the judgment and order dated August 19, 2011 passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Lucknow, by which it dismissed Original Application No.116 of 2011 filed by the =other officers who were allegedly involved in irregular purchases for the Central Ordnance Depot, Chheoki, also seem to have got away with very light, if at all, any punishment. Major General S.P. Sinha was subjected to an administrative action in which an order was passed on August 6, 2010 expressing severe

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2107 OF 2012 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.26892 OF 2011) Rajvir Singh ... Appellant Versus Secretary, Ministry of Defence & Others ... Respondents J U D G M E N T Aftab Alam, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated August 19, 2011 passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Lucknow, by which it dismissed Original Application No.116 of 2011 filed by the 2 appellant and rejected his challenge to the direction for the General Court Martial to re-assemble for his trial contending that his trial was barred by time as provided under section 122 of the Army Act, 1950 (for the sake of brevity "the Act"). 3. A General Court Martial was directed to be convened by order dated August 23/26, 2010 passed by the General Officer Commanding, Madhya Bharat Area, ("GOC, MB Area" for short) to try the appellant on different charges relating to gross financial irregularities punishable under Section 52(f) of the Act. The appellant challenged the order before the Armed Forces Tribunal (in Original Application No. 216 of 2010) on the plea that his trial by the General Court Martial was barred by limitation under section 122 of the Act. At that stage, the Tribunal did not go into the merits of the appellant's challenge and dismissed the Original Application leaving it open for the appellant to raise his objections before the Court Martial. In pursuance of the liberty given by the Tribunal, the appellant raised the objection before the Court Martial that his trial before it was barred by limitation. The Court Martial upheld the appellant's objection and by order dated February 17, 2011, allowed the "plea in bar" raised by the defence. However, the Confirming Authority, i.e., the (Officiating) GOC, MB Area, refused to confirm the order of the General Court Martial and by order dated 3 March 29, 2011, which is in some detail, found and held that reckoning from the date on which the commission of the offence and the identity of the appellant as one of the offenders came within the knowledge of the competent authority, the order giving direction for convening the General Court Martial was passed within a period of three years and, therefore, the bar of limitation did not come in the way of the trial of the appellant before the General Court Martial. Having, thus, arrived at the finding, he directed the GCM to proceed with the trial of the appellant as if the "plea in bar" was found not proved. The appellant challenged the order of the Confirming Authority once again before the Tribunal in Original Application no. 116 of 2011. But the Tribunal, mainly relying upon the decisions of this Court in Union of India and others v. V.N. Singh (2010) 5 SCC 579 and J.S. Sekhon v. Union of India and another (2010) 11 SCC 586, held that the General Court Martial was convened within the period of limitation. It, accordingly, rejected the application and upheld the order passed by the Confirming Authority. 4. The charges against the appellant pertain to the periods 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 when he was posted as officiating Commandant, Central Ordnance Depot, Chheoki. According to the charges, in procurement of stores he violated and flouted the relevant rules and in making purchases 4 worth about Rs.2.2 crores he caused wrongful loss of Rs.60.18 lakhs to the Government. 5. In this regard, first a pseudonymous complaint dated October 27, 2006 came making allegations of gross irregularities committed by the appellant in purchase of stores for the Central Ordnance Depot. The complaint was seen by the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Central Command ("GOC-in-C, CC" in short) on November 15, 2006. The complaint was followed by a report by the Central Command Liaison Unit which also highlighted the irregularities committed in procurement of stores at the Central Ordnance Depot, Chheoki. This report was seen by the GOC-in-C on December 6, 2006. On December 9, 2006, an order was issued on behalf of the GOC-in-C, for convening a Court of Inquiry to investigate the alleged irregularities/misdemeanors in the Central Ordnance Depot during the financial years 2005-2006 and 2006-2007. The irregularities/misdemeanors that were required to be inquired into were listed under the headings (a) upgradations of demand and (b) local purchase. The Court of Inquiry submitted its report on January 24, 2007 in which, apart from some other officers, the appellant was clearly indicted. It appears that the report of the Inquiry Committee was first placed before the GOC, MB Area, who on February 20, 2007 made a recommendation in light of the report. In his 5 recommendations the GOC, MB Area, observed that the Court of Inquiry had examined only a small fraction of the local purchase and had the Court gone into greater details more irregularities would have come to light. However, on the basis of the materials coming before the Court of Inquiry, the GOC, MB Area, found that there was adequate evidence regarding cognizable acts of omission/commission committed by several officers, including the present appellant in regard to whom he observed that he was to be blamed for causing wrongful loss to the government to the tune of Rs.60.18 lakhs in the process of procurements of stores worth Rs.2.2 crores by committing a number of procedural irregularities/illegalities. 6. The report of the Court of Inquiry along with the recommendations of the GOC, MB Area was forwarded to the GOC-in-C, CC on April 26, 2007. On May 7, 2007, the GOC-in-C, CC wrote a note in the form of recommendations on the report of the Court of Inquiry convened on his direction. He started by saying that he had perused the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry and he partially agreed with the findings and opinion of the Court. He observed that there was cogent and adequate material evidence regarding the cognizable acts of omission/commission committed by various officers of the Central Ordnance Depot, Chheoki. In regard to the appellant 6 the GOC-in-C made the following observations in paragraph 6 of his recommendation: "6. The culpability of IC-42501F Col Rajvir Singh, Offg Commandant, COD Chheoki, is established for causing wrongful loss to the Govt to the tune of Rs.60.18 lakhs in the process of procurement of stores through local purchase in the years 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 by committing the following procedural irregularities/illegalities:-" (The above quoted passage was followed by a list of different irregularities/illegalities allegedly committed by the appellant). 7. It, however, appears that on the basis of the materials before him the GOC-in-C, CC was also unhappy and dissatisfied with the role of one Major General S.P. Sinha, who, at the material time, was the ADGOS (CN & A) in the Central Command and who at the time the GOC-in-C was making his recommendation was posted as MGAOC, HQ-Western Command. Hence, in paragraph 7 of his recommendations he stated as follows:- "7. I recommend that a (sic.) appropriate (sic.) constituted C of I be ordered by integrated HQ of MoD (Army), MGO's Branch for investigation into the acts of omission/commission in respect of Maj. Gen. SP Sinha, ADGOS (CN & A) and any other higher auth, Col Rajvir Singh, Offg Commandant and offrs of the COD Chheoki as opined by the Court in the process of procurement of stores by the COD, Chheoki during the pd 2005-06 and 2006-07." 7 8. It is significant to note that insofar as the appellant is concerned, the GOC-in-C, CC, was undeniably the competent authority to initiate proceeding against him and to convene a General Court Martial to try him. Further, on the basis of the Court of Inquiry report and the recommendation of the GOC, MB Area, the GOC-in-C, CC, had clearly formed the opinion that the culpability of the appellant was established and there was cogent and adequate material evidence regarding the cognizable acts of omission/commission committed by him. Nonetheless, on May 7, 2007, the GOC-in-C, CC did not direct for initiating proceeding against the appellant and to convene the General Court Martial for his trial but clubbed his case with Major General S.P. Sinha in whose case the integrated headquarter of MoD Army was the competent authority and sent his recommendation to the integrated HQ to hold a Court of Inquiry to examine the role of the Major General in the irregularities committed at the Central Ordnance Depot, Chheoki, during his tenure there. 9. On the basis of the recommendation made by the GOC-in-C, CC, by his letter dated February 19, 2008, the integrated headquarters of MoD directed the HQ, Western Command (where Major General S.P. Sinha was at that time posted) to convene a Court of Inquiry to investigate the acts of omission/commission on the part of the Major General the then ADGOS 8 (CN & A), detailing the issues into which the investigation was required to be made. A copy of the letter was sent to the GOC-in-C, CC for information and further advising him to issue appropriate directions in respect of the appellant who was indicted by the Court of Inquiry that was held on his direction. 10. It was only then that the GOC-in-C, CC gave direction for initiation of disciplinary action against the appellant (and some other officers) vide order dated May 12, 2008, for the misdemeanors as stated in paragraphs 4 to 12 of the order insofar as the appellant is concerned (and in paragraphs 13 to 16 in regard to some other officers). 11. Following the order of the GOC-in-C, CC, a tentative charge-sheet containing 18 charges was given to the appellant on August 20, 2008. The hearing of charges was then held as required under rule 22 of the Army Rules, 1954 and at the end of the hearing, the Commanding Officer found that none of the charges were proved and there was no sufficient evidence to proceed further with the charges. The Confirming Authority, however, did not accept the view taken by the Commanding Officer and by order dated September 7, 2009, directed for taking additional summary of evidence. As directed by the Confirming Authority, additional summary was taken but 9 once again the Commanding Officer by his order dated March 9, 2010, found that none of the charges were proved. The Confirming Authority i.e. the GOC, MB Area, once again did not accept the order of the Commanding Officer. He framed four charges under section 52(f) of the Act relating to financial irregularities in procurement of store for the Central Ordnance Depot and directed the appellant to be tried by Court Martial. It was pursuant to this order that the General Court Martial came to be constituted which was challenged by the appellant as barred by limitation, as noted above. 