gone back to Assessing Officer to decide as to how much is job work charges and how much is repair and maintenance charges and then to disallow deduction from income of repairs and maintenance and to allow deduction u/s. 80-IB 25 ITA 1305/K/2008 Rajesh Kr. Drolia A.Y.05-06 of the Act for job work charges received by assessee. However, at the time of hearing, Ld. Counsel for the assessee submitted that there was a major fire broke out and as such entire record of the assessee was destroyed and it would not be possible to furnish books of account and other documents to Assessing Officer if the matter is restored to his file to decide deduction allowable to assessee u/s. 80-IB of the Act out of total receipt of Rs.96,01,410/- shown by assessee by way of repairing and maintenance in the form of job work charges. Therefore, instead of restoring the matter to Assessing Officer and with a view to finally decide the issue before us, we are of the considered view that it will be reasonable to consider 50% of the receipt as job work charges on which assessee will be entitled to get deduction u/s. 80-IB of the Act and the balance 50% is the receipt on account of repair and maintenance charges on which the assessee will not be entitled to get deduction u/s. 80-IB of the act. Therefore, the ground of appeal taken by department is allowed in part as indicated above. 19. In the result, appeal of the revenue is allowed in part. 20. Order pronounced in open court on 12.8.201ड

 आयकर अपीलीय अधीकरण,
यायपीठ – “ ब” कोलकाता,
IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL “B” BENCH: KOLKATA
(सम )Before ौी जी. ड . अमवाल, , उपा!य , ,  , ौी बी. आर. िम#ल,
यायीक सदःय ,,,्
एवं/and  ौी  महावीर िसंह,
यायीक सदःय)
[Before Hon’ble Shri G. D. Agrawal, V.P., Hon’ble Shri B. R. Mittal, JM
& Hon’ble Shri Mahavir Singh, JM]
 / I.T.A  No. 1305Kol/2008
िनधॉरण वषॅ////Assessment Year: 2005-06
Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax, Vs    Rajesh Kr. Drolia
C.C. XX, Kolkata      (PAN AACHR 8294 R)
(अपीलाथ1/Appellant)      (ू3यथ1/Respondent)
अपीलाथ1 क4 ओर से /For the Appellant:  Shri D. R. Sindhal
ू3यथ1 क4 ओर से /For the Respondent: Shri Dilip Loyalka/Smt. Shreya Loyalka
आदेश/ORDER
Per Mahavir Singh, JM ( महावीर िसंह, ,
यायीक सदःय , ,  )
The Hon’ble President, Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, vide order dated 08.06.2010,
constituted this Special Bench under section 253(3) of the Income Tax Act,1961(hereinafter
called as ‘the Act’) to consider and adjudicate following questions:
“1. Whether Ld. CIT(A) erred in law as well as in fact in allowing deduction u/s. 80-IB to
the assessee on the income earned from ‘job work’ which comprises of repairs and
maintenance?
2. Whether Ld. CIT(A) erred in law as well as in fact in treating the income from
repairing and maintenance at par with the income from manufacturing for the purpose of
Sec.80-IB?”
2. The brief facts giving rise to above questions are that assessee filed its return of income
on 28.10.2005 declaring total income at Rs.1,11,320/-. Assessee is a manufacturer of moulds for
ball pen and mould parts in Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli. Assessing Officer
issued notices under sections 143(2) and 142(1) of the I. T. Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as
“the Act”) requiring assessee to submit books of account and other related details.  In response
to notices, assessee stated that it is a manufacturing unit and has claimed deduction u/s. 80-IB of
the Act. It failed to produce details by stating that fire broke out in the office premises of
Today’s Writing Products Ltd and all records of assessee placed there were destroyed.  It was
stated that assessee HUF through Karta Shri Rajesh  Kumar Drolia was one of the
promoter/director of Today’s Writing Products Ltd.  No books of account were produced except
few preliminary details and break up of various expenses to substantiate its claim of deduction 2 ITA 1305/K/2008  Rajesh  Kr. Drolia A.Y.05-06
u/s. 80-IB of the Act.  Accordingly, Assessing Officer proceeded to complete assessment u/s.
144 of the Act discussing facts that assessee HUF is engaged in manufacturing of moulds
mainly supplied to main group concern namely Today’s Writing Products Ltd. and M/s.
Premium Writing Products.  According to Assessing Officer, these two concerns are engaged in
manufacturing of ball pens by using moulds supplied by assessee.  The Assessing Officer noted
that the assessee provided services to Today’s Writing Products Ltd. and M/s. Premium Writing
Products by way of repair and maintenance of moulds sold to them.  The assessee charged job
work charges for such repairs and services at Rs.96,01,410/- and claimed deduction u/s. 80-IB
of the Act.  The Assessing Officer after going through assessment records for assessment year
2003-04 noted that similar claim of deduction u/s. 80-IB of the Act was disallowed because it
provided only services for repairing and maintenance of moulds which does not constitute
manufacturing activity as it does not manufacture any article or thing and by this process no
new article or thing comes into existence.  The Assessing Officer noted that same moulds
existed all along, prior or after repairs and maintenance and discussing the case law of Hon’ble
Apex Court in the case of CIT Vs. Gem India Manufacturing Co. (2001) 249 ITR 307 (SC)
disallowed claim of deduction u/s. 80-IB of the Act.  The Assessing Officer disallowed the
deduction claimed by the assessee on profits from job work charges at Rs.16,05,356/- u/s. 80-IB
of the Act.  Aggrieved, assessee preferred appeal before CIT(A), who allowed claim of assessee
relying on Tribunal’s order for assessment years 2003-04 and 2004-05 by giving following
finding:
“3. It is seen from the perusal of the assessment order that the dispute about the nature
of manufacturing process in connection with the claim of the appellant for deduction
u/s. 80-IB is identical in this matter with the disputes in assessment year 03-04 and 04-
05.  It is further seen that they have been adjudicated upon by the Hon’ble ITAT in
those assessment years in favour of the appellant.  Respectfully following the order of
the ITAT in the case of appellant in the assessment years, the present appeal is
allowed.
Aggrieved, revenue came in appeal before Tribunal and this appeal was referred to
special bench by the order of Hon’ble President.
3. Ld. CIT-DR Sh. D. R. Sindhal argued on behalf of revenue. He stated facts that amounts
of sales, job work income, total deduction claimed  by assessee u/s 80-IB of the Act and
deduction u/s 80-IB of the Act on job work receipts for Assessment Years 2003-04, 04-05 and
05-06 are as under:-  
A.Y Sales  Job work Income
repair and
maintenance charges
Total 80-IB claim Amount of 80-IB
claim on job work
income 3 ITA 1305/K/2008  Rajesh  Kr. Drolia A.Y.05-06
03-04 Rs.52,49,200/- Rs.1,34,12,290/- Rs.73,08,307/- Rs.44,82,673/-
04-05 Rs.80,86,500/- Rs.1,11,63,660/- Rs.72,94,272/- Rs.43,94,985/-
05-06 Rs.98,10,000/- Rs.96,01,410/- Rs.53,58,756/-  Rs.34,31,642/-
He argued that repair and maintenance is not an ancillary activity of the assessee and perusal of
assessment order for Asstt. Yr.2003-04 reveals that assessment was framed U/s.144 of the Act,
as assessee did not produce books of accounts before AO and also did not submit the details as
called for by AO u/s.142(1) of the Act. He referred to relevant observations of the A.O. for
Asstt. Yr. 2003-04, which are as below:-
“In response to Notice Shri Rajesh Singh, FCA and A/R of the assessee appeared and
produced certain details. Assessee is a manufacturing unit claimed deduction u/s.8OIB.
Therefore, a detail requisition was made for different particular related to
manufacturing activities but Ld. A/R failed to produce such details. Above all no books
of a/cs was produced before me for examination. Only a few preliminary details were
produced on 07-12-2005 and thereafter, no compliances was made when 142(1) notice
was served as early as in October, 2005. Therefore, I proceed to complete the
assessment u/s. 144 to the best of my judgment on the basis of materials available in
record.”
Ld. CIT-DR argued that once assessee did not file details and did not produce books of
account, it is not possible to know exact nature of “job work charges” on which assessee
claimed deduction u/s.801B of the Act.  He argued that CIT(A) and Tribunal in these
assessment years felt that “job work charges” in this case means manufacture or production of
any article or things on behalf of others.  He referred to paragraph 6 of CIT(A)’s order for
assessment year 2003-04 and argued that this misinterpretation of job work is clear as under:
“The submissions are carefully considered. It is not disputed that the appellant used to get
deduction u/s.80-IA or 80 IB in the earlier assessment years with identical facts. While it is
true that the findings in the earlier assessment year, are not binding upon the tax authorities
considering the matter, ordinarily the earlier findings are not unsettled if they are not
arbitrary or perverse and if they are arrived at after making due enquiries. The claim of the
appellant is that the decision in the assessment order u/s. 143(3) of allowing deductions
u/s.8OlA/IB was arrived at after making due enquiries.
