IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL -“Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the amendment brought out by the Finance Act, 2010 to section 40(a)(ia) w.e.f. 01.04.2010, is remedial and curative in nature and is, therefore, retrospective in nature.” - In view of the foregoing reasons we are satisfied that the amendment carried out by the Finance Act, 2010 with retrospective effect from assessment year 2010- 2011 cannot be held to be retrospective from assessment year 2005-2006. Two diametrically opposite views on this issue, expressed, inter alia, by the Mumbai Benches of the tribunal, were placed before us. With utmost respect to the other, we are inclined to accept the one in favour of the Revenue. We, therefore, hold that the authorities below were fully justified in sustaining disallowance of Rs.50.12 lakhs u/s 40(a)(ia) in the year under consideration. The question posted before the Special Bench is, therefore, answered in negative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee by holding that the amendment brought out by the Finance Act, 2010 to section 40(a)(ia) w.e.f. 01.04.2010, is not remedial and curative in nature. 57. Ground no.3 dealing with this issue is, therefore, rejected. 58. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.

IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL 
MUMBAI SPECIAL BENCH “B”, MUMBAI
Before Shri R.S.Syal, A.M., Shri D.K.Agarwal, JM and
Shri Rajendra Singh, A.M.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 :Asst.Year 2005-2006
M/s.Bharati Shipyard Limited
302 Wakefield House, 3
rd
 Floor
Sport Road, Ballard Estate
Mumbai – 400 038.
PAN :AAACB1688E.
Vs.
The Dy.Commissioner of Income-tax
Circle 3(1)
Mumbai.
(Appellant) (Respondent)
Appellant by : Shri Vijay Mehta
   Respondent by : Shri Pradeep Sharma
Date of Hearing :25.08.2011  Date of Pronouncement :09.09.2011
O R D E R
Per R.S.Syal, AM :
 The Hon’ble President of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, on a reference
made by a Division Bench, has constituted this Special Bench by posting the
following question for our consideration and decision:-
“Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the
amendment brought out by the Finance Act, 2010 to section 40(a)(ia)
w.e.f. 01.04.2010, is remedial and curative in nature and is, therefore,
retrospective in nature.”
2.   Ground no. 2  of this appeal by the assessee arising  out of the order passed
by the CIT(A) on  15.01.2001 in relation to the  A.Y. 2005-06  is against the
confirmation of disallowance of Rs.2,31,820 made by the Assessing Officer on
account of delayed payment of ESI & PF dues.
3. After considering the rival submissions and perusing the relevant material on
record we find that the said contribution received from the employees has been
admittedly deposited after the due date under the respective Act but before the M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
2
close of the previous year relevant to the assessment year under consideration.  The
Hon’ble Madras High Court in CIT Vs. Shri Ganapathy Mills Company Limited
[(2000) 243 ITR 879 (Mad.)] has held that no disallowance can be made where the
contribution is deposited late but within the grace period. In most of the cases the
deposit has been made with in the grace period.  The Hon’ble Delhi High Court in
CIT VS. Aimil Ltd. & Ors. [(2010) 321 ITR 508 (Del)] has held that  if the
employees’ share of contribution is paid before the due date of filing the return u/s
139(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter called the Act),  then no
disallowance can be made. In view of the foregoing  facts it is clear that the
assessee deserves and is hereby allowed relief on this issue in the light of the above
precedents. This ground is allowed.
4. Ground no. 4 about the confirmation of disallowance of Rs.1,55,161 made
by the A.O. u/s 14A of the Act was not pressed by the learned A.R. The same is,
therefore, dismissed.
5. Ground no. 5 about the levy of interest u/s 234A, 234B and 234C is
consequential and accordingly disposed off.
6. Ground no. 3 is against the confirmation of disallowance of Rs.50,12,311
made by the Assessing Officer u/s 40(a)(ia) of the  Act. This ground forms the
subject matter of the question extracted above placed before the Special Bench for
contemplation and decision. Briefly stated the facts apropos this issue are that the
assessee is a company engaged in the business of manufacturing of medium sized
ships, barges, tugs etc. A note to the computation of income was attached by the
assessee stating that the provisions of section 40(a)(ia) are directory and not
mandatory. The AO noted that the assessee failed to deposit tax deducted at source
within the specified time. On being show caused, it was stated that the amount of
tax deducted at source was paid before the filing of return of income u/s 139(1) of
the Act and hence no disallowance of expenses was called for u/s 40(a)(ia). Not M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
3
convinced, the Assessing Officer made addition u/s  40(a)(ia). The assessee was
partly successful before the learned CIT(A). The ld. DR has not brought to our
notice any appeal filed by the Revenue against the relief allowed in the first appeal.
It shows that the impugned order has been accepted by the Revenue. In the present
appeal by the assessee we are concerned with the confirmation of disallowance of
Rs.50,12,311 which consists of two amounts. First is the professional fee of Rs.
4,228 which was credited/paid by the assessee up to 28.02.2005 and the amount of
tax deducted at source was paid on 8th April, 2005 as against due date of payment
of 7th March, 2005. Second item is the amount paid  to contractors totaling to
Rs.50,08,083 up to 28.02.2005 on which tax deducted at source was actually paid
on 23rd June, 2005 as against the due date of payment on 7th March, 2005.
7. We have heard the rival submissions and perused the relevant material on
record in the light of precedents cited before us. The question for our consideration
is as to whether section 40(a)(ia) amended by the Finance Act, 2010 with effect
from 01.04.2010 is retrospective from 01.04.2005 or prospective from the date
specified. Unless stated otherwise, the provisions of the Finance Act, 2010 would
have applied w.e.f. 01.04.2011 i.e. A.Y. 2011-12.  The provision in question has
been specifically given retrospective effect from  A.Y. 2010-11.  Now the case of
the  assessee is that the amendment made by the Finance Act, 2010 should be given
retrospective effect from 01.04.2005, being the date from which sub-clause (ia) of
section 40(a)  was inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004.   In order to find
answer to this question it would be relevant to note down the legislative history of
the provision.
8.    Section 40 has certain clauses  providing for the amounts which are not
deductible. Sub-clause (ia) of clause (a) of section 40 was inserted by the Finance
(No.2) Act, 2004 with effect from 1
st
 April, 2005 reading as under:- M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
4
“40.  Notwithstanding anything to the contrary  in sections 30 to 38, the following
amounts shall not be deducted in computed the income chargeable under the head
`Profits and gains of business or profession’---.  
 …..
(ia) any interest, commission or brokerage, fees for professional
services or fees for technical services payable to  a resident, or
amounts payable to a contractor or sub-contractor, being resident, for
carrying out any work (including supply of labour for carrying out
any work), on or, after deduction, has not been paid during the
previous year, or in the subsequent year before the expiry of the time
prescribed under sub-section (1) of section 200 :
 Provided that where in respect of any such sum, tax has been
deducted in any subsequent year or, has been deducted in the previous
year but paid in any subsequent year after the expiry of the time
prescribed under sub-section (1) of section 200, such sum shall be
allowed as a deduction in computing the income of the previous year
in which such tax has been paid.
 Explanation. – For the purposes of this sub-clause, -
 (i) “commission or brokerage” shall have the same meaning as in
clause (i) of the Explanation to section 194H;
 (ii) “fees for technical services” shall have the same meaning as in
Explanation 2 to clause (vii) of sub-section (1) of section 9;
 (iii) “professional services” shall have the same  meaning as in
clause (a) of the Explanation to section 194J;
 (iv) “work” shall have the same meaning as in Explanation III to
section 194C;
                                        ………”
9.        The Memorandum explaining the provisions in the Finance Bill explained
the rationale of the insertion of the new provision in following words :-
“With a view to  augment compliance of TDS provisions, it is
proposed to extend the provisions of section 40(a)(i) to payments of
interest, commission or brokerage, fees for professional services or M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
5
fees for technical services to residents, and payments to a resident
contractor or sub-contractor for carrying out any work (including
supply of labour for carrying out any work), on which tax has not
been deducted or after deduction, has not been paid before the expiry
of the time prescribed under sub-section (1) of section 200 and in
accordance with the other provisions of Chapter XVII-B. It is also
proposed to provide that where in respect of payment of any sum, tax
has been deducted under Chapter XVII-B or paid in any subsequent
year, the sum of payment shall be allowed in computing the income of
the previous year in which such tax has been paid.
The proposed amendment will take effect from 1st day of April, 2005
and will, accordingly, apply in relation to the assessment year 2005-
2006 and subsequent years. [Clause 11]”
                                                                (emphasis supplied by us)
10. At this juncture it would be relevant to note that clause (a) of section 40
provides that in the case of any assessee (i) any interest, royalty, fees for technical
services or other sum chargeable under this Act, which is payable outside India;
or in India to a non-resident, not being a company or to a foreign company on
which tax is deductible at source under Chapter XVII-B and such tax has not been
deducted or, after deduction, has not been paid during the previous year, or in the
subsequent year before the expiry of the time prescribed under sub-section (1) of
section 200, shall not be allowed as deduction. There is a proviso to sub-clause (i)
which provides that where in respect of any such sum,  tax has been deducted in
any subsequent year or has been deducted in the previous year but paid in a
subsequent year after the expiry of the time prescribed u/s 200(1), such sum shall
be allowed as deduction in computing the income of the previous year in which
such tax has been paid. Sub-clause (i) of section 40(a) is there in the Income-tax
Act, 1961 since inception. Alike  provision was there in the 1922 Act also as a
portion of proviso to section 10(2)(iii). The effect of sub-clause (i) of section 40(a)
is that the amount in the nature of items specified in this provision which is payable
outside India or in India to a non-resident etc. on which tax is deductible, it is
necessary that such tax must be deducted and paid after deduction during the M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
6
previous year or before the expiry of time u/s 200(1). If such tax is not so paid, the
expenditure referred to in the sub-clause shall not be allowed as deduction. Proviso
to this provision provides that where such tax has been deducted in subsequent year
or deducted in the previous year but paid in any subsequent year after the expiry of
time u/s 200(1), such sum shall be allowed as deduction in computing the income
of the previous year in which tax has been paid. Thus the strictness of the main
provision of section 40(a)(i) providing for disallowance of expenditure in the year
of its spending stands  softened by the proviso in  granting allowance of such
expenditure in the year of payment of due tax. It is evident that the operation of this
provision is restricted on the payment made outside India  or to a non-resident in
India etc.
 