12. Having narrated the relevant facts we may now take a look at the provision relating to limitation. Section 122 of the Act provides as follows:- "122. Period of limitation for trial. - (1) Except as provided by sub-section (2), no trial by court-martial of any person subject to this Act for any offence shall be commenced after the expiration of a period of three years [and such period shall commence. - (a) on the date of the offence; or (b) where the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to the authority competent to initiate action, the first day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of such person or authority, whichever is earlier; or 10 (c) where it is not known by whom the offence was committed, the first day on which the identity of the offender is known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to the authority competent to initiate action, whichever is earlier.] (2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply to a trial for an offence of desertion or fraudulent enrolment or for any of the offences mentioned in section 37. (3) In the computation of the period of time mentioned in sub-section (1), any time spent by such person as a prisoner of war, or in enemy territory, or in evading arrest after the commission of the offence, shall be excluded. (4) No trial for an offence of desertion other than desertion on active service or of fraudulent enrolment shall be commenced if the person in question, not being an officer, has subsequently to the commission of the offence, served continuously in an exemplary manner for not less than three years with any portion of the regular Army." 13. On behalf of the appellant it is contended that the period of limitation for his trial before the Court Martial would commence from February 20, 2007, when on the basis of the report of the Court of Inquiry, the GOC, MB Area, sent his recommendation to the GOC-in-C, CC indicting the appellant. It is pointed out that it was the GOC, MB Area, who passed the order dated August 23/26, 2010 convening the General Court Martial, directed the Commanding Officer to take further summary of evidence in the hearing of the charges under rule 22 and finally passed the order directing the Court 11 Martial to reassemble for the appellant's trial. It is, thus, the GOC, MB Area who is the competent authority to take action against the appellant and it is the date of his knowledge of the commission of the alleged offence and the identity of the appellant as the alleged offender that is relevant under section 122. 14. It is further submitted that in any event the GOC-in-C, CC was undeniably the competent authority to initiate action against the appellant. On May 7, 2007, the alleged offence and the identity of the appellant as the alleged offender was fully within his knowledge on the basis of the recommendation of GOC, MB Area and the report of the Court of Inquiry ordered by him. His knowledge is evident from his recommendation to Integrated HQ, wherein, he stated that the culpability of the appellant was established. The period of limitation must, therefore, commence from a date not later than May 7, 2007 and reckoning from that date, the period of three years came to end on May 6, 2010. But the order for convening the General Court Martial was finally passed by the GOC, MB Area on August 23/26, 2010, that is, clearly beyond the period of limitation. Hence, the appellant's trial before the General Court Martial was clearly hit by section 122 and was barred by limitation. 12 15. On behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, it is argued that the period of limitation in this case can only commence from May 12, 2008 when the GOC-in-C, CC directed that disciplinary action be initiated against the appellant and that later date must be deemed to be the date when the competent authority had the knowledge within the meaning of section 122 of the Act. 16. This is the argument adopted both in the order passed by the GOC, MB Area and the decision of the Tribunal upholding that order. 17. In the order, dated March 29, 2011 passed by the GOC, MB Area, in paragraph 34, it is observed as under: - "If the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court had been followed, the only question which the Court was to decide was, (sic.) which was the date on which the authority competent to initiate action issued its direction to initiate disciplinary action. However, the reasons given by the Court show that the Court was squarely guided by the issues framed by the learned Judge Advocate, which ran absolutely contrary to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court (as also the policy in vogue referred to by the learned Advocate Judge)". (emphasis added) 18. Affirming the view taken by the GOC, MB Area, the Tribunal in paragraph 12 of its judgment held and observed as follows - "In the case at hand on 7/5/2007, the date on which the applicant alleges the competent authority to have acquired knowledge, perusal of the said document which is Annexure No. A-6 to the 13 Original Application reveals that the respondent No. 3 is not able to form an opinion as to whether or not any offence has been established and furthermore he is not able to form a definite opinion regarding culpability of the applicant therefore he recommends for constitution of an appropriately constituted Court of Inquiry by Integrated HQ of the Mod (Army), MGO's Branch for investigation into the acts of omission/commission in respect of ADGOS (CN & A), the applicant and the officers of the Central Ordnance Depot, Chheoki. Thus it cannot be conclusively established regarding knowledge of the offence by respondent No. 3 at this stage. However, pursuant to recommendations of 7/5/2007 HQ Central Command approached Integrated HQ of the Mod (Army) for further inquiry in respect of officers for their involvement in the allegations. On 12/5/2008 the respondent No. 3 perused the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry held to investigate the allegations of various irregularities in Central Ordnance Depot, Chheoki and agreed with the recommendations of General Officer Commanding Madhya Bharat Area. The culpability of applicant, according to respondent No. 3 was established for causing wrongful loss to the Government. Upon being so satisfied regarding establishment of culpability the respondent No. 3 on 12/5/2008 he directed disciplinary action against the applicant. It is that date which would be counted as starting point towards computation of limitation for the purposes of Section 122(l) (b) of the Act." (emphasis added) 19. As noted above, both the GOC, MB Area and the Tribunal, base their orders on the decisions of this Court in. V.N. Singh (supra) and J.S. Sekhon (supra). The decisions of the GOC, MB Area and the Tribunal appear to be based on a complete misinterpretation of the two decisions of the Court. In both, V.N. Singh and J.S. Sekhon, the real issue before the Court was who 14 was the competent authority to initiate action against the delinquent officer and whose knowledge would be relevant for the purpose of section 122 of the Act. In both cases, it was contended, on behalf of the delinquent officers, that the knowledge of "the person aggrieved" long preceded the knowledge of the competent authority and reckoning from the date of knowledge of "the aggrieved person", the order convening the General Court Martial was barred by limitation. In V.N. Singh, it was submitted on behalf of the officer that one Brigadier K.S. Bharucha was the aggrieved person and in J.S. Sekhon, it was submitted that the Commander Works Engineer was the person aggrieved and if the period of limitation was computed from the date of their knowledge then the order convening the General Court Martial was barred by limitation. In both cases, the Court held that that part of section 122 that referred to the knowledge of the person aggrieved had no application to the facts of the case and the relevant date for computing the period of limitation was the date of knowledge of the competent authority to initiate action against the delinquent officer. In paragraphs 32 and 34 of the decision in V.N. Singh, the Court observed as follows: - "32. The term "the person aggrieved by the offence" would be attracted to natural persons i.e. human beings who are victims of an offence complained of, such as offences relating to a person or property and not to juristic persons like an organisation as in the present case. The plain and dictionary meaning of the term "aggrieved" means hurt, angry, upset, wronged, maltreated, 15 persecuted, victimised etc. It is only the natural persons who can be hurt, angry, upset or wronged or maltreated etc. If a Government organisation is treated to be an aggrieved person then the second part of Section 122(1) (b) i.e. "when it comes to the knowledge of the competent authority to initiate action" will never come into play as the commission of offence will always be in the knowledge of the authority who is a part of the organisation and who may not be the authority competent to initiate the action. A meaningful reading of the provisions of Section 122(1)(b) makes it absolutely clear that in the case of government organisation, it will be the date of knowledge of the authority competent to initiate the action, which will determine the question of limitation. Therefore, the finding of the High Court that Brigadier K.S. Bharucha was an aggrieved person is legally and factually incorrect and unsustainable. 34. The facts of the present case establish that the Technical Court of Inquiry was convened by DDST, Headquarter Delhi Area on 8- 1-1994 which recommended examination of certain essential witnesses for bringing into light the correct details and the persons responsible for the irregularities by a Staff Court of Inquiry and accordingly the Staff Court of Inquiry was ordered on 7-5-1994 by GOC-in-C Western Command which concluded in its report dated 31-8-1994, mentioning for the first time the involvement of the respondent in the offence. The GOC, Delhi Area i.e. the next Authority in chain of command to the respondent recommended on 19-10-1994 initiation of disciplinary action against the respondent whereas the GOC-in-C, Western Command gave directions on 3-12-1994, to initiate disciplinary action against the respondent. Therefore, the date of commencement of the period of limitation for the purpose of GCM of the respondent, commenced on 3-12-1994 when direction was given by GOC-in-C, Western Command to initiate disciplinary action against the respondent. The plea that the date of submission of the report by Technical Court of Inquiry should be treated as the date from which period of limitation shall commence has no substance. It is relevant to notice that no definite conclusion about the correct details and the persons responsible for the irregularities was mentioned in the report of Technical Court of Inquiry. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, this Court is of the view that the High 16 Court wrongly concluded that the period of limitation expired on 4-3-1996." 20. Similarly, in paragraphs 16 and 19 of the decision in J.S. Sekhon, it was held as follows - "16. According to the counsel appearing for the appellant, when the vigilance check report was submitted, Commander Works Engineer who is the person aggrieved came to know that there was a commission of an offence and therefore period of limitation as envisaged under Section 122 of the Act would commence from that date and when limitation is computed from the said date, convening of the General Court Martial on 9-3-1998 was barred by time, as it was beyond the period of three years as contemplated under Section 122 of the Army Act. 19. In our considered opinion, the expression "person aggrieved by the offence" is irrelevant in the facts and circumstances of the present case and what is relevant is the "knowledge of the authority competent to initiate action". The aforesaid acts were committed against the Government and not a natural person. In the facts of the present case no single person can be said to be aggrieved person individually due to the act of defrauding the Army. What is applicable to the facts of the case is the expression when it comes to the knowledge of the competent authority to initiate action." 