The relevant expression in section 80-lA/80-IB is whether the profits and gains are derived
from an undertaking engaged in activities listed in the relevant sections manufacturing or
producing any article or thing. There is no dispute in the case that the appellant derives profit
from manufacturing plastic moulds. It also cannot be disputed that plastic mould is an article
or thing. The written submission on behalf of the appellant relies upon several authorities
which hold that an article or thing manufactured on behalf of others on job work basis, is also
manufacturing an article or thing. Although, the authorities rendered their judgments in the
context of other sections, the expression interpreted by them is whether an article or thing is
manufactured. Kerala High Court in the case of Forbes Ewart and Figgis Pvt. Ltd (supra)
specifically considered whether manufacturing activity as job work on the raw material
supplied by the other party would amount to manufacturing an article in terms of section 32A
of the Act, It was held that intermediate items produced by any manufacturing activity which
are used as components by another manufacturer in producing the final product for the
market is also an article or thing, the portion of which would entitle the producer for relevant
deductions under the law. Whether the raw material is purchased by the appellant or supplied 4 ITA 1305/K/2008  Rajesh  Kr. Drolia A.Y.05-06
by the buyer of the product is not relevant for deciding whether the appellant manufactured
an article or thing out of such materials purchased by itself or received from others, If it is
job work, the profits of the manufacturer would to this extent be less than the profits in the
case of manufacturing on its own. Therefore, such adjustments as are required in the case of
job work manufacturing, is already done by the market conditions. The only question is
whether the plastic mould amounts to manufacturing of article or thing. That the raw material
is received from the purchaser is an irrelevant consideration. So also the fact that the product
is purchased by the supplier of raw material. Hence it is held that the appellant produces an
article or thing with entitlement to deductions claimed.”
He further argued that even Hon’ble Tribunal got confused and interpretation of ‘job work
charges” continued. He referred to relevant portion of the order of Tribunal for A.Y.03-04
which is as below:-
“The A.O held that the deduction could be available to an industrial undertaking
which manufactures or produces the article or things to the extent the assessee
manufactures on behalf of others, the real nature of its activity is to provide services.
The assessing officer was referring to the written response from the appellant that
while assessee manufactured moulds for plastic ball pens, the sister concerns
manufactured ball pens and components. The assessee supplied these moulds to the
sister concerns and also undertook repairs and maintenance of moulds. According to
the A.O., repairs and maintenance certainly do not constitute manufacturing. The A.O.
omits to consider the main activity of the assessee, namely to manufacture moulds and
supply them to sister concerns. Repairs and maintenance of moulds is an ancillary
and an allowed activity.  Even if the assessing officer disallowed the deduction u/s.80-
lB erroneously emphasizing the marginal part of the work of the assessee, namely,
providing repairs and maintenance support, the question still remains whether the
assessee carrying out manufacturing on behalf of others, can be said to be
manufacturing an article or thing to qualify for deduction u/s.80-IB.”
He argued that in this Order Tribunal heavily relied upon erroneous interpretation of
“job work charges” by CIT(A) and also referred to the decision of Amritsar bench of ITAT and
confirmed the order of CIT(A). Similarly, he narrated facts that Assessment order for Asstt. Yr.
2004-05 has also been passed by AO u/s.144 of the Act, as again assessee did not file required
details and did not produce books of account. He stated that in this year also nature of “job
work charges” remained vague, unclear and liable to be misinterpreted by CIT(A) as well as
Tribunal relying upon their earlier orders for deciding appeal for Asstt. Yr. 2004-05.
4.   He narrated facts from Asstt. Yr. 2005-06, that assessee took plea that there was fire in its
premises and again many of details could not be furnished by the assessee. However, most
importantly, during assessment proceedings of A.Y.2005-06, assessee filed cost break-up and
the kind of work done in job work manufacturing which is as under:-
“Cost break-up:
Jai Durgcs Engineering Company is manufacturing Plastic Moulds & their
components for writing instruments industries. Mould is heart of ballpen design & it is
a creative job. A mould is not similar to another mould hence cost of each mould vary
with other mould. The cost of mould depends of simplicity/ complexity of its design,
size & number of cavity in each mould. The cost of I set of ballpen mould varies from 5 ITA 1305/K/2008  Rajesh  Kr. Drolia A.Y.05-06
Rs.8.00 lacs to Rs.20.00 lacs depending upon above criteria’s. In manufacturing of a
mould the basic raw material are various kinds of Iron & Steel, Tools, Jigs & almost
80% cost is that of labour payment. This is basically a techno-labour oriented job.
Job work Manufacturing
We are doing job work for those parties to whom we sold the moulds. Job work is
basically manufacturing of mould parts which are needed regularly by those parties to
keep the mould in running condition & get their production. We are doing the same
from last 4-5 years and we are eligible to claim deduction u/s.801B and we got the
same in the previous Assessment years from the department.”
Ld. CIT-DR, in view of above facts, argued that said job work is nothing but repairing and
maintenance of the mould which have been sold by assessee earlier. Therefore, decisions of
Tribunal for A.Y.2003-04 and A.Y.2004-05 will not cover the appeal pending for A.Y.2005-
06.  He stated that Tribunal in its order for Asstt. Yr. 2004-05 has relied upon decision of
ITAT, Amritsar Bench in the case of Sharoff Electricals Pvt. Ltd. v ACIT (2004) 89 TTJ
761(Asr), wherein it was held that repairing of old transformers un-disputably being use of
same machinery and therefore, benefit u/s.8OHH/80I of the Act could not be denied. Therefore,
he stated that the decision of ITAT Amritsar Bench relied upon by assessee is distinguishable
on facts in the present case as assessee is only making repairs and maintenance of moulds
produced earlier by assessee. Ld. CIT-DR further distinguished case law of Hon’ble Bombay
High Court in the case of CIT Vs.  Buckau Wolf New India Engineering Works Ltd. (1984)
150 ITR 180 (Bom) by stating that words used in section 80-I of the Act were “attributable to”
wherein Hon’ble Bombay High Court mentioned words attributable to have been deliberately
used by legislature and they have wider import than the expression derived from and he stated
that words used in Section 8OIB of the Act are ‘derived from’ which has narrow meaning.  He
also referred to case law of Hon’ble Kerala High Court in the case of CIT Vs. A. M. Moosa
(1999) 237 ITR 867 (Ker), wherein it is held that profit must be derived from business
activities related to industrial undertaking and that income by way of sale of import licence,
export house premium and customs draw bock will not be entitled for deduction U/s.80J and
8OHH of the Act.  He also referred to the case law of Hon’ble Kerala High Court in the case of
CIT Vs. Forbes Ewart & Figgis (P) Ltd  (1999) 238 ITR 762 (Ker), which contains issue of job
work manufacturing and has no relevance to the facts of assessee’s case.  He stated that for
claiming deduction U/s.801B of the Act there must be manufacture or production of a new
article and there is overwhelming judicial opinion in favour of this proposition.  For this, Ld.
CIT-DR placed reliance on the case of law of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Tamil Nadu
State Transport Corporation Ltd v CIT (2001) 252 ITR 883 (S.C.), wherein it is held that tyre
retreading does not amount to production and production means, which brings into existence a
new article. When a tyre wears out, its life may be renewed by retreading but a different and
distinct commodity cannot be said to have come into existence as a result of retreading and 6 ITA 1305/K/2008  Rajesh  Kr. Drolia A.Y.05-06
therefore, the business of retreading of tyres did  not amount to production of a new article
entitling assessee to relief U/s.80J and u/s.8OHH of the Act. According to him, this decision is
squarely applicable to the case of assessee as the nature of job work in the case of this assessee
is nothing but repairs and maintenance of moulds sold earlier. He stated facts that due to repairs
and maintenance of old moulds, their life might be renewed and they might become useful for
further use. But, the activity of repairing and maintenance brings no new article or thing,
therefore, assessee is not eligible for deduction U/s.80-IB of the Act on such job charges.
5.   Ld. CIT-DR further relied on the decision of Hon’ble Kerala High Court in the case of
CIT v Vijaya Retreaders (2002) 253 ITR 53 (Ker), wherein it is held that there should be
manufacture or production of a new article but retreading of tyres gives no new article and,
therefore, it is held that assessee is not entitled for deduction U/s.80I of the Act. Further, he
relied on the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of CIT v Relish Foods (1999) 237 ITR
59 (SC), wherein it is held that the condition precedent before deduction U/s.80HH of the Act
is that new article must come into existence as a result of manufacture or production and has
held that when raw shrimps and prawns are subjected to the process of cutting head and tails,
peeling, deveining, cleaning and freezing, they do not cease to be shrimps and prawns and do
not become other distinct commodity and therefore,  deduction U/s. 80HH of the Act is not
available to the assessee.  He further relied on the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case
of CIT v Gem India Manufacturing Co. (2001) 249 ITR 307 (SC), wherein Hon’ble Apex
Court held that subjecting raw, uncut diamonds to a process of cutting and polishing, which
yields the polished diamonds does not amount to manufacture or production of an article or
thing as a new article or thing does not come into existence and therefore, the assessee is not
eligible for deduction U/s.801 of the Act. He also relied on the decision of Liberty India v CIT
reported in (2009) 317 ITR 218 (SC), wherein it is  held that the words “derived from” are
narrower in connotation as compared to the words “attributable to” and that by using the
expression “derived from” the Parliament intended to cover sources not beyond the first degree
and also that the source of receipts must be manufacture and production of an article. Ld. CITDR referred to words used in Section 35B of the Act as “manufacture and production”. He
referred to the case law of CIT v Tara Agencies (2007) 292 ITR 444 (SC), wherein Hon’ble
Apex Court has held that the activity of blending of tea will not amount to manufacture or
production and therefore, Hon’ble Supreme Court denied weighted deduction U/s.35B of the
Act to assessee.  He also referred to the decision of coordinate bench of this Tribunal, Chennai
Benches in the case of DXN Herbal Manufacturing (India) Pvt. Ltd. v ITO (2009) 3l6 ITR
(AT) 126 Chennai), wherein it is held that the activity of mixing of mushroom powder and 7 ITA 1305/K/2008  Rajesh  Kr. Drolia A.Y.05-06
putting them into capsules is neither manufacturing nor production of article and therefore, the
assessee is not entitled to deduction U/s.801B of the Act.