11.        It can be seen that the Finance (No.2) Act, 2004 extended the scope of
section 40(a)(i) by way of insertion of sub-clause (ia). Whereas sub-clause (i) deals
with the disallowance of expenses paid to non-residents etc. on the failure to deduct
or deposit  after deduction of tax during the previous year or in the subsequent year
before the expiry of time prescribed under section 200(1), sub-clause (ia)  extended
the application  of the same provision to the payments made to residents within the
same time frame. The remedy for granting deduction  in the subsequent year on
payment, through proviso, in both the provisions is also similar.  In nutshell,  the
insertion of sub-clause (ia) is nothing but expansion of the existing sub-clause (i) to
the residents.
12. The Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 2006 widened the scope of this
provision with effect from 1
st
 day of April, 2006 with which we are not concerned
in the instant appeal.
13.    Thereafter the Finance Act, 2008 made amendment to clause (a) in sub-clause
(ia) in section 40 with retrospective effect from 1
st
 April, 2005. The section as
amended by the Finance Act, 2008 read  as under:- M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
7
“(ia) any interest, commission or brokerage, rent, royalty, fees for
professional services or fees for technical services payable to a
resident, or amounts payable to a contractor or sub-contractor, being
resident, for carrying out any work (including supply of labour for
carrying out any work), on which tax is deductible  at source under
Chapter XVII-B and  such tax has not been paid,-
(A) in a case where the tax was deductible and was  so deducted
during the last month of the previous year, on or before the due date
specified in sub-section (1) of section 139 ; or
(B) in any other case, on or before the last day of the previous year.
Provided that where in respect of any such sum, tax has been
deducted in any subsequent year, or has been deducted-
(A) during the last month of the previous year but paid after the said
due date ; or
(B) during any other month of the previous year but paid after the end
of the said previous year,
such sum shall be allowed as a deduction in computing the income of
the previous year in which such tax has been paid." ;
14. Here it is important to note that Chapter IV-D deals with the income under
the head `Profits and gains of business or profession’. Section 28 contains a list of
items of income which shall be chargeable to income-tax under this head. Section
29 is computing provision which provides that income referred to in section 28
shall be computed in accordance with the provisions contained in sections 30 to
43D. Sections 30 to 37 grant various deductions on  account of expenses /
allowances etc. Section 38 restricts the amount of depreciation allowance u/s 32.
Then comes section 40 with the marginal note “Amounts not deductible”. It starts
with the non-obstante clause by providing that notwithstanding anything to the
contrary in sections 30 to 38, the amounts specified in this section shall not be
deducted in computing the income chargeable under the head “Profits and gains of
business or profession”.  Thus it is vivid that section 40 has overriding effect over
sections 30 to 38. In other words if any expenditure or allowance is deductible as M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
8
per the provisions contained in sections 30 to 38, it shall cease to be deductible if it
falls within the domain of section 40. But for the prescription of section 40,  the
expenses or allowances otherwise deductible u/ss 30 to 38 do not fail to qualify for
deduction.  Thus it is palpable that section 40 is  a substantive provision which
approaches to increase the tax liability of the assessee in the year of failure to
deposit tax within the prescribed period.
15.     Failure of the assessee to deduct tax at source ipso facto causes disallowance,
both as per the pre and post-amendment of section 40(a)(ia) by the Finance Act,
2008. Position was changed by the Finance Act, 2008 as regards the cases where
deduction of tax at source is made but there is delay in the payment.
16.       As per the scheme of section 40(a)(ia) from its insertion, similar to section
40(a)(i),  disallowance was made on the failure of the assessee to pay tax deducted
during the previous year, or in the subsequent year before the expiry of the time
prescribed u/s 200(1). Sub-section (1) of section 200 provides that any person
deducting any sum in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter shall pay
within the prescribed time the sum so deducted to the credit of the Central
Government or as the board directs. Rule 30 of the  Income-tax Rules, 1962
prescribes time for payment to Government account of the tax deducted at source.
Different time limits have been prescribed for depositing tax deducted at source
under various sections. In some cases such tax deducted at source is required to be
deposited on the same day, in others on or before 7 days from the end of the month
in which the deduction is made etc. Hence in no case the time limit for depositing
the amount of tax deducted at source during the financial year is beyond 30
th
 April,
of the next financial year.  This is the mandate of section 200(1) read with Rule 30.
Reverting to section 40(a)(ia) as originally inserted, any tax deducted at source
during the previous year relevant to assessment year 2005-2006 was obliged  to be
paid either upto 31
st
 March, 2005 and in certain cases where the time is available
u/s 200(1) , latest by  30
th
 April, 2005 depending upon the provision under which M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
9
tax is deducted. Failure to abide by such time limits caused disallowance u/s
40(a)(ia) as per by the Finance (No.2) Act, 2004.
17.         The Finance Act, 2008 brought out amendment to section 40(a)(ia) w.r.e.f.
1.4.2005 by relaxing earlier position to some extent. It made two categories of
defaults causing disallowance on the basis of the period of the previous year in
which tax was deductible. The first category of disallowances included the cases in
which tax was deductible and was so deducted during the last month of the
previous year but there was failure to pay such tax on or before the due date
specified in sub-section (1) of section 139 of the  Act.  In other words,  if any
amount on which tax was deductible  during last month of the previous year, that is
March 2005, but was paid before 31
st
 October, 2005, being the due date u/s 139(1),
the deductibility of the amount was  kept intact. The second category included
cases other than those given in category first. To  put it simply, if  tax was
deductible and was so deducted during the first eleven months of the previous year,
that is, up to February, 2005, the disallowance was to be made if the assessee failed
to pay it before 31
st
 March, 2005. The case of the assessee falls in this category as
it deducted tax at source in the period ending Feb. 2005, but deposited such tax in
April/June 2005. This resulted into disallowance of the expenditure.
18. It can thus be seen that the time limit originally provided by section 40(a)(ia)
with effect from 01.04.2005 was relaxed to some extent by way of the amendment
carried out by the Finance Act, 2008. This amendment by the Finance Act, 2008
was specifically made with retrospective effect from 01.04.2005,  being the date of
insertion of section 40(a)(ia).  It is relevant to note that proviso to section 40(a)(ia)
was also consequently amended to provide that where in respect of any such sum,
tax has been deducted in any subsequent year, or has been deducted during the last
month of the previous year but paid after the said  due date; or during any other
month of the previous year but paid after the end of the said previous year,  such M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
10
sum shall be allowed as a deduction in computing the income of the previous year
in which such tax has been paid.
19. Then came the amendment to section 40(a)(ia) by the Finance Act, 2010
with retrospective effect from 1
st
 April, 2010. The provision so amended, now
reads as under :-
“(ia) any interest, commission or brokerage, rent, royalty, fees for
professional services or fees for technical services payable to a
resident, or amounts payable to a contractor or sub-contractor, being
resident, for carrying out any work (including supply of labour for
carrying out any work), on which tax is deductible  at source under
Chapter XVII-B and  such tax has not been deducted  or; after
deduction, has not been paid on or before the due date specified in
sub-section (1) of section 139
Provided that where in respect of any such sum, tax has been
deducted in any subsequent year, or has been deducted during the
previous year but paid after the due date specified in sub-section (1)
of section 139, such sum shall be allowed as a deduction in computing
the income of the previous year in which such tax has been paid.”
20. From the above provision as amended by the Finance Act, 2010 with
retrospective effect from 1
st
 April, 2010 it can be seen that the only difference
which this amendment has made is dispensing with the earlier  two categories of
defaults as per the Finance Act, 2008, as discussed in para 17 of this order,  causing
disallowance on the basis of the period of the previous year during which tax was
deductible. The first category of disallowances included the cases in which tax was
deductible and was so deducted during the last month of the previous year but there
was failure to pay such tax on or before the due date specified in sub-section (1) of
section 139. The Finance Act, 2010 has not tinkered with this position. The second
category of the Finance Act, 2008 which required the deposit of tax before the
close of the previous year in case of deduction during the first eleven months, as a
pre-condition for the grant of deduction in the year of incurring expenditure,  has M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
11
been altered.    The hitherto requirement of the assessee deducting tax at source
during the first eleven months of the previous year and paying it before the close of
the previous year up to 31
st
 March of the previous year as a requirement for grant
of deduction in the year of incurring such expenditure,  has been eased to extend
such time for payment of tax up to due date u/s 139(1) of the Act. As per the new
amendment, the disallowance will be made if after deducting tax at source, the
assessee fails to pay the amount of tax on or before the due date specified in subsection (1) of section 139 of the Act. The effect of this amendment is that now the
assessee deducting tax either in the last month of the previous year or first eleven
months of the previous year shall be entitled to deduction of the expenditure in the
year of incurring it, if the tax so deducted at source is paid on or before the due date
u/s 139(1). This is the only difference which has been made by the Finance Act,
2010.  
21.    Non-deduction of tax at source from the specified payments continues to give
reason for disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) under the amended provision, as was there
during the prevalence of  the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004 and the Finance Act, 2008.
Further the disallowance has also been maintained in the provision in its current
form where the assessee, after deduction of tax at source,  fails to pay it within the
specified time.  Partial change has been made in the specified time for payment as a
sine qua non for deduction in the year of incurring the expenditure.   Still further,
the mandate of proviso consequently providing the remedial relief by granting
deduction in the subsequent year in which tax has been paid, also exists.
22.    Having seen the ambit of section 40(a)(ia) right from its insertion up to the
amendment made by the Finance Act, 2010,  now we proceed to examine as to
whether such amendment to Finance Act, 2010 is retrospective from 1
st
 April, 2005
as contended by the assessee or retrospective from 1
st
 April, 2010 by which date
this provision has been substituted. At this stage it would be relevant to consider M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
12
the Notes on clauses and Memorandum explaining the provision while introducing
Finance Bill, 2010 as under :-
Notes on clauses
“Clause 12 of the Bill seeks to amend section 40 of the Income-tax Act
relating to amounts not deductible.
 Under the existing provisions contained in sub-clause (ia) of clause
(a) of the aforesaid section, non-deduction of tax or non-payment of
tax after deduction on payment of any sum by way of interest,
commission or brokerage, rent, royalty, fees for professional services
or fees for technical services payable to a resident or amounts
payable to a contractor or sub-contractor, being resident, results in
the disallowance of the said sum, in the computation of income of the
payer, on which tax is required to be deducted under Chapter XVII-B.
It is proposed to amend sub-clause (ia) of clause (a) of the aforesaid
section to provide that disallowance under the said sub-clause will be
attracted, if, after deduction of tax during the previous year, the same
has not been paid on or before the due date of filing of return of
income specified in sub-section (1) of section 139.
 The proviso to the said sub-clause provides that where in respect of
any such sum, tax has been deducted in any subsequent year, or has
been deducted during the last month of the previous year but paid
after the due date of filing of return or deducted  during any other
month of the previous year but paid after the end of the said previous
year, such sum shall be allowed as a deduction in computing the
income of the previous year in which such tax has been paid.
  This amendment will take effect retrospectively from 1
st
 April,
2010, and will, accordingly, apply in relation to the assessment year
2010-2011 and subsequent years.”
                                                            (Emphasis supplied by us)
23.         Memorandum explaining the provisions in  the Finance Bill, 2010
provides the justification of the amendment to section 40(a)(ia)  in the following
words :- M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
13
“Disallowance of expenditure on account of non-compliance with
TDS provisions
A. The existing provisions of section 40(a)(ia) of the Income-tax
Act provide for the disallowance of expenditure like interest,
commission, brokerage, professional fees, etc. if tax on such
expenditure was not deducted, or after deduction was not paid during
the previous year. However, in case the deduction of tax is made
during the last month of the previous year, no disallowance is made if
the tax is deposited on or before the due date of filing of return.
 It is proposed to amend the said section to provide that no
disallowance will be made if after deduction of tax during the
previous year, the same has been paid on or before the due date of
filing of return of income specified in sub-section (1) of section 139.
 This amendment is proposed to take effect  retrospectively from 1
st
April, 2010 and will, accordingly, apply in relation to the assessment
year 2010-11 and subsequent years.
B. Under the existing provisions of section 201(1A)  of the Act, a
person is liable to pay simple interest at one per cent. forevery month
or part of month in case of failure to deduct tax or payment of tax
after deduction.
 With a view to discourage the practice of delaying the deposit of tax
after deduction, it is proposed to increase the rate of interest for nonpayment of tax after deduction from the present one per cent. to one
and one-half per cent. for every month or part of month.
 This amendment is proposed to take effect from 1
st
 July, 2010.”
                                                               (Emphasis supplied by us)
24.       The Finance Bill  proposed to amend the section for  providing  that no
disallowance will be made if after deduction of tax during the previous year, the
same has been paid on or before the due date of filing of return of income specified
in sub-section (1) of section 139 of the Act. M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
14
25.      It can thus be noticed that the amendment to section 40(a)(ia) by the Finance
Act, 2010 has been specifically made retrospectively applicable from the A.Y.
2010-11. It has no where been expressly set out that the amendment is curative or
merely declaratory of the previous law. The intention of the legislature   as
gathered from the Notes on clauses and the Memorandum explaining the provisions
of the Finance Bill does not particularly indicate  any relaxation in the provision
retrospectively from A.Y. 2005-06 by providing that the expenditure  on which due
tax was deducted up to February, 2005 but paid before the due date specified in
section 139(1) of the Act shall not suffer any disallowance in the A.Y. 2005-06.
26. There can be no denial to the fact that merely because a provision has been
expressly made prospective, can still, in certain circumstances, be retrospective.  In
order to buttress his submission that this amendment by the Finance Act, 2010 is
retrospective from assessment year 2005-2006, the learned Counsel for the assessee
has accentuated on the speech of the Finance Minister while introducing Finance
Bill 2010 (reproduced infra)  which starts with : “Relaxing the current provisions
………”. The learned AR argued that the amendment was  made with a view to
remove the unnecessary hardship caused to the assessee by the earlier provision.  It
was stated that the TDS provisions caused unnecessary burden on the assesses in
deducting tax at source from the payments made by it, on behalf of the Government
and then depositing the same in the Treasury within the prescribed time. He stated
that the vicarious liability cast on the assessees could not be made liable to punitive
action on non-compliance. It was submitted that non-deduction of tax at source
from the amounts genuinely spent by the assessee for its business purpose or the
due deduction but the late deposit of such tax beyond the time prescribed u/s
200(1) resulting into disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) caused a lot of hardship to the
assessees and thus the amendment by the Finance Act, 2010  relaxing the vigor of
such provision should be held to be retrospective from assessment year 2005-2006,
being the time of insertion of  this provision. It was also put forth on behalf of the M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
15
assessee that there was no warrant for making any disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) on
non-deduction of tax at source for the reason that a small default in not paying say
1% of TDS to the Government u/s 194C causes disallowance under this provision
of 100% of the expenditure incurred and the additional tax liability results at
33.99%. He further stated that if the effect of interest u/ss 234B and 234C was also
taken into consideration, then liability fastened upon the assessee as a consequence
of non-deduction of tax at source at 1% would come to around 45% of the amount
of expenditure itself. He invited our attention towards certain representations made
to the Hon’ble Finance Minister as Pre-budget memorandum urging the Hon’ble
Minister to delete section 40(a)(ia) or to bring some suitable amendment to help the
assessees in losing genuine deduction on this account. The learned A.R. stated that
the Hon’ble Finance Minister, taking into consideration all such pre-budget
representations, has given the relaxation in the terms indicated above. To further
strengthen his case, the ld. AR also submitted that the due deduction of tax at
source coupled with a little late deposit should be viewed as substantial compliance
with the TDS provisions inasmuch as the Government’s interest was not affected in
any manner as the tax was deducted and paid to it even though a bit belatedly. He
relied on certain judgments in support of the contention that the amendment by the
Finance Act, 2010 be considered as retrospective from the date of insertion of
section 40(a)(ia) as it was aimed at mitigating hardship to the assesses.
 