21. In both the cases, the authority competent to initiate action against the delinquent officer had passed the direction for taking action against the delinquent officer on the same day it came to know about the commission of the offence and the identity of the offender. Hence, in both cases, at some places, the date of knowledge and date of the direction to initiate action against the delinquent officer are used interchangeably and that is the reason 17 for the Tribunal to misinterpret the decision to mean that the period of limitation would commence from the date of direction to initiate action against the delinquent officer. 22. The Tribunal is also incorrect in observing that on May 7, 2007, GOC-in-C, CC had formed only a tentative opinion about the appellant because on that date he made the recommendation to the Integrated HQ for investigation into the act of omission/commission in respect of Major General S.P. Sinha and any other higher authority, including the appellant. It is noted above that the recommendation of the GOC-in-C, CC to the Integrated HQ was only in regard to Major General S.P. Sinha. So far as the culpability of the appellant is concerned, he had already formed the opinion on the basis of the report of the Court of Inquiry and the recommendation of the GOC, MB Area. Moreover, when the Integrated HQ vide its letter of February 19, 2008 pointed out that the appellant was indicted by the Court of Inquiry ordered by him and in his case it was for him to "append directions", there was no further material before the GOC-in-C, CC in connection with the appellant. The order that the GOC-in-C, CC passed on May 12, 2008 for taking disciplinary action against the appellant reads as follows: - "1. I have perused the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry held to investigate the allegations of various irregularities in Central 18 Ordnance Depot, Chheoki vide Headquarters Central Command, convening order Number 174091/57/C/A(PC), dated 09 December 06 and generally agree with the recommendations of the General Officer Commanding, Madhya Bharat Area. 2. The Court of Inquiry proceedings reveal that there is cogent and adequate evidence on record to establish various acts of omission/commissions on part of certain officers of Central Ordnance Depot, Chheoki as mentioned in the succeeding paragraphs. IC-42501F Colonel Rajvir Singh 4. The culpability of IC-42501F Colonel Rajvir Singh, Officiating Commandant, Central Ordnance Depot Chheoki, is established for causing wrongful loss to the Government to the tune of Rs. 60.18 Lakhs (Rupees Sixty Lakh eighteen thousand only) in the process of procurement of stores through local purchase in the year 2005-06 and 2006-07, by committing the following illegalities:- (a) xxx (b) xxx (c) xxx 5. xxx 6. xxx 7. xxx 8. xxx 9. xxx 10. xxx 11. xxx 12. xxx 13. to 16. xxxxxxx 17. Apropos above, I direct that disciplinary action against the above mentioned officers be initiated for the misdemeanors as mentioned against each of them in Para 4 to 16 above." 23. It is, thus, to be seen that the order dated May 12, 2008 is almost in identical words as the one passed on May 7, 2007. There is, therefore, no 19 escape from the fact that the GOC-in-C, CC was in knowledge of the offence and the identity of the appellant as one of the alleged offenders on May 7, 2007. Reckoning from that date, the order passed by the GOC, MB Area, to convene the General Court Martial on August 23/26, 2010 is clearly beyond the period of three years and hence, barred in terms of section 122. 24. One feels sorry to see a trial on such serious charges being aborted on grounds of limitation but that is the mandate of the law. It is seen above that GOC-in-C, CC had come to know about the offence and the offender being the appellant on May 7, 2007. It took one year from that date for him to pass the order for initiating disciplinary action against him on May 12, 2008. There were still two years in hand, which is no little time but that too was spent in having more than one rounds of hearing of the charges in terms of rule 22 with the result that by the time the order came to be passed to convene General Court Martial, more than three years had lapsed from the date of the knowledge of the competent authority. 25. Before concluding, we may also note that other officers who were allegedly involved in irregular purchases for the Central Ordnance Depot, Chheoki, also seem to have got away with very light, if at all, any punishment. Major General S.P. Sinha was subjected to an administrative action in which an order was passed on August 6, 2010 expressing severe 20 displeasure (non-recordable) against him. Lt. Col. Neeraj Gaur was finally acquitted by the General Court Martial. Lt. Col. Aloke Ghose was given severe displeasure (non-recordable) after the Commanding Officer found charges against him not proved. Major (now Lt. Col.) M.K. Bawa was similarly given severe displeasure (non-recordable) after the Commanding Officer found charges against him not proved. Against Lt. Col. Uma Shankar no further action was taken after charges against him were not proved in SoE. 26. In light of the discussions made above, the appeal must succeed. The judgment and order passed by the Tribunal is set aside and the direction by the GOC, MB Area, for reassembly of the General Court Martial is quashed. 27. The appeal is allowed. There will be no order as to costs. .............................................J (AFTAB ALAM) .............................. ...............J (CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD) New Delhi, February 15, 2012

Electronic Automatic Regulators would fall under Chapter sub-heading 9032.89. =The assessee's only argument appears to be that the goods in question requires to be classified under Chapter sub-heading 9032.89. 3. The Central Government has issued a Notification dated 01.03.2002 and in the said Notification it has classified the Electronic Automatic Regulators under Chapter sub-heading 9032.89. 4. In the present appeal, the Revenue effect is less than Rs.6 lacs and since the Revenue itself has classified the goods in dispute under Chapter sub-heading 9032.89 from 01.03.2002, it may not be necessary for this Court to consider in detail the appeal filed by the assessee. 2

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.6514 OF 2003 M/S.KEIHIN PENALFA LTD. ... APPELLANT VERSUS COMMNR. OF CUSTOMS & ANR. ... RESPONDENTS O R D E R 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order passed by the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi (for short 'the Tribunal') in Appeal No.C-517/2001-B and C-53/2001-B, dated 13th March, 2003. By the impugned judgment and order the Tribunal has confirmed the orders passed by the Adjudicating Authority, who had classified 'Electronic Automatic Regulators' under Chapter sub-heading 8543.89 and had issued a demand notice, inter alia, demanding the duty payable under the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962. The assessee had succeeded before the First Appellate Authority but the 1 Tribunal has reversed the findings and the conclusions reached by the First Appellate Authority. Hence this Civil Appeal by the assessee. 2. The assessee's only argument appears to be that the goods in question requires to be classified under Chapter sub-heading 9032.89. 3. The Central Government has issued a Notification dated 01.03.2002 and in the said Notification it has classified the Electronic Automatic Regulators under Chapter sub-heading 9032.89. 4. In the present appeal, the Revenue effect is less than Rs.6 lacs and since the Revenue itself has classified the goods in dispute under Chapter sub-heading 9032.89 from 01.03.2002, it may not be necessary for this Court to consider in detail the appeal filed by the assessee. 2 5. In that view of the matter, for the period after 01.03.2002, in view of the Notification issued by the Central Government, the goods, namely Electronic Automatic Regulators would fall under Chapter sub-heading 9032.89. With this observation and clarification, this appeal is disposed of. No costs. ...................J. (H.L. DATTU) ...................J. (ANIL R. DAVE) NEW DELHI, FEBRUARY 14, 2012. 3

Smt.Rani Chhabra had informed the Standing Counsel of the State of Uttar Pradesh that the requirements of the supply of the Civil Appeal paper books may not be necessary, since she is not interested in prosecuting the appeal.=Since the matter is of the year 2003, we 1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.6493 OF 2003 BALDHARI SINGH & ORS. ... APPELLANTS VERSUS STATE OF U.P. & ORS. ... RESPONDENTS O R D E R Mr.T.N.Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Mr.Kamlendra Mishra, learned standing counsel for the State of Uttar Pradesh, submits that learned counsel for the appellant Smt.Rani Chhabra had informed the Standing Counsel of the State of Uttar Pradesh that the requirements of the supply of the Civil Appeal paper books may not be necessary, since she is not interested in prosecuting the appeal. Learned counsel Smt.Rani Chhabra is not present before the Court when the matter is called for hearing. Since the matter is of the year 2003, we 1 do not intend to adjourn the matter. Therefore, taking the statement made by learned counsel appearing for Mr.Kamlendra Mishra as the gospel truth, we dispose of this appeal as not pressed. Ordered accordingly. ...................J. (H.L. DATTU) ...................J. (ANIL R. DAVE) NEW DELHI, FEBRUARY 14, 2012. 2