6.  Ld. CIT-DR further stated that recently Hon’ble Delhi High Court, exactly on similar
issue where after sales service, whether entitled to deduction u/s. 80HH and 80I of the Act was
the subject matter in the case of Honda SIEL Power Products Ltd. v CIT (2009) 318 ITR 309
(Delhi), wherein it is held that assessee is not entitled to deductions U/s. 80 HH and 80 I of the
Act  on profits from sale of imported machinery and spare parts used for providing after sales
service.  In view of the facts of present case and  case laws above relied upon, Ld. CIT-DR
stated that deduction U/s.801B of the Act will be available to assessee only if a new article
comes into existence as a result of manufacture or production but in the present case, assessee
is doing only repairs and maintenance of old moulds which were sold by him earlier in the garb
of so-called job charges. According to him, as a result of repairs and maintenance, no new
articles come into existence and it is neither manufactured nor production, therefore, it is not
entitled for deduction U/s.80-IB of the Act, on the so-called job charges. Accordingly, he urged
before us that the order of CIT(A) be reversed and that of the AO be restored.
7. On the other hand, the Ld. Counsel for the assessee stated facts that assessee is a
manufacturer of moulds for ball pen and mould parts in the Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar
Haveli and these moulds are hollow design of ball pen parts which are manufactured with the
help of Injection moulding machines. He stated that mould manufactured by the assessee
consists of the under mentioned parts which are also manufactured by the assessee itself:
a) Punches
b) Pin Point
c) Guide Pins
d) Guide/Degree Bush
e) Hanging Pin/Link Rode
f) Ejector Bush
g) Cavities
He briefly stated process for manufacturing each of above parts for which separate processes &
separate set of machines are used and narrated brief description of manufacturing of each part
as below:
“a) Punches: For manufacturing punches H13 & H11 steel are used & it is cut to the size of the
punch with the help of special cutting machines and then rough turning is done on it with the
help of turning machines. Thereafter its hardening is carried out as per need i.e. vacume or
Furnace hardening. The hardening should be 46-48 as per Rockwell Hardening Scale. 8 ITA 1305/K/2008  Rajesh  Kr. Drolia A.Y.05-06
Thereafter cylindrical grinding, surface grinding are done with the help of cylindrical &
surface grinding machines. Thereafter these punches are diamond polished & hard chromed
which involves very high precision and technique like electroplating and carried out with the
help of sophisticated machine which is a manufacturing activity in itself.
b) Pin Point: For manufacturing pin points H13 & H11 steel are used & it is cut to the size of
the pin point with the help of special cutting machines and then rough turning is done on it with
the help of turning machines. Thereafter it is given for furnace hardening. The hardening
should be 42- 44 as per Rockwell Hardening Scale. Thereafter cylindrical grinding, surface
grinding are done with the help of cylindrical & surface grinding machines through specialized
EDM drills. These pin points are now put to spark erosion with the help of sparking machines &
hard chromed.
c) Guide Pins: For manufacturing of Guide pins EM36 steel are used & it is cut to the size of
the guide pins  with the help of special cutting machines. Then rough turning is done on it with
the help of turning machines. Thereafter it is given for furnace hardening.  Thereafter
cylindrical grinding, surface grinding are done with the help of cylindrical & surface grinding
machines. These guide pins are lubricated with special lubricants and grooves are attached.
d) Guide/ Degree Bush: For manufacturing of Guide bush EM24 steel are used & it is cut to the
size of the guide bush with the help of special cutting machines. Then rough turning is done on
it with the help of turning machines. Thereafter it is given for furnace hardening and hardening
should be 58 as per Rockwell Hardening Scale.  Thereafter cylindrical grinding  surface
grinding are done  with the help of cylindrical & surface grinding machines.
e) Hanging Pins/Link Rode : For manufacturing of Hanging pins nickel chrome steel are used
& it is cut to the size of the hanging pins with the help of special cutting machines. Then rough
turning is done on it with the help of turning machines. Thereafter it is given for vacuum
hardening and hardening should be 44 as per Rockwell Hardening Scale. Thereafter cylindrical
grinding, surface grinding are done with the help of cylindrical & surface grinding machines.
f)  Ejector Bush: For manufacturing of Ejector Bush H13 steel are used & it is cut to the size of
the Ejector Bush with the help of special cutting machine. Then rough turning is done on it with
the help of turning machines thereafter it is given for furnace hardening and hardening should
be 46 as per Rockwell Hardening Scale.  Thereafter cylindrical grinding, surface grinding are
done with the help of cylindrical & surface grinding machines.
g)  Cavitites: For manufacturing of Cavities H13 chrome/stavessar steel are used & it is cut to
the size of the Cavities with the help of special cutting machine. Then rough turning is done on
it with the help of turning machines. Thereafter it is given for furnace hardening and hardening
should be 46 as per Rockwell Hardening Scale.  Thereafter cylindrical grinding, surface
grinding are done with the help of cylindrical & surface grinding machines. In each cavities
electrodes are inserted.”
The Ld. Counsel for assessee stated that manufacture of above parts with its own material as
well as steel supplied by customers and sale of moulds as well as supply of mould parts
manufactured qualifies for deduction u/s 80-IB of the Act, whether manufactured on its own
material or on job work basis. The assessee is basically a manufacturer and he referred an
example of ‘Voltas’ an air conditioning machine manufacturer who manufactures compressor,
cooling coil, body of air conditioner and other parts. He sells complete air conditioning
machine as well as parts like compressor, cooling coil etc and in case air-conditioning machine
develops problem and its compressor is replaced by manufacturer, the activity may be repair 9 ITA 1305/K/2008  Rajesh  Kr. Drolia A.Y.05-06
for the customer but same is a sale of manufactured part for Voltas. Similarly Hewlett Packard
(HP) manufactures computers and computer parts like motherboard, CPU, hard disk, screens,
keyboard etc and it sells fully assembled computers as well as its parts. According to him both
sales are sales of manufactured items only but in case customer gets hard disk of computer
replaced, it may be repair work for the customer but it is a sale of manufactured part (hard disk)
for HP. He also referred to the contrary, that if a person buys hard disk from market and
replaces the same in the computer of a customer, the same may be termed as repairing activity.
In view of this he argued that supplying of manufactured parts in the course of after sales
service is very much manufacturing activity. He stated in reference to the Special Bench that
issues framed by revenue predicates that income shown to have been earned from “job works”
in fact represents assessee’s income from repairs and maintenance but this premise is far from
facts. He stated facts that assessee provided after sales service to its valued customers, which is
essential for selling moulds. After sales service is an exclusive service to its own customers and
it is not that assessee carries on the business of doing repair. He argued that even if part of job
work is after sales service, that is immaterial, because after-sale service is an indispensable part
of manufacturing, almost universally, undertaken by manufacturers to maintain confidence and
dependence of the users and to retain market of manufactured items.  The Ld. Counsel for the
assessee referred to the decision of Delhi Bench of ITAT in the case of ACIT v. Woodword
Governors India (P) Ltd. (2007) 15 SOT 362 (Del), wherein it is held that the activity of after
sale service is manufacturing activity and observed as under:
  ‘In the instant case, the assessee company was engaged in manufacture, sale and
servicing of industrial application electronic controls etc. On the profit earned by the
industrial undertaking, the assessee claimed deduction under s. 80-IB. As per
provisions of s. 80-IB, assessee is entitled to deduction in respect of profits and gains
from certain industrial undertakings as referred to in sub-s.s (3) to (11) of the Act. The
deduction is computed with respect to profits and gains derived from such industrial
undertaking for a certain period as specified in the Act. The profit on which the
assessee is entitled to claim deduction should be arising out of manufacture or
production of the article or things specified in the Act. In the instant case, the assessee
company was basically engaged in, manufacturing of its products. There is no dispute
with regard to the claim of deduction on the profits derived from such manufactured
goods. In addition to it, the assessee company was also providing training to employees
of its customers for the use of the products sold to them and also providing after sales
services and repairing of the products sold to its customers. The activities which are
related to activity of manufacture and sale of products are that of provision of training
of the customers’ employees for being able to use the products and after sale service
and repairs. The profit from these activities are indeed "derived" from industrial
undertaking and formed part of manufacturing products. As the assessee is engaged
in the business of manufacture and sale of high precision governors and other control
devices. Given the high technical precision it is incumbent upon the assessee to not
only adequately train the customers’ employees to be able to use such products but as
and when the need arises provide after sales service and repair such products for their
continued efficient use. Admittedly, all these activities are carried out by the
undertaking itself and only supplement the manufacturing activity being carried out by
the undertaking. Thus, the essential ingredient of  nexus between the profit and the 10 ITA 1305/K/2008  Rajesh  Kr. Drolia A.Y.05-06
undertaking gets established. There is no infirmity in the order of the CIT(A) for
allowing deduction under s. 80-IB even in respect of profits derived from training of
customers’ employees and after sales services and repairs’.