27.             In the opposition the learned Departmental Representative contended
that there was no need to consider the amendment made by the Finance Act, 2010
as retrospective from assessment year 2005-2006 for the reason that Notes on
clauses and the Memorandum explaining the provisions in Finance Bill 2010
clearly indicate that the amendment will take effect retrospectively from 1
st
 April,
2010 and will accordingly apply in relation to assessment year 2010-2011 and
subsequent years. He stated that the legislature    has imposed burden on the
assesses in terms of deducting tax at source on the specified payments and M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
16
thereafter depositing it within the stipulated time. Doing this work is not charitable
but discharge of duty cast under the statute.  By not depositing the tax deducted at
source within the prescribed period, the ld. DR stated that the assessee disobeyed
the relevant provisions and the visiting of the mandate of section 40(a)(ia) was a
natural consequence. It was argued that  the addition was rightly sustained by the
ld. first appellate authority  by holding that the  amendment by the Finance Act,
2010 was not retrospective from 01.04.2005.
28. It is settled rule of construction that every statute is prima facie prospective
unless it is expressly or by necessary implication  made to have retrospective
operation. Ordinarily the courts are required to gather the intention of the
legislature   from the overt language of  the provision as to whether it has been
made prospective or retrospective, and if retrospective, then from which date. What
happens sometimes is that the substantive provision, as originally enacted or later
amended, fails to clarify the intention of the legislature  . In such a situation if
subsequently some amendment is carried out to clarify the real intent, such
amendment happens to be retrospective from the date the earlier provision was
made effective. Such clarificatory or explanatory amendment is declaratory. As the
later amendment clarifies the real intent and declares the position as was originally
intended, it takes retroactive effect from the date the original provision was made
effective.  Normally such clarificatory amendment is made retrospectively effective
from the earlier date. It may so happen that sometimes the clarificatory or
explanatory provision introduced later to depict the real intention of the legislature  
is not specifically made retrospective by the statute. Notwithstanding the fact that
such amendment to the substantive provision has been given prospective effect,  
nonetheless the judicial or quasi judicial authorities, on a challenge made to it, can
justifiably hold such amendment to be retrospective. The justification behind
giving retrospective effect to such amendment is to apply the real intention of the
legislature   from the date such provision was initially introduced. The intention of M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
17
the legislature   while introducing the provision is gathered,  inter alia, from the
Finance Bill, Memorandum explaining the provision of the Finance Bill .
29.a. Now we will espouse the cases relied on by both the sides to bolster their
respective points of view on the retrospective or prospective operation of the
amendment made by the Finance Act, 2010 to section  40(a)(ia).  The first case
relied by the learned A.R. in support of his contention about the amendment having
retrospective effect from  A.Y. 2005-06 is the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Allied Motors (P.) Ltd. etc. Vs. CIT [(1997) 224 ITR 677 (SC)].
Section 43B was inserted in the Act with effect from 01.04.1984. At the time of
insertion it provided that notwithstanding anything contained in any provision of
the Act,  a deduction otherwise allowable under this Act in respect of (a) any sum
payable by the assessee by way of tax, duty, cess or fee etc. or (b) any sum payable
by the assessee as an employer by way of contribution to any provident fund etc.
shall be allowed only in computing the income of that previous year in which such
sum is actually paid by the assessee irrespective of the previous year in which the
liability to pay such sum was incurred. Over the period, scope of section 43B has
been expanded by inserting clauses (c), (d), (e) and (f) granting deduction in
respect of bonus or commission etc. paid to employees; any sum payable as interest
on any loan or borrowing and; any sum payable by the employer in lieu of any
leave at the credit of his employee, only in computing the income of that previous
year in which such sum is actually paid. The object of the insertion of section 43B,
as can be seen from the Memorandum explaining the provisions in the Finance Bill
of 1983 (140 ITR St. 160), is to curb the activities of those tax payers who did not
discharge their statutory liability of payment of tax or duty or employees’
contribution to provident fund for long period but got deduction in that regard by
claiming that the liability to pay such amount was incurred.  Aimed at curing this
situation,  section 43B was introduced to provide that the deduction should be
allowed only in the previous year in which such sum is actually paid. As a result of M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
18
the implementation of this provision certain unintended consequences followed in
the sense that the amount of sales-tax collected by the assesses in the last quarter of
the previous year came to be disallowed whereas the liability to pay such sum did
not statutorily arise before the end of the year. It is obvious that sales-tax for the
quarter ending 31
st
 March can be deposited only after the close of the year. Section
43B led to disallowance of the amount of such sales-tax despite the fact that the
liability to pay such sales-tax arose only after the close of the year in April. In order
to remedy this unintended consequence, the Finance  Act, 1987 inserted first
proviso to section 43B with effect from 1
st
 April, 1988 to provide that no
disallowance on account of sales-tax etc. shall be made if it is actually paid on or
before the due date applicable for furnishing return u/s 139(1) of the Act. The
question before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was whether such proviso inserted by
the Finance Act, 1987 which came into effect from 1
st
 April, 1988 is prospective or
retrospective from assessment year 1984-85, being the year of insertion of section
43B. The Hon’ble Summit Court observed that the proviso was inserted to cure
unintended consequences and make the section workable and hence was
retrospective.
29.b.    It can, therefore, be easily seen that the amendment to section 43B by the
Finance Act, 1987 has been held to be retrospective on the ground that it was made
to remove unintended consequences of the section and to make it workable,
notwithstanding the fact that such proviso was inserted with effect from 1
st
 April,
1988.
29.c.   The next judgment relied by the learned A.R. is that of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in  CIT Vs. Alom Extrusions Ltd. [(2009) 319 ITR 306 (SC)]. There was
second proviso to section 43B which provided that no deduction shall be allowed in
respect of clause (b), namely,  any sum payable by the assessee as an employer by
way of contribution to provident fund etc. unless it was actually paid on or before M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
19
the due date as defined in  Explanation below clause (va) of section 36(1).
Explanation to section 36(1)(va) defines the “due date” to mean the date by which
the assessee is required as an employer to credit an employee’s contribution to the
employee’s account in the relevant fund under any Act, rule, order or notification
issued there-under or under any standing order, award, contact of service or
otherwise. The result of clause (b) read with second proviso to section 43B was that
for claiming deduction, it became imperative to deposit the employees’
contribution to provident fund etc. before the due date under the relevant Act etc.
In other words, if the employees’ contribution to EPF  for the month of March was
not deposited up to 15
th
 of April or within the grace period, the amount suffered
disallowance. The first proviso before the amendment, extending the time for
payment of the sums specified in various clauses of section 43B on or before the
due date u/s 139(1) as a pre-requisite for granting deduction,  did not operate to
clause (b) only of section 43B dealing with the employees’ contribution to the
provident fund etc.  On reading first proviso in juxtaposition to the second proviso,
it meant that any sum payable by the assessee by way of tax, duty, cess or interest
u/s 36(1)(ii) or payable to Scheduled banks or to State Financial Corporations etc.
[as per clauses (c) to (e)] or the amount payable in lieu of leave encashment at the
credit of the employees was deductible, if paid on or before the due date u/s 139(1)
of the Act. The only exception was clause (b),  dealing with employees’
contribution to provident fund etc.,  which  required the deposit to be made only as
per the time limit provided in  Explanation  below section 36(1)(va), for gaining
eligibility to deduction. The Finance Act, 2003 removed this  anomaly by omitting
second proviso and also carried out amendment to the first proviso by making it
applicable to all the clauses (a) to (f) of section 43B including clause (b). The
amendment so made by the Finance Act, 2003 with effect from 01.04.2004 brought
the employees’ contribution to EPF etc. on the same pedestal on which the other
sums are given under clauses (a), (c) to (f) of section 43B for the purpose of
granting deduction. It was claimed that the amendment so made by omitting second M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
20
proviso should be given retrospective effect. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in this
case considered all the aspects of this amendment and observed that : “The second
proviso resulted into implementation problems, which have been mentioned
hereinabove, and which resulted into enactment of Finance Act, 2003, deleting the
second proviso and bringing about uniformity in the first proviso by equating tax,
duty, cess, and fee with contributions to welfare funds. Once this uniformity is
brought about in the first proviso, then, in our view, the Finance Act, 2003, which
is made applicable by Parliament only with effect from April 1, 2004, would
become curative in nature, hence, it would apply, retrospectively, with effect from
April 1, 1988”. On page 315 of the report, the Hon’ble Supreme Court further
noted that if the Departmental contention about giving prospective effect to the
amendment was given effect to it would result into  hardship and invidious
discrimination `as certain assessees will be denied deduction for all times and they
would lose the benefit of deduction even in the year in which they pay the
contributions to the welfare funds’. It was, therefore, held that this amendment,
being curative, was retrospective.
29.d.  On going through this case also it becomes abundantly clear that the second
proviso resulted in implementation problems and the effect of considering the
amendment as prospective would have led to denial of deduction in certain cases
for all times despite the payment having been made subsequently. It was under
such circumstances that the omission of the second proviso and the consequential
amendment to the first proviso has been held to be retrospective.
29.e.  The next case on which a great deal of emphasis has been placed by the
learned A.R. is that of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in CIT Vs. Gold Coin Health
Food (P.) Ltd. [(2008) 304 ITR 308 (SC)]. The Finance Act, 2002 amended
Explanation 4 to section 271(1)(c) with effect from 01.04.2003 providing that the
penalty would be imposed even if the returned income is loss. In the case of Virtual M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
21
Soft Systems Ltd. Vs. CIT [(2007) 289 ITR 83 (SC)] (a Bench comprising of two
Hon’ble Judges) it was held that prior to the amendment with effect from 1
st
 April,
2003 penalty for concealment of income could not be levied in the absence of any
positive income. Doubt was expressed over the correctness of this view by a
subsequent Bench. Thereafter in the case of Gold Coin Health Food P. Ltd. (supra)  
(a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges) overruled the judgment in the case of Virtual
Soft Systems Ltd. (supra) by holding that Explanation 4 to section 271(1)(c)(iii)
regarding the imposition of penalty,  even if there is a loss,  is clarificatory and not
substantive. It was held to be applying even to the assessment years prior to 1
st
April, 2003,  being the date from which it was brought into force.
29.f.  From this case, it  can be easily seen that  the retrospective effect to the
amendment to Explanation 4 by the Finance Act, 2002 has been given by holding
that the position even anterior to such amendment was the same in as much as  the
penalty was imposable even in the case of loss. The intention of the legislature  
was found to be imposing penalty in all such cases even prior to the amendment
and that is how this amendment was held to be clarificatory and therefore,
retrospective.
29.g.   Similar is the position in the case of CIT Vs. Kanji Shivji And Co.    [(2000)
242 ITR 124 (SC)]. Explanation 2 to section 40(b) was introduced with effect from
1
st
 April, 1985 providing that where an individual is a partner in a firm otherwise
than as partner in representative capacity, interest paid by the firm to such
individual shall not be taken into account for the purposes of clause (b) to section
40. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of  Brij Mohan Das Laxman Das Vs.
CIT [(1997) 223 ITR 825 (SC)] held this insertion to be declaratory in nature and
hence retrospective. In this case it was held that the interest paid by the firm to a
partner on his individual deposits is not hit by section 40(b),  if the person is a
partner not in his individual capacity but as representing HUF. The same view was M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
22
taken in  Suwalal Anandilal Jain Vs. CIT [(1997) 224 ITR 753 (SC)]. However in
Rashik Lal And Co. Vs. CIT [(1998) 229 ITR 458 (SC)], somewhat contrary view
was expressed. That is how the matter came up before the larger bench of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kanji Shivji And Co. (supra).  In this case it has been
held that  Explanation 2 to section 40(b) is declaratory and retrospective  in
operation by affirming the judgments in the cases of Brij Mohan Das Laxman Das
(supra) and Suwalal Anandilal Jain (supra).
29.h.   The reasoning for holding the amendment to be retrospective in this case is
the Legislative recognition of different capacities an individual may hold. When a
person is partner representing his HUF, any transactions with that person in
individual capacity are to be treated as distinct from the transactions with HUF. It
is this recognition of the theory of different capacities of an individual ab initio,
that the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that Explanation 2 only clarified the intent of
the legislature  and did not grant a new relief by way of insertion of Explanation 2.
30.    We are reminded of the `Mischief rule’,  which is commonly called
“Heydon’s Rule”. This rule deals with ascertaining  the correct intention of the
legislature   by looking into the mischief that was sought to be remedied by the
legislation. It basically comprises four things to be considered:-
 (a) what was the common law before the making of the Act;
 (b) what was the mischief and defect for which the common law
did not provide;
 (c) what remedy the Parliament has appointed to cure the defect;
and
 (d) the true reasons for the remedy.
Any amendment passing the Heydon’s rule is retrospective. M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
23
31. A survey of the above judgments in para 29 supra  makes it patent that any
amendment to the substantive provision which is aimed at clarifying the existing
position or removing unintended consequences to make the provision workable has
to be treated as retrospective notwithstanding the fact that the amendment has been
given effect prospectively.
32.a.       Now we will consider the cases on the other side of the line in which the
amendment to the substantive provision has been held to be prospective. A Bench
of the five Hon’ble Judges in Padmasundara Rao (Decd.) and Others Vs. State of
Tamil Nadu And Others [(2002) 255 ITR 147 (SC)] has laid down that the language
employed in a statute is determinative factor of legislative intent. The first and
primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislation must be found in
the words used by the legislature  itself.
32.b.      In Reliance Jute and Industries Ltd. Vs. CIT [(1979) 120 ITR 921 (SC)]
the ITO set off the unabsorbed business loss for assessment years 1949-50 and
1950-51 against the business income and held that the remaining amount of
unabsorbed loss should be carried forward. In the assessment of later year i.e.
1960-61 the assessee claimed that the unabsorbed loss should be brought forward
and set off against the business income of the current year. It was contended on
behalf of the assessee that by virtue of section 24(2)(iii) of the Indian Income Tax
Act, 1922 as it stood before its amendment with effect from 1
st
 April, 1957,  the
assessee had acquired a vested right to have the unabsorbed loss carried forward
from year to year until it was completely set off and the subsequent amendment
limiting the period of carrying forward the loss to eight years could not divest the
assessee of the vested right which had accrued to him. In other words, it was
submitted that the amendment effected in 1957 was not retrospective in operation.
When the matter finally came up before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the assessee’s
contention was repelled by holding that the loss incurred in assessment year 1950-M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
24
51 could not be set off against the income of assessment year 1960-61 as the law to
be applied is that in force in the relevant assessment year and the law as existing in
assessment year 1960-61 has restricted the carry forward up to eight years only.  
32.c.    From this judgment it can be seen that the contention of the assessee about
the retrospective operation of the amendment carried out by the Finance Act, 1957
was rejected on the ground that it was neither expressly nor by necessary
implication provided that the amendment will have retrospective effect.
32.d.   In  J.K. Synthetics Ltd. Vs. CTO [(1994) 119 CTR (SC) 222] the question
was about the charging of interest on delayed payments under the Rajasthan Salestax Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that ordinarily the charging section,
which fixes the liability,  is strictly construed but that rule of strict construction is
not extended to the machinery provisions which are  construed like any other
statute. The provision for charging of interest, even though forming part of the
machinery provisions, was held to be substantive law. It was, therefore, held that
any provision in the statute levying interest on delayed payment of tax must be
construed as a substantive law and hence prospective.
32.e.   In the case of CWT Vs. Varadharaja Theatre (P.) Ltd. [(2001) 250 ITR 523
(Mad.)] the issue for consideration was the amendment made to section 40(3)(vi)
of the Finance Act, 1983 by the Finance Act, 1988 including cinema building in the
exemption list for the purposes of the Wealth-tax Act. It was claimed that the
amendment made by the Finance Act, 1988 was declaratory and hence should
apply to assessment years 1985-86 to 1986-87. Rejecting this contention, the
Hon’ble Madras High Court held that when Parliament enacts a law, it must be
understood with reference to the language used in the provision construed in the
light of the scheme of the Act and the object of the statute and the provisions
therein. `Every case of removal of hardship by Parliament did not indicate a M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
25
parliamentary intention to remove that hardship from an anterior date unless the
scheme of the Act, the context in which the amendment was made and the language
of the amendment warrants such a view’. When the thing which was specifically
excluded is subsequently included, such inclusion cannot be regarded as indicative
of intention on the part of the legislature   to have treated what is now included as
having been included at all times.  A test, as been laid down by the Hon’ble High
Court to consider whether the amendment is prospective or respective, is to
examine the amended provision with a view to ascertain as to whether that
provision without the aid of amendment is capable of taking within it what was
subsequently included after the amendment. Applying this test, the Hon’ble Court
held that cinema houses could not be construed as exempt from wealth-tax as per
earlier  provision.
33.  The principle which can be deduced from these cases discussed in paras 29
to 32 is that any amendment to the substantive provision is ordinarily prospective
except expressly stated otherwise or it comes out so by necessary implication.
Unless the amendment is made applicable with retrospective effect, such