Asiatic Wild Buffalo is reported to be the most impressive and magnificent animal in the world. Often it is found in the Western and Eastern Ghats of the country. Learned Amicus Curiae has moved this Court seeking a direction to the Union of India and the State of Chhattisgarh to prepare a rescue plan to save Wild Buffalo, an endangered specie from extinction and to make available necessary funds and resources required for the said purpose and also for a direction to take immediate steps to ensure that interbreeding between the wild and domestic buffalo does not take place and the genetic purity of the wild species is maintained. Direction was also sought for to prepare a scheme in consultation with the villagers for relocation of villagers from the Udanti Sanctuary to ensure the survival of the endangered wild buffalo. Direction was also sought for that Asiatic Wild Buffalo is reported to be the most impressive and magnificent animal in the world. Often it is found in the Western and Eastern Ghats of the country. Learned Amicus Curiae has moved this Court seeking a direction to the Union of India and the State of Chhattisgarh to prepare a rescue plan to save Wild Buffalo, an endangered specie from extinction and to make available necessary funds and resources required for the said purpose and also for a direction to take immediate steps to ensure that interbreeding between the wild and domestic buffalo does not take place and the genetic purity of the wild species is maintained. Direction was also sought for to prepare a scheme in consultation with the villagers for relocation of villagers from the Udanti Sanctuary to ensure the survival of the endangered wild buffalo. Direction was also sought for that =We are, therefore, inclined to dispose of this application with the direction to the State of Chhattisgarh to give effect fully the Centrally Sponsored Scheme - "the Integrated Development of Wildlife Habitats", so as to save wild buffalo from extinction. The State also would take immediate steps to ensure that interbreeding between wild and domestic buffalos does not take place and genetic purity of the wild species is maintained. The State is also directed to take immediate steps to undertake intensive research and monitor the wild buffalo population in Udanti Wildlife Sanctuary and other areas, where the wild buffalo may still be found, including preparing them their genetic profile for future reference. The State is also directed to take appropriate steps to initiate wildlife training programmes for the officials of the State Forest Department, especially for managing the above sanctuary and other areas where the wild buffalos are found. The State is also directed to submit Annual Plan of Operations to the Central Government detailing the proposed course of action, if not already done, as per the "Integrated Development of Wildlife Habitats" scheme, within a period of three months from today. All effective steps should be taken by the State to protect the Asian wild buffalo (Bubalus bubalis), which is declared as a State animal by the State of Chattisgarh.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION I. A. Nos. 1433 and 1477 of 2005 IN WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 202 OF 1995 T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad .. Petitioner (s) Versus Union of India & Others .. Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T K.S. Radhakrishnan, J. Asiatic Wild Buffalo is reported to be the most impressive and magnificent animal in the world. Often it is found in the Western and Eastern Ghats of the country. Learned Amicus Curiae has moved this Court seeking a direction to the Union of India and the State of Chhattisgarh to prepare a rescue plan to save Wild Buffalo, an endangered specie from extinction and to make available necessary funds and resources required for the said purpose and also for a direction to take immediate steps to ensure that interbreeding between the wild and domestic buffalo does not take place and the genetic purity of the wild species is maintained. Direction was also sought for to prepare a scheme in consultation with the villagers for relocation of villagers from the Udanti Sanctuary to ensure the survival of the endangered wild buffalo. Direction was also sought for that all research and monitoring inputs including scientific management of the wild buffalo and its habitat be made available on long term basis by involving institutes such as the Wildlife Institute of India, the Bombay Natural History Society etc. 2. The State of Chhattisgarh filed its reply affidavit on 30.01.2006 explaining the steps taken to conserve and preserve the endangered species which was declared as a State Animal. Along with the affidavit, a comprehensive operational Management Plan for Udanti Wildlife Sanctuary was also enclosed stating that the execution of the said Management Plan had suffered setbacks due to acute financial shortage for its implementation. Further, it was stated that the funds allotted under Central Assistance from the Government of India, Ministry of Environment and Forests was not in tune with the budget requirement for development of the sanctuary and the conservation of the endangered species. A chart showing shortfall in funds for the development of the sanctuary has also been annexed with the affidavit, so also a table showing the census figures of wild buffalos. The reasons for the decline of the wild buffalos have also been explained. In order to overcome those hurdles, it was stated that an MoU was entered into with the Wildlife Trust of India on 21.03.2005 which included special efforts for maintaining the genetic purity of those species and for breeding thereof. Steps taken to relocate the villagers residing within the sanctuary area has also been highlighted. 3. This Court on 08.09.2006 passed an order directing the Central Empowered Committee (CEC) to conduct an enquiry and submit a report. Affidavit filed by the State was also placed before the CEC and it had detailed discussions with the officials of the State of Chhattisgarh and MoEF. State of Chhattisgarh constituted a task force by its order dated 24.05.2007 for suggesting steps and formulating an action plan for the conservation and increasing the number of wild buffalos in the State. Proposal made by the Chief Wildlife Warden to replace the domestic buffalos reared by the villagers with cows and bullocks it was stated, was also given active consideration. CEC after consultation with the MoEF as well as the officials of the State Government submitted its report on 10.09.2008. 4. Steps taken by the State of Chhattisgarh to preserve and conserve the wild buffalo which was declared as a State Animal is far from satisfactory. When the matter came up for final hearing, the counsel appearing for the MoEF made available a copy of the Centrally Sponsored Scheme of 2009 (CSS) titled "Integrated Development of Wildlife Habitats". The Scheme was formulated during the Eleventh Five Year Plan. The Scheme has also incorporated additional components and activities for implementing the provisions of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 [for short the Act], National Wildlife Action Plan (2002- 2016), recommendations of the Tiger Task Force, 2005, and the National Forest Commission, 2006 and the necessities felt from time to time for the conservation of wildlife and biodiversity in the country. 5. Before coming into force of the Act, the scheme which was in force was "Assistance for the Development of National Parks and Sanctuaries" which used to support only National Parks and Wildlife Sanctuaries. However, following the amendment to the Act, in 2003, two more categories of Protected Areas (PAs) i.e. the Conservation Reserves and Community Reserves have been recognized. Conservation Reserves, which are government land, but do not require acquisition of rights, nor the curtailment of activities as envisaged in National Parks and Wildlife Sanctuaries are stated to be the most appropriate strategy for connecting protected areas, by providing corridors. Community Reserves are entirely based on efforts of the local people on privately owned lands which require financial and technical assistance for their future management. The Central Government before the Act came into force did not have much control over the States and the Union Territories for implementation of its various schemes and the Parliament, in order to give effect to Article 51A(g), enacted the Act for the protection of wild animals, birds and plants and for matters connected therewith, with a view to ensure the ecological and environmental security of the country. Article 48A of the Constitution of India imposes a duty on the State to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forest and wildlife of the country. 6. Article 51A(g) states that it is the duty of every citizen of India to protect and improve the natural environment including the wildlife and to have compassion for the living creatures. By the 42nd Amendment Act 1976 of the Constitution "Forests" was added as Entry 17A in the Concurrent List and the "protection of wild animals and birds" was added as Entry 17B. Consequently, both the Central and State Governments/UTs are mandated with the responsibility of protection and conservation of wildlife and its habitat. Chapter IV of the Act deals with the "protected areas." Earlier headings `Sanctuaries', `National Parks' and `Closed Areas', was substituted by the words "protected areas" by Act 16 of 2003. Section 18 of the Act empowers the State Government to declare its intention to constitute any area other than an area comprised within any reserve forest or the territorial waters as a sanctuary if it considers that such area is of adequate ecological, faunal, floral, geomorphological, natural or zoological significance, for the purpose of protecting, propagating or developing wildlife or its environment. Chapter IV also confers various other powers upon the State Government like acquisition, initiation of acquisition proceedings, declaration of areas as sanctuary, restriction on entry to the sanctuaries etc. It is unnecessary to refer to those provisions for the purpose of the instant case. 7. Section 36A of the Act empowers the State Government, after consultations with the local communities, declare any area owned by the Government, particularly the areas adjacent to National Parks and sanctuaries and those areas which link one protected area with another, as a conservation reserve for protecting landscapes, seascapes, flora and fauna and their habitat. The Act also empowers the State Government, where the community or an individual has volunteered to conserve wildlife and its habitat, declare any private or community land not comprised within a National Park, Sanctuary or a Conservation Reserve, as a Community Reserve, for protecting fauna, flora and traditional or cultural conservation values and practice. The management of Community Reserves shall primarily be done by the communities/individuals themselves. The Centrally Sponsored Scheme (CSS), therefore, intended to bring these two categories of PAs also under the ambit of the Scheme along with the existing National Parks and Wildlife Sanctuaries. 8. The State of Forest Report 2005 states that the forest and tree cover in the country is around 23.39%, of which forests constitute around 20.64%. However, the PA network covers only 4.8% of the geographical area of the country with most of the PAs forming part of the forest area. At present, India has a network of 99 National Parks, 515 Wildlife Sanctuaries, 43 Conservation Reserves and 4 Community Reserves in different bio- geographic zones. Protected Areas, i.e. Conservation Reserves and Community Reserves have an important role to play in maintaining geographical integrity of the Nation. Fact is that many important habitats still exist outside those areas which require special attention from the point of view of conservation. Habitat of Sandalwood, red sanders, white cedar, rhododendrons, Southern Tropical Montane forests, grasslands, alpine meadows of Himalayan region, corridors connecting PAs and crucial wildlife habitats, deserts, tropical swamps, rivers, estuaries, bamboo and reed breaks, mangroves, coral reefs, deserts etc. are examples of such habitats existing outside conventional PAs. The tenurial status of such habitats ranges from government-controlled Reserved Forests to Protected Forests, revenue forests, interspersed vegetation in plantation sector, revenue lands, village forests, private forests, religious forests, territorial waters, Community Conserved Areas etc. Such habitats also act as corridors for wildlife between PAs thus ensuring connectivity in the landscape. Human-wildlife conflict 9. Human-wildlife conflict is fast becoming a critical threat to the survival of many endangered species, like wild buffalo, elephants, tiger, lion etc. such conflicts affect not only its population but also has broadened environmental impacts on ecosystem equilibrium and biodiversity conservation. Laws are man-made, hence there is likelihood of anthropocentric bias towards man, and rights of wild animals often tend to be of secondary importance but in the universe man and animal are equally placed, but human rights approach to environmental protection in case of conflict, is often based on anthropocentricity. 