Ld. Counsel for the assessee also referred to the decision of Ahmedabad Bench of ITAT in the
case of DCIT Vs. Mira Industries 87 ITD 475 (Ahd), wherein similar view is expressed
8. Ld. Counsel for the assessee further referred to the decision of Amritsar Bench of ITAT
in the case of Saraf Electricals (P) Ltd (supra), wherein it is held manufacturing new items and
servicing used ones needing debugging after operation for a time involving the use of same
machinery required for manufacturing, in such situation, repair is no different from
manufacturing. He drew support from CIT v. Tamil Nadu Treatment Testing Services (P) Ltd.
238 ITR 529(Mad), wherein it is held therein that giving heat treatment to toughen the
untreated crankshafts and forgings and castings for use in automobiles is manufacturing though
there occurs no physical change through operations.  Ld. Counsel for assessee argued that
because of preponderance of judicial view of manufacture on own account and on job work as
on a parity, revenue has raised this issue that job work indeed represents after sale repair work
and contests the eligibility for exemption to the extent income represents income from such
repair allegedly to pass off as job work. He argued that, of late, there has been a legislative
development. Now a definition of the word “manufacture” which is determinant of issues in the
case has been carved out and emergence of the definition alters the scenario. He stated that
until recently nowhere in Section 80 IA or 80 IB of the Act and, for that matter, in the Act, no
definition of the word ‘manufacture’ was available. The absence of definition of the word was
not by chance but by design to leave the word to its widest amplitude possible consonant with
incentive nature of benefits of deduction/exemption under various sections hinging on
manufacture as the central condition precedent. According to him, this proved to be prone to
dispute and thus counter-productive. Ld. Counsel for the assessee referred to Export Import
Policy 2002 to 2007 (hereinafter Exim policy for short), whereby manufacture is defined in
Chapter DC, which is as follows:
“Manufacture” means to make, produce, fabricate, assemble, process or drawing into existence
by machine, a new product having a distinctive name, character or use and shall include
processes such as refrigeration, polishing, blending, reconditioning, repair, refurbishing,
testing calibration, reengineering. “Manufacture” for the purpose of this policy shall also
include agriculture, aquaculture, animal husbandry, floriculture, pisci-culture, poultry,
sericulture, viti-culture and mining.
Ld. Counsel stated that until recently, it is a fact that, this definition was in a different Act with
the object of imposing restrictions on import and export activity, which was considered a
constraint on its importation in the Act in the context of its incentive provisions.  He argued 11 ITA 1305/K/2008  Rajesh  Kr. Drolia A.Y.05-06
that this obstacle is removed by reason of the fact that this very definition has been bodily lifted
into Section 2(r) of the Special Economic Zones Act 2005 with effect from 10.2.2006.
According to him, selfsame definition has been incorporated in Section 10AA of the Act by
reference to said section 2(r) of SEZ Act and changed its definition in Exim Policy. The
definition in section 2(r) reads as under:
“Manufacture” means to make, produce, fabricate, assemble, process or drawing into
existence by machine, a new product having a distinctive name, character or use and
shall include processes such as refrigeration, polishing, blending, reconditioning,
repair, cutting, refurbishing, testing calibration, reengineering. “Manufacture” for the
purpose of this policy shall also include agriculture, aquaculture, animal husbandry,
floriculture, pisci-culture, paultry, sericulture, viti-culture and mining”.
In view of the above, Ld. Counsel for the assessee  argued that one striking aspect in this
connection is that it is clause (c) of schedule of the SEZ Act that has inserted Section 10AA
after Section 10A of the Act and Clause (iii) of Explanation 1 below sub-section (9) of Section
10AA contains the definition of “manufacture” by reference to Section 2(r) of the SEZ Act
2005. It reads:  “manufacture” shall have the same meaning as assigned to it in clause (r) of
Section 2 of the Special Economic Zones Act 2005. Thus it is incorporation of definition of
“manufacture” in the SEZ Act and in turn in Exim Policy in the Act by reference.  He further
stated that besides Section 10AA of the Act, the SEZ Act 2005 also inserted Section 80IAB of
the Act and thus SEZ Act has the elevation as a supplemental source of legislation in the Act
and the two sections cited are creatures of wedlock between the two.  In the light of the above,
Ld. Counsel for the assessee argued that the work relating to “repair” finds place in definition
of “manufacture” as adopted for the purpose of Section 10AA of the Act and it is for the first
time that a definition of the word “manufacture” is available in the Act. According to him, this
brings an end to the harrowing hunt for its meaning and, therefore, as a logical extension of
presence of definition in the Act, issue raised by  Revenue gets settled in vindication of
Tribunal’s earlier orders for series of past assessment years favouring assessee’s case,
immaterial whether the income from job works wholly or in part represents income from repair.
Ld. Counsel for the assessee also argued that logic for calling into aid the definition in section
10AA of the Act is straightforward and forthright and provisions of deduction in Section 80-IB
of the Act are undisputedly meant to encourage entrepreneurs to set up manufacturing
undertakings in identified backward areas. This section gives entrepreneurs reward for
undergoing hardihood in venturing out in such areas and contributing towards nation’s strife for
even growth of the industry nationwide. So, it is essentially an incentive provision and a relief
provision as well. This needs a purposive approach while giving the word “manufacture” its
connotation.  12 ITA 1305/K/2008  Rajesh  Kr. Drolia A.Y.05-06
9. Ld. Counsel for the assessee referred to section 10AA of the Act, which is also an
incentive provision given to a manufacturer as a booster to 100% export oriented industrial
activity in the Special Economic Zones and, therefore, Section 80-IB and 10AA of the Act
quite justifiably be said to stand on the equation from the object of social benefit.  He referred
to major intersecting points in the fundamentals of the two sections are as follows:
(i) both concern industrial undertaking manufacturing goods
(ii) in identified area – identified backward areas in the case of 80-IB and special
economic zones demarcated by the SEZ Act 2005 for section 10AA.
He stated that only additional angle for section 10AA of the Act is that the industrial
undertaking has to be 100% export-oriented, but that does not impair the fundamental unity or
equation of two provisions.  According to him, section 5 of the SEZ Act sets out as guidelines
for notifying Special Economic Zone of which the primary factor among other factors is
generation of additional economic activity and again, under its section 6, the zones are to be
demarcated as processing and non-processing areas. The processing area means area for setting
up Units for activities, being the manufacture of goods, or rendering services; or (b) the area
exclusively for trading or warehousing purposes; while the non-processing area are for
activities other than those specified under clause  (a) or clause (b).  He argued that the
pertinence of the provisions of SEZ Act lies in demonstrating the kindred nature of the two
provisions of the Act where both have as the presiding object the spread of the activity of
manufacture and generation of economic activity in the areas where the same are most desired
from welfare point of view and the nation’s socio-economic enrichment. They both offer
incentive to win over the entrepreneurs’ skepticism about prospects of industry in such areas.
The exemption or deduction of profit is meant to arouse motivation for entrepreneurs to divert
their industrial ventures to such areas and thus, indisputably, the objects of special favours and
situations calling for same analogy.  He referred to Explanation defining “manufacture”, which
is prefaced by words “for the purpose of this section” i. e. section 10AA of the Act, but it
dispels the ambiguity, uncertainty and confusion over the word used in other sections of the Act
with object similar to that of section 10AA of the  Act. The equation of objects makes the
definition useful as a guide for the purpose of unlocking the mind of legislature with regard to
the word occurring elsewhere in the Act.  For this the Ld. Counsel for the assessee relied on the
decision of Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of DIT v. Shree Visheshwar nath Memorial
Public Charitable Trust (2011) 333 ITR 248 (Del), wherein it is held that the definition of the
word in some other statute can be borrowed in case the word is not defined in the Act.  But he
stated that in the instant case the definition of manufacture is available in the Act itself though
in different section. As such there is no reason for not adopting the same. Ld. Counsel for the 13 ITA 1305/K/2008  Rajesh  Kr. Drolia A.Y.05-06
assessee also referred to the decision of Kerala High Court in the case of Tata Tea Ltd. Vs.