amendment to the substantive provision is to be regarded as prospective barring out
cases in which it is explanatory or clarificatory on one hand or it aims at removing
the unintended consequences.
34.     It is the sole prerogative of the legislature   to enact, modify and repeal any
law and also to introduce any amendment as retrospective or prospective.  All
provisions of the Act are brought out with a particular object in mind.   Soft
provisions, in the shape of incentives etc., are usually aimed at specific growth, like
that of a particular industry or particular area. On the other hand, the so-called
harsh provisions are aimed at mobilizing resources for utilizing them in welfare
measures and for general growth of the nation, such as that of health and education
of its citizens and making available better infrastructure etc.  Any provision in a M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
26
fiscal statute may be described as harsh from the angle of the tax payers, when it
either  causes some additional burden on the pockets of tax payers in terms of more
outflow of money in the shape of tax, interest and penalty or it casts an obligation,
fulfillment of which is not feasible. In the present appeal the hardship of the former
type has been argued.  It is austere that every fresh levy or withdrawal of existing
allowance may be described as harsh from the perspective of tax payers, but
beneficial from the point of view of nation as a whole. The legislature is
empowered to impose certain levy, even if it is harsh provided it falls within the
overall framework of the Constitution of India. So  long as a provision is
constitutionally valid, the judiciary cannot intervene, even if it is harsh. The role of
the courts is to interpret a provision in such a manner that the intention of the
legislature   is clearly brought out and implemented. If the language of a provision
is unambiguous and does not require any further elaboration, then there is nothing
for the courts to do in this regard.  If despite clear language of a provision, the
courts interpret it in a way so as to give unintended consequences from the angle of
Parliament, the legislature can pull out plug and again introduce the amendment in
consonance with its original intention. In such a scenario, the earlier interpretation
given by the Courts is overruled by the legislative process. In   Bharat Earth
Movers VS. CIT [(2000) 245 ITR 428 (SC)] it was held that  if liability on account
of leave encashment arises in the year then deduction is to be allowed even if the
liability has to be quantified and discharged at a later date.  This Supreme Court
judgment has been  nullified w.e.f. A.Y. 2002-03 by insertion of Section 43B(f).  
Similarly the Finance Act, 2008 inserted sec. 271(1B) w.r.e.f. 1.4.1989 to nullify
various judgments holding that where `satisfaction' was  not recorded in assessment
order,  it would amount to absence of satisfaction and hence penalty u/s 271(1)(c)
shall not be liable.   There are several such instances in which the legislature   has
reinforced its intention by way of amendment setting aside the contrary judicial
interpretation. M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
27
35.     From  the above discussion it is crystal clear that retrospective effect to a
provision cannot be  ordinarily given by judicial or quasi judicial authorities unless
it  is expressly given by the legislature.  There may be certain situations requiring
the giving of retrospective effect.  The scope for  the courts to validly give
retrospective effect to a provision, despite not being clearly given so by the
legislature, is limited. It extends to cases where the legislative intent has later been
made explicit which was earlier implicit in the provision or the existing provision
led to the unintended consequences and made the intention of the legislature  
unworkable.  Any amendment which has not been given retrospective effect by the
legislature, can’t be construed as retrospective on the solitary ground that the
original provision caused some hardship to the assessees. The relevant criteria to be
taken into consideration for arriving at the decision about  the retrospective or
prospective effect of a later provision,  is to unearth  the intention of the legislature  
at the time of introducing the original provision and not whether it caused hardship
to the taxpayers.   If it was very well known at the time of inserting the original
provision that it is going to be harsh, then any subsequent relaxation in it will not
be retrospective unless expressly stated. The reason for not holding such later
amendment as retrospective is manifest that the legislature in its wisdom intended
to impose a harsh levy.  In such a case the judicial or quasi judicial authorities
cannot help the situation by grabbing the legislative power in holding such later
relaxation as retrospective,  when the legislature has itself made it prospective.
36.      In our considered opinion the border line between a substantive provision
having retrospective or prospective effect, is quite prominent. One needs to
appreciate the nature of the original provision in conjunction with the amendment.
Once a provision has been given retrospective effect by the legislature, it shall
continue to be retrospective. If on the other hand  if the statute does not amend
retrospectively,  then one has to dig out the intention of the Parliament at the time
when the original provision was incorporated and also the new amendment.   If the M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
28
later amendment simply clarifies its intention of the original provision, it will
always be considered as retrospective. Like the case of Gold Coin Health Food P.
Ltd. (supra) in which the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the amendment to
Explanation 4  to section 271(1)(c)(iii) simply clarified the position which was
existing since inception of the provision that the penalty is leviable on concealment
irrespective of the fact whether ultimately assessed income is positive or negative.
Similarly in the case of Kanji Shivji And Co. (supra),  the Hon’ble Supreme Court
held that the purpose of Explanation 2 to section 40(b) was simply to clarify that
the Income-tax Act recognizes individual statues of a person as different from his
representative capacity. This  Explanation did not bring in a new provision but
clarified that the position was so since the introduction of the provision itself. In
this category of clarificatory or explanatory amendments to the substantive
provisions, the object is always to clarify the intention of the legislature as it was
there at the time of insertion of the original provision. That is the reason for which
the clarificatory amendments are always retrospective irrespective of the date from
which effect has been given to them by the legislature  .  
37.       The second category includes the cases in which there was no ambiguity in
the language of the provision at the time of its introduction and the object sought
was fully attainable. But while making the provision workable, besides the desired
results,  certain unintended consequences also crop up. In other words,  the section
was introduced originally with a particular purpose but while giving effect to the
provision in the attainment of that purpose,  certain outcomes which were never
desired or intended by the legislature, also follow.  Any amendment to remove such
unintended effects, is also always considered to be retrospective from the date of
the insertion of the main provision.
38.    The second category of cases are to be differentiated from the first category.
In both these categories, there is no difficulty in implementing the provision as M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
29
such. Whereas, the first category refers to the cases in which the intention of the
legislature  behind the provision was not properly understood, the second refers to
the cases in which while giving effect to such provision, certain unintended
consequences follow. The cases of  Allied Motors (P.) Ltd. (supra) and  Alom
Extrusions Ltd. (supra) fit into this second category of cases.  In Allied Motors (P.)
Ltd. (supra) the amendment was held to be retrospective on the ground that it was
impossible to pay sales-tax for the last quarter before the close of the year as the
liability to pay would arise only on or after 1
st
 April. As it could never have been
the intention of the legislature to require the assessee to do impossible,  the
amendment made to section 43B was held to have retrospective effect from the
date of insertion of the provision. Similarly in Alom Extrusions Ltd. (supra),  the
implementation of the provision led to the denial of deduction for all times
notwithstanding the intention the legislature   to allow deduction on payment basis.
39.   Here it is important to note that the cases of Allied Motors (P.) Ltd. (supra)
and  Alom Extrusions Ltd. (supra) are based on the proposition that the
implementation of the earlier provisions led to the consequences which were never
envisaged. The emphasis is on the removal of unintended consequences and not
intended consequences, even if harsh. It is settled legal position that there cannot be
any equity about the tax.  It is for the Parliament to decide as to in what manner the
tax is to be levied and collected. If a provision is made which is harsh but otherwise
constitutional and practical of implementation, there cannot be any question of
reading down such provision on the ground of equity or hardship. Intervention
becomes necessary when as a result of implementation of a provision, certain such
consequences follow which were never intended. If subsequently the rigor of the
provision is toned down for addressing to such unintended hardship to the
assessees, it would be considered as retrospective. On the other hand if it was clear
at the time of the insertion of the provision that some hardship from the assessee’s
perspective is going to be caused, then a subsequent amendment to reduce such M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
30
hardship from a higher level to lower level, cannot be considered as retrospective
unless expressly stated. The reason is obvious that in such cases the hardship which
was faced by the assessees at the time of introduction of the provision was very
much intended and foreseen and the subsequent amendment is reduction in the
intended hardship and not the removal of unintended hardship.
40.   On the contrary where the amendment is carried out to the provision with the
purpose of adding  some additional burden or reducing the existing burden of the
assesses,  it is always prospective unless expressly stated to be retrospective or
falling within the exceptions discussed above such as clarificatory or to remove the
unintended hardship. The case of Reliance Jute and Industries Ltd. (supra) deals
with a situation in which the amendment was carried out to the substantive
provision taking away certain benefit to the assessees in terms of extended period
for setting off of the brought forward losses. The case of  Varadaraja Theatre Pvt.
Ltd. (supra) is based on facts in which the subsequent amendment granted a benefit
to the assessee which was not available as per the earlier provisions. Thus we have
noticed that in both types of cases in which the later provision has taken away some
right which was earlier available or granted some benefit which was not earlier
available, such amendments have been held to be prospective from the dates of
insertion as these were neither clarificatory nor intended to remove any unintended
hardships.
41.  From the above discussion it clearly emerges that there is a clear distinction
between the cases in which the later amendment is impliedly retrospective or
prospective. That is probably the reason that a question was raised before the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in CIT & Ors. VS. Varas International (P.) Ltd. (2006) 283
ITR 484 (SC) for deciding as to whether : “For the amendment of a statute to be
construed as being  retrospective, should not the amended provision itself indicate,
either in terms or by necessary implication, that it is to operate  retrospectively?” M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
31
In the light of this question, the Hon’ble Supreme  Court was called upon to
reconsider its earlier judgments in  Allied Motors (P.) Ltd. (supra),  Suwalal
Anandilal Jain (supra), Brij Mohan Das Laxman Das and  Podar Cement. The
Bench of five Hon’ble Judges in this case noted that there is no conflict between
the judgments which requires resolution by way of reference. From this judgment it
is apparent that those earlier cases before the Hon’ble Supreme Court for a decision
as to whether the amendments considered therein were retrospective or prospective,
were decided on the basis of the nature of amendment  and the concerned benches
rendered  appropriate judgments after taking into consideration all the relevant
criteria.
42.  In the light of the above discussion we will now examine as to whether the
amendment made by the Finance Act, 2010 to section  40(a)(ia) inserted with
retrospective effect from 1
st
 April, 2010 can be considered as retrospective from the
date of insertion of the provision i.e. 1
st
 April, 2005 ?  We have noted above that
section 40(a)(ia) was inserted by the Finance (No.2) Act, 2004 with effect from 1
st
April, 2005 debarring deductions otherwise allowable u/s 30 to 38 in respect of the
items set out in this provision if the assessee failed to deduct tax at source or after
deduction,  failed to pay the same during the previous year or in the subsequent
year before the expiry of the time prescribed u/s 200(1). The position anterior to the
insertion of sub-section (ia) of section 40(a), which is continuing today also, is that
the assessees are obliged to deduct tax at source under Chapter XVII-B. The failure
to deduct or pay tax as per the requisite provisions entails consequences u/s 201
and 271C etc. by which the assessee is treated as in default, becomes liable to pay
interest and also suffers penalty. These provisions were also applicable prior to
insertion of section 40(a)(ia). It shows that the duty of the payer to deduct tax at
source was always there in the Act. With the insertion of section 40(a)(ia) by the
Finance (No.2) Act, 2004 non-deduction of tax at source from the items of
expenses specified or failure to pay such tax after deduction,  results into one more M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
32
adverse consequence in the shape of disallowance of the amount of expenditure in
the year of incurring it.  Simultaneous with the disallowance, proviso provides that
the deduction of the expenditure shall be allowed in the subsequent year when the
deducted tax is paid. To put it simply if there is no deduction of tax at source or
after deduction it is paid beyond the previous year or within the time specified u/s
200(1), the income of the first year increases but at the same time the income of the
subsequent year is reduced on the payment of tax. It is well-known that each year is
a separate and independent unit of assessment. The potential deduction in a later
year cannot be allowed to reduce the income for the earlier year and  vice versa.
Total income of an assessee for each year has to be computed as per the provisions
of the Act in so far as they apply. It is neither desirable nor permissible to mix up
the assessment of two years by claiming that since  the deduction shall become
permissible in second year, the AO should grant the deduction in the first year and
ignore it in the second year. If this view point is accepted then many provisions of
the Act shall become otiose. It is incumbent upon the AO to separately compute
total income of each year unmindful of the possible deduction or addition in the
next year.   Thus it can be seen that from assessment year 2005-2006 the assessee’s
failure to comply with the relevant provisions has the effect of enhancing income
by way of non-granting of the relevant deduction in the year of incurring such
expenditure.  It is an altogether different matter  that in the subsequent year the
assessee becomes eligible for deduction on payment of tax. Hence apart from the
consequences already faced by the assessee for failure to deduct tax at source or
pay late as per the prescribed time in terms of the applicability of sections 201 and
271C etc., it came to be additionally hit by section 40(a)(ia) in terms of losing
deduction of expenditure in the concerned year for its failure to deduct or pay after
deduction of tax at source within the prescribed time, which was otherwise
available to it because of having genuinely incurred the expenditure from
assessment years 2005-2006. It is seen that the constitutional validity of section
40(a)(ia) was challenged before various courts including the Hon’ble Madras High M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
33
Court in Tube Investments of India Ltd. And Anr. Vs. Asst. CIT (TDS) And Anr.
[(2010) 325 ITR 610 (Mad.)]. The Hon’ble High Court observed that the
substantive provision of section 40(a)(ia) when seen along with its proviso is
within legislative competence of Parliament. In the course of judgment, the
Hon’ble Court noted that the intention of the legislature   is not to tax the payer for
its failure to deduct the tax at source. Object of introduction of section 40(a)(ia) has
been found to ensure that one of the modes of recovery as provided under Chapter
XVII-B is scrupulously implemented without any default in order to augment the
said mode of recovery. Thus the provision of section 40(a)(ia) as inserted by the
Finance Act, 2004 has been held to be constitutionally valid.
43.   The view canvassed on behalf of the assessee, in favour of retrospectivity of
the amendment by the Finance Act, 2010 was that the unamended provision caused
undue hardship to the assesses, which  has been removed. Our attention was invited
towards various pre-budget representations made to the Hon’ble Finance Minister
impressing upon him either to delete this provision or make it workable. The sum
and substance of the submission of the ld. AR was that the relaxation given by the
Finance Act 2010 has mitigated the unintended hardship which was earlier caused
to the assessee and hence it should be given retrospective effect from the date of
insertion of the provision.
44.   We do not find any force in this contention. The reason is that there is no
doubt that some intended difficulty has been caused by the Finance Act, 2004 on
the introduction of section 40(a)(ia). We are calling it hardship to the assessee from
a different angle as with the insertion of this provision the expenditure otherwise
deductible has become non-deductible in the year of incurring on its failure to
deduct tax at source or pay such tax after deduction within the stipulated period. At
the same time we are calling it as “intended” for the reason that the legislature   in
its wisdom brought out this provision with a view to augment compliance of the M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
34
TDS provisions. The objective sought to be achieved by bringing out section
40(a)(ia) is the augmentation of the TDS provision.  If in attaining this main
objective of augmentation of such provision, the assessee suffers disallowance of
any amount in the year of default, which is otherwise deductible, the legislature  
allowed it to continue. This is the cost which the Parliament  has awarded  to those
assesses who fail to comply with the relevant provisions by considering the overall
objective of boosting TDS compliance.  Apart from other consequences of failure
to deduct tax at source as discussed above, one more adverse consequence has been
added. The fact that this provision is still continuing in the Act, proves that the
Parliament did not consider it expedient to remove section 40(a)(ia) projecting so
called hardship, which is only the side effect in the attainment of the larger goal of
augmentation of compliance of TDS provision. The Finance Act, 2008 brought out
certain amendments by relaxing the rigor of the provision by making two
categories of defaults causing disallowance on the  basis of the period of the
previous year in which tax was deductible. It is important to note that the
amendment by the Finance Act, 2008 was made with retrospective effect from
01.04.2005. Thus it can be seen that from the assessment year 2005-2006 up to
assessment year 2009-2010, post the retrospective amendment carried out by the
Finance Act, 2008, the first category of disallowances included the cases in which
tax was deductible and was so deducted during the last month of the previous year
but there was failure on the part of the assessee to pay such tax on or before the due
date specified in sub-section (1) of section 139; and the second category included
cases in which tax was deductible and was so deducted during the first eleven
months of the previous year but there was failure to pay it before the last day of the
previous year. The Finance Act, 2010 has made partial change in the specified time
for payment of tax only in the above referred second category by extending it from
the last day of the previous year to the time specified u/s 139(1) of the Act,  in
parity with the specified time of the first category.  Except for that there is no
change in the overall structure of the provision. Non-deduction of tax at source M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
35