10. Man-animal conflict often results not because animals encroach human territories but vice-versa. Often, man thinks otherwise, because man's thinking is rooted in anthropocentrism. Remember, we are talking about the conflict between man and endangered species, endangered not because of natural causes alone but because man failed to preserve and protect them, the attitude was destructive, for pleasure and gain. Often, it is said such conflicts is due human population growth, land use transformation, species habitat loss, degradation and fragmentation, increase in eco-tourism, access to natural reserves, increase in livestock population, etc. Proper management practices have to be accepted, like conservation education for local population, resettlement of villages, curbing grazing by livestock and domestic animals in forest, etc., including prey-preservation for the wild animals. Provision for availability of natural water, less or no disturbance from the tourists has to be assured. State also has to take steps to remove encroachments and, if necessary, can also cancel the patta already granted and initiate acquisition proceedings to preserve and protect wildlife and its corridors. Areas outside PAs is reported to have the maximum number of man- animal conflict, they fall prey to poachers easily, and often invite ire of the cultivators when they cause damage to their crops. These issues have to be scientifically managed so as to preserve and protect the endangered species, like wild buffalo and other species included in Schedule 1 Part 1 of the Wildlife Protection Act, as well as other species which face extinction. 11. Management plan for Udanti Wildlife Sanctuary (2002-2003, 2011-2012) published by the Forest Department of Government of Chattisgarh, paragraph 3.6.2 of the Report reveals much more than what meets the eyes which reads as follows:- "Prior to declaration as sanctuary this area was part of East Raipur Division in which rules to regulate illegal poaching and hunting existed. Before declaration of Govt. forest it was under control of Bindrawagrah Zameendar. In those days shooting was allowed after receiving a fee of Rs.25/- at that time. Shooting of wild buffalo was prohibited after Govt. Notification no.1905-1517-4 dt. 27.08.1935 but in this zameendari one shooting licence holder was entitled to shoot one Bison, one Barasingha, Tow spotted deer and one Sambhar. Game rules of C.P. and Bear Game Act, 1935 and CP & Bear Bird game 1942 were existing in this are during past. After end of Zameendari system when these forest became Govt. forest rules were enforced to regulate hunting vide notification no.788-2319 DT.19.8.53. In these shooting rules of 1953 shooting of wild Buffalo was allowed after formal permission of Govt. But shooting of bison was prohibited. In shooting rules of 1955 different fee was decided for hunting. Shooting of Bison, wild buffalo, Barasingha, Tiger, Sambhar, Leopard, Sloth Bear and Cheetal were allowed. These hunting rules were not very effective for regulation of shooting and hunting and therefore shooting was stopped by Govt. of M.P. completely vide notification no. 6036-10(2)-71 dt. Govt. of India in this regard started 11.11.1971. Effective steps after enforcement of wildlife protection act 1972." 12. Paragraph 3.6.3.2 deals with encroachment and other illegal activity, which reads as follows :- Encroachment and other Illegal activity In UWLS encroachment for land hunger is not common practice. Sometime due to lack of clearcut demarcation live or boundaries, cases of encroachment have been observed. Therefore, village boundary should be development of villages and for the betterment of villagers in the revenue villages inside and around the sanctuary. These department are revenue, ICDS, Veterinary Health Services, Medical Department, State Electricity Board etc., semi Govt. village institutions like village and Janpad Panchayat are also working for development activities. More development activity causes more interference in forest and the privacy of wild life. These ultimately cause conflict with wildlife. Conflict with wildlife to the abnormal behaviour of wild animals like aggressiveness of monkey, cattle lifting by carnivore, injury by bears during Mahua season etc. Development of people is always welcome but not in the cost of negative ecological in the ecosystem. 13. Report clearly states that development activities causes more interference in forest and also the privacy of wildlife and these ultimately cause conflict with wildlife. Man-animal conflict often takes place when wild animals cause damage to agricultural crop and property, killing of livestock and human beings. Human population growth, land use transformation, species loss of habitat, eco-tourism, too much access to reserves, increase in livestock population bordering the forest, depletion of natural prey base etc., often stated to be reasons for such conflict. Central Govt. the State Governments, and the Union Territories should evolve better preservation strategies, in consultation with Wildlife Boards so that such conflicts can be avoided to a large extent. Participation of people who are staying in the Community Reserves is also of extreme importance. The necessity of implementing proper management measures for preserving the wild buffalo has also been elaborately stated in the Report. 14. Environmental justice could be achieved only if we drift away from the principle of anthropocentric to ecocentric. Many of our principles like sustainable development, polluter-pays principle, inter-generational equity have their roots in anthropocentric principles. Anthropocentrism is always human interest focussed and non-human has only instrumental value to humans. In other words, humans take precedence and human responsibilities to non-human based benefits to humans. Ecocentrism is nature centred where humans are part of nature and non-human has intrinsic value. In other words, human interest do not take automatic precedence and humans have obligations to non- humans independently of human interest. Ecocentrism is therefore life-centred, nature-centred where nature include both human and non-humans. National Wildlife Action Plan 2002-2012 and centrally sponsored scheme (Integrated Development of Wildlife Habitats) is centred on the principle of ecocentrism. 15. The National Wildlife Action Plan (2002-2016) is intended to provide adequate protection to wildlife in multiple use areas such as Government forests outside PAs, various Community Conserved Areas like sacred groves, community and panchayat forests, identified private forests such as interspersed forests in tea, coffee and cardamom gardens and other protection landscapes, farm lands, wastelands, wetlands, coastal habitats, heronries, wintering wetlands of birds, catchment forests, turtle nesting sites, pastures for livestock and wild herbivore, deserve ecosystems etc. Recovery Programmes 16. The Centrally Sponsored Scheme also deals with Recovery programmes for saving critically endangered species and habitats. It was noticed that, due to variety of reasons, several species and their habitats have become critically endangered. Consequently, the scheme intends to extend support to such recovery programmes for saving critically endangered species and their habitat based on the requirement felt from time to time. The objective of this recovery plan of saving critically endangered species/ecosystems cannot be covered under the components of Conservation of PAs and protection of wildlife outside PAs as disjunct population across a wider landscape/seascape. Several programmes are proposed under the recovery plan, of which one is to save the critically endangered species of Asian Wild Buffalo and grasslands and riverine forests of central and north India. Several other components were also included in the recovery plan such as Dolphin and River Systems, Nilgiri Tahr, Asiatic Lion etc. The scheme envisages that the Director, Wildlife Preservation, Government of India, in consultation with the Wildlife Institute of India or the relevant scientific institute/organization and with the approval of the Standing Committee of the National Board for Wildlife can initiate other recovery programmes or wind up the ongoing programme. The Director, Wildlife Preservation, is also authorised to undertake assessment of the effectiveness of any `recovery programme' already undertaken or being undertaken. The Integrated Development of Wildlife Habitats scheme specifically highlighted the necessity to preserve and conserve the habitat of wild buffalo. The scheme states as follows: "Wild buffalo is one of the worst affected mammalian species in the recent times. Domestication of the species and continuous interbreeding with domestic buffalo has led to inbreeding, genetic disorders, competition and mortality due to disease. Apart from this, habitat fragmentation, degradation, and poaching are the main threats to the conservation of this globally threatened species. Urgent and concerted efforts are needed to recover this species from the brink of extinction." 17. Conservation and Management of Wildlife, as per the Act, is primarily vested in the States / UTs who are in physical possession of the area. It was noticed that many States/UTs have set up various regular wildlife wings within the States/UT Forest Departments and implemented a scheme as to be done in accordance with a work programme covering the 11th Plan period. The Centrally Sponsored Scheme, therefore, envisages that the State/UTs are required to submit Annual Plan of Operations (APOs) to the Central Government detailing the proposed course of action, which consists of management planning and capacity building, anti-poaching and infrastructure development, restoration of habitats, eco-development and community oriented activities etc. so as to qualify for the financial assistance under the scheme. The concerned State/UTs have to follow certain conditions which have been enumerated in the scheme. 18. The State of Chhattisgarh, in the instant case, has pointed out that they could not effectively give effect to some of the programmes for preservation and conservation of wild buffalo due to lack of funds. The scheme envisages 100% assistance. It is relevant to extract the Pattern of Funding and the same reads as follows: Pattern of Funding 7 Under the Scheme, 100% assistance is provided for non-recurring items of expenditure for National Parks, Wildlife Sanctuaries, Conservation Reserves and Community Reserves. 7 50% cost of recurring expenditure is provided for National Parks, Wildlife Sanctuaries, Conservation Reserves and Community Reserves where the State Government provides for the balance 50% as the matching share. 7 National Parks, Wildlife Sanctuaries, Conservation Reserves and community Reserves in mountain regions, coastal zones, deserts, or those areas which support highly endangered species i.e. Snow Leopard, Red Panda, Rhino, Sangai Deer, Phayre's leaf monkey, Musk Deer, Hangul, Great Indian Bustard, Great Indian Hornbill, Siberian Crane, Chinkara, Chowsingha, Black Buck, Marine Turtles, Nilgiri Tahr, Lion Tailed Macaque, Bustards, Floricans, Pelicans, Gyps Vultures, Wild Ass, Grizzled Giant Squirrel, Clouded Leopard, Wild Buffalo, Hoolock Gibbon and Lion are eligible for 100% central assistance for both recurring and non- recurring items of expenditure. 