ACIT reported in (2010) 234 CTR 90 (Ker), (2010) 189 Taxman 303 (Ker.), wherein it has
applied this definition of manufacture in section 10AA of the Act in defining manufacture for
section 10B even in the absence of the definition in that Section and has held that processing of
blending tea amounts to manufacture and the income  therefrom is entitled to the exemption
under section 10B of the Act. Originally section 10B of the Act defined manufacture to include
processing, but the said definition was deleted by the Finance Act 2000. The issue was whether
with the disappearance of the definition benefit of exemption for income from processing under
section 10B of the Act pales out. The High Court answered in negative, holding that deletion of
definition was not for restriction but for further enlargement of the meaning. He also referred to
another decision of Hon’ble Kerala High Court, viz.,  Girnar Industries Vs. CIT (2010) 230
CTR (Ker) 401, (2010) 187 Taxman 136, wherein it took the view that in the absence of
definition of “manufacture” in 10A of the Act, aid can be taken from its definition in Section
10AA of the Act.  Ld. Counsel finally argued that since definition of “manufacture” in Section
10AA of the Act includes repair as one of the parameters of the expression “manufacture”, it is
only fair, reasonable and irresistible that repair  should also be taken as a parameter of
“manufacture” for the purpose of Section 80-IB of the Act. There is nothing in the object of
Section 80-IB of the Act, which can be said to be repugnant to the object of Section 10AA of
the Act. Both provisions stand on equation in regard to the basic nature of the objects, i.e.,
growth of industry - one, for the purpose of export development and the other for the purpose
of removing the pockets of industrial backwardness  of the national economy. So, they are
public interest provisions and fundamentally marked by a common trait of betterment of
national economy.  Ld. Counsel for the assessee finally relied on settled law that a provision for
deduction, exemption or relief should be interpreted liberally, reasonably and in favour of
assessee and it should be so construed as to effectuate the object of legislature and not to defeat
it. He relied on CIT Vs. Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. Co. Ltd. 196 ITR 149 (SC), Bajaj Tempo v.
CIT 196 ITR 188(SC); CIT v. U. P. Cooperative Federation Ltd. 176 ITR 435(SC); Mysore
Minerals v. CIT 239 ITR 775 (SC); Broach Distt. Cooperative Cotton Sales, Ginning and
Pressing Society Ltd. v. CIT, Ahmedabad 177 ITR 418(SC); CIT, Madras v. South Arcot
District Cooperative Marketing Society Ltd. 176 ITR 117(SC); Amritsar v. Strawboard
Manufacturing Co. Ltd. 177 ITR 431(SC); CIT Bombay and Others v. Mahindra and Mahindra
Ltd. and Others 144 ITR 225(SC); CBDT v. Aditya V Birla 170 ITR 137(SC); CIT, Central-I
Calcutta V. Birla Bros. Pvt. Ltd. 133 ITR 373(Cal); CIT v Salem Textiles Ltd 237 ITR
662(Mad); CIT, Tamil Nadu I v Simpson and Company 122 ITR 283(Mad); J.K.Abdul Jabbar
v CIT 237 ITR 389(Mad); CIT v K.S.Chandrasekaran, Sundaram Finance Ltd 216 ITR
455(Mad); CIT, Gujarat I v. Satellite Engineering Ltd. 113 ITR 208(Guj); CIT Gujarat v. 14 ITA 1305/K/2008  Rajesh  Kr. Drolia A.Y.05-06
Gujarat State Warehousing Corporation 124 ITR 282(Guj); CIT v Gujarat Oil and Allied
Industries 201 ITR 325(Guj); CIT v. Mahant Oil Industries Pvt. Ltd 193 ITR 620(Kar);
Gokuldas Export V. CIT 200 ITR 401(Kar); CIT v. Bhageeratha Engineering Ltd. 193 ITR
674(Ker); CWT v. N. C. John 233 ITR 475(Ker); CIT v. Trinity Hospital 225 ITR 178(Raj);
Jammu and Kashmir Tourism Development Corporation v. CIT 248 ITR 94(J&K).
10. The Ld. Counsel, without prejudice to above arguments and case laws, argued that if at
all there are decisions which create doubt, it is a settled law that in case of doubts the
construction most beneficial or favourable to assessee should be adopted even if it results in his
obtaining a double advantage and if it is a case of considering respective hardships or
inconveniences of revenue and assessee, the court should lean in favour of assessee. For this, he
referred to decisions of CIT vs. Vegetable Products Ltd. (1973) 88 ITR 192 (SC), CIT v.
Shivarudrappa 200 ITR 1, 6 , CIT vs. Multi Metals Ltd. (1991) 188 ITR 151 (Raj), CIT vs.
Bharat Nidhi Ltd. (1983) 141 ITR 740 (Del) and CIT vs. International Computers Ltd. (1981)
131 ITR 1 (Bom), Central Provinces & Berar Provincial Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. CIT (1946)
14 ITR 479, CIT v. Mirza  Ataullaha Baig & Anr. (1993) 202 ITR 291, Oudh Sugar v. CIT 222
ITR 726, CIT v. Lokmat News Papers Pvt. Ltd. (1995) 216 ITR 199.  In view of this, Ld.
Counsel stated that cumulative effect of judicial principles clearly indicates contra-indication
for the case sought to be made out against assessee and even in the absence of definition of
manufacture, liberal construction requires that repair by way of after-sale service as the integral
part of manufacture. It is empiric axiom that all manufacturers provide customers using their
products’ after-sale service, so to construe such after sales service as part of manufacturing
activity is quite reasonable.  
11. Ld. Counsel for the assessee distinguished case laws cited by revenue of the Supreme
Court in Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation Ltd. (supra) as well as the decision of the
Kerala High Court in Vijaya Retreaders (supra), wherein it has been held that tyre-retreading is
not production. In the above cases assessees were not the manufacturers of tyres or retread
rubber. They were purchasing retread rubber from tyre manufacturers and pasting the same on
the worn tyres. As such they were not manufacturers. This decision is non- germane to the
present issue. In view of this fact, he stated that repair in assessee’s case is after-sale service as
all manufacturers universally offer to their customers. He also distinguished case Relish Foods
(supra) stating that it has been held that decapitating, dressing, deveining and freezing shrimps
and prawns is no process of manufacturing or producing. This is also not relevant. Here the
assessee is admittedly a manufacturer of ball pen moulds. The assessee undertakes repair of the
moulds manufactured by it as after-sales service. He also distinguished another case cited by 15 ITA 1305/K/2008  Rajesh  Kr. Drolia A.Y.05-06
revenue of Gem India Manufacturing Co. (supra) where cutting and polishing diamond was
held as not amounting to manufacture or production. This case is also not applicable to the
assessee because the assessee is admittedly a manufacturer of moulds. The next case relied
upon by the revenue is Liberty India (supra), wherein it has been held that the word derived
from is narrower than the words ‘attributable to’. This case is also not applicable as the entire
profit of the assessee has been directly derived from manufacturing activity only. The next case
relied upon by the revenue is Tara Agencies (supra). This case related to blending of tea. At the
time of the judgment definition of the word manufacture was not available in the Act and after
its incorporation Kerela High in the case of Tata Tea Ltd (supra) has held tea blending to be
manufacture after distinguishing the case of Tara Agencies (supra). Moreover assessee is not
carrying on blending activity. The next case relied on is DXN Herbal Manufacturing (India)
Pvt. Ltd. (supra), wherein the question arose whether mixing mushroom powder and filling in
capsules was construable as manufacture and Tribunal answered in negative. The case of the
assessee is not that of any mixing activity. The assessee is very much carrying on
manufacturing activity.
12. Ld. Counsel for the assessee further distinguished the case law of Hon’ble Delhi High
Court in the case of Honda Siel Power Products Ltd. (supra), wherein the Delhi High court held
that sale of imported spare parts for after sale service does not amount to manufacture. In this
case Honda Siel was importing complete gensets, spare parts and also assembling few gensets.
The Court held that profit from sale of imported spare parts cannot be held to be profit from
manufacturing activity. However in the case of the assessee it sells parts manufactured by itself.
As such this case also does not apply to the assessee. He tried to negate the argument of
revenue that tax deduction at source is a proof that payments made by parties are not for sale of
manufactured goods but for repair and this inference is totally inconsistent with realities. The
assessee claimed that manufacture is part of job work, i.e. of materials supplied by other parties
for moulds to be manufactured by assessee. The assignment of such job work is treated as
contract and tax deduction has no bearings, whether assessee received payments for job work
done or repair work. Tax deduction proves nothing to disentitle assessee from benefit of
deduction u/s 80-IB of the Act. In view of the above, since the assessee is not carrying out any
repair work, it is the manufacturer of moulds and mould parts and providing after sales service
to its customers, the entire profit is derived from manufacturing activity only and as such is
entitled to deduction u/s 80-IB of the Act on its entire income. So, whole dispute is superfluous.
Moreover in view of settled principle of law to interpret provisions of deduction and
exemptions or relief liberally, reasonably and in favour of assessee so as to effectuate the object
of legislature and not to defeat it and in case of  doubts the construction most beneficial or 16 ITA 1305/K/2008  Rajesh  Kr. Drolia A.Y.05-06
favourable to the assessee should be adopted even if it results in his obtaining a double
advantage, the assessee should not be denied deduction u/s 80-IB of the Act on job work.