from the specified payments still warrants disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) as was there
under the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004 and the Finance Act, 2008.  Further the
disallowance per se has also been maintained in the provision in its current form,
where the assessee, after deduction of tax at source,  fails to pay it within the
specified time.  Still further, the prescription  of  the proviso providing for the
remedial relief in the subsequent year in which tax has been paid, also exists.
45.   We are unable to appreciate the contention raised on behalf of the assessee
that the undue hardship caused to the assessee has been relaxed by the legislature
with the amendment carried out by the Finance Act, 2010.  The so called hardship
as caused with the insertion of section 40(a)(ia) with effect from 1
st
 April, 2005 is
still continuing as such. The effect of amendment by the Finance Act, 2010 is
limited only to extending the time available for deposit of tax in the second
category of cases from the last day of the previous year to the time specified u/s
139(1) of the Act.  Thus it is vivid that the amendment by the Finance Act, 2010 is
not aimed at removing any unintended hardship to the assessee, but to relax the
intended hardship to some extent by increasing the time available for deposit of tax
in one category of cases. When the amendment does not remove the unintended
hardship or is not explanatory, the same cannot be held to be retrospective unless it
is specifically provided.  We again revert  to the case of Varadharaja Theatre (P.)
Ltd. (supra) laying down the test for deciding whether the amendment is
prospective or retrospective. In the words of the Hon’ble Court : `When the thing
which was specifically excluded is subsequently included, such inclusion cannot be
regarded as indicative of intention on the part of the legislature  to have treated
what is now included as having been included at all times.’ It is  abundantly clear
that the time limit to deposit of tax deducted at source for one category of cases has
now been extended by the Finance Act, 2010 to the due date u/s 139(1) of the Act.
Such a benefit was earlier specifically excluded as it was available only in respect
of the other category of cases.  As such, it can not be inferred that the later M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
36
extension of time is indicative of the intention of the legislature  to have made it
available even in the earlier years.
46.    In view of the fact that section 40(a)(ia) has been amended by the Finance
Act, 2010 with retrospective effect from 01.04.2010,  we refuse to declare it as
having retrospective effect from the date of insertion of the provision i.e.
01.04.2005.
47. The learned A.R. supported his argument of retrospective effect from one
more angle. He invited our attention towards proviso to section 40(a)(ia)
substituted by the Finance Act, 2010 with effect from 01.04.2010. It was contended
that as per this proviso, where in respect of any such sum tax has been deducted in
any subsequent year or has been deducted during the previous year but paid after
the due date specified in section 139(1), such sum shall be allowed as a deduction
in computing the income of the previous year in which such tax has been paid. He
argued that if the amendment by the Finance Act, 2010 is considered as
prospective, then unintended consequences would follow. To elaborate his point of
view, he cited an example in which tax is deducted in February 2009 but is paid in
July 2009. It was argued that addition will be made in assessment year 2009-2010
by considering the earlier provision, as per which  tax deducted at source is not
paid on or before the last date of the previous year i.e. 31
st
 March, 2009. As per his
contention, the deduction should have been allowed in assessment year 2010-2011
on account of payment made by the assessee in July 2009 as per the mandate of the
proviso before amendment.  He stated that with the amendment by the Finance Act,
2010 with retrospective effect from 1
st
 April, 2010,  the deduction of expenditure
can be allowed only in the year of its incurring if the tax has been deducted and
paid on or before the due date u/s 139(1) and further the proviso applies to cases in
which the same is paid beyond the due date u/s 139(1) so as to allow deduction in
computing the income of the previous year in which such tax has been paid. He M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
37
submitted that the assessee’s case will fall outside the prescription of the proviso to
section 40(a)(ia) as amended by the Finance Act, 2010 as the amount is actually
paid in July 2009 which is not beyond but before  the due date u/s 139(1). It was
thus submitted that the assessee will neither get deduction in assessment year 2009-
2010 nor in assessment year 2010-2011.
48.     This submission is devoid of any force.  The legislature   has employed the
words  `such sum’ in the language of the proviso and not `any sum’.   These words
in the proviso talk of the sum referred to in the main provision of  sub-clause (ia) of
section 40(a).  The words `such sum’ have tightly tied the proviso with the main
provision. It is imperative to note the proviso to sub-clause (ia) always contained
the words `such sum’ whether it is the insertion of section 40(a)(ia) by the Finance
(No. 2) Act, 2004 or amendment by the Finance Act, 2008 or by the Finance Act,
2010. We need to consider the non-obstante clause in the beginning of section 40
which provides that : “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in sections 30 to
38, the following amounts shall not be deducted in  computing the income
chargeable under the head `Profits and gains of business or profession’”.  To put it
simply,   in order to fall within the trap of sub-clause (ia) of section 40(a) causing
disallowance, it is sine qua non that the expenditure should be otherwise deductible
in the year as per sections 30 to 38. Proviso obtains  its scope from the main
provision of sub-clause (ia) which,  in turn,  refers to the amounts otherwise
deductible in the year of incurring such expenditure under the head `Profits and
gains of business or profession’. Only when the assessee is otherwise eligible for
deduction in respect of interest, commission, brokerage etc. in the year of its
incurring, that the question of making disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) arises. Thus the
proviso is controlled by the main provision of sub-clause (ia) of section 40(a) and
cannot be looked upon as de hors the main provision. Following the meaning of the
words `such sum’ in the proviso,  it becomes manifest that the sum deductible as
expenditure in the year of payment of tax is the one  which was not allowed as M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
38
deduction  due to disabling provision of section 40(a) in the year of incurring such
expenditure.  It cannot refer to the expenditure neither claimed nor disallowed as
per the main provision in the earlier year. The proviso allows deduction of the
amount of such expenditure in computing the income of the subsequent year, when
tax is paid.  To put it simply, the proviso is only an enabling provision in the
subsequent year,  of the disabling provision of the main part of the section 40(a)(ia)
in an earlier year of incurring such expenditure. When a particular amount of
expenditure is disallowed in the first year for failure to deduct tax at source or to
pay tax thereon after such deduction as per the main provision of sub-clause (ia),
then such amount of expenditure wins deduction on the payment of tax in the later
year.
49.      It is the complete provision of section 40(a)(ia) together with its proviso as
prevailing in a particular year which governs the non-deductibility of expenditure
in one year and then its deductibility in the later year. Because of the thread of
`such sum’ in the language of proviso, it becomes impermissible to look at the
main provision as amended by the Finance Act, 2008 for making disallowance of
expenditure and then at the proviso as amended by the Finance Act, 2010 for
allowing expenditure in the subsequent year of payment.  The situation would have
been otherwise,  if the expression `any sum’ had been used in the language of the
proviso instead of `such sum’.   In that case any amount of expenditure, on which
tax deducted had been paid in a particular year,  irrespective of the year of
incurring expenditure,  would have got  deduction in such  year of payment of tax.
It is only in that case  that payment of tax made in July 2009 would have suffered
complete disallowance both in the  A.Y.s  2009-10  and 2010-11.  But fortunately,
position is not so as the deduction will  be permissible to the assessee in A.Y.
2010-11 going by the provision as amended by the Finance Act, 2008.  
  M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
39
50.      Now we will examine the example cited by the ld. AR in the light of the
above discussion. In that case the assessee claiming deduction in assessment year
2009-2010 will not be granted deduction in that year because of its failure to pay
tax within the time stipulated as per the provision standing amended by the Finance
Act, 2008, but when  such tax is paid after 31
st
 March but before the due date u/s
139(1) say, July 2009, the deduction would be allowed in assessment year 2010-
2011 as per proviso to the same provision.   As per the provision as amended by the
Finance Act, 2010,  no deduction  of expenditure claimed in  A.Y. 2010-11 will be
allowed if there is failure on the part of the assessee to pay tax deducted at source
on or before the due date specified u/s 139(1). The amended proviso will come to
the rescue of the assessee in granting such deduction in the later year of  payment
of tax, which had suffered disallowance in  A.Y. 2010-11. The amended proviso by
the Finance Act, 2010 shall apply only in respect of interest, commission or
brokerage etc. which have been disallowed in assessment year 2010-2011 for the
failure to deposit tax, duty, cess or fee etc. u/s  139(1) and not any expenditure
which was claimed and disallowed in A.Y. 2009-10 or any earlier year.
51.       It is thus clear that there is no anomaly in the amendment carried out by the
Finance Act, 2010 as projected by the ld. AR. Section 40(a)(ia) before and after
amendment is workable as independent unit distinctly.   As the language of proviso
is clear and uses the expression `such sum’, the view point canvassed by the ld. AR
that the expenditure shall lose deduction in either of the years, is sans merits.
52.    From the above para it can be seen that there is no hint in the proviso to
section 40(a)(ia), as contended by the ld. AR,  that the amendment is retrospective
from 01.04.2005. On the other hand the Finance Minister’s speech is one more
additional reason for holding amendment of the Finance Act, 2010 as not
retrospective from assessment year 2005-2006. The relevant para of the speech is
as under:- M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
40
“137. Relaxing the current provisions on disallowance of expenditure,
I propose to allow deduction of such expenditure, if tax has been
deducted at any time during the financial year and paid before the due
date of filing the return. This will allow most deductors additional
time up to September of the next financial year. At the same time, I
propose to increase the interest charged on tax deducted but not
deposited by the specified date, from 12 per cent. to 18 per cent. per
annum.”
                                           (Emphasis supplied by us)
52.      A careful perusal of the above para of the speech indicates that it has two
components. First is the partial relaxation in the  time limit for deposit of tax as
discussed above in this order and the second is the simultaneous increase in the
interest rate. Use of the words `At the same time’ after the relaxation of the time
limit for depositing the tax and before the mention of increase in the interest rate on
tax deducted but not deposited by the specified date,  fairly indicates that both have
been linked with each other.  Same thing appears from the Memorandum
explaining the provisions in the Finance Bill, reproduced above in para 23 of this
order, which is in two paras.  Whereas  para A. explains about the partial relaxation
in the time limit for deposit  of tax so as to escape disallowance, para B. provides
for the increase in the interest rate on tax deducted but not deposited  by the
specified date. It is thus evident that simultaneous with partial relaxing of the time
limit for depositing the tax deducted at source, the interest rate chargeable on tax
deducted but not deposited before the specified time has also been increased from
12%  to 18% per annum as per section 201(1).  It is a trite law that every statute
which impairs vested rights acquired under the existing laws or gets a new
obligation or attaches a new disability in respect  of transactions already passed,
must be presumed to be prospective. This view has been reiterated several times by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court including in the case of  R Rajagopal Reddy & Others
Vs. Padmini Chandrasekharan [(1995) 213 ITR 340 (SC)].  The Special Bench of
the Tribunal in ITO Vs.  Ekta Promoters (P.) Ltd. [(2008) 113 ITD 719 (Del) (SB)]  M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
41
has also held to the same effect that the provision for levy of interest on excess
refund u/s 234D is prospective and applies only from assessment year 2004-2005.
This Special Bench order has been approved by the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in
Director of Income Tax Vs   Jacabs Civil Incorporated [(2011) 330 ITR 578
(Del.)]. From these precedents it is abundantly clear that the levy of interest under
the Act is always prospective unless expressly stated otherwise.  It is noticed that
section 201(1) has been amended by the Finance Act, 2010 with effect from
01.07.2010 providing for increase in the interest rate from 12% to 18%.  If we hold
that section 40(a)(ia) has been amended by the Finance Act, 2010 with
retrospective effect from  A.Y. 2005-2006,  then the consequential amendment to
section 201(1)  would also require the same treatment. As the amendment to
section 201(1) has not been made retrospective from assessment year 2005-2006
and it being substantive provision impairing the vested right acquired under the
existing provision,  cannot be given retrospective effect,  in our considered opinion
the amendment to section 40(a)(ia) also cannot be held retrospective from A.Y.
2005-06.
53.    The learned A.R. emphatically focused on the contention that the expenditure
so incurred by the assessee was genuine and by depositing the tax deducted at
source a little late, it substantially complied with the provisions of section 40(a)(ia).
It was further submitted that there was no logic in disallowing expenditure  and
causing loss at around 45% of the expenditure in the shape of tax and interest etc.
for a mere non-deduction of tax at the rate of 1% of the contract payments.  The ld.
AR further put forth that the loss caused to the assessee by making disallowance in
the current year could not be made good by allowing deduction in the subsequent
year on payment of  such tax as,  in certain cases,   it may take several years to
absorb the loss caused by the heavy deduction granted in the subsequent year
without there being corresponding income. In the backdrop of these submissions, it
was vigorously argued that the retrospective effect to the amendment made by the M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
42
Finance Act, 2010 from the date of insertion of section 40a)(ia), that is, A.Y. 2005-
06,  was the need of the hour.
54.  We are not impressed with these submission for ruling the latest amendment to
section 40(a)(ia)  as having retrospective  operation from 1.4.2005.  Primarily we
find that none of these submissions really deal with the retrospective or prospective
effect of the amendment made by the Finance Act, 2010.  Rather these depict the
hardships caused to the assessee by the very insertion of section 40(a)(ia). All these
hardships, such as genuine expenditure suffering disallowance, tax effect of around
45% as against non-deduction of tax at source at the rate of 1% of the expenditure
and the difficulty in absorbing the deduction in the subsequent years due to
inadequacy of profits etc., continue even after the amendment to the provision by
the Finance Act, 2010.   It can be seen that the Finance Act, 2010 has not repealed
the provision of sec. 40(a)(ia) that it could be claimed that the hardships
enumerated above which were caused by the Finance  (No. 2) Act, 2004 have been
done away with.  The latest amendment has simply extended the time limit for
deposit of tax deducted at source in certain cases. We have noted above that the
other consequences of section 40(a)(ia) are still present in the provision. That apart,
it is simple and plain that if the expenditure is not genuine or not incurred for the
purpose of business,  it would not at all qualify for deduction at the very threshold
and the resultant application of section 40(a)(ia) would be automatically ruled out.
We are equally unconvinced with the contention of substantial compliance of the
provisions on late deposit of tax deducted at source. There can be either
compliance or non-compliance of a particular provision. Given the time limit for
the deposit of tax deducted at source,  if it is deposited by the time prescribed it is a
case of compliance of the provision and if it is late deposit even by a single day, it
is non-compliance. We cannot say that by depositing such tax belatedly, the
assessee substantially complied with the provisions of section 40(a)(ia). If we
stretch this argument a little further and suppose that instead of depositing the tax M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
43
deducted at source in July 2005 in the above example,  the assessee deposits a day
after the due date u/s 139(1) of the Act, would it still mean that  the assessee has
substantially complied with the provision so as to  escape the mischief of section
40(a)(ia)?  The answer is in negative. The Finance Act, 2010 has extended the time
limit for depositing tax deducted at source by the due date u/s 139(1) of the Act
from the earlier lesser time available for compliance.   If the tax is deposited by the
due date, it would mean escape from the clutches of section 40(a)(ia) for
assessment year 2010-2011, but  if it is deposited even the next day beyond the due
date, natural consequences would follow and it would call for disallowance u/s
40(a)(ia) in the year of incurring the expenditure.   In the like manner,  in the year
under appeal,  if the tax deducted at source up to  February, 2005 had been
deposited up to  31
st
 March,  it would have amounted to compliance of the
provision, but the late deposit even on 1
st
 April, 2005 would amount to noncompliance warranting interference by section 40(a)(ia) entailing disallowance of
expenditure in the Assessment year 2005-06.  However the fact that the assessee
deposited it beyond the prescribed period, would amount to compliance of the
prescription of the proviso,  entitling the assessee to deduction in the A.Y. 2006-07.
55.  Further if we proceed with the hypothesis of substantial compliance  even on
late deposit  not causing  any disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) in the year of incurring the
expenditure,  it will make the  proviso redundant.  When we consider the mandate
of section 40(a)(ia) in entirety, it becomes apparent  that it has  two ingredients,
viz., first,  the disallowance of expenditure due to non-deduction or non-deposit of
tax deducted at source in time  and  second,  the allowing of expenditure in the later
year in which the amount of tax deducted at source is deposited. It is one composite
provision. Both these limbs, that is, the disallowance of expenditure in the year of
incurring expenditure and allowing it in the year of payment are integral part of the
provision. As per the proviso, the assessee gets deduction of expenditure in the year
of payment of tax deduced at source.  But if we allow deduction of the expenditure M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
44
in the year of its incurring on some equitable ground or on the theory of substantial
compliance despite the fact the tax was deposited beyond the prescribed time, then
it would mean the obliteration  the  proviso from the provision, which is  obviously
impossible.
56.   In view of the foregoing reasons we are satisfied that the amendment carried
out by the Finance Act, 2010 with retrospective effect from assessment year 2010-
2011 cannot be held to be retrospective from assessment year 2005-2006.  Two
diametrically opposite views on this issue, expressed,  inter alia, by the Mumbai
Benches of the tribunal, were placed before us. With utmost respect to the other,
we are  inclined to accept the one in favour of the Revenue.  We, therefore, hold
that the authorities below were fully justified in  sustaining disallowance of
Rs.50.12 lakhs u/s 40(a)(ia) in the year under consideration. The question posted
before the Special Bench is, therefore, answered in negative, in favour of the
Revenue and against the assessee by holding that the amendment brought out by
the Finance Act, 2010 to section 40(a)(ia) w.e.f. 01.04.2010, is not remedial and
curative in nature.
 