7 In the case National Parks, Wildlife Sanctuaries, Conservation Reservation and Community Reserves falling in the high mountainous, snow clad regions (where working season is limited to a few months) in the States of Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand and Sikkim, the central assistance shall be given in one instalment. For other States, the approved allocation shall be released in two instalments (80 per cent as 1st instalment and balance as 2nd instalment.) 7 Similarly, subject to site-specific adjustments, as a guiding principle, a 40:40:20: proportion of financial sharing shall be ensured between Centre, State as owners of the privately held land, when such areas are involved in the case of Community Reserves. 19. State of Chattisgarh has maintained the stand that they do not have sufficient funds to undertake various programmes for protection of wild buffalo within the national parks, sanctuaries and also at conservation reserves and community reserves. This stand cannot be countenanced now, especially after the introduction of the Scheme. 20. Wild buffalo has been included as Item No. 41, Part I of Schedule I of the Act. Once it is included in Schedule I, the State Board for Wildlife has to advise the State Government in the selection and management of the areas to be declared as protected areas, in the formulation of policy for protection and conservation of the wildlife etc., as per Section 8 of the Act. Section 9 of the Act states that no person shall hunt any wild animal specified in Schedule I to IV, except as provided under Sections 11 and 12. 21. The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) has calculated the percentage of endangered species as 40% of all organisms. IUCN Red List refers to specific categories of endangered species and includes critically endangered species. IUCN Red List of Threatened Species uses the term endangered species as a specific category of imperilment, rather than as a general term. Under the IUCN Categories and Criteria, endangered species is between critically endangered and vulnerable. Wild water buffalo is included in the category of endangered species. Apart from the human-animal conflict, the most important threat to wild buffalo is inbreeding with feral and domestic buffalo, habitat loss/degradation and hunting. Diseases and parasites (transmitted by domestic livestock) and competition for food and water between wild buffalo and domestic stock are also serious threats. Habitat loss is also a major concern for species endangerment. When wild buffalos' eco- system is not maintained, they lose their home and either forced to adopt new surroundings or human habitat. Eminent ecologists have proposed biological corridors, biosphere reserves, ecosystem management and eco-regional planning as approaches to integrate biodiversity conservation and socio-economic development at increasingly larger spatial scales. 22. We have seen the subjects `forest' and `protection of animals and birds' are in the concurrent list of the Constitution and it is the fundamental duty of every citizen of India under Article 51A(g) of the Constitution to protect and improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wildlife. It is to achieve the above objective and also to give effect to the purpose of the object of the Act that the Central Government has sponsored "the Integrated Development of Wildlife Habitats". As per the Scheme and the Act, the State Government is empowered to notify conservation reserves and community reserves for protecting the landscape, seascapes, flora and fauna and their habitat. The Act also empowers the State Government to declare any private and community land not comprised within the national parks, sanctuaries or conservation reserves or community reserves for protecting fauna, flora and traditional or cultural conservation values and practice. 23. We are, therefore, inclined to dispose of this application with the direction to the State of Chhattisgarh to give effect fully the Centrally Sponsored Scheme - "the Integrated Development of Wildlife Habitats", so as to save wild buffalo from extinction. The State also would take immediate steps to ensure that interbreeding between wild and domestic buffalos does not take place and genetic purity of the wild species is maintained. The State is also directed to take immediate steps to undertake intensive research and monitor the wild buffalo population in Udanti Wildlife Sanctuary and other areas, where the wild buffalo may still be found, including preparing them their genetic profile for future reference. The State is also directed to take appropriate steps to initiate wildlife training programmes for the officials of the State Forest Department, especially for managing the above sanctuary and other areas where the wild buffalos are found. The State is also directed to submit Annual Plan of Operations to the Central Government detailing the proposed course of action, if not already done, as per the "Integrated Development of Wildlife Habitats" scheme, within a period of three months from today. All effective steps should be taken by the State to protect the Asian wild buffalo (Bubalus bubalis), which is declared as a State animal by the State of Chattisgarh. 24. The applications are disposed of as above. ......................................J. (K.S. Radhakrishnan) .......................................J. (Chandramauli Kr. Prasad) New Delhi, February 13, 2012

Tamil Nadu Pattathari Asiriyargal Velaivaippu Sangam (Tamil Nadu Graduate Teachers Employment Opportunity Association) represented by its Secretary. In this writ petition, the Association has challenged on behalf of some of its members the order passed by the State Government in G.O.Ms.No.181, School Education Department, dated 15.11.2011 so far as it has prescribed Teacher Eligibility Test even for persons who have completed certificate verification conducted by the Teachers Recruitment Board for appointment to the post of Graduate Assistants and for consequential direction to respondents 1 and 2 to appoint the members of the petitioner association as Graduate Assistants on the basis of the seniority in the Statewide list kept by the employment exchange as was done in the case of Secondary Grade Teachers.=while the candidates who appeared in the typewriting test had no indefeasible or absolute right to seek an appointment, yet the same did not give a licence to the competent authority to cancel the examination and the result thereof in an arbitrary manner. The least which the candidates who were otherwise eligible for appointment and who had appeared in the examination that constituted a step-in-aid of a possible appointment in their favour, were entitled to is to ensure that the selection process was not allowed to be scuttled for mala fide reasons or in an arbitrary manner. 17.It is trite that Article 14 of the Constitution strikes at arbitrariness which is an antithesis of the guarantee contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Whether or not the cancellation of the typing test was arbitrary is a question which the Court shall have to examine once a challenge is mounted to any such action, no matter the candidates do not have an indefeasible right to claim an appointment against the advertised posts." 14.As held by the Supreme Court, the candidates do not have indefeasible right to claim appointment against the advertised posts. If the State explains the reason for prescribing the particular mode of selection and cancellation of the earlier process, such a decision cannot be frowned upon as violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. On the other hand, in this case, the impugned G.O clearly explains the mandatory directions issued under the RTE Act which has to be obeyed by the State Government. 15.Secondly, the State Government has taken a policy decision to screen the candidates before their entry to the post. In these days because of mushrooming the Teachers Training Institutes and colleges all over State, such standardization process is inevitable. The petitioner cannot be heard to say that their case should be treated differently only because of their selection in the earlier selection process and on the basis of the old policy. 16.In view of the above factual matrix and legal precedents, the petitioner Association has not made out any case. Hence the writ petition will stand dismissed. No costs. Consequently connected miscellaneous petitions stand closed.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED : 10.02.2012 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.CHANDRU W.P.No.2108 of 2012 and M.P.Nos.1 and 2 of 2012 Tamil Nadu Pattathari Asiriyargal Velaivaippu Sangam, rep by its Secretary NA.Murugadass No.668A, Muthiya Nagar, Chennai Salai L.N.Puram, Panruti-607 106. .. Petitioner Vs. 1.The State of Tamil Nadu, rep by its Secretary to Government (School Education) Department, Fort St George, Chennai-600 009. 2.The Director, School Education, DPI Campus, College Road, Chennai-600 006. 3.The Chairman, Teachers Recruitment Board, 4th Floor, EVK Sampath Buildings, College Road, Chennai-600 006. .. Respondents This writ petition is preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for the issue of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to call for the records relating to G.O.(Ms)No.181, School Education (C2) Department, dated 15.11.2011 passed by the first respondent and quash the same insofar as it prescribes Teacher eligibility test for persons who have already completed certificate verification conducted by the Teachers Recruitment Board for appointment as BT Assistants is concerned and consequently to direct the respondents 1 and 2 to appoint the members of the petitioners Association as BT Assistant on the basis of the statewide employment seniority as has been done in the case of secondary grade teachers. For Petitioner : Mr.R.Gandhi, SC for Mr.V.S.Sivasundaram For Respondents : Mr.M.Dig Vijayapandian, AGP - - - - ORDER This writ petition is filed by an Association known as Tamil Nadu Pattathari Asiriyargal Velaivaippu Sangam (Tamil Nadu Graduate Teachers Employment Opportunity Association) represented by its Secretary. In this writ petition, the Association has challenged on behalf of some of its members the order passed by the State Government in G.O.Ms.No.181, School Education Department, dated 15.11.2011 so far as it has prescribed Teacher Eligibility Test even for persons who have completed certificate verification conducted by the Teachers Recruitment Board for appointment to the post of Graduate Assistants and for consequential direction to respondents 1 and 2 to appoint the members of the petitioner association as Graduate Assistants on the basis of the seniority in the Statewide list kept by the employment exchange as was done in the case of Secondary Grade Teachers. 