13. We have heard rival contentions and gone through facts and circumstances of the case.
The admitted facts are that assessee is engaged in manufacturing of moulds and also carrying
on repairs and maintenance of same moulds sold to buyers.  The assessee’s total receipt from
job work charges including repairing and services are at Rs.96,01,410/-.  The assessee claimed
entire job work charges including repairing and services as deduction u/s. 80-IB of the Act and
Assessing Officer disallowed deduction u/s. 80-IB of the Act from job work charges at
Rs.16,05,356/- out of profit from job charges disclosed at Rs.35,32,470/-  on the basis that the
same comprises receipts of repairs and maintenance.  Now, above question referred whether
income earned from job work which includes repairs  and maintenance is to be allowed
deduction u/s. 80-IB of the Act.  First of all, we have to go through provisions of section 80-IB
of the Act.  The relevant provision of section 80-IB (1) and (4) of the Act reads as under:
Deduction in respect of profits and gains from certain industrial undertakings other
than infrastructure development undertakings.
80-IB. “(1) Where the gross total income of an assessee includes any profits and gains
derived from any business referred to in sub-sections (3) to
41
[(11), (11A) and (11B)]
(such business being hereinafter referred to as the eligible business), there shall, in
accordance with and subject to the provisions of this section, be allowed, in computing
the total income of the assessee, a deduction from such profits and gains of an amount
equal to such percentage and for such number of assessment years as specified in this
section.”
“(4) The amount of deduction in the case of an industrial undertaking in an industrially
backward State specified in the Eighth Schedule shall be hundred per cent of the profits
and gains derived from such industrial undertaking for five assessment years beginning
with the initial assessment year and thereafter twenty-five per cent (or thirty per cent
where the assessee is a company) of the profits and gains derived from such industrial
undertaking”
Section 80-IB was introduced w.e.f. 1.4.2000 by the Finance Act, 1999 as a result of
substitution of the then existing section 80-IA of  the Act.  The scope and effect of the
introduction of section 80-IB by the Finance Act, 1999 has been clarified in the departmental
circular no.779 dated 14
th
 September, 1999, which was further amended by Finance Act, 2000
w.e.f. 1.4.2001, by Finance Act, 2001 w.e.f. 1.4.2002, by Finance Act, 2002 w.e.f. 1.4.2003, by
Finance Act, 2003 wr.e.f. 1.4.2004 and by Finance Act, 2004 w.e.f. 1.4.2005.  The scope and
effect of the above stated amendments have been made clear by Board Circular no.795 dated 9
th
August, 2000 vide para 37, 37.2, 37.3 and 37.4 as under:
“37. Tax holiday in respect of undertakings set up in industrially backward States and
Union Territories of the Eighth Schedule and industrially backward districts extended up 17 ITA 1305/K/2008  Rajesh  Kr. Drolia A.Y.05-06
to 31
st
 March, 2002.- 37.1 Under the existing provisions of section 80-IB of the Incometax Act, 1961, a deduction is allowed, in computing the taxable income, in respect of
profits derived from a new industrial undertaking or the business of a hotel.
‘37.2 For encouraging industrialization in industrially backward States, the Finance Act,
1993, provided for a five year tax holiday for industrial undertakings set up in
industrially backward States and Union Territories  specified in the Eighth Schedule,
which start manufacture or production during the period beginning on the 1st day of
April, 1993, but before the 31st day of March, 2000. After the first five years, a deduction
of 30 per cent of profits in the case of companies  (25 per cent. in the case of other
assessees) is allowed for the subsequent five years. Similarly, a five year tax holiday is
available to undertakings set up in notified industrially backward districts of Category
“A” and a three year tax holiday to those set up in industrially backward districts of
Category “B”, which begin manufacture or production after 1st October, 1994, but on or
before 31st March, 2000.
37.3 The Finance Act, 2000, extends the tax holiday to undertakings set up in industrially
backward States and Union Territories as specified in the Eighth Schedule, which start
manufacture/production even after 31st March, 2000, but on or before 31
st
 March, 2002.
It also seeks to extend the tax holiday to undertakings set up in industrially backward
districts on or before 31st March, 2002.
37.4 The amendments will take effect from 1st April, 2001, and will, accordingly, apply in
relation to the assessment year 2001-2002 and subsequent years. [Section 39)”
We find  that the expression used in section 80-IB of the Act is “where the gross total income
of an assessee includes any profits and gains derived from any eligible business in accordance
with and subject to the provisions of this section, be allowed , in computing the total income of
the assessee, a deduction from such profits and gains….”, it means that the purpose for
providing deduction from business profits u/s. 80-IB of the Act was to encourage industrial
activity in India and it is inconceivable that deductions should be made available in respect to
profits and gains which are not derived from an activity having a direct nexus to the industrial
activity as contemplated in this section.  The entire section has to be read as a whole and
interpretation placed thereon has to be fit the overall scheme of the provision, which is to
encourage industrial activity in India and if the interpretation sought to be placed by Ld.
Counsel for assessee is accepted, then it might possibly lead to a situation where profits from
repairs and maintenance apart from job work for which industrial undertaking has been set up
for manufacturing may undertake very little manufacturing in an assessment year but assessee
yet claimed deduction from the profits and gains of business including repairs and maintenance.
We find in the context of section 80-IB of the Act and that of section 80-HH and section 80-I of
the Act are inasmuch as are in parametria, because in both sections 80-HH and 80-I of the Act
uses the expression “profits and gains derived from an industrial undertaking”, the burden is on
assessee to show that income earned from an activity, the profits from which are claimed to
qualify for deduction has immediate and direct nexus to essential activity of the industrial
undertaking.  In this context, Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Pandian Chemicals Ltd. Vs. 18 ITA 1305/K/2008  Rajesh  Kr. Drolia A.Y.05-06
CIT (2003) 262 ITR 278 reiterates this distinction  and insist that only such business profit that
have a direct nexus to the essential business activity of assessee, can qualify for deduction u/s.
80-HH of the Act.  Hon’ble Apex Court in Pandian Chemicals Ltd. (supra), affirming the
decision of Hon’ble Madras High Court in CIT Vs. Pandian Chemicals Ltd. (1998) 233 ITR
497 (Mad), held as under:
“The High Court rejected the submission of the appellant by relying upon  the decision
of this court in Cambay Electric Supply Industrial Co. Ltd. v. CIT  [1978] 113 ITR 84,
where this court had clearly stated that the expression  “derived from” had a narrower
connotation than the expression “attributable  to” (page 93) :

“In this connection, it may be pointed out that whenever the Legislature
wanted to give a restricted meaning in the manner suggested by the learned  SolicitorGeneral, it has used the expression ‘derived from’, as, for instance, in  section 80J. In
our view, since the expression of wider import, namely, ‘attributable to’, has been used,
the Legislature intended to cover receipts from sources other than the actual conduct of
the business of generation and distribution of electricity.”
 The word “derived” has been construed as far back in 1948 by the Privy  Council in
CIT v. Raja Bahadur Kamakhaya Narayan Singh [1948]  16 ITR 325  when it said
(page 328) :
 “The word ‘derived’ is not a term of art. Its use  in the definition indeed
demands an enquiry into the genealogy of the product. But the enquiry should stop as
soon as the effective source is discovered. In the geneaological tree of the interest land
indeed appears in the second degree, but the immediate and effective source is rent,
which has suffered the accident of non-payment. And rent is not land within the
meaning of the definition.”
 This definition was approved and reiterated in 1955 by a Constitution Bench of this
court in the decision of Mrs. Bacha F. Guzdar v. CIT [1955] 27 ITR 1 at page 7. It is
clear, therefore, that the word “derived from” in section 80HH of the Income-tax Act,
1961, must be understood as something which has direct or immediate nexus with the
appellant's industrial undertaking.  Although electricity may be required for the
purposes of the industrial undertaking, the deposit required for its supply is a step
removed from the business of the industrial undertaking. The derivation of profits on
the deposit made with Electricity Board cannot be said to flow directly from the
industrial undertaking itself.
 The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has referred to several
decisions of the Madras High Court in order to contend that the word “derived from”
could be construed to include situations, where the income arose from something
having a close connection with the industrial under- taking itself. All the decisions cited
by the appellant have been considered by the Madras High Court in the case of
Pandian Chemicals Ltd. [1998] 233 ITR 497. We see no reason to disagree with the
reasoning given by the High Court  in Pandian Chemicals Ltd.'s case [1998] 233 ITR
497 with respect to those decisions to hold that they do not in any way allow the word
“derived” in section  80HH to be construed in the manner contended by the appellant.
 The learned counsel for the appellant then contended that having regard to  the object
with which section 80HH was introduced in the statute book, this  court should give a
liberal interpretation to the words in a manner so  as to  allow such object to be
fulfilled. The rules of interpretation would come into play only if there is any doubt
with regard to the express language used.  Where the words are unequivocal, there is
no scope for importing any rule of interpretation as submitted by the appellant. In the 19 ITA 1305/K/2008  Rajesh  Kr. Drolia A.Y.05-06
circumstances of the case, we affirm the decision of the High Court and dismiss the
appeal without any order as to costs.”