57.      Ground no.3 dealing with this issue is, therefore, rejected.
58. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.
Order pronounced in the open Court on this 09
th
 day of September, 2011.
 
     Sd/-    Sd/-     Sd/-
   (D.K.Agarwal)     (Rajendra Singh)      (R.S.Syal)
   Judicial Member   Accountant Member       Accountant Member
 
Mumbai : 09
th
 September, 2011.
Devdas* M/s.Bharti Shipyard Limited.
ITA No.2404/Mum/2009 (SB)
45
Copy to :
1. The Appellant.
2. The Respondent.
3. The CIT concerned
4. The CIT(A)- XXVII, Mumbai.
5. The DR/ITAT, Mumbai.
6. Guard File.
TRUE COPY.
       By Order
     Assistant Registrar, ITAT, Mumbai.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPELLATE BOARD 13. In this regard our work is lessened because the only dispute raised by the learned counsel for the respondent is that the respondent’s mark is ‘NEW M.P.JEWELLERS’ and even assuming that the name may be identical, the mark being a composite one with the monogram which contains the letters ‘NMPJ’ and the name would definitely have its own dissimilarity. It was also contended that the logo with the name and the mark being a composite one, the same cannot be separated for the purpose of comparison with the mark of the applicant. We could have appreciated the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent if the logo mark and the name is being used as a trade mark in respect of the goods of the respondent in a visible manner. Here we are concerned with the trade name with which both the traders are to be identified. The applicant has to be identified as ‘M.P.JEWELLERS’ and the respondent will be identified as ‘NEW M.P.JEWELLERS’ In such identification the logo part of the mark has no relevance at all.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPELLATE BOARD 2nd floor, Annexe-l, Guna Complex, 443, Anna Salai, Teynampet, Chennai 600 018 (Circuit Bench Sitting at Kolkata) ORA No.22/2004/TM/KOL MONDAY, THIS THE 10th DAY OF JANUARY, 2005 HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE S.JAGADEESAN        ...CHAIRMAN HON'BLE DR.RAGHBIR SINGH                             ...VICE CHAIRMAN                                       M.P.Jewellers P-227 Ram Krishna Samadhi Road (C.I.T.Scheme-VIM) KOLKATA – 700 054                                               Applicant (By Advocates S/Shri G.Chakravartti and Samit Talukdar) Vs. New M.P. Jewellers Chawk Bazaar HOOGHLY Kolkata – 712 103                                                    Respondent  (By Advocate Shri Dr.A.M.Saha) ORDER            (No.1/2005) Hon'ble Shri Justice S.Jagadeesan. Chairman:             The applicant filed this application under section 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) for rectification of the Register of Trade Marks by directing the Registrar of Trade Marks to expunge  and cancel the respondent’s mark ‘NEW M P JEWELLERS’ under registration No.690610 dated 14.12.1999.  The case of the applicant is that it is a registered partnership firm established in or about 1945.  It was registered with the Registrar of Firms.  The applicant used the words ‘M.P. JEWELLERS’ and /or ‘M. P.’ as its trading names and trade mark in respect of its business to distinguish its products.  The said trade marks have been popular in the field of jewellery, precious and semi precious stones together with astrological consultancy services.  Apart from the registered place of business at Ramakrishna Samadhi Road, Kolkata, the applicant also has branches in other places of Kolkata.  The applicant is engaged in trading and marketing of all types of jewellery made of gold, silver and other precious metals.  The said jewelleries are sold and marketed under the trade name and trade mark ‘M.P. JEWELLERS’ and / or ‘M.P.’.  The said trade marks were registered and some of the applications for registrations in different languages are pending.  The applicant is using the said marks continuously since 1945 and their turnover for the year 1988-89 was Rs.38,46,890 and the same rose to Rs.15,91,19,615 during  the period 2002-03.  Similarly the advertisement expenses of the applicant which was Rs.4,36,867 in the year 1988-89 rose to Rs.1,11,00,739 during the year 2002-03.    Due to the long use of the mark, the public associates the same exclusively with the applicant.  The applicant also initiated legal proceedings against M/s National MP Jewellers and another M/s New MP Jewellers for using the same mark.  The applicant filed yet another legal proceeding which was settled between the parties.  In or about 1997 the applicant came to know that some other party was offering jewels for sale under the trade name ‘M.P. JEWELLERS’ alias ‘NEW M.P. JEWELLERS’ consisting of words M.P. JEWELLERS so as to take unlawful and illegal benefit of the goodwill existing in favour of the applicant and filed a suit which also ended in compromise.  Whenever the applicant came to know about the use of the offensive mark, without fail they initiated legal proceedings to protect their mark.  In 1995 the applicant came to know that the respondent herein using the trade name M/s New MP Jewellers and making unlawful gain by passing off its goods as that of the applicant.  The applicant duly filed a suit 4/1996 on the file of the District Court, Hooghly for injunction restraining the respondent from passing off its goods as that of the applicant.  By an order dated 7.6.1996 the District Judge restrained the respondent from using the name ‘NEW MP JEWELLERS’ or another name which includes the words ‘MP JEWELLERS’.  During the pendency of the suit, in or about May, 2001 the respondent took out an application stating that they have changed the name of their business from the impugned ‘M/s  NEW M.P. JEWELLERS’ to ‘M.M.P JEWELLERS’ and prayed for disposal of the suit in view of the change of name.  As the change of name by the respondent gave rise to a new cause of action, the applicant filed another suit OS 12/2001 in the District Court, Hooghly alongwith an interlocutory application seeking for interim injunction.  The District Judge granted the interim order restraining the respondent from using their trade name ‘MP JEWELLERS’ or another deceptively similar trade name.  Irrespective of the injunction order the respondent was using both the impugned names, ‘NEW M.P. JEWELLERS and M.M.P . JEWELLERS’.  Later the applicant came to know that the respondent did not change their name from ‘NEW M.P. JEWELLERS’ to ‘M.M.P. JEWELLERS’ and were continuously using the name ‘NEW MP JEWELLERS’.  On 27.11.2003 the respondent’s counsel served a copy of the application under Order VI Rule 17 in OS 4/1996 to amend the written statement including the fact that the respondent is the proprietor of the registered trade mark ‘NEW MP JEWELLERS’ under No.690610 in class 14 as the same was registered under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958.  The applicant is the prior adopter and prior user of the mark ‘M.P. JEWELLERS’ and / or ‘M.P.’ in respect of jewellery and precious metals and the said marks have become distinctive of the goods of the applicant.  Hence the use of the impugned trade mark by the respondent is unlawful and the impugned registration is in contravention of sections 9, 11 and 18(1) of the said Act.  The trade mark of the applicant earned huge goodwill and as such the use of an identical mark by the respondent would cause deception and confusion among the public even if the impugned mark is used in respect of goods and / or services which is not similar to the goods of the applicant.  Hence the remaining of the mark in the Register is in contravention of section 11(2) of the Act.  The applicant came to know about the registration only by way of the amendment petition filed by the respondent and immediately this application for rectification was filed.  2.         The main grounds urged by the applicant are that they are prior adopter and user of the impugned mark as such the registration granted in favour of the respondent is in contravention of provisions of sections 9,11, and 18(1) of the Act.  Furthermore the impugned mark being same or identical to that of the applicant’s mark, the use of the same would cause confusion and deception in the trade as well as in the public.  The respondent obtained the registration suppressing the pendency of the proceedings in the Civil Court and as such the impugned mark cannot continue to be in the register and there is no sufficient cause for the registration of the same and also for continuation of the same in the Register. 3.         The respondent filed their counter statement stating that they adopted the composite mark in the year 1992 comprising the letters ‘N M P J’ interwoven with each other, making a monogram and name ‘New M.P. Jewellers’ to be used in connection with its business in relation to gold and silver ornaments.  After adopting the composite trade mark the respondent had been using the same continuously to the knowledge of all concerned.  In order to get the statutory protection, the respondent applied for registration of the monogram ‘N M P J’ with ‘New M.P. Jewellers’ and also obtained the registration as there was no opposition.  When the respondent was using the monogram with the name honestly, they received a notice in June, 2004 from the District Court through which it came to know about the injunction order in the other suit.  It had also filed an application for vacating the interim order.  The respondent also filed an application for amendment of the written statement after obtaining the registration and the same was allowed.  The present rectification application is vexatious, motivated and out of business rivalry.  The respondent adopted the monogram written in a particular style interwoven to distinguish and to denote their product and the name ‘New  M.P.  Jewellers’ adopted long back in the year 1978.  Apart from this plea the respondent made specific denials of the averments in each and every paragraphs of the application and further stated that the application filed to dismiss the suit OS 4/1996 on the ground of change of name into ‘M P Jewellers’ from ‘New M P Jewellers’ was not pressed as the application filed in or about 2001 was in disturbed mind as the respondent was completely frustrated and in depression.  The respondent also pleaded that the use of the composite mark, monogram ‘N M P J’ with the name ‘New M. P. Jewellers’ will not cause any confusion or deception in the trade.  Along with the counter statement the respondent also filed evidence in support of the registered mark by way of an affidavit of Madan Mohan Pal, the sole proprietor of the respondent’s firm wherein it is stated that the respondent honestly adopted the name ‘New M.P. Jewellers’ in the year 1978 and the name was adopted from the initial words of his name and first letters of Madan Mohan Pal.  He also furnished the sales statistics for the year 1990-91 which was Rs.3,20,112 and it rose to Rs.13,19,279 during the period 1995-96. 4.         The applicant filed evidence in reply and also the objections to the supplementary affidavit to the evidence in support of registration. 5.         We have heard learned counsel Shri G.Chakraborty on behalf of the applicant and learned counsel Dr.A.M.Saha on behalf of the respondent. 6.         Learned counsel for the applicant contented that the applicant is using the trade name ‘M.P. JEWELLERS’ since 1945.  The evidence has been produced for use of the same since 1989.    The applicant initiated several legal proceedings against the offenders of their trade mark as well as the trade name ‘M.P. JEWELLERS’.  Against the respondent also they filed two suits OS 4/1996 as well as 12/2001 which are pending in the District Court, Hoogli.  The respondent had obtained the registration of the impugned mark during the pendency of those suits and during the subsistence of the injunction order restraining the respondent from using the said marks.  Further, the respondent did not deny the prior use of the applicant of their identical mark.  Since the mark of the applicant and respondent are identical and same and the applicant’s mark being the earlier registered one, the impugned mark ought not to have been registered.  Hence the registration of the respondent’s mark is in contravention of sections 9, 11 and 18(1) of the Act.  Apart from that the suppression of the pendency of the suit as well as the order of injunction by the respondent before the Registrar of Trade Marks will amount to fraud played by the respondent and on this ground also the impugned mark is liable to be cancelled.  He also relied upon the judgement of the Supreme Court in AIR 1994 SC 1837 at 1843 para 29 Satyabrata Biswas V. Kalyan Kumar Kisku as well as another judgement of the Supreme Court 1994 in (1) SCC paras 1, 2 and 6. SP Chengalvaraya  Naidu Vs. Jagannath . 7.         On the contrary the learned counsel for the respondent vehemently contented that their mark is a composite mark with the monogram containing ‘N M P J’ and the name ‘New M.P. Jewellers’ and their invoices and bills contains the monogram and the name.  As such there cannot be any confusion in the trade.  Further the composite mark cannot be separated to find out the possibility of confusion or deception.  It should be taken as a single unit in order to decide the question of confusion.  Further he contended that the applicant could have objected before the Registrar of Trade Marks when the application for registration was pending.  In the absence of any explanation on the part of the applicant for not opposing the registration of the impugned mark, the rectification proceedings is only an after thought due to business rivalry.  In support of his proposition he also relied upon the judgements of this Board reported in 2004 PTC 578 Kamaladevi Chordia V. P. Ganeshan  and  2004 PTC 610 Balaji Consumer Products of India V. Chinnaswami.  The applicant is having their trade within Kolkata city whereas the respondent is having their trade in the mouffisil  district and as such there cannot be any confusion.  He further contented that the applicant all along have been dealing with precious stones and never had any dealings in the gold jewellery prior to the adoption of the impugned mark by the respondent in respect of gold jewellery.  Hence the respondent is the first one who adopted and prior user of the impugned trade mark in relation to gold jewellery.  Consequently there is no valid cause for the cancellation of the impugned mark or for removal of the same from the Register of Trade Marks. 8.         We have carefully considered the contentions of both the counsel.  To find out the similarity of marks by comparison, it is relevant to refer to the principles laid down by the various Courts. In Parle Products (P) Ltd. Vs. J.P. and Co., Mysore AIR 1972 SC 1359  wherein the Supreme Court has laid down the underlying principles thus:-             “….. In order to come to the conclusion whether one mark is deceptively similar to another, the broad and essential features of the two are to be considered.  