2.It is the case of the petitioner that by G.O.Ms.No.181, the State Government has prescribed Teacher Eligibility Test for all recruitments to the post of teachers in accordance with the directions contained under Section 23(1) of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (for short RTE Act). Under the said Act, the National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) has been appointed as the Academic Authority by the Government of India. The Academic Authority has indicated that all the States in which teachers are recruited in future for the elementary segment should have passed the Teacher Eligibility Test to be conducted by the appropriate Government in accordance with the guidelines framed by the NCTE for this purpose. Therefore, the State Government on the basis of the said direction had specified that teachers who do not have minimum qualification, were given five years time to acquire the minimum qualification. For all recruitments in respect of even teachers working in unaided private schools are also required to pass the said test within five years. So far this State was concerned, persons for whom minimum qualification prescribed was Diploma in Teacher Education as well as Graduate Assistants and who are teaching classes 6 to 8 and have acquired B.Ed. qualification, should pass Teacher Eligibility Test. In the case of the secondary grade teachers, the earlier recruitment was done on the basis of the District level employment registration and seniority. 3.When the same was challenged before this Court in a writ petition in Unemployed Secondary Grade Teachers Welfare Association Vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in 2008 (4) LLN 560, this Court held that the names sponsored by the District Level employment exchange was violative of Article 16(1) of the Constitution. Therefore, a direction was given to adopt the Statewide employment exchange seniority list for the purpose of recruitment. This order passed by the Division Bench came to be challenged by the aggrieved persons before the Supreme Court in SLP(Civil) Nos.18227 and 18227 of 2008. While granting leave, the Supreme Court refused to grant stay, but, on the other hand, had directed the State Government to follow the Statewide seniority in the employment registration while appointing Secondary Grade Teachers from the list of eligible persons from all the District employment exchanges and by newspaper public advertisements throughout the State. The Supreme Court had also stated that the said arrangement will apply even for recruitment to the matters which are pending disposal of appeal before the Supreme Court. 4.In the light of the said direction, the State Government had changed the recruitment policy framed for the year 2006-07 for recruiting graduate assistants from written examination to that of the Statewide registration seniority in employment exchange. But, in the light of the directions issued by the Supreme Court as well as the subsequent directions issued by the NCTE, which became the academic authority under Section 23(1), the State Government had issued guidelines that so far as the Secondary Grade Teachers are concerned, the direction of the Supreme Court in adopting Statewide seniority list will be taken as the criteria for appointment until the appeals before the Supreme Court are disposed of. The general policy directing teachers who are to be appointed as Secondary Grade teachers to teach classes of middle schools, high schools and higher secondary schools will have to take written examination, i.e., Teacher Eligibility Test in accordance with the guidelines framed by the NCTE and certificate verification will have to be followed. The TRB was designated as the Nodal Agency for conducting of Teacher Eligibility Test and for recruitment of teachers. 5.The contention raised by the petitioner was that some of their members whose names were set out in page 50 of the typed set (27 members) have already gone through the selection process in the earlier recruitment process and some of them have already been appointed. Therefore, the persons who went through earlier selection process cannot be subjected to the present order of the State Government. Therefore, to that extent, the State Government should be prohibited from insisting for those 27 persons from writing any examination for future recruitment. Since the only question of certificate verification alone was the earlier criteria and they were having gone through the same, they should be given appointment orders. In essence, they wanted to contend that at the time of issuance of appointment orders prescribing new qualification was illegal. They cannot introduce a new testing process. Secondly, in respect of secondary grade teachers, there is no such insistence and that the past practice of recruitment through employment exchange sponsorship based upon seniority cannot be dislodged. 6.It is not clear as to how the association can take the cause of such persons and no aggrieved person is before this court. The Association is only the registered society. Unless and until an actually aggrieved person is before this court, the contentions raised herein cannot be taken up by this court. In any event, when once the Parliament Act prescribed a particular recruitment mode, there is no choice of the State Government deviating from that process, lest the educational qualification given by such institutions will be de-recognised by the NCTE. 7.In this context, it is necessary to refer to the implications of the RTE Act . Sections 23 and 38 of the RTE Act reads as follows: 23.Qualifications for appointment and terms and conditions of service of teachers. (1) Any person possessing such minimum qualifications, as laid down by an academic authority, authorised by the Central Government, by notification, shall be eligible for appointment as a teacher. 38.Power of appropriate Government to make rules. (1) The appropriate Government may, by notification, make rules, for carrying out the provisions of this Act. (2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing powers, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely: (a) to (k) omitted (l) the salary and allowances payable to, and the terms and conditions of service of, teacher, under sub-section (3) of Section 23; 8.Even when the UGC prescribed eligibility test in the form of State level Entrance Test or National Entrance Test as the criteria for appoint of college and University teachers, the Supreme Court has upheld the prescription of such criteria by the highest academic decision body vide its decision in University of Delhi v. Raj Singh reported in 1994 Supp (3) SCC 516 and in paragraphs 20 and 24, it was observed as follows: "20.The ambit of Entry 66 has already been the subject of the decisions of this Court in the cases of the Gujarat University1 and the Osmania University2. The UGC Act is enacted under the provisions of Entry 66 to carry out the objective thereof. Its short title, in fact, reproduces the words of Entry 66. The principal function of the UGC is set out in the opening words of Section 12, thus: It shall be the general duty of the Commission to take ... all such steps as it may think fit for the promotion and coordination of University education and for the determination and maintenance of standards of teaching, examination and research in Universities .... It is very important to note that a duty is cast upon the Commission to take all such steps as it may think fit ... for the determination and maintenance of standards of teaching . These are very wide-ranging powers. Such powers, in our view, would comprehend the power to require those who possess the educational qualifications required for holding the post of lecturer in Universities and colleges to appear for a written test, the passing of which would establish that they possess the minimal proficiency for holding such post. The need for such test is demonstrated by the reports of the commissions and committees of educationists referred to above which take note of the disparities in the standards of education in the various Universities in the country. It is patent that the holder of a postgraduate degree from one University is not necessarily of the same standard as the holder of the same postgraduate degree from another University. That is the rationale of the test prescribed by the said Regulations. It falls squarely within the scope of Entry 66 and the UGC Act inasmuch as it is intended to co-ordinate standards and the UGC is armed with the power to take all such steps as it may think fit in this behalf. For performing its general duty and its other functions under the UGC Act, the UGC is invested with the powers specified in the various clauses of Section 12. These include the power to recommend to a University the measures necessary for the improvement of University education and to advise in respect of the action to be taken for the purpose of implementing such recommendation [clause (d)]. The UGC is also invested with the power to perform such other functions as may be prescribed or as may be deemed necessary by it for advancing the cause of higher education in India or as may be incidental or conducive to the discharge of such functions [clause (j)]. These two clauses are also wide enough to empower the UGC to frame the said Regulations. By reason of Section 14, the UGC is authorised to withhold from a University its grant if the University fails within a reasonable time to comply with its recommendation, but it is required to do so only after taking into consideration the cause, if any, shown by the University for such failure. Section 26 authorises the UGC to make regulations consistent with the UGC Act and the rules made thereunder, inter alia, defining the qualifications that should ordinarily be required for any person to be appointed to the teaching staff of a University, having regard to the branch of education in which he is expected to give instruction [clause (e) of sub-section (1)]; and regulating the maintenance of standards and the coordination of work or facilities in Universities [clause (g)]. We have no doubt that the word defining means setting out precisely or specifically. The word qualifications , as used in clause (e), is of wide amplitude and would include the requirement of passing a basic eligibility test prescribed by the UGC. The word qualifications in clause (e) is certainly wider than the word qualification defined in Section 12-A(1)(d), which in expressly stated terms is a definition that applies only to the provisions of Section 12-A. Were this definition of qualification, as meaning a degree or any other qualification awarded by a University, to have been intended to apply throughout the Act, it would have found place in the definition section, namely, Section 2. 24.It is now appropriate to clarify the direction that the Delhi High Court issued in allowing the writ petition. It held that the notification dated 19-9-1991, by which the said Regulations were published, was valid and mandatory and the Delhi University was obliged under law to comply therewith. The Delhi University was directed to select lecturers for itself and its affiliated and subordinate colleges strictly in accordance with the notification. Put shortly, the Delhi University is mandated to comply with the said Regulations. As analysed above, therefore, the Delhi University may appoint as a lecturer in itself and its affiliated colleges one who has cleared the test prescribed by the said Regulations; or it may seek prior approval for the relaxation of this requirement in a specific case; or it may appoint as lecturer one who does not meet this requirement without having first obtained the UGC's approval, in which event it would, if it failed to show cause for its failure to abide by the said Regulations to the satisfaction of the UGC, forfeit its grant from the UGC. If, however, it did show cause to the satisfaction of the UGC, it not only would not forfeit its grant but the appointment made without obtaining the UGC's prior approval would stand regularised." 