We find that Hon’ble Apex Court has considered its  own decision in the case of Cambay
Electric Supply Industrial Co. Ltd. (supra) as well as the decision of Mrs. Bacha F. Guzdar
(supra).  And also of Raja Bahadur Kamakhya Narayan Singh (supra), wherein the definition of
the word ‘derived’ was discussed and the same was reiterated by constitution bench of Hon’ble
Apex Court in Mrs. Bacha F. Guzdar (supra).
14. We further find from the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of CIT Vs.
Sterling Food  (1999) 237 ITR 579(SC), wherein the issue was whether the income derived by
assessee by sale of import entitlements was profit  and gain derived from its industrial
undertaking of processing sea food.  Hon’ble Apex Court observed that the Division Bench of
the High Court came to the conclusion that income which the assessee had made by selling the
import entitlements was not a profit and gain which it had derived from its industrial
undertaking.  Further, the Division Bench of the High Court observed that to obtain benefit of
section 80HH, the assessee had to establish that the profits and gains were derived from its
industrial undertaking and it was not just sufficient that a commercial connection was
established between the profits earned and the industrial undertaking.  The Industrial
undertaking itself had to be the source of profit and the business of the industrial undertaking
had directly to yield that profit.  The industrial undertaking had the direct source of that profit
and not a means to earn any other profit.  Accordingly, in import entitlements, the source
referable to the profits and gains arising out of the sale proceeds of import entitlements was
therefore, the scheme of the Central Government and not that of industrial undertaking.
Hon’ble Apex Court finally held as under:
“Our attention was also invited to the judgment of  this court in National  Organic
Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise [1997] 106 STC  467. The
relevant portion of the judgment is contained in paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 and they read
thus (page 470):
“10. The dictionaries state that the word ‘derive’ is usually followed by the word ‘from’,
and it means: get or trace from a source; arise from, originate in; show the origin or
formation of.
 11. The use of the words ‘derived from’ in item 11-AA(2) suggests that  the original
source of the product has to be found. Thus, as a matter of plain English, when it is said
that one word is derived from another, often  in another language, what is meant is that
the source of that word is  another word, often in another language. As an illustration,
the word ‘democracy’ is derived from the Greek word ‘demos’ the people, and most
dictionaries will so state. That is the ordinary meaning of the words ‘derived from’ and
there is no reason to depart from that ordinary mean- ing here. 20 ITA 1305/K/2008  Rajesh  Kr. Drolia A.Y.05-06
 12. Crude petroleum is refined to produce raw naphtha. Raw naphtha is further refined,
or cracked to produce the said products. This is not controverted. It seems to us to make
no difference that the appellants buy the raw naphtha from others. The question is to be
judged regardless of this, and the question is whether the intervention of the raw
naphtha would justify the finding that the said products are not ‘derived from refining of
crude petroleum’. The refining of crude petroleum produces various products at
different stages. Raw naphtha is one such stage. The further refining, or cracking, of
raw naphtha results in the said products.  The source of the said products is crude
petroleum. The said products  must therefore, be held to have been derived from crude
petroleum.”
 We do not think that the source of the import entitlements can be said to be the
industrial undertaking of the assessee. The source of the import entitlements can, in the
circumstances, only be said to be the Export Promotion Scheme of the Central
Government whereunder the export entitlements become available. There must be, for
the application of the words “derived from”, a direct nexus between the profits and
gains and the industrial undertaking. In the instant case, the nexus is not direct but only
incidental. The industrial undertaking exports processed sea food. By reason of such
export, the Export Promotion Scheme applies. Thereunder, the assessee is entitled to
import entitlements, which it can sell. The sale consideration therefrom cannot, in our
view, be held to constitute a profit and gain derived from the assessee’s industrial
undertaking.”
15. The Ld. Counsel for the assessee’s argument that an industrial undertaking also to
undertake activity of repairing and servicing, which in turn could complete the company’s
product profile so that customers are offered comprehensive services including after sale
services. But we cannot buy this argument of the Ld. Counsel for the assessee as service and
maintenance is not an integral part of manufacturing activity of industrial undertaking and as is
clear from the opening word of section 80-IB of the Act that deduction in respect of profits and
gains from certain industrial undertaking is to be allowed under the provisions of section 80-IB
of the Act while computing taxable income in respect of profits derived from an industrial
undertaking and not from any other activity which has no immediate or direct nexus to the
essential activity of the industrial undertaking.  Section 80-IB of the Act uses the opening word
that where the gross total income of assessee includes any profits and gains derived from any
business and the deduction under this provision be allowed in computing the total income of
the assessee from such profits and gains of an amount equal to such percentage and for such
number of assessment years as specified in this section. The Hon’ble Apex Court has also
drawn a distinction between the expression ‘derived from’ and ‘attributable to’ in the case of
Cambay Electric Supply Co. Ltd Vs. CIT (1978) 113 ITR 84(SC), wherein it is held that the
expression ‘attributable to’  was wider in import than the expression ‘derived from’.  The
expression of wider import, namely, attributable to, was used when the legislature intended to
cover receipts from sources other than the actual conduct of the business.  But in the present
case before us, the assessee’s source of income is from repairs and maintenance i.e. after sale
services and it may have commercial connection between the profits earned and the industrial
undertaking but industrial undertaking itself is not the source of this profit. This profit from 21 ITA 1305/K/2008  Rajesh  Kr. Drolia A.Y.05-06
repair and maintenance earned by assessee is not a direct yield from industrial undertaking as
the word used in section 80-IB of the Act of profits and gains derived from.
16. Another facet of the argument made by the assessee is that since the definition of
manufacture in section 10AA includes repairs is one of the parameters of the expression
manufacture,  we have considered that the definition of manufacture has been bodily lifted into
section 2(r) of the SEZ Act, 2005 w.e.f. 10.2.2006.  We have gone through the provisions of
section 10AA(9) and explanation (1) below section 10AA(9) of the Act and found that this
explanation is for the purpose of this section only and it cannot be enlarged to other chapters of
this Act.  The relevant explanation (1) starts as under:
“Explanation 1 – For the purposes of this section,-
and relevant definition of ‘manufacture’ reads as under:
(iii) ‘manufacture’ shall have the same meaning as assigned to it in clause ® of
section 2 of the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005.”
From the arguments of Ld. Counsel for assessee it is clear that the Explanation 1, above
referred, is for the purpose of this section only and it cannot be used elsewhere in the Act as
section 10AA is a code in itself and it gives complete exemption to the income earned by units
in SEZs.  The income earned from units in SEZs do not form part of total income u/s. 10AA of
the Act, whereas u/s. 80-IB of the Act the deduction is to be allowed where gross total income
of assessee includes any profits and gains derived  from business profits of industrial
undertaking  while computing the total income of the assessee.  We are of the view that
inclusion of the definition of ‘manufacture’ as assigned in clause (r) of section 2 of the SEZ
Act, 2005 in section 10AA of the Act, will not apply to other provisions of the Act, particularly
section 80-IB of the Act in view of specific mention in Explanation (1) that these definitions
are for the purposes of this section i.e. sec. 10AA of the Act.  Accordingly, these arguments of
Ld. Counsel for the assessee are not convincing in view of clear provisions.  There is marked
difference between the provisions of section 10AA of the Act that is meant for exemption of
income from the total income of the Assessee, whereas section 80-IB of the Act grants
deduction to the assessee from the profits and gains derived from its industrial undertaking and
that also from the business of the industrial undertaking that had directly yielded that profit.
Hence this facet of the argument of Ld. Counsel is rejected.