They should not be placed side by side to find out if there are any differences in the design and if so, whether they are of such character as to prevent one design from being mistaken for the other it would be enough if the impugned mark bears such an overall similarity to the registered mark as would be likely to mislead a person usually dealing with one to accept the other if offered to him.” 9.         A division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Hiralalal Prabhudas V. Ganesh Trading Company, AIR 1984 Bom.218, Mr.Justice Lentin speaking for a Division Bench adverted to the previous decisions of the Supreme Court on the subject and held that the Court must be guided by the following considerations:             “5. What emerges from these authorities is (a) what is the main idea or salient features, (b) marks are remembered by the general impressions or by some significant detail rather than by a photographic recollection of the whole (c) overall similarity is the touchstone, (d) marks must be looked at from the view and first impression of a person of average intelligence and imperfect recollection, (e) overall structure, phonetic similarity and similarity of idea are important and both visual and phonetic tests must be applied, (i) the purchaser must not be put in a state of wonderment, (g) marks must be compared as a whole microscopic examination being impermissible, (h) the broad and salient features must be considered for which the marks must not be placed side by side to find out differences in design, and (i) overall similarity is sufficient.  In addition, indisputably the nature of the commodity, the class of purchasers, the mode of purchase and other surrounding circumstances.”             10.       It may also be worthwhile to refer to a passage from Kerley’s Law of Trade Marks and  Trade Names 13th Edition paras 16-38 at 603:-             “When the question arises whether a mark so resembles another mark as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion, it should be determined by considering what is the leading characteristic of each.  The one might contain many, even most, of the same elements as the other, and yet the  leading, or it may be the only, impression left on the mind might be  very different.  On the other hand, a critical comparison of two marks might disclose numerous points of difference, and yet the idea which would remain with any person seeing them apart at different times might be the same.  Thus it is clear that a mark is infringed if the essential features, or essential particulars of it, are taken.  In the case of device marks, especially, it is helpful before comparing the marks to consider what are the essentials of the claimant’s device; with word marks, the court is apt to be more impressed by the dangers of giving the claimant what amounts to a monopoly in a large class of words.” These are the principles governing to find out the similarity of trade marks. 11.       Here we are concerned with the trade name which also turn to be the trade mark.  The applicant is carrying on the business with the trade name ‘M.P.JEWELLERS’ and / or ‘M.P.’  The respondent also claims to use the same name ‘NEW M.P.JEWELLERS’.  So far as the  respondent’s mark is concerned, it is registered with the monogram containing the letters ‘NMPJ’ as given below:- 12.       There is no dispute that both the applicant as well as the respondent are carrying on the business in jewellery falling under class 14 of the Fourth  Schedule of the Rules framed under the said Act.  The claim of the applicant is that they have adopted the trade name ‘M.P.JEWELLERS’ since 1945 and registered the mark under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958.    They also produced under annexure ‘A” some of the notifications for registration of the same in other languages.  The registered mark of the applicant is ‘M.P’ under No. 7000542 dated 4.3.96 which is in English.  The trade mark No.700543 is in Bengali and trade mark No.700544 is in Hindi.  Under annexure ’B’ the applicant has produced the invoices which bears the name ‘M.P. JEWELLERS’ from 1989 to 1999 which contains about 50 invoices.  The applicant has also produced under annexure ‘C’ the advertisements.  Apart from these documents they have also filed the interim orders granted in the civil suit instituted against the respondent and others under TS No.2/96, 3/97.    In the application the applicant has furnished the sales statistics for the period from 1988-89 to 2002-03 which reveals that the sale Rs.38,46,890 in the year 1988-89 had increased to Rs.15,91,19.615 in the year 2002-03.  Hence there is sufficient evidence on the part of the applicant that they have been using the trade name as well as the mark ‘M.P. JEWELLERS’ for a considerable period  which attained reputation and goodwill and also had a distinctiveness in respect of the goods of the applicant.  13.       In this regard  our work is lessened because the only dispute raised by the learned counsel for the respondent is that the respondent’s mark is ‘NEW M.P.JEWELLERS’ and even assuming that the name may be identical,  the mark being a composite one with the monogram which contains the letters ‘NMPJ’ and the name would definitely have its own dissimilarity.  It was also contended that the logo   with the name and the mark being a composite one, the same cannot be separated for the purpose of comparison with the mark of the applicant.  We could have appreciated the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent if the logo mark and the name is being used as a trade mark in respect of the goods of the respondent in a visible manner.  Here we are concerned with the trade name with which both the traders are to be identified.  The applicant has to be identified as ‘M.P.JEWELLERS’ and the respondent will be identified as ‘NEW M.P.JEWELLERS’   In such identification the logo part of the mark has no relevance at all. 14.       Both the applicant and the respondent are dealing in jewellery.  Perhaps the jewelleries made by them may contain their mark which cannot be easily visible.  In the business field and among the customers they should be known only by the trade name which has become the trade mark also.  In such circumstances the question for consideration is whether the respondent’s name ‘NEW M.P. JEWELLERS’ along with its log mark would cause confusion or deception in the trade?  We do not want to extract judgements except to quote a few.  The High Court of Jammu and Kashmir in the case of Mohan Meakin Ltd., V. Kashmir Dreamland Distillery and Anr. Reported in  1990 IPLR 321 held that the trade mark  ‘MMB’ and ‘MBB’ for whisky are identical and granted an order of injunction in favour of the plaintiff. Similarly the learned single Judge of Madras High Court in the case of Khoday Distilleries V. Scotch Whisky Association Scotland and others reported in AIR 1999 Madras 274 held that the mark  ‘Peterscott’ in relation to whisky made in India was deceptively similar to ‘scotch’ and was likely to lead the consumers of whisky into thinking the whisky manufactured in this country and sold under the trade mark ‘Peterscott’ was also scotch whisky and such trade mark was ineligible for registration.  In yet another case in P.L.Anwar Basha Vs. N. Natarajan AIR 1980 Madras 56, it was held that ‘Meen Mark Beedi’ used by both the parties are likely to cause confusion and deception within the meaning of section 2(b) of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958.    The Bombay High Court in the case of Tata Tea Limited V. Suruchi Tea Company  reported in 2004  PTC 83 has held that Tata Tea of the petitioner therein and Suruchi Tea of the respondent are similar and likely to cause confusion on the ground that the overall similarity of the two marks has to be regarded with reference to the essential features and that the respondent has clearly not been able to discharge the fundamental requirements under section 11(a) of the said Act.  The respondent therein furnished no cogent explanation as to how he came to adopt the trade design thus striking a resemblance of the mark of the appellant. 15.       With the assistance of the above principles along with the principles laid down in other cases referred to in paras 8 to 10 supra, if we look at the two marks cum trade names we have no hesitation that the word ‘NEW’ added by the respondent in their trade name has no distinctiveness in respect of their goods as contemplated under section 9.  The explanation offered by the respondent to adopt the name ‘NMPJ’   is that the word was coined from the initials of first letters of his name  Madan Mohan Pal.  Even if the first letters of the name is to be taken it can be ‘MMP’ and it cannot be ‘NMPJ’.  Even if the respondent adopted ‘MMP’ as the trade name it is also highly doubtful whether the said mark would not cause confusion in the light of the judgement of the Jammu & Kashmir High Court reported in 1990 IPLR 321. 16.       The deception or confusion is a question related to the consumer.  So far as the jewellery is concerned we can  have a judicial notice that the ladies in rural area would walk into a jewellery shop.  But the educated and the higher strata of society always have a constant connection with a particular trader depending upon the various schemes announced by them or the concessions offered to them.  There is a possibility that a few may have heard about the trade name which turn out to be the mark and try to visit the particular shop.  In such circumstances on comparison of both the marks, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that there will be a confusion in the minds of  the public.  As already stated the adding of the word ‘NEW’ has no significance at all in respect of the goods of the respondent or even in its trade name.  At the most the word ‘NEW’ would give an impression that the applicant has commenced a new shop under the same trade name ‘M.P. Jewellers’.  In such circumstances the mark adopted by the respondent certainly would amount to deception and confusion and as such is prohibited for registration under section 11 (a) of the said Act.  Hence the mark cannot be permitted any longer to remain in the Register of Trade Marks. 17.       It was also contended by the learned counsel for the respondent by referring to the evidence filed by the applicant along with the application that the applicant had all along been dealing with only precious stones and not with gold jewels till the respondent commenced their business.  We are unable to agree with the said contention of the learned counsel for the respondent.  The applicant produced annexure ‘B’ series, the bills dealing with precious stones as well as jewellery, for which the applicant has obtained the registration.  When it is a connected product falling under class 14, it is not open to the respondent to raise such a plea. 18.       With regard to the date of commencement of business by the respondent is concerned, there is a dispute in that also.  In para 9 of the counter statement the respondent has stated that in the year 1992 he honestly adopted the composite mark comprising letters ‘NMPJ;’ and the name ‘NEW M.P. JEWELLERS” in connection with his business in relation to gold and silver ornaments.  In para 4 of the same counter statement it is stated that the respondent is carrying on the business of manufacturing and selling jewelleries since 1978 with the trade name ‘NEW M.P.JEWELLERS’.    In para 3 of the affidavit filed as evidence in support of the impugned mark also the respondent has stated that sometime in the year 1978 he honestly adopted the trade name ‘NEW  M.P.JEWELLERS’.  In para 4 and 5 of the same affidavit also the same has been reiterated.  But in the affidavit he has furnished only the sales statistics for the year 1990-91 and 1991-92 stating that the documents relating to the earlier years are not readily available.  In para 9 he has stated that he honestly adopted the composite mark  comprising the letters ‘NMPJ’ interwoven with each other making a monogram and the word ‘NEW MP JEWELLERS’ and furnished the sales statistics for the year 1992-93  to 1995-96.    The documents produced by the respondent did not establish their business since 1978.    There is absolutely no iota of evidence that the respondent adopted the trade name ‘NEW M.P.JEWELLERS’ in 1978.  As already stated the trade name was adopted as a combination of the letters of his name Madan Mohan Pal also cannot be accepted.  In fact under exhibit ‘B’ series at page 50 of the type set along with the evidence in support of the impugned mark, the respondent has filed  the application for registration under the West Bengal Shops and Establishments Act which is dated 24.7.1992 wherein the date of commencement of business is given as 2.7.92.    The registration certificate was issued on 30.9.1992 as seen from page 52 of the type set.  The trade licence in the name of the respondent is also dated 9.7.92 which is clear from the exhibit ‘C’ series.  Apart from that the respondent has also enclosed exhibit ‘D’ series, the invitation for the first anniversary which is in April, 1993 and the second anniversary in April, 1994 which would clearly establish that the respondent has started the business only in the year 1992, much later than the applicant.  When the respondent started his business subsequent to the applicant, it is for him to explain as to why and how he adopted the impugned mark as well as the trade name.    We are not satisfied with the explanation offered by the respondent.  Even if the cause for adoption of the name is to be accepted when the mark offends the already registered mark then the same cannot be registered.  Merely because the respondent’s mark has been registered as a composite mark it cannot be said that it is distinguishable from that of the applicant’s mark.  When considering the customers and the goods dealt with by both the parties, unhesitatingly we find that the respondent’s mark would cause confusion as the same is similar and identical to that of the applicant’s mark.  When the traders are to be identified by their trade name, which incidentally becomes their trade mark also, the similar names would definitely cause confusion.  Hence the applicant has clearly established that the impugned mark has wrongly been registered by the Registrar of Trade Marks and consequently the same is liable to be cancelled.  In view of the above finding there is no need for us to elaborately discuss the judgements cited by  both the parties, as the principles laid down in various judgements are to be considered with facts and circumstances of that particular case.  19.       For the reasons stated above, the Original Rectification Application is allowed and we direct the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks, Kolkata to cancel the registration of the mark No. 690610 dated 14.12.1999  and also to expunge the same from the Register of Trade Marks.  However, there will be no order as to costs. (Dr.Raghbir Singh)                         (Justice S.Jagadeesan)   Vice-Chairman                               Chairman wrk Disclaimer: This order is being published for present information and should not be taken as a certified copy issued by the Board