9.Subsequently, in Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission Vs. Baloji Badhavath reported in (2009) 5 SCC 1, the Supreme Court upheld the right to conduct preliminary examination and in paragraph 29, it was observed as follows: "29.Indisputably, the preliminary examination is not a part of the main examination. The merit of the candidate is not judged thereby. Only an eligibility criterion is fixed. The papers for holding the examination comprise of general studies and mental ability. Such a test must be held to be necessary for the purpose of judging the basic eligibility of the candidates to hold the tests. How and in what manner the State as also the Commission would comply with the constitutional requirements of Article 335 of the Constitution of India should ordinarily not be allowed to be questioned." 10.Therefore, there was no illegality in prescribing such test as the minimum requirement for entry. It is in exercise of power under the Central enactment, the directions have been issued. The State Government is bound to obey the same. Hence the petitioner cannot be heard to challenge the prescription of criteria for entry into the Government service as illegal. 11.As to whether their selection should be considered on the basis of the earlier process based upon certificate verification done by the TRB, it must be noted that mere inclusion of names in the select list will not give right to get employment as held by the Supreme Court in Rakhi Ray v. High Court of Delhi reported in (2010) 2 SCC 637 and in paragraph 24, it was observed as follows: "24.A person whose name appears in the select list does not acquire any indefeasible right of appointment. Empanelment at the best is a condition of eligibility for the purpose of appointment and by itself does not amount to selection or create a vested right to be appointed. The vacancies have to be filled up as per the statutory rules and in conformity with the constitutional mandate. In the instant case, once 13 notified vacancies were filled up, the selection process came to an end, thus there could be no scope of any further appointment." 12.Further, it cannot be said that they have got vested right and that appointment should be given. In this context, it is necessary to refer to a judgment of the Supreme Court in State of M.P. v. Sanjay Kumar Pathak reported in (2008) 1 SCC 456 and in paragraphs 15,18,21,22 and 24, it was observed as follows: "15.The respondents do not dispute before us that the tabulation of the marks obtained by them was not finalised. For the purpose of selection, the marks allotted to each of the candidates should be known to the members of the Selection Committee. Members of the Selection Committee before preparing the select list were entitled to undergo a consultative process so as to enable them to arrive at a consensus in regard to the candidates who should be appointed. As the tabulation process itself was not completed, the question of preparing any select list also did not arise. 18........ As the selection process itself was not complete, there was nothing before the Tribunal as also the High Court to indicate that they had acquired legal right of any kind whatsoever. Even where, it is trite, the names of the persons appeared in the select list, the same by itself would not give rise to a legal right unless the action on the part of the State is found to be unfair, unreasonable or mala fide. The State, thus, subject to acting bona fide as also complying with the principles laid down in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, is entitled to take a decision not to employ any selected (sic candidate) even from amongst the select list...... 21.In K. Jayamohan v. State of Kerala4 this Court held: (SCC p. 171, para 5) 5. It is settled legal position that merely because a candidate is selected and kept in the waiting list, he does not acquire any absolute right to appointment. It is open to the Government to make the appointment or not. Even if there is any vacancy, it is not incumbent upon the Government to fill up the same. But the appointing authority must give reasonable explanation for non-appointment. Equally, the Public Service Commission/recruitment agency shall prepare a waiting list only to the extent of anticipated vacancies. In view of the above settled legal position, no error is found in the judgment of the High Court warranting interference. (See also Munna Roy v. Union of India5.) 22.In All India SC&ST Employees' Assn. v. A. Arthur Jeen6 it was opined: (SCC p. 387, para 10) 10. Merely because the names of the candidates were included in the panel indicating their provisional selection, they did not acquire any indefeasible right for appointment even against the existing vacancies and the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies as laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court, after referring to earlier cases in Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India2. Para 7 of the said judgment reads thus: (SCC pp. 50-51) 7. It is not correct to say that if a number of vacancies are notified for appointment and adequate number of candidates are found fit, the successful candidates acquire an indefeasible right to be appointed which cannot be legitimately denied. Ordinarily the notification merely amounts to an invitation to qualified candidates to apply for recruitment and on their selection they do not acquire any right to the post. Unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate, the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies. However, it does not mean that the State has the licence of acting in an arbitrary manner. The decision not to fill up the vacancies has to be taken bona fide for appropriate reasons. And if the vacancies or any of them are filled up, the State is bound to respect the comparative merit of the candidates, as reflected at the recruitment test, and no discrimination can be permitted. This correct position has been consistently followed by this Court, and we do not find any discordant note in the decisions in State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha7, Neelima Shangla v. State of Haryana8 or Jatinder Kumar v. State of Punjab9. 24.In Pitta Naveen Kumar v. Raja Narasaiah Zangiti11 this Court observed: (SCC p. 273, para 32) 32. The legal position obtaining in this behalf is not in dispute. A candidate does not have any legal right to be appointed. He in terms of Article 16 of the Constitution of India has only a right to be considered therefor. Consideration of the case of an individual candidate although ordinarily is required to be made in terms of the extant rules but strict adherence thereto would be necessary in a case where the rules operate only to the disadvantage of the candidates concerned and not otherwise. In a situation of this nature, no appointment could be made by the State in absence of the select list. The State could not substitute itself for the Selection Committee." 13.Further the Supreme Court has held that even when selection was made and subsequently it was cancelled, there is no right to question the same, vide its judgment in East Coast Railway v. Mahadev Appa Rao reported in (2010) 7 SCC 678 and in paragraphs 14 to 17, it has been held as follows: "14.It is evident from the above that while no candidate acquires an indefeasible right to a post merely because he has appeared in the examination or even found a place in the select list, yet the State does not enjoy an unqualified prerogative to refuse an appointment in an arbitrary fashion or to disregard the merit of the candidates as reflected by the merit list prepared at the end of the selection process. The validity of the State's decision not to make an appointment is thus a matter which is not beyond judicial review before a competent writ court. If any such decision is indeed found to be arbitrary, appropriate directions can be issued in the matter. 15.To the same effect is the decision of this Court in UT of Chandigarh v. Dilbagh Singh10 where again this Court reiterated that while a candidate who finds a place in the select list may have no vested right to be appointed to any post, in the absence of any specific rules entitling him to the same, he may still be aggrieved of his non-appointment if the authority concerned acts arbitrarily or in a mala fide manner. That was also a case where the selection process had been cancelled by the Chandigarh Administration upon receipt of complaints about the unfair and injudicious manner in which the select list of candidates for appointment as conductors in CTU was prepared by the Selection Board. An inquiry got conducted into the said complaint proved the allegations made in the complaint to be true. It was in that backdrop that action taken by the Chandigarh Administration was held to be neither discriminatory nor unjustified as the same was duly supported by valid reasons for cancelling what was described by this Court to be as a dubious selection . 16.Applying these principles to the case at hand there is no gainsaying that while the candidates who appeared in the typewriting test had no indefeasible or absolute right to seek an appointment, yet the same did not give a licence to the competent authority to cancel the examination and the result thereof in an arbitrary manner. The least which the candidates who were otherwise eligible for appointment and who had appeared in the examination that constituted a step-in-aid of a possible appointment in their favour, were entitled to is to ensure that the selection process was not allowed to be scuttled for mala fide reasons or in an arbitrary manner. 17.It is trite that Article 14 of the Constitution strikes at arbitrariness which is an antithesis of the guarantee contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Whether or not the cancellation of the typing test was arbitrary is a question which the Court shall have to examine once a challenge is mounted to any such action, no matter the candidates do not have an indefeasible right to claim an appointment against the advertised posts." 14.As held by the Supreme Court, the candidates do not have indefeasible right to claim appointment against the advertised posts. If the State explains the reason for prescribing the particular mode of selection and cancellation of the earlier process, such a decision cannot be frowned upon as violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. On the other hand, in this case, the impugned G.O clearly explains the mandatory directions issued under the RTE Act which has to be obeyed by the State Government. 15.Secondly, the State Government has taken a policy decision to screen the candidates before their entry to the post. In these days because of mushrooming the Teachers Training Institutes and colleges all over State, such standardization process is inevitable. The petitioner cannot be heard to say that their case should be treated differently only because of their selection in the earlier selection process and on the basis of the old policy. 16.In view of the above factual matrix and legal precedents, the petitioner Association has not made out any case. Hence the writ petition will stand dismissed. No costs. Consequently connected miscellaneous petitions stand closed. 10.02.2012 Index : Yes Internet : Yes vvk To 1.The State of Tamil Nadu, rep by its Secretary to Government (School Education) Department, Fort St George, Chennai-600 009. 2.The Director, School Education, DPI Campus, College Road, Chennai-600 006. 3.The Chairman, Teachers Recruitment Board, 4th Floor, EVK Sampath Buildings, College Road, Chennai-600 006. K.CHANDRU, J. vvk ORDER IN W.P.NO.2108 of 2012 10.02.2012