17. Another facet of argument made by Ld. Counsel that the assessee sale moulds as well as
supply mould parts manufactured by it.  For this Ld. Counsel stated that the assessee is
basically a manufacturer only and he cited example  of Voltas Air-conditioner that the 22 ITA 1305/K/2008  Rajesh  Kr. Drolia A.Y.05-06
manufacturer manufactures air-conditioning machine, manufactures compressor, cooling coil,
body of air-conditioner and other parts but sells complete air-conditioning machines as well as
parts.  He referred that in case air-conditioning machines and its compressor is replaced, the
activity may be repair for customer but same is sale of manufactured parts for Voltas.  We have
no quarrel over the proposition and in case the assessee is selling moulds manufactured by it
and spare parts of moulds also sold for doing repairs and maintenance, qua sale of moulds and
spare parts of moulds assessee is entitled for deduction u/s. 80-IB of the Act.  But in respect to
repair of moulds, it charges two types of receipts i.e. receipt on account of sale of spare parts as
well as repairs and maintenance charges, in case of sale of spare parts assessee is entitled for
deduction u/s. 80-IB of the Act but in respect to repairs and maintenance charges it is not
entitled for deduction in view of clear provisions  of section 80-IB of the Act, because that
receipt has no immediate or direct nexus with the industrial undertaking and that is not the
source of profit of industrial undertaking.  Reference made by Ld. Counsel for assessee of
Woodword Governors India (P) Ltd. (supra) of Delhi Bench of ITAT, wherein Tribunal has
allowed the claim by holding that the assessee company was also providing training to
employees of its customers for the use of products sold to them and also providing after sales
services and repairing of the products sold to its  customers and accordingly, activities which
are related activities of manufacture and sale of products are that of provision for training of the
customers employees for being able to use the products and after sales service and repair.  The
Tribunal held that profits from these activities are indeed derived from industrial undertaking
and formed part of manufacturing products.  We are of the view that decision of Delhi Bench in
the case of Woodword Governors India (P) Ltd. (supra) is not in term of the provisions of
section 80-IB of the Act as after sale services and repairing of the products sold to its customers
does not come within the purview of manufacture and also profit earned is not derived from
industrial undertaking.  The decision of Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Honda Siel
Power Products Ltd. (supra), referred by Ld. CIT-DR, is a clear authority directly on the same
issue where profits from sale of imported machinery and spare parts used for providing after
sale services was held not to be the profits from industrial undertakings entitled for speciation
deduction u/s. 80HH and 80I of the Act.  Before Hon’ble Delhi High Court, the facts were that
the assessee was engaged in the manufacture and sale of portable gensets and water pumps. In
the return of income for the assessment year 1995-96, filed on November 30, 1995, the assessee
disclosed a business income of Rs.4,48,18,770. The assessee claimed a deduction under section
80HH of the Act at Rs. 2,56,76,813 and under section 80-I of the Act at Rs. 3,20,96,017
respectively. The assessee imported certain spare parts and components which were used in the
manufacture of gensets as well as for providing after-sales service to customers. Additionally,
the assessee imported gensets of a certain capacity which were not being manufactured in India 23 ITA 1305/K/2008  Rajesh  Kr. Drolia A.Y.05-06
to complement its product profile and present to the customers a choice from a complete range
of gensets. The Assessing Officer denied the claim of deduction under sections 80HH and 80-I
of the Act in respect of the profits earned from both the sale of spare parts and components as
well as the sale of imported gensets on the ground  that the profits therefrom could not be
considered to be income "derived" from the industrial undertaking. This was upheld by the
Tribunal. Hon’ble High Court dismissing the appeal held as under:
 (i) that the Tribunal was right in law in upholding the order of the Assessing
Officer reducing the profit earned on sale of spare parts and imported gensets
from the income of the eligible undertaking(s) for  the purpose of computing
deductions under sections 80HH and 80-I.
(ii) that sale of imported spare parts used in providing after-sales service to
customers might be incidental to the business activity of the assessee but  had no
direct nexus with the activity of the industrial undertaking which was the
manufacture of gensets. Profits from such sale were not entitled to special
deduction under sections 80HH and 80-I.
We find from the above decision of Hon’ble Delhi High Court that no doubt the issue was
profit from sale of imported machinery and spare parts but also charges for providing after
sales services and Hon’ble Delhi High Court has negated the claim of assessee in terms of
above.
18. Now we will conclude our decision in terms of the above as under:
(i) That the assessee’s case of repairing and maintenance charges are not at par with the
income from manufacturing for the purposes of section 80-IB of the Act even though in section
10AA of the Act the definition of ‘manufacture’ has been bodily lifted into section 2(r) of SEZ
Act, 2005 w.e.f. 10.02.2006, reason being the Explanation (1) prescribing definitions after subsection 9 of section 10AA clarifies that these definitions will apply for the purposes of this
section only.  Section 10AA of the Act being a code in itself, the definition incorporated from
another Act cannot be applied to other provisions of the Act.  Even otherwise, the income
falling u/s. 10AA do not form part of total income whereas u/s. 80-IB of the Act only deduction
from profits and gains derived from industrial undertaking is allowed and thus there is marked
difference in these two provisions and definition of other section cannot be borrowed for
allowance of deduction u/s. 80IB of the Act.
(ii) The assessee is earning job work charges as well as repairs and maintenance, which are
included in job work charges, no doubt it is established that there is commercial connection
between profits earned on account of repairs and maintenance and the industrial undertaking
but for that source of profit is not directly from  industrial undertaking.  The business of
industrial undertaking had directly to yield that profit to claim deduction u/s. 80-IB of the Act.   24 ITA 1305/K/2008  Rajesh  Kr. Drolia A.Y.05-06
(iii) We have considered the case laws relied on by both the sides noted and discussed, but
we find that the provision of section 80-IB of the Act is in pari materia with the provisions of
section 80HH and 80I of the Act, wherein Hon’ble Apex Court in Sterling Food, Pandian
Chemicals Ltd. and Cambay Electric Supply Industrial Co. Ltd. (supra) has discussed the
expression in the context of these sections that the use of expression profits and gains derived
from an industrial undertaking, there is distinction between the expressions ‘derived from’ and
‘attributable to’. Hon’ble Apex Court held that only such business profits that have a direct
nexus to the essential business activity of the assessee can qualify for deduction under section
80HH of the Act. Inasmuch as both sections 80HH and 80-I use the expression "profits and
gains derived from an industrial undertaking", the burden is on the assessee to show that the
income earned from an activity, the profits from which are claimed to qualify for deduction,
has an immediate and direct nexus to the essential activity of the industrial undertaking. Hence,
our answer to first question referred is that the assessee is entitled for deduction u/s. 80-IB on
income earned from job work charges but excluding repairs and maintenance charges.  Our
answer to second question referred is that the income from repair and maintenance cannot be
treated at par with the income from manufacturing for the purposes of deduction u/s. 80-IB of
the Act.
iv)  That the assessee in the present case has earned income from job work which comprises
of repairs and maintenance, it has two limbs that the income from job work is to be allowed as
deduction in terms of section 80-IB of the Act but income from repairs and maintenance cannot
be equated at par with income from manufacturing and hence not eligible for deduction in
terms of section 80-IB of the Act.  In the present case, assessee is a manufacturing unit and has
claimed deduction u/s. 80-IB of the Act on job work charges including repairs and
maintenance. As stated by assessee, it failed to produce details as fire broke out in office
premises of Today’s Writing Products Ltd and all records of assessee placed there were
destroyed.  No books of account were produced except few preliminary details and break up of
various expenses and accordingly, Assessing Officer completed assessment u/s. 144 of the Act
by disallowing deduction claimed u/s. 80-IB of the Act job work charges including such repairs
and maintenance by holding that maintenance of moulds which does not constitute
manufacturing activity as it does not manufacture any article or thing and by this process no
new article or thing comes into existence. In term of above that income earned from job work
will qualify for deduction u/s. 80-IB of the Act but income from repairs and maintenance is not
at par with income from manufacturing and will not qualify for deduction u/s. 80-IB of the Act.
In view of above facts, the matter should have gone back to Assessing Officer to decide as to
how much is job work charges and how much is repair and maintenance charges and then to
disallow deduction from income of repairs and maintenance and to allow deduction u/s. 80-IB 25 ITA 1305/K/2008  Rajesh  Kr. Drolia A.Y.05-06
of the Act for job work charges received by assessee.  However, at the time of hearing, Ld.
Counsel for the assessee submitted that there was a major fire broke out and as such entire
record of the assessee was destroyed and it would not be possible to furnish books of account
and other documents to Assessing Officer if the matter is restored to his file to decide deduction
allowable to assessee u/s. 80-IB of the Act out of  total receipt of Rs.96,01,410/- shown by
assessee by way of repairing and maintenance in the form of job work charges.  Therefore,
instead of restoring the matter to Assessing Officer and with a view to finally decide the issue
before us, we are of the considered  view that it will be reasonable to consider 50% of the
receipt as job work charges on which assessee will be entitled to get deduction u/s. 80-IB of the
Act and the balance 50% is the receipt on account of repair and maintenance charges on which
the assessee will not be entitled to get deduction u/s. 80-IB of the act.  Therefore, the ground of
appeal taken by department is allowed in part as indicated above.
19. In the result, appeal of the revenue is allowed in part.
20. Order pronounced in open court on 12.8.2011

 Sd/-    Sd/-     Sd/-
(जी. ड . अमवाल,उपा!य )   (बी. आर. िम#ल,
यायीक सदःय ,,,् )   (महावीर िसंह,
यायीक सदःय)
(G. D. Agrawal)         (B. R. Mittal)       (Mahavir Singh)  
Vice President       Judicial Member                               Judicial Member
 
    (तार ख)))) Dated 12
th
 August, 2011   Pronounced by
        Sd/-(BRM)   Sd/-(SVM)  Sd/- (MS)
              JM       AM          JM
व9र: िन;ज सिचव Jd.(Sr.P.S.)
आदेश क4 ूितिल प अमे षतः- Copy of the order forwarded to:
1. अपीलाथ1/APPELLANT – DCIT, CC-XX, Kolkata.
2 ू3यथ1/ Respondent, Rajesh Kr. Drolia, HUF, C/o, Jajodia Merchantile Pvt.
Ltd., 13, Brabourne Road, Kolkata-1.
3. आयकर किमशनर (अपील)/ The CIT(A),            Kolkata
4. आयकर किमशनर/CIT,           Kolkata
5. वभािगय ूितनीधी / DR, Kolkata Benches, Kolkata
        स3या पत ूित/True Copy,        आदेशानुसार/   By order,
         
सहायक पंजीकार/Asstt. Registrar.