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA =Constitutional petition – application for interim order of stay of execution of constitutional court order nullifying nominations of MPS who were nominated ad independents yet they joined parliament as party flag bearers and vice versa. These two applications each sought for interim orders of stay of execution of the Constitutional court ruling nullifying the nomination of several members of parliament who had joined parliament as independents and vice versa. The two applications were consolidated and heard together. The applications were granted pending the hearing and determination of a substantive application for stay of execution.

THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA  
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UGANDA
AT KAMPALA(CORAM:         ODOKI, CJ, TSEKOOKO, KATUREEBE,          KITUMBA AND KISAAKYE, JJ.SC.)CONSTITUTIONAL APPLICATION NO. 02 OF 2011
(ARISING FROM CONSTITUTIONAL APPLICATION NO. 01 OF 2011)
(ARISING FROM CONSTITUTIONAL PETITION NO. 38 OF 2010)

HON. WILLIAM OKETCHO:    :::::::::::              APPLICANT

VERSUS

GEORGE OWOR: ::::::::::::::               RESPONDENT

ANDCONSTITUTIONAL APPLICATION NO. 04 OF 2011(ARISING FROM CONSTITUTIONAL APPLICATION NO.03 OF 2011)
(ARISING FROM CONSTITUTIONAL PETITION NO. 38 OF 2010)

ATTORNEY GENERAL:                 :::::::::::::                     APPLICANT

VERSUS 

GEORGE OWOR: ::::::::::::::               RESPONDENT

Constitutional petition – application for interim order of stay of execution of constitutional court order nullifying nominations of MPS who were nominated ad independents yet they joined parliament as party flag bearers and vice versa.

These two applications each sought for interim orders of stay of execution of the Constitutional court ruling nullifying the nomination of several members of parliament who had joined parliament as independents and vice versa. The two applications were consolidated and heard together. The applications were granted pending the hearing and determination of a substantive application for stay of execution.

RULING OF THE COURT

Two Applications for Interim Orders to stay execution of the Decree and Orders in Constitutional Petition No. 38 of 2010 pending the determination of the substantive Applications filed by the applicants for stay of execution. The first Application was filed by Hon. William Oketcho against George Owor. The second Application was filed by the Attorney General against George Owor. At the time of hearing the Application, we decided to consolidate the two Applications since they concerned the same subject matter and sought to stay Orders arising from the same Constitutional Petition.
Hon. Oketcho was represented by Mr. Peter Kabatsi, Mr. Joseph Matsiko, Mr. Alfred Okello Oryem and Mr. Medard Lubega Ssegona. The Attorney was represented by Ms. Patricia Muteesi, Principal State Attorney and Mr. Richard Adrole State Attorney. The Respondent George Owor was represented by Dr. James Akampumuza and Mr. Muzamiru Kibeedi.
During the hearing, counsel for the Applicants conceded that they were not asking for stay of the Order or Declaration that the Members of Parliament who were nominated as independent candidates when they had been elected to Parliament on party tickets, or those who were nominated as party flag bearers when they had been elected as independent to Parliament, vacated Parliament at time of nomination in accordance with Article 83 of the Constitution. We agree with counsel that this was a Constitutional obligation which binds Members of Parliament.
The only substantive Order which the Applicants sought to stay was the Order nullifying the nomination of the Applicant and other Members of Parliament in similar circumstances.
Upon considering the submissions made by counsel in these Applications we are satisfied that sufficient grounds have been shown upon which this court should exercise its discretion to stay the Order nullifying the nomination of the Applicant and other Members of Parliament in similar circumstances, until the substantive Application for stay of execution is disposed of.

Costs in these Applications shall abide the outcome of the Appeal.

Dated at Kampala this 11^th day of February, 2011.

B.ODOKI
CHIEF JUSTICE
J.W.N. TSEKOOKO
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
B. KATUREEBE
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT


C.N.B KITUMBA
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
E.M.K. KISAAKYE
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT